Lloyd P.

Gerson

THE PRESENCE AND THE ABSENCE OF THE DIVINE

IN THE PLATONIC TRADITION

The sweeping title of my paper conceals a relatively modest goal. I propose to

elucidate concisely some of the fundamental principles according to which the
presence and the absence of the divine are treated in the Platonic tradition. Part
of my aim is to display the employment of two different but basic principles
which, if they are not in contradiction, at least seem to be in some tension.
One way of dealing with the divine that is metaphysically innocent is to be
found both in the Greek literary tradition and in the sacred scriptures of the three
great monotheistic religions. What Homer and Hesiod, both the Old and New
Testaments, and the Koran have in common is that they assume that the divine is
to be represented and encountered in personal terms. Thus, reports or reflections
on the absence and the presence of the divine are construed according to a prin-
ciple of personal interaction. God or the gods reveal or conceal themselves from
us for their own reasons. In general, encounters with the divine are explained
according to motives that are at least analogous to human motives. That is, if we
attribute some sort of beliefs and desires to the divine, we can understand the
gods' presence and absence in terms of these. This way of dealing with our sub-
ject is metaphysically innocent because interpersonal relations generally need not
rest upon any particular metaphysical assumptions. That is why religion can do
without metaphysics or theology, though theology cannot do without metaphy-
sics, even when it would prefer to do so.
The other way of dealing with the divine that is anything but metaphysically
innocent is to construe the divine according to the exigencies of a metaphysical
system. According to this way, interaction between the divine and the human is
transformed into the relation between the intelligible, broadly conceived, and the
sensible. The personhood of the divine is constricted or better, reduced, to what-
ever it is that belongs to the explanatory role of the intelligible. Thus, we do not
have to attribute beliefs or desires to the gods in any perspicuous sense. Un-
doubtedly, the capaciousness of the Greek word θειος, that is, its semantical
reach beyond the personal, makes this easier than it would be in some other tra-
ditions. For the ancient Greek philosophers generally, there is no inevitable irony
in the use of the word θείος for impersonal, albeit infinitely powerful, forces.

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366 Lloyd P. Gerson

The assumption that the divine is to be described in personal terms is ubi-

quitous in Plato, especially in the dialogues generally regarded as 'early'. Plato's
Euthyphro provides an obvious example of a relatively simple text where the
underlying assumption is that our relations to the divine are to be understood in
interpersonal terms. Thus, even though the dialogue ends in failure to discover
the true definition of piety, all of the definitions considered suppose that piety is
some sort of interpersonal relationship between men and gods1. Remarkably, in
Book X of his Laws (888 c-d), exactly the same assumption is present in the
Athenian Stranger's exhortation to the skeptics to believe that the gods exist, that
they are benevolent, and that they cannot be bribed.
If for Plato gods are persons, then they are souls. The identification generally
of souls and persons, explicit in the Alcibiades (130 c), is directly inferable from
things said in works of doubtless authenticity. For example, at the end of Phaedo
(115 c-116 a), Socrates chides his friends for thinking that after drinking the
poison, they will have the problem of what to do with him. In fact, he says, they
may have a problem about what to do with his body, but he will be long gone.
Conversely, and now with respect to the gods, the argument in Laws X (893 b 6-
896 e 2) that soul precedes body and 'manages' the universe is taken to be the
proof of the existence and personal involvement of the gods in human affairs 2 .
There is, however, much more to the matter than this. For one thing, the re-
lation between a discarnate soul or person and human beings here below is even
more problematic than the relation between soul and body within a single human
being. At least in the latter case, we can adduce evidence for the fact of interac-
tion, even if we cannot explain how it occurs. Perhaps if the gods were simply
embodied, the problem of their interaction with us would just reduce to the
problem of how to understand the possibility of any interpersonal communica-
tion. But, as we learn from Timaeus (38 c-39 e; 39 e-40 b), it is precisely those
gods that are embodied, namely, the planets and the fixed stars, that do not inter-
act with us in a personal manner 3 . By contrast, the evidently disembodied Demi-
urge is or has a mind 4 . His interaction with persons is entirely through his effects

1
All of the definitions of piety in Euthyphro (6 e; 9 e; 12 e; 14 d) presuppose beliefs and
desires in the gods.
2
See 899 b 9 where the Athenian Stranger quotes Thaïes' 9εών είναι πλήρη πάντα.
Quoted later by Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Prop. 145, p.128,20 (Dodds).
3
At 40 d-41 a, the traditional gods are very casually introduced and dismissed without any
suggestion whatsoever that they are supposed to engage human persons.
4
See 46 e 4; 47 e 4 which seem to indicate that the Demiurge has a νους. If this is so, then
the Demiurge may be said to be a soul. See 30 b 3; 39 e 1-2; 46 d 5-6 which suggest that νους
cannot be present without soul. Also, see Sophist 249 a 4; Philebus 30 c 9-11. In opposition to

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 The Presence and the Absence of the Divine 367

(τα δια νου δεδημιουργημενα, 47 e 4). Indeed, his very existence and nature
are only inferred from the effects of his creative activity (28 c). That is hardly
surprising. For a disembodied mind is a strange sort of person. As Plato typically
characterizes disembodied mind, it is literally absorbed in contemplation of in-
telligible reality. This fact makes interaction otiose to say nothing of productive
activity. So, what we may term Plato's philosophical treatment of the divine in
Timaeus is in some tension with his treatment of the gods as extraordinary per-
sons5.
Perhaps even more striking in this regard is the fact that for Plato the first
principle of the universe is evidently impersonal. The Form of the Good, whether
or not we agree to follow Aristotle in identifying it with the One, has no personal
attributes . And given what Plato says about the Demiurge and the Forms, we
seem justified in inferring that if the Form of the Good is superordinate to the
latter, it is also superordinate to the former7. Although I shall return to this matter
later, here I only wish to point out that part of the reason for so impersonalizing
the Good is the difficulty of seeing how a first principle of all, properly under-
stood, could be present to anything outside itself. The Good does not even have
the residual personal attribute of intellection. The first principle of all it seems
cannot possess the specificity requisite for personhood because such specificity
requires a complexity incompatible with an absolutely first principle8.
The tension I am suggesting is present in Plato's thought about divine pres-
ence and absence may be expressed in this way. The more refined is his concep-
tion of the divine, the more problematic is divine presence and absence as well.
For that the existence of which we can have only an attenuated conception, ab-

this, Brisson, Le Meme et l'autre 84 argues that, 'Bref, l'âme du monde a un nous, et le démi-
urge est un nous.' See also Hackforth, Plato 's Theism 4-9.
5
At Laws 899 a 3 Plato refers to the 'miraculous' (ύπερβαλλούσας &αύματι) hypothesis
that the soul of the Sun moves the Sun without being in its body. It is an hypothesis he evi-
dently rejects.
6
See most recently Schefer, Platon und Apollon, who argues, unconvincingly I believe, for
the identification of the Form of the Good or the One with Apollo.
7
A comparison of 29 e 3 and 30 d 2 strongly suggests some sort of identity of the Demi-
urge and Forms. See Perl, The Demiurge and the Forms 81-92, for an interesting discussion of
the evidence and an argument for the neoplatonic view that the Demiurge and the Forms are to
be identified.
8
Consider, for example, Aristotle's testimony, Metaphysics Ν 4 1091 b 13-15, on the Pla-
tonic identification of the Good with the absolutely primary One.

