Transient Stability Training

Haytham Mostafa, [Link], PhD

Power System Engineer, Power System Limits

Nov 2018
Objectives

• Understand the concept of power system

transient stability.
• Comprehend the IESO practice in
implementing Transient Stability
standards.
• Perform a complete transient stability
study using TSAT

2
Agenda

• Transient Stability (Theory)

– Transient Stability definition
– Single Machine Infinite Bus model and Swing Equation
– Equal Area Criteria
– Transient Stability Enhancement
• IESO Transient Stability Studies
– IESO Transient Stability Criteria
– IESO Transient Stability Criteria Implementation
• Performing Transient Stability Studies
– Introduction to TSAT
– Hands-On Study (Parameters affecting Transient
Stability)
– Hands-On Study (BBO Limit Study)

3
TRANSIENT STABILITY
(THEORY)
4
Steady-state = stable equilibrium
• Things are not changing
• Concerned with whether the system variables are within
the correct limits
Transient Stability
• "Transient" means changing
• The state of the system is changing
• We are concerned with the transition from one equilibrium
to another
• The change is a result of a "large" disturbance
 What is Power sSstem Transient
(Angle) Stability?
Thoughts?!
• The ability of the power system to maintain synchronous
operation when subjected to a severe transient disturbance,
such as:
– faults on transmission circuits, transformers, buses
– loss of generation
– loss of loads
• Response involves large excursions of generator rotor
angles: influenced by nonlinear power-angle relationship
• Stability depends on both
– the initial operating state of the system
– the severity of the disturbance
• Post-disturbance steady-state operating conditions usually
differ from pre-disturbance conditions
7
Single Machine Infinite Bus model

• We will demonstrate the phenomenon

using a very simple system and simplified
models
– All resistances are neglected
– Generator is represented by the classical
model

Single machine - infinite bus system

8
Single Machine Infinite Bus model

V0

E '  VV0

9
Single Machine Infinite Bus model

• The generator's electrical power output is

E V
Pe  sin  Pmax sin 
XT

• With the stator resistance neglected, Pe

represents the air-gap power as well as
the terminal power

10
Effects of Disturbance and Swing Equation

• The oscillation of  is superimposed on the

synchronous speed ω0
 r d
dt
  0

• Equation of Motion or Swing Equation

2 H d 2
Pm  Pmax sin 
 0 dt 2
where:
Pm = mechanical power input (pu)
Pmax = maximum electrical power output (pu)
H = inertia constant (MW-sec/MVA)
 = rotor angle (elec. radians)
t = time (secs)
 Single Machine Infinite Bus model
(Power-Angle Relationship)

2 H d 2
Pm  Pmax sin 
 0 dt 2
1
2
b
b

1 1 2
2
a a

• 1: Stable Equilibrium Point

• 2: Unstable Equilibrium Point
Single Machine Infinite Bus model
(Power-Angle Relationship)

• Both transmission circuits in-service: Curve 1

– operate at point "a" (Pe = Pm)
• One circuit out-of-service: Curve 2
– lower Pmax
– operate at point "b"
– higher reactance  higher  to transmit same power
Faults in Stability Studies

V
Representation of Faults in Stability
Studies
• Power system are balanced.
• Faults may introduce some unbalance in the system.
• Symmetrical components are used to simulate the faults so conventional
balanced power system tool can be used
– Positive-sequence network is represented in detail
– Negative- and zero-sequence voltages and currents throughout the system are
usually not of interest in stability studies
• unnecessary to simulate the complete negative- and zero-sequence networks in system stability
simulations
• effects represented by equivalent impedances (Z 2 and Z0) as viewed at the fault point F
• Impedances are combined appropriately as the effective fault impedance
Zef

Zef V
Equal Area Criteria

P(Pre_Fault)
P(Pre_fault)
P(Post_Fault)
P(During_fault)
P(Post_fault)
P(During_Fault
)

0 45 90 135 180

16
Equal Area Criteria (Stable Case)
Pe
2 H d 2
Pm  Pmax sin 
 0 dt 2

Fault Clearing

Response to a fault cleared in tcl seconds - stable case

17
Equal Area Criteria (Stable Case)cont'd
Pre-disturbance:
 both circuits I/S : Pe = Pm, δ = δ0
 operating point a

During Fault:
 operating point moves from a to b
 inertia prevents δ from changing instantaneously
 Pm > Pe rotor accelerates to operating point c
Equal Area Criteria (Stable Case)cont'd

