1.

Overview

 The Middle East is highly unstable: 4 failing states, 3 ongoing wars, and many armed
militias and terrorist groups.
 Among all the players, Saudi Arabia and Iran stand out as long-term rivals.
 They haven’t fought each other directly but engage in proxy wars — supporting opposite
sides in other countries’ conflicts.
 This rivalry has shaped much of the region’s instability and is often called a “Middle
Eastern Cold War.”

2. Origins of the Rivalry

Timeline Saudi Arabia Iran Notes

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is founded

Iran also has oil, but suffers foreign
1932–1938 (1932) and becomes rich after oil
interventions and coups.
discovery (1938). Aligns with the US.

US-UK backed coup overthrows Iran’s PM

1953 —
Mosaddegh; installs Shah Reza Pahlavi.

Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini

overthrows Shah. Pro-clergy, anti-Western
1979 —
regime emerges. This alarms Saudi Arabia’s
monarchy.

Religious Predominantly Sunni, hosts Islam’s Predominantly Shia, now claims to represent
Divide two holiest cities (Mecca & Medina). the true Islamic revolution.

Saudis fear Shia revolutionary ideas

Iran begins exporting revolutionary ideology to
Impact could spread and threaten
Shia groups abroad.
monarchies.

3. Proxy Conflicts

1. Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)

o Iraq (under Saddam Hussein) invades Iran to curb its revolution.
o Saudi Arabia backs Iraq with funds and weapons to counter Iran.
o Nearly 1 million killed; worsens Saudi–Iran hostility.
2. US Invasion of Iraq (2003)
o Saddam’s fall removes a buffer between Iran & Saudi Arabia.
o Power vacuum → civil war → rise of Sunni and Shia militias.
o Iran backs Shia factions; Saudis back Sunni factions.
 3. Arab Spring (2011)
o Regional uprisings against autocratic regimes.
o Saudi Arabia: status-quo power — backs monarchies and dictators to prevent
uprisings at home.
o Iran: anti-status-quo power — supports revolutionary or Shia groups challenging
monarchies.
4. Major Proxy Battlefields
o Yemen: Saudi military backs government; Iran backs Houthi rebels.
o Syria: Iran backs Assad’s regime alongside Hezbollah; Saudis back Sunni rebels.
o Bahrain: Iran supports Shia opposition; Saudi troops help suppress protests.
o Ongoing influence struggles in Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, and Iraq.

4. Geopolitical Cold War

 Similar to the US–Soviet Cold War:

o No direct war between the two powers.
o Both back opposing factions in conflicts worldwide (here, across the Middle
East).
 The rivalry has drawn in other countries:
o Saudi tensions with Qatar over its ties with Iran.
o Competition for influence in post-ISIS Iraq and Syria.
 The conflict is unpredictable, often escalating with new civil wars.

🟩 Key Themes

 Ideology vs. Status Quo: Iran seeks to export its revolutionary Shia-led governance;
Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve monarchic, Sunni-led order.
 External Powers: US historically aligned with Saudi Arabia; Iran positioned itself
against US-backed order.
 Regional Instability: Proxy wars have devastated weaker states, deepening humanitarian
crises and fueling extremism.

Summary of Key Facts: Middle East Conflict (October 7,

2023 – September 26, 2025)
This document summarizes the factual events and developments in the Middle East conflict as
depicted in the provided video script, focusing on the Israel-Iran conflict, its proxies, and
regional shifts from October 7, 2023, to September 26, 2025. The information is drawn from the
script’s narrative, covering the Israel-Palestine war, Iran-Israel tensions, and related regional
dynamics.

1. Israel-Palestine Conflict (October 7, 2023 – Ongoing)

 October 7, 2023 Attack: Hamas, led by Yahya Sinwar, launched a surprise attack on
Israel, involving dozens of fighters breaching the Gaza-Israel border. The attack included
killings, rapes, and hostage-taking, described as targeting Jews "for the sake of being
Jews."
o Impact: Over 200 hostages taken, with ~50 remaining by 2025 (half believed
dead). Israel’s response included airstrikes and a ground war in Gaza to destroy
Hamas.
o Casualties: By December 2023, over 11,000 Palestinians killed; by mid-2024,
over 30,000, with 60,000+ by 2025 (mostly women and children). International
groups labeled Israel’s actions as potential war crimes or genocide; Israel accused
Hamas of using civilians as human shields.
o Blockade and Humanitarian Crisis: Israel’s blockade restricted food, water, and
aid, displacing nearly 2 million Palestinians and causing widespread starvation.

2. Iran-Israel Conflict and the 12-Day War (June 13-24, 2025)

 Historical Context: Decades-long animosity since Iran’s 1979 Revolution, with Iran
supporting anti-Israel proxies (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis) and pursuing nuclear
ambitions, opposed by Israel’s “long campaign” to prevent Iran’s nuclear weapon
development.
 April 2024 Escalation: Israel attacked an Iranian embassy complex in Syria, killing
senior IRGC commanders. Iran retaliated with a direct attack on Israel (first-ever
conventional attack), launching 200+ drones and missiles, mostly intercepted by a
coalition including Israel, the U.S., and Arab states.
 Operation Rising Lion (June 2025): Israel launched a major offensive targeting Iran’s
nuclear facilities (Natanz, Fordow), supported by U.S. stealth bombers and submarines.
The 12-day war killed Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists, severely damaging
Iran’s nuclear program.
o Iran’s Retaliation: Iran launched missiles, some breaching Israel’s defenses,
killing at least five and injuring dozens. Iran accused the U.S. of enabling Israel’s
strikes.
o Outcome: Iran’s nuclear program set back “years”; Israel vowed to destroy any
rebuilt facilities tied to military nuclear projects. Iran’s “ring of fire” (proxy
network) weakened significantly.

