TYPE Review

PUBLISHED 29 September 2025

DOI 10.3389/fpos.2025.1634560

From Arab Spring to regional

OPEN ACCESS reset: Saudi-Iranian rivalry and
strategic contestation in the Gulf
EDITED BY
Rany Sam,
National University of Battambang, Cambodia
REVIEWED BY
Yon Machmudi,
(2011–2023)
University of Indonesia, Indonesia
Basem Ezbidi,
Birzeit University, Palestine Ayman Albarasneh*
*CORRESPONDENCE
Prince Al Hussein Bin Abdullah II School of International Studies, Department of Political Science, The
Ayman Albarasneh
University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan
[email protected]
RECEIVED 24 May 2025
ACCEPTED 04 September 2025
PUBLISHED 29 September 2025
This paper analyzes the Saudi-Iranian rivalry between 2011 and 2023 and
its implications for Gulf regional security. It shows that the rivalry operates
CITATION
Albarasneh A (2025) From Arab Spring to simultaneously at state, sub-state, and symbolic levels, reinforced through proxy
regional reset: Saudi-Iranian rivalry and conflicts, sectarian mobilization, and competing identity narratives. While the
strategic contestation in the Gulf
2023 diplomatic breakthrough suggested progress, the findings confirm that
(2011–2023). Front. Polit. Sci. 7:1634560.
doi: 10.3389/fpos.2025.1634560 the structural and ideological foundations of the rivalry remain unresolved.
COPYRIGHT
Positioned within a descriptive-analytical, interpretive framework, the research
© 2025 Albarasneh. This is an open-access applies process tracing to examine key geopolitical events, including the
article distributed under the terms of the Arab Spring, the Yemen war, the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, and the
Creative Commons Attribution License (CC
BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in
2023 China-mediated normalization. These events are viewed as part of a
other forums is permitted, provided the continuous geopolitical process shaped by power structures, domestic politics,
original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) and identity-driven strategies. The study integrates neorealism, offensive realism,
are credited and that the original publication
in this journal is cited, in accordance with
and constructivism to provide a multi-dimensional explanation of the rivalry.
accepted academic practice. No use, While neorealism and offensive realism explain material interests and strategic
distribution or reproduction is permitted behavior, constructivism highlights the role of identity, ideology, and sectarian
which does not comply with these terms.
narratives. A hybrid neorealist framework is proposed to incorporate non-state
actors and symbolic tools of influence, reconciled methodologically through
layered process tracing with explicit rules for weighing competing theoretical
predictions. This theoretical approach helps explain both external behavior and
internal motivations. The rivalry operates at state, sub-state, and symbolic levels,
reinforced through proxy conflicts and religious mobilization. Although the
2023 diplomatic breakthrough suggests progress, the structural and ideological
foundations of the rivalry remain unresolved. This research addresses a critical
gap by combining theories and linking them to recent regional events. Policy
recommendations include a formal dialogue platform between Gulf states
and Iran, confidence-building measures, and a regional security charter. By
combining theory, regional analysis, and policy insight, the study contributes to
ongoing debates on Gulf security and offers practical ideas for future stability.

KEYWORDS

Saudi-Iranian rivalry, Gulf security, strategic identity, sectarianism, neorealism, hybrid

realism

Introduction
The geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been defined by different
strategic visions and opposing ideological accounts, resulting in continuous conflict and
distrust. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Tehran began a revolutionary foreign policy
entrenched in Shi’a Islamist ideology that directly challenged the balance of power in
the region enjoyed by Saudi Arabia and the Sunni bloc. This long history has created
an enduring rivalry that has made the overall political environment in the Middle East
hostile, whereby the powers aim for regional supremacy via direct confrontations or proxy

