CASE LAW-
PJ RATNAM VS D KANIKARAM & ORS
AIR 1964 SC 24
PJ RATNAM VS D KANIKARAM & ORS
AIR 1964 SC 244
FACTS
The three respondents before us and one other Kagga
Veeraiah- were plaintiffs m O.S. 432 of 1951 on the file of
District Munsiff, Guntur in which a claim was made for
possession of certain lands. The appellant was the Advocate
for these plaintiffs. The suit was dismissed by the Trail Court
and an appeal was filed therefrom to the Subordinate Judge,
Guntur and pending the disposal of the appeal there was a
direction by the Court that the crops standing on the suit-land
be sold and the proceeds deposited into Court. In pursuance of
this order a sum of about Rs. 1,600/- was deposited into Court-
on December 19, 1951
The appeal by the plaintiffs was allowed by the Subordinate Judge.
The unsuccessful defendants preferred a second appeal to the High
Court, but meanwhile the plaintiffs made an application for
withdrawing the amount deposited in Court. By virtue of interim
orders passed by the Court they were granted liberty, to withdraw the
sum pending disposal of the second appeal in the High. Court filed by
the defendants on furnishing security of immovable property. The
security was furnished and the withdrawal was ordered. A cheque
petition E.A. 250 of 1952 was accordingly filed which was allowed and
thereafter a cheque was issued in favour of the Advocate--the
appellant before us--for Rs. 1,452.4/-, this being the sum remaining to
the credit of the plaintiffs after deduction of poundage etc
The appellant, Advocate admitted that he had received
and had cashed the cheque on behalf of his clients who
were entitled to be paid this sum. The second appeal was
allowed by the High Court and the plaintiff's suit was
dismissed, as a result of which the plaintiffs had to refund
the sum of the defendants in the suit. The plaintiffs made
a written demand on the appellant for the proceeds of the
cheque that had been cashed by him and not paid over to
them.
The appellant in reply claimed to have paid over the sum to
them on their passing a receipt which happened to be in the
bundle of case-papers returned to them. The respondents filed a
complaint under Section 12 and 13 of the Legal Practitioners
Act. The explanation of the Advocate was called for and the
District Judge was directed to hold an enquiry and forward his
report to the High Court. His report was that the appellant's
case was not unbelievable and he was entitled to the benefit of
doubt. The matter was heard by a Bench of three Judges of the
High Court, who held him guilty of professional misconduct and
suspended him for five years from practice.
CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANT
In this Court the appellant contended,
(1) That the Bar Council had not been consulted before the case was referred to
the learned District Judge for inquiry and report and this vitiated the legality
of the entire proceedings against the appellant
(2) That the complaint filed by the respondents on the basis of which action
was taken against the appellant was not shown to have been signed by
them, nor properly verified by them as required by the rules of the High
Court.
(3) That as in substance the charge against the appellant was misappropriation
of money belonging to the clients, the High Court should have left the
complainants to their remedy of prosecuting the appellant and should not
have proceeded to deal with him under s. 10 of the Bar Councils Act.
(4) That there was a procedural irregularity in the mode in which
the case against the appellant was conducted.
(5) That one of the plaintiffs--Kagga Veeraiah had himself
admitted in his evidence that he and others had received the
proceeds of the cheque which the appellant had cashed and that
in the face of this admission the High Court was clearly wrong in
finding that the appellant had failed to pay over the money to his
clients.
Held-
(1) That the fact that in the order of reference of the proceedings under s.
10(2) of the Bar Councils Act, to the District Judge, there is no explicit
statement that the Bar Council had previously been consulted, is not decisive
on the point. There would be a presumption of regularity in respect of official
and judicial acts and it would be for. the party who challenges such regularity
to plead and prove his case. Since, this objection was not raised in the High
Court, even when the appellant applied for a certificate, this Court will not
entertain this objection which rests wholly upon a question of fact
(2) The complaint petition had been signed by the respondents and properly verified
and even
otherwise since the High Court was competent to initiate these proceedings suo motu
under s. 10(2) of the Act, the point raised is wholly without substance.
(3) There is a clear distinction between cases where the misconduct is one in relation
to the practitioner's duty to his client and other cases where it is not so. In the
former Class of cases the court would be exercising its discretion properly if it
proceeded to deal with the charge as a piece of professional misconduct without
driving the complainant to seek his remedy in a criminal court. As far as the facts and
circumstances of the present case are concerned, it must be held that the High Court
was fully justified in proceeding against the appellant under the provisions of s. 10 of
the Bar Councils Act. Chandi Charan Mitter a Pleader, In re. (1920) I.L.R. 47 Cal. 1115
and Emperor v. Satish Chandra Singha, (1927) I,L.R. 54 Cal. 721, distinguished.
Stephens v. Hills, [1842] 152 E.R. 368, referred to.
4) No complaint, that the appellant was prejudiced by the manner in
which the inquiry was conducted in the matter of the order in which the
evidence was adduced, was made either before the District Judge or
before the High Court and there is nothing on the record to suggest
that any prejudice had occurred to the appellant.
(5) The evidence of Kagga Veeraiah was correctly characterised by the
High Court as devoid oftruth and the appellant, therefore, cannot rely
on any admission of this witness as evidence of the plaintiffs having
received the sum.
JUDGEMENT
Having regard to the gravity of the offence, there is no
justification for reducing the period of suspension. The
appeal therefore, must be dismissed.
OVER VIEW
Here are some facts about the case P.J. Ratnam v. D. Kanikaram:
• The case was heard by the Supreme Court of India on April 10, 1963.
• The case was an appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
• The appellant, P.J. Ratnam, was an advocate who was found guilty of professional
misconduct.
• The misconduct was that Ratnam did not pay a sum of money to his clients
despite demands, and falsely claimed to have paid them.
• The Supreme Court suspended Ratnam from practice for five years.
• The court said that the suspension was a lenient punishment, and that they would
have struck Ratnam's name from the State roll of advocates if they had the
power.
• The case involved a claim for possession of certain lands.
• The suit was dismissed by the Trail Court, and an appeal was filed to the
Subordinate Judge, Guntur.
• While the appeal was pending, the court ordered the crops on the suit-land to be
sold and the proceeds deposited into court.