3. Iran’s Proxy Network (Axis of Resistance)

 Key Proxies:
o Hezbollah (Lebanon): Iran’s most powerful proxy, considered the best-armed
non-state actor globally. In 2023, it fired rockets into Northern Israel post-October
 7, prompting 60,000 Israeli evacuations. In 2024, Israel’s covert pager/walkie-
talkie attacks killed ~30 (including two children) and injured 3,000, followed by
airstrikes destroying Hezbollah’s missile stockpiles and killing leader Hassan
Nasrallah.
o Hamas (Gaza): Supported by Iran with funding, training, and weapons, Hamas
executed the October 7 attack independently, without full Iranian coordination.
By 2025, Hamas was significantly weakened, with Yahya Sinwar killed.
o Houthis (Yemen) and Shia Militias (Iraq): Fired on Israel and U.S. bases,
respectively, but clashes did not escalate further.
 General Qassem Soleimani: Iran’s key strategist, killed in a U.S. drone strike in January
2020, had built a multinational proxy network. His death emboldened Hezbollah’s
Nasrallah until his 2024 assassination.
 Axis Collapse: By 2025, the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad (fled to Moscow), Hamas’s
destruction, and Hezbollah’s isolation broke Iran’s regional influence.

4. U.S. Role and Policy Shifts

 Obama Era (2008-2016): Imposed sanctions and covert cyber operations against Iran’s
nuclear program. Signed the JCPOA (2015), restricting Iran’s nuclear activities in
exchange for sanctions relief, opposed by Israel.
 Trump Era (2017-2021, 2025): Withdrew from JCPOA (2018), imposing “maximum
pressure” sanctions. Supported Israel’s strikes in 2025, joining the war on June 20 with
strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites. Trump’s negotiations with Iran (early 2025) failed over
demands for zero enrichment.
 Biden Era (2021-2025): Attempted to revive JCPOA, easing some sanctions, but talks
stalled. Supported Israel defensively post-October 7 but urged restraint to avoid regional
war. Criticized for not using full leverage (e.g., arms embargo) to curb Israel’s Gaza
campaign.

5. Regional Alliances and Shifts

 Abraham Accords (2020): Israel normalized ties with UAE and Bahrain, driven by
shared anti-Iran sentiment, bypassing Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia considered joining
by 2023, alarming Iran.
 Syria and Assad’s Fall (2025): Rebel groups overthrew Iran’s ally Bashar al-Assad,
further isolating Iran.
 Balance of Power: By 2025, Israel’s military successes and U.S. support weakened Iran
and its proxies, strengthening Israel and Arab allies (UAE, Bahrain). However, ongoing
Gaza conflict and lack of political solutions raised concerns about long-term stability.

6. Nuclear Dynamics

 Iran’s Program: Pre-2025, Iran enriched uranium beyond JCPOA limits, with a
stockpile 12 times the agreed limit by 2023. Israel’s 2025 strikes targeted enrichment
facilities, delaying Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
  Israel’s Stance: As the Middle East’s only nuclear power, Israel viewed Iran’s nuclear
program as an existential threat, justifying preemptive strikes.

7. Broader Regional Impact

 Destabilization Concerns: Critics argue Israel’s actions (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran)
risk perpetual conflict, with no clear political vision. Civilian casualties (e.g., 60,000+ in
Gaza, thousands in Lebanon) fueled accusations of ethnic cleansing or genocide.
 New Middle East Order: The collapse of Iran’s axis and Assad’s regime shattered the
pre-2023 regional structure, leaving an uncertain future. Israel claims a more stable
region is possible with weakened Iranian influence.

Sources

 Script-based interviews with Israeli, U.S., and Iranian officials, experts, and insiders.
 References to Reuters, Al Jazeera, and other media for event corroboration.
 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports on Iran’s nuclear activities.
 Public statements from Netanyahu, Trump, Biden, and Iranian leaders.

Note: This document focuses solely on facts from the script, excluding speculative elements like
the "Islamic NATO" concept, as it was not directly addressed. Provide additional information or
specific angles for inclusion in a revised version if needed.

1. Background: The Middle East Before WWI

 The Ottoman Empire controlled most of the Middle East, including Palestine.
 Britain’s main strategic interest was safeguarding the Suez Canal and routes to India.
 By 1914, Britain had occupied Egypt and had influence around the Persian Gulf.

2. WWI and Britain’s Imperial Strategy

 Britain, France, and Russia planned secretly to divide Ottoman lands.

 Britain needed the Middle East as the “soft underbelly” to strike the Central Powers.
 British strategy: combine military campaigns with diplomacy and promises to local
groups.
3. Arab Nationalism and the Arab Revolt

 Ottoman “Young Turks” promoted Turkish nationalism, alienating Arabs.

 Arab leaders, especially Sharif Hussein of Mecca, sought Arab independence.
 Britain promised Hussein support for an independent Arab kingdom if he revolted.
 Hussein and his sons, Faisal and Abdullah, led the Arab Revolt (1916), aiding Britain’s
advance from Egypt into Palestine.

