Position Paper – The United

States of America (USA)

Committee – DISEC (Disarmament and
International Security Committee)
The United Nations (UN) Disarmament and International Security Committee

(DISEC) was created as the first of the 6 Main Committees in the General

Assembly when the charter of the United Nations was signed in 1945. Thus, DISEC

is often referred to as the First Committee. DISEC was formed to respond to the

need for an international forum to discuss peace and security issues among

members of the international community. According to the UN Charter, the purpose

of DISEC in the General Assembly is to establish ‘general principles of cooperation

in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles

governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and also to give

“recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security

Council.” Although DISEC cannot directly advise the Security Council’s

decision-making process, the UN Charter explains that DISEC can suggest specific

topics for Security Council consideration. Aside from its role in the General

Assembly, DISEC is also an institution of the United Nations Office for

Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), formally named in January 1998 after the

Secretary-General’s second special session on disarmament in 1982. The UNODA

is concerned with disarmament at all levels—nuclear weapons, weapons of mass

destruction, and conventional weapons—and assists DISEC through its work

conducted in the General Assembly for substantive norm-setting support to further

its disarmament initiatives.

Agenda - The Ramifications of the Yemeni
Crisis
Delegate Name – Aaradhya Patel

Brief History and details of Yemen

The country of Yemen is situated in the southwestern corner in the Arabian Peninsula, and

is surrounded by mountains with sufficient patches of fertile land for agricultural purposes.

Yemen was home to a number of ancient kingdoms due to its fertility and commercial

prosperity; for this reason, it was known to the ancient Romans as Arabia Felix (Latin:

"Fortunate Arabia") to distinguish it from other countries of the Arab region.

The early expansion of Islam was greatly aided by Yemen. In addition to being a key port

along the maritime trade routes, the city of Aden served as a hub for the spread of Islam

throughout Africa and the Indian subcontinent. A number of early Islamic warfare and

political conflicts took place in Yemen.

The geographical isolation and steep topography of Yemen allowed the growth of different

regional identities within Yemen. The nation developed its own cultural practices and

traditions as a result of its isolation from the rest of the region and its relatively self

sufficient economy. This, supported with interactions and trade with various other

civilizations set the path for identification as a separate entity amongst the broader Arab

group.

In order to understand the current conflict, it is vital to highlight the role of religion and

internal differentiation within the country. Although the primary religion of the nation is

Islam, it is categorized with the existence of two main branches: Shia and Sunni. However,

it is important to note that this differentiation is not binary and there exists further sects

and sub groups within the above-mentioned branches.

Religion has a vital role to play in the self-identification of the citizens of Yemen, this
plays a vital role in differentiation amongst the community and political affiliation which

are major factors that have contributed to the current situation of the conflict.

Currently, about 65% of the population is made up of the Sunni majority while about 35%

of the population comprises the Shia minority. However, it is important to note that these

numbers are subject to frequent alterations.

Soon, the spirit of the revolution spread to the MENA region, including Yemen.

Yemen, one of the poorest countries, is arguably undergoing the world’s worst

humanitarian crisis.

Yemenis marched in Sana'a in January 2011 demanding that Ali Abdullah Saleh,

their leader, step down. Following a year of unrest and violence, Saleh resigned

in response to domestic and international pressure and was replaced by a

transitional government led by his previous vice president, Abderabbu Mansour

al-Hadi. When the Houthi Rebels violently took control of the capital in 2014,

the balance of power was fundamentally shifted. This series of events resulted in

the formation, in 2015, of a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia that

intervened on behalf of the internationally recognised Yemeni government

through air strikes, blockades, ground troops, and alliances with local groups

which have played a part in the increased violence in the country. To this day,

the country is engulfed in an armed conflict with no end in sight. Aside from the

ongoing conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic had ravaged the country and posed

an even greater threat to an already vulnerable population.

Due to a similar identity and shared history, diplomatic ties between the North and South

began in the 1980’s post the decline of socialist movements in the world. This set the basis

for a reunification of the two nations which culminated in the signing of the Yemen Unity

Agreement by leaders of the North and South in 1989. The formal unification took place

on the 22nd May 1990 thereby establishing the Republic of Yemen.

On December 17, 2010, an unwitting street vendor changed everything.

Muhammad Bouazizi sold fruit on his cart. Local authorities seized his cart
because he had no license. He offered to pay a fine, but instead, he was harassed

and humiliated. Mohammed Bouazizi then set himself on fire outside a local

government office. He was taken to the hospital, but he died a few weeks later.

Protests erupted after Tunisians declared him a national hero. Tunisia's

government fell a week after Bouazizi's death.

Since taking Sanaa, Yemen's capital, in 2014, the Houthis have formed an alliance

with many northern political, military, and tribal groups. The coalition, known as

the Sanaa-based authorities, has established control over state institutions,

marginalised political opponents, and steadily gained territory in the north. The

Houthis-led alliance currently controls almost all of northern Yemen and is the

dominant force in Yemen's most populous areas. The Houthis are also under attack

from a tangle of armed groups within Yemen, including the Islamist party Islah, a

southern separatist movement, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The aim of

the Houthis has changed over the years but its focus is to get international

recognition of the Houthi government. With the ongoing Sunni-Shia tensions, the

Houthis are supported by Iran, while the United States, Sunni-majority Saudi

Arabia, and other Gulf states support Yemen's internationally recognised

government.

Ali Abdullah Saleh took power in north Yemen in 1978 and remained president

after the country's unification with the south in 1990. He collaborated with tribal

power to take control of the country, putting members of his clan in key positions

in the army and economy, leading to accusations of corruption. When former allies

deserted him during the Arab Spring, Saleh joined forces with his former enemies,

the Houthis, and helped them in seizing Sanaa. Despite their differences, they ruled

a large portion of Yemen together after the war began in 2014. Then, seeing his

chance to reclaim power for his family by turning against the Houthis, Saleh

attempted to flee in 2017 and was killed. When Saleh switched sides, so did some

of his commanders and troops. They are now fighting against their former Houthi

allies under the command of the late president's nephew, Tarek, an army general

with ties to the UAE.

Abd-Rabbu Hadi, a general in south Yemen just before unification, supported Saleh

during the civil war in 1994. When the separatists were defeated, Saleh appointed

Hadi as Vice President. When Saleh was removed from office, Hadi was elected to

a two-year term in 2012 to direct a democratic transition involving a new

constitution and new elections in 2014. Hadi has been at odds with the UAE

because of his alliance with the Islamist Islah party. It is viewed as a branch of the

Muslim Brotherhood, which has been designated as a terrorist organisation by

Saudi Arabia and UAE.

When the Saudi-led Arab coalition intervened in March 2015 to fight the Houthi

rebels who had taken control of the country's major cities, southern separatists and

government-aligned forces joined the alliance. In 2015, the separatists, led by UAE

general Aidaroos al-Zubaidi, took Mukalla from al Qaeda and Aden from the

Houthis. They have over 50,000 fighters who have been armed and trained by the

UAE. In a power struggle with Hadi's government for control of the south, the main

separatist group, the Southern Transitional Council, has taken control of Aden

several times. Despite a deal arranged by Saudi Arabia to end the conflict in 2019,

tensions remain high.

It used the chaos of the Arab Spring to set up mini-states in eastern regions and

launched numerous attacks against Hadi's transitional government. During the civil

war, it launched attacks on both sides. Any extended chaos in Yemen could enable

it to plan attacks elsewhere.

Since 2016, the United Arab Emirates has provided military and financial aid to the

Security Belt, now a South transitional council(STC) dominated paramilitary group.

The United States, United Kingdom, France, and other Western countries have

provided firm military support and weapons to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.

Saudi troops have been placed along the borders and in some Yemeni provinces, but

the Saudi military focuses mainly on air strikes against Houthi-held areas. Saudi
Arabia has also provided Hadi with a refuge base as well as support for the fighting

in northern Yemen. Following an uproar over civilian casualties caused by the

coalition's bombings, Joe Biden stopped US support for the war and made ending it

a priority.

Iran has backed the Houthi rebels, who took control of parts of Yemen in 2014 and

began fighting a Saudi-led coalition in 2015. Despite claims from the UN and

others, Iran denies arming the Houthis, while the Houthis claim their drones and

missiles are manufactured domestically.

Since the Houthis captured Yemen's capital, Sanaa, in 2014, they have formed

alliances with many political, military and tribal groups in the north. The

coalition, known as the Sanaa Authority, took control of the country's

institutions, marginalized political opponents and steadily gained territory in

the north. The Houthi-led coalition now controls almost all of northern Yemen

and is the dominant force in Yemen's most populous regions. The Houthis are

also under attack in Yemen by several armed groups, including the Islamist

Islah party, the southern separatist movement and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula. The goal of the Houthi has changed over the years, but it aims to

gain international recognition for the Houthi government. Due to ongoing

Sunni-Shia tension, Iran supports the Houthis, while the United States,

Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states support Yemen's

internationally recognized government.

The rise of non-state actors primarily originates in regions of political instability. This

leaves a power vacuum in the region that is filled in by various radical groups that aim at

securing control in the region. The instability in Yemen and growing tensions amongst the

North and South post-Unification further aggravated the situation

The birth of non-state actors in Yemen began with early recruitments by the Mujahideen to

fight the Soviet-Afghan war in Afghanistan. The prominent influence of individuals like

Osama Bin Laden paved the path for Al-Qaeda in the region. The Yemeni branch of AL
Qaeda thrived on exploiting the tribal population of the region by gaining the support of

certain communities. This was also supported by the economic instability and lack of

development in various regions of the nation.

The economic disparity and lack of opportunities create a vacuum of purpose among the

youth. These grave factors led to the growth of Al-Qaeda ideology amongst the youth who

were attracted towards a purpose and financial incentives.

In 2009, the Yemeni and Saudi Branches of Al-Qaeda eventually merged to form

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) which eventually became one of the most

dangerous units of the non-state actor. Yemen became a base to launch attacks and recruit

new members.

The growing civil war between the Houthis and the government forces have further

allowed non-state actors to solidify their presence in the region. ISIS also managed to

attain a foothold in the region back in 2014 in light of the civil war.

Numerous claims of war crimes committed by various parties participating in the

continuing conflict in Yemen have been made. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians, the

damage of civilian infrastructure, the targeting of hospitals and schools, and the

employment of illegal weapons are all considered war crimes. Both the Houthi rebels

supported by Iran and the Saudi-led coalition that backs Yemen's internationally

recognized government have been charged with these atrocities.

Undoubtedly, the region has served as a platform for a proxy war between the two

dominant powers of the region- Iran and Saudi Arabia. Their involvement in the war

questions their liability to war crimes committed in the region.

The Saudi led Coalition has been repeatedly bombing regions under Houthi control which

includes the capital of Sana’a. Saudi Arabia has bombed marketplaces like the Bazaar- Al

Hudaydah, schools and even hospitals in the region killing many civilians.

The Saudis have also bombed ports of the region thereby disconnecting the region from

humanitarian aid leading to further death of innocent civilians

The United States remains the primary supporter of Saudi Arabia since the second world

war. The nation still remains as the largest arms importer from the USA. However, the

United States support is not limited to arms but also training and refuelling of fighter F

15’s mid-battle giving them longer range to strike targets in Yemen.

The humanitarian crisis in Yemen is an urgent situation that has unfolded due to a

combination of conflict, political instability, and economic collapse. Since the conflict

erupted in 2014, Yemen has witnessed widespread suffering, with millions of its citizens

grappling with displacement, famine, and a severe lack of basic necessities. The

destruction of critical infrastructure, including healthcare facilities and schools, has left

the population vulnerable to diseases and limited access to education.

Among the most vulnerable are children, women, and the elderly, who find themselves in

an increasingly dire situation due to persistent shortages of basic necessities. As the

conflict rages on, the daily lives of Yemeni civilians are marred by the commission of war

crimes and the flagrant violation of human rights.

The humanitarian crisis has reached a critical juncture, as access to essential resources

such as food, clean water, and medical care becomes increasingly limited. The lines

between combatants and innocent bystanders blur, leaving countless civilians trapped in a

cycle of despair. This crisis extends beyond physical hardships, as psychological and

emotional scars accumulate among a population that has endured prolonged turmoil.

The conflict, which escalated from a civil war to a complex regional struggle, has led to a

mass displacement of Yemeni citizens, forcing many to flee their homes in search of

safety and basic necessities. These displaced individuals have been uprooted from their

communities due to violence, insecurity, and the collapse of essential services. More than

3 million people have been displaced, with over 24 million people in need of assistance.

The crisis has also led to Yemeni refugees seeking asylum in neighboring countries and

beyond. The challenges faced by these refugees are exacerbated by the fact that many

countries in the region such as Djibouti and Ethiopia, are themselves grappling with their

own economic, social, and political difficulties. This places an additional strain on the
host nations' resources and infrastructure, making it difficult to adequately provide for the

needs of both their own citizens and incoming refugees.

The large-scale violence and chaos also raises the chances of human trafficking. Migrant

workers from the Horn of Africa who remained or arrived in Yemen during the reporting

period may have endured intensified violence, and women and children may have

become vulnerable to trafficking. The government is unable to pursue any investigations,

prosecutions, or convictions of government officials complicit in trafficking offenses,

despite reports of some international agencies of officials engaged in trafficking in both

urban and rural areas, including the domestic servitude of children and women, sex

trafficking of women, recruitment and use of child soldiers by the government of the

Republic of Yemen Armed Forces, and forced labor of migrant workers.

The hostilities around the port city of Hodeidah means that several transport links that are

vital to securing humanitarian access, are under threat. About 90% of all food imports and

70% of all humanitarian aid are now estimated to enter Yemen through Hodeidah. The

Security Council established a Special Political Mission to support the ceasefire between

the government and Houthi rebels around the port of Hodeidah.