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conflicts. The rivalry is additionally complicated by this historical Simultaneously, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s
rivalry representing a broader contest over legitimacy, identity and Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia would no longer seek to enhance
vision of regional order. It is a competition beyond just a traditional Sunni leadership, but rather seek to bolster its influence through
states conflict. economic revival and key partnerships (Al-Dosari, 2016; Hidayat
In this research, the focus has been placed on the effects of et al., 2022). As for Iran, it persists with its foreign policy
the Saudi-Iran conflict on regional diplomacy, especially in regard of ideological resistance, regional deterrence, and unbalanced
to how it has evolved and survived in the face of regional crises, influence. The Gulf States often label their policies as blatant
coupled with wars on regional diplomacy. For the study of Middle attempts to threaten their stability. Such shifts in foreign policy
East politics and for the study of ideology and identity in the and their connection to internal political conditions such as
face of foreign politics in a very unstable regional environment, regime legitimacy, elite cohesion, and ideological narratives are
grasping the concept of the Saudi-Iran rivalry is imperative. This influenced deeply and analyzed more through constructivist theory
study stands out as it sheds further light on the theoretical and in this study.
empirical aspects of structural and intermediary factors in relation Following the power vacuum left behind, Iraq’s coming to
to strategic behavior, with specific focus on the former non-great assume the strategic role seems natural. After the fall of Saddam,
powers, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. Tehran began working systematically on their political and military
Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq that toppled the engagements with the post-invasion Iraq. Liable to foster a Shi’a
Ba’ath regime and enabled Shi’a political empowerment, Iran political formation that is aligned with Iranian interests, does not,
swiftly moved to capitalize on the power vacuum that emerged, for sure, make Saudi Arabia’s worries any lesser, especially of the
expanding its influence in not only Iraq but also Syria, Lebanon, growing Shi’a crescent from Tehran to Beirut. Further, relations
and Yemen. Saudi Arabia, along with the rest of the Gulf between Tehran and its GCC neighbors has been fully poisoned
Cooperation Council (GCC) states, remained concerned about the by Tehran-Bahrain claims over disputed territories since the late
issue and viewed the increased Iranian activity in the region with sixties and various other claims after 1971 over the Emirati islands.
grave strategic threat concern. The deepening divergence in power The increase of geostrategic rivalry has shifted-market
has significantly helped shape the Gulf security architecture and instability to global markets and neighboring sea routes,
has brought about another alignment of external arrangements, undermining global market stability (Kindleberger, 1973).
chiefly those involving the United States (Han and Hakimian, Serving as the central hub for seaborne oil transit, any conflicts
2019). Washington’s strategic bonding with Saudi Arabia, and its between Riyadh and Tehran would lead to oil price increases and
maintenance of a military presence in the Gulf, have deepened pose serious concerns over supply security. This is why a political
regional cleavages that exist along the Saudi-Iranian confrontation, confrontation at a bilateral level has ripples on a global scale in
thus serving American interests. terms of economics and strategy. The US’ withdrawal from JCPOA
Following the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in 2011, both in 2018 signified a putative collapse of diplomatic containment
countries were eager to take advantage of the political shifts to approaches, driving further aggressive regional maneuvering by
expand their influence. Saudi Arabia tried to counter the growing both players (Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 2015).
influence of Iran by deepening its ties with the US and backing Given this surprising turn of events, the China-brokered
groups opposed to Iran in the region. On the other hand, Iran harmony between Iran and Saudi Arabia made diplomatic
took advantage of the chaos to deepen its relations with Shi’a waters navigable. Although promising, the normalization remains
groups, casting itself as the protector of Shi’a communities and fragile due to the lack of enforceable mechanisms and long-
the opponent of Western dominance. The 2011 Arab uprisings term institutional support; analysts posit that this marks a
also marked a change in the way both countries used sectarian tactical pause instead of a structural shift (Baghernia, 2024).
identities to justify their actions. The different ways in which This buildup provides the basis for the research emphasis on
both countries view their threats and plan their security has, for applying international relations theories to explain both conflict
many years, created tension in the Gulf and prevented meaningful and temporary cooperation.
regional collaboration. With this background, the study has the aim of reflecting
The rivalry reached a critical point in 2016 when the on the Saudi-Iranian rivalry from 2011 to 2023 as seen through
Saudi authorities executed the Shi’a cleric Nimr al-Nimr, which major events and power shifts that have determined how the two
subsequently resulted in an attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. relate. It considers the underlying causes of their hostility, whether
Both of these events diluted already simmering tensions and religious divides, strategic competitions, or third-party alliances,
epitomized a wide ideological gap between the two authorities. The while thinking about the fruits of recent peace talks, such as the
support Iran provides to organizations like Hezbollah, Houthis, 2023 China-mediated one.
and some Iraqi militias has made the regional security even more Given the deepening rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the
fragile and has compelled Saudi Arabia to wage a campaign of study aims to analyze critically the impact of bilateral interactions
diplomatic isolation, economic pressure and military adventurism on regional security architecture between 2011 and 2023. The
particularly in Yemen to counterbalance Iranian influence. The analysis is situated around understanding how this decades-old
Yemeni war has continued to escalate since 2015 when the Houthis conflict has shaped Gulf security dynamics in particular through
took over Sanaa, evolving into a prolonged proxy war where both the evolving posture of Saudi Arabia in this period and the strategic
powers have utilized asymmetric tools to advance their strategic responses it put forward. Accordingly, the study is guided by
objectives, further exacerbating the regional humanitarian crises two central research questions: (1) How did the Saudi-Iranian
(Juneau, 2020). interactions shape regional security between 2011 and 2023? and