4. British Double-Dealing

 Hussein–McMahon Correspondence (1915): implied Arab independence, including

Palestine.
 Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916): secretly divided the region between Britain and France;
Palestine was to be internationalized.
 The contradiction between these promises later fueled Arab mistrust.

5. Zionism and the Balfour Declaration

 Zionism, begun in late 19th-century Europe (Herzl), sought a Jewish homeland in

Palestine.
 Britain saw Jewish influence—especially in the US and Russia—as potentially decisive.
 Balfour Declaration (Nov 1917): Britain supported “a national home for the Jewish
people in Palestine,” while promising not to harm non-Jewish communities.
 Arabs felt betrayed as they believed Palestine was promised to them.

6. End of WWI and Aftermath

 Arab forces, with British support, captured Damascus (1918), believing independence
was near.
 Meanwhile, Britain allowed Zionist institutions to develop in Palestine, e.g., Hebrew
University.
 Publication of secret treaties by the Bolsheviks (1917) exposed Britain’s duplicity,
deepening Arab resentment.
 The conflicting British promises to Arabs and Jews sowed the seeds of the later Arab–
Israeli conflict.

Key Themes

 Imperial competition and strategic interests drove Britain’s policies.

  Contradictory promises to Arabs and Jews created a lasting grievance.
 Arab nationalism and Zionism—two rival nationalist movements—were both
encouraged by Britain for wartime advantage.


October 7, 2023 Attack

 Around 1,200 Hamas gunmen breached the barrier between Gaza and Israel.
 Multiple Israeli army bases and civilian communities (kibbutzim) were attacked.
 1,154 Israelis and foreign nationals were killed on October 7 and in the days
immediately following.
o Of these:
 256 were soldiers
 53 were police and other security forces
 63 were civilian security guards
 782 were unarmed civilians
 The attacks also resulted in the abduction of numerous hostages (exact number not
specified in the video).
 At least 27 hostages died between their homes and the Gaza fence in unclear
circumstances.
 The assault included coordinated use of:
o Paragliders
o Boats
o Thousands of rockets
o Simple drones to disable radar and communications along the border.

Civilian Impact and Controversies

 Mass killings occurred at kibbutzim and at a nearby music festival attended by hundreds
of civilians.
 Evidence suggests some hostages and civilians were killed by Israeli security forces
(e.g., during counterassaults at Be’eri and at the music festival site).
 Journalists and investigators reported that some of the most graphic stories widely
circulated (e.g., mass beheadings or large numbers of babies burned or mutilated) were
not supported by the evidence.
 Initial Israeli government figures of 1,400 deaths were later revised to 1,200, after some
burned bodies were identified as those of Hamas fighters rather than Israeli civilians.
 Misinformation and disinformation played a role in shaping public opinion and were
sometimes propagated by official sources.
 36 of the unarmed victims were children, including 13 under the age of 12.
Gaza Context

 The Gaza Strip:

o Home to 2.3 million people, about 70% of whom are refugees whose families
were displaced in 1948.
o Has been under blockade since 2007.
 Hamas:
o The Islamic Resistance Movement, governing Gaza since winning Palestinian
elections in 2006.
o Designated a terrorist organization by many Western countries.
o Advocates armed resistance against Israel’s occupation.

Pre-Attack Intelligence and Preparation

 Hamas trained for the incursion openly, posting videos online.

 Israel had obtained a copy of Hamas’s detailed invasion plan, but its significance was
underestimated.
 Some Israeli intelligence officers warned of imminent danger but were dismissed.
 Hamas fighters reportedly received instructions for the attack only minutes before it
began, suggesting a high level of operational secrecy.

Israeli Response

 Israeli security forces were initially overwhelmed.

 Reports suggest that versions of the Hannibal Directive (which prioritizes preventing
hostage-taking even at the risk of hostage deaths) were possibly applied during the
counterattack.
 Israeli helicopter pilots reportedly had difficulty distinguishing between Hamas fighters,
civilians, and hostages; in some cases, they allegedly relied on information from
WhatsApp groups to identify targets.

Casualty Verification and Misinformation

 Al Jazeera’s Investigative Unit (I-Unit):

o Analyzed 7 hours of footage, much of it from Hamas fighters’ headcams.
o Compiled a comprehensive list of victims.
o Concluded that:
 Widespread war crimes occurred.
  Some widely reported atrocities (e.g., mass killings of infants, mutilations)
were not substantiated by evidence.
 Misinformation and deliberate disinformation were used to generate
outrage and support for military retaliation.
 Questions remain about:
o Deaths of at least 18 people killed by Israeli ground forces.
o Unexplained deaths of others recovered under rubble.
o Proper forensic investigations to determine how and by whom certain victims
were killed.

Humanitarian Impact

 Israel’s military response to October 7 has resulted in at least 31,000 Palestinian deaths
in Gaza, including 13,000 children (as cited in the video).

1. Saudi–Israel Normalization Talks

 A landmark normalization deal was being brokered by the United States between
Saudi Arabia and Israel.
 The talks were halted by Saudi Arabia after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks and the
subsequent Israeli military response in Gaza.
 Saudi Arabia said it could not continue talks while:
o Israeli military operations in Gaza continued.
o It needed to show solidarity with Palestinians and the broader Muslim world.
 The halt was seen as a major setback for U.S. efforts to reshape regional alignments.

2. Geopolitical Context

 The UAE and some other Gulf states (like Bahrain, Morocco) already have normalized
ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords.
 A Saudi–Israel deal would have been a game-changer for the region’s geopolitics.
 The Hamas attack shifted the regional dynamic, making Palestinian solidarity a priority
for Riyadh.

