Theme 10 - EVM & VVPAT

Guidance Plan:
1. The EVM & VVPAT system is the lynchpin in the conduct of free, fair and transparent election. Thus training of the RO in this vertical is vital in
ensuring ‘zero error’ elections that will positively impact the trust and confidence of all the stakeholders in the integrity of the electoral process.
This PPT aims to familiarize the RO with the EVM & VVPAT ecosystem as a whole and his role vis-à-vis the EVM & VVPAT in the non-election, election
and petition period. Special emphasis is given to the FLC, randomization, dispersal, poll day and counting day procedures. The RO is exposed to the
gist of all important instructions so as to ensure clarity in implementation.
2. The PPT has been divided into 4 parts. Part – I briefs the RO about the background and basics of EVM & VVPAT, its history and the role of the
Technical Expert Committee (TEC) and its composition. The technical security aspetcs are then explored and security features and mechanisms are
detailed.
3. Part-II of the PPT dwells into the legal provisions for the use of EVMs & VVPATs. The RO is given a detailed overview of the relevant sections and
rules of RPA, 1951 and COER, 1961, followed by the landmark judgements of Supreme Court and High Courts that have played a significant role in
shaping the usage of EVM & VVPATs.
4. The Administrative Safeguards and the mechanisms and its elements are focussed upon in Part-III of the PPT. A brief of the EVM Management
System (EMS) is also a part of this segment. The RO is appraised of the SoPs to be followed across various phases of the electoral process, starting
with storage, followed by FLC, randomization, Commissioning/Preparation, Dispersal day and culminating in the Poll day.
5. The Counting Arrangements & Instructions for Counting of Votes (EVM & VVPAT) form the Part-V of the PPT. The RO is briefed about the
infrastructure and security arrangements at the Counting Centre and Media Centre, The Provisions & guidelines regarding Counting of Postal Ballot
(PB) and votes from EVMs is encapsulated later. The next section is on the Encore Counting Application, that informs the RO about the
Infrastructural requirements, and the processes involved in the day before counting day and on counting day. The arrangements for counting of
VVPAT Slips are dealt subsequently with accompanying pictorials. The procedures regarding removal of VVPAT slips from VVPATs, sealing and storage
of EVM & VVPATs after counting of votes wraps up this section.
6. The penultimate segment of the PPT (Part – V), strives to address the debate around EVMs, taking up individual issues followed by explanations and
clarifications. It has been designed to address the concerns raised by various stakeholders on the EVM & VVPAT system. Also, a comparative of the
EVM used by ECI vis-à-vis the voting machines of other countries has also been included. Reasons for not reverting to the ballot method of voting
concludes this part. 1
Presentation Structure
Part - I Part – IV
Introduction to EVM & VVPAT Counting Arrangements & Instructions
Part - A EVM - components for Counting of Votes
Part - B History of EVM Part - A Arrangement for counting of votes
Part - C Technical Expert Committee (TEC) Part - B Counting of Postal Ballot (PB)
Part - D Technical Security Part - C Counting of votes from EVMs
Part – II Part - D Encore Counting Application
Legal Provisions for the use of EVMs & VVPATs Part - E Counting of VVPAT Slips
Part – III
Administrative Safeguards Part – V
Debate around EVMs – explanations and clarifications
Part - A Administrative Safeguards - Mechanisms
Administrative Safeguards - Part – VI
Part - B SoPs till Poll Day EVM & VVPAT - Don’ts

2
Part – I
Introduction to EVM & VVPAT
Part – A
EVM - components
EVM – components - Ballot Unit (BU) + Control Unit (CU) + VVPAT
• EVM consists of Ballot Unit, Control Unit and
VVPAT
• Polling Officer presses the Ballot Button of
Control Unit which enable the voter to cast his
vote using Ballot Unit
• When a voter presses a button against the
candidate of his choice in Ballot Unit, red light
glow against candidate of his choice in Ballot
Ballot Unit VVPAT Control Unit.
Unit
• A paper slip showing the serial no, name and the
symbol of the candidate of his choice is
generated and visible for about 7 seconds
Contd… through transparent window of VVPAT
EVM – components - Control Unit – contd.

CONTROL UNIT-
enables the Ballot Unit to accept vote
from the voter and stores the vote
cast.

Contd…
EVM – components - Ballot Unit – contd.

BALLOT UNIT- the voter can

franchise his/her vote by pressing
a button against the candidate of
his/her choice

Contd…
EVM – components – VVPAT – contd.

VVPAT-
allows the voters to verify that
their votes are cast as intended.
Polling Station Layout
Polling
Agents
Voting Compartment

Polling
Officers

BU & VVPAT
Presiding
Officer with CU
Voter
Part – B
History of EVM
History of EVM - Timeline
EVM system has evolved over 40 years and have been in use in all elections since 2000

Year Development
1977 CEC- S L Shakdar talked about introducing an Electronic machine.
1980 - 81 EVMs developed and demonstrated by ECIL and BEL.
EVMs used first time in 50 polling stations of Parur AC in Kerala. And then in 11
1982 - 83
Assembly Constituencies: 8 states, 1UT.
1984 SC suspends EVM usage: cannot be used till RP Act is amended.
1988 RP Act amended: enabling use EVMs w.e.f. 15.03.1989.
2000 EVM has been used continuously since 2000

Contd…
History of EVM – Timeline – contd.
Year Development
2018 SC dismissed petition asking for return to Ballot papers!

2010 In All Political Party Meeting held on 04.10.2021 agreed to incorporate VVPAT with EVM

14th August 2013-The Conduct of Elections Rules 1961 amended to use VVPAT & First used
14-Aug-13 in Bye-election for 51-Noksen AC in Nagaland

Oct-13 SC allowed ECI to introduced VVPAT system in phased manner

In all party meeting, the Commission committed to ensure 100% coverage of VVPATs in all
2017
future elections.

2019 100% deployment of VVPATs in Lok Sabha 2019.

SC directions for verification of VVPAT slips of 5 polling stations per AC or AS in a PC for

Apr-19 greater satisfaction.

Since 2000, EVMs have been used in all elections: 4 Lok Sabha and 132 State Legislative Assemblies. Till date, more than 340
crore votes cast on EVMs.
Part – C
Technical Expert Committee (TEC)
T E C- History & role
1st Technical Expert TEC constituted for evaluation of upgraded EVMs
Committee (TEC) formed Submitted an Evaluation Report in 2006

January, 1990 December 2005

April 1990 November 2010

Recommended use of the Current TEC

EVMs unanimously
• Approves EVM Design
• Vets and seals the software
• Recommends continuous design improvement
• Recommends improvements in the manufacturing process
Composition of past TECs
Composition of first TEC on EVMs – 1990
1. Professor S. Sampath, Chairman Technical Advisory Committee, Defence Research &
Development Organization DRDO), Ministry of Defence.
2. Professor PV Indiresan of the IIT Delhi.
3. Dr. Rao C. Kasarabada, Director, Electronic Research & Development Centre (ERDC),
Trivandrum.
Composition of TEC on EVMs– Dec 2005
Prof P.V. Indiresan, Ex-Director, IIT Madras as Chairman of TEC.
4.Prof. D.T. Shahani of IIT Delhi.
5.Prof. A.K. Agarwala of IIT Delhi.
Present TEC composition
1. Prof D T Shahani, Prof Emeritus, IIT-Delhi

2. Prof Rajat Moona, Director IIT Bhilai, Former Director General CDAC

3. Prof A K Aggarwala, IIT Delhi

4. Prof Dinesh K Sharma, Prof Emeritus, IIT Bombay

Part – D
Technical Security
Secure design and manufacturing - snapshot

Automated self
Unauthorized Access Secured Development Most advanced diagnostics at every
Standalone Machine Detection Module and Manufacturing Encryption techniques switch ON

Strong “mutual No Radio Frequency Real Time Clock for

authentication transmission or One Time Dynamic Coding of date and time
capability” reception capability Programmable (OTP) Key Presses stamping key presses
Secure design and manufacturing
 Standalone Machine:
EVM is a machine not connected with external world through wire or wifi or blue tooth or
any network.

 Unauthorized Access Detection Module (UADM):

UADM embedded in the machine disables EVM permanently, if any attempt made to
access microcontroller or memory.

 Most Advanced Encryption Techniques:

Encrypted communication between Control Unit, Ballot Unit and VVPAT cannot be
deciphered by tapping cables.
Secure design and manufacturing
 Automated self diagnostics at every switch ON:
It checks EVM’s standard features each time it is Switched ON.

 Strong Mutual Authentication Capability:

The strong mutual authentication capability ensures that any unauthorized devices
cannot interact with EVMs.

 No Radio Frequency Transmission or Reception Capability:

Any tampering of ECI-EVM by coded signals by wireless, Bluetooth or WiFi is ruled out as
EVM does not have any radio frequency (RF) communication capability, hence, cannot
communicate through any wireless protocol.
Secure design and manufacturing
 One Time Programmable (OTP):
The programme (software) used in these machines is burnt into a One Time
Programmable (OTP) chip at the time of manufacturing so that it cannot be altered or
tampered with.

 Dynamic Coding of Key Presses:

Every key press is coded dynamically making it impossible for anyone to decode the
signals between Control Unit or Balloting Unit or VVPAT.

 Real Time Clock for date and time stamping key presses:
Every authorized or unauthorized key press is recorded with date and time stamp on real
time basis.
Secure design and manufacturing
 Secured Development & Manufacture:
- Manufactured by Premium PSUs- BEL & ECIL: Both deal with manufacturing of sensitive
equipment critical to the safety and security of the Nation and have strong security protocols.
- SOFTWARE Developed in-house by BEL/ECIL. Fully vetted by TEC. Never sub-contracted.
- Secure Manufacturing: 4-level Physical/Process access Control, Regular frisking, Outside e-
gadgets prohibited, CCTV Coverage, Access Data and Process Data logging, Alarm and Alert
generation.
- Third Party Testing by Directorate of Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification (STQC) as
per Standards & Quality Process set by TEC. Software is also tested & checked by STQC for
authenticity.
Part – II
Legal Provisions for the use of EVMs & VVPATs
Background
• The Electronic Voting Machines were used for the first time during the General Election to the
Kerala Legislative Assembly held from Parur Assembly Constituency in May, 1982 at 50 polling
stations. Thereafter, these machines were used in ten other constituencies in 1982-83.

• After 1983, the EVMs could not be used, as in the Election Appeal arising out of the election
petition relating to the use of the machines in the election from Parur Assembly Constituency
in Kerala, the Supreme Court ruled that there should be specific provision in the law providing
for use of EVMs in elections.