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368 Lloyd P. Gerson

sence is not easily distinguished from non-existence. There are two fundamental
and related questions posed for the Platonic tradition in all of this. First, is the
question of the personhood of non-mythological deities. Second, is the more
general question of how the intelligible realm is supposed to be present to and
absent from the sensible, assuming that these deities belong to that realm. It is
frequently and correctly asserted that to talk about the 'separation' of the intelli-
gible from the sensible in a Platonic context is misleading. The spatial metaphor
of separation mistakes the relation between what in Phaedo Plato calls 'the two
kinds of beings' (79 a 6). Hence, the terms 'presence' and 'absence' seem
equally misleading. As I shall try to show now, this is not entirely the case.
Moreover, insofar as the divine is associated with the intelligible and the divine
is supposed to retain even residual personhood, the aptness of the language of
presence and absence needs to be reaffirmed.
The essence of the answer to the question about the presence and the absence
of the intelligible to the sensible is implicit in the dialogues themselves. In the
first part of Plato's Parmenides, the young Socrates is unable to remove the diffi-
culties raised regarding his ingenuous theory that a single separate Form must be
posited to account for the phenomenon of identity in difference. When, says
Parmenides, there are many large things, you assume that there is a Form of
Largeness over and above these. This Form, presumably, is supposed to explain
how there can be many things correctly called 'large' that are yet distinct one
from the other (132 e). I have argued elsewhere that all of Parmenides' objec-
tions against Socrates' theory constitute in fact a super-dilemma: if the Form is
present in its instances, impossible or absurd consequences follow; if it is absent
or separate from its instances, the Forms will become utterly impotent as ex-
planatory entities and accordingly, positing them as such is pointless. Faced with
such a dilemma, Plato and Platonists generally will want to say something like
the following: in one sense the Form is present in its instances and in one sense it
is not. What we need to be able to say is that Beauty or Largeness or Justice or
Sameness are in their instances but the Forms of these are not. What we need to
do is to make a distinction between a Form and its nature or between the separate
entity and the nature that its name names. Although I shall not here try to show
this in detail, if such a distinction can be made, one can pass safely between the
horns of the dilemma9.
The sort of distinction to which I am referring is what in later medieval phi-
losophy came to be called a 'real minor distinction,' that is, a real distinction

9
See Gerson, God and Greek Philosophy 33-52.

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 The Presence and the Absence of the Divine 369

within one entity rather than between separate entities. The latter is referred to as
a real major distinction. Two substances are distinct according to the latter and a
substance and its attributes are distinct according to the former. By contrast, a
conceptual distinction refers to the same entity under two different concepts. Of
course, even if it is true that such a distinction is available to Plato and even if it
is true that such a distinction is crucial to protecting the theory of Forms from
shipwreck, it does not follow that Plato (or any other Platonist) was aware that
this is so. What then is the evidence that a real minor distinction between a Form
and its nature is one that Plato recognized and that the Platonic tradition em-
ployed it as an integral part of the account of Forms and generally of the relation
between the eternal and the temporal realms?
Let us begin with the evidence from Aristotle. In a passage in Topics (137 b
6-8) referring to arguments about Forms, Aristotle says, 'since being at rest does
not belong to the Form of Man (αύτοανθρώπω) qua man (άνθρωπος), but qua
Form (ιδέα), it could not be a property of man to be at rest.' It is not entirely
clear whether Aristotle at the time of writing Book 5 of Topics was himself a
friend or a foe of Forms. In either case, the distinction between Form and nature
is implicit in the express distinction between the Form of Man qua man and qua
Form. It is evidently an Academic distinction, one which Aristotle presumably
came at some point to believe is not sufficient to save at least some versions of
the theory of Forms from insurmountable objections10. Aristotle apparently be-
lieves that if the Form of Man is immutable qua Form, but mutable qua man,
then the Form of Man is both immutable and mutable and that this is a contra-
diction. But the only way that this can be so while at the same time recognizing a
distinction between Form and nature is if the distinction is held to be a mere
conceptual distinction and not a real distinction. Did Plato himself recognize it as
such?
The clearest evidence that Plato did is the passage at Phaedo 102 d 6-8 where
it will be recalled Socrates claims that not only 'the Form of Largeness itself
(αύτό το μέγεθος) will never be large and small simultaneously (άμα)' but also
'the largeness in us (το έν ήμιν μέγεθος)' will never submit to being small nor

10
See Metaphysics A 9 990 b 27ff., where the argument against Forms seems to presume
the unuseability of the distinction. Also, see Owen, Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of
Forms. Owen describes the distinction as between Ά predicates' and Έ predicates,' that is,
between those that apply to Forms in virtue of being Forms and those that apply to Forms in
virtue of the particular concept they represent. Owen claims that Aristotle is justified in hold-
ing that the distinction cannot be used to avoid contradictions in the theory of Forms. Thus, for
example, the Form of Man is immutable qua Form, but mutable qua man, and so it is mutable
and immutable.

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370 Lloyd P. Gerson

will it be overcome by it. The clear implication of this passage is that the Form of
Largeness insofar as it is large and an instance of largeness ('the largeness in us')
are the same insofar as they both cannot be small. But if the Form of Largeness
were only conceptually distinct from largeness, then whatever is true of the
largeness in the instance will be true of it. But this is not so. For one thing, a
Form is one but largeness is neither one nor many 11 . For another, the account of
the instance will necessarily include items that are no part of the account of the
separate Form. That account will include items that are identical with an account
of that which is opposite to the instance. For example, an account of the tallness
of Simmias will include his actual height which will also belong in an account of
his shortness.
Another important piece of evidence is provided by Timaeus 52 a where the
Form is said 'never to enter into anything else anywhere' and is distinguished
from 'that which bears the same name and is like that Form (όμώνυμον
ομοιον).' Presumably, this is the same distinction as that between the Form of
Largeness and the largeness in us in Phaedo with the added explicit stipulation
that the Form is really distinct from its instances. With this distinction, we can
fairly say that the Form is both present (through its likeness) and absent by its
separation.
A real minor distinction between a Form and its nature may thus be sup-
ported in the texts of Plato. Is this distinction warranted? One may suppose that it
is not, I believe, only if one holds either that Forms are altogether unnecessary or
that the objections raised by Parmenides are essentially captious and can be an-
swered without such a distinction. One might hold the latter if one supposed that
the nature that the Form's name names is not in fact identical with that which is
in the instance, that, for example, it is not the nature of beauty that is in the beau-
tiful thing. After all, sensibles are said to be images precisely because they are
not like the Forms they image. Nevertheless, such a position is hopeless. The
only reason for positing Forms in the first place is that they are to account for
identity in difference, that is, the presence of the identical nature in many in-
stances 12 . What makes them images is not that the nature is not present but that it