3. Statements from Israel

 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson emphasized:

o They are targeting Hamas fighters and infrastructure, not civilians.
 o They did not put civilians in harm’s way and aim to avoid civilian casualties.

4. Ground Reality in Israel

 A resident (identified as Moshe) described:

o Normally busy streets, restaurants, and the Tel Aviv seafront being empty due to
the war.
o A sense of fear and disruption in daily life.

5. Eyewitness Account from Southern Israel

 A resident living near the Gaza border described the October 7 attacks:
o Attackers arrived using motorized paragliders to cross the border.
o Six armed attackers landed in their community early in the morning.
o They moved house to house, attacking residents.
o Victims included civilians aged 17 to 85.
o The witness described killings as deliberate and brutal.

6. Key Themes

 Regional diplomacy stalled: The Hamas attack and Gaza conflict froze Saudi–Israel
normalization.
 Shift in priorities: Both Saudi Arabia and Israel focused on immediate conflict issues
rather than peace talks.
 Human impact: Civilians in Israel faced direct attacks; Palestinian civilians in Gaza face
heavy bombardment.

Rising tensions: The conflict’s spillover risks affecting broader Middle

East alignments.

IRAN Israel war

2. Historical Timeline (Key Turning Points)

a. Pre-1979: Cooperation

 Iran (under the Shah) was the second Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel.
 Israel imported Iranian oil; there were daily flights between Tel Aviv and Tehran.
  Substantial Jewish community lived in Iran.

b. 1979 Iranian Revolution

 Shah overthrown; Ayatollah Khomeini seized power.

 Israel re-defined as “Little Satan,” USA as “Great Satan.”
 Iranian regime shifted to pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel policy.
 Israeli embassy in Tehran was handed to the PLO.

c. 1980-1988 Iran–Iraq War

 Despite hostile rhetoric, Israel secretly supplied weapons to Iran (“enemy of my

enemy”) to weaken Saddam Hussein.
 Iran realized need for missile and nuclear capability after Iraqi missile strikes.
 Khomeini opposed nuclear weapons, but successor Khamenei supported nuclear program
for deterrence.

d. 1980s–2000s: Rise of Iranian Proxies

 Iran cultivated alliances with Hezbollah (Lebanon), Hamas and PIJ (Gaza), Houthis
(Yemen), Shia militias (Iraq), Assad regime (Syria).
 These networks became Iran’s regional influence tools and Israel’s main security
threat.

e. US–Israel Axis vs Iran

 US sanctions on Iran since 1979; strong security partnership with Israel.

 2005-2010: US–Israel cyber-attack on Iran’s enrichment facilities (Stuxnet).
 2010–2020: Israeli targeted assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists.

f. 2015: Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA)

 Brokered by Obama; limited enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief.

 Netanyahu opposed it, demanding zero enrichment.

g. 2018: US Withdrawal under Trump

 Trump withdrew from JCPOA; reinstated sanctions.

 Ordered killing of Gen. Qassem Soleimani (2020).
 Iran accelerated enrichment to near-weapons grade (83.7% in 2023).
Document: Key Incidents and Facts on the Ongoing Iran–Israel Conflict
(as per the video transcript)

1. Timeline of the Conflict

 The conflict between Iran and Israel has lasted four days so far.
 Both sides have exchanged six rounds of attacks each, with Iran carrying out one
additional attack overnight.
 The war remains ongoing with no clear victor yet; however, Israel is assessed to have
temporary dominance due to its extended reach into Iranian territory.

2. Military Engagements

Attacks by Israel

 Israel has reportedly launched around 700–750 attacks using missiles, drones, and
airstrikes.
 Israeli strikes have included:
o Tehran and surrounding areas, exploiting gaps in Iran’s air defense.
o Iran’s nuclear-related sites, including:
 Natanz facility: Its energy-production surface installations were
reportedly damaged, possibly affecting uranium centrifuges underground.
 Other nuclear sites (e.g., Fordow and a suspected deep-underground
facility near Koh-e-Kalong): These remain primary Israeli and Western
concerns.
 Israel claims to have killed approximately 20 senior Iranian commanders, a major
tactical gain.

Attacks by Iran

 Iran has reportedly launched around 350 missiles and drones toward Israel.
 About 90% of these were aimed at Israel’s main coastal urban areas (e.g., Haifa, Tel
Aviv), while a few struck the West Bank and Arab-majority areas.
 Some Iranian missiles reportedly hit:
o Near Haifa’s naval base and energy sector facilities.
o A building close to the Mossad headquarters in a populated area.
o Areas near the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, with limited reported structural
damage.

3. Defense Systems and Information Control

  Israel’s layered defense systems — Arrow-3, Arrow-2, Arrow-1, David’s Sling, and
Iron Dome — have been intercepting Iranian missiles.
 Israeli authorities have restricted sharing of images and videos of the damage,
particularly from nighttime attacks and impacts of hypersonic missiles.

4. Strategic and Symbolic Targets

 Haifa: A key Israeli naval base and energy hub, subjected to concentrated Iranian strikes.
 Fordow Nuclear Facility: Located near the holy city of Qom, believed to be a highly
fortified underground enrichment site.
 Koh-e-Kalong Facility (suspected): Allegedly deeper and larger than Natanz and
Fordow, never inspected by international agencies.
 Natanz Facility: Previously under IAEA inspection; surface facilities reportedly struck
by Israel early in the conflict.