• Thereupon, ECI recommended to the Government of India to amend the law suitably to
provide legal sanction for the use of EVMs.

Contd…
Background – contd.
In December, 1988 a new Section 61A was inserted in the RPA, 1951, empowering ECI to use Electronic Voting
Machines in elections, which reads as under –

“61A. Voting machines at elections.—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder,
the giving and recording of votes by voting machines in such manner as may be prescribed, may be adopted in such
constituency or constituencies as the Election Commission may, having regard to the circumstances of each case,
specify.”

 Explanation:
For the purpose of this section, "voting machine" means any machine or apparatus whether operated electronically or otherwise used for
giving or recording of votes and any reference to a ballot box or ballot paper in this Act or the rules made thereunder shall, save as otherwise
provided, be construed as including a reference to such voting machine wherever such voting machine is used at any election.

 The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the above provision in All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v/s.
Chief Election Commissioner and others [2002(UJ)(1)387]
NB: In case of any discrepancies, kindly refer Manual of Election Laws]
RPA 1951 – provisions
S 58 RPA 1951 - Fresh poll in the case of destruction, etc., of ballot boxes
(1) If at any election,—
(a) any ballot box used at a polling station or at a place fixed for the poll is unlawfully taken out of the custody of the
presiding officer or the returning officer, or is accidentally or intentionally destroyed or lost, or is damaged or
tampered with, to such an extent, that the result of the poll at that polling station or place cannot be ascertained; or
[(aa) any voting machine develops a mechanical failure during the course of the recording of votes; or]
(b) any such error or irregularity in procedure as is likely to vitiate the poll is committed at a polling station or at a
place fixed for the poll, the returning officer shall forthwith report the matter to the Election Commission.
(2) Thereupon the Election Commission shall, after taking all material circumstances into account; either—
(a) declare the poll at that polling station or place to be void, appoint a day, and fix the hours, for taking a fresh poll at
that polling station or place and notify the day so appointed and the hours so fixed in such manner as it may deem fit,
or
(b) if satisfied that the result of a fresh poll at that polling station or place will not, in any way, affect the result of the
election or that 5[the mechanical failure of the voting machine or] the error or irregularity in procedure is not
material, issue such directions to the returning officer as it may deem proper for the further conduct and completion
of the election.
(3) The provisions of this Act and of any rules or orders made thereunder shall apply to every such fresh poll as they
apply to the original poll.
Contd…
RPA 1951 – provisions – contd.
S 169 RPA 1951 - Power to make rules
(1) The Central Government may, after consulting the Election Commission, by notification in the Official Gazette,
make rules1 for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any
of the following matters, namely—

[(a) the form of affidavit under sub-section (2) of section 33A;]

[(aa)] the duties of presiding officers and polling officers at polling stations;

[(aaa) the form of contribution report;]

Contd…
RPA 1951 – provisions – contd.
S 169 RPA 1951 - Power to make rules
(b) the checking of voters by reference to the electoral roll;

[(bb) the manner of allocation of equitable sharing of time on the cable television network and other electronic
media;];

(c) the manner in which votes are to be given both generally and in the case of illiterate voters or voters under
physical or other disability;

(d) the manner in which votes are to be given by a presiding officer, polling officer, polling agent or any other
person, who being an elector for a constituency is authorised or appointed for duty at a polling station at which he is
not entitled to vote;

Contd…
RPA 1951 – provisions – contd.
S 169 RPA 1951 - Power to make rules

(e) the procedure to be followed in respect of the tender of vote by a person representing himself to be an elector
after another person has voted as such elector;

[(ee) the manner of giving and recording of votes by means of voting machines and the procedure as to voting to be
followed at polling stations where such machines are used;]

(f) the procedure as to voting to be followed at elections held in accordance with the system of proportional
representation by means of the single transferable vote;

(g) the scrutiny and counting of votes including cases in which a recount of the votes may be made before the
declaration of the result of the election;

[(gg) the procedure as to counting of votes recorded by means of voting machines;]

Contd…
RPA 1951 – provisions – contd.
S 169 RPA 1951 - Power to make rules

(h) the safe custody of 3[ballot boxes, voting machines], ballot papers and other election papers, the period for which such
papers shall be preserved and the inspection and production of such papers;

[(hh) the material to be supplied by the Government to the candidates of recognised political parties at any election to be held
for the purposes of constituting the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of a State;]

(i) any other matter required to be prescribed by this Act. [(3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid as soon as may be after
it is made before each House of Parliament while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one
session or [in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the
successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule
should not be made,] the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so,
however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under
that rule.]
COER 1961 – provisions
R 49A COER 1961- Design of (EVM) Electronic Voting Machines

Every electronic voting machine (hereinafter referred to as the voting machine) shall have a control unit and a
balloting unit and shall be of such designs as may be approved by the Election Commission.

Provided that a printer with a drop box of such design as may be approved by the Election Commission may also be
attached to a voting machine for printing a paper trail of the vote, in such constituency or constituencies or parts
thereof as the Election Commission may direct.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49B COER 1961 - Preparation of voting machine by the (RO) Returning Officer
(1) The balloting unit of the voting machine shall contain such particulars and in such language or languages as the Election
Commission may specify.

(2) The names of the candidates shall be arranged on the balloting unit in the same order in which they appear in the list of the
contesting candidates.

(3) If two or more candidates bear the same name, they shall be distinguished by the addition of their occupation or residence or
in some other manner.

(4) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this rule, the returning officer shall—

(a) fix the label containing the names and symbol of the contesting candidates in the balloting unit and secure that unit with his
seal and the seals of such of the contesting candidates or their election agents present as are desirous of affixing the same;

(b) set the number of contesting candidates and close the candidate set section in the control unit and secure it with his seal and
the seals of such of the contesting candidates or their election agents present as are desirous of affixing the same;
Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49B COER 1961 - Preparation of voting machine by the (RO) Returning Officer

(c) where the printer for paper trail is used under the proviso to rule 49A, set the printer as per
the number of contesting candidates set in the Control Unit by –

i) loading in the printer the serial numbers and names of candidates and symbols allotted to
them as given on the balloting units under clause (a);

ii) loading paper in the printer; and

iii) sealing the printer in such manner as may be directed by the Election Commission”.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49C COER 1961 - Arrangements at the polling stations (PS)
(1) Outside each polling station there shall be displayed prominently—

(a) a notice specifying the polling area, the electors of which are entitled to vote at the polling station and, when the polling

area has more than one polling station, the particulars of the electors so entitled; and

(b) a copy of the list of contesting candidates.

(2) At each polling station there shall be set up one or more voting compartments in which the electors can record their votes

free from observation.

(3) The returning officer shall provide at each polling station one voting machine and copies of relevant part of the electoral roll

and such other election material as may be necessary for taking the poll.

(4) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-rule (3), the returning officer may, with the previous approval of the Election

Commission, provide one common voting machine for two or more polling stations located in the same premises.
Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
49D COER 1961 - Admission to the (PS) Polling Station
The presiding officer shall regulate the number of electors, to be admitted at any one time inside the polling
station and shall exclude therefrom all persons other than—
(a) polling officers;
(b) public servants on duty in connection with the election;
(c) persons authorised by the Election Commission;
(d) candidates, their election agents and subject to the provisions of rule 13, one polling agent of each candidate;
(e) a child in arms accompanying an elector;
(f) a person accompanying a blind or infirm elector who cannot move without help; and
(g) such other person as the returning officer or the presiding officer may employ under sub-rule (2) of rule 49G or
sub-rule (1) of rule 49H

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
49E COER 1961 - Preparation of voting machine for poll
(1) The control unit and balloting unit of every voting machine used at polling station and the printer for paper trail where
used, shall bear a label marked with—

(a) the serial number, if any, and the name of the constituency;

(b) the serial number and name of the polling station or stations as the case may be;

(c) the serial number of the unit; and

(d) the date of poll.

(2) Immediately before the commencement of the poll, the presiding officer shall demonstrate to the polling agents and other
persons present that no vote has been already recorded in the voting machine and it bears the label referred to in sub-rule (1),
and where the printer for paper trail is used that the drop box of the printer is empty.

(3) A paper seal shall be used for securing the control unit of the voting machine, and the presiding officer shall affix his own
signature on the paper seal and obtain thereon the signature of such of the polling agents present as the desirous of affixing the
same. Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
49E COER 1961 - Preparation of voting machine for poll
(4) The presiding officer shall thereafter fix the paper seal so signed in the space meant therefore in the control unit of the voting
machine and shall secure and seal the same.

(5) The seal used for securing the control unit shall be fixed in such manner that after the unit has been sealed, it is not possible
to press the “result button” without breaking the seal.

(6) The control unit shall be closed and secured and placed in full view of the presiding officer and the polling agents and the
balloting unit placed in the voting compartment.

(7)Where the printer for paper trail is used, the printer shall also be kept along with the balloting unit in the voting
compartment and shall be connected to the EVM in the manner as directed by the Election Commission.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
• 49F COER 1961 - marked copy of PER.

• 49G COER 1961 - Facilities for women electors

• 49H COER 1961 - Identification of electors

• 49I COER 1961 - facilities for public servants on election duty.

• 49J COER 1961 - challenging of identity.

• 49K COER 1961 - safeguards against personation.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49L COER 1961 - Procedure for voting by voting machines
(1) Before permitting an elector to vote, the polling officer shall—
(a) record the electoral roll number of the elector as entered in the marked copy of the electoral roll
in a register of voters in Form 17A.
(b) obtain the signature or the thumb impression of the elector on the said register of votes; and
(c) mark the name of the elector in the marked copy of the electoral roll to indicate that he has been
allowed to vote:
(d) give details of the document produced by the elector in proof of his/her identification.]
Provided that no elector shall be allowed to vote unless he has his signature or thumb impression on
the register of voters.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (2) of rule 2, it shall be necessary for any presiding
officer or polling officer or any other officer to attest the thumb impression of the elector on the register
of voters.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49M COER 1961 - Maintenance of secrecy of voting by electors within the polling station and
voting procedures
(1) Every elector who has been permitted to vote under rule 49L shall maintain secrecy of voting within the polling
station and for that purpose observe the voting procedure hereinafter laid down.

(2) Immediately on being permitted to vote the elector shall proceed to the presiding officer or the polling officer in-
charge of the control unit of the voting machine who shall, by pressing the appropriate button on the control unit,
activate the balloting unit; for recording of elector's vote.

