HAZOP Procedure for company

RISK = CONSEQUENCE (IMPACT) x FREQUENCY ( LIKELIHOOD) OF OCCURRENCE A measure of the consequence of a hazard and the frequency with which is likely to occur.

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

HAZOP Procedure for company

WHAT ? HAZOP is Hazard and Operability Analysis WHEN ? Hazop can be used at practically any stage. It is so widely used that almost any form of process hazards analysis is referred to as HAZOP ADVANTAGE ? HAZOP is very thorough , because you force yourself to examine most aspect DISADVANTAGE? HAZOP is very time consuming and costly. If not setup correctly and managed properly , it can be ineffective. Needs leadership by an Expert in the field of Hazop

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

HAZOP Procedure for company

A hazard and Operability ( HAZOP) analysis is the systematic identification of every credible deviation in the system or process , usually a chemical manufacturing process from the design intent. This method was used UK Imperial Chemical Industries in the 1960s The purpose of a Hazop is to review a process or operation systematically to identify whether deviations from the desired practices could lead to undesirable consequences Hazop is usually requires a series of meeting during which the team , using process drawings , systematically evaluates the impact of the deviations from the desired practices The risks of deviations are assessed and if deemed unacceptable , the a set of recommended action is determined

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

What Is PHA ?

Definition a system to identify, assess & mitigate potential hazards to a tolerable level by addressing not only technology but also facility and human using specific tools Objective :
To ensure that an adequate assessment of risk is carried out in order to meet the following :
1. 2. 3. 4. To To To To identify hazards and operability problems identify the consequences and evaluate the risk of hazard events analyse the adequacy of existing safeguards recommend additional safeguards to reduce the risks if necessary

PHA Tools

Which technique?

Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP)

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Hazard Identification (HAZID) Hazard Analysis (HAZAN) Structured What-if Technique (SWIFT) Safety Integrity Level Assessment (SIL) Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

It depends on: The type of work you are doing and The type of potential hazards

HAZOP Process

Hazard & Operability Problems

Highly

Existing Safeguards
Procedure

explosive fuel gas Electric power High pressure steam of 54 bar High temperature superheated steam N2, O2, Argon Chemicals Tray collapsed Tubes leak, not properly weld Valve passing
Consequence & Hazard Risk

Alarm & operator intervention Interlock, LSHH, PSHH Lab analysis Scheduled DOSH inspection Preventive Maintenance

Additional safeguards & recommendations

PEOPLE - Fatality, injury ENVIRONMENT - air, water, land, ecological ASSET: Equipment, asset damage/loss REPUTATION: Loss of business, national impact

Proper training program for new staff? Additional transmitter or alarm? Verification checklist? Review inventory of critical spare part?

Method Selection

CAUSE DEVIATION CONSEQUENCE

What-If Checklist Failure Mode & Effect Analysis (FMEA)

HAZOP Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

Examples of PHA Applications

What If/Checklist

FMEA

HAZOP

FTA

Conceptual Design Basic Detailed Existing process Process change Decommissioning

The Process Flow

start
Managing Recommendations & Tracking

Assurance
Compliancy & Review Communicate any findings to affected employee

Planning
Identify area of study/set boundary Select Team comprises of PHA leader, scribe & members

Prioritized?Review/challenge? Assign action party Follow-up/track Communicate to employees

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Hazard Review
To cover Technology, Human Errors, Facility Siting & Inherent Safer Process To select the suitable tools e.g. What-If?,HAZOP, FMEA, FTA,IPF
Consequences Analysis

Identify the potential source of leakages Type of event F, E,TR Size of release Effect to PEAR

Hazard Identification (HazId)

Field tour Previous MOC & Incident? Previous HazOp report?

Supporting Elements

Facilities Data through PIMS, SAP records, e-HSEMS, eCPA

Site visit for verification, ergonomics study, fire safety review,

Up-to-date Information and Documentation e.g. P&ID, O&M, MSDS, Area Classification

Resources PHA practitioners & cross-functional subject matter expert

What is HAZOP?