The humanitarian conditions experienced by women and children in Yemen paint a

distressing picture of vulnerability and suffering. Women, in particular, face grave

challenges as safety and security erode due to the conflict. Heightened risks of sexual and

gender-based violence become a grim reality in the absence of law and order. The

UNFPA also reports that cases of gender-based violence have surged by over 63% since

the conflict escalated, placing women at increased risk of abuse and exploitation. Access

to healthcare, especially reproductive services, becomes a struggle, contributing to higher

rates of maternal mortality and childbirth complications. Additionally, the prevailing food

shortages disproportionately affect women, who often prioritize feeding their families

over their own nutrition. The displacement caused by the conflict further compounds their

hardships, exposing them to harsh living conditions and limited access to essential

resources.
For Yemeni children, the crisis is equally dire. The World Health Organization (WHO)

highlights the alarming impact of disrupted healthcare on children, with under-five

mortality rates at a staggering 55.4 deaths per 1,000 live births, one of the highest in the

world.

Malnutrition rates have reached alarming levels, leaving nearly 2.3 million children under

the age of 5 suffering from acute malnutrition. Many lack access to sufficient and

nutritious food, leading to devastating health consequences. Education disruption is

another pressing concern, as conflict-damaged schools or safety concerns force children,

especially girls, to drop out. The psychological impact is substantial, with children

exposed to trauma from prolonged violence and displacement. Their physical health is

also at risk due to limited access to healthcare, resulting in preventable diseases taking a

toll. In the midst of this crisis, the imperative to protect, support, and prioritize the needs

of women and children cannot be overstated. Urgent international attention is required to

ensure their well-being and secure a more stable future for Yemen.

With a devastating crisis within the nation, the future for the people of Yemen seems

bleak. This is primarily due to a lack of governance, insufficient healthcare and minimal

funds. The conflict in the nation must be put to rest and efforts must be made to restore

peace in the region. The international community as responsible nations should aid in the

restoration and rehabilitation of the damaged nation

Stance of the United States of

America
Ambassadors were briefed by the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, who commended
Oman for its efforts to achieve the agreement which came into effect on 6 May.

He said the cessation of hostilities represented an important and necessary de-escalation in the Red
Sea following the resumption of deadly US airstrikes on Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.

However, recent events show that the country is still ensnared in wider regional tensions, he said,
pointing to Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport in Israel and Israel’s subsequent strikes on
Hudaydah Port, Sana’a Airport, and other locations.
“Nevertheless, the announcement of 6 May provides a welcome opportunity on which we must
collectively build to refocus on resolving Yemen’s conflict and advancing a Yemeni-owned peace
process,” he said.

The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, and Yemeni Government forces, backed by a Saudi-led
coalition, have been battling for control of the country for more than a decade.

“The challenges facing Yemen are immense: from the deep and significant levels of mistrust between
the parties, with some still reportedly preparing for war, to near economic collapse,” Mr. Grundberg
told the Council

He said the UN will continue to work to bring the sides to the table to identify and agree on solutions
that are acceptable to all.

“Yemenis want to move forward – the status quo is untenable,” he insisted. “And while the frontlines
may currently appear relatively stable, what Yemen has now is not peace.”

He stressed the need for continued engagement by the international community to help the Yemeni
people realize their desire to build a stable, prosperous and safe country.

Mr. Grundberg used the briefing to again highlight the plight of personnel from the UN, international
and national NGOs, civil society and diplomatic missions, who continue to be arbitrarily detained by
the Houthis.

“Not only is their detention in violation of international law, but it has also caused a significant
chilling effect throughout the international community, which only has one outcome: undermining
support to Yemen, which will sadly impact the Yemenis most in need,” he said.

He welcomed the recent release of staff members from the Dutch Embassy and international
organization, saying “this demonstrates what is possible, but these releases are woefully
insufficient.”

The Special Envoy concluded his remarks by stating that Yemenis have endured over 10 years of
instability, uncertainty and economic collapse.

Speaking directly to the population, he reiterated that “I see you. I hear you. You have not been
forgotten - and I won’t relent in my efforts to pursue peace and stability in Yemen.”

He urged the warring parties “to be courageous and choose dialogue,” emphasizing that “the United
Nations will not waiver in its commitment to support you in finding a negotiated settlement to this
conflict.”

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A spate of recent attacks on United States facilities and personnel in three Middle Eastern countries
and Washington, D.C.’s retaliatory air strikes, alongside the ongoing Red Sea crisis, threaten to further
exacerbate an already volatile regional situation, a senior United Nations official today warned the
Security Council.

Rosemary A. Dicarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, briefed the
Council on the rising tensions, with near daily incidents since mid-October 2023 — including some
165 attacks on United States facilities in Syria and Iraq, prompting American strikes in the two
countries. Then, on 28 January, a drone attack killed three United States service members and
injured 40 in north-east Jordan. She recalled that on 2 February, United States Central Command
said it had carried out 85 air strikes in Iraq and Syria against reported Iranian affiliated groups.

Syria and Iraq condemned those strikes, she noted, claiming they had resulted in deaths and injured
civilians, while the United States said it had targeted command and control operations, intelligence
centres and weapons facilities and was not seeking conflict in the Middle East or elsewhere.

Stressing nearly five months of heartache and anguish for Israelis and Palestinians in Gaza, she
reiterated the Secretary-General’s call for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. As long-
term regional stability demands the implementation of a clear political road map in each situation,
she appealed to the Council to continue actively engaging all concerned parties to prevent further
escalation.

In the ensuing debate, some delegates supported the position on the legitimacy of the strikes,
emphasizing that they were necessary to support sovereignty and international peace and security,
while others disputed that narrative as Western and impractical.

The United States representative recalled that, on 2 February, his country conducted precision air
strikes in Iraq and Syria against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated militia groups
— necessary and proportionate action. The United States does not desire more conflict in the region
where it is actively working towards de-escalating the conflict in Gaza. Also, “we are not seeking a
direct conflict in Iran,” he asserted.

Echoing that position, the United Kingdom’s delegate condemned the multiple attacks since
October 2023 by Iran-aligned militant groups on the Global Coalition against Da’esh and Iraqi military
bases in Syria and Iraq. Expressing full support for the right of Washington to self-defence, she said
that the Global Coalition has one objective: to counter Da’esh. Iran’s political, financial and military
support to militant groups is destabilizing the region and threatens the collective ability to counter
Da’esh.

Turning to the Red Sea, the representative of the Republic of Korea said the Houthis have continued
their indiscriminate attacks on merchant and commercial vessels, jeopardizing the free flow of
commerce in the Red Sea. He noted measures taken by United States forces to limit the risk of
escalation in defending their personnel and facilities. “Above all, at this volatile moment, when
miscalculation can unintendedly lead to a tinderbox, any attempts to politically exploit the situation
and risk regional stability are unacceptable,” he stressed.

Other delegates pushed back on that narrative, with the representative of the Russian Federation
stating that due to the 85 so-called “retaliation strikes” on the territory of Iraq and Syria, civilians and
soldiers died, pointing to the aggressive nature of the United States in the Middle East. He also
highlighted the participation of the United Kingdom, stressing that the ongoing attacks against
Yemen undermine the central role of the United Nations. Spotlighting Washington, D.C.’s brazen
aggression against Iraq’s sovereignty, he cited the alleged coordination of the strikes with Baghdad as
“a deliberate lie”. The escalation of violence has already gone far beyond the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, into the Red Sea and Yemen, he cautioned.

The representative of Iraq condemned and categorically rejected any attack against several areas
within its territory, which have led to loss of life and injuries, undermining sovereignty and territorial
integrity. He further rejected attacks on its military bases, or the use of its territory to be used for
score settling or for policies to be rolled out, condemning the United States’ attacks targeting military
positions, which led to dozens of deaths among personnel and civilians. He reiterated the
importance of the Council in shouldering its responsibility for the maintenance of international
community peace and security, to combat all violations and ensure respect for the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.

In a similar vector, the representative of Syria stressed that the aggression by the United States
against his country constitutes a threat to regional and international peace and security, in blatant
violation of international law. Even historical sites — including the ancient Al-Rahba Citadel — were
targeted. “The United States is presenting a distorted interpretation of the UN Charter, especially
Article 51, ignoring the fact that occupation has no right to self-defence, and that the root causes of
conflicts, suffering, and instability in the region are the wrongful policies of the United States and its
blind and unlimited support for the Israeli occupation entity,” he asserted.

The representative of Iran, rejecting the accusations against his country, stressed that it never seeks
to contribute to the spillover in the region and has no military presence in Iraq. In Syria, Iranian
military advisers are legally present since they were invited officially by Damascus to fight terrorism.
“It is evident to everyone that the root causes of the current situation in the region are occupation,
aggression, and the continued genocide and horrific atrocities committed by the Israeli regime and
fully supported by the [United States] against innocent Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank,”
he pointed out.

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Since 2015, conflict has caused widespread humanitarian suffering and significant infrastructure
damage in Yemen, long the Arab world's poorest country. In 2021, the UN estimated that 377,000
people had died as a result of the conflict (including combatants) and that nearly 60% of deaths were
from non-military causes, such as lack of food, water, or health care. Foreign observers have
denounced human rights violations attributed to all parties. Since the truce expired in 2022, fighting
has not returned to "pre-truce levels." Houthi cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia and Saudi-led
coalition airstrikes ceased, though the Houthis threaten to strike countries that could support U.S.
operations. In 2021, President Donald Trump designated the Houthis a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist entity (SDGT) and Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). President Joe Biden reversed these
steps before redesignating the Houthis as an SDGT in 2024. President Trump redesignated the
Houthis as an FTO in March 2025.

Through 2024, U.S. diplomats said they sought to transform the truce into a durable ceasefire,
enable a political solution, and support UN mediation. Ambassador Steven Fagin has served as U.S.
Ambassador to Yemen since June 2022, and is serving as Chargé d' Affaires ad interim in Iraq.

In July 2025, the Administration called for an end to the UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah
Agreement (UNMHA), saying its mandate to support implementation of a December 2018 ceasefire
agreement that halted fighting over Yemen's Red Sea ports "have long been superseded by
circumstances." On July 9, 2025, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg said security
conditions in Yemen are "fragile and unpredictable," and he warned that "for some – on both sides
of the conflict – the appetite for a military escalation remains."

Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks on Israel, and Israel's military operations in Gaza,
the Houthis began targeting Israeli territory as well as commercial ships transiting the Bab al Mandab
Strait. The Houthis claimed to have targeted Israel-linked vessels, but they have targeted vessels from
many countries, diverting more than half of the pre-conflict maritime traffic from the Red Sea
and driving up global shipping costs and insurance premiums. The Houthis halted attacks following
the January 2025 Israel-Hamas ceasefire, but resumed attacks on land-based targets in Israel in
March. In July 2025, the Houthis resumed maritime attacks, sinking two vessels and capturing some
crew members. UN Security Council Resolution 2722 (2024) demands the Houthis cease attacks, and,
in July 2025, the Council voted to extend related reporting provisions until January 2026.

Through 2024, U.S. forces intercepted Houthi-launched projectiles, prevented some attempted
Houthi seizures of vessels, led coalition patrol operations, and struck Houthi targets in Yemen. U.S.
forces took responsibility for Red Sea presence and information sharing missions under Operation
Prosperity Guardian in February 2025. On March 15, 2025, U.S. forces began a military campaign the
Administration intended to compel the Houthis to end their attacks and eliminate their capability to
threaten maritime transit. The Houthis resisted, attacked U.S. Navy ships, and shot down U.S.
unmanned aircraft. The U.S.-Houthi truce has held since May 2025. In June, U.S.
CENTCOM stated that "Only through a whole of government approach, of which military operations
are a key component, will a sustained return of freedom of navigation be guaranteed."

Foreign support and accumulated expertise may allow the Houthis to pose enduring maritime
security risks. U.S. sanctions actions target the group's global support networks. U.S. officials
have described Iran's efforts to supply the Houthis with weaponry, targeting information, and
military advice. In July, U.S. officials announced that Yemeni forces had seized 750 tons of munitions
and hardware intended for Houthi use. In 2024, a U.S. official said, "Iran does not control the
Houthis" but without Iran's assistance, "the Houthis would struggle to effectively track and strike
vessels navigating shipping lanes."

The UN reports that 19.5 million Yemenis (more than half the population) need humanitarian
assistance and protection. In May 2025, UN agencies and humanitarian organizations warned that
without changes to a trend of "drastic cuts" to funding, needs in Yemen "will worsen ... and will likely
cause an increase in morbidity and mortality in the coming months." As of July 22, 2025, the annual
UN humanitarian funding appeal for Yemen sought $2.47 billion to provide life-saving assistance to
10.5 million people and was 13.1% funded. Limits on movement and bureaucracy constrain
humanitarian access and affect aid delivery, largely in Houthi-controlled areas, where the Houthis
have detained UN and aid workers. Terrorism designations, U.S. assistance policy changes, or
escalation of conflict could affect trade and humanitarian operations.

The 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 118-159) did not extend a previous ban on U.S. in-
flight refueling of aircraft engaged in hostilities in Yemen's civil war. Supplemental appropriations for
FY2024 (P.L. 118-50) and continuing appropriations for FY2025 (P.L. 119-4) provide additional funds
for U.S. Central Command. President Trump, like President Biden, has asserted authority to direct
military operations in Yemen pursuant to the President's constitutional authority as Commander in
Chief and Chief Executive. In April, some Representatives and Senators sought details from the
Administration on its strategy and plans. Through oversight and appropriations, Congress may
evaluate, support, or constrain executive branch efforts to weaken Houthi capacity, interdict Iranian
support, or address humanitarian conditions.

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While there were no significant changes in the human rights situation in the government-controlled
areas of Yemen during the year, the Iran-backed Ansar Allah, commonly referred to as the Houthis,
rounded up more than 100 Yemenis working for humanitarian and diplomatic organizations that
were operating within areas of their control. The June roundup coincided with a Houthi media
campaign using a series of broadcasts with fabricated and forced confessions, heavily featuring
current and former U.S. locally employed staff detained since 2021, alleging international and
nongovernmental organizations were operating to subvert all aspects of Yemeni society.

