EDUCATION OF THE FUTURE

NAVAL OPERATIONAL LEADERS

By
DR M. VEGO
JMO DEPARTMENT,
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
NEWPORT, RI
USA
 NAVAL OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP

MARITIME NAVAL
THEATER- OPERATIONAL MARITIME THEATER
STRATEGIC OF
COMMANDERS
LEADERSHIP
OPERATIONS
COMMANDERS

THEATER
NAVAL FLEET
COMPONNENT COMMANDERS
COMMANDERS

NAVAL NUMBERED
DISTRICT FLEET
COMMANDERS COMMANDERS

JOINT TASK
FORCE
COMMANDERS
PPT-97VEGO53
 TENETS OF OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP
ABSOLUTE PRIMACY OF
POLICY & STRATEGY
FIRM AND UNWAVERING FOCUS
ON THE OBJECTIVE

APPLICATION OF
OVERWHELMING
BALANCING OPERATIONAL
FORCE AT THE
FACTORS VS. OBJECTIVE
DECISIVE PLACE
AND TIME

INDIRECT OBTAINING AND MAINTAINING

APPROACH FREEDOM OF ACTION
TENETS
(CARDINAL
JOINTNESS RULES)

EXERCISING THE INITIATIVE

TO ENLARGE ONE’S
OWN FREEDOM TO ACT

WILLINGNESS
TO
TAKE HIGH BUT SELECTION OF THE
PRUDENT RISKS PROPER WEIGHT
OF EFFORT
CONCENTRATION OF
FORCES AT THE
CREATIVE WEIGHT OF MAIN
THINKING EFFORT

PPT-97-VEGO41A (PFR)
 EDUCATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS
• PROFESSIONAL
KNOWLEDGE
• MILITARY/NAVAL HISTORY
• GENERAL KNOWLEDGE
PROFESSIONAL
KNOWLEDGE
• THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE AND
UNDERSTANDING OF TACTICS OF HIS
SPECIALTY AND COMBINED ARMS
TACTICS
• OPERATIONAL ART
• POLICY AND STRATEGY
• FORCE PLANNING
OPERATIONAL ART
 EVOLUTION OF THE TERM

• OPERATION (HENRY H. E. LLOYD, ADAM

HEINRICH DIETRICH VON BUELOW)
• GRAND TACTICS (JACQUE GUIBERT, ANTOINE-
HENRI DE JOMINI; J.F.C. FULLER)
• OPERATIONS (HELMUTH VON MOLTKE, SR.)
• OPERATIONAL ART (OPERATIVNOYE
ISKUSSTVO) (A.A. SVECHIN)
• CONTROL OF OPERATIONS
( OPERATIONSFUEHRUNG)
• OPERATIONAL (COMMAND AND)
CONTROL (OPERATIVE FUEHRUNG)
• OPERATIONAL ART
• OPERATIONAL WARFARE
 WHAT IS OPERATIONAL ART?

• OPERATIONAL ART IS AN INTERMEDIATE FIELD OF

STUDY AND PRACTICE BETWEEN STRATEGY AND
TACTICS
• IT IS APPLIED ACROSS THE ENTIRE “OPERATIONAL
CONTINUUM.”
• IT DEALS WITH THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PLANNING,
PREPARING, CONDUCTING, AND SUSTAINING MAJOR
OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS AIMED AT
ACCOMPLISHING OPERATIONAL OR STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVES IN A THEATER.
 EMERGENCE OF OPERATIONAL ART, 1805-1945
NAPOLEONIC
WARS
1805
AMERICAN WARS OF RUSSO- WORLD WORLD
TIME FRAME CIVIL GERMAN JAPANESE WAR WAR
WAR UNIFICATION WAR I II
1861-65 1866-71 1904-05 1914-18 1930 1939-45
OPERATIONAL ART

ON LAND

NAVAL/MARITIME

AIR

PPT-98-VEGO-47 (PFR)
 EMERGENCE OF OPERATIONS (OPERATIONAL ART)

STRATEGY

OPERATIONS
(Operational Art)

TACTICS

PPT-98-VEG0-38A (PFR)
 INFLUENCE OF:

• POLITICS & SOCIETY

• SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
• INDUSTRIALIZATION
• MILITARY PRACTITIONERS AND
THEORETICIANS
• PRUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF.
 WHY IS IMPORTANT TO
KNOW AND UNDERSTAND
OPERATIONAL ART?
• THE GAP BETWEEN STRATEGY AND
TACTICS IS TOO LARGE TO BE BRIDGED
WITHOUT AN INTERMEDIATE FIELD OF
STUDY AND PRACTICE -- OPERATIONAL ART
• RESULTS OF TACTICAL ACTIONS ARE
USEFUL ONLY WHEN LINKED TOGETHER AS
A PART SOME LARGER DESIGN FRAMED BY
STRATEGY AND ORCHESTRATED BY
OPERATIONAL ART
• TECHNOLOGICAL AND/OR NUMERICAL
SUPERIORIOTY IN ITSELF IS OFTEN
INSUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE THE ULTIMATE
SUCCESS IN A WAR
• ALL WARS ARE WON OR LOST AT THE
OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEVELS
• SKILLFUL APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL ART
CAN GREATLY REDUCE THE DISADVANTAGES
OF ONE’S GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION.
• OPERATIONAL ART ENABLES A
SMALLER, BETTER TRAINED AND
SKILLFULLY LED FORCE GUIDED
BY SOUND STRATEGY TO DEFEAT
QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY MUCH
STRONGER (BUT POORLY LED AND
TRAINED) ENEMY FORCE.
• KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF
OPERATIONAL ART SIGNIFICANTLY
ENHANCES THE PERFORMANCE OF
ONE’S TACTICAL COMMANDERS IN
EXECUTING THE HIGHER COMMANDER’S
INTENT
• OPERATIONAL ART REQUIRES
CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS IN IMPROVING
ONE’S PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION.
 COMPONENTS OF OPERATIONAL ART
(IN GENERIC TERMS)
STAGES OF COMBAT
FORCE EMPLOYMENT
METHODS OF
OPERATIONAL COMBAT FORCE
FUNCTIONS EMPLOYMENT