HAZOP comes from the phrase HAZard and OPerability study It is a systematic method (team-based) for examining complex facilities or processes to find actual / potentially hazardous

procedures / operation. These hazards shall be eliminated or

mitigated to a tolerable level (ALARP) Identification & assessment of hazards related to process deviation or changes in process operating envelope

Importance of HAZOP

How can we operate plants safety if we do not know the hazards? How can we control the hazards if we dont understand their potential of release and impacts. How can we be confident that we are controlling the hazards if we dont know how we expect our controls to perform? How can we improve on the safeguards to ensure that the hazards are adequately mitigated?

General way of doing HAZOP

By considering the plant on section-by-section, line-by-line and item-by-item; develop suitable node By defining normal operation By considering deviations from normal operation By using a keyword matrix to initiate discussion

General assumptions while doing HAZOP study

One failure at a time (no double jeopardy) unless

It has the potential to happen It has happened before

The system will perform as the design intent

The system is operated and maintained in line with the design intent

Protective systems/safeguarding are functioning as designed

Outline of HAZOP Technique

HAZOP systematically review deviations from design intent

The study shall consists of a team of knowledgeable and

experience personnel Use guidewords to stimulate creative thinking Identify significant consequences and reasonable causes (reject small, unimportant issues e.g. small release from valve packing) Review the available safeguards Develop recommendations to manage risks Proceed to the next deviation Put risk ranking for each of the cause (preferably later)

Outline of HAZOP Technique

The results are qualitative in nature (quantitative

assessment is available by using QRA)

Effective duration is 4-5 hours per day depending on the team

Further study may be required more in-depth analysis (i.e.

quantitative method) and it should be noted

HAZOP Process

Divide system into nodes and state design intent

For each node, select parameter Deviation

No

List Causes
Possible?
Yes

No

Consequence?
Yes

Yes

Existing

SAFEGUARD
sufficient?

No

Proposed Option

HAZOP Process Flow Detail

Identify a Node Describe design intent & operating condition Consider first or next Guide Word Identify all Causes and record Identify all Consequences and record

List existing Safeguards and record

Identify the Risk Ranking and record Provide any recommendations and record No

Last Guide Word? Yes

Take a new Node

HAZOP Process Flow

1. Identify a Node 2. Describe design intent and operating condition

A node is defined as a segment of the system which have distinct

design intent
The boundary of the node should be selected such that it is manageable for the team to analyze Typical node: One major equipment (vessel/column/storage tank etc), associated minor equipment (pumps/valves etc), instrumentation and other ancillary equipment

Team must understand the design intent of the node specific information
on how the node is operated under design conditions (specific pressure, temperature, flow etc)

HAZOP Process Flow Normally, a node follows the process flow Start at an isolation point (valve or equipment item) of where the line enters the node being analyzed (INLET BOUNDARY) Continue to the next change of design intent OR Continue to where a critical parameter (e.g. flow, pressure, temperature)

changes
OR Continue to the next equipment item The point of where the node stops is known as OUTLET BOUNDARY

Practical Tips for Node Selection Aim for nodes which is planned to take no more than 1 2 hours to study Aim for not more than 5 causes for the first Guide Word If the team needs to analyze the node in parts, then break the node into smaller nodes HAZOP Leader and Scribe may choose the nodes before the study session

starts. The proposed nodes shall be agreed by the team members

Be prepared to change the nodes if the team is struggling to analyze it

Example of Selection of Node: HAZOP Study on MOC

Replacement of PV-1100
Node No: 3
The following are nodes/area of study for HAZOP: Node 1: Line from V6-0204 to AGI Node 2: Line from V6-0207 to AGI Node 3: AGI

AGI

PV-1100

Node No:1 Node No: 2

From LP fuel gas From Glycol

From V6-0207

From V6-0204

HAZOP Process Flow

3. Consider Guide Word
Guide Word NO, NOT or NONE MORE OF LESS OF AS WELL AS PART OF REVERSE OTHER THAN Process Deviation The complete negation of the design or operating intent Quantitative increase of the parameter Quantitative decrease of the parameter Qualitative increase of the parameter Qualitative decrease of the parameter Logical opposite of the design intent Something else happens Definition No part of the intention is achieved More of the intention occurs or is achieved Less intention occurs or is achieved All the intention is achieved with some addition Only some of the intention is achieved The reverse of the operating intention occurs No part of the intention occurs