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings;
disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or
detention; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict;
serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of
violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship;
restrictions of religious freedom; crimes, violence, or threats of violence motivated by antisemitism;
trafficking in persons, including forced labor; and significant presence of the worst forms of child
labor.

This report covers abuses by the government and other actors that exerted control over areas of the
country (including the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council), otherwise
referred to as “the parties in Yemen.” The Houthis controlled the former capital of Sana’a, including
remnants of former state institutions and entities located there, as well as much of northern Yemen,
where approximately two thirds of the citizens lived.

The government did not take credible steps to identify and punish officials who committed human
rights abuses.

Nongovernmental actors, including tribal militias, the Houthi terrorist militia, and other terrorist
groups (including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and a local branch of ISIS), committed significant
abuses with impunity. The Houthis confiscated state resources, extorted the business sector, and
diverted humanitarian assistance. They misused anti-corruption authorities established by former
president Ali Abdullah Saleh to stifle dissent and repress political opponents. Houthi control in the
north severely reduced the government’s capacity to investigate abuse or corruption.

There were numerous reports of government, progovernment, rebel, terrorist, and foreign forces
committing arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year.

From August 2023 through July 31, the National Commission for the Investigation of Alleged
Violations of Human Rights (NCIAVHR) investigated 74 cases of alleged extrajudicial killings across the
country. The NCIAVHR found government-backed military and security forces committed 12 reported
killings, and the Houthis reportedly carried out 42.

The Abductees Mothers Association (AMA) announced in April that Ali Shajia’i, a civilian from the
Tihama region, died in Hudaydah while in the custody of the Joint Forces on the West Coast, a group
linked to the country’s internationally recognized government. The reason for his detention was
unclear.

The NCIAVHR reported that on July 7, government forces stationed in al-Hadd, in the Yafi’ District of
Lahij Governorate, struck the house of a civilian amid clashes with the Houthis, resulting in the death
of a young girl.

In March, a Houthi convoy of 14 heavily armed vehicles entered a residential area in Rada’a, al-Bayda
Governorate, and fighters planted explosives in a residence, resulting in the deaths of at least 13
civilians, including four children.

In July, Houthi armed men stormed a mosque in the village of Minjarah, in the al-Sawar District of al-
Mahwit Governorate, and fired live ammunition indiscriminately, killing a man and a woman.
On March 23, the human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Justice for Yemen Pact
reported the Houthis detained and tortured Sabri Abdullah Ali al-Hakimi, an employee of the
Ministry of Education in Sana’a, leading to his death in detention. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen
(POE) reported in October that at least five individuals died as a result of torture during the year

There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government
authorities.

The law restricted freedom of expression, specifying members of the press were permitted to
exercise that right only within the limits of the law. The law also called for journalists to uphold
national unity and prohibited criticism of the head of state. Government-aligned actors did not
respect even these restricted rights, and the Houthis significantly restricted freedom of expression in
areas under their control through violence and intimidation.

Progovernment militias, Houthis, and tribal militias were responsible for a range of abuses against
media outlets.

All parties to the conflict significantly restricted freedom of expression. Women human rights
defenders (HRDs), journalists, and activists faced specific repression based on their sex. HRDs faced
harassment, threats, and smear campaigns from the government, Saudi-led coalition, and Houthi
forces.

The NGO Reporters Without Borders wrote that journalists risked abuse by the parties in Yemen,
including abduction, killing, torture, or cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment.

The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate reported 17 “violations” against journalists, workers, and media
outlets during the year. The Houthis and the government reportedly committed five violations
respectively, while the Southern Transitional Council (STC) committed three. The reported violations
included the deprivation of freedom and assault of media institutions and individuals.

Freedom House reported freedom of expression and private discussion were severely limited
because of intimidation by armed groups and unchecked surveillance by the Houthis. The report
cited Houthi operatives blocking news websites, online messaging, social media platforms, and
satellite broadcasts. In April, the Houthis, as part of a larger prisoner exchange with the government,
released four journalists unlawfully detained in 2015 and sentenced to death in 2020.

In April, Amnesty international reported that in August 2023 government-affiliated security forces in
Marib seized the camera of a media producer and deleted his news footage. The producer was
released from detention after signing a pledge that he would not film in the city without a permit.
The report did not specify the permitting requirements the media producer violated.

Houthi actors engaged in numerous attacks against journalists. Amnesty International reported in
April that five armed men physically assaulted journalist Mujalli al-Samadi, an avid critic of Houthi
leadership, in August 2023. Samadi reported the incident to the al-Sabaeen District police station,
but authorities reportedly failed to hold anyone accountable. Amnesty International went on to
report that in September 2023, Houthi operatives detained journalist Nabil al-Sidawi and sentenced
him to eight years in Houthi-controlled “prison.”

All parties to the conflict routinely retaliated against media outlets and workers expressing critical
views and censored media outlets in areas under their control. All parties to the conflict restricted
access for international reporters, as well as rights documentation bodies. Reporters Without
Borders stated that finding independently reported news and information in the country was difficult
because all parties in Yemen controlled media outlets. The organization noted journalists’ activities
were closely monitored and that anything from social media posts to published articles could result
in arrest.

The Yemeni Media Freedoms Observatory (Marsadak) reported in March that the STC-affiliated
“National Southern Media Authority,” an extra-governmental group, forbade hotel and event venue
owners from holding any media events without the group’s prior approval.

Marsadak reported security forces affiliated with the Security Belt Forces arrested journalist Fahmy
al-Alimi on July 18 for criticizing the STC. Alimi was detained for five days before committing not to
work for any media outlet without approval from the “National Southern Media Authority.”

In its World Freedom Report, released in April, Freedom House assessed that the government
historically controlled much of the terrestrial television and radio. Houthis reportedly regularly
blocked certain news websites, online messaging and social media platforms, and satellite
broadcasts.

The law provided for the right of citizens employed in the private sector to join unions and bargain
collectively. The conflict made it difficult, however, to assess whether these rights were respected or
penalties enforced. These protections did not apply to public servants, day laborers, domestic
servants, foreign workers, and other groups who together made up most of the workforce. The civil
service code covered public servants. The law prohibited antiunion retaliation, including prohibiting
dismissal for union activities. While unions could negotiate wage settlements for their members and
could conduct strikes or other actions to achieve their demands, workers had the right to strike only
if prior attempts at negotiation and arbitration failed. Unions had to give advance notice to the
employer and the government and receive prior written approval from the executive office of the
General Federation of Yemen Workers’ Trade Unions before striking. Strikes could not be carried out
for “political purposes.” The proposal to strike had to be put to at least 60 percent of all workers
concerned, of whom 25 percent had to vote in favor of the strike. Foreign workers could join unions
but could not hold office.

The government was unable to enforce labor laws due to the conflict. The government did not
enforce laws on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining in areas under its
control. Parties to the conflict often accused unions and associations of being linked to a political
group or opposition. Additionally, Houthi-controlled former ministries purportedly responsible for
the implementation of labor laws in areas under Houthi control did not implement the law in those
areas.

Observers also warned that any civil society projects or funds deemed politically opposed to the STC
risked having their activities being banned or shut down.

The whereabouts of Yemeni Teacher Club leader Abu Zaid al-Kumaim remained unknown at year’s
end. Houthi operatives abducted him in October 2023 after he organized a two-month teachers’
strike.

The law provided for a minimum wage for all sectors. The minimum wage for private-sector
employees had to at least equal the public-sector minimum wage which was below the poverty
estimate. The law mandated that wage payments depended on the terms of the employment
contract. Employees could be paid on a monthly, fortnightly, weekly, or hourly basis.

The minimum civil service wage was more than the estimated poverty income level, but many civil
servants were not paid consistently, and most salaries were too low to provide for a large family.
Workdays were limited to eight hours. Work weeks were limited to 48 hours distributed over six
working days followed by one day of paid rest. The maximum working hours during the month of
Ramadan could not exceed six hours per day or 36 hours per week. The law required an employee’s
workday to have at least one hour of rest so that any continuous period of work did not exceed five
hours. Friday was the day of rest but could be substituted for another day of the week if required for
work. The conflict made it difficult to verify whether these laws were respected.

Occupational safety and health (OSH) laws and standards were not appropriate for the main
industries in the country.

Responsibility for identifying unsafe situations remained with OSH experts and not the worker. The
law provided workers the right to remove themselves from a hazardous workplace. The conflict
made it difficult determine how or whether the government responded to workers’ OSH complaints.

The law obligated employers to provide health care to workers for preemployment medical
examinations and for periodic medical exams while employed. The conflict made it difficult to verify
whether these laws were implemented consistently.

There was no credible information available regarding work-related accidents or fatalities during the
year.

The government did not, or was unable to, enforce penalties for wage, hour, or OSH violations. No
information was available regarding penalties imposed for wage and hour violations or if any were
applied. Many workshops and stores operated 10- to 12-hour shifts without penalty. In practice, the
agencies responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws did not operate or were significantly
impaired, due to the conflict. The number of labor inspectors was insufficient to enforce compliance.
Inspectors had no authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimated in March 2021 (the most
recent information available) that informal employment represented 78 percent of total
employment. Various sources reported the impact of conflict and lack of effective economic policies
or enforcement authorities caused the informal sector in both government- and Houthi-controlled
areas to develop at an “accelerated pace.” OSH law did not apply to the informal sector, including
domestic servants, casual workers, or agricultural workers. The government did not enforce other
labor laws applicable to this sector. Working conditions were poor in the informal sector, and wage
and overtime violations were common. Foreign migrant workers, youth, and women workers
typically faced the most exploitative working conditions.

There were numerous reports of enforced disappearances by or on behalf of government,

progovernment, Houthi, terrorist, and foreign forces.

The NCIAVHR’s September report stated forces and security agencies affiliated with the government
were responsible for at least 159 cases of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances. Omar
Suleiman Ahmed Bama’as was arrested at a checkpoint in government-controlled Hadhramawt
Governorate in August 2023, without legal justification. His family was denied information regarding
his whereabouts, and his son’s request to see him was rejected despite the attorney general’s
directives. His whereabouts remained unknown as of December.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that United Arab Emirates-backed forces, in particular the STC,
arbitrarily arrested and forcibly disappeared individuals at two informal detention facilities.
The Houthis conducted a new series of detentions, arresting additional current and former local
employees of the U.S. Embassy. Between May and June, the Houthis detained and forcibly
disappeared more than 60 humanitarian employees, including at least 13 UN staff members,
according to media and NGO sources.

The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to
challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The parties in Yemen did not observe
these requirements.

Local NGOs reported arrests by unidentified authorities or security forces and frequent
incommunicado detentions for long periods of time. In its September report, the AMA detailed 833
cases of arbitrary detention in 2023, of which government-affiliated forces were reportedly
responsible for 28 cases, STC-affiliated forces for 51, and the Houthis for 754.

Local NGOs reported governmental and Houthi security agents regularly removed some persons
suspected of crimes from their homes at night and detained them without warrants, in contravention
of the law.

Prolonged detentions without charge or, if charged, without a public preliminary judicial hearing
within a reasonable time were believed to be common practice by the parties in Yemen, despite their
prohibition by law.

On August 14, the American Center for Justice accused the Houthis of detaining Hanan al-Muntasir,
from the Tihama region, for two years, subjecting her to torture and forcing her to sign a false
admission of guilt before referring her to a Houthi-controlled “court.” The center also stated the
Houthi “criminal court of appeals” increased her sentence from 12 years to 13 years in August,
claiming she spied for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The constitution and law prohibited torture and other such practices, but there were credible reports
government officials and progovernment, foreign, Houthi, and terrorist forces committed such
abuses, including against journalists, HRDs, and migrants. Although the law lacked a comprehensive
definition of torture, there were provisions allowing prison terms of up to 10 years for torture.

The POE reported in October that the Houthis systematically subjected detainees to torture and
other forms of degrading treatment, including beatings, starvation, electrical shock, mock
executions, and sexual assault.

Prisoners in the Central Security Camp in Sana’a, operated by the Houthi National Committee for
Prisoners Affairs under Abdulqader al-Mortada, endured severe systemic torture, according to the
POE’s November 2023 report. Detainees, including political prisoners, journalists, and others,
suffered beatings, electric shocks, and other forms of abuse. According to media reports, al-Mortada
was personally involved in these abuses, resulting in permanent disabilities and even deaths.

Impunity was a significant problem among government security forces, including a lack of effective
mechanisms to investigate and prosecute abuse. Civilian control of security agencies was weak.
There was no information that the government, the STC, or the Houthis took any accountability
measures for these abuses.

Investigations in the October POE report revealed that prisoners in Houthi detention facilities were
subjected to solitary confinement in dark cells for extended periods, leading to conditions like
paralysis, amnesia, and blindness.
An HRW report in February documented that the Houthis recruited more than 70,000 new fighters,
including children as young as 13, since October 7, 2023. HRW interviews with human rights activists
and civil society workers confirmed a significant increase in child recruitment by the Houthis amid
Gaza hostilities. According to the October POE report, the government confirmed 3,298 cases of child
indoctrination by the Houthis in the first half of the year.

In September the NCIAVHR also reported instances of child soldier recruitment in government-
controlled areas from August 2023 to July. The report published the NCIAVHR’s findings that a
commander in the government’s 203rd Brigade forcibly enrolled a child age 14 in military training in
Ma’rib, where the child and his family had sought refuge from Houthi attacks in 2017. The child was
killed in September 2022 by unexploded ordnance.

According to the October POE report, the Houthis increased their recruitment and use of children as
soldiers since the beginning of the Gaza war in October 2023, reportedly recruiting boys as young as
10, often over their parents’ objections. The POE reported the Houthis used “summer camps” that
promised children money and food but where children were separated from their families for two
weeks for indoctrination and combat training. The POE also received reports of sexual violence,
including rape, against children in the camps. The government informed the POE that in April, Houthi
operatives sped up the establishment of these camps, with at least 696 open by June with 15,000
children enrolled.