OPERATIONAL
FACTORS OPERATIONAL
PLANNING

COMPONENTS
THE OBJECTIVES

PRINCIPLES
OF OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL
WARFARE TRAINING

ELEMENTS OF
OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL
WARFARE LEADERSHIP

PPT-97VEG023
CHARACTERISTICS
PREREQUISITES
• THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
EXPANSION OF THEATER-WIDE OR
OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS
 OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
 OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
 OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
WARFARE (C2W)
 OPERATIONAL FIRES
 OPERATIONAL PROTECTION
 OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS
POLICY AND STRATEGY
 NATIONAL POLICY
• IS A BROAD STATEMENT ON THE
COURSE OF ACTION IN PURSUIT OF
A SPECIFIC NATIONAL OBJECTIVE
• POLICY DETERMINES WHICH
ASPECTS OF NATIONAL INTERESTS
SHOULD BE PURSUED AS
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES.
• THE TERM OBJECTIVE IS USED FOR
MORE QUANTIFIABLE (MEASURABLE)
EXPRESSION OF THE NATION’S GOALS
OR AIMS.
• NATIONAL OBJECTIVES ARE
ACCOMPLISHED BY USING DIVERSE
SOURCES OF POWER, CALLED
NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF POWER.
 NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

Financial Political
Cultural

Scientific Diplomatic

Aspects

Ideological Military

Informational Other Economic

 WAR AND POLICY
• THE WAR IS USE OF VIOLENCE TO COMPEL
OUR ENEMY TO DO OUR WILL
• WAR IS A TRUE POLITICAL INSTRUMENT, A
CONTINUATION OF POLITICAL INTERCOURSE,
CARRIED OUT BY OTHER MEANS
• THE WAR IS NEVER FINAL BECAUSE THE
DEFEATED STATE OFTEN CONSIDERS THE
OUTCOME MERELY AS A TRANSITORY EVIL

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

 ON STRATEGY
• STRATEGY IS THE PROCESS OF
INTERRELATING AND BALANCING
ONE’S ENDS WITH ONE’S MEANS
• WHEN APPLIED TO A GIVEN SET OF
ENDS AND MEANS, THE RESULT IS
A SPECIFIC WAY OF USING
SPECIFIED MEANS TO ACHIEVE
DISTINCT ENDS.
 SCOPE OF STRATEGY
Determine
Synchronize all Desired (Strategic)
Use of or Threat of
Military and Non-Military End State
Use of Military & Non-Military
Sources of Power Sources of Power
Determine Political
Building Alliances Strategic Objectives
And Coalitions
Determine Military
Enhance the Country’s Strategic Objectives
Alliance /Coalition
TASKS
Vision of the
Character and Duration
Determine Conditions & Timing Of the Future War
Conflict / War Termination

Provide Framework
Decide Whether Allocate Adequate For the Use Of
A War Be Forces and Resources Military Sources of Power
Offensive or Defensive
Distribute One’s Own Determine Theater of
And Friendly Forces Main and Secondary
Among Theaters Effort
 TYPE OF STRATEGY
• NATIONAL STRATEGY
• NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (U.S.
TERM)
• GRAND STRATEGY (BRITISH TERM)
• ALLIANCE/COALITION STRATEGY
• MILITARY STRATEGY
• THEATER STRATEGY
• SUPPORTING STRATEGIES
 NATIONAL STRATEGY

• IS AN ART AND SCIENCE OF

APPLYING THE INSTRUMENTS OF
NATIONAL POWER TO ATTAIN
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AS
ARTICULATED BY THE NATIONAL
OR ALLIANCE/COALITION
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.
 MILITARY STRATEGY
• IS AN ART AND SCIENCE OF EMPLOYING
ARMED FORCES OF A NATION OR
ALLIANCE TO SECURE OBJECTIVES OF
NATIONAL OR ALLIANCE/COALITION
POLICY BY THE USE, OR THREAT OF
USE, OF MILITARY FORCE.
• MILITARY STRATEGY IS NOT INVOLVED IN
THE ACTUAL EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES
IN COMBAT.
 TYPE OF MILITARY STRATEGY

• OFFENSIVE VS. DEFENSIVE

• STRATEGY OF ANNIHILATION VS.
STRATEGY OF EROSION
(ATTRITION)
• SYMMETRIC VS. ASYMMETRIC
STRATEGY.
 THEATER STRATEGY
• IS THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
SECURING OBJECTIVES OF
NATIONAL AND/OR
ALLIANCE/COALITION POLICY AND
MILITARY STRATEGY BY THE USE
OF FORCE OR THREAT OF USING
FORCE IN A GIVEN THEATER (OF
WAR).
POLICY AND STRATEGY
CONFLUENCE
 STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
Desired
(Strategic)
End State