Deviations obtained by using Guide Words

Parameter
Flow Flow Flow Pressure Pressure Temperature Temperature Level Level Reaction Reaction Composition Contamination Relief Sampling Service Service Service Service Service Service Maintenance More Reverse More Less More Less More Less More Other Other Other Other Other No No No No No No Other

Guide Word
No/Less

Deviation
No/Less Flow More Flow Reverse Flow High Pressure Low Pressure High Temperature Low Temperature High Level Low Level More Reaction Other Reaction Off-specification Contamination Relief Sampling Power Failure Instrument Air Failure Cooling Water Failure Steam Failure Nitrogen Failure No Flushing Oil Maintenance

Consider other modes of operation Normal Operation Reduced Throughput / Turndown Routine Start Up

Routine Shutdown
Commissioning Emergency Special Modes of Operation

Other Guide Words

Phase Composition Testing Operation Electrical : Gas / liquid / solid : Two phase / changes with time / slugging / additives : Equipment / hydrocarbon streams / effluents / sampling points : Operability / maintainability : Area classification / isolation / earthing

Instrument

: Sufficient for control / too many / correct location / consistent philosophy / separate tapping for alarm and IPF

Global Guide Words Toxicity Commissioning / start up Shutdown (isolation / purging) Breakdown (including services and utility failures) Effluent Noise

Fire / explosion
Safety equipment Materials of construction Quality, consistency & reliability Efficiency and reliability Ignition Engineering issues

Corrosion / erosion Previous precaution

Accessibility
Orientation Safety/ ESD Environmental

Viscosity

HAZOP Process Flow

4. Identify all Causes

The Causes identified must be within the Node

It must be a credible scenario

Typically done using a brainstorming technique without considering the Consequences It is possible that there are none or no new Cause identified for a specific Deviation

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for NO FLOW Wrong routing Blockage Incorrect blind plate insertion Isolation in error Burst pipe Large leakage Incorrectly installed check valve Equipment failure (fail-close valve, pump, filter etc)

Incorrect pressure differential

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for MORE PRESSURE Surge problems Thermal overpressure Isolation of relief devices Positive displacement pump running Failed open PCV Incorrect design pressure Gas breakthrough (inadequate venting) Connection to high pressure system

Specification of pipes, vessels, fittings & instruments

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for OTHER COMPOSITION Phase change Settling of slurries Leaking isolation valves, exchanger tubes Incorrect feedstock specification Process control upsets Uncontrolled reaction by intermediate or by-products

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for RELIEF Wrong relief philosophy (process / fire etc) Unsuitable type of relief device, blocking Unsuitable relief device location Multi-phase flow Effect of debottlenecking on relief capacity Effect of inlet/outlet piping & manifold configuration

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for INSTRUMENTATION Wrong control philosophy Wrong fail-safe philosophy Unsuitable instrument location and response time Time available for operator intervention Panel arrangement and location Fire protection Unsuitable set points of alarms, trips and authorization of changes Alarm and trip testing, auto/manual switches and human error

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for SERVICE FAILURE Failure of Instrument air, steam, water & nitrogen Hydraulic power, electric power Telecommunications, computer and interfaces Heating and ventilation Contamination of Instrument air, steam, nitrogen

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for ABNORMAL OPERATION Purging Flushing Start up Normal shutdown Emergency operation Emergency shutdown Inspection of operating machines

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for IGNITION SUPPRESSION Grounding arrangement Insulated vessel/equipment Low conductance fluids Two liquid phases Splash filling of vessel Insulated components Dust and powder handling Electrical area classification