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(2) What security dynamics aimed to preserve and improve Gulf and foreign occupation. The vision laid out above helps us
security, specifically with Saudi Arabia’s stable interactions during understand the rivalry as a battle of far more consequence than a
that period? These questions inform the broader research aims, strategic rivalry: it is a conflict for regional identity, for legitimacy,
which include identifying the geopolitical and ideological factors and for the shape of the political order of the Middle East. This
sustaining this rivalry, exploring the consequences of regional is echoed further in Bianco (2018), who points to the highly
instability, particularly in conflict zones such as Yemen, Iraq, ideological aspects of the Saudi-Iranian conflict after 2011, as
and Syria, and assessing the extent to which global powers such the Arab Spring heightened sectarian narratives and deepened
as the United States have influenced the strategic balance in the divide between the revolutionary rhetoric of Tehran and the
the Gulf. Moreover, the review considers the degree to which traditionalist outlook of Riyadh.
recent diplomatic overtures, such as the 2023 China-mediated In understanding these developments, more and more the
détente, reflect a substantive shift in the regional order or merely literature looks to constructivist theory, which highlights the
a temporary recalibration of long-standing hostilities. This study, roles of identities, narratives, and perceptions in determining
by applying theory to recent events and relevant hypothesis, drives international conduct (Wendt, 1999). Constructivist scholars argue
a timely and relevant research to one of the most enduring rivalries that the dispute is not physical but ideational, originating from
in the modern Middle East. a clash of misrecognition, long-standing historical conflicts, and
The key contribution of this study is in the methodology it religious symbolism. Ontological security, which underscores how
employs: it sequences theoretical perspectives in the cases while states guarantee their self-identity in times of uncertainty, has
resolving inconsistencies openly, thus bringing rivalry analysis up recently extended this notion. According to Shadunts (2023), Iran’s
to date with evidence from after 2020. foreign policy behavior is not only influenced by material threats
but also by a crisis of identity and knowledge production, especially
in the post-JCPOA environment. Similarly, Adisönmez et al. (2022)
Literature review and theoretical and Cohen and Hitman (2021) argue that Saudi Arabia and Iran
framework deploy regional confrontation as a mechanism to stabilize internal
ontological insecurities tied to regime narratives, sectarian identity,
An article based on Saudi-Iran works on the Saudi-Iranian and civilizational legitimacy. These internal anxieties become
rivalry with the considerations of a country’s shifting power and externalized as sectarian rivalry and regional assertiveness.
structural insecurities (Grumet, 2015). It is clear in the literature to Simultaneously, offensive realism, as articulated by
agree with the Gulf ’s security not only being threatened by country Mearsheimer (2001), offers another lens through which to
rivalries but also with external alliances, sectarian divisions and interpret the rivalry. From this perspective, both Iran and Saudi
evolving threats to national sovereignty. This part discusses the Arabia are rational actors striving for regional hegemony in an
literature that looks at the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, anarchic system. Iran’s interventions in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen,
while also looking into the different theories such as neorealism, and Saudi Arabia’s assertive foreign policy under Vision 2030,
constructive realism, offensive realism, and hegemonic stability are thus viewed as offensive strategies to maximize power and
theory that can be used to analyze and understand this rivalry. deter external encroachment. These actions, while portrayed as
Legrenzi (2011) argues that the Council of Gulf Cooperation defensive in domestic rhetoric, fit within an offensive realist logic
Countries was thought to be created in response to Iranian of preemption and denial of strategic depth to rivals. Although
threats of expansion and region-wide disruption. Saudi Arabia, offensive realism was originally developed for great power politics,
in particular, was reliant on American political and military recent work suggests its conceptual tools can be cautiously adapted
guaranties given the region’s weak political and military structures. to explain the aggressive regional behavior of middle powers
In the same vein, Yetiv (2004) draws attention to the gulf like Iran and Saudi Arabia (Juneau, 2020). This study therefore
rivalry’s global aspect, particularly the role U.S. foreign policy applies offensive realism not as a full explanatory model, but as
and oil market policies played. From a realist standpoint, a framework to understand the logic behind specific expansions
these dependencies illustrate a classical balance-of-power model and counter-expansions.
whereby weaker states align with external powers to hedge against Another complementary approach is hegemonic stability
regional threats. theory, which postulates that regional and global stability are
The post-2003 political vacuum in Iraq represents a pivotal more likely when one power predominates. The current multipolar
moment in the literature, marking a fundamental transformation in fragmentation in the Middle East, featuring U.S., Chinese, Russian,
Iran’s regional posture (Cerioli, 2021). Katzman (2003) and Knights and Turkish interventions, undermines the prospects for a stable
(2013) emphasize how Iran exploited the collapse of Saddam Gulf security regime. As regional powers compete for dominance,
Hussein’s regime to embed itself within Iraq’s military and political the absence of a clear hegemon or cooperative architecture
fabric, thereby altering the sectarian and strategic calculus of the perpetuates instability and escalates proxy conflicts. Roberts (2025)
Gulf. Saudi Arabia perceived this growing influence as a zero-sum introduces the concept of residual hegemony, arguing that despite
threat to Sunni dominance, prompting counterbalancing behavior visible U.S. military pullback in the Gulf, influence persists
through diplomatic isolation of Tehran and interventionist policies through latent mechanisms such as technological dependencies,
in regional theaters such as Yemen and Syria. infrastructure networks, and institutional linkages. This suggests
Cerioli (2024) provides a valuable framework for interpreting that U.S. retrenchment does not equate to full withdrawal but
Iranian state behavior through four interconnected domains: rather a transformation of its hegemonic role into more indirect
Islamic political ideology, oil market influence, military expansion, yet structurally embedded forms of dominance.