Political Military
Strategic Strategic
Objectives Objectives
Elements

Forces and Resources Restraints

Available or And
Becoming Available Constraints
 DESIRED (STRATEGIC) END
STATE
• DESIRED (STRATEGIC) END STATE IS
BROADLY EXPRESSED POLITICAL,
DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY, ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, ETHNIC, HUMANITARIAN,
INFORMATIONAL, AND OTHER
CONDITIONS THAT THE HIGHEST
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF A NATION OR
ALLIANCE/COALITION WANTS TO SEE IN
A GIVEN THEATER AFTER THE END OF
HOSTILITIES.
• DESIRED (STRATEGIC) END STATE
PROVIDES A BROADER FRAMEWORK
FOR DETERMINATION OF STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVES
• IT ALSO LARGELY DETERMINES
DURATION AND INTENSITY OF WAR
• ONLY AFTER DESIRED (STRATEGIC) END
STATE IS DEFINED STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE DETERMINED.
• IT IS A PART OF A STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL OR
ALLIANCE/COALITION LEADERSHIP
• IT IS APPLIED ONLY FOR A CAMPAIGN OR
MAJOR OPERATION INTENDED TO END
THE HOSTILITIES.
 DESIRED (STRATEGIC) END STATE AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

NATIONAL OR STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

• NATIONAL OR ALLIANCE /
ALLIANCE/ COALITION OBJECTIVES
COALITION • DESIRED END STATE
LEADERSHIP • RESOURCES

}
• CONSTRAINTS LIMITATIONS
• RESTRAINTS

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE DESIRED END STATE

• POLITICAL POLITICAL
• DIPLOMATIC DIPLOMATIC
• MILITARY MILITARY
• ECONOMIC ECONOMIC
• SOCIAL SOCIAL
• INFORMATIONAL INFORMATIONAL
• ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
• OTHER OTHER

MILITARY STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVE

PPT-97VEG034B (PFR)
STUDY OF MILITARY/NAVAL
HISTORY
“… THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE HIGHER
ART OF WAR IS NOT ACQUIRED
EXCEPT BY EXPERIENCE AND THE
STUDY OF HISTORY OF WARS AND
THE BATTLES OF GREAT
CAPTAINS.”

NAPOLEON I
• MILITAR/NAVAL HISTORY IS THE SINGLE MOST
IMPORTANT INDIRECT PRACTICAL SOURCE
FOR ACQUIRING OPERATIONAL THINKING
• HISTORY IS INHERENTLY BROADER, DEEPER,
AND MORE DIVERSE THAN THE STUDY OF ANY
OTHER AREA OF HUMAN ACTIVITY
• HISTORIANS VS. STUDENTS OF HISTORY
• STUDY OF PAST CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR
OPERATIONS
• STUDY OF A WAR AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENA
• MILITARY/NAVAL HISTORY MUST BE STUDIED IN
WIDTH, DEPTH, AND CONTEXT
• MILITARY/NAVAL HISTORY MUST BE
ACCURATE AND FRANK ASCCOUNT OF
THE PAST EVENTS
• CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ OBSERVED
THAT MILITARY HISTORY HAS VALUE
WHEN ALWAYS PRESENTS THE TRUTH,
THE ENTIRE TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT
THE TRUTH
• THERE IS A GREAT DANGER OF
CENSORED AND PROPAGANDISTIC
HISTORY.
• ANOTHER PITFALL IS USING A CERTAIN HISTORICAL
EVENT AS A RECIPE FOR THE FUTURE—EXAMPLE
OF FIELD MARSHAL ALFRED VON SCHLIFFEN’S
DOGMATIC VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
BATTLE OF CANNAE IN 216 BC
• STUDY OF MILITARY/NAVAL HISTORY MUST BE
MORE THAN A LOGICAL, FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF
THE PAST EVENTS
• IT MUST PROVIDE A SYNTHESIS OF EVENTS
• THE GREAT VALUE OF HISTORY WRITTEN FROM THE
OPERATIONAL VS. TACTICAL PERSPECTIVE
• THE NEED TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS AND THEN
DERIVE OPERATIONAL LESSSONS LEARNED.
OPERATIONAL LESSONS
LEARNED
 THE PURPOSE OF
DERIVING LESSONS
 TYPES
• TECHNOLOGICAL
• TACTICAL
• OPERATIONAL
• STRATEGIC
 PROCESS OF DERIVING OPERATIONAL LESSONS
SOURCES ANALYSIS

PEACETIME • DETERMINATION OF
OPERATIONAL/STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL/
• MANEUVERS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
• EXERCISES
• PLANNING GAMES
• OPERATIONAL FACTORS
• WAR GAMES • OPERATIONAL
• COMMAND POST EXERCISES
FUNCTIONS
• FIELD TRIPS
• OTHER • OPERATIONAL DECISIONS
OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR • OPERATIONAL
PLANNING/
• INSURGENCY
• COUNTER-INSURGENCY
PREPARATIONS/ CONCLUSIONS
• COUNTER-TERRORISM
EXECUTION
• OTHER • OPERATIONAL
WAR LEADERSHIP
• MAJOR OPERATIONS
• CAMPAIGNS • OPERATIONAL
EDUCATION OPERATIONAL
PEACETIME/WAR LESSONS
• OPERATIONAL TRAINING
STUDY OF MILITARY/NAVAL
LEARNED
HISTORY: • OTHER
• MAJOR OPERATIONS
• CAMPAIGNS
THE FACTOR OF TIME
 SOURCES OF LESSONS LEARNED