5. Casualties and Public Sentiment

 While precise casualty figures remain undisclosed, both sides have reported significant
damage.
 Israel’s hope that Iranian public anger would turn against their leadership has not
materialized.
 Iran’s rapid retaliation (within 12 hours) surprised observers and demonstrated pre-
preparedness.

6. International Involvement

 United States:
o President Donald Trump stated the U.S. supports Israel but will not enter the
conflict militarily unless American assets or citizens are targeted.
o His remarks suggest the U.S. seeks a justification (e.g., a direct Iranian strike on
U.S. targets) before considering intervention.
 United Kingdom:
o Has provided refueling aircraft and other logistical support to Israel from
bases in Cyprus, Oman, and the Persian Gulf.
o The British Prime Minister confirmed the redeployment of UK assets to support
Israel’s operations.
 Russia: Reportedly provided intelligence indicating UK logistical support to Israel.
 Western Powers: Concerned about escalation and Iran’s nuclear capabilities; monitoring
closely.
  Russia and China: Oppose Iran’s potential withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and further escalation.

7. Risk of Escalation

 Analysts warn that if the conflict continues beyond a week with heavy Israeli losses,
Western powers may intervene — either to enforce a ceasefire or to directly attack Iran.
 Iran has reportedly avoided striking U.S. or NATO assets to prevent further escalation.
 If Iran withdraws from the NPT, it could encourage a regional nuclear arms race and
provide Western powers justification for direct intervention.

8. Nuclear Capabilities Highlighted

 Natanz: A long-monitored facility; surface-level energy components damaged.

 Fordow: Near Qom, highly fortified (approx. 500m underground); believed to hold ~408
kg of enriched uranium, sufficient for 1–3 nuclear weapons within weeks if weaponized.
 Koh-e-Kalong (suspected site): Deeper and larger than Fordow; never inspected by the
IAEA; raises the most concern for Israel and the West.

Summary Table of Key Facts

Aspect Details

Duration of conflict 4 days (ongoing)

Israeli attacks ~700–750 (missiles, drones, airstrikes)

Iranian attacks ~350 (missiles, drones)

Notable Iranian targets Haifa (naval base, energy facilities), Tel Aviv, Mossad HQ vicinity

Notable Israeli targets Natanz (damaged), near Tehran, alleged underground sites

Iranian casualties ~20 senior commanders killed (claimed by Israel)

U.S. stance Supportive of Israel, no direct military involvement (as of now)

UK stance Active logistical support to Israel

Nuclear concern Fordow and suspected Koh-e-Kalong facility

Risk of escalation High if Western intervention occurs or if Iran leaves NPT

Note

The above account is based solely on the content of the shared video transcript.
Actual battlefield data and casualty figures are difficult to verify and may differ from these
reports. Independent sources (UN, IAEA, or reputable international media) should be consulted
for confirmation.

Would you like me to export this as a Word (.docx) document for easier download and
formatting?

Neutral English Translation (Key Narrative)

 The strike targeted the Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which is the main U.S. hub in the
Middle East for space, flight, and regional military operations.
 The base houses not only U.S. forces (around 10,000 in normal circumstances) but also
Qatari, Canadian, Bahraini, Australian, Danish, and British forces. A section of the base
is run by the British Army.
 Iran launched 19 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, but Qatar’s multi-layered
air defense intercepted nearly all of them. Only one missile penetrated, and it caused no
significant damage.
 Iran reportedly notified Qatar in advance, which in turn informed the U.S., suggesting
that Iran intended to avoid casualties or escalation.
 The attack was described as “symbolic and controlled”, intended to show that Iran
could strike U.S. bases in the region if attacked, breaking a previous precedent of
restraint.
 A similar pattern was noted in Iran’s earlier symbolic attack on Israel, where the missiles
carried minimal warheads and caused little destruction.
 The incident is seen as having changed the “rules of the game”—Iran demonstrated the
will and ability to target U.S. regional bases.
 Former U.S. President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social expressing relief that no
American lives were lost, no major damage occurred, and thanked Iran for advance
warning. He suggested this could lead to a move towards regional peace and harmony,
urging Israel to also pursue de-escalation.
 The discussion highlighted that the U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear-related facilities
(e.g., Fordow, Natanz) caused limited setbacks, as Iran preserved much of its knowledge
and infrastructure. The strikes were more of a power projection for domestic and
Israeli audiences than a decisive blow.
 The speaker notes that Israel’s recent strategy inside Iran includes expanding targets,
even attacking prisons in Tehran, which housed both political prisoners and ordinary
criminals.
 o Such attacks, according to the speaker, aim to weaken the state’s governance
capacity by causing chaos, similar to tactics used in Gaza and Syria.
o France condemned the attack only because French citizens were detained in
that prison, not because of the broader humanitarian impact.
 The Washington Post recently published an exclusive report with an audio recording
allegedly from Mossad, in which commanders of Iran’s IRGC were warned to leave Iran
within 12 hours or face threats to their families. This recording, reportedly sent to about
20 individuals, is presented as evidence of deep Israeli penetration into Iran and the
use of intimidation against families.
 The speaker concludes that while the U.S.–Iran exchange appears to have ended with
controlled retaliation, the Israel–Iran confrontation is escalating, and Israel’s tactics
are increasingly aimed at undermining Iran’s internal stability.

