The Limits

of Relativism
in the Late
Wittgenstein
Olga Szynkaruk
Ludwig Joseph Johann
Wittgenstein (1889-1951)

• One of the most important and influential

philosophers of the XXth century
• A student of Bertrand Russell
• A member of the Vienna Circle – a group of
notable intellectualists pursuing the natural
and social sciences, logic and mathematics,
who met regularly at the University of
Vienna from 1924 to 1936. The society
included Karl Popper and Willard Van Orman
Quine
• Notoriously perfectionist, he published very
little during life
• The classical interpretation divides his works (Wikimedia Commons 2017)
into two phases: early and late, the former
defined by Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
and the latter by Philosophical Investigations
 Early Wittgenstein
• Research and philosophical reflection
focused upon linguistics, interpretation,
logic and the nature of representation
• Every proposition can be described as
either true or false
• A logical construction can provide a
means to distinguish sense from
nonsense
• Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, often
referred to as simply The Tractatus, first
published in 1921 in Germany, is
considered the quintessential work of
this phase. It has proven notoriously Portrait of the philosopher as a young
problematic in interpretation, and man, ca. 1910 (Wikimedia Commons
attempts to perform a persuasive one 2017).
have become an entire area of
philosophical research
 Late Wittgenstein
• The approach to philosophy is notably more
balanced than what can be seen in the earlier
works, many of previous postulations
become renounced
• A vast change in the language used from that
of systematic logic to a much less hermetic
language
• A rejection of dogmatism in favour of a more
lax, individualized approach in full
mindfulness of specific circumstance
• The concepts of language games, rule-
following, and private language
• Philosophical Investigations, published in
1953, two years after the philosopher’s Later in life (military-history.com, 2014)
passing, is considered the quintessential
work of this phase
An obligatory
cat meme
before we
return to our
regularly
scheduled
programming.
Wittgenstein and Relativism
• The Tractatus is interpreted as a work of
an absolutist nature, while works of the • Whether or not can Wittgenstein be
later phase offer a more relativist described as a relativist is a
approach controversial subject, as relativism itself
• There are philosophers reading late
is difficult to define, and as a descriptor
Wittgenstein as a relativist, as his stance includes many stances, some of them at
shares identifying features with relativist variance; Wittgenstein’s works can
views, such as a universally self- prove equally difficult in interpretation
defeating stance and a refusal to ascribe
set values to different worldviews,
• To call Wittgenstein a relativist might
including those considered irrational.
be a fallacy: in doing so, one risks a
• Wittgenstein’s own perception of his false atribution by claiming adherence
work excluded a purely relativist to systematic philosophy where there
position, as he never argued for a had originally been none
superiority of a particular philosophical
stance over another
Stances on various types • Ontological relativism: Wittgenstein seems
decidedly in favour of the notion. The
of relativism perceptions of the world vary depending on a
vast array of factors, and therefore, alternative
ontologies as a means of conceptualizing it are
• Logical relativism: it is unclear whether possible
Wittgenstein supports this notion or not. • Epistemological relativism: while Wittgenstein
A famous quote, Then you are in favour allows for a co-existence of various
of contradiction? Not at all; any more epistemological frameworks, he also argues that
than of soft rulers, while relativist on the some of them will be more useful in certain
surface, is rather difficult to persuasively contexts than others, thus offering a stance that is
construe as one or the other closer to contextualism than relativism
• Relativism about rationality: a telling quote
• Alethic relativism: in the later phase, the seems to present a view similar to the one
nature of truth seems to play no expressed on ontological relativism – not a
substantial role in philosophical inquiries. radically rationalistic one, relegating the problem
Wittgenstein’s account of truth is instead to the philosophy of linguistics: So you
minimalistic, limited to a simple phrase: p are saying that human agreement decides what is
is true. His stance might be considered true and what is false?’ – It is what human