Post Fault:
• faulted circuit is tripped, operating point shifts to d
• Pe > Pm  rotor decelerates
• rotor speed > ω0  δ increases
• operating point moves from d to e such that A1 = A2
• at e, speed = 0, and δ = δ m

• Pe > Pm  rotor decelerates; speed below ω0

• δ decreases and operating point retraces e to d
• with no damping, rotor continues to oscillate
Equal Area Criteria (Unstable Case)

2 H d 2
Pm  Pmax sin 
 0 dt 2

Response to a fault cleared in tc2 seconds - unstable case

20
Equal Area Criteria (Unstable Case)cont'd

• Area A2 above Pm is less than A1

• When the operating point reaches e, the kinetic
energy gained during the accelerating period
has not yet been completely expended
– the speed is still greater than w0 and d continues to
increase

• Beyond point e, Pe<Pm, ® rotor begins to

accelerate again
• The rotor speed and angle continue to increase
leading to loss of synchronism
 Practical Method of Transient Stability Analysis

Unstable
Stable
800
1000
600
800

600 400

400 200

200
0
0 0 5 10 15 20 25
0 5 10 15 20 25 -200
-200
-400
-400

Unstable
800
700
2 H d 2
600 Pm  Pmax sin 
500  0 dt 2
400
300
200
100
0
0 5 10 15 20 25
22
Structure of the power system model for transient stability analysis

23
Practical Method of Transient Stability Analysis

• Practical power systems have complex network

structures
• Accurate analysis of transient stability requires detailed
models for:
– generating unit and controls
– voltage dependent load characteristics
– HVDC converters, FACTs devices, etc.
• Currently, the most practical available method of
transient stability analysis is time domain simulation:
– solution of nonlinear differential equations and algebraic
equations
– step-by-step numerical integration techniques
– complimented by efficient techniques for solving non-linear
highly sparse algebraic equations
Activity (1):
List the factors Impacting Transient Stability

E V
Pe  sin  Pmax sin 
XT
2 H d 2
Pm  Pmax sin 
 0 dt 2

25
Factors Impacting Transient Stability
(a) How heavily the generator is initially loaded.
(b) The generator output during the fault. This depends on the fault location and
type.
(b) The fault clearing time.
(c) The post-fault transmission system reactance.
(d) The generator reactance. A lower reactance increases peak power and reduces
initial rotor angle.
(e) The generator inertia. The higher the inertia, the slower the rate of change angle.
This reduces the kinetic energy gained during fault. i.e. area A1 is reduced*.

(f) The generator internal voltage magnitude. This depends on the field excitation.
(g) The infinite bus voltage magnitude.
* Clearing Angle= f(clearing time, inertia, accelerating and synchronizing power)
Transient Stability Enhancement
• High-Speed Fault Clearing
– Amount of kinetic energy gained by the generators during a fault is
directly proportional to the fault duration
• quicker the fault is cleared, the less disturbance it causes
• Reduction of Transmission System Reactance
– Most direct way of achieving this is by reducing the
reactances of transmission circuits
• voltage rating, line and conductor configurations, and number of
parallel circuits determine the reactances of transmission lines
– Additional methods of reducing the network reactances:
• use of transformers with lower leakage reactances
• series capacitor compensation of transmission lines
Transient Stability Enhancement

• Regulated Shunt Compensation

– Can improve system stability by increasing the flow of
synchronizing power among interconnected generators
(voltage profile control)
– Static VAR compensators can be used for this purpose
Transient Stability Enhancement
• Excitation Systems Control

Excitati
on
Transient Stability Enhancement
• Excitation Systems Control
Disturban
ce

Volt
M
W
Transient Stability Enhancement
• Excitation Systems Control

Excitati
on
Transient Stability Enhancement
• Excitation Systems Control

Without
PSS With PSS
Transient Stability Enhancement
• Excitation Systems Control
– Increase of generator field voltage during a transient
disturbance has the effect of increasing the internal voltage of
the machine, which in turn increases synchronizing power
– Fast excitation response to terminal voltage variations,
required for improvement of transient stability, often leads to
degrading the damping of local plant mode oscillations
– Supplementary excitation control, commonly referred to as
power system stabilizer (PSS) provides a convenient means of
damping system oscillations
Madawaska Area Undamped Oscillations
Transient Stability Enhancement

Special Protection Schemes (SPS)