Structured Document: Key Incidents and Facts

1. The Retaliatory Strike

 Initiator: Iran
 Target: U.S.-operated Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar
 Reason: Retaliation for earlier U.S. strikes inside Iran.
 Base Significance:
o Central hub for U.S. space, flight, and military operations in the Middle East.
o Houses U.S., Qatari, British, Canadian, Bahraini, Australian, and Danish
personnel.
o Known as the “Pentagon of the Middle East” for the U.S.
 Attack Details:
o Duration: Less than an hour.
o Weapons: 19 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
o Effectiveness: Only 1 missile penetrated the defenses, no casualties or
significant destruction.
 Intent:
o Iran reportedly informed Qatar and thus the U.S. beforehand.
o Aimed to demonstrate capability without escalating into full-scale war.
o Largely symbolic—minimal warheads used.

2. U.S. and Israeli Responses

 U.S. Reaction:
o Former President Donald Trump:
 Thanked Iran for advance warning.
 Noted zero casualties and minimal damage.
 Expressed hope for regional peace and encouraged Israel to de-escalate.
  U.S. Strikes on Iran:
o Claimed large-scale attacks on facilities like Fordow and Natanz.
o Described as power projection, with limited impact on Iran’s nuclear
capabilities.

3. Israel’s Escalation Inside Iran

 Targets Expanded:
o Strikes reportedly included prisons in Tehran housing political detainees and
common criminals.
o Aim attributed to weakening Iran’s governance capacity by fostering internal
chaos.
 International Response:
o France condemned the prison attack only due to harm to French detainees, not
for the general humanitarian issue.

4. Alleged Mossad Threats

 Source: Washington Post exclusive report.

 Content: Audio recording warning IRGC commanders to leave Iran within 12 hours
or face harm to their families.
 Recipients: Around 20 individuals.
 Timing: June 13, coinciding with Israeli strikes in Iran.
 Implication: Indicates extensive Israeli penetration in Iran and use of threats targeting
non-combatants.

5. Strategic Implications

 For Iran:
o Demonstrated ability to strike U.S. bases, breaking prior restraint.
o Retained significant nuclear program knowledge despite U.S.–Israeli attacks.
 For the U.S.:
o Appears satisfied with limited exchange and avoids further escalation.
 For Israel:
o Focused on destabilizing Iran internally, extending conflict beyond military
targets.
 For Qatar:
o Expressed anger over violation of sovereignty due to attacks on Al-Udeid.
Context: Erdogan’s Visit to the US

 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited the White House for talks with US
President Donald Trump.
 This was Erdogan’s first White House visit since 2019.
 The visit was framed as a chance to improve ties after strained relations during
President Joe Biden’s term, when Biden had refused to host Erdogan.

Main Issues in Talks

1. Israel–Gaza Conflict
o A major sticking point between Ankara and Washington.
o Erdogan wants the US to pressure Israel over its war in Gaza.
o Trump acknowledged Ankara’s concerns and said he would meet Israeli PM
Benjamin Netanyahu soon.
2. Turkey’s Relationship with Russia
o The US criticized Turkey’s imports of Russian energy.
o Trump urged Erdogan to reduce such purchases.
o Turkey recently signed a long-term deal to import US liquefied natural gas,
which may ease US concerns.
3. Syria and the Kurds
o The US has worked with Kurdish forces in Syria, which Ankara sees as linked
to Kurdish separatists in Turkey.
o Erdogan is pressing Washington to end support for these forces and to encourage
their integration with the Damascus government.
4. Military and Trade Deals
o Erdogan seeks:
 An end to US restrictions on selling advanced weapons to Turkey.
 Particularly, the F-35 stealth fighter jets; Turkey had been removed from
the program after buying Russian S-400 missiles.
 Approval for new F-16 fighter jets.
 Lifting of remaining US sanctions on Syria (including “Caesar Act”
sanctions).
o Turkey reportedly plans to buy Boeing civilian aircraft for Turkish Airlines,
signaling trade cooperation.

Differences in Leadership Relations

 Under Biden:
o Relations were strained, in part due to concerns about democratic backsliding in
Turkey.
 Under Trump:
 o Relations are described as warmer—sometimes even called a “bromance.”
o Trump was said to be less focused on Turkey’s domestic political issues and more
on transactional deals.

Analysts’ Insights

 Dorian Jones (DW Correspondent):