Flame arrestors
Hot work and hot surfaces Auto-ignition and pyrophoric materials

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples of Causes for SAFETY EQUIPMENT Fire and gas detection Testing of emergency equipment Emergency shutdown First aid, medical resources Fire fighting response time Effluent disposal Emergency plan & training Hazards created by others

Toxic and hazardous properties of process materials

HAZOP Process Flow

5. Identify all Consequences

Consequences shall be linked to the cause identified

Safeguards is not considered in Consequences determination

(assume the safeguards fail) Consequences can be within the Node or outside of the Node (upstream and downstream) One Cause can lead to many Consequences (list all of them) Can be listed under People, Environment, Asset and Reputation Meaningful and significant

Can be listed one by one starting from not-so-worse consequence

until the worst case scenario

Examples of consequences

People First aid injury, minor injury, major injury, fatality Environment Local spillage, effluent discharge to river, black smoke Asset Equipment crack, valve damage, fire/explosion on storage tank Reputation Media attention, public inquiry, disrepute to international image

HAZOP Process Flow

6. List existing Safeguards

It is the designed system or administrative controls to prevent,

detect or mitigate the Consequences

May list the safeguards based on the Causes Something to think about: i. ii. Does an indicator or a gauge being considered as a safeguard? Does working procedure being considered as a safeguard?

HAZOP Process Flow

Safeguards for any system could be listed based on the systems Layers of Protection theory.

HAZOP Process Flow

7. Identify the Risk Ranking

The Risk Ranking for each Consequence shall be identified by

utilizing the PGB Risk Matrix

Consequence vs. Probability = Risk Ranking In general, there are three levels of Risk Ranking i.e. HIGH MEDIUM and LOW The Consequence rating shall take into consideration of the detection and mitigation safeguards available The Probability rating shall take into consideration of the

prevention safeguards available

Sample of Risk Matrix

CONSEQUENCE
A Never heard of in the industry

INCREASING LIKELIHOOD ------>

B Has happened in the industry. C Has happened once in the company D Has happened several times per year in the company. E Has happened several times per year in company

People (P)

Environment (E)

Assets Loss (A)

Reputation (R)

Negligible

1 time in > 20 years

1 time between 4 to 20 years

1 time between 6 months to 4 years

1 time in < 6 months

P0 No injury P1 Slight Injury P2 Minor Injury P3 Major Injury

E0 No effect E1 Slight effect E2 Minor Effect E3 Localised effect E4 Major effect E5 Massive effect

A0 No loss A1 Slight loss < 10k A2 Minor Loss 10k ~ 100k A3 Local Loss 100k ~ 0.5 M A4 Major Loss 0.5M ~ 10M A5 Extensive Loss > 10 M

R0 No Impact

L L L L L

L L L L M

L L L M M

L L M M H

L L M H H

R1 Slight Impact
R2 Limited Impact R3 Considerable Impact R4 National Impact

P4 Fatalities P5 Fatalities

R5 International Impact

HAZOP Process Flow

8. Provide any Recommendations

If the team decided that the existing Safeguards are inadequate to prevent, detect or mitigate the Consequences, they may recommend additional safeguards to protect the system The Recommendations must address the issue and bring the risk to an acceptable level i.e. LOW The Recommendations must be clear and use 3Ws WHAT, WHY and WHERE A further study may also be recommended because HAZOP is not a tool to solve safety issues in detail

Cost of the recommendations SHALL NOT be an issue for the HAZOP

analysis team

HAZOP Team Selection

The team shall consist of o HAZOP leader to facilitate the study o Scribe to record the study o Operation personnel o Multi-disciplinary members, depending on the scope of the study (e.g. instrument, electrical, mechanical, inspection, piping, civil, HSE) Balance of skills, knowledge and experience Willing contributors, able to express thoughts clearly

Process Engineer & Operation Personnels Responsibilities

Provide simple description of the system Provide design intention for each process unit

Provide information in process conditions and design conditions

Provide operational specialist input to the analysis Check design for operational issues

Ensure design compatibility with existing work practices

Check design for operating procedure and training requirements Provide details of process chemistry Provide details of process hazards