• Cross Tripping:
– This transient stability animation plays out an artificial
scenario in real time on a 2000 bus equivalent system that
creates sustained oscillations in a couple of generators.
– Controlled System Separation and Load Shedding
– Used to prevent a major disturbance in one part of an
interconnected system from propagating into the rest of the
system and causing a severe system issues.
– In some instances it may be necessary to shed selected loads
to balance generation and load in the separated systems
Transient Stability Enhancement
Reactor Switching

MVAr
150
MVAr
150

MVAr
150
450
MVAr

Increase the
Bus Voltage
Transient Stability Enhancement

Special Protection Schemes (SPS)

• Reactor Switching
– Reactor normally remains connected to the network
– Resulting reactive load increases the generator internal
voltage and reduces internal rotor angle
– Following a fault, the reactor is switched out which
further improves stability
Transient Stability Enhancement
Special Protection Schemes (SPS)
• Generator Tripping (Generation
Rejection)
– Selective rejection of generation at an appropriate
location in the system reduces power to be transferred
over the critical transmission interfaces.
– the most critical generator are tripped at a calculated
time when required
IESO TRANSIENT
STABILITY STUDIES

39
40
Events that Caused the 1965 Blackout

1200
MW
Bec 200

k MW

500
GS
MW

41
 Events that Caused the 1965 Blackout

• The initial event was the operation of a backup

relay at Beck GS in Ontario near Niagara Falls
– opened circuit Q29BD, one of five 230 kV circuits
connecting Beck GS to load centers in Toronto and
Hamilton
• Prior to opening of Q29BD, the five circuits were
carrying
– 1200 MW of Beck generation, and
– 500 MW import from Western NY State on Niagara ties
• Net import from NY 300 MW
• Loading on Q29BD was 361 MW at 248 kV;
• The relay setting corresponded to 375 MW
Events that Caused the 1965
Blackout
• Opening of Q29BD resulted in sequential tripping
of the remaining four parallel circuits
• Power flow reversed to New York
– total change of 1700 MW
• Power surge back to Ontario via St. Lawrence LxP
ties
– LxP ties tripped by protective relaying
• Generators in Western New York and Beck GS lost
synchronism, followed by cascading outages
• After about 7 seconds from the initial disturbance
– system split into several separate islands
– eventually most generation and load lost due to
inability of islanded systems to stabilize
November 9, 1965 - Blackout of Northeast US and
Canada
• Within a few minutes, there was a complete shut
down of electric service to
– virtually all of the states of New York, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, Vermont
– parts of New Hampshire, New Jersey and Pennsylvania
– most of Ontario, Canada
• Nearly 30 million people were without power for
about 13 hours
• Developments that followed had a major impact on
the industry!
Formation of Reliability Councils
• Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) formed in
January 1966 to improve coordination in planning and
operation among utilities in the region that was blacked out
• Other eight reginal reliability councils (RRCs) formed in the
following months
• North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)
established in 1968
Reliability Enhancement after the 1965
Blackout
• All utilities in North America began to review
reliability related policies, practices and procedures
• Coordination of activities and information exchange
between neighboring utilities became a priority
• Each Regional Council established detailed Reliability
criteria and guidelines for member systems
• Power system stability studies became an important
part of operating studies
• Many of these developments has had an influence on
utility practices worldwide
IESO TRANSIENT STABILITY
STUDIES CRITERIA

47
IESO Standards

• ICG is operated and planned mainly to

comply both NPCC and NERC standards
• NPCC and NERC operational standards
are implemented and explained in the
– Ontario Resource and Transmission Asses
sment Criteria
(System Planning)
– Market Manual 7.4
: IESO-Controlled Grid Operating Policies
(System Operation)

48
General Transient Stability Criteria
(MM 7.4 and ORTAC)

• For acceptable transient rotor angle stability,

synchronous units remaining connected to ICG
shall not lose synchronism for the respected
contingencies with due regard to reclosure.
• Transient angle stability shall be maintained if the
critical parameter is increased by 10% to allow
margin.
• This is to account for modeling errors, metering
errors and variations in dispatch
• The 10% increase can be simulated by generation
or load changes even beyond the forecast load or
generation capabilities provided it does not lead
to invalid results.
Acceptable Damping Factors
(ORTAC and MM 7.4)
Respected Contingencies

• The types of contingencies that must be

respected on elements that form the BPS
and BES are, at a minimum, specified by
NPCC and NERC respectively.
• The types of contingencies that must be
respected on the remaining local elements
are specified by the IESO.
Respected Contingencies