o Noted positive atmosphere despite ongoing sticking points.
 Sinan Ülgen (Director, EDAM think tank, former diplomat):
o Expected the leaders to “agree to disagree” on Gaza but present unity publicly.
o Emphasized Turkey’s need for US cooperation in areas beyond the Israel issue.
o Highlighted that Turkey sees Trump as a transactional rather than a reliable long-
term partner
 EVIN HUGGARD:
What approach has Turkey traditionally taken toward Israeli-
Palestinian affairs under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan? How
does this issue fit into Turkey’s broader foreign policy?
 ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ:
The Palestinian issue is front and center to Erdoğan’s vision of
where he wants to take Turkey.
 As two of the non-Arab states in the region, Turkey and Israel
have long been fascinated with one another and have enjoyed
close ties for much of their 74-year relationship.
 But over the past two decades under Erdoğan, relations have
been tumultuous, often in parallel with the ups and downs in
Israeli-Palestinian tensions. In 2009, Erdoğan walked out of a
panel with Shimon Peres in Davos after accusing the former
Israeli president of killing children. In 2010, a Turkish aid flotilla
tried to break the blockade of Gaza, leading to a deadly Israeli
raid and years of cold peace between the two countries.
 Although Turkey and Israel normalized ties in 2022, relations
have dramatically worsened since Hamas’ October 7 attack
and Israel’s military operations in Gaza. Erdoğan has taken a
 very harsh stance against Israel and the two countries have
recalled their ambassadors — though trade relations continue.
 Under Erdoğan, Turkey’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian
issue is distinctly different from the pre-Erdoğan, Kemalist
period in two ways.
 The first is Erdoğan’s belief in the legitimacy of Hamas as a
viable Palestinian actor, which is a natural outcome of his
ideological affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdoğan
believes Hamas needs to be part of the political process and
has moved the Turkish establishment toward that idea. Hamas
has had a presence in Turkey and sent delegations there since
it won the Palestinian elections in 2006. I should note that
Ankara’s engagement is with Hamas’ political wing; as far as I
know, there has been no Turkish support for the group’s
military wing in Gaza. But Erdoğan has been open about his
political support for Hamas — whose political representatives
were reportedly in Turkey at the time of the attack.
 Another distinction from the pre-Erdoğan age is the central role
of the Palestinian issue in Turkey’s aspirations for regional
leadership — and Erdoğan’s use of neo-Ottomanism to sell that
idea to Turkish voters. The Turkish president has built his
political platform on the theme of an ascending Turkey — with
a historic responsibility to protect the dispossessed Muslim
populations in the region, including, of course, the Palestinians.
This notion of Turkish exceptionalism runs through all of
Erdoğan’s foreign policy speeches and is at the core of his
“Century of Turkey” platform. It also works well domestically
for the voters: Erdoğan is the only leader standing up to Israel
and the West, we are often told. This is how he wants to be
 remembered, as the leader who oversaw the rebirth of the
Turkish empire and who hasn’t forgotten the Palestinians and
Jerusalem.

 Turkey’s response to the crisis

 KEVIN HUGGARD:
How has Turkey responded to the present crisis? In your policy
paper, you write that the evidence suggests that “the Turkish
establishment views this as an inflection point, not a passing
flare-up of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Given this, has the
Turkish policy response thus far represented a departure from
its traditional posture toward Israel-Palestine?
 ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ:
Erdoğan is known for his pragmatism and his skillful use of
geopolitics to expand Turkey’s interests. When it suits his
interests, he is willing to drop principles, reverse course,
straddle between the West and Russia, reconcile with enemies,
and so on. But not on the Palestinian issue. There is no
pragmatism there. Erdoğan sees it as his calling to take a
position against what Israel is doing, even if the price is
isolation. It is clearly personal, ideological, and near and dear
to his heart.
 Turkey has taken the most strident anti-Israeli position within
NATO, with Erdoğan organizing pro-Palestinian rallies himself
and slamming both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
and the United States. But he may have gone overboard this
time. Erdoğan has called Hamas a “liberation movement” —
openly stating “Hamas is not a terrorist organization” and
accusing Israel of committing “genocide.” Of course, this is
 very different from what many Arab leaders have done, which
is criticizing Israel for its disregard for Palestinian civilians while
also keeping their distance from Hamas.
 When I spoke to Turkish diplomats and officials, even
secularists, I was struck by how deeply resentful of the U.S.
approach they were. There is plenty of criticism of Western
double standards when it comes to dealing with civilian
casualties in Ukraine and Gaza.
 I noticed something else in these conversations: Turks are not
certain that the threat of regional war is gone. They see the
U.S. military buildup in the Eastern Mediterranean not as a
deterrent for Iran, which is what the Biden administration
intends, but as a provocation for Iran and Russia. They seemed
to think that this could still become a regional inflection point,
with a new intifada or greater involvement by Iran’s proxies,
and later Russia.

 Turkish elite vs. societal opinion

 KEVIN HUGGARD:
To what extent is the Turkish political response to this crisis
driven by bottom-up societal demands as opposed to the top-
down needs of its political leaders?
 ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ:
No doubt the public is very sensitive to this issue — and in full
sympathy with Palestinians. For the ordinary citizen, there is
nonstop coverage of the suffering in Gaza and rolling
commentary that Israel is able to do this because the United
States allows it.
 Public criticism of Hamas in the early days after the October 7
carnage is long gone. The picture that emerges in the public
conversation is black and white, of the oppressor and the
oppressed, with no nuance and barely a memory of what
happened on October 7. There is also growing anti-
Americanism for what is perceived as the United States’ blank
check for Israel.
 Erdoğan amplifies those sentiments and brings in an element
of legitimization for Hamas by making the case that Hamas is
not a terrorist organization. In doing this, he has been able to
mold the public’s outlook on the issue: According to polling
data from Metropoll, only 30% of respondents believe that
Hamas is a terrorist organization.
 This conflict has also allowed Erdoğan to make a case about a
civilizational rift with the West. He calls it “crusader vs
crescent” and of course, Turkey is on the side of the crescent. I
worry that more and more people in Turkey are now buying
this civilizational argument and think of Turkey as separate
from the liberal order — which is described as immoral,
bigoted, and hypocritical. I believe that the conflict in Gaza has
just pushed Turkish society a few more inches towards the idea
of a non-aligned Turkey.