The lack of a consistent system for birth registration compounded difficulties in proving age, which at
times contributed to the recruitment of children into the military.

Early and forced marriage was a significant, widespread problem, exacerbated by the conflict. The
United Nations reported forced marriage and child marriage for financial reasons due to economic
insecurity was a systemic problem. There was no minimum age for marriage, and girls reportedly
married as young as age eight.

According to UNICEF, girls forced into early marriage often remained trapped in a cycle of poverty
and unfulfilled potential, and married boys and girls were more vulnerable to being coerced into
child labor or recruited into fighting.

According to the international civil society network Girls Not Brides, 30 percent of girls in the country
married before age 18, and 7 percent, or 1.3 million, were married before age 15. A June report by
the European Centre for Democracy and Human Rights noted girls remained vulnerable to sexual
exploitation, sometimes becoming victims of “tourist” or short-term marriages with wealthy men
from nearby countries.

The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning
refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.

The law did not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government did not
have a system for providing protection to refugees. No domestic law addressed the granting of
refugee status or asylum, and there was no system for providing protection to asylum seekers.
UNHCR was able to conduct some refugee status determinations in the country, although this did not
guarantee individuals protection under the law. According to UNHCR, the government granted prima
facie status to Somali nationals. The Houthis interfered in the refugee status determination process
in areas under their control, leaving many refugees with lapsed documentation. According to UNHCR,
asylum seekers were not registered in Houthi-controlled, northern areas of the country.
The government lacked the capacity to provide physical protection to refugees, many of whom were
held in detention centers operated by the Houthis in the north and by the government in the south.
Smuggling groups often helped de facto authorities run these detention centers.

The government did not assist in returning or resettling refugees. Instead, the International
Organization for Migration reported it assisted approximately 3,285 migrants and refugees in the first
three quarters of the year, mostly Ethiopians, to voluntarily return to their home country.

The Jerusalem Post reported Yahya Ben Yousef died in June and was buried in Sana’a, with no
immediate family left to perform Jewish funeral rites. Levi Salem Musa Marhabi, held in Houthi-
controlled detention since 2016, was the country’s only known remaining Jewish citizen at year’s
end. If other Jews remained, it was likely they concealed their religious identity fearing oppression.

Members of the Jewish community were not eligible to serve in the military or national government.
Government and nongovernment authorities forbade them from carrying the Yemeni ceremonial
national dagger.

The Houthi movement regularly used antisemitic slogans. The Houthis’ anti-Israel rhetoric often
blurred into antisemitic propaganda. The Houthis continued to propagate such materials and slogans
throughout the year, including adding anti-Jewish slogans and rhetoric into the elementary education
curriculum and books. Pan-Arab media outlets reported children in Houthi summer camps were
instructed to shout the Houthi slogan, which includes “Death to Israel, curse the Jews.”

https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/yemen

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including
extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment by the government or on behalf of the government; harsh and life-threatening prison
conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary;
political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious abuses in a
conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian harm, enforced disappearances or
abductions, torture, physical abuses, and conflict-related sexual violence; unlawful recruitment or
use of children in armed conflict by the parties in Yemen; serious restrictions on freedom of
expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists,
unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the enforcement or threats of
enforcement of criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom;
substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association;
restrictions of religious freedom; restrictions on freedom of movement within the territory of a state
and on the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully
through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation;
serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on and harassment of international
human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic and intimate
partner violence, sexual violence, child, early, and forced marriage, and female genital mutilation;
crimes involving violence targeting migrants; crimes, violence, or threats of violence motivated by
antisemitism; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex
sexual conduct between adults, which were enforced; crimes involving violence or threats of
violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or intersex persons; and existence of the
worst forms of child labor.

This report covers abuses by the government (sometimes referred to as the Republic of Yemen
Government) and other actors who exerted control over areas of the country (including the United
Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council), otherwise referred to as “the parties in
Yemen.” The Iran-backed Houthi movement, officially known as Ansar Allah, controlled the former
capital of Sana’a, including remnants of former state institutions and entities located there, as well as
much of northern Yemen, where approximately 80 percent of the citizens lived.

The government did not take credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed
human rights abuses.

Nongovernmental actors, including the Houthis, tribal militias, and terrorist groups (including al-
Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and a local branch of ISIS), committed significant abuses with
impunity. The Houthis confiscated state resources, collected “taxes” on the business sector, and
diverted humanitarian assistance. The Houthis misused remnants of former anti-corruption
authorities to stifle dissent and repress political opponents. Houthi control in the north severely
reduced the government’s capacity to conduct investigations into abuse or corruption.

There were numerous reports of government, progovernment, rebel, terrorist, and foreign forces
committing arbitrary or unlawful killings.

Established in 2012 by Presidential Decree No. 140, the National Commission for the Investigation of
Alleged Violations of Human Rights (the National Commission) was the lead body within the
government tasked with opening formal inquiries into allegations of “human rights violations by all
parties to the conflict.” In their reporting period from the beginning in August 2022 and ending July
31, the National Commission investigated 76 cases of alleged extrajudicial killings across the country.
The National Commission found 15 cases were committed by government-backed military and
security forces, and 35 cases of reported killings committed by the Houthis.

The local human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Mwatana reported that forces backed
by the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) Southern Transitional Council (STC) were responsible for eight
incidents they documented during the year and that the Houthis were responsible for five incidents.

The National Commission reported that on February 18, Omar Abdul Basit Ha’il al-Qadsi, a member
of the 170th Air Defense Brigade that reported to the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), shot
and killed Anwar Abdul Fattah Hassan al-Soufi in al-Noor City in the Ta’iz Governorate. The military’s
prosecution issued an arrest warrant for al-Qadsi but did not compel him to appear before the
judiciary for further investigation.

On April 21, media reported progovernment personnel from the Shabwah Defense Forces shot and
killed Abdullah bin Abdullah Abd Rabbuh al-Bani as he departed the airport prayer area in Biyhan
District, Shabwah Governorate. Armed individuals blocked al-Bani’s car, preventing his departure,
and opened fire, killing al-Bani and injuring six others. The attorney general commissioned a team to
investigate the case, and several suspects were referred to the judiciary for trial.

On March 30, local and international press reported Houthi forces had detained, tortured, and killed
activist Hamdi Abdul Razaq, known on the internet as “al-Mukhol.” Houthi forces allegedly detained
him for his critical statements on social media regarding Houthi leadership and their relationship
with Iran.

The National Commission reported that on March 16, Qais Saleem Musfir al-Munbah was stopped
for an identity check at a Houthi-controlled checkpoint. When al-Munbah explained he did not have
an identity card with him, Houthi-affiliated security forces refused him passage and insisted that he
return with identification documents. When he attempted to bypass the checkpoint, the Houthi
guards shot and killed him.
There were numerous reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government, progovernment,
Houthi, terrorist, and foreign forces. Mwatana reported 102 enforced disappearances during the
year, attributing 41 to security forces loyal to the ROYG, nine to what Mwatana referred to as the
Joint Forces (an umbrella term referring to UAE-backed anti-Houthi armed groups), and two to the
progovernment international coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Mwatana attributed 49 of disappearances
to the Houthis and was unable to attribute one disappearance to any party to the conflict. Mwatana
noted the full count was likely much higher by all actors.

There was no update by year’s end on the whereabouts of 11 current and former local employees of
the U.S. embassy, detained by the Houthis since October 2021. None of the employees had been
“charged” with a crime as of year’s end.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that UAE-backed forces, in particular the STC, arbitrarily
arrested and forcibly disappeared individuals at two informal detention facilities.

In a July report, the Abductees’ Mothers Association recorded 56 cases of civilians disappeared in
2022, of which it said 41 were taken by Houthi forces, eight by STC security forces, three by security
agencies affiliated with the ROYG, and four by the Joint Forces. There were no reports that the
government made significant efforts to prevent, investigate, or punish these acts.

The constitution and law prohibited torture and other such practices, but there were credible reports
that government officials and progovernment, foreign, Houthi, and terrorist forces committed such
abuses, including against journalists, human rights defenders (HRDs), and migrants. Although the law
lacked a comprehensive definition of torture, there were provisions allowing prison terms of up to 10
years for those convicted of torture. Mwatana reported it documented 57 cases of torture and other
inhuman and degrading treatment during the year, attributing 21 to forces loyal to the ROYG, 21 to
the Joint Forces, five to the Saudi-led coalition, and nine to the Houthis. In a February report, the UN
Panel of Experts on Yemen (POE) assessed that the parties in Yemen engaged in torture and other
forms of mistreatment. Journalists, HRDs, and migrants were among the victims of these abuses.

Mwatana’s October 11 submission for the country’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) listed 70
incidents of torture carried out by what the group referred to as governmental forces and 117 by STC
forces between 2019 and July 2023.

Mwatana also reported widespread torture by government forces in the Political Security Prison in
the city of Seiyun in the Wadi Hadhramawt District. One prisoner reported under the pseudonym of
Sami Haider that he had endured torture and degrading treatment, including suspension by iron
shackles, beatings and whippings with wires, and dousing with cold water for hours.

The POE’s February report included interviews from 12 former detainees who reported being
abducted by the Houthis, detained for several months or years in different locations, and subjected
to inhuman and degrading treatment, including severe beatings using batons and wires, electric
shocks, suspending by the arms for hours, and repeated spraying with ice-cold water. In July, al-
Arabiya reported the Houthis moved detained former model and actress Entisar al-Hammadi to
solitary confinement, after allegedly beating her with an electrical cable.

Impunity was a significant problem among government security forces, including a lack of effective
mechanisms to investigate and prosecute abuse. Civilian control of security agencies was weak.
There was no information that the government, STC, or Houthis took any accountability measures for
these abuses.
Conditions in prisons and detention centers operated by the government, STC, Houthis, and rural
tribes under areas of their respective control were harsh and life-threatening. Monitoring
organizations reported overcrowding, limited ventilation, extremely high temperatures and humidity,
and lack of access to natural light, bathroom facilities, health care, water, and sufficient meals.

Abusive Physical Conditions: The Global Organized Crime Index characterized conditions in prisons
operated by the parties in Yemen as difficult, citing security and health concerns as the most serious.

The Abductees’ Mothers Association reported cases of partial paralysis, loss of hearing and sight, and
death as the result of inadequate health care in detention centers. Many detainees also raised
complaints before the court regarding the lack of health care in government-controlled detention
centers. Some detainees contracted diseases during their arrests, resulting in the deterioration of
their health. Court decisions to refer detainees to doctors and specialists were often ignored by
security agencies overseeing the detention facilities.

The National Commission conducted field visits to prisons in the governorates of Ta’iz, Hudaydah,
Aden, Dhalea, and Marib. The National Commission reported numerous instances of insufficient food
provisions and inadequate healthcare, which prison administrators blamed on overcrowding caused
by a backlog in the courts.

The Abductees’ Mothers Association also reported on poor conditions in the Houthi-run “Security
and Intelligence Prison” in Sana’a. Detainees reportedly lacked access to health care. The
Organization for Rights and Liberties (SAM), an NGO based in Geneva, found that at times when
detainees were taken to the hospital, the detainees’ families were forced to cover their medical
expenses, although the Abductees’ Mothers Association noted at times prisoners were denied
medicine provided by families. The group also reported that prisoners lacked blankets at several
detention facilities under Houthi control.

In December, the magazine UNIPATH cited the Yemeni Organization for Detainees and Abductees to
report that the Houthis operated 639 “prisons,” of which 230 were public and 298 were secret
facilities, as well as 111 specially created “prisons” located under Houthi-controlled buildings.

On April 16, the Houthis and the government plus the Saudi-led coalition released a total of 887
detainees in a prisoner exchange. Media reported alleged mistreatment and torture by detainees
held by both sides, including physical abuse as well as inadequate food and medicine.

Administration: Limited information was available on prison administration. There was no

information on whether authorities conducted investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment.
There was no ombudsman to serve on behalf of prisoners and detainees.

Authorities across the country kept women who had completed their sentences in prisons and
detention facilities if there was no male guardian to accompany them on release, or released them
only to women’s shelters if their families refused to receive them.

Independent Monitoring: The government, STC, and Houthis denied independent human rights
observers and humanitarian organizations access to detention facilities. Monitoring organizations
generally obtained information regarding the condition of prisons and detention facilities from
released detainees and their family members. They also reported receiving threats related to their
work, particularly from the Houthis.
The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to
challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The parties in Yemen did not observe
these requirements.

The law stated authorities could not arrest individuals unless they were apprehended while
committing a criminal act or served with a warrant. The law required authorities to arraign a
detainee within 24 hours or release them. A judge or prosecuting attorney had to inform the accused
of the basis for the arrest when deciding whether detention was required. The law stipulated
authorities could not hold a detainee longer than seven days without a court order. The law
prohibited incommunicado detention, provided detainees the right to inform their families of their
arrest, and allowed detainees to decline to answer questions without an attorney present. It also
required the government to provide attorneys for indigent detainees, prohibited arrests or serving
subpoenas between sundown and dawn, and contained provisions for bail. UN bodies, NGOs, and
media reporting concluded the parties in Yemen frequently violated these laws and international
human rights norms.

Detainees often did not know which investigating agency had arrested them, and the agencies
frequently complicated matters by unofficially transferring custody of individuals between agencies.

Houthi-controlled entities and “courts” were accused of granting bail only if they received a bribe.
Tribal mediators commonly settled cases in rural areas without reference to the formal court system.
Tribes in rural areas operated unauthorized “private” detention centers based on traditional tribal
justice. Tribal leaders occasionally placed “problem” tribesmen in private jails, which sometimes
were simply rooms in a sheikh’s house, to punish them for noncriminal actions. Tribal authorities
often detained persons for personal reasons without any formal trial or judicial sentencing.