11
Sophist provides several additional examples. Sameness is not difference but the Form of
Sameness is different from the Form of Difference (255 e). Similarly, motion is not at rest nor
is rest in motion, yet the Form of Motion is at rest (256 b), etc. See Gerson, A Distinction in
Plato's Sophist.
12
One might claim that the identity arises otherwise. That is, all the instances of a Form F
are identical in the sense that the Demiurge intended them as images of the Form the way that
an artist may represent something variously. Nevertheless, it would seem that the identity must
be ultimately ontological and not located in the purposes of a creator. All of the things on my

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 The Presence and the Absence of the Divine 371

is present in a diminished capacity. In fact, the only way that the nature of the
separate Form could be present to any instance is in a diminished capacity.
If we can thus assure ourselves that the real distinction between a Form and
its nature is essential for the theory of Forms, we need to ask next what this im-
plies for the central issue of this paper, namely, the presence and absence of the
divine. Straightforwardly, it suggests the possibility that insofar as the divine is
assimilated to the intelligible, its presence is the presence of the divine nature and
not the divine entity. Dubbing this a sort of metaphysical Docetism is not entirely
unfair. But we shall need to explore further the notion that the personhood can be
usefully characterized in this manner.
For my purposes, I construe the Platonic tradition widely enough to embrace
those who are reacting to Plato as well as those who are defending him. Thus I
justify my turning briefly to three passages in Aristotle. Certainly, later Platonists
regarded Aristotle's philosophy as being in harmony with Plato's 1 . The first
passage is from Metaphysics Book 12 where Aristotle identifies the unmoved
mover with the 'activity' (ένεργεια) that is intellection and then identifies intel-
lection with the best life (7 1072 b 7-30). The second is in Nicomachean Ethics
Book 10 where Aristotle exhorts his readers to live according to the divine activ-
ity in us. He adds, even more strongly, that 'each man is this part,' that is, the
divine part of the soul (7 1177 b 26-1178 a 8). The third is again from Meta-
physics Book 12 where Aristotle claims that 'intellect' (τον νουν) is the 'most
divine of the phenomena' (των φαινομένων &ειότατον, 9 1074 b 15-16). There
are many, many things that one could say about these three passages. Here, I
limit myself to several brief remarks based upon the foregoing and my general
theme.
The association by Aristotle of the primary activity in his metaphysical
system with life provides a fulcrum for elevating the first principle of all into
some sort of divine person. The association is taken for granted and for it no
argument is provided. We note, however, that the price for so associating
primary activity with life is that god, as external final cause, is in principle not
present to us14. Or so it seems. But our second passage tells us something

desk may be identical in the sense that they were all bought with the intention of serving some
one general purpose.
13
The claim that Aristotle's philosophy is in harmony with Plato's must be sharply distin-
guished from the claim, made by no one in antiquity, that Aristotle's philosophy is identical
with Plato's.
14
See 1072 b 1-3: δτι δ' εστι το οδ ενεκα έν τοις άνικήτοις, ή διαίρεσις δηλοΐ· εστι
γαρ τινί το οδ ενεκα <κα\> τινός, (5ν τό μεν εστι το δ' ούκ εστι. I take it that the dis-
tinction refers to (a) an 'external' and (b) an 'internal' final cause and that god is supposed to

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372 Lloyd P. Gerson

different, particularly if we have reason to believe, as my argument above

suggests, that the divine is present in us analogous to the way the nature of a
Form is present to its images without the Form itself being present. Thus, the
divine nature is present to us but the divine person is not. As we know, the
Aristotelian concept of ενεργεία is of the utmost importance within the later
tradition for situating theology within the confines of Platonic metaphysics. But
this still leaves us with the problem of personal interaction. The presence of the
divine nature, which in Aristotle's text could be interpreted as nothing more than
the presence of a certain power, is not obviously the presence of a person in any
sense. In the third passage, it is odd that intellect should be said to belong to the
phenomena. If we understand this as referring to the divine part in us, as in the
second passage, the depersonalized presence of the divine is strongly affirmed.
Much of the continuing story I am about to tell is focused on dealing with the
problem of how philosophers construe personal interaction with an intellect,
whether or not a part of 'the phenomena'.
Here I make only one further point regarding Aristotle's reaction to Plato and
its consequence. Aristotle regards the first principle of all, rightly, as far as the
Platonists are concerned, as unqualifiedly simple. There can be no real distinc-
tions within the Unmoved mover. He believes that thinking and life can belong to
such a principle. If it should turn out that thinking and life cannot belong to such
a principle, then the presence of the divine, understood as the presence of the first
principle, becomes entirely problematic. The presence of the divine must be the
presence of that which is not unqualifiedly simple as a first principle must be.
I mention at this point Alcinous, born in the minds of modern scholarship
Albinus, as representative of an exceedingly interesting and portentous attempt to
solve this problem. In Alcinous' Handbook of Platonism, we find the conflation
of the Unmoved Mover, the Demiurge, and the Form of the Good15. In general,
making the Forms thoughts in the divine mind seems the most direct and effec-
tive means for asserting that the presence of the intelligible is the presence of the
personal16. It is worth reflecting for a moment on why, though the move that
Alcinous reports was undoubtedly popular and influential, it was substantially
rejected by many later Platonists.
The problem is not with making Forms thoughts in the divine mind. It is
rather with making the first principle of all a person, present to this world per-

be the former.
15
See Handbook of Platonism, 10,3,2-3.8-9.12-18.
16
See 9,2,7-8 and Dillon's commentary 94-95.

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 The Presence and the Absence of the Divine 373

sonally. The most succinct way of stating the problem is this: the complexity
required for the construction of personhood, whether divine or human, is appar-
ently incompatible with ontological ultimacy. The notion of divine simplicity
increases in coherence only as the meaning of 'divine' is progressively drained of
personal characteristics. This is exactly the basis for the implicit rejection of
Alcinous' position by Numenius17. For Numenius argues that the first god is
'simple' (άπλοΰς), whereas the creator god is in fact complex18. And this first
god is at rest and 'wholly contemplative'19. It does not create20. The conflation of
the first principle of all with a self-contemplator is accepted, but the further iden-
tification of this with the Demiurge is rejected, ostensibly owing to the complex-
ity contained in the notion of the latter. The presence of the first god to creation
is only indirect, not through its nature, but through the personal mediation of the
Demiurge. What is of particular interest here is the strain caused by Numenius'
efforts to reconcile the philosophical exigencies of ontological ultimacy with
those of even the deracinated personal divinity of a νους 21 . We can just barely
trace the strategy of employing the real minor distinction in the Aristotelian
mode in Numenius' alluding to the presence of the νους of the first principle in
us via the instrumentality of the second god22. But this strategy is only so strong
as its ability to withstand an assault on the putative simplicity of νους 2 3 .
The most important texts for the claim for the simplicity of the first principle
of all and therefore for the subordination of νους are Plotinus' V 3 [49], 'On the
Knowing Hypostases and That Which is Beyond' and V 6 [24], 'On the Fact
That That Which is Beyond Being Does not Think, and on What is the Primary