• Under pre-contingency conditions with all

facilities in service, or with a critical
element(s) out of service after permissible
control actions, the IESO controlled grid
is to maintain transient stability.
• Transient Stability of the power system
shall be maintained during and following
the most severe of the respected
contingencies, with due regard to
reclosing.
Respected Contingencies
The following BPS list of respected contingencies are relevant
to this training:
• A permanent three-phase fault on any element with normal
fault clearing. Single
Contingency
• Simultaneous permanent phase-to-ground faults on the same
or different phases of each of two adjacent transmission
circuits on a multiple transmission circuit tower, with normal
fault clearing. Double Contingency
• A permanent phase-to-ground fault on any element with
delayed fault clearing. Double Contingency
A complete list of Respected contingencies can be found in:
Ontario Resource and Transmission Assessment Criteria (ORTAC)
(System Planning)
Market Manual 7.4: IESO-Controlled Grid Operating Policies (System
Operation)
Respected Contingencies

• For single Contingencies:

– Less number of elements are tripped post-
contingency
– Fault severity is larger (3-phase fault)
• For doubles Contingencies:
– Two, or more, elements are tripped post-
contingency
– Fault severity is less (L-L-G or L-G faults)
Transient Stability Criteria (Highlights)

• Units connected to ICG shall not loose

synchronism
• 10% margin.
• All elements in service.
• Critical Elements out-of-service.
• Single and double contingencies.
IESO TRANSIENT STABILITY
STUDIES CRITERIA
IMPLEMENTATION

56
 Criteria Implementation (Illustrative
Example)
900
Pre-contingency Flow= 1000
MW

Line 1 Single
Contingency
G1 Line 2 (Forced Outage)
Line 3 Grid
G2 Line 4
Unstable
Stable

Interface I1

Double Contingency
BPS
(Forced Outage)
Bus

I1 Limit with 10%

Margin:
All I/S Limit818.2 MW
 Criteria Implementation (Illustrative
Example)
800
Pre-contingency Flow= 900
MW

Line 1 Single
Contingency
G1 Line 2 (Forced Outage)
Line 3 Grid
G2 Line 4
Unstable
Stable

Interface I1

Double Contingency
BPS
(Forced Outage)
Bus

I1 Limit with 10% Margin:

Limit (with Line 1 Outage)727.3 MW
Ex(1): Flow out of Northeast Area (FS)
Flow into/out of Northeast Area

60
Fault Simulations

Fault
1 3
A B
2 Dummy Bus I 4

For a fault at Dummy Bus I:

• Local end clearing: MR+ TAR +BTM + BKR
• Remote end clearing: MR+ TAR+TP + BTM +
BKR
• Action time(s) of a SPS can be obtained in the
FDD document for the SPS.
Fault Clearing Sequence/Times

• MR = (Measuring Relay)
– Distance/Line Differential protection relay =
25 ms
• TAR=Trip Auxiliary Relay=4ms
• BTM= (Breaker Trip Module)
– Legacy = 4ms, Breaker relay/IED = 6 ms
• TP = (Teleprotection)
– SONET = 15 ms, MW/PLC-SSB=25 ms
• BKR= (Breaker) – Depends on the breaker
For more details, please review the Protection Training Module

62
Fault Clearing Sequence/Times-
Breaker Interrupt Time (BKR)

63
Flow into/out of Northeast Area

64
For a 3-phase fault at X503E (Differential Protection)

65
Fault Clearing Sequence/Times and
Fault Admittance
Normal clearing times for a 3-phase fault on X503E
@Hanmer
Location Total time (ms)
Local (JL503, PL503) Trip 25+4+4+33 = 66

Remote (DL503,L03L11) Trip 25+4+4+33 = 66

Impedance for 3-phase Fault at Hanmer 500kV= 0

Switching Deck
/
/
Description 3ph_X503E@Hanmer
Simulation 15.000000 Seconds
Step Size 0.25 Cycles
At Time 0.1 Seconds
Tap Line ;152000 ;152010 ;1 ;105106 0.0001
Three Phase Fault At Bus ;105106
At Time 0.166 Seconds
Remove Line ;152000 ;105106 ;1
Clear Three Phase Fault
Remove Line ;105106 ;152010 ;1
Remove Line ;152010 ;153010 ;1
Remove Line ;153000 ;153010 ;1
Nomore
/
END
Flow into/out of Northeast Area

• A Three phase fault on either X503E or

X504E will lead to transient instability
issues in the northeast.
• Therefore, a Flowsouth (FS) limit is
introduced to avoid transient instability in
the northeast zone.
• Generation rejection, Porcupine SVC,
Nobel series capacitors can improve the
FS transfer limit.