(3) The elector shall thereafter forthwith—

(a) proceed to the voting compartment;

(b) record his vote by pressing the button on the balloting unit against the name and symbol of the candidate for
whom he intends to vote; and

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49M COER 1961 - Maintenance of secrecy of voting by electors within the polling station and
voting procedures
(c) come out of the voting compartment and leave the polling station:

Provided that where printer for paper trail is used, upon casting the vote by pressing the button under clause (b), the elector shall
be able to view through the transparent window of the printer, kept alongwith the balloting unit inside the voting compartment,
the printed paper slip showing the serial no, name and the symbol of the candidate for whom he has cast his vote before such paper
slip gets cut and drops in the drop box of the printer”.

(4) Every elector shall vote without undue delay.

(5) No elector shall be allowed to enter the voting compartment when another elector is inside it.

(6) If an elector who has been permitted to vote under rule 49L or rule 49P refuses after warning given by the presiding officer to
observe the procedure laid down in sub-rule (3) of the said rules, the presiding officer or a polling officer under the direction of the
presiding officer shall not allow such elector to vote.

(7) Where an elector is not allowed to vote under sub-rule (6), a remark to the effect that voting procedure has been violated shall be
Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49MA COER 1961 - Procedure in case of complaint about particulars printed on paper slip

(1) Where printer for paper trail is used, if an elector after having recorded his vote under rule 49M alleges that the
paper slip generated by the printer has shown the name or symbol of a candidate other than the one he voted for,
the presiding officer shall obtain a written declaration from the elector as to the allegation, after warning the elector
about the consequence of making a false declaration.

(2) If the elector gives the written declaration referred to in sub-rule (1), the presiding officer shall make a second
entry related to that elector in Form 17A, and permit the elector to record a test vote in the voting machine in his
presence and in the presence of the candidates or polling agents who may be present in the polling station, and
observe the paper slip generated by the printer

(3) If the allegation is found true, the presiding officer shall report the facts immediately to the returning officer,
stop further recording of votes in that voting machine and act as per the direction that may be given by the
Returning Officer. Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49MA COER 1961 - Procedure in case of complaint about particulars printed on paper slip

(4) If, however, the allegation is found to be false and the paper slip so generated under sub-rule (1) matches with
the test vote recorded by the elector under sub-rule (2), then, the presiding officer shall-

(i) make a remark to that effect against the second entry relating to that elector in Form 17A mentioning the serial
number and name of the candidate for whom such test votes has been recorded;

(ii) obtain the signature or thumb impression of that elector against such remarks; and

(iii) make necessary entries regarding such test vote in item 5 in Part I of Form 17C.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49N COER 1961 - Recording of votes of blind or infirm electors
(1) If the presiding officer is satisfied that owing to blindness or other physical infirmities an elector is unable to
recognise the symbol on the balloting unit of the voting machine or unable to record his vote by pressing the
appropriate button thereon without assistance the presiding officer shall permit the elector to take with him a
companion of not less than eighteen years of age to the voting compartment for recording the vote on his behalf
and in accordance with his wishes: Provided that no person shall be permitted to act as the companion of more
than one elector at any polling station on the same day: Provided further that before any person is permitted to act
as the companion of an elector on any day under this rule that person shall be required to declare that he will keep
secret the vote recorded by him on behalf of the elector and that he has not already acted as the companion of any
other elector at any other polling station on that day.

(2) The presiding officer shall keep a record in Form 14A of all cases under this rule.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49-O COER 1961 - Electors decide not to vote

If an elector, after his electoral roll number has been duly entered in the register of voters in
Form 17A and has put his signature or thumb impression thereon as required under sub-rule (1)
of rule 49L, decided not to record his vote, a remark to this effect shall be made against the said
entry in Form 17A by the presiding officer and the signature or thumb impression of the elector
shall be obtained against such remark.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49P COER 1961 – Tendered Votes
(1) If a person representing himself to be a particular elector seeks to vote after another person has already voted as such elector,
he shall, on satisfactorily answering such questions relating to his identity as the presiding officer may ask, be, instead of being
allowed to vote through the balloting unit, supplied with a tendered ballot paper which shall be of such design, and the
particulars of which shall be in such language or languages as the Election Commission may specify.

(2) Every such elector shall before being supplied with tendered ballot paper write his name against the entry relating to him in
Form 17B.

(3) On receiving the ballot paper he shall forthwith—

(a) proceed to the voting compartment;
(b) record there his vote on the ballot paper by placing a cross mark `X' with the instrument or article supplied for the
purpose on or near the symbol of the candidate for whom he intends to vote;
(c) fold the ballot paper so as to conceal his vote;
(d) show to the presiding officer, if required, the distinguishing mark on the ballot paper;
(e) give it to the presiding officer who shall place it in a cover specially kept for the purpose; and
(f) leave the polling station.

(4) If owing to blindness or physical infirmities, such elector is unable to record his vote without assistance; the presiding officer
shall permit him to take with him a companion, subject to the same conditions and after following the same procedure as laid
down in rule 49N for recording the vote in accordance with his wishes. Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49Q COER 1961 – Presiding Officer's entry in the voting compartment during poll

(1) The presiding officer may whenever he considers it necessary so to do, enter the voting compartment
during poll and take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that the balloting unit is not tampered or
interfered with in any way.

(2) If the presiding officer has reason to suspect that an elector who has entered the voting compartment is
tampering or otherwise interfering with the balloting unit or has remained inside the voting compartment for
unduly long period, he shall enter the voting compartment and take such steps as may be necessary to ensure
the smooth and orderly progress of the poll.

(3) Whenever the presiding officer enters the voting compartment under this rule, he shall permit the polling
agents present to accompany him if they so desire.
Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49R COER 1961 – Closing of poll

(1) The presiding officer shall close a polling station at the hour fixed in that behalf under section
56 and shall not thereafter admit any elector into the polling station:

Provided that all electors present at the polling station before it is closed shall be allowed to cast
their votes.

(2) If any question arises whether an elector was present at the polling station before it was
closed it shall be decided by the presiding officer and his decision shall be final.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49S COER 1961 – Account of votes recorded

(1) The presiding officer shall at the close of the poll prepare an account of votes recorded in
Form 17C and enclose it in a separate cover with the words ‘Account of Votes Recorded’
superscribed thereon.

(2) The presiding officer shall furnish to every polling agent present at the close of the poll a true
copy of the entries made in Form 17C after obtaining a receipt from the said polling agent
therefore and shall attest it as a true copy.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49T COER 1961 – Sealing of voting machine after poll

(1) As soon as practicable after the closing of the poll, the presiding officer shall close the control unit to ensure that
no further votes can be recorded and shall detach the balloting unit from the control unit and from the printer,
where printer is also used, so however, that the paper slips contained in the drop box of the printer shall remain
intact.

(2) The control unit and the balloting unit and the printer, where it is used, shall thereafter be sealed, and secured
separately in such manner as the Election Commission may direct and the seal used for securing them shall be so
affixed that it will not be possible to open the units without breaking the seals.

(3) The polling agents present at the polling station, who desire to affix their seals, shall also be permitted to do so.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49U COER 1961 – Sealing of other packets
(1) The presiding officer shall then make into separate packet,—

(a) the marked copy of the electoral roll;

(b) the register of voters in Form 17A;

(c) the cover containing the tendered ballot papers and the list in Form 17B;

(d) the list of challenged votes; and

(e) any other papers directed by the Election Commission to be kept in a sealed packet.

(2) Each packet shall be sealed with the seal of the presiding officer and with the seal either of the candidate or of
his election agent or of his polling agent who may be present at the polling station and may desire to affix his seal
thereon.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49V COER 1961 – Transmission of voting machines, etc., to the Returning Officer

(1) The presiding officer shall then deliver or cause to be delivered to the returning officer at such place as the
returning officer may direct,—

(a) the voting machine;

(b) the account of votes recorded in Form 17C;

(c) the sealed packets referred to in rule 49U; and

(d) all other papers used at the poll.

(2) The returning officer shall make adequate arrangements for the safe transport of the voting machine, packets
and other papers for their safe custody until the commencement of the counting of votes.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49W COER 1961 – Procedure on adjournment of poll

(1) If the poll at any polling station is adjourned under sub-section (1) of section 57, the provision of rules 49S to 49V shall, as far
as practicable, apply as if the poll was closed at the hour fixed in that behalf under section 56.

(2) When an adjourned poll is recommended under sub-section (2) of section 57, the electors who have already voted at the poll
so adjourned shall not be allowed to vote again.

(3) The returning officer shall provide the presiding officer of the polling station at which such adjourned poll is held, with the
sealed packet containing the marked copy of the electoral roll, register of voters in Form 17A and a new voting machine.

(4) The presiding officer shall open the sealed packet in the presence of the polling agents present and use the marked copy of
the electoral roll for marking the names of the electors who are allowed to vote at the adjourned poll.

(5) The provisions of rule 28 and rules 49A to 49V shall apply in relation to the conduct of an adjourned poll before it was so
adjourned.

Contd…
COER 1961 – provisions – contd.
R 49X COER 1961 – Closing of voting machine in case of booth capturing

Where the presiding officer is of opinion that booth capturing is taking place at a polling station
or at a place fixed for the poll, he shall immediately close the control unit of the voting machine
to ensure that no further votes can be recorded and shall detach the balloting that from the
control unit.
Hon’ble High Courts - Judgements
 Karnataka High Court 1999
‘This invention is undoubtedly a great achievement in the electronic and computer technology and a national pride’.

 Madras High Court 2001

‘There is also no question of introducing any virus or bugs for the reason that the EVMs cannot be compared to
personal computers.’

 Kerala High Court 2002

The High Court recorded its appreciation on the efficiency of the mechanism of detecting votes cast by
impersonators. Upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2003.

Contd…
Hon’ble High Courts – Judgements – contd.
 Bombay High Court: Order dated 23.02.2018:
The Bombay High Court ordered a detailed Forensic Examination of the EVMs from CFSL, Hyderabad for checking
any manipulation etc. The CFSL report clearly ruled out any tampering, alteration or manipulation in the EVMs.

 High Court of Madhya Pradesh: Order dated 05.12.2018:

In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 28016/2018 Naresh Saraf Vs ECI & Anr, Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh
expressed satisfaction at the Security and Storage Protocols for EVMs and VVPATs established by the ECI and
rejected petition to give directions for any changes.

Contd…
Hon’ble High Courts – Judgements – contd.