17
I think Dillon, The Middle Platonists 367, is somewhat misleading when he says that
Numenius shares with Albinus (that is, Alcinous) 'the distinction between the Supreme God
and the Demiurge'.
18
See fr. 11,11-12 (des Places): ό 9εός ό μεν πρώτος έν έαυτοΰ ών έστιν άπλοϋς. Nu-
menius goes on to explain that the second god is 'divided' (σχίζεται) by its operation upon
matter.
19
See fr. 15,3 and fr. 16,12. I accept Dodds' conjecture in the phrase επειτα θεωρητικός
όλως of έπει ό α' (= πρώτος).
20
See fr. 12,1-2: και γαρ ούτε δημιουργεΐν έστι χρεών τον πρώτον ...
21
Note in particular the 'total unknowability' (παντάπασιν άγνοούμενον) of the first god,
fr. 17,1.4. The passages from Plato that are usually adduced in support of this claim, namely,
e.g., Timaeus 28 c 3 and Epistle VII 341 c 6, show no such thing. See Frede, Numenius 1059-
1062, on possible reasons attributable to Numenius for elevating the first principle of all above
the Demiurge.
22
See fr. 12,14-21 and fr. 16,3 on the first principle as νους.
23
The further tension between a νους and a Demiurge is evident in Numenius' apparent
differentiation of a third god from a second. See especially frs. 21 and 22, where Proclus
seems to assume that Numenius posits three gods or principles.

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374 Lloyd P. Gerson

and What is the Primary and What is the Secondary Thinking Principle'. The
basic anti-Aristotelian argument is quite simple: If there is multiplicity (πλήθος)
necessarily in that which thinks (τω νοοϋντι), there cannot be thinking in what is
not a multiplicity. But this, that is, what is not a multiplicity, is first. Thinking
and intellect therefore will be only in what comes after (V 6 [24] 3,23-25)24. The
first principle of all does not think (III 9 [13] 9). The argument is devastating to
Aristotle's position that the first principle of all is an intellect or simply the ac-
tivity of intellection. It is also something of a Pyrrhic victory, since now it seems
that the first principle of all cannot possess even the attenuated features of per-
sonhood of the unmoved mover.
There are basically three closely connected principles employed by Plotinus
to mitigate the disassociation of personhood with ontological ultimacy. The first
is that the One cannot be really related to anything, though everything is really
related to it25. The second is the principle of instrumental causality. And the third
is the principle of analogical predication. I will address briefly each of these
points in turn.
With regard to the first principle, suffice it to say that if the One were really
related to anything, its simplicity would be compromised. This point is most
easily grasped when we realize that for Plotinus, as for virtually all his predeces-
sors, real relations are attributes of their terms. If the One were to have the attrib-
ute R in relation to (προς) Νους or anything else, there would need to be some
sort of real distinction between the One and R. But no real distinctions can be
posited for that which is absolutely simple. With regard to the second principle,
precisely because the One is not really related to anything, its causal activity is
instrumental26. Whether we name this 'emanationism' or 'qualified creationism'
hardly matters. What does matter is that the presence of the first principle to us is
a mediated presence27. Since it is not present to us otherwise, it makes little sense

24
See III 8 [30] 9,45-55; V 3 [49] 10.
25
See VI 8 [39] 8,12-15: 'But we must say that he [the One] is altogether unrelated to any-
thing, for he is what he is before them; for we take away the "is", and so also any kind of
relations to the real beings'. See also III 9 [13] 9,3-4.
26
See VI 7 [38] 42,21-3: 'But since Soul depends on Intellect and Intellect on the Good, so
all things depend on him through intermediaries (πάντα εις έκεϊνον δια μέσων)'.
27
See my paper Plotinus ' Metaphysics. I here leave aside the obvious question of the evi-
dent lack of instrumentality in the causality of Intellect itself by the One. See especially V 2
[11] 1,7-11 but also III 8 [30] 9,29-32; V 1 [10] 5,18-19; V 1 [10] 7,5-35; V 3 [49] 10,40-44;
V 3 [49] 11,4-12; V 4 [7] 2,4-7; V 5 [32] 5,15; VI 7 [38] 17,14-16; VI 7 [38] 35,19-23. The
technical answer to the question is: Intellect is produced by the instrumentality of the ένέργεια
έκ της ουσίας of the One. See V 1 [10] 6,30-39; IV 8 [6] 6,8-12; V 4 [7] 1,27-34; V 4 [7]
2,28-39; VI 8 [39] 18,51-52.

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 The Presence and the Absence of the Divine 375

to speak of its absence. Finally, with regard to the third principle, what seemed to
be the inevitable depersonalization of the One becomes a repersonalization of it
as the cause of the personal attributes of its instrumental causes. Thus, the One
has a sort of life, especially a cognitive life28. It has will (βούλησις) 29 . And, as
that from which all things come, it is in a sense providential .
As I indicated, the name we choose to characterize Plotinus' metaphysics is
not important. But the notion of instrumental causality by the first principle of all
is of the utmost importance. Of course, the idea of instrumental causality is both
implicit and explicit within the tradition Plotinus has received. But instrumental
causality by the first principle of all, the putative locus of the divine, is not. Thus,
this instrumental causality is not comparable to the imposition of 'shapes and
numbers' by the Demiurge on the pre-cosmic chaos in Plato's Timaeus (53 b-c).
For the Demiurge is not an ultimate ontological principle, and the ultimate prin-
ciple, the Good or the One, does not operate instrumentality on what is 'below'
the finite Forms. Ultimacy and presence together require instrumentality.
It is in the light of this instrumental causality that we should come to the
great treatise 'On the Presence of Being, One and the Same, Everywhere as a
Whole' (VI4-5). In this treatise, the focus is on how the intelligible generally is
present to the sensible world. Of particular interest to us is Plotinus' claim that
'what participates in what comes after it [the One] has also participated in it' (VI
5 [23] 4,20-21). Participation is thus viewed as the converse of instrumental cau-
sality. As Plotinus argues at considerable length, the intelligible is present to the
sensible as a 'whole', that is, without diminution of itself. That which is entirely
without limitation, the One, is therefore limitlessly present31. So, it is not exactly
sufficient to mitigate the presence of the first principle by instrumentality. For
without further qualification, direct, albeit instrumental, contact with the divine
would be a permanent endowment of all things and not in any sense an achieve-

28
See VI 8 [39] 16,12-29; V 1 [10] 7,12; V 4 [7] 2,12-26; VI 7 [38] 39,1-2; VI 8 [39]
18,26.
29
See VI 8 [39] 13,1-18,53; VI 8 [39] 21,1-5.
30
See II 9 [33] 15,11-12; VI 7 [38] 39,26-27; V I 7 [38] 37,29-31.
31
On the infinity of the One, see V 5 [32] 6,5; VI 7 [38] 32,9. On the omnipresence (παν-
ταχού) of the One, see III 8 [30] 9,25; III 9 [13] 4,1; V 5 [32] 8,24; V 5 [32] 9,18-19,22-23; VI
4 [28] 3,18; VI 5 [23] 4,5; VI 8 [39] 16,6.