68
Activity 2:
Bruce A Transient Stability

69
Activity 2:
Bruce A Transient Stability

70
Bruce A Transient Stability
• Without using Bruce SPS, the following
situations may lead to transient
instability:
– If D1 bus is out of service
• Any contingency, that would lead to the loss of K1 Bus, will
leave Bruce connected to only B20P and B22D can lead to
transient stability issues .
• Loss of B22D, and leaving G1 on B20P should be studied
or not?
– If D2 bus is out of service
• Any contingency, that would lead to the loss of K2 Bus, will
leave Bruce connected to only B27S and B5V can lead to
transient stability issues

71
Ex (2): St. Lawrence Area Doubles Contingencies

z
Beauharnois_
Quebec

Saunders
GS

Cardinal_Power
GS Moses_NY
GS

72
Ex (2):
L24A+L22H double Contingency
(LG fault on each line @ St. Lawrence at different phases)

73
Fault Clearing Sequence/Times
(Delayed Fault Clearing due to Breaker Failure)

LG Fault (phase a)
4
1
L24A Station 2
5
Dummy Bus I
Station 1 2
LG Fault (phase b)
6
L22H Station 3
3 7
Dummy Bus II
Fault Clearing Sequence/Times
(Cont.), and fault admittance
Normal clearing times for L24A+L22H Contingency
(LG fault on each line @ St. Lawrence)
Location Total time (ms)
Local (HL24, L22L24, AL22) Trip 25+4+4+50 = 83 ms

Remote 25+4+25+4+50= 108 ms

(HT4L24,DL24,HL22,L22L27) Trip
Fault Admittance:
L24A(L-G)= 436.51 -j12556.78 MVA
L22H(L-G)= 2820.24 -j11474.59 MVA
Equivalent Admittance=3257 –j24032 MVA
 Fault Clearing Sequence/Times
(Delayed Fault Clearing due to Breaker Failure)

Stuck Breaker
LG Fault
4
1
Line 12 Station 2
5
Dummy Bus I
Station 1 2

6
Line 13 Station 3
3 7
Dummy Bus II
Trip Sequence:
Bkr1Bkr 4,5Bkr 3Bkr 6,7
Fault Clearing Sequence/Times
(Delayed Fault Clearing due to Breaker Failure)

77
Ex(3): Simulate L22L24_BKF Contingency
(LG on one line only @St. Lawrence, i.e. “L24A”)

78
Ex(3): Simulate L22L24_BKF Contingency
(LG on one line only @St. Lawrence, i.e. “L24A”)

79
Fault Calculation Example
Delayed clearing times for L-G Fault on L24A @St. Lawrence,
L22L24_BKF
Location Total time (ms)
HL24 Trip 25+4+4+50 = 83 ms

L24A Remote (HT4L24,DL24) 25+4+25+4+50 = 108 ms

Trip
Local fault (AL22) Trip 25+4+105+4+4+50 = 192 ms

L22H Remote (L22L27, HL22) 25+4+105+4+25+4+50 = 217

Trip ms
Fault Admittance:
L24A(L-G)=674.94 -j5849.78 MVA
 Comparison
Double Breaker Failure
• Fault Clearing Time • Fault Clearing Time
108ms 217ms

• Equivalent • Equivalent
Admittance Admittance
3257 –j24032 MVA 674.94 -j5849.78
• End status: MVA
• End status:
Loss L22H and L24A
Comments?Loss L22H and L24A
Activity 3:
• What are the system conditions that
would make a fault on L24A worse than a
double on L24A+L22H? Why?

82
Activity 3:
• What are the system conditions that
would make a fault on L24A worse than a
double on L24A+L22H? Why?

83
Activity 3:

• Scenario 1:
– Initial system conditions
• All I/S, or AL22 O/S
– Disturbance
• L-L-G fault on L22H+L24A
– Post contingency
• loss of L22H+L24A
• Scenario 2:
– Initial system conditions
• AL22 O/S
– Disturbance
• 3-phase fault on L24A
– Post contingency
• loss of L22H+L24A

84
References:

• Ontario Resource and Transmission A

ssessment Criteria
• Market Manual 7.4
: IESO-Controlled Grid Operating Policies
• Hydro-One Protection Clearing Times