Arbitrary Arrest: The POE reported the government judicial system was weak and that the parties to
the conflict and security forces largely disregarded even the few court rulings on cases of arbitrary
arrest or detention.

Local NGOs reported arrests by unidentified authorities and frequent incommunicado detentions for
long periods of time. From August 1, 2022, to July 31, the National Commission investigated 689
cases of “detention and disappearances,” including 152 cases allegedly perpetrated by the
government and affiliated security entities and 516 cases allegedly perpetrated by the Houthis.

Mwatana reported that by the year’s end it had documented 216 arbitrary detentions and 42
incidents to internationally recognized government forces, 38 incidents to the STC, five incidents to
the Joint Forces and 131 incidents to the Houthis.

Mwatana reported that on October 23 government forces conducted an extensive campaign

targeting civilians for arrests and detentions in Hadramawt Governorate. According to their
reporting, the Houthis also launched a widespread campaign of detention of dissidents during the
September 26 Revolution celebrations.

The Houthis did not provide any information regarding the situation of three UN staff members in
their custody, two since November 2021 and one since August. A staff member of NGO Save the
Children, Hisham al-Hakimi, died in Houthi custody in September. The Houthis had not provided
information regarding the circumstances of his death as of year’s end.

The law prohibited arrests or serving subpoenas between sundown and dawn, but local NGOs
reported governmental and Houthi security agents regularly detained some persons suspected of
crimes from their homes at night without warrants.
Pretrial Detention: Limited information was available on pretrial detention practices, but persons
arrested were frequently denied their constitutional right to be charged within 24 hours. Prolonged
detentions without charge or, if charged, without a public preliminary judicial hearing within a
reasonable time were believed to be common practices by the parties in Yemen, despite their
prohibition by law.

The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, but there were no indications that any form
of independent judiciary existed. The government generally did not respect judicial independence
and impartiality.

A July report from Abductees Mothers Association documented the failure of the Special Criminal
Court in government-controlled Aden to provide a fair public trial to 14 defendants accused of
forming an armed gang in 2018. The report noted that the defendants’ confessions were extracted
under torture, that all charges were baseless and fabricated, and that the defendants were denied
judicial proceedings within a reasonable timeframe. In 2022, the defendants were acquitted but
released only after they undertook an extended hunger strike.

SAM Organization for Rights and Freedoms, Yemeni Coalition, U.S. Center for Justice, and other local
and international human rights organizations released a statement in February calling on Houthi-
affiliated “authorities” to end “political trials” against detainees and dissidents. It also urged the
government to respect international standards and release detained activists. The groups found the
Houthi-controlled “Specialized Criminal Court” in Sana’a did not follow procedures meeting
minimum fair trial standards. SAM also found that government and STC courts issued inordinately
harsh sentences to at least 32 public figures, including journalists and activists, five of whom were
sentenced to death in Marib, although charges were not publicly specified.

On April 16, as part of the nearly 900-person prisoner exchange with the government and the Saudi-
led coalition, the Houthis released journalists Abdul Khaleq Amran, Tawfik al-Mansouri, Hareth
Homaid, and Akram al-Walidi, whom they had detained for eight years on charges of spying for Saudi
Arabia.

The law provided the right to a fair and public trial, but the judiciary generally did not enforce that
right. Criminal defendants were commonly denied the following rights: a presumption of innocence;
prompt informing of the charges; a fair, timely, and public trial; presence at their own trial;
communication with an attorney of their choice; adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense;
free assistance of an interpreter if necessary; opportunity to confront prosecution or plaintiff
witnesses and present one’s own witnesses and evidence; not be compelled to testify or confess
guilt; and an appeal.

Trials were generally supposed to be public, but courts could and did conduct closed sessions “for
reasons of public security or morals.” Judges played an active role in questioning witnesses and the
accused while adjudicating criminal cases. The law required the government to furnish attorneys for
indigent defendants in serious criminal cases, but the government often did not provide counsel in
such cases. There was no information regarding whether defendants had adequate time and facilities
to prepare a defense or to free assistance of an interpreter. The law allowed defendants to confront
or question witnesses against them and present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf.

The government limited access to due process. For example, a court of limited jurisdiction
considered security cases and a specialized criminal court, the State Security Court, operated under
different procedures in closed sessions and did not provide defendants the same rights provided in
the regular courts. Defense lawyers in security cases reportedly did not have full access to their
clients’ charges or court files.

In addition to established courts, there was a tribal justice system for noncriminal matters. Tribal
judges, usually prominent sheikhs, adjudicated noncriminal cases under tribal law, which usually
involved public accusation without the formal filing of charges. Tribal mediation often emphasized
social cohesion over punishment, sometimes at the expense of the accused’s fair trial guarantees.
The public often respected the outcomes of tribal processes more than the formal court system,
which many viewed as corrupt and lacking independence.

There were numerous reports of political prisoners and detainees held by the parties in Yemen.

Amnesty International reported that during a hearing in March, Ahmad Maher, a journalist detained
by STC forces, told a judge at the STC’s “Specialized Criminal Court” that he had been subjected to
torture and that his confession was extracted under duress. Maher was arrested by STC forces in
August 2022, and Amnesty reported he was repeatedly subjected to torture and other mistreatment
and was denied access to adequate health care, including for injuries sustained as a result of torture.
The group reported that as of December, he had conducted several hunger strikes protesting his
detention in Bi’r Ahmad prison in Aden.

In March, local and pan-Arab media reported the Houthi-controlled “Specialized Criminal Court” had
“sentenced” three YouTubers, who had posted videos critical of the Houthis’ handling of the
economy and accusing them of corruption, to “prison terms” ranging from six months to three years
and fined them 10 million Yemeni riyals each ($40,000). Houthi-controlled media released confession
videos, which some believed to be coerced, of the detainees, but the defendants recanted the
confessions before they were “sentenced.”

The Houthis continued the “prosecution” of more than 20 Baha’is on charges of apostasy and
espionage dating from 2018. On May 25, Houthi forces broke into a private residence in Sana’a
where Baha’is were meeting and detained and subsequently disappeared 17 persons. Human rights
groups widely reported the incident as the targeting of Baha’is solely on the basis of their religious
belief. The Houthis did not file “charges” against any of the 17 Baha’is they detained, seven of whom
were released, and 10 of whom remained in detention at the end of the year, according to Baha’is of
the United States.

Freedom House reported the conflict affected government enforcement of property rights, making it
difficult for individuals to own property or seek restitution for seized property. The Yemeni Journalists
Syndicate in Aden reported security forces affiliated with the STC seized its offices in February.

According to the February POE report, the Houthis continued judicial procedures to seize assets and
properties from Baha’is, even though many of the defendants had been expelled from the country.

The February POE report noted disputes over land and property were a long-standing problem. The
POE investigated one case where a Houthi supervisor in the Zubaid, Beit al-Faqih, and al-Jarrahi
Districts forced residents in those areas to cede their lands. When they refused, Houthi forces
overran the village with military vehicles, bulldozers, and tractors, beat women with rifle butts, and
“arrested” approximately 76 citizens, many of whom were released only after signing documents
handing over their lands.

The law prohibited arbitrary or unlawful interference with an individual’s privacy, family, home, or
correspondence, but the government generally failed to effectively enforce this law. The law required
the attorney general personally to authorize telephone call monitoring and reading of personal mail
and email, but there was no indication authorities followed the law.

According to human rights NGOs, Houthi agents searched homes and private offices, monitored
telephone calls, read personal mail and email, and otherwise intruded into personal matters without
even the pretense of “warrants” or authorization from Houthi “courts.”

Although the UN-mediated truce between the ROYG and the Houthis formally expired in October
2022, its terms largely remained in place during the year. As a result of the UN-mediated truce in
2022, cross-border aerial attacks between Saudi and Houthi forces were limited compared with
earlier years. The UN Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP) reported the year saw the lowest
annual civilian casualty count on CIMP’s records since it started reporting in the country in 2018, with
1,675 civilian casualties reported, including 284 children.

Killings: Despite the truce, Mwatana reported the parties in Yemen used shelling, ammunition, land
mines, and other explosive devices that resulted in the killings and injuries of hundreds of individuals
and destroyed civilian infrastructure.

An August 21 HRW report found that Saudi security forces on the border with Yemen killed at least
650 Ethiopian migrants and asylum seekers who tried to cross the border between March 2022 and
June 2023. CIMP reported more than one-third of all civilian casualties in the country during the year
were the result of violence in Saada’s western border with Saudi Arabia, with 586 civilian border
casualties, constituting a 58 percent increase compared with the 372 reported in 2022. CIMP
reported that 343 of these casualties were the result of shelling and another 240 were killed or
injured by border outpost and patrol shootings. CIMP reported that 81 percent of the 432 civilian
casualties caused by shelling took place in Saada, typically in the form of machine gun fire from
border outposts and patrols on the Saudi border.

Mwatana reported 32 incidents of ground shelling during the year, resulting in 77 casualties,
including 46 children and eight women. It attributed seven incidents to the internationally recognized
government forces, one incident to the Joint Forces, one to the STC, 18 incidents to the Houthis, and
eight incidents to Saudi border guard units.

Mwatana documented 165 incidents involving land mines and explosive devices, which led to the
injury and loss of life for 306 civilians, among them 200 children and 25 women. It reported
government forces were linked to four landmine incidents and 15 incidents with other explosive
weapons, the STC was responsible for one landmine incident and six other explosive device
incidents, and the Houthis for 77 landmine incidents and 51 other explosive device incidents.

On August 15, government investigator Adnan al-Muhya was killed while leading the investigation
into the July 21 killing of World Food Program staff member Moayad Hameidi. Both killings occurred
in areas of the Ta’iz Governorate controlled by the government but pan-Arab media reported al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was likely responsible for the incidents.

Abductions: On November 19, Houthi forces seized the Bahamas-flagged, Japanese-operated cargo
ship MV Galaxy Leader as it was transiting the Red Sea and forced it to anchor near Hudaydah Port.
The Houthis detained the ship’s multinational crew including Bulgarian, Mexican, Romanian,
Ukrainian, and Filipino citizens. The Houthis continued to detain the ship and its crew at year’s end,
despite calls by the UN Security Council and other international actors for their release.
Tribal militias and terrorist groups, including AQAP and a local branch of ISIS, committed significant
abuses, including abductions. Pan-Arab media linked AQAP to the August 28 abduction of two
Doctors without Borders staff members in the Ma’rib Governorate.

Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: The POE assessed that torture and mistreatment were
endemic and committed by the parties in Yemen. The POE documented that Security Belt Forces in
government-controlled Aden abducted Ahmed Maher, a freelance journalist and former editor of
the Marsad Aden news website, and his brother and held them at Bi’r Ahmad prison, where they
subjected them to treatment potentially amounting to torture and coerced them to confess to
terrorism-related offenses.

The POE documented interviews with 12 victims the Houthis detained, tortured, maimed, and, in
some cases, sexually violated in Houthi detention facilities. The POE detailed one instance of a young
woman subjected to torture and sexual violence during her more than 17 months in various Houthi
detention centers.

Child Soldiers: The parties in Yemen were implicated in child soldier recruitment and use. The
Secretary of State determined Yemen had governmental forces and Houthi armed groups that
recruited or used child soldiers during the reporting period of April 2022 to March 2023.

A Mwatana report in March documented the recruitment and use of a total of 3,402 child soldiers
recruited between 2015 and March. Government forces recruited 552 children, Saudi and UAE-led
coalition forces recruited 284 children, and Houthi forces recruited at least 2,566 children.

According to an Arab News report on May 1, government officials and activists alleged the Houthis
used “summer camps” to radicalize and indoctrinate children and recruit them as soldiers. According
to reports, the Houthis threatened to treat those who refused to attend as foreign collaborators,
detaining several activists for failure to attend such events. SAM reported that in one camp children
as young as seven were taught to clean weapons and dodge missiles.

The lack of a consistent system for birth registration compounded difficulties in proving age, which at
times contributed to the recruitment of children into the military.

Other Conflict-related Abuse: The parties in Yemen routinely imposed severe restrictions on the
movement of persons, goods, and humanitarian assistance. HRW reported the government impeded
aid through “the imposition of complex bureaucratic requirements on aid agencies that have
impacted millions of civilians’ ability to access it.” They also documented many cases of aid
interference and obstruction by Houthi forces, including violence against aid staff and their property
and attempts to control aid monitoring and recipient lists to divert aid for political patronage
purposes.

In a report released on January 30, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) noted 727 incidents across the country where access to humanitarian aid and services was
affected from October to December 2022. OCHA also confirmed in an August 16 press release that
aid workers experienced interference, with UN national women staff facing extensive movement
restrictions.

Mwatana’s submission for the country UPR documented 29 incidents where government forces
obstructed humanitarian aid access, including hindering the passage of trucks transporting food
assistance, between 2019 and July. It also documented 30 incidents where forces described as UAE-
backed obstructed humanitarian aid access.
Mwatana documented 165 incidents of attacks on schools, hospitals, and other civilian infrastructure
carried out by all parties to the conflict. In their submission to the country’s UPR, Mwatana reported
there were many cases in which schools were used as prisons, military bases, and detention centers.
Between 2019 and July 2023, Mwatana attributed at least 91 incidents to forces it described as UAE-
backed and 19 incidents to government forces in which these groups used schools for military bases
or detention centers.

The constitution restricted freedom of expression, specifying members of the press were permitted
to exercise that right only within the limits of the law. The law also called for journalists to uphold
national unity and prohibited criticism of the head of state. Government-aligned actors did not
respect even these restricted rights, and the Houthis significantly restricted freedom of expression in
areas under their control through violence and intimidation.

Freedom of Expression: All parties to the conflict severely restricted freedom of expression. Women
HRDs, journalists, and activists faced specific repression based on gender. HRDs faced harassment,
threats, and smear campaigns from the government, Saudi-led coalition, and Houthi forces.