 Palestinian actors and Turkey’s

Islamist-secular divide
 KEVIN HUGGARD:
Does the Islamist-secular divide in Turkish politics inform which
Palestinian actors Turkish leaders are likely to support (i.e., the
main Islamist group, Hamas, or the primary secular nationalist
 one, Fatah)? Or does support for the Palestinian cause
generally transcend those ideological divides in Turkey?
 ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ:
I think the Palestinian cause now transcends the Islamist-
secular divide.
 For the government, the ideological battle has long been
settled in favor of Hamas. While Turkey deals with both Fatah
and Hamas and has at times hosted Palestinian Authority (PA)
President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh
simultaneously, the PA is viewed as an ineffective entity — and
Hamas a reality. In that sense, Turkey has elevated and
legitimized Hamas’s position within the Muslim world.
 But I don’t know what all that means for the future. We have
no idea what Israelis are planning for Gaza or what type of a
postwar Gaza administration will emerge. Qatar and Turkey will
continue to deal with Hamas’ political wing. But if the PA steps
in to take control of Gaza, meetings with Haniyeh or other
Hamas leaders could be irrelevant.
 For me, the real question is: will Turkey recalibrate and tone
down its language on Hamas in order to have the type of
access it wants in Gaza and the West Bank?

 Turkey’s role in ending the fighting

 KEVIN HUGGARD:
What role do you believe Turkey under Erdoğan would like to
play in the diplomatic efforts to end the current fighting and
begin reconstruction in Gaza?
 ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ:
It is no secret that Erdoğan is eager to participate in the
 mediation efforts and in Gaza’s postwar reconstruction and
governance. Turkey has had decades of peacekeeping
experience in Somalia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan and has the
capacity to play a role in Gaza. For Erdoğan, Turkish flags
flying in Gaza would be the ultimate fulfillment of a historic
mission.
 But as it is, he has self-sabotaged any Turkish role in Gaza in
the short term. Turkey is frozen out of the ongoing negotiations
with Hamas because it has offended Israel so deeply in the
latter’s time of need. Erdoğan has erred by using language
that has not only angered the Israeli government but also
alienated Israeli society. I doubt Israelis will want Turkey near
Gaza — at least during the present Israeli government. As to
what happens in a post-Netanyahu scene, it is too early to say.
 But as I said before, Erdoğan is a pragmatist and I feel he is
angling for a post-Netanyahu relationship in any case. Erdoğan
is lashing out at Netanyahu but by personalizing it, he wants to
keep open the door for engagement with a future Israeli
government. We will see if that will work.
 Additionally, Qatar is already playing a role in mediation efforts
with Hamas. So, Turkey is not needed there, though Erdoğan
would have loved to lead the negotiations in the way he did
with the Black Sea grain deal or prisoner exchanges between
Ukraine and Russia. Now it’s a question of what Turkey can do
— and what Israel would want it to do — in a postwar Gaza.
Unfortunately, the idea of a postwar Gaza is still too distant to
speculate. But the three ideas would be humanitarian aid,
reconstruction, and providing legitimacy to whatever
governance structure emerges. Turkey would also be eager to
 help with governance issues in Gaza, but no one in the
neighborhood would like that, including Egypt, Iran, and the
other Arab states.

 Turkish-U.S. relations
 KEVIN HUGGARD:
What role do Turkey and the United States’ respective Israeli-
Palestinian policies play in their bilateral relationship? Have
their diverging responses to the present crisis elevated
tensions between Washington and Ankara?
 ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ:
No doubt it has made an already difficult relationship more
complicated.
 The October 7 attack came at a fragile moment in Turkish-U.S.
relations — which have been tumultuous for almost a decade.
People were hoping for a reset of sorts, but it’s now more
difficult. Erdoğan refused to meet with U.S. Secretary of State
Antony Blinken on his recent visit to Turkey and has described
the United States as the main culprit behind Israel’s actions.
He seems to view this in civilizational terms and is deeply
suspicious of the U.S. military buildup in the area.
 The Turkish-U.S. relationship is a metaphor for a failed
marriage — and they cannot even agree on an amicable
separation. (Divorce is not an option because their NATO
membership is an iron-clad prenup.) Everyone understands
there needs to be some guardrails to prevent this relationship
from further deteriorating, but the strategic divergence is now
all too real and hard to ignore. Turkish and U.S. officials are
aware that they need to be in a better place than this. But
 when they sit together, they both have a long list of demands
and grievances and it’s always a question of who will go first.

 How President Biden can engage

Turkey
 KEVIN HUGGARD:
You write that Turkey’s response contains contradictory desires
for “wanting to lead the charge against the West/Israel and
seeking visibility and leadership in a postwar settlement.” In
light of this contradiction in the Turkish position, how might the
Biden administration best engage with Turkey in efforts to
create a post-conflict settlement?
 ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ:
Washington would have been open to involving Turkey in
hostage negotiations or as part of a future humanitarian
framework. But Israelis need to sign off on that and I am not
sure they are there. It’s important to harness the interest
Erdoğan has in Gaza for a constructive engagement. But it’s
not a priority on anyone’s mind. For the Biden administration,
the priority with Turkey now is getting Turkish approval for
Sweden’s NATO accession — and once that happens, I imagine
there will be more of a conversation on Gaza and Syria. That
could pick up if Erdoğan tones it down on Hamas or Netanyahu
leaves office.
 But sooner or later, the Biden administration will want to
engage with Turkey. Erdoğan’s intermediation might not be
necessary for the hostage negotiations, but Turkey’s stamp of
approval will be important in legitimizing whatever structure is
going to emerge in postwar Gaza. Turkey is a regional
heavyweight and has enormous influence in the Sunni world. It
would be counterproductive to leave Turkey out of the tent.