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376 Lloyd P. Gerson

ment or a task at which we might fail32. That is why Plotinus must add the prin-
ciple that this participation is according to the capacity of the participant33.

Faced with almost insurmountable problems of scholarship, it is extremely

difficult to say with confidence, much less with certainty, what role Porphyry has
in this story34. It does seem to me unquestionable, however, that he, along with
Iamblichus, are immensely important in reshaping the Platonic position on the
presence and absence of the divine. To what extent exactly this occurred owing
to pressure from competing Christian thinkers I shall not here attempt to say.
That such pressure is at least part of the explanation is clear enough from a much
discussed fragment in which Porphyry appears to identify νους with the God of
the Hebrews 35 .1 am particularly struck by this fragment because of its deliberate
mixing of the two different models for treating of divine presence and absence
with which I began. I think it is actually a nice question as to which of the two
traditions was being co-opted here. There is all the difference in the world be-
tween, on the one hand, recognizing personal gods and speculating on means of
access to them while at the same time maintaining a rigorous metaphysical and
hence relatively impersonal account of principles and, on the other hand, identi-
fying a personal divinity with one of the principles36.

32
See 1 4 [46] 4,20: 'the fact that it [the One] is good is different from the fact that it is pre-
sent to him'.
33
See VI 4 [28] 11,6-8; VI 5 [23] 3,14-16; VI 5 [23] 11,28-30. At VI 9 [9] 7,5-6 we read:
'... it [the One] is always present to anyone who is able to touch it, but is not present to the one
who is unable'. See Numenius, ft. 41 (des Places).
34
See, especially for a survey of these, Smith, Porphyrian Studies 717-773.
35
See Porphyry, Commentary on the Chaldean Oracles, in: Lydus, De mensibus IV
53,110,18f. (Wünsch): ό μέντοι Πορφύριος έν τω ύπομνηματι των λογίων τον δις
έπέκεινα τουτέστι τον των δημιουργον τον παρά 'Ιουδαίων τιμώμενον είναι άξιοι, δν
ό Χαλδαΐος δεύτερον άπο του άπαξ έπέκεινα, τουτέστι του άγα&οΰ θεολογεί. I leave
out of account the question of whether in Philosophy from Oracles Porphyry came to place the
God of the Hebrews above νους. See Waszink, Porphyries und Numenios 56-58, and Hadot,
La métaphysique de Porphyre 132-133.
36
Regardless of whether Porphyry is to be identified as the author of the anonymous com-
mentary on Plato's Parmenides, the Neoplatonic reading of that dialogue does not constitute
the sort of mixing I here have in mind, for the Platonic 'One' is not personalized. I must leave
out of account the truly tantalizing case of Hierocles of Alexandria and his apparent identifica-
tion of a first principle with the Demiurge, thereby thoroughly personalizing metaphysics. See
Aujoulat, Le néo-platonisme alexandrin Hiéroclès D'Alexandrie, especially the 'première
partie'.

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 The Presence and the Absence of the Divine 377

Although the invention of ή θεουργία undoubtedly antedates what we have

come to call 'Neoplatonism,' I suggest that we try to see its prominence in Iam-
blichus in the light of the above37. That is, theurgy is in Iamblichus directed to
the traditional gods, or, more accurately, to gods conceived traditionally as ex-
traordinary persons, but persons nonetheless. Theurgy is thus contrasted with ή
θεολογία, that is, theologia naturalis, understood as based upon metaphysical
principles. And as we have seen, the metaphysical principles of Platonism had
already tended toward the depersonalization of the ultimate principles. What we
have here are the elements of a doctrine of 'two truths', religious and scientific or
metaphysical. It is a doctrine appropriated by certain segments of the Christian
theological tradition, almost always to the detriment of metaphysics38. But that
doctrine, as we know, is not unequivocally where pagan Neoplatonism tends.
What Iamblichus in fact does is attempt to incorporate an authentically Platonic
and metaphysical account of how the divine is present and absent into the newly
theurgized milieu .
The account to which I refer is based upon the minor real distinction with
which we began. The Iamblichan version, according to Proclus, rests upon a
distinction between the 'unparticipated' (άμέθεκτον), 'that which is participated
in' (μετεχόμενον), and 'that which participates' (μετέχον) . Let us note the
ambiguity contained in the phrase 'that which participates'. That phrase may
refer either to that which possesses an image or copy of a Form or the image or
copy itself41. Insofar as it refers to the latter, the account of participation occurs
entirely within the framework of Platonic metaphysics. Insofar as it refers to the
former, the answer to the question of the manner in which participation occurs
allows of considerable scope. In On the Egyptian Mysteries, Iamblichus reveal-

37
See Dodds, Appendix II to The Greeks and the Irrational 283-311.
38
This is not quite accurate. The practice of religion separated from metaphysics tends to
the elimination of the latter, not merely its detriment.
39
See On the Mysteries (des Places) I 2,6,1-2 for the explicit connection of the philosophy
of Plato and Pythagoras with the Hermetic tradition..
40
See Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarli {In Ti.) II 105,15ff.; 240,4-7; 313,15-24;
The Elements of Theology (El. Theol.), Props. 23-24; In Parmenidem (In Prm.) 1069,23 ff.
41
See Parmenides 129 a; 130 b where there is to be found the basis for a fourfold distinc-
tion: (1) that which participates in likeness; (2) the likeness which is participated in; (3) the
likeness in that which participates; and (4) the Form separate (χωρίς) by itself (αύτο κα&'
αύτό). At Phaedo 102 d 6-8, the distinction between the nature of the Form and the image of it
is clear. At the same time, the former is implicitly distinguished from the Form itself because
the Form, unlike its nature, does admit of opposites.