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The neorealist tradition remains the dominant theoretical lens and as long as conflicts are resolved through predetermined rules.
in the Gulf rivalry literature. Originally articulated by Waltz (2000) In the article, neorealism designs the framework for system level
and later extended by researchers like Walt (1987) in the balance- constraints, offensive realism designs the rationale for strategic
of-threat variant of neorealism, neorealism is concerned with expansion, and constructivism designs the mechanisms of identity
structural constraints and the international system’s influence on securitization. If the predictions differ, the layer which is supported
state behavior. States are unitary actors in an anarchic international by the stronger form of process tracing is preferred. Hoop tests
order in order to survive, which leads to states forming alliances are weak tests, smoking-gun tests are strong tests, and doubly
and primarily balancing against threats. Saudi-Iranian rivalry fits decisive evidence is stronger than smoking-gun evidence. This
neatly into this mold as both states employ regional proxies and approach makes theory contamination less likely and makes the
external alliances and deterrent posturing to assuage their perceived evidentiary hierarchy explicit. The strength of inference is given
vulnerabilities (Gul et al., 2021). for the dominant layer for each case; the other layers only
Iran’s partnerships with non-state actors such as Hezbollah, provide secondary or complementary mechanisms, not additional
the Houthis, and certain Iraqi militias can be seen as asymmetric competing explanations. Recent theoretical scholarship, such as
balancing designed to compensate for conventional military Michaels (2022) who updates realist-constructivism by explaining
imbalances. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, counterbalances the layered explanatory power and how realist and constructivist
externally via U.S. military support, arms purchasing, and logics in foreign policy analysis complement each other, supports
coalition-building with Gulf and Western states. The whole this approach. Similarly, methodological research (Beach, 2023)
balance-of-power dynamics support Walt’s contention that threat has shown that process tracing is epistemologically flexible and
perceptions originate from perceived intentions rather than well-suited to multiple theoretical integrations, which enhances
just capabilities. its usefulness.
It is important to acknowledge that neorealism, offensive Indeed, this study interacts with the literature that poses the
realism, and constructivism originate from divergent ontological Saudi-Iranian rivalry not as an act of mere statecraft, but as a deeply
premises: neorealism rests on structural materialism, offensive embedded conflict in historical trauma, religious legitimacy, and
realism on rational power-maximization, and constructivism a contested vision of Middle Eastern order. While the functional
on intersubjective identity formation. Although such paradigms constitution of rivalry has been studied in more traditional
are often viewed in opposition to one another, this study approaches, this study attempts to further the discussion through
methodologically integrates them using layered process tracing. a synthesis of neorealist and constructivist theoretical insights,
Each theory is assigned to the explanatory level at which it linking these insights with recent cases from 2011 to 2023 to
provides the clearest causality—systemic pressures for neorealism, provide a timely view on regional security challenges and prospects
strategic expansion for offensive realism, and identity securitization for de-escalation via diplomatic realignment. Recent analyses of
for constructivism. This approach shifts theoretical tension to post-2023 ties suggest that rapprochement effects remain largely
complementarity. This explicit integration makes certain that symbolic across Yemen and Iraq, which supports our claim about
the hybrid framework is logically consistent and that the shallow identity change (Alotaibi, 2023; Cook, 2023; Fantappie
unique perspectives of each paradigm are preserved (Sotarauta and Nasr, 2023; Salami, 2023). Cerioli (2024) and Roberts (2025)
and Grillitsch, 2022). To join these perspectives, the study position Gulf order within evolving great-power brokerage and
proposes a hybrid theoretical framework combining structural residual United States influence, aligning with the neorealist layer
realism, offensive expansionism, and ideational identity formation. of our framework.
Arghavani Pirsalami et al. (2023) demonstrate how Iran’s strategic
posture post-JCPOA is driven as much by regime survival and
ontological reassurance as by security concerns. This synthesis Methodology
helps explain how threat perception is not only shaped by external
constraints, but by internal political narratives that frame rival This study adopts a descriptive-analytical, interpretivist
states as existential challengers. research design grounded in a descriptive-analytical methodology,
Even though neorealism, offensive realism, and constructivism enriched by the method of process tracing. Given the complexity
have substantially different starting points—be it structural of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and its entanglement with structural
materialism, rational power-maximization, or intersubjective forces, ideological contestation, and evolving foreign policy
identity formation—this article integrates them all by using a orientations, a descriptive-analytical approach offers the most
complex methodology. With the use of process tracing, the appropriate framework for conducting in-depth, context-sensitive
different perspectives can be ordered logically: neorealism brings analysis. Rather than seeking to quantify behavior or test causal
attention to system-wide limitations, offensive realism focuses hypotheses through statistical models, this research aims to
on the strategies of expansion and counter-expansion, and interpret the strategic motives, identity narratives, and geopolitical
constructivism sheds light on the significance of identity narratives consequences that have shaped bilateral relations over the past
and ontological insecurity. Each theory is assigned a different decade. By situating state behavior within broader theoretical and
explanatory dimension, which shifts the conflict between the historical contexts, the study endeavors to uncover the underlying
theories into complementarity. Reconciliation and adjudication mechanisms that perpetuate competition, conflict, and intermittent
of the methodology. Although the underlying paradigms have cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
contradictory ontologies, they can be synthetized as long as each The descriptive-analytical method allows for systematic
is confined to the domain in which it has comparative advantage engagement with secondary data sources, including peer-reviewed

