A.
Effectivity of
Laws
1. Tanada vs Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 - Article 2 of the New Civil Code does not dispense
with theGazette of laws that provide for its own
publication requirement in the Official
effectivity date.
Publication is an indispensable requirement for laws to be valid and enforceable.
Publication of
presidential decrees which are “of public nature” or “general in application” shall be
published
Official in the otherwise it would violate the due process clause because it would
Gazette,
be unjust
people fornot given a notice of the existence of laws which restrict and
to be
Facts:
regulate their acts.
1. This is a case invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution.
2. Tañada, et al., seek a wit of mandamus to compel Hon. Tuvera, et al., to publish
or cause the publication in the Official Gazette various unpublished presidential decrees.
3. However, respondent public officials contended that publication in the official gazette is
not a sine qua non (without which, not.) requirement when the law itself
provides for its own effectivity date.Since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is a requirement for laws and acts to
be valid and enforceable.
Ruling:
1. Yes, Under Article 2 of the New Civil Code it does not dispense with the publication
requirement in the Official Gazette of laws that provide for its own
effectivity date. Publication is an indispensable requirement for laws to be
valid and enforceable. Publication of presidential decrees which are “of
public nature” or “general in application” shall be published in the Official Gazette,
otherwise it would violate the due process clause because it would be unjust
for people to be not given a notice of the existence of laws which restrict and regulate
their acts. Furthermore, non publication will result in the ineffectivity of the law.
The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains
from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published
in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws
provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
2. published,
Tanada vs Tuvera 146have
they shall SCRAno446 The force
binding clause,
and“unless
effect. otherwise provided” refers to the
- effectivity and not to the publication daterequirement,
of which cannot in any event be omitted.
Publication is in every case. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of
indispensable
the Civilthat
meant Codethe publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication,did
necessary, when
not have to be made in the Official Gazette.This clause does not
mean that may
legislature the make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date, without
previous its
publication, but the legislature may shorten or extend the usual fifteen-day
period. to
correct It issaynotthat under the disputed clause publication. may be dispensed with
altogether
such omissionbecausewould offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge
of the
that arelaws
supposed to
Facts:
govern it.
1. In the April 24, 1985 decision of the Supreme Court which affirmed the necessity of
publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances
which are general in application, and unless so provided, shall have no
binding effect.
2. Petitioners move for consideration or clarification of the decision on various questions.
3. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication;
and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not publication is still required in light of the clause, “unless otherwise
provided”
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What, where and where is the publication to be made?
Ruling:
4. Yes, Publication is still required. The clause, “unless otherwise provided” refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the publication requirement, which cannot in any
event be omitted. Publication is indispensable in every case. The clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when
necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette.This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication, but the
legislature may shorten or extend the usual fifteen-day period. It is not
correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether because such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. If the
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately
upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication, it is likely that persons not
aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a
failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
5. No, The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a
law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all
the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member
of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
3. As a general rule, publication must be in full or there is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
As to where, under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in
the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere (now, Official Gazette or Newspaper of General
Circulation pursuant to E.O No. 200), as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen
days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon
their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
3. De Roy vs Court of Appeals 157
SCRA 757 Facts:
1. This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of
the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v.
Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution
promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since
the decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27
October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of
time.
2. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
3. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
4. Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which
was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of
the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate
court
Issue/s:
1. Whether there’s a GADALEJ in CA’s ruling and if the rule enunciated in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon should apply to the case, given the alleged non-
publication of the decision in the Official Gazette.
2.Whether the doctrine of "last clear chance" is applicable to
the case. Ruling:
1.No, The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. In Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon: Established the rule against
extending the period for filing motions for reconsideration. Contrary to petitioners'
view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme
Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
2.No, The doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular
accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.
4. La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association vs Ramos 421 SCRA
vs 148 Facts:
1.The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the
constitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of
1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No.
2. March 30, 1995: The government executed an FTAA with Western Mining Corporation
(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
3. January 27, 2004: The Supreme Court en banc promulgated a Decision granting the
Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-
40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP.
4. Procedural: Respondents filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
An Oral Argument was held on June 29, 2004. After hearing both sides the Court required
the Parties to submit their respective Memoranda.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the sale of WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius and the subsequent
transfer of the FTAA (Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement) rendered the case
moot.
Ruling:
1. No, The petitioners claim that a Filipino corporation is not allowed by the Constitution to
enter into an FTAA with the government is untenable. Under Sec. 2. x x x The exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. x x x." Nowhere in the
provision is there any express limitation or restriction insofar as arrangements other
than the three aforementioned contractual schemes are concerned.
Neither can one reasonably discern any implied stricture to that effect. There’s no
reason to believe the Constitution’s framers—who clearly supported
developing the country’s natural resources—intended to limit Filipino
involvement. In fact, the Constitution prioritizes Filipinos and Filipino companies in this
area.
5.Gatbonton vs NLRC – GR No. 146779, Jan 23,
2006 Facts:
1. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated November 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470, affirming the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC); and the CA Resolution dated January 16, 2001, denying the motion
for reconsideration.
2. Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua
Institute of Technology (MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some time in November
1998, a civil engineering student of respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against
petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct
unbecoming of an academician.
3. MIT's Committee on Decorum and Investigation placed Gatbonton under a 30-day
preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999, pending investigation.
4. Gatbonton filed a complaint for illegal suspension, damages, and attorney's fees with the
NLRC.
5. MIT's rules implementing R.A. No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act) were published on
February 23, 1999.
Issue/s:
1.Whether the preventive suspension of Renato S. Gatbonton legal, considering that the
Mapua Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 7877 were not yet published at the
time of his suspension?
2. Whether Renato S. Gatbonton entitled to damages for the alleged illegal preventive
suspension?
Ruling:
1. The petition is partly meritorious.
Petitioner’s preventive suspension was based on respondent MIT’s Rules and
Regulations for the Implemention of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A.
No. 7877. Rule II, Section 1 of the MIT Rules and Regulations. In the case of Tañada vs.
Tuvera,13 it was ruled that:
… all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
The Court agreed that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The Mapua Rules is one of
those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce
and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application.
14
In fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required publication of the rules for its effectivity,
as provided in Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative Provisions), which states that "[T]hese
Rules and Regulations to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after publication by the Committee."
Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioner’s preventive suspension on January 11,
1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had
no legal basis.
Moreover, even assuming that the Mapua Rules are applicable, the Court finds that there is
no sufficient basis to justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an
accused may be placed under preventive suspension during pendency of the hearing
under any of the following circumstances:
(a)if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the
continued stay of the accused during the period of investigation constitutes a
distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or
(b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the
educational community.
2. With regard to the petitioner's claim for damages, the Court finds the same to be
without basis. While petitioner’s preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this
does not automatically mean that he is entitled to moral or other damages. ( the Court
added that exemplary damages may be awarded only if the dismissal was shown to
have been effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.)
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10,
2000 and Resolution dated January 16, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
57470 as well as the NLRC Decision dated September 30, 1999 together with its
Resolution dated December 13, 1999, are hereby SET ASIDE and the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision dated June 18, 1999 is REINSTATED.
6. People vs Quiachon- GR No. 170236, August 31, 2006
Facts: : Roberto Quiachon y Bayona, the appellant, accused of qualified rape.