NGO Reporters Without Borders wrote that journalists faced abuses by the parties to the conflict and
ran the risk of being abducted, mistreated, tortured, or killed.

The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate reported 82 violations against journalists, workers, and media
outlets during the year, with slightly more than half attributed to the government. They reported five
journalists detained at year’s end. The STC held Ahmed Maher and Naseh Shaker, Houthi forces held
Waheed al-Sufi and Nabil al-Sadawi, and AQAP held Muhammed Qaid al-Maqri.

On March 6, Reporters Without Borders reported that STC personnel expelled the Yemeni Journalists
Syndicate from its Aden headquarters on February 28 and threatened the organization’s president
with death if he did not leave. The STC denied using force to take over the building, claiming the
government owned the building and the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate was an illegitimate entity that
had exceeded its legal mandate and violated labor laws.

Freedom House reported freedom of expression and private discussion were severely limited
because of intimidation by armed groups and unchecked surveillance by the Houthis. In multiple
instances, Houthi-controlled entities went to the homes of activists and political leaders opposed to
the Houthis and threatened detention to intimidate perceived opponents and silence dissent.

Violence and Harassment: Progovernment militias, Houthis, and tribal militias were responsible for a
range of abuses against media outlets.

Freedom House assessed in its annual Freedom in the World Report that journalists endured violent
attacks and enforced disappearances committed by all sides in the conflict.

On June 13, the International Federation of Journalists reported prosecutors in government-

controlled Marib issued arrest warrants against five journalists investigating alleged corruption in the
judiciary of Marib: Ali al-Faqih, editor in chief of the website al-Masdar Online; Ahmed Yahya Ayed
and Muhammad Musad al-Salihi, editors in chief of the news outlet Marib Press; and the bureau
chiefs of two television channels, Yemen Shabab and al-Mahreya.

On May 28, STC-affiliated officials on the island of Socotra arrested two French journalists, Quentin
Mueller and Sylvain Mercadier, demanding the journalists disclose the names of their sources and
their meeting places and confiscating their passports, laptops, cameras, and books. The officials
reportedly questioned Mueller about previous reporting on UAE interference in Yemen in a 2021 al-
Jazeera documentary.

On June 5, Houthi security services in Amran City jailed journalist Fahd al-Arhabi for publishing
information on a Houthi politician who appropriated land belonging to workers of a state-owned
cement factory.

Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online
Media: All parties to the conflict routinely retaliated against media outlets and workers expressing
critical views and censored media outlets in areas under their control. All parties to the conflict
restricted access for international reporters, as well as rights documentation bodies. Reporters
Without Borders noted objective reporting on the war was rare because the parties to the conflict
controlled the media outlets and threatened independent journalists with arbitrary detention and
abusive treatment.

On June 18, government authorities in Marib arrested and imprisoned writer Manea Suleiman for
opinions he shared on social media. He remained in detention at year’s end, and authorities
prevented his family from communicating with him.

Freedom House assessed in their March report that the government historically controlled much of
the terrestrial television and radio. Houthis reportedly regularly blocked certain news websites,
online messaging and social media platforms, and satellite broadcasts.

Libel/Slander Laws: The law criminalized criticism of the “person of the head of state,” the
publication of “false information” that might spread “dissent and division among the people,”
materials that might lead to “the spread of ideas contrary to the principles of the Yemeni revolution,”
and “false stories intended to damage Arab and friendly countries or their relations.”

On January 14, Houthi “courts” charged Mustafa al-Mumari and Ahmed Hajar with spreading false
information, defamation, and inciting violence after posting a 10-minute YouTube video titled, “The
Sanaa government loots the wealth of Yemen and Yemenis.” The video named specific Houthi
officials, accused them of corruption, and criticized tax policies in Houthi-controlled territory.

Nongovernmental actors inhibited freedom of expression, including for members of the press.

All parties to the conflict censored online content. Internet access was significantly limited and
disrupted by the conflict. Censorship affected internet freedom, and there were notable cases of
Houthi intrusion into cyberspace.

Monitoring and information platform the Observatory for Media Freedoms in Yemen reported in its
biannual report that on January 9, the Public Funds Prosecution in the government-controlled
Hadramawt Governorate held its second hearing in the trial of journalist Ali Salem al-Awbathani. Al-
Awbathani was charged with defaming a scientific institution in a posting on his personal Facebook
page. The complaint was brought against him by the Presidency of Hadramawt University. The case
was later adjourned.

Various sources confirmed the Houthi-controlled “Public Telecommunications Corporation” and

internet service providers systematically blocked user access to websites and internet domains that
the Houthis deemed dangerous to their political agenda.

On February 14, Scholars at Risk reported Dhamar University had dismissed six students from the
mechatronics department for their participation in protests regarding Houthi interference in the
university as well as the need for improved laboratory facilities.
The law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but all parties to the
conflict failed to respect these rights. The government and all parties to the conflict restricted the
freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

In September, Amnesty International reported all parties to the conflict curtailed peaceful assembly
of HRDs, journalists, political opponents, and perceived critics. It also reported Houthi agents carried
out a “wave of arrests rounding up scores of largely peaceful demonstrators” carrying Yemeni
Republic flags who gathered to commemorate the anniversary of the country’s September
revolution.

The law provided for freedom of association, but it also regulated the activities of associations and
foundations and the establishment and activities of NGOs. Government authorities required annual
NGO registration. The law required the government to provide a reason for denying registration, such
as deeming an NGO’s activities “detrimental” to the state, but the government complied with this
provision inconsistently. The law prohibited NGO involvement in political or religious activities and
required government observation of NGO internal elections.

Civil society organizations reported the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and the Ministry of
Planning and International Cooperation used conflicting directives governing engagement between
international and national organizations to increase oversight and control over humanitarian funding.
NGOs reported these requirements made it difficult to implement their programs.

In July, a Mwatana field study described wide-ranging restrictions and repressive policies imposed on
civil society by all the parties to the conflict.

There were NGO reports that the Houthis harassed and detained activists and shut down numerous
NGOs, often citing treason or conspiracy with foreign powers. Houthi-controlled entities created the
“Executive Office for Monitoring Operations of International Organizations,” reportedly to monitor
NGO activity. As a result, several NGOs originally based in Sana’a moved to Aden, other cities in
government-controlled areas, or abroad.

Restrictions on movement by women significantly constrained humanitarian and NGO activities, and
in some cases the Houthis deliberately targeted women working for NGOs and humanitarian
organizations.

The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation;
however, the government and all parties to the conflict often did not respect those rights.

In-country Movement: Progovernment forces, the Houthis, and tribal forces maintained checkpoints
on major roads. In many regions, armed tribesmen frequently restricted freedom of movement,
operated their own checkpoints, sometimes with military or other security officials, and often
subjected travelers to physical harassment, extortion, theft, or short-term kidnappings for ransom.
Damage to roads, bridges, and other infrastructure from the conflict hindered the movement of
goods and persons throughout the country, including hampering the delivery of humanitarian aid
and commercial shipments.

In July, the conflict analysis NGO ACAPS confirmed movement restrictions in areas controlled by each
party to the conflict continued impacting the safety and security of humanitarians and movement of
commodities.

Houthi forces had kept the main roads in and out of the city of Ta’iz closed since 2015, severely
restricting freedom of movement for civilians and impeding the flow of essential goods, medicine,
and humanitarian access to residents. The Houthis agreed under the terms of the truce to negotiate
with the government on restoring access to Ta’iz roads, but there was no progress while the truce
remained in effect, and the roads remained closed as of year’s end.

Women did not enjoy full freedom of movement, although restrictions varied by location. The Office
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported harassment at checkpoints of women
and girls not accompanied by a male escort, as well as inability to afford transport, hampered
women’s ability to reach health, nutrition, and other services.

Houthi “authorities” required women to show mahram (guardianship) permission and have their
guardian (father, brother, husband, or son) present to obtain or renew personal identity cards,
despite the law not requiring such conditions.

The Houthis increased the enforcement of mahram requirements, even though the law did not
impose such requirements. The Houthis largely enforced mahram through verbal directives and
governorate-level localized circulars. Tribal authorities in areas bordering Houthi-controlled territory
also imposed mahram requirements. The unclear Houthi directives concerning mahram
requirements resulted in some Sana’a-based car rental agencies refusing to rent vehicles to women
or to sell seats to women for travel in shared vehicles.

Foreign Travel: Limited commercial flights operated with few interruptions out of Sana’a
International Airport under Houthi control, allowing residents to travel to Jordan and onward.
International flights also operated from the government-controlled airports of Aden, Seyun, and Ar-
Ryan.

Houthi “authorities” imposed mahram requirements on women seeking to travel internationally or

obtain or renew passports and prevented HRDs from traveling.

On September 30, Houthi agents prevented Mwatana chairperson Radya al-Mutawakel, vice
chairperson Abdul-Rashid al-Faqih, and three other Mwatana staff from traveling through Sana’a
International Airport. The five HRDs were released without charges after interrogation, but the
Houthi agents banned them from travel indefinitely.

There were no known reports that the government forcibly exiled political opponents but there were
reports that the Houthis forcibly exiled political opponents, HRDs, religious minorities, and others.

The government cooperated with UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in providing
protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other
persons of concern.

Access to Asylum: According to Integral Human Development, access to asylum procedures was
restricted. The law did not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government
had not established a system for providing protection to refugees. No domestic law addressed the
granting of refugee status or asylum, and there was no system for providing protection to asylum
seekers. UNHCR was able to conduct some refugee status determinations in the country, although
this did not guarantee individuals protection under the law. According to UNHCR, the government
granted prima facie status to Somali nationals. The Houthis attempted to take over the refugee status
determination process in areas under their control, leaving many refugees with lapsed
documentation. According to UNHCR, asylum seekers were not registered in Houthi-controlled,
northern areas of the country.
The government lacked the capacity to provide physical protection to refugees, many of whom were
held in detention centers operated by the Houthis in the north and by the government in the south.
Smuggling groups often helped de facto authorities run these detention centers. According to
UNHCR, approximately 65 percent of asylum seekers resided in southern governorates.

According to the October UNHCR Strategy and Action Plan, there were more than 71,000 refugees
and asylum seekers in the country, mainly from Ethiopia and Somalia.

Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: An August 21 HRW report alleged that the Houthis had a
significant role in trafficking, extorting, imprisoning, and abusing of migrants in camps in the north.
The report found that Houthi forces coordinated and facilitated access to the border for smugglers in
Saada Governorate and sometimes collected migrants injured during their crossing into Saudi Arabia
from hospitals in Saada and forcibly return them to smugglers in the camps. Interviewees alleged
Houthi forces often extorted bribes from the migrants or transferred them to what migrants
described as detention centers, where migrants suffered abuse until they paid an exit fee.

Employment: Refugees faced insufficient livelihood opportunities given the pervasive economic
challenges. There were also legal barriers to formal employment for refugees, asylum seekers, and
migrants.

Access to Basic Services: Refugees generally lacked access to basic services due to the conflict. Many
health facilities remained closed due to damage caused by the conflict, some were destroyed, and all
facilities faced shortages in supplies, including medications and fuel to run generators. According to
UNHCR, the Kharaz refugee camp in Lahj Governorate was the only refugee camp in the country and
hosted more than 9,600 refugees and asylum seekers.

Durable Solutions: The government did not assist in returning or resettling refugees. Instead, the
International Organization for Migration reported that during the year it assisted approximately
6,000 migrants and refugees, mostly Ethiopians, to voluntarily return to their home country.

According to a May report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, approximately 276,000
displacements were recorded across the country in 2022.

The country contributed to statelessness through discrimination against women in nationality laws.

The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections
held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.

Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: There had been no national elections since the conflict
began in 2014. The parliament last convened in April 2022 to grant legitimacy to the Presidential
Leadership Council (PLC), which took control after former President Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi stepped
down and included political and security leaders from various parties and armed groups.

Political Parties and Political Participation: The law required political parties to be national
organizations that did not restrict their membership to residents of a particular region or to members
of a particular tribe, religious sect, class, or profession. The former ruling General People’s Congress
party split into several regional factions as well as a separate faction under Houthi control in Sana’a.
The sitting cabinet and the PLC included members affiliated with established political parties, as well
as other political elements, including the STC. PLC Vice President Tareq Saleh and his National
Resistance forces also had a political wing.

Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: Gendered social

norms, security considerations, and disproportionate caretaking responsibilities posed barriers to
women participating on equal basis with men in political life. Persons who identified as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) did not participate openly in the political process.

Women held limited ministerial-level positions in the government. One woman was appointed to
Executive Committee of the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission under the PLC, several
women served in the larger, 50-member Consultation and Reconciliation Commission, and one
woman was named to the government’s official delegation for UN-led peace talks. Women remained
active in civil society, including participating in protests and demonstrations in the south, developing
a feminist road map for peace, negotiating the release of detainees and political prisoners, and
working through civil society organizations to hold authorities accountable.

In its Freedom in the World Report for the year, Freedom House wrote that the minority group with
East African origins known as the muhamasheen (marginalized) accounted for as much as 10 percent
of the population but suffered discrimination in politics and society. The INSAF Center for Rights and
Development reported on other estimates of the muhamasheen population accounting for as much
as 12.7 percent of the population. The Sana’a Center reported that the muhamasheen lacked
political power in local communities to lobby for inclusion in development projects and humanitarian
beneficiary lists.

While the law provided for criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the government did not
implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption.

Corruption: Corruption was pervasive throughout the country, and observers reported petty
corruption in nearly every government office. Applicants for government jobs were often expected to
purchase their positions via bribery. Observers believed tax inspectors routinely undervalued
property assessments and pocketed the difference. Many government officials and civil service
employees, including teachers and health-sector workers, went unpaid due to lack of government
resources, while public-sector payrolls were padded with “ghost workers” receiving salaries for jobs
they did not perform. Corruption also regularly affected government procurement.