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academic literature, policy reports, governmental declarations, the rivalry’s events in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Bahrain. Second,
regional think tank analyses, and international institutional the descriptive-analytical method is essential for understanding the
documents. Data were selected based on their thematic relevance, ideational aspects of the rivalry, including how historical grievance,
scholarly credibility, and chronological proximity to the events sectarian identity, and regime legitimacy influence foreign policy
under review. Sources published between 2000 and 2024 were decision-making. The study also applies constructivism’s internal
considered, with particular emphasis on those addressing the political factors, such as elite ideological framing, national
2011–2023 period. Different in origin, the time band selected here identity preservation, and their impact on external behavior. In
is dependent upon capturing the maximum polarization interim, the end, process tracing serves as a powerful instrument in
namely the post-process induced by the Arab Spring and dread of relating theoretical insights from neorealism, offensive realism, and
maximizing the catalytic impact, i.e., the diplomatic normalization constructivism to actual empirical realities and hence will provide
in 2023 by China between Riyadh and Tehran, thus coherently greater explanatory power for the study.
delimiting the temporal raison d’être for tracing the evolution Thus, in essence, this research method provides a nuanced,
of the rivalry. Besides, stringent source inclusion criteria were theoretically grounded, and empirically rich account of one of the
applied, thereby upholding the study’s analytical validity. most consequential rivalries in modern Middle Eastern politics.
The selected materials analyzed were either peer-reviewed or By merging interpretive rigor with methodological transparency,
institutionally validated by eminent academic or policy entities the study is thereby able to contribute to academic and policy
such as Chatham House, Middle East Institute, or the Arab discourse on regional security, strategic behavior, and the emerging
Center for Research and Policy Studies. Whenever available, Arabic international order in the Gulf.
sources were also included, either in the original or translated
versions, so as to present indigenous-level accounts and not build
on Western accounts. Explicitly, blogs with non-peer-reviewed Discussion
content, anonymous commentary, or political commentaries
lacking in academic or institutional credentials were excluded, The Saudi–Iranian rivalry has endured because it is structurally
enhancing the reliability and interpretive richness of the analysis. embedded within the fragmented Gulf security order, reinforced by
A process tracing, applied as a descriptive-analytical method, power asymmetries, identity-oriented competition, and the absence
acts as the analytical core of this study, thereby helping in of a legitimate regional hegemon. To explain its persistence, this
the identification of causal pathways and mechanisms linking section applies the hybrid framework systematically across four
discrete political events to broader strategic shifts. This method is key events: the Arab Spring (2011), the Yemen War (2015–
particularly suited for unpacking how key events; such as the Arab present), the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA (2018), and the
Spring, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, the U.S. withdrawal 2023 China-mediated normalization. Each event is examined
from the JCPOA, and the 2023 China-brokered normalization, through a dominant theoretical lens, supported by complementary
fit into a long-term rivalry driven by both external strategic perspectives, to avoid over-layering while capturing the multi-
shifts and internal ideological narratives. This lens is helpful dimensional character of the rivalry.
in interpreting how a Yemen military campaign (2015), Iran’s
response to the U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA (2018), and the
normalization of 2023 talk to each other and are interrelated. Arab Spring (2011): constructivism as
In other words, these events are not isolated, contrarily, are dominant
interconnected developments happening within a continuous bloc
of geopolitical dynamics. To aid this understanding, Table 1 offers The Arab Spring is best understood through constructivism,
a brief overview of selected geopolitical events from 2011 to which highlights the role of identity securitization, sectarian
2023 serving as causal milestones in intensifying and recalibrating mobilization, and regime legitimacy. As uprisings erupted in
the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Every event is documented for its Bahrain and Syria, Iran viewed them as Shi’a empowerment
strategic importance and is located within a broad interpretive and a challenge to tyrannical rule. Saudi Arabia, on the other
narrative that demonstrates the effectiveness of process tracing hand, viewed them as a threat to the stability of Sunni rule
in recreating diplomatic and security changes over time, Case- as well as the stability of the region. Such conflicting views
level reasoning evaluates information according to its significance, more eloquently explain the Saudi military action in Bahrain
giving preference to doubly decisive and smoking-gun evidence and Iranian rhetorical support for the opposition in Syria
when theoretical frameworks conflict. than any material calculations do. Symbolic acts demonstrate
This study looks at offensive realism in the context of regional how policy was shaped and defended under the paradigm of
players such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, focusing on their strategic ontological security (Shadunts, 2023; Adisönmez et al., 2022),
reason and pursuit of influence within a structural framework. while neorealism associates these series of events to systemic
This study, therefore, looks at offensive realism in the context of balancing behavior, constructivism better explains the ideational
regional players such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, paying attention to overreactions, identity-based securitization, and transformation of
their strategic reason and pursuit of influence within the structural local uprisings to region-wide conflicts.
framework. Both countries show offensive realism in proxy wars, Bahraini government requested in March of 2011 for the
alliances, and deterrent signaling, showing offensive behavior in Peninsula Shield forces to enter Bahrain, meanwhile Tehran was
power projection, which is typical for global powers. First, the framing protests as valid Shi’a mobilization associated with anti-
descriptive-analytical framework allows a detailed examination of authoritarian Shi’a legitimacy. Riyadh made the move in a bid to

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TABLE 1 Process-traced key events in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry (2011–2023).

Year Event Description Strategic impact Key references

2011 Arab Spring and Bahrain Popular uprisings swept the region; Iran Sectarian polarization intensifies; Bianco, 2018; Abdullah, 2012
Crisis backed Shi’a protests in Bahrain while Iran-GCC distrust deepens
Saudi troops entered to restore order

2015 Saudi-led Intervention in Saudi-led coalition launched Operation Proxy warfare escalates; rivalry Feierstein, 2017; Darwich,
Yemen Decisive Storm against Iranian-backed regionalized 2018
Houthis

2016 Execution of Sheikh Nimr Prominent Shi’a cleric executed; Iran’s Diplomatic relations severed; CJPME, 2018
al-Nimr reaction included attacks on Saudi ideological confrontation peaks
diplomatic missions

2018 U.S. Withdrawal from JCPOA U.S. exited Iran nuclear deal, Gulf instability surges; Riyadh endorses Cook, 2023
reimposing sanctions; Iran resumed U.S. maximum pressure
uranium enrichment

2019 Aramco Drone Attacks Saudi oil facilities targeted; attributed to Energy insecurity exposed; deterrence Salami, 2023
Iran or proxies credibility questioned

2020 Soleimani Assassination U.S. drone strike kills top Iranian Iran strengthens non-state alliances; Fantappie and Nasr, 2023
commander; regional tensions spike Saudi security recalibrated

2023 China-Brokered Diplomatic restoration via trilateral Strategic thaw; testing durability of Baghernia, 2024;
Rapprochement Beijing agreement normalization Commentary, 2023

prioritize regime security and alliance reassurance, which is in line domestic legitimacy needs into regional postures (Abdullah, 2012;
with identity securitization and balancing dynamics identified in Bianco, 2018; Legrenzi, 2011).
this case. Documented spikes in sectarian rhetoric in 2011–2012
in Bahrain and Syria illustrate how symbolic politics translated
domestic legitimacy needs into regional postures (Abdullah, 2012; U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA (2018):
Bianco, 2018; Legrenzi, 2011). neorealism as dominant

The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA illustrates the primacy