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378 Lloyd P. Gerson

ingly and explicitly ties participation in the gods to the participants' capacity42.
For example, το [φως = the divine nature] δ' έστιν εν και αύτο πανταχού
όλως, άμερίστως τε πάρεστι πάσαι τοις δυναμένοις αύτοϋ μετέχειν 43 .
And later (33,7-11), theurgy (ή των έργων τέχνη) is identified as that which
facilitates participation. More particularly, 'illumination through prayers' (ή δια
των κλήσεων ελλαμψις) describes at once the means by which participation is
effected and the nature of that which is participated44. And finally, participation
is characterized as 'waking up' the 'intellectual' (νοερόν) element in us, an ele-
ment that Iamblichus most revealingly equates with the 'intelligible' (νοητόv),
and bringing it in contact with its superior paradigm, the intellect of the divine45.
In Book VIII, Iamblichus explicitly joins the account of Hermetic theology to
the metaphysical account of first principles46. To be sure, the personal gods are
of a lower 'rank' than the impersonal gods or metaphysical principles, including
the ineffable One and second One, the μονάς έκ του ενός. Especially striking is
the easy integrated continuity of the two accounts. Metaphysics and religion have
rarely been more intimately united. There are essentially two principles that ef-
fect this union. First, is the principle of the natural affinity of participants with
that in which they participate47. Clearly, we could have no natural affinity for

42
See most recently Nasemann, Theurgie und Philosophie in Jamblichs De mysteriis 13-18,
on the correct attribution of this work to Iamblichus.
43
I 9 [16] 31,13-14. Cf. In Philebum fr. 5, Iamblichi Chalcidensis. Platonis Diálogos
Commentariorum Fragmenta (Dillon), where Damascius quotes both Porphyry and Iamblichus
as holding that πάντα είναι πανταχού ... άλλως μεντοι καί άλλως.
44
Myst. I 12,40,19-41,11. In this passage, the divine will (βούλησις) of the Good (τάγα-
θοϋ) is invoked in an entirely unproblematic fashion. A bit later (42,15-17), participation is
'personalized' as 'contact' (συνάπτειν) between men and gods. In Book IV, answering the
question regarding the efficacy of petitionary prayer, Iamblichus emphasizes the personal
motivations of the gods (IV 1,181,8-13). And the last words of the work, X 8,294,5, pick up
the fundamental theme of της όμονοητικης φιλίας between us and the gods.
45
Myst. I 15,46,13-16. The words ούδ' ώς ετερον προς ετερον κοινωνεί των έν τα!ς
εύχαϊς νοήσεων (47,10-11) may be supposed to mitigate the personalization of invocational
prayer, but I doubt this. It seems rather that in prayer the one who invokes the gods makes
himself like the person the god is. Remarkably, at 49,5-8, it is denied that the gods are persons
like us; prayers unite us with τα θεία είδη και προς αυτούς τούς θεούς. Already at I 3 and
4, Iamblichus claims against Porphyry that the attributes of the gods have to be understood
independently of their explanatory roles.
46
Cf. Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne (Safïrey/Westerink) I 5,25,24-26,22, where Proclus
takes as his task the demonstration of the συμφωνία of the Platonic teaching and Orphism,
Pythagoreanism, and Chaldean Oracles.
47
See des Places, La religion de Jamblique 92-93, for some of the references to this princi-
ple in On the Egyptian Mysteries. See especially I 8,29,1-2: οπόταν επιτήδεια προς την
θείαν μετοχήν γένηται; V 7,207,10-15, and V 12,216,5-8 where sacrifices are said to 'as-
similate' (άφομοιοί) us to the gods and make us έπιτηδείους for friendship with them. The

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 The Presence and the Absence of the Divine 379

non-existent personal gods. The generality of the principle accommodates the

metaphysics of the depersonalized divine very nicely. That is why there is an
even deeper principle at work in Iamblichus, namely, that we possess 'an innate
grasp of the gods' (ή περι θεών έμφυτος γνώσις) which 'preexists argument
and demonstration' (λόγου τε και αποδείξεως προϋπάρξει) 48 . In the nicely
phrased counterpoint to Kant's Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen
Vernunft posed by the American philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff, such an
assertion is truly the basis for a doctrine of 'reason within the bounds of relig-
ion' 49 . As Iamblichus goes on to explain, this grasp, or more properly 'contact'
(ή συναφή), is a presupposition of all inquiry into the gods50. If the contact pre-
supposed is not exclusively contact with personal gods, it is largely so. What
separates Iamblichus from his Platonic predecessors and from the άρχή of the
tradition himself is the persistent and untrammeled mixing of the devices for
controlling personal divine presence and absence with those used for under-
standing the principles themselves51.
When we come to Proclus it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that virtually
everything that we have discovered as operative in the Platonic tradition's treat-
ment of our topic is present. Only more so. We find the real minor distinction52.
We find instrumental causality by the One53. We find the principle that the divine
is present to all things according to the degree of their capacity54. And so on. Let

epistemologica! analogue of this principle is το δ' δμοιον άει του όμοιου γνωστικόν. See,
e.g., De Communi Mathematica Scientia (Festa) 8,102. Iamblichus is here of course repeating
a philosophical commonplace if we take its meaning in the most general sense.
48
Myst. I 3,7,14-16. See also X 5,290,16-292,4 for a particularly clear example of the in-
tertwining of theurgy and metaphysics. Here the 'hieratic paths' (ίερατικαϊς όδοίς) are actu-
ally constitutive of a grasp of 'the father', the 'self-sufficient principle transcending essence'
(του προουσίου αύταρχοϋντος).
49
Wolterstorff and Plantinga are two philosophers in the Reformed tradition who wish to
argue that belief in the existence of the personal Christian God is a 'properly basic belief. A
properly basic belief is one that is not justified on the basis of other beliefs. As well as a belief
in the existence of God, it is also a belief in the presence of God in human experience. But
such a belief, like other properly basic beliefs, is rationally justified nonetheless. See Faith and
Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. There is a striking similarity between this fundamental
principle in the Reformed tradition and Iamblichus' principle of innate grasping of the divine.
50
Myst. I 3,8,3-13.
51
See most recently, Stäcker, Die Stellung der Theurgie in der Lehre Jamblichs, especially
18-26, for a positive evaluation of the rationality of theurgy in Iamblichus along related lines.
52
See El. Theol. Prop. 23,26,1-3; Theol. Plat. Ill 2,10,15-11,15.
53
See El. Theol. Prop. 56,54 and Prop. 137,120,31-122,6: Note the use of the word
συνυφίστησι to indicate instrumentality.
54
See El. Theol. 142,126,3-7.