 High Court of Gujarat: Order dated 19.03.2019:

“....as will be evident from the extensive reproduction of the status report on EVMs/VVPATs, the system of
registering vote of the voter and reflection of his vote has become more transparent and apparent to regain the
voter’s confidence in the system. What essentially was the object of introduction of the VVPATs was the restoring of
the voter’s confidence by logging and registering of his vote correctly in the EVM. The Voter Verifier Audit Trail as
the name suggests assures the voter of his vote having been correctly recorded in the system..” Once the object of
the audit of the voter’s vote, from his perception is achieved, who is the end consumer of the franchise, the mere
apprehension voiced by the candidate, pales into insignificance

Contd…
Hon’ble High Courts – Judgements – contd.
High Court of Delhi: Order dated 03.08.2021:

• Dismissed plea seeking to stop the use of EVMs

• Imposed a fine of Rs. 10,000 on the petitioner terming the petition as a ‘Publicity Interest
Litigation’ based on hearsay and ‘baseless allegations and averments’.
Hon’ble Supreme Court – Judgements
Order dated 22.11.2018:

 In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1332/2018, Nyaya Bhoomi & Anr Vs ECI, Hon’ble Supreme Court
dismissed the petition requesting for return to Ballot paper system.

 Upon hearing the counsel the court made the following ORDER-

 “Having heard learned counsel for the petitioners and upon perusing the relevant material,
we are not inclined to entertain the writ petition. The same is, accordingly, dismissed.”

Contd…
Hon’ble Supreme Court – Judgements – contd.
Order dated 08.04.2019 (N. Chandrababu Naidu & Others v/s Union of India & Another):

 “We are certain that the system ensures accurate electoral results.”

 “Verification of VVPAT slips of 5 Polling Stations per Assembly Constituency or Assembly Segment in a
Parliamentary Constituency would lead to greater satisfaction.”

 Review Petition against above order dismissed on 07.05.2019.

Order dated 21.05.2019:

 The Supreme Court on 21.05.2019 dismissed a PIL seeking counting of VVPAT slips of all EVMs while
rebuking the petitioner NGO (Tech 4 All) for making a “mockery of democracy” by moving the court
despite a clear ruling by the apex court directing counting of VVPAT slips of five Polling Stations per
assembly segment.
Part – III
Administrative Safeguards
Part – A
Administrative Safeguards -
Mechanisms
Administrative Safeguard mechanisms - snapshot

Stakeholder Allocation and First Level EVM Management

Participation Movement Checking (FLC) Randomizations Candidate Setting System (EMS)

Multiple Mock Poll Closure & Storage and Counting Day -

Polls Poll Day Checks Transportation Security Protocol

NB: Presence of political parties/candidates/their representatives in every election related process is mandatory
The first and the foremost safeguard is the active participation of political parties and candidates in the entire
eco-system around EVMs, right from witnessing opening and sealing of warehouses and strong rooms,
witnessing First Level Check & Candidate Setting, observing 2 stage randomization, conducting mock polls and
signing on various paper seals.
1. Stakeholder participation
Active Participation of & Witness by Political-Parties/Candidates in All Processes

2
Opening & Sealing of
EVM Warehouses &
Strong-rooms
1 First Level Check (FLC)

List of EVMs after 1st &

Counting
Process 6 3 2nd
shared
randomization
to political
parties/candidates

Candidate Setting & Symbol

Conduct mock poll and
receive mock poll results
5 4 loading-Sign on Paper Seals on
EVMs after all processes
2. Allocation & Movement
 Planned Allocation:
- EVMs are allocated to poll going State by the Commission
- Received by District Election Officer (DEO) who is personally responsible for secured storage
- EMS used for inventory management of all EVMs nationwide for the sake of transparency
 Secured Transportation:
- Movement of EVMs mandatorily managed through EVM Management System (EMS)
- Only Containerized/Sealed Trucks used
- All Trucks sealed with Lock and Paper Seals
- Mandatory GPS tracking of EVM vehicles
- All movement under 24X7 Police Escort
- Videography done of shifting process
- Political parties informed in advance about the opening, stocking and sealing of warehouses while moving EVMs
NB: Around 6 months before the polls Commission allots EVMs to the poll going state either from BEL/ECIL or from other
States. The EVMs then move under 24/7 police security and are received by the DEOs who are personally responsible for
secured storage in their districts. The entire inventory management is done using EVM Tracking Software.
3. First Level Checking (FLC)
- FLC is mandatorily done in the presence of representatives of political parties
- Fully sanitized hall under videography and full security
- Full functionality and behavioural check is done on every EVM
- Defective (non-functional) EVMs are kept aside and not used in election
- FLC status captured in EMS
- Introduction of Pre-FLC unit on pilot basis to mitigate human errors during FLC

Contd…
3. First Level Checking (FLC) – process – contd.
Mock Poll on randomly
selected 5% EVMs for higher EVMs/VVPATs stored in
Complete physical check up
votes (1200 votes in 1%, CU sealed after FLC Strong Room under 24X7
(switches, cable, latches
1000 in 2% & 500 in 2%) using ‘Pink Paper Seal’ security
etc) & functional test

2 4 6 8
1 3 5 7

Mock Poll on All Electronic Result in CU is tallied with Signing on seals by Photocopies of record
EVMs/VVPATs VVPAT Slip count and results shared Engineers and registers shared with political
with representatives representatives party representatives
4. Randomization
Allocation and assigning of EVMs to constituency/PS, ballot paper sequence of names, and
ballot button on BU to candidate:
 Randomization is the foundation of EVM Security

 Till first randomization- no one knows which EVM is going to which Constituency.

 Till nomination finalization- no one knows the sequence of names on the ballot paper.

 Hence, till candidate setting no one (not even RO/DEO/CEO/Commission) knows which
button on which BU will be assigned to which candidate, making even an attempt to
tamper absolutely futile.

 Till 2nd Randomization- no one knows which EVM will go to which PS.

 Added to this is the 3 stage Randomization of polling officials to different polling stations.
Contd…
4. Randomization – contd.
 EVMs are Randomized twice using EMS.
 No human intervention in randomisation.
 Only FLC approved EVMs as per EMS get picked up for first randomisation.

PS1
1st 2nd Randomization
Randomization
AC 1
PS2
District

AC 2 PS(n
)

AC (n)

Presence of political parties/candidates/their representatives in every election related process is mandatory

Contd…
4. Randomization – contd.
1st and 2nd Randomization – activities and differences:

1st Randomization 2nd Randomization

 Done after FLC  Done just before ‘candidate
 To allocate EVMs from district, setting’.
randomly, to a particular AC/AS.  To allocate EVMs available in
 In presence of representatives of an AC/AS to polling stations.
political parties.  In presence of
 List of AC/AS-wise Randomized candidates/election agents
EVMs shared with political and list shared.
parties.
5. Candidate Setting
Candidate Setting Process

Insert ballot paper in the Ballot Seal Ballot

Unit & Set Number of Candidates Unit
Mock Poll on Every
EVM with VVPAT
Symbol loading in VVPAT Seal VVPAT +
1000 vote on 5%
EVMs with VVPATs
Seal
Candidate Setting in Control Unit Candidate
Set of CU

Presence of political parties/candidates/their representatives in every election related process is mandatory

Contd…
5. Candidate Setting – contd.
Security Measures

 Done only after finalization of the names of contesting candidates.

 Fully sanitized hall under videography and full security.

 Done in the presence of candidates or their agents.

 Introduction of new Symbol Loading Units (SLUs) for loading symbols in VVPATs, and
enabling simultaneous live viewing on TV monitor by all stakeholders
6. Multiple Mock Polls
 Each EVM & VVPAT undergoes mock poll during FLC, and again during Candidate Setting. In
addition 10% EVMs are randomly picked up for higher vote (500-1200) mock poll. Electronic
result count is verified with paper slips count.

 10% EVMs randomly taken out for Training and Awareness undergo Mock Polls several
times.

 Before start of actual poll, Mock poll on each EVM along with VVPAT with at least 50 votes
in the presence of polling agents. Electronic result count is verified with paper slips count.
7. Poll Day Checks
 Polling Agents

 Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) and Micro Observers deployed at poling stations.

 Web Casting/CCTVs

 Frequent visits (Sector Officers /Senior officers/ Observers)

 2 hourly reporting of votes polled

 Media vigil
8. Poll Closure & Transportation
• Poll Closed on EVM by pressing CLOSE button – EVM cannot accept any further
vote.

• EVMs sealed in the respective carrying cases & polling agents sign on them.

• EVMs transported back to the reception centres under armed escort.

Candidates’ representatives are allowed to follow them.
9. Storage & Security
 EVM Warehouse/Strong-room with only One Entry Point.
 Entry secured by a Double Lock System with DEO & Dy. DEO, each having custody of keys of one lock each.
 24X7 Armed security.
 The opening & closing of EVM warehouse ONLY in presence of Political party representatives- advance
written intimation mandatory.
 Every EVM moved is managed by ECI through EMS.

Post Polling:
 Polled EVMs are stored in strong room having double lock system.
 Candidates allowed to put their own seals on locks.

Contd…
9. Storage & Security – contd.
Various layers of security of polled EVMs:
1. Unique ID of BUs, CUs & VVPATs shared with political parties/candidates.
2. Sealing of CU and BU with Pink Paper Seals during FLC and commissioning respectively on which political
parties and candidates put their signatures.
3. Sealing of EVMs before starting actual poll on which polling agents also put their signatures.
4. Seals on carrying cases of EVMs after closing of poll on which polling agents also put their signatures.
5. Double lock system at the door of strong room on which candidates also put their own seals.
6. CCTV feed to Candidates Camping Area to monitor strong room.
7. Two Cordoned round-the-clock security (Inner perimeter manned by CAPF and Outer perimeter by State
Armed Police.
8. Log-book and videography of officers inspecting the two cordons daily.
9. Candidates/their representatives are allowed to watch the strong room 24x7
10.24/7 security arrangement for unused EVMs also.

Contd…
9. Storage & Security – contd.
Secure storage in Strong Rooms till counting:
 Polled EVMs kept in strong room, sealed in the
presence of the Candidates and Observer.

 Facilitation for Candidates to watch the Polled EVM

Strong Room 24/7.

 Starting from FLC of EVMs to Counting of votes,

EVMs are kept in Strong-room with full 24/7
security.
SAP- State Armed Police CAPF- Central Armed Police Force

Contd…
9. Storage & Security – contd.
Storage during Election Petition period:
• Election Petitions can be filed within 45 days of result declaration.
• EVMs (BU+CU) & VVPATs remain under sealed conditions till EP position is
ascertained.
• EVMs and VVPATs under EP, are kept under safe custody of DEO (Strong Room) till
final disposal of EP.
• Print on VVPAT Slips remains for 5 years.
• Remaining EVMs and VVPATs not in EP are now free for re-use.
10. Counting Day Protocol
 On the day of counting, strong room opened in the presence of Candidates, RO and
Observer under videography.