of neorealist systemic pressures. With the collapse of institutional
Yemen War (2015–present): offensive guarantees, Iran recalibrated its nuclear strategy, perceiving
realism as dominant survival within an anarchic order as contingent on deterrence.
Saudi Arabia, in turn, deepened reliance on U.S. defense
The Yemen War exemplifies offensive realist dynamics, as both guarantees, interpreting the collapse as confirmation of Iran’s
Saudi Arabia and Iran pursued regional power maximization under revisionist ambitions (Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 2016; Mirza
conditions of uncertainty. Iran’s support for the Houthis, although et al., 2021). While offensive realism helps explain Iran’s
limited in scope, symbolically expanded its influence at minimal assertive maneuvers post-2018, the dominant driver lies in the
cost (Juneau, 2020). Saudi Arabia responded with a full-scale absence of enforceable rules within the international system.
intervention to prevent the establishment of an Iranian-aligned Constructivism also complements this explanation by showing how
regime on its southern border, reflecting a strategy of pre-empting Iran reframed the JCPOA collapse as a narrative of revolutionary
encirclement. These behaviors fit Mearsheimer’s (2001) logic of resistance, bolstering regime legitimacy. As Arghavani Pirsalami
rational expansion rather than defensive balancing. Constructivist et al. (2023) demonstrate, Iran’s post-JCPOA posture was
insights remain relevant, especially regarding sectarian narratives simultaneously about ontological reassurance and regime survival,
that justified the conflict to domestic audiences (Bianco, 2018), but reinforcing the logic of deterrence and identity preservation even
they played a secondary role. Thus, the Yemen War underscores under systemic constraint. Together, these perspectives highlight
how Saudi Arabia and Iran deliberately expanded their strategic how structural insecurity and identity narratives combined to
depth through aggressive regional maneuvers, consistent with escalate rivalry.
offensive realist assumptions. In the period following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA
In March 2011, Peninsula Shield forces entered Bahrain at in May 2018, Iran took a nuclear posture that escalated demands
the government’s request, while Tehran framed the protests as step by step. It sought leverage through its nuclear program and
authentic Shi’a mobilization tied to anti-authoritarian legitimacy. regional behavior while maintaining a deterrent narrative to the
Riyadh’s move prioritized regime security and alliance reassurance, home audience. In response, Saudi Arabia increased its defense
consistent with identity securitization and balancing dynamics coordination with the US and other partners, viewing the failure
identified here. Documented spikes in sectarian rhetoric in 2011– of the negotiations as proof of the Iranian regime’s revisionist
2012 in Bahrain and Syria illustrate how symbolic politics translated ambitions. This sequence conforms to a neorealist interpretation

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of systemic pressure, with constructivist and ontological security Synthesis

use amplifying the interpretive threat and regime justification
(Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 2016; Shadunts, 2023; Arghavani Across these cases, the hybrid framework demonstrates
Pirsalami et al., 2023; Roberts, 2025). explanatory clarity by sequencing theories according to their
Beyond systemic insecurity, Iran’s reaction also reflected strongest causal fit. Constructivism provides the best explanation
deeper ontological anxieties. As Ezbidi (2023) notes, Tehran’s for the Arab Spring, where identity securitization was decisive.
leadership framed the U.S. withdrawal not merely as a Offensive realism dominates the Yemen War, where power
geopolitical loss but as a sectarian and ideological assault, maximization shaped the strategies of both states. Neorealism is
which intensified the regime’s reliance on symbolic narratives of most relevant to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, where
revolutionary resistance. This aligns with Arghavani Pirsalami systemic constraints drove behavior. Finally, the 2023 China-
et al. (2023), who emphasize that Iran’s post-JCPOA posture mediated normalization is best understood through a neorealist
combined deterrence with ontological reassurance. Thus, lens, though constructivist insights help explain the symbolic
the episode reveals how systemic and identity-based logics fragility of the rapprochement. By applying theories in this
reinforced one another, driving both strategic recalibration and sequenced manner, the study avoids theoretical over-layering
ideological consolidation. while retaining the complementarity of material and ideational
explanations. The Saudi–Iranian rivalry thus emerges as a strategic
identity conflict, where structural insecurity, rational expansion,
and ontological narratives reinforce one another across time.
China-mediated normalization (2023):
neorealism with constructivist support

The 2023 rapprochement brokered by China is best explained Conclusion

through neorealist balancing in a multipolar Gulf environment.
Saudi Arabia and Iran recognized the costs of continued At a foundational level, this study is grounded in the
confrontation and sought tactical de-escalation, facilitated by conviction that international relations, particularly in the Middle
China’s role as an external mediator (Baghernia, 2024). Roberts East, cannot be understood solely through the prism of material
(2025) characterizes this as “residual hegemony,” noting that power or transactional diplomacy. Instead, it approaches the
even amid U.S. retrenchment, its structural influence persists Saudi-Iranian rivalry as a deeply embedded conflict system,
through technological dependencies and institutional linkages. sustained not only by structural insecurity but by identity
However, the agreement’s fragility underscores the importance of politics, historical narratives, and normative contestation. The
constructivist factors: symbolic reconciliation did not resolve deep main problem addressed in this research was the absence
ontological insecurities or sectarian identity divides. Thus, while of a comprehensive, multi-dimensional framework capable of
neorealism accounts for the systemic incentives to balance within explaining both the enduring hostility and the periodic de-
a multipolar order, constructivism explains why this normalization escalation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This issue is critical,
remains shallow and unlikely to transform the rivalry into given the destabilizing effects of their rivalry on broader Gulf
sustained cooperation. security and the international system.
The March 2023 Beijing statement restored diplomatic ties Informed by an interpretivist methodology and a multi-
and produced subsequent embassy moves and high-level security theoretical framework, the study seeks not to reduce this rivalry
talks (Editors, 2024). Yet indicators in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria to a singular explanatory model but to understand it holistically,
showed uneven or minimal de-escalation through 2023–2024, as a phenomenon shaped by competing visions of regional order
suggesting a tactical thaw without identity transformation. China’s and political legitimacy. The framework combined Neorealism,
role functioned as brokerage rather than guarantee provision, which explained the rivalry’s systemic pressures; Offensive Realism,
while residual United States influence persisted through defense, which interpreted Iran and Saudi Arabia’s assertive behaviors
energy, and institutional channels (Baghernia, 2024; Cook, post-2011; and Constructivism, which revealed how sectarian
2023; Fantappie and Nasr, 2023; Commentary, 2023; Salami, identity, domestic ideological narratives, and ontological insecurity
2023). contributed to threat perception. This alignment not only
However, recent scholarship tempers optimism about the acknowledges their ontological divergence but explicitly shows
durability of this rapprochement. Cook (2023) and Fantappie how they can be methodologically reconciled through layered
and Nasr (2023) underline that normalization has not produced process tracing, allowing each paradigm to explain distinct causal
meaningful de-escalation in Yemen, Iraq, or Syria, suggesting mechanisms without theoretical incoherence.
that its impact remains largely symbolic. Salami (2023) further This study directly answered its two research questions. First
demonstrates how Iraq continues to experience competing Saudi (RQ1), it demonstrated that Saudi–Iranian interactions from 2011
and Iranian influences despite the Beijing accord, underscoring the to 2023 reshaped Gulf security by intensifying proxy conflicts,
fragile and uneven nature of the détente. Taken together, these forging external alliances, and recalibrating the regional order
accounts confirm that while neorealism explains the short-term through key events. Second (RQ2), it showed that efforts to
balancing incentives behind the deal, constructivism clarifies why preserve Gulf security were mediated not only by systemic
deep-seated identity cleavages prevent sustainable transformation constraints but also by sectarian narratives, regime legitimacy,
of the rivalry. and domestic political imperatives. These findings confirm that