CONFLICT (WAR) Peacetime

• Combat • Exercises
• Personal • Maneuvers
Experiences • Battle Experiments
• Planning Games
Sources of • War Games
Lessons
Learned

Military / Naval
History
 Pitfalls In Deriving Lessons Learned

Focus on
Lack of Proper Technology and
Analysis Underestimating
Neglecting the Enemy
Human Factors
Lack of Time Focusing on a
Single Event

Lack of Information
Pitfalls
in Deriving Service
Parochialism
Lessons Learned
Cultural Arrogance
Institutional
Biases
Mirror-imaging

Other
Stifling Views that Imposition of
Contradict the Current a Certain View by
Higher Authority Overestimating
Policies or Doctrine
the Enemy
LESSONS LEARNED IN
PEACETIME
Lessons Learned from One’s Own
Maneuvers

U.S. Navy’s Fleet Problems

1927-1940
 U S F 9 9 R e p o r t o f F le e t P r o b le m X X I, 1 9 4 0
K ra s n o y a rs k B e r in g S e a G u lf o f A la s k a
L a b ra d o r
S e a o f O k h o ts k CANADA Sea
N o v o s ib ir s k
Ir k u t s k
C
C a lg a r y
Va n c o u ve r
U la a n b a a ta r
Q iq i h a r
H a r b in S e a t t le O tta w a
M i n n e a p o li s
M O N G O L IA U.S.A.
U ru m q i L ia o y u a n C h ic a g o B u f fa lo
B e ijin g B o u ld e r P h i l a d e lp h i a
NO R TH N e w Yo rk
Y in c h u a n KOREA W a s h in g to n D . C .
S a n F r a n c is c o K a n s a s C ity
X in i n g Sendai N o r fo lk
J in a n M e m p h is
Lu o ya n g SO UTH
To k yo
N o r t h P a c if ic O c e a n A L o s A n g e le s C h a r lo tt e
H u a in a n KOREA S a n D ie g o D a ll a s
JAPAN
C hengdu W uhan Shanghai N e w O r le a n s J a c k s o n v il le
J i a x in g P T.A -1 H o u s to n
Yu e y a n g N in g b o O r la n d o
Dukou W enzhou Ta m p a
Fuzhou C H IN A
30 M ia m i
K u n m in g X ia m e n 0° M E X IC O G u lf o f M e x ic o
T A IW A N H A W A I IA N
V ic t o r ia 3 IS L A N D S M e x ic o C ity CUBA

600 m i
1
P h i li p p i n e S e a S A IP A N P T.B 2
C a r ib b e a n S e a
P H I L I P P IN E S
GUAM E 3
0 °
24
A M AR SHALL B
A IS L A N D S
PA LA U B o g o ta
M I C R O N E S IA P T.B -1 C O L O M B IA
M A L A Y S IA
P T .A C a li
K IR IB A T I G A L A PA G O S ECUADO R
P A P U A N E W G U IN E A IS L A N D S Q u it o
G u a y a q u il
J a k a rta
SO LOM ON
IN D O N E S IA IS L A N D S PERU
M ARQUESAS
IS L A N D S
P o rt M o re sb y
L im a
SAM OA
T im o r S e a
IS L A N D S
D
C D -9 9 V E G O -2 6 (P F R )
 U.S. MARINE CORPS’S CONCEPT OF
LANDING OPERATIONS

• MARINE CORPS DERIVED PROPER

LESSENS FROM THE ALLIED FAILED
OPERATION AT GALLIPOLI
• LESSONS FROM THE SERIES OF THE
EXERCISES CONDUCTED IN THE 1920S
• LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GERMAN
LANDING AT BAY OF RIGA (OPERATION
ALBION) IN OCT 1917
Failure to Learn from One’s Own Exercises
and Maneuvers
British Army’s Exercises of
Mechanized Forces: Salisbury Plain
1927-1934

Lessons Learned from Foreign

Exercises and Maneuvers

German Study and Analysis of the Exercises

Conducted by the British Army’s Mechanized
Forces
1927-1934
British Armor on Maneuvers, Salisbury Plain, 1929
THE JAPANESE FAILURE TO LEARN PROPER LESSONS
ON THE EMPLOYMENT
OF THEIR SUBMARINES

• OCT 1940—EXERCISES SHOWED GREAT

POTENTIAL OF SUBMARINES TO ATTACK
THE ENEMY MERCHANT SHIPPING
• APR 1941—EXERCISES CONDUCTED
BETWEEN HONSHU AND MICRONESIA
SHOWED GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN USING
SUBMARINES AGAINST THE ENEMY’S
SURFACE COMBATANTS.
 PLANNING GAMES/
WAR GAMES & EXERCISES
• THE GERMAN CONCEPT OF THE “MASS
EMPLOYMENT OF U-BOATS” (SUBMARINE
SCREENS) ORIGINATED IN A NAVAL WAR GAME
CONDUCTED IN 1934
• THIS CONCEPT WAS TESTED FOR THE FIRST TIME
DURING THE WEHRMACHT MANEUVERS IN THE
FALL OF 1937
• THE U-BOAT EXERCISE IN THE NORTH SEA AND OFF
CAPE FINISTERRE IN MAY 1939; ANOTHER
EXERCISE WAS HELD IN THE BALTIC IN JULY 1939.
LESSONS LEARNED IN
COMBAT
• PERSONAL EXPERIENCES AND
REMINISCENCES OF DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS
• OFFICIAL/SEMI-OFFICIAL AFTER-
ACTION REPORTS
• INSTITUTIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
LESSONS LEARNED BY
THE LOSERS
• THE GERMAN STUDY OF THE EXPERIENCES OF
WORLD WAR I—57
COMMITTEES/SUBCOMMITTEES WERE
ESTABLISHED BY GENERAL HANS VON SEECKT
IN NOVEMBER 1919
• THE RESULT WAS THE FIELD MANUAL
FUEHRUNG UND GEFECHT DER VERBUNDENEN
WAFFEN (LEADERSHIP AND COMBINED ARMS
COMBAT) ISSUED IN 1921
LESSONS MISLEARNED BY
THE VICTORS
 Lessons Not Learned Because of
the Exclusive Focus on a Single
Theater.

