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46. The Battalion lost 3 Officers,4 JCOs, 148 other ranks killed, and 5 Officers, 8
JCOs and 244 other ranks wounded.
47. The Battalion won 2 MahaVir Chakras, and 7 Vir Chakras.
48. After the Cease fire, the Battalion reverted to its peace location at Ramgarh.
Overhaul of Forces in the East
49. A general reorg of forces was carried out as follows: -
49.1. Commanders.
49.1.1. Owing to Sickness of Gen Kaul. Gen Harbaksh was appointed
GOC at IV Corps. He took over on 24 Oct 1962.
49.1.2. Maj Gen A S Pathania, MVC, MC replaced Maj Gen Niranjan
Prasad as GOC 4 Inf. Div, while he was preparing to fight the second phase
of the Battle of Se La.
49.1.3. Many Bde Cdrs were also changed. In particular Brig Hoshiar
Singh, MC, IOM, Croix de Guerre, who was appointed as the new
commander of 62 Inf Bde.
49.1.4. Maj Gen MS Pathania was appointed as GOC 2 Mm Div a new
raising.
49.2. Fmns.
49.2.1. 2 Mtn Div a new rising to take over responsibility of NEFA less
Kameng frontier division.
49.2.2. 11 Bde replaced 181 Bde in the Walong Sector on 31 Oct 1962.
49.2.3. 5 Bde was made responsible for the remainder of the 2 Mtn Div
Sector.
49.2.4. A number of battalions within the fmn were also changed.
50. Unfortunately, there was a feeling in Eastern Command that the Chinese would
not advance further and a sense of complacency rather than urgency set in.
Developments on the Political Front
51. On the political front the Chinese carried out considerable propaganda to the effect
that it was the Indians who attacked at Thag La and that the Chinese “counterattacked in
self-defence”.
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Date and Events
52. 24 Oct 1962.
52.1. China issued a three-point statement as under-
52.1.1. Both countries to withdraw their forces 20 km from the Line of
Actual Control.
52.1.2. Both Prime Ministers to meet again to arrive at a settlement.
52.2. India did not agree, as this would mean accepting Chinese occupation of
Indian Territory.
53. 27 Oct 62. India rejected China's proposal for reasons mentioned above and
pro-posed that both sides revert to the position along the entire boundary as it existed
before
54. 04 Nov 62. Chou En Lai wrote to Nehru repeating and explaining the earlier
proposal and asked him to reconsider his decision.
55. 05 Nov 62. Sitrep from IV Corps indicated that Chinese tps were very active on
northern flank of Se La. Patrols were sent out from 62 Bde at Sela. Chinese infantry
patrols were also noticed in area of Tse La and Mago indicating intention to encircle Se
La from the far North and mov towards Pcshing La. This indicated an intention to cut the
Bomdi La - Dirang Dzong road patrol clashes took place. Patrols also reported enemy
move between Se La massif and Bhutan border.
56 Nov 1962. Chinese rd building activities night and day to link Bumla with
Tawang indicated further offensives and possible need to complete operations before the
passes were snowed under.
57. 14 Nov 1962.
57.1. Nehru replied to Chou En Lai stating that India could not envisage China
retaining Indian territory obtained through aggression. He once again stated that
both sides should revert to positions held prior to 08 Sep 1962.
57.2. China responded by launching a vituperative propaganda against India in
general and Nehru in particular.
57.3. Int reports from IB indicated: -
57.3.1 Chinese road construction force completed link Bumla-Tawang.
57.3.2 Chinese build up mainly forward of Tawang and Walong Sectors,
also at Siang and Subansiri.