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the rivalry persists because structural, strategic, and symbolic reconceptualizing the region not as a balance-of-power arena but
dimensions reinforce one another over time. as a shared security community, wherein coexistence is premised
This study aimed to provide a synthesized theoretical on mutual recognition rather than dominance.
framework regarding the Saudi-Iranian conflict triggered in 2011– This research also holds significant policy relevance. It calls
2023, spanning a period characterized by proxy wars, major for the institutionalization of GCC-Iran dialogue forums, nuclear
conflicts, and the change of key players in the region. The study confidence-building measures, and multilateral security platforms
showed how classical and modern forms of realism, especially inspired by the OSCE model. These recommendations flow
neorealism, remain useful to be applied to strategic behavior, but directly from the study’s findings: sectarian securitization during
not to the ideational, sectarian, and asymmetric factors that fuel the Arab Spring underscores the need for religious dialogue;
this conflict. This study, in an effort to close this gap, made use of the destabilization following the JCPOA withdrawal highlights
a combination of neorealism, offensive realism, constructivism as the urgency of nuclear CBMs; and the fragility of the 2023
well as a combination of interpretative and materialist approaches normalization demonstrates the necessity of institutionalized
where the focus is on securitization of meaning and legitimacy, Gulf-wide platforms. Furthermore, track II diplomacy, engaging
identity, and legitimacy securitization. religious, academic, and civil society actors, can complement state-
A review of these pivotal moments shows how the Arab Spring level dialogue by fostering epistemic trust and social resilience.
protests in 2011 deepened sectarian divisions in Bahrain and Syria, Finally, one has to acknowledge this study’s methodological
later leading to the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia limitations. This reliance on secondary sources limits access to real-
from 2015 with the asymmetric support of the Houthis and Saudi time decision processes and elite perceptions. Observational and
intervention. The 2018 U.S. JCPOA withdrawal led to regional descriptive research techniques in the field such as ethnographic
imbalance and harder, riskier moves, and the 2023 China-led studies in the regional capitals, focused interviews with high
normalization changed the pattern of outside mediation. These officials, and media discourse analysis should be incorporated in
moments illustrate the inseparable nature of security threats and the future research. Such research methodologies will allow us to
identity-driven strategies. Both ruling regimes took and amplified explore foreign policy and its formation in the context of Iran and
sectarian narratives in a bid to sustain their legitimacy at home and Saudi Arabia better.
to rationalize their actions in the region. To sum up, this study contributes to the Middle East’s
This study contributes originally to academic literature by international relations scholarship by offering a theoretically
proposing a revised neorealist framework that incorporates the comprehensive yet analytically rigorous treatment of what is
role of sectarianism and non-state actors into the structural arguably the region’s single most long-lasting and unresolved rift.
logic of international rivalry. By conceptualizing the Saudi- By answering the research questions posed and bridging theoretical
Iranian confrontation as a form of strategic identity conflict, the gaps, it develops an original hybrid framework of “strategic identity
study expands the boundaries of neorealism while maintaining realism” that connects physical power and identity politics. In
its core emphasis on survival and balancing behavior in an doing so, it invites scholars to move beyond strict theoretical silos
anarchic system. This hybrid framework provides a more accurate and view complexity as a positive analytic. In this way, this study
and nuanced explanation of the rivalry’s persistence, offering paves the way for research that can not only explain regional
scholars a new lens to analyze similar cases where identity, insecurity but also offer practical steps for its transformation. The
ideology, and power converge. Unlike previous analyses that policy measures in Section 6 translate these findings into practicable
treated these paradigms as incompatible, this study shows how their steps that prioritize institutionalized dialogue, nuclear and missile
ontological divergences can be reconciled and transformed into confidence-building, and desecuritization of sectarian identity.
analytical complementarity.
In terms of methodological innovation, the study applies
process tracing within a review-based design, demonstrating how Policy recommendations
descriptive analysis can be used to reconstruct strategic patterns
and diplomatic shifts across a defined historical timeline. This Considering the findings of this study, it is quite clear that
design allows for both theoretical depth and empirical clarity, durable de-escalation in the Gulf cannot be achieved through
making visible the causal mechanisms that connect events such episodic diplomacy or symbolic normalization. The Saudi-Iranian
as the 2015 Saudi intervention in Yemen, Iran’s response to rivalry is established as a structurally embedded conflict with
the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, and the China-mediated deep-rooted identity and ideological dimensions. Hence, its long-
normalization initiative of 2023. term stability calls for a strategic rethink of regional security
Importantly, the study also addressed how domestic political architecture, diplomatic engagement, and norm-building. Each of
imperatives; such as regime survival, ideological legitimacy, and the recommendations below flows directly from the key events and
elite discourse, shape external behavior. Constructivism was thus theoretical insights analyzed in the study.
applied to link the internal ideological construction of political First, drawing on the lessons of the Arab Spring (2011), when
elites with their foreign policy postures. sectarian securitization heightened identity-based polarization,
These findings underscore a central dilemma: while short- both Iran and Saudi Arabia should be encouraged to engage in
term diplomatic gestures may reduce tension, they do not resolve a formal, inclusive Gulf Dialogue Forum, ideally supported by
the underlying causes of regional insecurity. As long as threat neutral external factors such as Oman, Kuwait, or international
perceptions remain rooted in existential identity claims and zero- institutions. This platform would institutionalize communication
sum hegemonic aspirations, structural transformation will remain channels, allowing states to express concerns, share security
elusive. A meaningful shift in Gulf security, therefore, requires assessments, and negotiate disagreements before they escalate