 Round-wise CUs are brought to the counting tables from Strong Rooms under
CONTINUOUS CCTV Coverage.

 Unique ID number of the CU & the signed seals are verified and shown to the polling
agents.

 EVMs are stored back in Strong Room in the presence of candidates/their

representatives till the completion of the Election Petition period.
11. EVM Management System (EMS)
 In house EVM Stock Management Software

 Barcode of every EVM is scanned into EMS every time it moves

from one Warehouse to another

 All EVM Allocations done on EMS

 FLC status(OK/Rejected) captured in EMS

 EVMs Randomisation twice on EMS

 EVM sent for repair captured in EMS

 EVMs under EP marked in EMS

Part – B
Administrative Safeguards -
SoPs till Poll Day
Storage - classification

Non-election Period Election Period Petition Period

After Election Petition FLC to Election After Counting of Votes to confirmation

till start of FLC Petition Period of Election Petition Period

NB 1: Storing EVMs and VVPATs during non-election period - EVM Warehouse

NB 2: Storing EVMs and VVPATs from FLC to completion of EP filing period - EVM Strong Room
Storage - Categories of EVM Strong Room
1. FLC Strong Room: Having FLC-Ok EVMs/VVPATs after completion of FLC of EVMs/VVPATs.

2. Repair Strong Room: Having FLC-rejected EVMs/VVPATs and un-polled non-functional/rejected EVMs/VVPATs
pertaining to Awareness, Training, Commissioning, dispersal, mock poll (Category C) etc.

3. Training & Awareness Strong Room: Having EVMs & VVPATs pertaining to Training & Awareness.

4. AC/AS Strong Room: Having EVMs/VVPATs after First Randomization of EVMs and VVPATs.

5. Polled Strong Room: Having polled EVMs and VVPATs [Category A (Polled) EVMs and VVPATs and Category B (Polled
non-functional) EVMs and VVPATs] after completion of Poll till Counting of votes. Re-polled machines, if any, may also
be kept here.

6. Reserve Strong Room: Having Category D (unused/reserve) EVMs/VVPATs after completion of Poll.

7. District Strong Room: Storing Category A (Polled) EVMs and VVPATs and Category B (Polled non-functional) EVMs after
Counting of Votes till Election Petition Period.
Storage SoPs – Non-election Period
 Storage Place: Treasury/District HQs/Tehsil HQs

 Physical Aspects of Warehouse (WH):

o Only 1 entry/exist point

o Other doors/windows to be sealed using brick-masonry or concrete
o Double lock system
o Installation of Main Switch outside WH/Strong Room
o No other material to be stored

 Custody of keys:

o All keys of Lock-1 with DEO and all keys of Lock-2 with Dy.DEO (District HQs)
o All keys of Lock-1 with SDM and all keys of Lock-2 with Tehsildar (Outside District HQs)
o Deposition of keys in Treasury
o Handling of keys to be a part of CTC (Certificate of Transfer Charge) Contd…
Storage SoPs – Non-election period – contd.
 Security:
o 1/2 Section Armed Security
o CCTV
o Fire Alarm
o Fire extinguisher both inside and outside

 Inspection by DEO:
o Monthly
o Quarterly (April, July, October & January)
Storage SoPs – Election Period
Stages:

1. FLC to 1st Randomization

2. After 1st Randomization to dispersal

3. Poll Day to before Counting Day

4. Counting Day

Contd…
Storage SoPs – Election Period – contd.
1. FLC to 1st Randomization:
 Custody of DEO
 Strong Room with Double Lock System
 All keys of Lock-1 with DEO and all keys of Lock-2 with Dy.DEO
 1 Section Armed Security
 CCTV
 Open for taking out Awareness/Training units (10%) and after 1st
Randomization in presence of political parties (National & State
Recognised) under videography Contd…
Storage SoPs – Election Period – contd.
2. After 1st Randomization to dispersal
 Custody of RO
 Double Lock System
 All keys of Lock-1 with RO and all keys of Lock-2 with ARO
 1 Section Armed Security
 CCTV
 Open only after 2nd Randomization for commissioning/preparation and on dispersal
day in presence of candidates/ their agents under videography

Contd…
Storage SoPs – Election Period – contd.
3. Poll Day to before Counting Day
 Custody of RO
 Double Lock System
 All keys of Lock-1 with RO and all keys of Lock-2 with ARO
 CCTV
 1 Platoon Armed Security (2 tier Security)
 No one allow to enter inner tier
 Daily visit of RO/ARO/DEO/SP
 Candidates/their agents are allowed to watch security

Contd…
Storage SoPs – Election Period – contd.

4. Counting Day:
 1 Platoon Armed Security
 3 tier Security on Counting Day: Inner- CPAF, Middle-SAP, Outer-DAP
 CCTV
 Opening/Closing of Strong Room in presence of candidates/ their agents and ECI
Observer under videography
Storage SoPs – Petition Period
 Custody of DEO
 1 Platoon Security
 CCTV

NB - Opening and closing of EVM Warehouse/Strong Room in presence of the Political Parties/
Candidates under videography
First Level Checking - SoPs
Listing of activities:
1. Schedule of FLC and intimation to political parties
2. Arrangements for FLC
3. Work to be done during FLC
4. Supervision of FLC
5. Disposal of VVPAT slips generated during FLC on daily basis
6. Marking of FLC Status on EVM Management System (EMS)

Contd…
First Level Checking – SoPs – contd.
1. Schedule of FLC and intimation to political parties
 CEO/DEO to prepare schedule
 Intimation to political parties at the district HQs under intimation
to State HQs with proper acknowledgment

Contd…
First Level Checking – SoPs – contd.
2. Arrangements for FLC
 Spacious, well-lit, dust-free hall
 FLC area to be barricaded and sanitized by police
 TV/Monitor for each SLU to be used for symbol loading in VVPATs
 Storage facility of P-FLCU and SLU in a separate room in FLC premises
 Computer with internet connection in a separate room
 Entry of hall through Door Frame Metal Detector
 Entry on production of ID Card issued by DEO
 Webcasting of FLC process
 Arrangement of manpower

Contd…
First Level Checking – SoPs – contd.
3. Work to be done during FLC
 FLC only by authorized engineers of BEL/ECIL
 FLC Process
o Cleaning of machine
o Visual Inspection
o Pre-FLC using P-FLCU
o Full functionality checks: 1 vote to each candidate for EVM, 6 votes to each candidate
button for VVPAT. In 1% testing by connecting 4 BUs.
o Conduct of Mock Poll: Randomly Selected (5% EVMs and VVPATs)- 1200 votes in 1%,
1000 votes in 2% and 500 votes in 2% and verification
 Opening of plastic cabinet of EVM and sealing of CU Cabinet with Pink Paper Seal Contd…
First Level Checking – SoPs – contd.
4. Supervision of FLC
 Under close supervision of DEO
 FLC Supervisor appointed by DEO
 CEO/DEO to monitor through web cast

5. Disposal of VVPAT slips generated during FLC on daily basis

6. Marking on FLC Status on EMS

 DEO to provide 2 mobiles
 FLC OK to be scanned by election official using Mobile App
 FLC Rejected to be scanned by BEL/ECIL engineer using Mobile App
Randomizations – SoPs
 Randomizations in EMS only

 First Randomization
o After FLC at DEO Level

o In presence of political parties

o To allocate AC-wise

 Second Randomization
o Before commissioning/preparation at RO Level

o In presence of candidates/their agents

o To allocate PS-wise
Commissioning/Preparation – SoPs
 In presence of candidates/their representatives
 Arrangements at Commissioning Hall and Premises including Storage facility of SLU in a separate room
 Under videography
 Work Done
o VVPAT: Symbol Loading with SLU (TV/Monitor for simultaneous viewing by candidates or their
representatives/Power Pack/Paper Roll/Sealing of Paper Roll Compartment
o Ballot Unit: Ballot Paper/Thumb-wheel setting/Masking/Sealing with Pink Paper Seal and Address
Tags
o Control Unit: Candidate Setting/sealing of Candidate Set and Power Pack Sections with Address Tags
 1 vote to each candidate button
 1000 votes in randomly selected 5% EVMs and VVPATs and verification
 Replacement of particular BU, CU and VVPAT in case of non-functional
 Disposal of VVPAT slips generated during commissioning on daily basis
Dispersal Day – SoPs
 In presence of candidates/their representatives
 Checking of seals, buttons, switch, ballot etc to ensure correctness and
pertaining to particular PS
 Not to test VVPAT
 Replacement of particular BU, CU and VVPAT in case of non-functional
Poll Day– SoPs
 Start of Mock Poll before 90 minutes

 Atleast 50 votes and 1 vote to each candidate/NOTA

 Sealing of CU and VVPAT after mock poll

 Pressing of CLOSE BUTTON after completion of Poll

 Sealing of BU/CU/VVPAT in respective carrying case

 Replacement Protocol

o Respective Unit during Mock Poll

o Entire Set (BU+CU+VVPAT) in case of Non-functional of BU or CU and VVPAT only in case of Non-

functional of VVPAT
Contd…
Poll Day – SoPs – contd.
 EVM management on Poll Day

o Category A: Polled Units (with PO)

o Category B: Polled Defective Units (with PO)

o Category C: Un-polled Defective Units (with SO)

o Category D: Reserved Units (with SO)

 Polled Strong Room: Category A and Category B (Collected at Collection Centre)

 Repair Strong Room: Category C (Collected at separate Collection Centre)

 Reserve Strong Room: Category D (Collected at separate Collection Centre)

 All movement of EVM vehicles to be GPS tracked

 Proper security with all category of units

Part – IV
Counting Arrangements & Instructions
for Counting of Votes (EVM & VVPAT)
Part – A
Arrangement for counting of votes
Arrangements at Counting Hall
 Spacious halls for social distancing
EVMs – LAY OUT OF COUNTING HALL
Black
Board
 Adequate lighting with Generator backup
C.S
C.S
 Separate entry and exit
C.A

C.A
7 14
Agents of candidates

Agents of candidates

C.S C.S

7 Counting Tables in each Counting Hall (or as approved

C.A

C.A
6 13

C.S C.S

C.A
C.A

12

by the Commission)
5

C.S C.S
C.A

C.A
Counting

4 11

Counting
C.S C.S
 VCB in only 1 Counting Hall (RO present) per AC/AS
C.A

C.A

3 10


C.S C.S
C.A

C.A

2 9
Barricades using transparent material/wire-mesh
C.S C.S
C.A

C.A


1

Videography/CCTV of counting process in general

R.O for AC/
Candidates/ ARO for PC
Agents

Clerks to assist
 Large whiteboard having pre-written candidates
C.S=Counting Supervisor; C.A. = Counting Assistant

name/round numbers.
 Display of Counting of Votes poster (related to EVM and
VVPAT)
Counting Centre - infrastructure and security
arrangements
 Three tier cordoning security
o Outer cordon: by Local police
o Middle cordon: at the gate of counting premises by SAP
o Inner cordon: at door of Counting Hall by CAPF

 Smooth flow of EVMs/VVPATs from strong room to counting hall with CCTV coverage with
no blind spots and without crisscrossing paths with another strong room/counting hall.