Typical information required

As built / latest P&ID of the plant PFD and material balances Design parameters: temperature, pressure, flow etc Operating parameters: temperature, pressure, flow etc Equipment data sheet / drawing Marked up P&ID / drawing of the system as reference Operating procedures Schedule of alarm/trip setting Cause & effect matrix

Interlock logic chart

Properties and hazards of process materials

HAZOP Team dynamics

Everyone shall be involved o Encourage quiet people, manage loud people Maintain attention and motivation o Concentrate on the task Appropriate pace o Not too rush or too drawn out

Appropriate orientation
o Primarily process rather than content oriented

HAZOP Procedure Existing Plant

Occupational Safety & Health Administration( OSHA) process safety management ( PSM) regulation 29 CFR 1910.119 -Requires company to update or revalidate their PHA at least every 5 years -In addition , the US Environment Protection Agencys (EPA) risk management program rule , 40 CFR Part 68 requires companies to performe quatitative off-site consequences analysis

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

Scheduled hazard study on existing plant

Risk assessment in this context is the process of quantifying the level of risk associated with the operation of the equipment / machine It should be a structured and systematic process that answers the following 4 specifics questions:i) How severe are potential injuries? ii) How frequently are employees exposed? iii) What is possibility of avoiding the hazards if it does occur?

iv) What is the likelihood of an injury should a safety control system fail ?

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

Pilot Plant & Operational Lab

Pilot Plant & Operational Lab

HAZOP GROUP PRESENTATION

HAZOP GROUP PRESENTATION

How to perform HAZOP process ?

1.

Preparation P&ID PFD plus material and energy balances Equipment specifications Layout drawing

2. Facilitator and Process Engineer Break P&ID down into nodes Nodes are equipment items If nodes are too small you can loose sense of analysis and incur excessive repetition If nodes are too large , hard to handle and becomes confusing

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

How to perform HAZOP process ? 3. Prepare HAZOP outline with List of Deviations 4. Assemble HAZOP team

5. Facilitators Explains The facilitator or one of the team members explains the purpose and scope of the HAZOP and sets the rules of the study
6. Process Engineer Explains Process in general Immediate Node being Hazoped 7. HAZOP Each Node Using Deviation Listed in Outline Working Through the P&ID Produce Hazop worksheet recording the following : Cause Consequence Safeguards Action & recommendation Remarks

How to perform HAZOP process ?

8.At the End of HAZOP , the Facilitators Issues Preliminary HAZOP Report consisting of Attendance Outline Detail report Action/ recommendation Register. 9. Issues Final Report Giving Full Details

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

Example of Single Node on Boiler System

Boiler Feed Water for F4- 781

LA 7809

LC 7810A LT 7810

LALL 7809

Steam drum

LT 7809 LSLL 7809

BV

Water drum
FC 7810 FC 7810

Economizer

NC
BV

PI 7801 PI 7802 PT 7801

PI 7810
FT 7810

TI 7801

FY 7810
From BFW Header

FV 7810

TI 7801

BV

BV

NC
Demin Water

NODE 1

BW-3"-7801-D6103-H(N20B)

NC

TW-1"-7801-A1031-H(N20A)

HAZOP Worksheet
Design intent: Replacement of B/Valve at D/ Stream & U/ Stream FV 7801 DEVIATIO N CAUSES CONSEQUENC ES SAFEGUARD S REMARKS & RISK RANKING ACTION BY/ DATE:
STAT US

NODE 1 GUIDE WORD More

More Pressure

BV at Econo mizer partial ly close

1.Increased backpressure on Steam turbine 2.ST tripped

RECOMMENDATION S P PI 7801 To install L , PI vibration sensor 7802 to all ST pump and PI 7810 (indicati on only L

E L

A R M L 1.

MTA ( Q3 Fy 2010/11)

No

Pressure BV at U/stream or D/ Stream FV 7810 is fully close 1.,No water supply to steam drum leading to low level 2.Boiler tripped 3.Slow down the process LSLL 7809 To implement Tagging system to critical valve

M L 1.POA ( 1st May 2010 )

Less

Less pressure

NA