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Albarasneh 10.3389/fpos.2025.1634560

into open hostility. This initiative should include all Gulf states, regional frameworks must include mechanisms for accountability,
regardless of ideological or sectarian orientation, to foster a sense transparency, and early warning systems. Drawing on UN best
of collective ownership over regional peace. practices, the Gulf could benefit from establishing a Regional
Second, reflecting the destabilization following the U.S. Conflict Prevention and Monitoring Center, equipped to analyze
withdrawal from the JCPOA (2018), there is a pressing need for tensions, report violations of agreements, and provide independent
confidence-building measures (CBMs) related to the nuclear and verification of state conduct. This would reduce the perception of
missile domains. As shown by the fallout from the withdrawal, bias and foster long-term trust.
regional actors are often left vulnerable to the consequences of In sum, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry must be addressed not only
great power negotiations. Iran and the GCC states should establish as a bilateral issue but as a systemic challenge to regional security
a regional nuclear transparency protocol, where technical experts and international order. By grounding these recommendations in
from both sides conduct reciprocal visits to observe nuclear the empirical cases analyzed and the hybrid theoretical framework
activities and missile development. This could be modeled after developed, the study demonstrates how institutional mechanisms,
the confidence-building practices of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, identity reconciliation, and strategic foresight can transition
adapted to the Gulf context. the Gulf from fragile détente to sustainable coexistence. The
Third, in line with findings from both the Arab Spring recommendations proposed here are therefore not abstract ideals
and the Yemen War (2015–present), which revealed the but pragmatic steps informed by the study’s findings, offering a
instrumentalization of sectarian identity, the desecuritization realistic roadmap for policymakers and scholars committed to
of sectarian identity must become a priority. The use of sectarian breaking the cycle of rivalry and reimagining the Gulf as a space
narratives has proven effective for short-term regime consolidation of cooperation.
but destructive for regional integration. Both Tehran and Riyadh
should revise state-sponsored curricula, media messaging,
and religious outreach to promote intra-Islamic tolerance and Author contributions
pluralism. The establishment of a joint Saudi-Iranian Commission
on Religious Dialogue; comprising clerics, scholars, and educators, AA: Supervision, Investigation, Software, Conceptualization,
would signal a commitment to reducing sectarian polarization. Writing – review & editing, Resources, Writing – original draft,
Such a step, while symbolic, would address one of the most emotive Validation, Project administration, Visualization, Methodology,
and instrumentalized drivers of rivalry. Data curation, Formal analysis.
Fourth, building on the study’s theoretical insight that Gulf
rivalry is sustained by shared vulnerabilities as much as by
divergent identities, regional security cooperation should be framed
Funding
around shared vulnerabilities rather than divergent identities.
The author(s) declare that no financial support was received for
Issues such as climate change, maritime piracy, cyberattacks, and
the research and/or publication of this article.
economic diversification affect all Gulf states. Initiatives like a Gulf
Environmental Security Council or a Joint Gulf Cyber Task Force
could serve as starting points for functional cooperation, creating
Acknowledgments
habits of interaction that may gradually soften strategic mistrust.
Fifth, recognizing the study’s finding that domestic imperatives;
The author would like to express sincere gratitude to
including regime survival and legitimacy concerns, shape
The University of Jordan for its valuable support and for
foreign policy behavior, any diplomatic effort that ignores
providing the resources and academic environment that made this
the internal political dynamics; such as elite fragmentation,
research possible.
legitimacy concerns, and ideological posturing, is unlikely to
succeed. Therefore, external mediators, such as China or the
EU, should adopt a dual-track diplomacy that engages both Conflict of interest
official representatives and influential societal actors (academics,
religious figures, media institutions) to build a multilayered The author declares that the research was conducted in the
peace constituency. absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
Sixth, as demonstrated by the fragility of the 2023 China- construed as a potential conflict of interest.
brokered normalization, while this development was a positive step,
it should not be overestimated. As Baghernia (2024) notes, China’s
involvement remains marginal in terms of sustained security Generative AI statement
guarantees. Regional actors must avoid becoming over-dependent
on external mediation and instead prioritize indigenous conflict The author(s) declare that no Gen AI was used in the creation
resolution models. A possible pathway could be the drafting of a of this manuscript.
Gulf Security Charter, drawing lessons from the ASEAN Treaty of Any alternative text (alt text) provided alongside figures in
Amity and Cooperation. Such a charter would codify principles of this article has been generated by Frontiers with the support of
sovereignty, non-intervention, and peaceful dispute settlement. artificial intelligence and reasonable efforts have been made to
Seventh, consistent with the study’s emphasis on structural ensure accuracy, including review by the authors wherever possible.
insecurity and the absence of enforcement mechanisms, future If you identify any issues, please contact us.

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