 Opening of strong room in presence of candidates/their agents, RO and Observer under

videography
Media Centre
 Separate Room for Media Centre
 Appoint one senior officer from the Public Relation Department for Media Centre
 Allow media persons in small batches and for short duration only to visit Counting Hall
 Prohibition of mobile phone and other communication equipment by media person in
Counting Hall.
 Allow mobile phones or Communication equipment from Media Centre
Part – B
Counting of Postal Ballot (PB)
Counting of PBs - Provisions & guidelines
 Provide account of PB to contesting candidates on daily basis

 Provide latest account of PB to Observer on previous day of counting

 Provide latest account of PB to Observer on counting day also

 Take PB count first at 8.00 AM

 Not more than 500 PBs in one Table

 An ARO for each Table.

 Candidates are allowed to depute counting agents for each PB Table

NB: Where victory margin is less than the number of rejected PB as invalid, all the rejected PB shall be
mandatorily re-verified by RO and Observer before declaration of result under videography
Part – C
Counting of votes from EVMs
General guidelines:
• At 8.30 AM start counting of votes from EVMs
• Examination of seals of CU and Form 17 C to ensure CU was actually used at that particular
polling station and shown to candidates/counting agents
• Note down result displayed on CU in Part-II of FORM-17C carefully and ensure signing by
Counting Agents and Counting Supervisors
• Photocopy of round-wise tabulation signed by RO and Observer to be provided to
candidates/their agents
• RO shall be responsible for any inaccuracy/discrepancy in Form 20.
• EVM counting go on irrespective of the stage of Postal Ballot counting.
• Once EVM counting is completed, VVPAT slips counting start as per prescribed procedure
EVM Counting – challenges and proposed action
Challenges in EVM Counts Proposed Action

•Serial number of seals mentioned in Form 17C does not match • Match with records.
• Unique ID of CU mentioned in Form 17C does not match • Explain to Candidates/ Counting agents.
• Seal of the CU or its carrying case is damaged/broken • Proceed counting

•Low Power or No Power in the CU thereby non retrieval of polled data • Install new Power Pack
• No display or Partial display (segment issue) in CU • If no display, set aside CU.
• Count VVPAT slips after completion of all CUs count

Non-closure of CLOSE button by PO on poll day • Press Total button of CU to check polled votes with Form 17C
• If match, press CLOSE button and the RESULT button to obtain
result.
• If not match, set aside CU.

•Non-compliance of mock poll procedure cases • No counting of votes from CU/VVPAT, if margin is more.
• Total votes polled in CU do not match with total polled votes entered • Count VVPAT slips, if margin is less
in Form-17C
Part – D
Encore Counting Application
Infrastructure requirement
 Dedicated Computer, Printer, Scanner

 Redundant IT system for each RO.

 Dedicated 8MBPS leased line for counting centre with fixed IP address for each computer.

 Backup 8MBPS leased line with Internet connectivity from diff. service provider.

 Generator Power Backup

 Online UPS with sufficient backup and surge protection

 Disabling all USB ports and drives except Printers

 Installation of Updated antivirus with current definition

 Microsoft Office licensed version and patched up

 DIO to be responsible for network architecture and operations

Process - A day before counting day
Step 3
Step 1 Step 2
Table
Round Set up Account set up
Assignment

Rounds = Total Polling Create additional RO- Assign tables to users for
Stations/ Total Tables Computer Assistant for data entry of EVM votes
setup in counting centre data entry of votes

Activate account and set

password and PIN

115
Process - on counting day

Step 1
Table wise EVM Votes Step 2
entry for each Round Round Declaration Step 3
Table 1 Postal Ballot Votes Step 4
Table 2 Round 1
entry Results Declaration
. Round 2 Enter Postal Ballot Votes
. . & Finalise
Finalise EVM votes and
.
. Postal Votes entry &
.
. Declare Results after
.
. verification of complete
.
data
. .
Table N Round N
Part – E
Counting of VVPAT Slips
Arrangements for counting of VVPAT Paper Slips
 One of the Counting Tables inside the Counting Hall (RO Hall) shall be earmarked by the
Returning Officer as VVPAT Counting Booth (VCB) for Counting of VVPAT Paper Slips.
 Dimension of VCB: 6ft x 6ft x 8ft
 VCB shall be enclosed in a wire-mesh just like a Bank Cashier Cabin, so that no VVPAT paper
slip can be accessed by any un authorised person.
 Installation of CCTV at ceiling
VVPAT Counting Booth (VCB)

PIGEON HOLE

CONTAINER
Sequence of VVPAT Paper Slips counting
 Counting of VVPAT slips of polling station (s) due to non-display of result on CU.

 Counting of VVPAT slips of polling station (s) due to non-compliance of mock poll or Form 17 C
mismatch [VVPAT slips count is NOT required, if winning margin is more than the total votes
in that particular polling station(s)]

 Counting of VVPAT slips under R 56D COER1961

 Mandatory verification of VVAPT slips of randomly selected 05 PS per AC/each AS of PC.

NB: In case more than 1 VVPAT used in a PS, both will come in VCB, but counting of slips shall
be done one by one.
Application for VVPAT Paper Slips counting
 After announcement of result sheet entries, any candidate, their election agent or their counting agents may apply
in writing (Under R 56 COER 1961) to the RO to count the printed VVPAT paper slips in any or all polling stations.

 If such application is made, the RO shall pass a speaking order on whether the VVPAT paper slips should be counted.

 If the RO decides to allow the counting of the VVPAT paper slips of any or all polling stations, such decision of the RO
must be recorded in writing along with the reasons thereof. The RO shall give due consideration to the following:

1. Whether the total number of votes polled in that polling station is greater or lesser than the margin of votes
between winning candidate and candidate making the application

2. Whether EVM had a problem and was replaced at that polling station during poll

3. Whether there was any complaint about VVPAT not printing or complaints by any voter under R 49MA COER
1961 in that polling station during the poll.
Mandatory verification of VVPAT Paper Slips
 Mandatory verification of VVPAT paper slips of randomly selected 05 (five) polling station
shall be conducted in all General and Bye Elections to the LS and LA, in addition to the
provisions of R 56D COER 1961, after the completion of the last round of counting of votes
recorded in the EVMs, as under:

 In case of General and Bye elections to LA, verification of VVPAT paper slips of randomly
selected 05 (five) PS per AC.

 In case of General and Bye elections to the LS, verification of VVPAT paper slips of randomly
selected 05 (five) polling stations of each Assembly Segment of the PC concerned.
Random selection of PS for paper counts
 Written intimation regarding draw of lots by RO to Candidates/Election agents well in advance
 Draw of lots must be conducted after completion of CU counts
 Procedure for the conduct of draw of lots:
o White colour paper cards of postcard shall be used for conducting the draw of lots
o Total number of such paper cards should be equal to total number of polling stations in the AC/AS
o The paper cards shall have pre-printed AC/AS number, AC/AS name and date of poll on the top, and the
polling station number in the centre. Each digit of the polling station number shall be atleast 1”x1” (1 inch by
1 inch) size and printed in black.
o The paper cards to be used for draw of lots should be four folded in such a way that polling station number is
not visible.
o Each paper cards shall be shown to the candidates/their agents before folding and dropping in the container.
o The paper cards shall be shown in the big container and must be shaken before picking up 01 (one) slip by
the Returning Officer. Contd…
Random selection of PS for paper counts – contd.
Random selection of PS for paper counts – contd.
Random selection of PS for paper counts – contd.
Random selection of PS for paper counts – contd.
Random selection of PS for paper counts – contd.
Random selection of PS for paper counts – contd.
Random selection of PS for paper counts – contd.
Sealing of EVMs after counting of votes
• Keep all Control Units, after removing power packs from CUs, whether result has been retrieved from it or not back

inside its carrying case and seal the carrying cases once again.

• Removal of VVPAT slips from VVPATs–

o After the result is announced, the VVPAT paper slips will be taken out of the VVPAT printer unit, irrespective of whether the slips

were counted or not and kept in a paper envelope made of thick black paper polling station wise; it shall be sealed using red wax

with the bilingual secret seal of the Commission provided to the Returning Officer.
o If more than one VVPAT was used in a particular polling station, the VVPAT slips taken out from each VVPAT slips should be kept in

the separate envelope.

o All the envelopes of a particular AC/AS must be kept in a separate big trunk.
o The said trunk shall be kept with all the statutory documents relating to that election.

• STORAGE of EVMs & VVPATs after counting of votes: After completing counting of votes, keep the EVMs and printed

paper slips of VVPATs in the strong rooms. Do not open the Strong room till the completion of Election Petition (EP)

period i.e. till EP list is received from respective High Court.

Part – V
Debate around EVMs – explanations
and clarifications
Doubts created around EVM
1. Hacked EVM
2. Vote Stuffing after Poll Closure
3. Remotely Altered Control Unit Display
4. Defective Vs Tampered
5. Memory Manipulation
6. Replaced Microcontroller or Memory chips
7. Altered software code

Contd…
EVM Hacking
 ‘Hacking’ is unauthorised access to or control over computer network security systems for
some illicit purpose.
 In the case of ECI EVMs, the word ‘Hacking’ is not applicable for following reasons:
o The EVM is a stand-alone machine and is not connected to any network through wire or
wirelessly.
o The software programme in the OTP Microcontroller can neither be read nor modified.
Remotely altering display through wireless
communication
 It is alleged this can be done by either replacing the original display module with another
display fitted with a wireless device or inserting an extra circuit board which can communicate
with an external unit via a wireless device and tamper the result by controlling the CU display
used for declaring the result.
 Such a modification would require unfettered access to the EVM after FLC – Ruled out.
 In M3 EVMs the display is mounted in the UADM. Any attempt to open the UADM will send
the EVM into Factory Mode- Ruled out.
Memory manipulation
It is alleged that voting data can be altered by clipping a Memory Manipulator IC to
the memory chip where Vote data is stored. This would need-
• Full and free access to CUs after the Polling is over- Ruled Out
• Breaking the seals and locks of the strong room in the presence of two layers of
security plus the representatives of the candidates camping near the strong
room- Ruled Out
• The memory is inside the microcontroller which itself is inside the UADM- Ruled
Out
Replacement of microcontroller/memory chip or motherboard
Administrative Safeguards

• Chip replacement would require access to EVM Warehouses – Ruled Out.