Local and international organizations, including Transparency International, agreed corruption was a
serious problem in every branch and level of government and among nonstate actors, especially in
the security sector. International observers claimed government officials routinely benefited from
insider arrangements, embezzlement, and bribes.

The ATWAD Anti-Corruption Organization, an NGO, assessed that the government’s Supreme
National Authority for Combatting Corruption (SNACC) suffered from a lack of sufficiently qualified
staff and investigators, as well as a lack of independence. The government lacked adequate reporting
mechanisms for corruption and written protections for whistleblowers. SNACC struggled to cover its
operating expenses and employee salaries during the year.

On August 25, parliament issued a report alleging violations and corruption in the electricity, energy,
telecommunications, and financial sectors. The report stemmed from a parliamentary investigation
into the sale of the telecommunications company Aden Net to a UAE company. It also accused the
electricity ministry of misappropriating funds, purchasing low-quality fuel, and unlawfully waiving
tariffs on fuel derivative imports.

Domestic and international human rights groups generally operated with restrictions from all parties
to the conflict to monitor or investigate human rights conditions and cases and publish their findings.
Government officials were rarely cooperative or responsive to the views of these groups.
International NGOs and international organizations faced permission restrictions in accessing Houthi-
controlled areas and frequently were not able to operate at full capacity in Sana’a. Local employees
of international NGOs and organizations faced potential detention and kidnapping by
nongovernmental groups. Employees of local NGOs faced similar restrictions.

The National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago discontinued on-the-ground data
collection efforts in a human trafficking patterns study, following incidents involving its staff. In
February, a visibly terrified resident of Abyan returned to the center’s offices a day after being
interviewed and asked staff to delete their interview notes without explanation.

Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: There were numerous reports of threats or violence
against HRDs.

On December 5, a Houthi-controlled court in Sana’a convicted and sentenced to death Fatima Saleh
al-Arwali, the former head of the Yemen office of the Arab League’s Union of Women Leaders, on
charges of collaborating with the enemy. She had no legal representation at the trial, and by year’s
end, her family had only been able to contact her twice in detention since she was arrested in August
2022.

On July 10, the UN special envoy to Yemen stated the Houthis severely restricted freedom of
movement for the United Nations and other international organizations due to mahram
requirements and road blockades in Ta’iz and other governorates.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The government’s National Commission had the mandate to
investigate all alleged human rights abuses in the country but was generally ineffective in carrying
out its mandate. The commission was nominally independent of the government but did not have
enforcement power. The commission investigated and reported on human rights conditions during
the year and participated in training with the United Nations.

In September, the National Commission released its 11th periodic report, documenting 2,997
incidents of human rights violations countrywide from August 2022 to July 31. The commission
addressed violations committed by the government and government-backed security forces, the
Houthis, the Saudi-led coalition, and other parties to the conflict.

Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape of men and women, but it did not
criminalize spousal rape. The punishment for rape was imprisonment for up to 25 years. The
government did not enforce the law effectively, however. By law, authorities could prosecute rape
survivors on charges of fornication if they did not charge a perpetrator with rape. Without the
perpetrator’s confession, the rape survivor had to provide four male witnesses to the crime. There
were no reliable rape prosecution statistics, and the number of rape cases was unknown. Human
rights NGOs said sexual assault and gender-based violence were widespread among migrant
communities and generally underreported.

In February, the POE reported Houthi use of detention, torture, degrading treatment, and sexual
violence on civilians in their custody was widespread. The POE reported former women detainees
were particularly vulnerable in Houthi-controlled areas because of the assumption they had suffered
sexual violence while in detention, resulting in social ostracism and decreased personal and
professional opportunities. Former women detainees of Houthi “prisons” reported to the POE that
although they had regained their liberty, they continued to suffer from trauma, receive threats from
Houthi operatives, face social rejection, and lack psychosocial support, employment, and other
livelihood opportunities.
The solution is that the amount of refugee camps must be increased and there must be and more
humanitarian support must be provided. There also must be more humanitarian support provided to
the refugee camps like funds, food, water and basic rights must be provided.

A woman who escaped Houthi custody in August 2022 was interviewed by the panel in February and
described her detention for more than 17 months by the Houthis under charges of working against
the Islamic religion and serving the interests of foreign powers. She resisted rape by a Houthi official
while in secret detention and was repeatedly physically assaulted by detention center guards. She
also stated the Houthis often threatened to publish compromising images of detained women as a
means of coercion.

The OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview

confirmed that migrant women and girls
faced disproportionate risk of sexual
violence. The August HRW report on the
Saudi-Yemen border reported the case of a
woman who was allegedly raped and
impregnated by a smuggler. The report
alleged three of the 10 women and girls
interviewed were raped by smugglers or
other migrants.
Muhamasheen women were particularly vulnerable to rape and other abuse because negative
societal attitudes toward muhamasheen resulted in general impunity for attackers.

The law stated authorities should execute a man convicted of killing a woman, but it allowed
leniency for persons guilty of “honor” killings or the violent assault or killing of a woman for
perceived “immodest” or “defiant” behavior. The law did not address other types of gender-based
abuse, such as forced isolation, imprisonment, or early and forced marriage.

The law provided women with protection against domestic violence, except spousal rape, under the
general rubric of protecting persons against violence, but authorities did not enforce this provision
effectively. Survivors rarely reported domestic abuse to police, and criminal proceedings in cases of
domestic abuse were rare.

Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): The law did not prohibit FGM/C, but a ministerial
directive banned the practice in government institutions and medical facilities, according to HRW.
According to a United Nations Population Fund report published in October, the most recent data
from 2013 indicated 19 percent of women ages 15 to 49 had undergone FGM/C, with prevalence
rates as high as 80 percent and 85 percent in al-Mahrah and Hadramawt Governorates, respectively.
FGM/C was less common among girls ages 15 to 19 than among women ages 45 to 49.
Discrimination: Women faced deeply entrenched discrimination in both law and practice in all
aspects of their lives. Mechanisms to enforce equal protection were weak, and the government did
not implement them effectively.

Women could not marry without permission of their male guardians; did not have equal rights in
inheritance, divorce, or child custody; and had little legal protection. They experienced discrimination
in areas such as employment, credit, pay, owning or managing businesses, education, and housing.

Hospitals often required a male guardian’s consent before admitting a woman, creating significant
problems for households with no remaining adult men. Women also faced unequal treatment in
courts, where a woman’s testimony equaled half that of a man’s testimony. A husband could divorce
a wife without justifying the action in court, but a woman had to provide justification.

Any citizen wishing to marry a foreigner had to obtain the permission of the Ministry of Interior, the
National Security Bureau, and, in some instances, the Political Security Organization under
regulations that authorities enforced arbitrarily. A woman wishing to marry a foreigner had to
present proof of her parents’ approval. A foreign woman who wished to marry a male citizen had to
prove to the ministry that she was “of good conduct and behavior.” Women experienced economic
discrimination, and the Houthis “prohibited” women from participating in certain professions and
increasingly limited women’s freedom of movement through mahram requirements.

According to international organizations, mahram requirements prevented women and girls,

particularly female heads of household, from receiving humanitarian aid, as female staff could not
travel to field locations, and it was generally considered inappropriate for male staff to deliver
support or assistance to unaccompanied women.

The law prohibited women from working the same hours as men or in jobs deemed hazardous,
arduous, or morally inappropriate.

HRW reported in February that the Houthis discouraged women from obtaining work outside of the
home through laws barring them from public places and certain workplaces.

Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the
part of government authorities.

The continuing conflict and ensuing humanitarian crisis made it difficult to find reporting on the
government’s approach to reproductive rights. The conflict led to a breakdown of the health-care
system, and women and girls, including survivors of sexual violence, did not have access to essential
reproductive health services.

In February, UNFPA reported that less than half of the hospitals remained functional and, of those,
only 20 percent of health facilities offered maternal and child health services, due to lack of supplies,
staff shortages, damage due to conflict, inadequate equipment and supplies, and inability to meet
operational costs. As a result, 5.5 million women and girls of childbearing age and 1.5 million
pregnant and breastfeeding women had limited or no access to reproductive health services.

The Houthis prevented health centers and pharmacies in areas under their control from providing
any method of family planning to women without a prescription and the presence and consent of
their husbands. The Houthis justified this policy and a ban on health workers using illustrated family
planning guides as being consistent with “faith identity.”

Although racial discrimination was illegal, some groups, such as the muhamasheen community and
citizens born to foreign parents, faced social and institutional discrimination based on race, ethnicity,
and social status. The muhamasheen, who traditionally provided low-prestige services such as street
sweeping, generally lived in poverty and endured persistent societal discrimination, including
discrimination in employment. Muhamasheen women were particularly vulnerable to rape and other
abuse.

Media reports referencing muhamasheen activists noted that while social castes and slavery were
abolished in the 1960s, tribal justice systems reinforced historical patterns of discrimination. Walk
Free, an NGO focused on ending modern slavery, estimated in its 2018 report (most recent data
available) there were 85,000 victims of modern slavery in the country, or 3.1 percent of the
population, but that due to the impossibility of conducting surveys under conflict, the data likely
underestimated the problem. This broad category included forced labor and debt bondage, human
trafficking, and forced and early marriage.

During the year the Houthis reportedly targeted muhamasheen communities to recruit fighters.
INSAF Center for the Rights and Development reported muhamasheen women were also more
vulnerable to sexual violence and harassment by Houthi and other combatants, especially at
checkpoints.

According to UNICEF, muhamasheen struggled to register their newborns, with only 9 percent
holding birth certificates, the absence of which limited access to other government documents, as
well as jobs and services.

Birth Registration: There was no universal birth registration. Many parents, especially in rural areas,
never registered their children or registered them several years after birth. The requirement that
children have birth certificates to register for school was not universally enforced. The lack of birth
registration reportedly led courts to sentence juveniles as adults, including for crimes eligible for the
death sentence.

Education: Public schooling was free to children through the secondary school level, but HRW
reported that many children, especially girls, did not have easy access to education.

Approximately 170,000 teachers in Houthi-controlled provinces had not received regular pay since
2016.

Child Abuse: The law did not define or prohibit child abuse, and there was no reliable data on its
extent. Authorities considered violence against children a private family matter.

Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: Early and forced marriage was a significant, widespread problem,
exacerbated by the conflict. The United Nations reported forced marriage and child marriage for
financial reasons due to economic insecurity was a systemic problem. There was no minimum age for
marriage, and girls reportedly married as young as age eight.

According to UNICEF, girls forced into early marriage often remained trapped in a cycle of poverty
and unfulfilled potential, and married boys and girls were more vulnerable to being coerced into
child labor or recruited into fighting.

Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law criminalized the commercial sexual exploitation of children.
The law prohibited pornography, including child pornography, although there was no information
available on whether the legal prohibitions were comprehensive. The law did not define statutory
rape and did not impose a minimum age for consensual sex.

Media outlets reported that only one Jewish citizen, Levi Salem Musa Marhabi, might remain in the
country, and he remained in Houthi-controlled detention.
The Houthi movement regularly used antisemitic slogans. Anti-Israel rhetoric often blurred into
antisemitic propaganda. The Houthis propagated such materials and slogans throughout the year,
including adding anti-Jewish slogans and rhetoric into the elementary education curriculum and
books. In March, the Yemen Policy Center reported children in Houthi summer camps were
instructed to shout the Houthi slogan, which contained the phrase “death to Israel, curse the Jews.”

Members of the Jewish community were not eligible to serve in the military or national government.
Government and nongovernment authorities forbade them from carrying the ceremonial national
dagger.

Criminalization: The law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct. The penal code stated
that “unmarried men shall be punished with 100 lashes of the whip or a maximum of one year of
imprisonment, married men with death by stoning”. For women, the penalty for premeditated
commission of same-sex consensual behavior was up to three years’ imprisonment; when the
offense was committed under duress, the perpetrator was punishable with up to seven years’
detention.

There were no known executions of LGBTQI+ persons during the year.

Violence and Harassment: The government did not consider violence or discrimination against
LGBTQI+ persons “relevant” for official reporting. No nongovernment reporting was available.

Discrimination: Due to the criminalization of and possible severe punishment for consensual same-
sex sexual conduct, few LGBTQI+ persons were open regarding their sexual orientation or gender
identity. Individuals known or suspected of being LGBTQI+ faced discrimination.

Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available.

Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: Information regarding involuntary or

coercive medical or psychological practices specifically targeting LGBTQI+ individuals was unavailable.

Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: Information regarding

restrictions of freedom of expression, association, or peaceful assembly for LGBTQI+ persons was not
available. LGBTQI+ expression was viewed as taboo and largely hidden due to widespread stigma.

The constitution and the law affirmed the rights of persons with disabilities. The law granted persons
with disabilities the same rights as persons without disabilities, but the government did not
effectively enforce it. The law mandated the establishment of special educational institutions to
provide basic education to persons with disabilities. The law, however, was not implemented. The
law also affirmed the right of persons with disabilities to public education.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor was responsible for protecting the rights of persons with
disabilities, but the ministry did not carry out these duties due to the conflict and humanitarian
crisis. The Yemen Fund for the Care and Rehabilitation of People with Disabilities reported in 2018,
the most current information available, that only 750 students with disabilities were studying at the
university level, and that the closure of 300 special education centers had deprived 190,000 students
with disabilities of education. Persons with disabilities faced limited access to the workplace and
discrimination in hiring. The law reserved 5 percent of government jobs for persons with disabilities,
but this was rarely enforced.

In March, Amnesty International reported those with disabilities experienced unique hardship during
conflict in the region because they lacked sufficient warning in advance of impending attacks.
Families were separated while fleeing, and those with disabilities were left behind.
While there were no reports of social violence against persons with HIV or AIDS, the topic was a
socially sensitive taboo and infrequently discussed. Discrimination against persons with HIV or AIDS
was a criminal offense. Information was not available regarding incidents of discrimination.