French Focus on the Lessons of War

Fought on Western Front 1914-1918
Neglect of the Lessons Learned in the
War on Eastern Front and the Balkans
Battlefield in Flanders, 1917
 O P E R A T IO N A L P E N E T R A T IO N A T T A R N O W -G O R L IC E 2 -9 M a y 1 9 1 5 , A N D P U R S U IT
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A rm y

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G o r lic e
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2 n d A u s tr o -H u n g a r ia n
P ass
D u k la A rm y
P ass
H a lic z
9 th A rm y

G e rm a n S o u th e rn
P o d o lsk i
A rm y

20 40 60 80 100km
7 th A u s tro -H u n g a ria n A rm y
C D -0 1 - V E G O -1 8 -( J M P ) 0 3 2 5 0 1
 G E R M A N IN V A S IO N O F S E R B IA , O C T O B E R 1 9 1 5 -M A R C H 1 9 1 6
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P R IL E P
DURAZZO
B U L G A R IA N A R M Y STRUG A
O C H R ID A
A U S T R O -H U N G A R IA N O F F E N S IV E ELB ASA N
U N T IL M A R C H 1 9 1 6 O R ID
B IA LAKE M O N A S T IR ( B IT O L J )
SKUM
P R ES PA LA K E
0 20 40 60 80 100 km
A L B A N IA G REECE
C D -9 8 -V E G O -1 4 (J R N )
LESSONS MISLEARNED DUE
OVERESTIMATION OR
UNDERESTIMATION OF THE
ENEMY
• GERMAN OVERESTIMATION OF THE
FRENCH ARMY IN THE INTERWAR
YEARS
• THE GERMAN UNDERESTIMATION
OF THE RED ARMY BECAUSE OF
THE LATTER’S POOR
PERFORMANCE DURING THE
SOVIET-FINNISH WAR IN 1939-1940.
 LESSONS MISLEARNED DUE TO
CULTURAL BIAS OR ARROGANCE
Lessons Not Learned Because of
Cultural Bias

The European Armies Ignored to Learn the

Lessons of the American Civil War
1861-1865
FORGETTING ONE’S OWN
LESSONS LEARNED
The U.S. and British Navy’s Neglect of
Defense and Protection of Shipping in
the Interwar Years
 LESSONS MISLEARNED DUE TO
OVERESTIMATION OF THE ROLE OF A
SINGLE SERVICE
 Lessons Misapplied Because of
Overestimating the Role of a Single
Service or Combat Arm

War in Bosnia 1995

War in Afghanistan 2001-2002
(Operation Enduring Freedom)
 M ilita r y S it u a t io n in B o s n ia & H e r z e g o v in a , 3 0 J u ly 1 9 9 5
ZAG REB V IR O V IT IC A BELI
M A N A S T IR

K A R LO VA C O S IJ E K
S IS A K
PA K R A C
SUN JA L IP IK
V O J N IC Q L IN A V U K O VA R
O G U L IN N O VA V IN K O V C I
G R A D IS K A
SLAV O N S KI B R O D
SLUNJ
PLASKI BO SANSKI
NO VI
C A Z IN
BO SANSKI GR ADACAD
OTO CAC KRUPA BRCKO
B IH A C BANJA LU KA
T IT O V A
K O R E N IC A

L IC K I
O B IK D O N JI
G O S P IC U D S IK A LAPAC TUZLA

D R VA R
JAJCE Z V O R N IK
GR ACAC
BO SANSKO T R A V N IK KLADANJ
M A S L E N IC A O B RO VAC D O N JI
GR ANOVO Z E N IC A VA R E S
ZADAR VA K U F V IT E Z OLOVO S R E B R E N IC A
K R U S C IC A KAKANJ
B E N K O VA C K N IN GLAM OC
KUPRES ZEPA
B IO G R A D N A M O R U
SA R A JEV O
D R IN IS
L IV N O

S IB E N IK
S IN J DUVNO

T R O G IR S P L IT

M O S TA R
M AKARSKA RO DOC

C A P L J IN A
STO LAC
PLOCE

T R E B IN J E

D U B R O V N IK

9 8 -C D - 6 7 - V E G O (P F R )
 Sound Lessons Learned and
Successfully Applied in Another
Theater

German Campaign in Poland 1939

vs.
Campaign in The West 1940
 G E R M A N IN V A S IO N O F P O L A N D (F A L L W H IT E ),
SEPTEM B ER 1939
L IT H U A N IA
AR M Y G RO U P B A L T I C S E A
NO RTH
(B O C K )
K O E N IG S B E R G