• Any chip replacement before FLC will get caught during FLC.

• Chip Replacement after FLC would require access to Strong Rooms and breaking of EVM Pink Paper seals–
Ruled Out.

• Microcontroller is inside the UADM and cannot be accessed without putting the EVM in Factory Mode- Ruled
Out.
Technical Security
• BUs and CUs communicate only amongst themselves after mutual authentication and cannot be connected to
any other machine. Thus, any modified EVM (with microcontroller /memory changed) would not be usable
even if someone is able to hypothetically bypass security arrangements and modify EVM.
Tampered source code ‘Trojan’
 It is alleged that Trojan can be introduced in the following manner-

o by reprogramming the chip, or

o by the chip manufacturer during fusing of the software.

 Re-programming Ruled Out as these are OTP chips.
 Code tampering by the chip manufacturer Ruled Out as the software is ported by BEL/ECIL
in their factories in the highest security environment.
Vote stuffing after poll closure
Administrative safeguards
• Poll closed by pressing the “CLOSE” button on the CU after last vote, Representatives of
candidates who are present signs on the seals.
• EVM seals checked on counting day.
What if seals broken and votes stuffed while transporting?
• EVM does not accept any votes after CLOSE button pressed in CU.
What if CLOSE button not properly pressed and Votes Stuffed while transporting?
• Poll Closure time recorded in the PO’s diary and any votes polled in the EVM after this time
can be identified due to time stamping of key presses.
Defective/non-functioning/malfunctioning EVM vs
manipulation/tampering of EVM
Defective/Non-functional/malfunctional Manipulation/Tampering
 An EVM can be said defective/non-functional, if they An EVM can be said manipulated/Tampered, if someone has
do not work due to any mechanical/electronic fault. made unauthorised alteration to interfere in its working. The
 Malfunctioning machine is one which would randomly same is ruled out due to technical security implemented in EVM
behave erroneously, but without a predefined biased and administrative safeguards prescribed by ECI.
manner.
Dictionary meaning- ‘Failing to work or function properly’.
Dictionary Meaning- ‘to interfere in an illegal & disruptive manner
or to make alterations or adjustments, especially secretly so as to
subvert an intended purpose or function.
EVMs, like any other machines can become non A tampered EVM must behave in a pre-defined and biased
functional. Such defects get detected during the 3 mock manner to favour a particular candidate and this partisan
polls and are replaced. behaviour of the machine must be replicable/demonstrable.
All such defective EVMs are promptly removed from the No evidence of any incident of any EVM Tampering, ever has been
election process and replaced with a full functional EVM. produced.

NB 1: While 1-2% EVMs may become Defective/Non-functional (and are replaced with good
EVMs), no case of Malfunctioning EVM (i.e. one recording wrong vote) ever reported.
NB 2: Question of Tampering absolutely ruled out due to several layers of technical and
administrative safeguards.
Defective EVM Protocol
Defective EVMs
EVMs that fail to function due to any mechanical, structural or physical defect like faulty
switches, broken button, faulty connections etc.
However, these NEVER record Wrong Vote.

• EVMs are checked for defects 3 times - during FLC, candidate setting, before start of poll.

• Serial Numbers and defects of these EVMs are noted and EVMs are sent to the manufacturers
for analysis and repair.

• Manufacturers follow same security protocols during repair as they do for manufacturing new
EVMs.
EVM Challenge 2009
• Commission organized an EVM Challenge during 3rd – 8th August 2009.

• Political Parties, Petitioners before various Courts and some individuals, who had alleged
tamperability of ECI-EVM, invited to participate in the Challenge.

• 100 EVMs brought from 10 States were offered for demonstration of alleged tamperability in
presence of technical expert group, representative of manufacturers and ECI Officers.

• None of the persons could actually demonstrate any tamperability of the ECI-EVM.
EVM Challenge 2017
• Commission organized an EVM Challenge on 3rd June 2017.
• All National and State Political Parties invited to participate in the Challenge.
• Parties allowed to pick EVMs of their choice from the 5 poll-gone States (UP, Punjab, UK, Goa,
Manipur), which were securely held in the Strong rooms under 24*7 armed security.
• Parties given opportunity to demonstrate EVM manipulation/tampering in the votes recorded
in the EVMs of their choice, as variously alleged earlier.
• NO Political Party participated in the Challenge.
• Only 2 parties i.e. NCP & CPI-M reported to venue, ONLY TO UNDERSTAND THE EVM PROCESS
BETTER and were given detailed briefing.
• The credibility and integrity of ECI-EVMs has always remained perfectly intact and unscathed.
Various forms of Electronic Voting in other countries
 Electronic Voting (Fully /Partially)
19 Countries using electronic voting in some form through EVMs (Direct Recording Machines),
some with Paper Trail -
India, USA, Canada, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, Switzerland, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Peru,
Venezuela, Armenia, Namibia, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh.
 Electronic Counting
13 Countries are using e-technology for counting of votes -
Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Belgium, Australia,
South Korea, Philippines, Mongolia, Bhutan, Namibia.

Contd…
Various forms of Electronic Voting in other countries –
contd.
Other countries using EVMs (DRMs):
 USA, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, Switzerland, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Peru, Venezuela, Namibia, Nepal, Bhutan, Armenia, Bangladesh.
 Currently, in the USA, the Direct Recording Machines (DRMs) are used in 27 states, among
which paper audit trails are used in 15 states.
 The other voting methods include: Optical Scan Paper Ballot Systems, Ballot Marking Devices,
and the Punch Card Ballot.

Contd…
Various forms of Electronic Voting in other countries –
comparative with ECI EVMs – Contd.
ECI EVM Foreign EVM

Standalone Mostly networked

Manufactured in Premium PSUs Manufactured entirely by private entities

Verified and certified by an independent Technical No such robust and independent certification/ checks
Experts Committee

Data is stored internally and not transferrable by any Voting data recorded in the DRM is transferred by
device means of CD, etc

Full end to end security protocol and administrative No such protocols, e.g. in Ireland
safeguards for the use, storage, transportation and
tracking

Administrative and physical security as per legal No such legal framework, e.g. in the Netherlands
framework across the country.

Voter verifiability and auditability of every vote cast Lack of such facility in the NEDAP machines- un-
Why Going Back to Ballot not a Solution
1. Average around 2000 invalid votes in each Constituency when ballots used.

2. Vote stuffing was very easy with Ballot papers. EVMs designed to allow only 4 votes per
minute ruling out vote stuffing.

3. Counting of Ballot Papers was always prone to manual errors. EVM counting both quick and
accurate.

4. Retrograde step in the era of Technology when even financial transactions done electronically.

5. Ballot papers are made of wood pulp and hence made at a cost to environment.

6. India is the largest democracy in the world with about 93.7 crore registered voters unmatched
in scale and complexity.
Contd…
Why Going Back to Ballot not a Solution – contd.
7. There is a clear need to leverage on technology to make the voting process more efficient and
accurate compared to the manual ballots.

8. Since the introduction of VVPATs, more than 113 crore voters have cast their votes with full
satisfaction & ONLY 25 (twenty-five) complaints received u/r 49MA, which were all FOUND TO
BE FALSE.

9. Till date, in 61 (Sixty-one) instances RO has allowed slip counting since 2017. All counts
matched.

10.In Mandatory Verification of VVPAT slips count no case of a vote cast for Candidate ‘A’ getting
transferred to candidate ‘B’.
Part – VI
EVM & VVPAT - Don’ts
 DON’Ts - General
1 Don’t allow the units to be handled by any unauthorised personnel/staff
2 Don’t move/keep/store EVM/VVPAT in any unauthorised place.
3 Don’t’ shift any EVM/VVPAT without making entry in EMS.
4 Don’t leave any EVMs &VVPAT without 24X7 security.
5 Don’t damage any seal of the BU, CU & VVPAT.
6 Don’t burn any VVPAT slips.
7 Don’t’ leave VVPAT Paper Lock in vertical position during transportation.
8 Don’t position the EVM & VVPAT near an open window or any direct light/high- illumination source in the polling Station.

9 Don’t forget to put paper lock position in vertical position before switching ON the CU.
11 Don’t move/shift the units anywhere during the period from - Commissioning to the Counting Day - except EVMs & VVPAT required
for use in poll.
12 Don’t switch ON CU before VVPAT paper roll knob is in unlocked condition (vertical position).
13 Don’t remove cables without pressing the clips on the connectors.
14 Don’t insert cables by pressing the clips on the connectors.
15 Don’t switch OFF CU unless all 7 slips are printed and cut.
16 Don’t connect or disconnect EVM and VVPAT cables when CU switch is ON.
17 Don’t switch ON/OFF CU repeatedly.
18 Don’t leave EVMs and VVPATs unattended.
DON’Ts - During storage of EVMs and VVPATs
1 Don’t open and close EVM warehouse without intimation and participation of the representatives of National and State Recognised
Political Parties
2 Don’t keep other material whether election related or not (except the documents/materials prescribed by the Commission)
with EVM and VVPAT.
3 Don’t forget to install fire extinguisher at FLC centre, Warehouse, Strong room.
4 Don’t store EVM and VVPAT at any place below the Tehsil Headquarters-level
5 Don’t keep various models of EVM and VVPAT at same room/hall of the warehouse
6 Don’t keep/mix EVM and VVPAT of other election management bodies(viz. State Election Commission etc.) with ECI EVM and VVPAT
7 Don’t forget to disconnect electricity inside room/hall having EVM/VVPAT
8 Don’t forget to seal all other doors/windows (except entry/exit door) using brick-
masonry or concrete
9 Don’t make EVMs & VVPAT warehouse in the Educational Institute.
10 Don’t open the strong room/warehouse having EVM and VVPAT pertaining to Election Petition for any purpose without approval of
the Court concerned
11 Don’t forget videography of opening and closing of warehouse/strong room
12 Don’t forget to maintain Log Book for each entry and exit.
13 Don’t forget to maintain Duty Roster of security personnel.
DON’Ts - Transportation
1 Don’t transport EVM and VVPAT without GPS/Mobile app-based tracking.