The law provided for the right of citizens employed in the private sector to join unions and bargain
collectively. These protections did not apply to public servants, day laborers, domestic servants,
foreign workers, and other groups who together made up most of the workforce. The civil service
code covered public servants. The law prohibited antiunion retaliation, including prohibiting
dismissal for union activities. While unions could negotiate wage settlements for their members and
could conduct strikes or other actions to achieve their demands, workers had the right to strike only
if prior attempts at negotiation and arbitration failed. Unions had to give advance notice to the
employer and the government and receive prior written approval from the executive office of the
General Federation of Yemen Workers’ Trade Unions before striking. Strikes could not be carried out
for “political purposes.” The proposal to strike had to be put to at least 60 percent of all workers
concerned, of whom 25 percent had to vote in favor of the strike. Foreign workers could join unions
but could not hold office.

The government was unable to enforce labor laws due to the conflict. The government did not
enforce laws on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining in areas under its
control. Parties to the conflict often accused unions and associations of being linked to a political
group or opposition. Additionally, Houthi-controlled former ministries purportedly responsible for
the implementation of labor laws in areas under Houthi control did not implement the law in those
areas.

Houthi militia members kidnapped Abu Zaid al-Kumaim, a leader of the Yemeni Teachers Club union,
from his home in Sana’a on October 9 after he called for payment of public employee salaries. The
union issued a statement expressing disappointment that he was “arrested” for asking the Houthis to
pay educators who had gone without salaries for the last eight years. In November, SAM Organization
for Rights and Liberties reported al-Kumaim’s condition significantly deteriorated and that Houthi
authorities transferred him temporarily to al-Kuwait hospital after he fell into a coma. According to
NGO reports, at year’s end he was still detained despite Houthi promises to release him.

Wage and Hour Laws: The law provided for a minimum wage for all sectors. The minimum wage for
private-sector employees had to at least equal the public-sector minimum wage. The law mandated
that wage payments depended on the terms of the employment contract. Employees could be paid
on a monthly, fortnightly, weekly, or hourly basis.

The minimum civil service wage was more than the estimated poverty income level, but many civil
servants were not paid consistently, and most salaries were too low to provide for a large family.
Workdays were limited to eight hours. Work weeks were limited to 48 hours distributed over six
working days followed by one day of paid rest. The maximum working hours during the month of
Ramadan could not exceed six hours per day or 36 hours per week. The law required an employee’s
workday to have at least one hour of rest so that any continuous period of work did not exceed five
hours. Friday was the day of rest but could be substituted for another day of the week if required for
work.

Occupational Safety and Health: Occupational safety and health (OSH) laws and standards were not
appropriate for the main industries in the country.

Responsibility for identifying unsafe situations remained with OSH experts and not the worker. The
law provided workers the right to remove themselves from a hazardous workplace.
The law obligated employers to provide health care to workers for preemployment medical
examinations and for periodic medical exams while employed. The conflict made it difficult to verify
whether these laws were implemented consistently.

There was no credible information available regarding work-related accidents or fatalities during the
year.

Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not, or was unable to, enforce penalties for
wage, hour, or OSH violations. No information was available regarding penalties imposed for wage
and hour violations or if any were applied. Many workshops and stores operated 10- to 12-hour
shifts without penalty. In practice, the agencies responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws
did not operate or were significantly impaired, due to the conflict. The number of labor inspectors
was insufficient to enforce compliance. Inspectors had no authority to make unannounced
inspections and initiate sanctions.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimated in March 2021 that informal
employment represented 78 percent of total employment. In July, the government reported the
informal sector had developed at an “accelerated pace” in recent years due to the impact of conflict
and lack of effective economic policies. OSH law did not apply to the informal sector, including
domestic servants, casual workers, or agricultural workers. The government did not enforce other
labor laws applicable to this sector. Working conditions were poor in the informal sector, and wage
and overtime violations were common. Foreign migrant workers, youth, and women workers
typically faced the most exploitative working conditions.

https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/yemen

Due to the deteriorating security situation in Sana’a, the Department of State suspended embassy
operations at U.S. Embassy Sana’a on February 11, 2015.

All consular services, routine and emergency, continue to be suspended until further notice. The
level of instability and ongoing threats in Yemen remain extremely concerning. There are no plans for
a U.S. government-coordinated evacuation of U.S. citizens at this time. If you wish to depart Yemen,
you should stay alert for other opportunities to leave the country. U.S. citizens who are able to
depart Yemen for another country and are in need of emergency assistance upon arrival may contact
a U.S. embassy or consulate in that country.

For U.S. citizens departing Yemen, please consider all possible routes before deciding to depart via
the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border. Travel to the border can be dangerous, and U.S. citizens who have
attempted to cross have reported long delays in a harsh environment, and some have been detained
or turned away by Saudi authorities.

At the time of this posting, the only open border crossing is at Al Wadiah, also written as “Al
Wuday’ah”. The Saudi border post is not staffed or designed to handle high demand. At times,
travelers have reported sleeping outdoors for days before being able to cross. The location is
extremely remote, and there is no access to food, water, shelter, or other essentials there. Please
plan your travel accordingly, and consider the risks involved. The journey may be very dangerous.
There have been reports of attacks and airstrikes in several areas on both sided of the border. There
may be checkpoints, and travelers have given accounts of extortion, armed robbery, questioning, and
detentions. U.S. citizens have reported being singled out for extra attention at times, so it may be
safer to conceal your citizenship in some situations. At this time we have no personnel in Yemen or
near the border due to safety and security concerns.
It may be safer to wait and find another way to leave Yemen. We cannot guarantee that any one
person will receive a visa, and Saudi authorities may ask you to find a sponsor who is a Saudi national
or is legally resident in this country. Foreign relatives and undocumented U.S. citizens have been
turned away by Saudi authorities despite our best efforts to assist them.

It is reported that travelers are required to pay a fee of 100 Saudi Riyals to leave Yemen. Travelers are
recommended to obtain a police pass from the Yemen Interior Ministry or tourism police if possible
otherwise they may face difficulties at government checkpoints inside Yemen. Contact us at +966 12-
220-5000 if there is any trouble at the borderWe do not recommend that Yemeni family members
travel to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi authorities may allow U.S. citizens to enter, but it is less likely they
will give visas to Yemenis. If they come to the border and are turned away by Saudi authorities, they
could be stranded in a very difficult situation. If they are allowed to enter Saudi Arabia, they will not
be allowed by the Saudis to stay here long enough to complete the immigrant visa process. For these
and other reasons, you will need to consider applying in another country. We are referring these
cases primarily to our embassies in Malaysia, Algeria, Ethiopia and Sudan. If you do enter Saudi
Arabia, you will need a plan for where to go next.

https://sa.usembassy.gov/yemen-crisis

The U.S. Embassy in Sanaa is currently closed due to the ongoing conflict and high level of insecurity
within Yemen. Since February 2015, the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen and much of his core Yemen
Affairs Unit (YAU) staff have been based at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

The United States is committed to Yemen’s stability, security and economic recovery, including
supporting its ability to counter the malign influence of Iran and defeat terrorist groups such as ISIS
and Al-Qaeda. The U.S. supports United Nations and Coalition partner efforts to achieve a
permanent cessation of hostilities among the parties and a negotiated, inclusive settlement that
leads to a unified, representative government led by the legitimate Republic of Yemen Government
(ROYG).

In addition to diplomatic activities promoting national reconciliation and dialogue, the United States
invests in Yemen’s people and economy. The United States is one of the largest donors to Yemen in
terms of humanitarian and developmental assistance and works closely with U.N. agencies,
international partners, and several U.S. and local NGO’s. Through flexible assistance efforts that
strengthen the ability of Yemeni systems and institutions to meet Yemeni citizen needs, the U.S. and
other donors are helping manage conflict and build a foundation for sustainable peace.

https://ye.usembassy.gov/u-s-yemen-relations

RTR – Iran
“Thank you, Honorable Chair. This delegation recognizes the legitimate security concerns of all States
in this chamber. However, the international community cannot ignore actions that materially
exacerbate the Yemeni crisis and threaten regional and global security. We therefore call for an
immediate focus on transparency, accountability, and measures that reduce both militarization and
civilian suffering.”

 Iran-linked support has materially strengthened the Houthis’ military capabilities.

The UN Panel of Experts and multiple independent analyses document transfers of materiel, training
and facilitation that have accelerated the Houthis’ operational reach and lethality. This external
support has converted a local conflict into a broader regional flashpoint.

 Houthi attacks have caused civilian deaths and disrupted global maritime security.
Since late 2023, Houthi strikes on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and adjacent waters have
damaged and sunk ships, and in some instances resulted in fatalities — with direct consequences for
global trade and seaborne humanitarian supplies to Yemen. These attacks force costly rerouting,
raise insurance premiums, and imperil neutral shipping.

 The humanitarian ramifications are immediate and catastrophic.

Yemen remains among the world’s gravest humanitarian crises: millions depend on aid, port capacity
and aid deliveries are hindered by hostilities and seizures, and UN agencies and local responders
increasingly face detention and access denial — dramatically worsening civilian suffering. The
security approach must therefore be coordinated with humanitarian safeguards.

 Illicit logistics networks and sanctions-busting directly finance violence.

Reports indicate that fuel shipments, smuggling operations and financial channels have been used to
sustain armed activity inside Yemen; this is not an abstract accusation but a documented security
challenge that the Council must address through sanctions enforcement and interdiction.

“Our concern is not to single out grievances, but to uphold UN instruments that bind all states. The
Arms Embargo on designated Yemeni actors, the UN Charter obligations to refrain from actions that
fuel international instability, and the NCA (Security Council precedent) require us to act where
external assistance prolongs conflict and endangers civilians.”

“Words alone cannot substitute for action. If the delegate of Iran asserts non-involvement and
peaceful intent, we respectfully but firmly invite Tehran — in concrete terms — to support
immediate inspection modalities and to cooperate with the Panel of Experts to trace the provenance
of the arms and fuel shipments that fuel this conflict. Transparency here is not humiliation; it is the
fastest route to de-escalation.”

Iran rebuttal – These accusations are baseless and politicized

US comeback - If so, the quickest remedy is cooperation. This delegation requests that Iran engage
the Panel of Experts’ evidence-chain and allow verification — allegations are refuted by facts, not
rhetoric.

Iran rebuttal - You are interfering in our sovereign affairs.

US comeback - Sovereignty does not grant license to destabilize a neighbour or to enable actors who
attack civilian shipping. The Council’s remit is to preserve international peace and security — a
responsibility shared by all.

Iran rebuttal - Our ties are political/financial support for resistance movements; you call it
interference.

US comeback - Support that materially increases the capacity to strike civilians or international
shipping falls within the Council’s legitimate concern. Political framing cannot negate material
consequences documented by the Panel.
Iran rebuttal - We support legitimate regional actors — you selectively target us.

US comeback - This delegation does not pursue selective politics — it pursues compliance with
Security Council measures and the protection of civilians. Where credible evidence shows material
assistance that prolongs conflict, we have a duty to act

Iran rebuttal - Attacks on shipping are the result of legitimate resistance to Israel, not Iran.

US Comeback - Even in the fog of war, international law protects neutral commerce and civilian lives.
The origin of motivation does not absolve actors of responsibility for attacks that endanger neutral
seafarers and humanitarian deliveries.

https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/259/53/pdf/n2425953.pdf

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/houthis-iran

Points in Round Robbin

Oman
1. The GCC, can assist in construction
2. We also request the International Corporation to aid Yemen

Turkey
1. Urges regional partners UN-backed reconstruction fund.
2. Promote restoration of healthcare and educational institutions where access to education
will be ensured to all Yemenis

Egypt
1. The reconstruction of Yemen’s public infrastructure.
2. Urgent Humanitarian intervention

Palestine
1. To help Yemen in this crisis, provide them with shelter, food and water and all the resources
to live, as in humanitarian aid

Iraq
1. Using natural energy sources like solar power energy would help reduce the money put into
creating infrastructure

Israel
1. Negotiation as a solution. First step to end any conflict.
2. Talks with all parties involved like Houthis, Yemen, etc.
Germany
1. Funding the countries, help negotiate
2. Get recognized by the UN

China
1. Temporary living quarters in areas outside Yemen where refugees can live and have work,
jobs and education.
2. Other countries can build living quarters in nearby Arab nations that have excess area of
desert.

Russia
1. We could help set up donors here and internationally.

France
1. The Allied countries can divide among themselves, separating and taking initiative to focus
on humanitarian aid.
2. The Humanitarian aid can be giving food, shelter and medical aid.

United Kingdom
1. Highly recommends donating humanitarian aid to places of suffering in Yemen, especially to
Women and Children.

Iran
1. A ceasefire would be insufficient, supporting them with economic and social opportunities.
2. DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, …) They take out weapons of countries and this would
be funded by other countries.

UAE
1. Rehabilitation centres for former child soldiers in Yemen.
2. Providing Agricultural Aid
3. These focus on militant affected areas.

Houthi (Ansar Allah)

1. Call for a ceasefire.
2. Request foreign interference to step down.
3. Discuss this matter to protect the civilians.
4. End all the corruption.
5. Aim is to stop more damage

Yemen
1. Suggests a peace talk about the Yemeni crisis
2. Send Humanitarian aid to the Yemeni people like Medic
USA
The USA firmly believes that countries must be limited to use foreign weapons for defensive
purposes only and not for offensive purposes. All countries must have a right to defend themselves
using foreign weapons. The United States calls for a UN-supervised Arms Traceability Mechanism,
integrating serial-number databases, maritime-tracking intelligence, and mandatory disclosure of
dual-use exports. Enforcement must be global, not optional.

Saudi Arabia
1. 2/3 to the Yemeni government and 1/3 to the Houthi. (Parliamentary seats)
2. Reason the 2010 election which were held in Yemen and the Yemeni government won.
3. This would be mediated by USA, China and Saudi
4. Houthis are not permitted to hold non-state or personal military forces for their use.