D A N Z IG E A S T P R U S S IA
P O M E R A N I A 3R D ARM Y
(K U E C H L E R )
J O H A N N IS B U R G
4TH A RM Y
(K L U G E ) PO M O RZE
ARM Y NAREV
G R O UP
BYDG O SZC Z
M O D L IN B Y A L IS T O K
AR M Y

PO ZNAN
K U T R Z E B A ’S
B ZUR A W A RSAW
ARM Y 28 SEPT B R E S T-
L IT O V S K
K A L IS Z
P O L A N D
LO DZ
G E R M A N Y

R O M M E L ’S
ARM Y TO M A SZO W
8TH ARM Y RADO M L U B L IN
(B L A S K O W IT Z )
CHELM
K IE L C E
S A N D O M IE R Z
10TH A R M Y DUN AJEC
(R E IC H E N A U )
S Z Y L L IN G ’S
ARM Y
CRACO W
12 SEPT
ARM Y G R O UP LV O V
SO U TH
(R U N D S T E D T ) PR ZEM YSL
S O S N K O W S K I’S
ARM Y
14TH A R M Y JABLUNK A
(L IS T )
PA SS
S L O V A K I A

M A IN P O L IS H C O N C E N T R A T IO N S

P O L IS H R E S E R V E S

G E R M A N A T TA C K S

C D -9 8 -V E G O -4 2 (J R N )
Lessons “Mislearned” in One Area
and then the Same Lessons
Misapplied in Adjacent Area

Bosnia 1995
vs.
Kosovo 1999
 M ilita r y S it u a t io n in B o s n ia & H e r z e g o v in a , 3 0 J u ly 1 9 9 5
ZAG REB V IR O V IT IC A BELI
M A N A S T IR

K A R LO VA C O S IJ E K
S IS A K
PA K R A C
SUN JA L IP IK
V O J N IC Q L IN A V U K O VA R
O G U L IN N O VA V IN K O V C I
G R A D IS K A
SLAV O N S KI B R O D
SLUNJ
PLASKI BO SANSKI
NO VI
C A Z IN
BO SANSKI GR ADACAD
OTO CAC KRUPA BRCKO
B IH A C BANJA LU KA
T IT O V A
K O R E N IC A

L IC K I
O B IK D O N JI
G O S P IC U D S IK A LAPAC TUZLA

D R VA R
JAJCE Z V O R N IK
GR ACAC
BO SANSKO T R A V N IK KLADANJ
M A S L E N IC A O B RO VAC D O N JI
GR ANOVO Z E N IC A VA R E S
ZADAR VA K U F V IT E Z OLOVO S R E B R E N IC A
K R U S C IC A KAKANJ
B E N K O VA C K N IN GLAM OC
KUPRES ZEPA
B IO G R A D N A M O R U
SA R A JEV O
D R IN IS
L IV N O

S IB E N IK
S IN J DUVNO

T R O G IR S P L IT

M O S TA R
M AKARSKA RO DOC

C A P L J IN A
STO LAC
PLOCE

T R E B IN J E

D U B R O V N IK

9 8 -C D - 6 7 - V E G O (P F R )
 P r o v in c e o f K o s o v o
dam
Ra
s in N is
a

Raska B la c e
S je n ic a

U vac
P ro k u p lje

ic a
T opl

a
Rask

Ju
zn
Ib a

e M
B r e s to v a c

r
N ovi

ora
K u r s u m lij a

va
P azar L e p o s a v ic

S E R B I A B o jn ik

Leskovac
T u tin
G a z iv o d s k o Lebane
M o n te n e g ro Je zero
Z u b in P o to k
Zvecan
K oso vska
M itr o v ic a
P o d u je v o M e d v e d ja
ia n ic a
B e ra n e Jab
R ozan
V u c itr n
B a tla v s k o
J e ze ro
Is to k

D u rak o va c S rb ic a
b
(D ju ra k o v a c ) La

na
K li
V it o m ir ic a O b ilic
P r is t in a
L im Pec K lin a G lo g o v a c Novo
K oso vo B rd o K o so vs k a
P o lje dam K a m e n ic a
P la v
L i p lj a n V r a n je
D ecani J a n je v o

Si
R a d o n j ic k o

tn
Je zera

ic a
J u n ik M a lis e v o
G n jila n e B u ja n o v a c
S t im lje va
M o ra
D ja k o v ic a D ra h ov ac

a
T r o p o je

ck
A LB a j r a m C u r r i

na
Bi
U ro se v ac
S uva R eka

B A
V i t in a P re s e v o

N I
A P r iz r e n
K a c a n ik
m

S trp c e
D ri

l l
Be

Le
K um anovo

pe
na
K osovo

c
Kukes
D ra g as
ar S k o p je
In te r n a tio n a l b o u n d a r y rd
Te to v a Va

P c in ja
R e p u b lic b o u n d a r y
A u t o n o m o u s p r o v in c e B ro d
K a m e n ja n e
b o u n d a ry ka
T re s
N a tio n a l c a p ita l

Va
P r o v in c e c a p ita l

rd a
V r a p c is te
THE FO RM ER

r
R a ilr o a d
G o s tiv a r
Road
A ir p o r t Y U G O S L A V R E P U B L IC
O F M A C E D O N IA
a

0 2 0 K ilo m e t e rs
d ik

T ito v V e le s
Ra

0 2 0 M ile s dam
M o v ro v s k o

C D -9 9 -V E G O -0 5 (P F R )
Lessons Learned Too Soon

Afghanistan 2001-2002
vs.
Iraq 2003
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: LAND OPERATIONS 19 MAR–14 APR 2003
 Repeating Mislearned Lessons in
Planning a Similar Operation in the
Future