2 Don’t transport EVM and VVPAT in un-containerized vehicles

3 Don’t transport EVM and VVPAT without armed security

4 Don’t transport VVPAT in unlock position of the paper roll knob (vertical position)

5 Don’t forget to invite the representatives of National and State Recognised Political Parties while sending or
receiving EVMs and VVPATs from warehouse/ strong room.
6 Don’t forget to coordinate with the DEOs concerned in case of Factory to State, State to Factory, Inter-State and
Intra-State transportation of EVMs and VVPATs.
DON’Ts - First Level Checking (FLC)
1 Don’t allow to take any electronic device inside FLC Hall except those items permitted by ECI.
2 Don’t forget to install Door Frame Metal Detector (DFMD) at FLC centre.
3 Don’t allow any person inside the FLC hall without proper frisking.
4 Don’t forget to dispatch the FLC rejected Units to the factory for repairs after completion of FLC.
5 Don’t forget to mark FLC OK, FLC rejected unit in EMS on a daily basis.
6 Don’t’ forget to conduct mock poll in 5% randomly selected EVMs & VVPATs(1200 votes in 1% EVMs, 1000 votes in
2% EVMs and 500 votes in 2% EVMs)
7 Don’t forget to paste pink paper seal on CU
8 Don’t use real election symbol during FLC and Training & Awareness
9 Don’t leave VVPATs slips generated during FLC / T&A without shredding on daily basis.
10 Don’t forget to install fire extinguisher at FLC centre, Warehouse, Strong room.
11 Don’t forget to intimate in writing FLC schedule to National and State Recognised
Political parties at District Headquarters as well as State Headquarters
DON’Ts - First Level Checking (FLC) – contd.
12 Don’t appoint FLC Supervisor below the rank of Deputy Election Officer
13 Don’t forget to submit FLC Preparedness Certificate before starting FLC
14 Don’t allow other equipment inside the FLC hall except those mentioned in FLC
SoP
15 Don’t forget to barricade and sanitize FLC area by police.
16 Don’t allow entry to FLC hall without production of Identity Card issued by the DEO.
17 Don’t forget to frisking of every person/officer/engineer at every entry and exit.
18 Don’t forget to install TV/Monitor display with HDMI input for each SLU under use in FLC hall.
19 Don’t forget to paste FLC SoP in FLC Hall.
20 Don’t allow any person/official except authorized staff and engineers of Bharat Electronics Limited and Electronics
Corporation of India Limited, as the case may
be, to conduct FLC
21 Don’t keep FLC OK and FLC Reject EVM and VVPAT in the same strong room
22 Don’t forget to share list of FLC OK units to National and State Recognised Political Parties after completion of FLC
with proper acknowledgment
DON’Ts – Training and Awareness
1 Don’t forget to mark those EVM and VVPAT in EMS as ‘Training/Awareness’
2 Don’t forget to paste a yellow colour sticker mentioning Training /Awareness on T&A EVMs.
3 Don’t take out T&A EVMs more than 10% of total number of PS in the district.
4 Don’t use units without FLC OK sticker for T&A.
5 Don’t use real election symbol during training, Awareness, FLC of EVMs & VVPATs.
6 Don’t forget to share list of EVM and VVPAT taken out for T&A to National and
State Recognised Political Parties after completion of FLC with proper
acknowledgment
7 Don’t keep T&A units in FLC Strong Room or vicinity of FLC OK Strong Room.
Keep them in separate designated warehouse/nearby training areas.
8 Don’t forget to share the information of the designated warehouse to keep T&A EVMs and VVPATs
9 Don’t forget to destroy VVPAT slips generated during Training and Awareness on daily basis
10 Don’t operate EVM Demonstration Centre(s) set up at DEO, RO Headquarters/ Revenue Sub-Division Offices after
announcement of election by the ECI.
11 Don’t forget to re-introduce T&A EVMs and VVPATs as Poll Day Reserve after de-novo FLC, randomizations,
candidate setting etc.
DON’Ts - Randomizations
1 Don’t forget to intimate in writing 1st Randomization schedule to National and State Recognised Political parties
with proper acknowledgment
2 Don’t allocate EVM and VVPAT AC-wise uneven during 1st Randomization
3 Don’t allocate Ballot Units more than Control Units during 1st Randomization
4 Don’t forget to receipt EVM and VVPAT AC-wise by scanning after 1stRandomization
5 Don’t forget to share list of 1st Randomized EVM and VVPAT (AC-wise) to National and State Recognised Political
Parties with proper acknowledgment
6 Don’t forget to intimate in writing 2ndRandomization schedule to all the contesting candidates/their agents with
proper acknowledgment
7 Don’t forget to share list of 1st Randomized EVM and VVPAT (AC-wise) to the respective contesting candidates/their
agents with proper acknowledgment
8 Don’t miss out to update polling stations before 2nd Randomization
9 Don’t forget to share list of 2nd Randomized EVM and VVPAT to all the contesting candidates/their agents with
proper acknowledgment
DON’Ts - During Commissioning
1 Don’t forget to intimate in writing schedule of Commissioning of EVMs and VVPATs to all the contesting
candidates/their agents with proper acknowledgment
2 Don’t leave VVPATs slips generated during commissioning without shredding on a daily basis.
3 Don’t forget to check correct loading of Serial Numbers, Names of Candidate and their Symbols in VVPATs
4 Don’t forget to conduct mock poll of 1000 votes on 5% randomly selected EVMs as well as VVPAT during
commissioning.
5 Don’t keep VVPAT knob in Working mode (Vertical position) after commissioning
6 Don’t set candidates in CU without connecting BU(s) and VVPAT.
7 Don’t forget to share lists of EVMs and VVPATs to be used in polling stations (polling station-wise) and reserve EVMs
and VVPATs
DON’Ts - During dispersal to polling stations
1 Don’t forget to ensure EVM/VVPAT is related to the particular polling station for which it has been allotted.
2 Don’t take away any EVM & VVPAT to any unauthorised place like residence, etc.
3 Don’t repeatedly switch ON and OFF the VVPAT as it will deplete the battery as well as paper roll causing problems
during the poll day.
4 Don’t forget to switch OFF the CU while connecting or disconnecting the EVM units and VVPAT using cables
5 Don’t pull the cable of BU & VVPAT while disconnecting from the CU.
6 Don’t forget to earmark a government building as the cluster point for polling parties and for EVMs/VVPATs
dispatch to polling stations on P-2/3. Don’t use Police stations for such cluster points.
7 Don’t switch on the VVPAT at the time of dispersal.
8 Don’t connect Ballot Unit, Control Unit and VVPAT during dispersal
9 Don’t keep VVPAT knob vertical (Working mode) while transporting.
10 Don’t stay at any place other than designated place.
11 Don’t remove any seal from BU, CU and VVPAT.
12 Don’t use vehicle other than vehicle provided for dispersal.
DON’Ts - During Mock Poll
1 Don’t start mock poll, if no or one election agent is present. Wait for 15 minutes.
2 Don’t stop mock poll without casting at least 50 votes.
3 Don’t keep BU, CU and VVPAT on one table for mock poll. (Keep BU & VVPAT at voting compartment)
4 Don’t forget to cast at least one vote to each candidate button including NOTA during mock poll
5 Don’t leave any mock poll slips inside the VVPAT slips compartment after completion of mock poll on poll day.
6 Don’t forget to delete mock poll data from the CU before starting of actual poll.
7 Don’t keep mock poll VVPAT slips unstamped in black envelop.
8 Don’t forget to tally EVM count with VVPAT slips count during mock poll.
9 Don’t forget to fill Mock Poll Certificate (Part-I of Presiding Officer Report)
10 Don’t start actual poll without sealing Result Section of CU and Drop Box of VVPAT and taking signatures of polling
agents.
DON’Ts - During poll
1 Don’t operate the paper roll knob till the end of the poll.
2 Don’t forget pressing of close button of CU after completion of poll.
3 Don’t conduct mock poll in case of replacement of only VVPAT during the actual poll.
4 Don’t hang any high illumination bulb over VVPAT at Voting Compartment
5 Don’t Switch ON the Control Unit at the time of connection and disconnection of Ballot Unit, Control Unit and
VVPAT
6 Don’t Switch ON Control Unit when VVPAT paper roll knob is in lock position (horizontal position)
7 Don’t forget to tape the interconnecting cable of BU/VVPAT to the leg of then table with ‘transparent’ adhesive
tape.
8 Don’t forget to press both side latches of connector while disconnecting the cable
9 Don’t forget to clear mock poll data from the Control Unit and VVPAT mock slips from VVPAT in mock poll process
10 Don’t enter into the voting compartment to educate illiterate how to cast vote. Use cardboard BU for this
purpose.
11 Don’t Switch OFF/Switch ON EVM during poll process
12 Don’t forget to remove VVPAT Power Pack (Battery) from VVPAT before sealing of VVPAT in its carrying case after
completion of poll
DON’Ts - After poll
1 Don’t keep polled units and reserve units in the same strong room
2 Don’t transport EVM and VVPAT in unauthorized vehicle (not notified for transport of EVM and VVPAT)
3 Don’t store the “C” & “D” category of EVMs in the vicinity of “A” & “B”category of EVMs & VVPATs.
4 Don’t’ leave the VVPAT battery inside the VVPAT after completion of poll.
5 Don’t forget to intimate all the contesting candidates about the storage place of category A, B, C and D.
6 Don’t keep polled units of two or more Assembly Constituency/Segment in thesame strong room, after poll
7 Don’t transport EVMs and VVPATs without escort after poll from polling stations to collection centre.
DON’T’s – During counting, after counting and for
pending EP EVMs and VVPATs
DURING COUNTING
1 Don’t obtain result from CUs without verifying seals.
2 Don’t forget to write in pen, in space between counting supervisor’s signature and signature of candidate/their
agents/counting agents in Part-II for Form-17C “We, hereby certify that CU No.(s)…………is/are the same which
were used in the Polling Station No…………..”.
AFTER COUNTING
1 Don’t leave CU batteries inside CUs before storing them in the strong room after counting of votes.
2 Don’t forget to remove VVPAT slips from all VVPATs after counting of votes before storing VVPAT in warehouse.
3 Don’t open the strong room till the completion of EP period i.e. till EP list is received from respective High Court.
4 Don’t store 2 or more than 2 ACs machines in same strong room after completion
of poll and counting of votes till the completion of EP period.
FOR PENDING EP EVMs and VVPATs
1 Don’t open the strong room where EP related EVMs are stored, without permission of the Court, except in
exceptional cases like flood, fire, etc.