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380 Lloyd P. Gerson

us begin with Proclus' proud declaration in The Platonic Theology that the tradi-
tion of which his own works constitute a sort of summa reconciles in an espe-
cially noteworthy way the transcendence and providence of the gods55. The text
shows clearly what hardly needs emphasizing, that Proclus is absorbed with the
issue of defending a metaphysically refined religion. As Proclus understands it,
theology is generally recognized to be a science of τα πρώτα (viz., άρχαι) κατά
φυσίν 56 . As a Piatonist, Proclus wants to insist that these first principles that are
the subject of theological truth are henads57. Theology studies these, their prop-
erties (τοις ιδιότητας), what proceeds from them (τάς προόδους αύτών), and
the orders of forms (τοις των είδών τάξεις) that depend on them. Whether this
identification of henads with gods is to be traced to Syrianus and his interpreta-
tion of the second hypostasis of Plato's Parmenides or not, the important point
for my purposes is Proclus' effort to achieve a seamless integration of meta-
physics and religion58. It is not entirely misleading to identify the product as a
kind of revealed theology, that is, as something other than one of the three tradi-
tional forms: mythological, civic, and natural59.
The core of the Proclean doctrine of divine presence and absence is the parti-
cibility of the divine henads60. Proclus rejects the idea that if the first principle or
cause of all is to be absolutely simple, it can, ex se, so to speak, account for the
complexity of the intelligible universe. Whether this is cause or effect of his
interpretation of the first hypostasis of the second part of Plato's Parmenides I

55
Theol. Plat. 115,76,10-18.
56
Theol. Plat. 13,12,12. On the next page, Proclus adds αύταρκεστάτας (13,7).
57
Theol. Plat I 3,14,17-18. In a way, of course, the unparticipated One is also the subject of
theological truth. See also I 14,67,10-17, for the divine hierarchy beginning with henads. At In
Prm. VI 1109,7-15 (Cousin), we find the claim that the One is divine because it is ή πηγή of
divinity and the identification of divinity with henads or, as El. Theol Prop. 114,100,22 has it,
every αυτοτελής henad is a god. See also Theol. Plat. I 19,19,9.
58
See Theol. Plat. I 10-11,40-55, for the interpretation of the second part of Parmenides
that Proclus endorses and that he attributes to Syrianus. On the origin and meaning of the
doctrine of henads, see especially Saffrey/Westerink, Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne III 9-
77 and also Dodds, Proclus. The Elements of Theology 257-258.
59
Saffrey/Westerink, Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne v. I 189, describe it as 'théologie
scientifique'.
60
See El. Theol. Prop. 116,102,26-27: μεδεκτή άρα έστι πάσα ένας μετά το εν
ύποστάσα καί πας θεός μεθεκτός. That the unparticipated 'produces' (ύφίστησιν) that
which is participated, namely, its own nature, should profoundly affect our comprehension of
any putative dynamism in the Proclean system. See El. Theol. Prop. 23,26,1. See the useful
papers by De Rijk, Causation and Participation in Proclus, and Meijer, Participation in
Henads and Monads. Also, Sweeney, Participation and the Structure of Being.

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 The Presence and the Absence of the Divine 381

shall not now attempt to say61. That is, Proclus rejects what I take to be in fact
Plotinus' correct interpretation of Plato's Form of the Good insofar as this can be
identified with a first principle called 'the One'. According to this interpretation,
the One is δύναμις πάντων, that is, virtually all things within its causal scope62.
The technical meaning of 'virtually' being used here is perhaps most simply
illustrated by the analogy according to which white light can be said to be virtu-
ally all the colors of the spectrum. Or if one likes, a properly functioning calcu-
lator contains virtually all the answers to the questions that can be legitimately
asked of it. Proclus, whether or not misled by his belief that the first hypothesis
of the second part of Parmenides refers to the Good elided with the One, takes
the unqualified simplicity of the subject of that hypostasis as excluding even the
putative complexity imported into the first principle by claiming that it is virtu-
ally all things63. In fact, although the henads fulfill the role that (on my interpre-
tation) is fulfilled by the One in Plotinus and in Plato, they do so each by being
virtually and eminently what everything in their 'series' or σειρά is owing to
participation64. That is, Proclus wants to reject the notion that a first principle,
insofar as it is one, can have even the conceptual complexity of virtuality .
This is why the One is not participable66. The explicit reason for the unpar-
ticipability of the One is that if it were participated, it would become the unity of
some particular and cease to fulfill its causal role. This is I think but another way
of saying that by being participated it would either lose its simplicity or tran-

61
See Saffrey, La Théologie Platonicienne de Proclus 1-12 and Steel, Le Parménide est-il
le fondement de la Théologie Platonicienne? 373-397.
62
See V 3 [39] 15,33. Cf. III 8 [30] 10,1; V 1 [10] 7,9-10; V 3 [49] 16,2; V 4 [7] 1,24-
25,36; V 4 [7] 2,38; V 5 [32] 12,38-39; V I 7 [38] 32,31; VI 7 [38] 40,13-14; VI 8 [39] 9,45; VI
9 [9] 5,36-37.
63
See In Prm. VI for the general interpretation of absolute 'one' as absolutely simple. At
1090,13ff., it is clear that the absence of intelligible complexity is what follows from absolute
oneness.
64
See El. Theol. Prop. 118,104,5-6. It is somewhat confusing that the henad is ύπερούσιος
and eminently what something with an ο ύ σ ί α is by participation. See, e.g., Theol. Plat. Ill
4,17,7-8. This is why henads only in a qualified way do the job that Forms do as Plato con-
ceived them.
65
See In Prm. VI 1048,35-1049,1 where it is said that though each henad is 'in all' each is
χωρίς from the other. I take the specification of separation as an indication of the desire to
preserve simplicity. See also In Ti. III 12,22-30 where the absolute simplicity of the One is
given as the reason for positing henads.
66
See El. Theol. Prop. 116,102,1; In Prm. 1067,1-2. Cf. Theol. Plat. I 3,14,2-3. Meijer,
Participation in Henads and Monads 83-84, cites In Piatonis Rempublicam (In Rmp.) I 260,5-
6: έπει καί άμε δεκτά φαίης αν μετέχεσ&αι πως and rightly, in my view, argues that this
claim does not undercut the claim that the One is not participable.

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382 Lloyd P. Gerson

scendence. That the One is imparticipable does not preclude either its causality or
some other sort of relation of the henads to it. As Proclus coyly puts it, the
henads are 'linked' (συνάπτει) to 'the One itself (το αύτόεν) . Moreover, the
henads are 'divinized' (τεθεωνται) by the One68. That is, they are divinized by
being henads. The One's divinity consists in its being the Good, the ultimate
object of desire69. Thus, the presence and the absence of the divine in Proclus is
ultimately determined by the radically impersonal One. And this is no doubt
intensified by the separation of the henads one from the other. I mean that any
inclination on Proclus' part to construct personhood out of a radically simple first
principle is mitigated by the henads themselves. The first principle and the pleth-
ora of gods become fragmented aspects of divinity, with the latter corresponding
severally to the attributes of the one-being of the second hypothesis of Par-
menides. One could hardly compose a plausible profile of a personality under
such conditions.
A henad is perhaps most accurately characterized as the unity that a Form is
independent of the Form's nature70. This meaning seems to be required not only
owing to the intermediate status of the henads between the first principle of all
and Forms but especially owing to the one-to-one correspondence of henads and
Forms71. As we have seen, Proclus is well justified in finding in Plato a real dis-
tinction between a Form and its nature, or, as we now have it, a unity and an
essence, even if his best evidence is located in places other than the second part
of Parmenides. What seems less justified is his way of merging the elements of
personal religion with metaphysics72.