British Battle of Tanga in 1914

vs.
Gallipoli Amphibious Landing in 1915
Battle of Tanga,13 Nov 1914
 G A L L IP O L I L A N D IN G , 2 5 A P R IL 1 9 1 5

E U R O P E A N TU R K E Y
G U LF O F
X ER O S

S EA O F
M ARM O RA
G a lli p o li

6 AUG UST S U V LA BA Y

G A B A TE P E A S IA M IN O R
IM B R O S
K IL IO
BA H R C ha na k

K r i th io

A S IA TIC T U R K E Y
2 5 A P R IL C A P E H E LL E S
KUM
K A LE
LE M N O S

TE N E D O S

9 8 -C D -1 2 -V E G O -(P F R )
Gallipoli Withdrawal
TRANSFERABILITY OF THE
LESSONS LEARNED
 Lessons Learned in One Theater
Were Misapplied in Another Theater

German Campaign in the West 1940

vs.
Invasion of the Soviet Russia 1941
(Fall Barbarossa)
GERMAN OPERATION GELB (YELLOW), MAY 1940

MÜNSTER

DORTMUND

ANTWERPEN
COLOGNE
DUNKERQU E

BRUSSEL A ACHEN

LÜTTICH
NAMUR KOBLENZ
ARRAS

ABBEVILL E
AMIENS

AISNE

SE
OI R EIMS
M
AR
NE

PARIS
S
EI
NE

OR LEANS
0 50 100 150 KM
THIRD ARMY GROUP

LE GEND: GB = BRITISH - B = BELGIAN

C D-97 -VEG0 -13 2 ( JRN )

LESSONS LEARNED FROM
FOREIGN EXPERIENCES
 FAILING TO LEARN
LESSONS FROM THE
EXPERIENCES OF OTHERS
 Failure to Learn from the
Experiences of Others

U.S. Navy’s Failure to Study the British

Experience in the Defense & Protection
of their Maritime Trade in the Northern
Atlantic
1939-1942
 BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, PHASE IV
JANUARY - JULY 1942

00-vego-40(ajl)
 MISLEARNING THE
LESSONS FROM THE
EXPERIENCES OF OTHERS
• FAILURE OF THE EUROPEAN
MILITARIES TO DERIVE PROPER
LESSONS FORM THE ANGLO-BOER
WAR 1899-1902
 IGNORING LESSONS
MISLEARNED BY OTHERS
• US MARINE CORPS IGNORED
LESSONS MISLEARNED BY THE
BRITISH RE GALLIPOLI LANDING IN
1915.
 Reassessing the “Mislearned”
Lessons by Others

German Study and Analysis of the

Gallipoli Landing -- German Landing in
the Bay Of Riga, Oct 1917
(Operation Albion)
 62° 62°
8° 9° 10° 11° 12° 13° 14° 15° 16° 17° 18° 19° 20° 21° 22° 23° 24° 25° 26° 27° 28° 29° 30°
H u d ik s v a ll
H E L S IN G L A N D
SEA O F
H a fs o
M a n ty t u o to
B jö rn e b o r g

B O T H N IA
K aum o
R e la n d e r G r d
61° F IN L A N D 61°

G E S T R IK L A N D G e fle
Bay
N y s ta d
G e fle V ib o r g

F r e d r ik s h a m n rg
bo
B o rg a Vi
U s k e la of
y
Ö re g ru n d
AALAND L e c h to Ba
B jö rk o
E c k e ro H e ls in g fo rs G lo s h o lm
S v e a b org S o d ersk a r H o c h la n d K ro n s ta d t B a y
A Å la n d S e a I c m l a n d
K r is tia n ia S e skär
60° UPLAND F ö g l ö F io r d B a rö s P o rk a la U d d e 60°
F lo g a n H enga d T ju t e r s o S t. P e te r s b u r g
a n
J u s s a ro
D ra m m e n N o r rte lg e Lagskar U to
n l H ockskar
R u s s a ro T w a r m in n e
( N o r r ta lje ) S o d e ra rm B engskar
F i N . H o ft
Kunda
S v e n s k a B jo r n o f N a rg ö n Bay
l f
M os Bogskar W u lf N a rv a B a y
S u ro p K a rlo
N O RW AY S venska H ogar
G u P a c k e r O rt
F r e d r ik s ta d SW EDEN S t o c k h o lm O d e n s h o lm
R e v a l ( T a l li n n ) N a rv a
IN G E R M A N L A N D

M
E S T O N IA

oo
L a u r v ik F r e d r ik s h a ld G lo t o w a B k . S p it U d d e
.

n
W in k o w a B k .
Fj

So
K . Tachko na
ia

un
59° S trö m s ta d N ekm an G d. 59°
ia n

d
K . R is t n a
DAG Ö
is t

U r s h o lm H apsal
N y k ö p in g
Kr

Ö STER L a n d s o rt

BO HUS H a fr in g e
A re n d a l V a d e ro b o d K . H u n d s o rt W e rd e r
N o r r k ö p in g
VESTER Bay P e rn a u
SKAG ERRAK H a llo
G Ö TA LA N D F il s a n d ÖSEL
G Ö TA L A N D S a ritc h e ft
K r is tia n s a n d H a ra d s k ä r K yno
M aseskar