beings say that is true and false; and they agree
contextualist, but there is too little here to in the language they use. That is not agreement
go on for a decisive diagnosis. in opinions but in form of life.
Moral relativism
• The ineffability of ethics, a stance best described • There is no metasystem of ethics
in a quote from the Tractatus and apparently
retained since its publication: Ethics cannot be • It is impossible to ascribe a moral value to
expressed in words a deed of unknown motivations and
• It is impossible to successfully argue the value equally impossible to completely extract it
of one ethical system over another, as such a out of the context of a specific system of
question itself cannot be resolved; it can only be moral beliefs
asked with a particular stance in mind and
answered in the spirit of the same • An individual’s action can be subject to
• A criticism of contemporary moral philosophy: moral judgment if their beliefs and
it was Wittgenstein’s belief that no actual moral circumstances are known, yet at the same
problems were to be found in philosophical time there is no set of universally-
works acknowledged moral norms by which one
• Answers to hypothetical questions cannot be could judge the actions of each individual
described as either true or false – therefore, such everywhere
problems have no possible solution and their
value to philosophy is questionable • This approach also reflects the main
• An actual solution of a moral quandary can be differences between early and late
performed only in the context of a specific Wittgenstein: the former was an attempt to
ethical system; otherwise the solution is merely create a theory of everything, while the
illusory
latter exists as a more decentralized set of
• An ethical sentence says ‘You must do that!’ or various reflections.
‘That is good!’ but not ‘People say that this is
good’.
• Relativism in it’s pure form cannot be • The third option between absolutism
accepted over absolutism, as it would in and relativism can be perhaps found in
itself be an answer to a question that this quote from Philosophical
pertains to a specific context of beliefs, Investigations, pertaining to the concept
yet is posed as one seemingly above it. of rule following: This was our paradox:
Wittgenstein seems to argue that to no course of action could be determined
demand a choice between one and the by a rule, because every course of action
other would, in itself, be a form of can be made out to accord with the rule.
absolutism that has no persuasive The answer was: if everything can be
foundation. made out to accord with the rule, then it
• Wittgenstein seems to endorse a large can also be made out to conflict with it.
number of relativistic theses in his later And so there would be neither accord
thought. Many think of him in this manner nor conflict here.
and use him to champion relativistic • Hanna and Harrison (2011) propose a
positions. However, when one different summarization of Wittgenstein:
distinguishes the different kinds of a stance called „Wittgensteinian
relativistic positions and examines his realism”, describing a middle ground
texts, his views do not emerge as radically between the two opposing views as
relativistic (O’Grady 2002, s. 335) suggested in the quote above.
Bibliography
• Biletzki, Anat and Matar, Anat, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward
N. Zalta (Ed.), URL =
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/en
tries/wittgenstein/, date of access 10.11.2018.
• Christiensen A.M.,Wittgenstein and Ethical
Norms. The Question of Ineffability Visited
and Revisited,
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/articl
e/download/14772/13493+&cd=4&hl=pl&ct=
clnk&gl=pl, date of access 10.11.2018.
• Edmonds D., Edinow J., 2002, Pogrzebacz
Wittgensteina. Opowieść o
dziesięciominutowym sporze między dwoma
wielkimi filozofami, Warszawa.
• Hanna P. and Harrison B., 2011, The Limits
of Relativism in the Late Wittgenstein, in A
Companion to Relativism, S. D. Hales (Ed.). A photograph by Moritz Nahr, 1930 (via
doi:10.1002/9781444392494.ch10. Wikimedia Commons)
Further bibliography
• Heal J. 1993 Wittgenstein a relatywizm, in
Acta Universalis Nicolai Copernici, Filozofia,
t. 15, pp. 19-28.
• Szczęch S. 2014 W stronę relatywizmu
etycznego Ludwika Wittgensteina, in Logos i
ethos 2014, t.1 (36), pp. 223–234.
• O'Grady P. 2004 Wittgenstein and relativism,
in International Journal of Philosophical
Studies, 12:3, pp. 315-337, DOI:
10.1080/0967255042000243975
Thank you
for bearing
with me
your
attention.