67
See El. Theol. Prop. 116,102,24. We must add, however, that we read in the In Prm.
1069,15 that the One is άσύντακτος with the henads which I presume follows from its being
unparticipable.
68
See In Prm. VI 1043,28, 1109,14-17; El. Theol. Prop. 138,122,1-2; Theol. Plat. Ill
4,17,9-12. The One is a 'henad of henads' as well. See In Ti. 1457,23.
69
See El. Theol. Prop. 113,100,11.
70
See In Ti. III 12,22-28. In this passage the henads are called φύσεις, it is true, but they
are also 'above ούσία'. See also Theol. Plat. Ill 3,13,6-18 and 6,20,1-4. Cf. Iamblichus, cited
by Damascius as saying: τάς των ειδών μονάδας, <μονάδας> το έκαστου λέγων άδιάκρι-
τον, fr. 4 Dillon.
71
See El. Theol. Prop. 135-137: πάσα 9ε!α ένας ύφ' ένός τίνος μετέχεται των όντων
αμέσως ... καί δσαι αί μετεχόμεναι ένάδες, τοσαϋτα και τα μετέχοντα γένη των
όντων (135,120,1-4).
72
See Festugière's defense of Proclus' combining 'reflective piety' and 'popular piety' in:
Proclus et la religion traditionnelle 575-584. Proclus' sincerity is not I think in question.

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 The Presence and the Absence of the Divine 383

Proclus is clear that the presence generally of the intelligible to the sensible
is the obverse of participation73. We should note the difference between the Pla-
tonic idea of όμοίωσις θεω and the Proclean idea of μέθεξις των θεών 74 .
Although there is undoubtedly in Proclus much that is in harmony with the idea
of personal assimilation to the divine, nevertheless the language of participation
fits ill with the notion of gods as persons75. Perhaps what is most remarkable in
Proclus is his dedication to holding together the purely religious with the starkly
metaphysical aspects of the Platonic tradition.
This very rapid sketch must conclude with some mention of John Philoponus
who in a way brings us full circle back to Plato. For we can see in the Christian
Philoponus efforts to reincorporate the personal into the Platonic conception of
the divine76. It is perhaps somewhat of an oversimplification to imagine that the
appearance of Philoponus' De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum in 529 C.E.
signals the decisive break with the tradition. Still, the rejection of the eternity of
the world and therefore the assertion of its temporal origin (or at least the possi-
bility of its temporal origin) seems to be a crucial step in the process77. That Phi-
loponus himself saw it in this way is evident in the Prologue to his Christian
work, De opifìcio mundi written perhaps between 547 and 560 C.E.78. In that
Prologue, Philoponus says that he has in many works argued against those who
do not believe that the world had a beginning in time. He adds that he has done
so with a view to removing the danger that arises of not believing that God is a
creator (δημιουργον) of the world if one does not believe that the world was

73
See especially El. Theol. Prop. 142,126,6-7: κατά γαρ το μέτρον της τούτων
παρουσίας ή μεθεξις. Also, In Prm. IV 882,1-883,37. At El. Theol. Prop. 98, presence is
represented in causal terms: πάν αίτιον χωριστον πανταχού έστιν ά μ α και ούδαμοΰ.
74
See, e.g., In Ti. I 409,20; II 231,18; III 65,4. In Iamblichus, we find both participation in
the gods, directly, as it were, and participations in their powers or deeds. See Myst. I 12,42,13;
1115,111,11-12; III 20,149,8.
75
See In. Ale. (Westerink), 51,13-16 on πίστις, αλήθεια, and ερως as the means that gods
provide to humans for achieving union with them. See also Theol. Plat. I 25,110,1.
76
Fortunately, I do not need to address the vexed issue of Philoponus' alleged conversion
to Christianity in the middle of his life. The outstanding issues are admirably addressed by
Verrycken, The Development of Philoponus' Thought and its Chronology. Verrycken's insis-
tence on a 'duality of doctrine', that is, a duality between the Christian and non-Christian
Philoponus, independent of how this duality maps onto the chronology of his writings, seems
to be entirely sound.
77
The entirely negative judgment on the question of the temporal origin of the universe by
Neoplatonists generally is the reverse side of the coin. Temporally conditioned activity is
certainly one mark of the personal. On the basis for the Platonic view in the interpretation of
Plato's Timaeus see Baltes, Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios.
78
See the translation of and introduction to De opificio mundi by Schölten.

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384 Lloyd P. Gerson

created out of nothing. The point is of course that if the world does not have a
beginning in time, then there would be no need to believe in a creator God, that
is, the personal God of the Biblical book of Genesis. But if the world is created in
time, that is something for which an explanation in terms of personal motivation
is natural and compelling79.
The creation of the world ex nihilo implies that the fundamental ontological
divide is between God and creation, not between the intelligible and sensible
realms. So, for example, the eternity of the fifth element, defended by Aristotle,
is denied80 God's creative activity and primacy are not in conflict with his sim-
plicity, although, as Simplicius complains against Philoponus, it is evidently in
conflict with his unchangeability81. So, for Philoponus the presence and the ab-
sence of the divine is differently construed. As Philoponus puts it in De opificio
mundi, everything came to be by the 'will of God'; that is what the words in the
Book of Genesis 'let there be light' indicate82. Henceforth, the terms of the rela-
tionship between the divine and human are expressed entirely in scriptural lan-
guage, that is, as a relationship among persons. The metaphysics that goes along
with the theology based upon scripture is accordingly subordinated. Philoponus'
theorizing in the monophysite controversy makes this abundantly clear.
Space permitting, something should be said about the pseudo-Dionysius and
John Scotus Eriugena, for they all in different ways take up Proclus' burden of
fitting metaphysics to religion. In conclusion, I would like to return to my view
of what that burden is. A religion that is based on encounters with a personal god
or gods through their presence to us generally operates quite innocent of meta-
physics. By contrast, an exclusively philosophical approach to the divine almost
inevitably leads to the attenuation of the personal thereby constructing divine
presence and absence according to metaphysical principles. The task assumed by
the Platonic tradition was to construct a metaphysics that could plausibly be seen
as a religion. And at the risk of seeming facile, I would say that they do so by
separating the metaphysical presence of the divine from the religious absence.

79
It is revealing that Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, pp.117,1-118,16;
141,1-144,15 (Rabe), argues that Plato in Timaeus believe that the Demiurge made the world
in time. If all motion originates in soul, and the world has a γένεσις and all γένεσις is a mo-
tion, an independent argument for personal divinity is opened. See especially pp. 89,3-91,5.
On the argument in De aeternitate mundi that Plato believed the world was created in time, see
Judson, God or Nature?
80
See, for example, Simplicius, In Cael. 59, 6-10.
81
See Simplicius, In Ph. 1182,28-36.
82
See De opifìcio mundi 6,1-2.

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 The Presence and the Absence of the Divine 385

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