Fa
58° P a te r N o s te r S w e rb e 58°

ro
M a rs tr a n d K o n g e lf
S to rk lä p p e n
R unö

Sd
Skagen D om esn os S a lis
G o th e n b u rg

.
T a n n is B . V in g a V is b y
G ib k e n Bay
d L A T V IA
G OTLAND
F r ie d r ic h s h f
H irs h o lm
G Ö T A L A N D un W e s te rg a r n
L y s e r O rt
L e p e n ie k e n of
So

R U S S IA
O s te rg a r n W in d a u ( V e n t s p il s ) R ig a
ar

O s c a rs h a m n
Jam m er B. N i d in g e n
lm

SM ALAND
Ka

B a c k o fe n A n g ern
H a n s t h o lm A a lb o r g
HALLAND F a lu d d e n
D ünam ünde
57° 57°
R ig a
KATTEG AT K a p e ll U d d e n
A a lb o r g B . S te in o r t CO URLAND
H a lm s ta d
ND

K a lm a r
ÖLA
.

R a n d e rs L a h o lm s B . L ib a u (L ie p a y a )
ar Sd

B L E K IN G
JU TLA N D
K a lm

E b e lt o ft S c h u lt z 's K a rls k r o n a
G r u n d H e s s e lo K a rls h a m n O la n d s S . U d d e P appensee
R i n g k j o b in g A a rh u s H j e lm Z e a l a n d s R i f f H e ls in g b o r g T o r l i w n m s l id d e
H e ls in g o r U tla n g a n
56° L a n d s kro n a
Ahus P o la n g e n
L IT H U A N IA 56°
DENM ARK
Hanö U t k li p p a n N im m e r s a tt
Bay
M em el
F r e d e r ic ia C openhagen M a lm ö S im r is h a m n
E s b je r g
ZEALAND KO VNO
Y s ta d
Gr

T r a lle b o r g
K o rs o r
ea

H a d e r s le b e n FUNEN Sandham m ar
s H a ff

R o d v ig
tB
Sm

H a m m e re n
e lt
a l le

BO RNHOLM
he

ri sc
r B

S y lk S to lp e - B n k . Ku
e lt

FA LS TE R
55° F le n s b u r g L A A L A N D N y k jo b in g 55°
Bay Bay K ö e n i g s b e r g ( K a l in in g r a d )
A rk o n a
A m ru m S C H L E S W IG of P u tz ig of
K ie le r D a n z ig In s te rb u rg
ff

S to lp m ü n d e
Ha

P e llw o r m RUG EN (G d a n s k ) s
N e u fa h r w a s s e r he
B e rg e n sc
M e c k le n b u r g e r B .
S tr a ls u n d G r e ifs w a ld e r D a n z ig ( G d a n s k ) F ri E A S T E R N P R U S S IA
O ie
G r e if s w a ld
R o s to c k
W is m a r M E C K L E N B U R G
W o lg a s t
W O L L IN PO M M ERN
K ö s lin
GERM ANY
8° 9° 10° 11° 12° 13° 14° 15° 16° 17° 18° 19° 20° 21° 22° 23° 24° 25° 26° 27° 28° 29° 30°
W o l l l in

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
N a u t ic a l M il e s
2 0 0 1 - J M O - B A LTIC S E A
TRANSFERABILITY OF
LESSONS LEARNED BY
OTHERS
• US LACK OF SUCCESS IN
TRANSFERRING THE LESSONS
FROM THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE IN
MALAYA IN 1948-1960 TO VIETNAM–
“STRATEGIC HAMLET” PROGRAM
 Lessons “Mislearned” Because of Too
Little or Too Much Focus on Technology

The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902

The Russo-Japanese War 1904-05
War Against Iraq 2003
(Operation Iraqi Freedom).
The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

 LESSONS FROM
MILITARY /NAVALHISTORY
Lessons Misapplied Because of the
Exclusive Focus on a Single
Historical Event

Field Marshal Alfred Von Schlieffen’s

Obsession with the Battle of Cannae
216 B.C. and the Single-sided
Envelopment Maneuver
 SINGLE-SIDED ENVELOPMENT

AM STERDAM
ARNHEM
ROTTERDAM MÜNSTER

BREDA DORTMUND

ANT WERP
COLOGNE
DUNKERQUE
BRUSSEL AACHEN

LILLE
LIEGE
NAMUR KOBLENZ
ARRAS

ABBEVILLE

AMIENS
LUXEMBOURG
SEDAN

AISN E DIEDENHOFE N
VARIANT (THIONVILLE )

REIMS
VERDUN METZ

PARIS STRASBOURG

ORLEANS FRE IBURG

0 50 100 150 KM
BELFORT

CD-97- VEGO-131A (JRN)

 Lessons “Mislearned” Because of
Dogmatic Adherence to the Writings
of a Famous Historian

Obsession of the Great Navies of the

Day Prior to 1914 and in the Interwar
Years with the “Decisive Battle”
Influence of the Writings of Rear
Admiral Alfred T. Mahan
 Mahanian Decisive Battles
Battle of
Tsushima Straits, 1905 Battle of Jutland, 1916
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE
• INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
• ECONOMICS
• GEOPOLITICS/GEOSTRATEGY
• INTERNATIONAL FINANCES
• INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
ARMED CONFLICT/LAW OF THE
SEA
• FOREIGN CULTURE/POLITICAL
HISTORY/TRADITIONS
• ETHNICITY/NATIONALISM
• RELIGIONS
• OTHER
QUESTIONS?