Unit 4

Prakriti Malla
 Law of Domicile
• The 19th century witnessed an important legal development; in common law countries,
the personal law tended to become that of domicile, while, in continental/civil law
countries, the personal law tended to be that of nationality.
• While some systems of conflict law rely heavily on nationality, the problems with it are
obvious; there are persons of dual nationality and those who are stateless. Any attempt
to apply the national law to a person from a federal or composite State requires
localising rules to identify the smaller unit and, thus, to a considerable extent
undermines the test.
• Although the problems of using the lex patriae, the law of the nationality, in a unitary
State such as Italy are much reduced,5 there remains the major difficulty, that whatever
organic relationship is perceived between the citizen and the State as to which historical
and cultural matters play a significant part, it by no means follows that the law of the
nationality reflects the society in which the particular individual lives. People who settle
abroad often do not change their nationalities, with the consequence that the
application of the lex patriae may well result in determining their legal status by a law
which they have had no connection for many years – if at all.
• Originally, it would seem that English law considered domicile to be a concept that
indicated a permanent home but, as the century progressed the rules as to the
acquisition and loss of domicile became increasingly complex and artificial.
 Meaning of Domicile
• ‘By domicile we mean home, the permanent home,’ observed Lord
Cranworth in Whicker v Hume.
The principle that domicile was a legal concept distinct from nationality or residence was
established by the middle of the 19th century in Udny v Udny (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 441, where
Lord Westbury discusses the distinction and draws upon the work of Joseph Story.
That developed from the middle of the 19th century now permits five propositions to be stated
with some degree of confidence. These are:
(a) no person can be without a domicile;
(b) a person cannot at the same time have more than one domicile (at least, no more than one
for the same purpose);
(c) an existing domicile is presumed to continue until it is proved that a new domicile has been
acquired;
(d) the question of where a person is domiciled is determined solely in accordance with English
law;and
(e) the relevant standard of proof is the civil standard of proof.
There are, thus, two requirements – the fact of residence (factum) and the intention to reside
(animus).
 Why English Law suggest Domicile as
connecting factor instead of Nationality
• No person can be without a domicile. A domicile is ascribed to a
person by law as his domicile of origin or of dependence. As will be
seen, he will keep such a domicile unless and until he acquires
another by choice, and if he abandons a domicile of choice his
domicile of origin will revive and be his domicile unless and until he
acquires another domicile of choice. This inability of anyone to be
without a domicile is a feature of the English law which makes
domicile preferable as a connecting factor for determining the
personal law to any other, since a person can be without a
residence, a home or a nationality.
• no one can have more than one domicile for any one purpose at
the same time; he can, however, have more than one residence,
home or nationality.
 Types of Domicile
• (a) domicile of origin, which is the domicile
attributed at the time of birth;
• (b) domicile of choice, which is the domicile a
competent person may acquire during his
lifetime; and
• (c) a domicile of dependency, which means that
the domicile of the
dependent person is dependent on the conduct
of another.
 Domicile of Origin
• A person’s domicile of origin depends on the
domicile of one of his
parents at the time of his birth, not on where he was
born, nor on his parents’ residence at that time.
• In Udny v. Udny,6 for example, Colonel Udny was
born and then lived in Tuscany, where his father
resided as British consul. But his father was
domiciled in Scotland, so the Colonel’s own
domicile of origin was Scotland.
 The rules for the ascertainment of the
domicile of origin are
(i) a legitimate child takes his father’s domicile
(ii) an illegitimate child and a posthumous child, that is a legitimate child born
after his father’s death, both take his mother’s domicile, and
(iii) a foundling or one whose parents’ domicile is unknown is domiciled in the
place where he is found or born.

A minor’s domicile may change after his birth, but any new domicile he acquires
based on the change of his parents domicile is a domicile of dependence and
not of origin (except where he is adopted);

(iv) In case of adopted child, the domicile of origin can be changed after the child’s
• birth. By statute, an adopted child becomes thenceforth for all legal purposes
the child of his adoptive parents, so he takes their domicile as his domicile of
origin.
 Domicile of dependence
• Married women
• Until 1 January 1974, as a matter of law, a married woman
automatically possessed the domicile of her husband even if
he and she lived apart and even though they were judicially
separated.
• Only if their marriage was void or after it had been annulled or
dissolved or after her husband’s death could she have her own
domicile, separate from his.
• However, by the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act
1973, from and after 1 January 1974, the domicile of a married
woman is ascertained in the same way as is that of an adult
male.
• A married woman now has the capacity to acquire a
domicile of choice. For instance, if we analyse the legal
position in Nepal as revealed through the Sabina Pandey
case, the court took the position that the wife’s domicile
was not dependent on that of her husband. Th e court used
Sabina Pandey ’ s residence and intention to assess her
domicile independently of her husband ’ s domicile. It held
that, although the husband Puskar Raj Pandey may be
considered to have a domicile in the US, since Sabina
Pandey ’ s actual residence and intention to reside in the US
had not been proven, Sabina Pandey could not be said to be
domiciled in the US.
• Article 82 of the Afghan Civil Procedure Code states: ‘ If
the defendant is a married woman, the hearing of the case
shall be within the jurisdiction of the court located in the
place of residence of the husband. ’ 38 Article 83 states:

• If the defendant is an unmarried woman and has attained

the age of marriage (age of majority) or who possesses
the full legal capacity, the court which is located in the
place of residence of her father or her close relatives i.e.
whoever is responsible for her feeding and upbringing
shall have jurisdiction to hear the claim.
• Similarly, section 15 of the Indian Succession Act
specifically discusses the mode of acquisition of a
new domicile by a woman on her marriage. It
provides that by marriage a woman acquires the
domicile of her husband if she had not the same
domicile before. Section 16 is an explanation to
section 15 and provides that a wife ’ s domicile
during her marriage follows the domicile of her
husband. However, an exception to section 16
stipulates that the wife ’ s domicile no longer
follows that of her husband if the sentence of a
competent court separates them or if the husband
is undergoing a sentence of transportation.
• In State of Bihar v Kumar Amar Singh , the
court held that the domicile of the wife
remained in India, even though she had
migrated to Pakistan, because her husband
remained in India. In Kashiba Bin Narsapa v
Shripat Narhiv , the Bombay High Court held
that the domicile of a widow remained that of
her husband, unless she acquired a domicile
of choice.
 Minors
• Unless minor attained age of 16 and opt for the domicile of his choice,
the domicile of dependence of a legitimate minor is, with the, that of
his father, and changes automatically if his father changes his own
domicile. However, after his father’s death follow that of his mother.
But if his mother changes her domicile, the minor’s domicile does not
necessarily alter.
• in Re Beaumont, Mr and Mrs B were domiciled in Scotland. They had
several children all of whom had a Scottish domicile of origin and of
dependence. The father died and Mrs B then married N. They went to
live in England where they acquired a domicile. They took all the
children to live with them with the exception of Catherine, who was
left in Scotland with her aunt, with whom she had lived since her
father’s death. Catherine attained her majority and shortly thereafter
died in Scotland. The Court of Appeal held that Catherine died
domiciled in Scotland, since her mother had not exercised her power
to alter her domicile.
• Suppose X is born in France and illegitimate, when his
mother is domiciled in New Zealand. If his mother
acquires a domicile in England leaving X in France,
then, if his domicile does not automatically change, X
will remain domiciled in New Zealand, a country in
which he has never set foot, until he is sixteen at least.
This does not look very sensible.
• Re Beaumont does not seem a very satisfactory
decision nowadays, when men and women are equal in
law (although it had good reasons behind it when it
was decided).
• the domicile of a minor whose parents had been divorced
before 1 January 1974 or after that date were separated, and
lived in different countries and acquired separate domiciles,
and who lived exclusively with the mother. The Domicile and
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 provides that where the
parents of a child, including an adopted child under sixteen,
are alive but live apart, the child’s domicile of dependence is
that of his father. But if he has a home with his mother and
none with his father, his domicile is that of his mother. Once
he acquires his mother’s domicile under this provision he
retains it until he is sixteen even if he ceases to have a home
with her, unless he has at any time a home with his father.
Mental patients
• It appears that the domicile of a mentally disordered person
cannot be changed by his own act since he is unable to form
the requisite intention, and thus he retains the domicile he
had when he became insane.
• There is authority for the proposition that if a person
becomes insane during his minority66 his domicile of
dependence can be changed by an alteration of the domicile
of the parent upon whom he is dependent, even if this takes
place after he attains majority, but that if he becomes insane
after he attains majority, his domicile cannot be changed for
him
 THE DOMICILE OF CHOICE
• Every person in the World who has attained the age of
majority over the and is not mentally incapable, is
regarded by English law as able to acquire a domicile of
choice by residing in a country with the present
intention of making it his permanent home.
• The two basic elements for obtaining a domicile of
choice are the fact of residence (corpus) and the
intention of remaining (animus manendi et
revertendi).Domicile of choice is acquired by free will
when one resides in a particular place with the
intention of making it a permanent home.
• Unlike the domicile of origin, which is ascribed by law, the domicile of choice
is a question of fact, not of law, and it requires the co-existence of residence
in a country and a bona fide intention to make a home in that country
permanently. An initial line of cases has given preference to the fact of stay
over the intention. However, later decisions have tilted more in favour of
assessing intention and have taken the position that, although length of
residence is essential, even a short stay at a place coupled with an intention
to make that place a permanent home may confer a domicile of choice.
• The chief problems in this area concern the definition of the requisite
intention and the proof of its existence in the particular case.
• Cheshire and North state that: ‘ [N]othing must be neglected that can
possibly indicate the bent of the residents mind. His aspirations, whims,
amours, prejudices, health, religion, financial expectations while determining
intention.
• In Re Furse an American, who owned a farm in England
where he lived and worked and had his family after 1923,
had considered returning to New York from time to time but
after the 1940s had abandoned searches for a house in the
United States. Thereafter he stayed on his farm and said
nothing except that he might go back to the United States if
he ceased to be capable of leading an active life on the farm.
• It was held that he had acquired a domicile of choice in
England, since his intention to leave was vague and
indefinite. There was no pressure on him to stay here, and
he was wholly integrated into the community in which he
lived
• The facts of White v Tennant were
unremarkable: a family were moving home. The
man abandoned his home in State A and moved
about half a mile to his new home in State B.
Having put their belongings in the new house,
the family returned to their old State as the new
house was not ready to inhabit. When the man
died during the night the court decided that he
died domiciled in State B and not State A.
 Domicile of Origin and Domicile of Choice:
Revival of Domicile of Origin
• That strong evidence is required to prove the abandonment of a domicile of origin,
and that the domicile of origin is retained until a domicile of choice is acquired is
illustrated by the House of Lords judgments in Bell v Kennedy and Ramsay v
Liverpool Royal Infirmary. But within the USA jurisdictions, the practice is to regard
the abandoned domicile as continuing until a new domicile is acquired
• In both cases, the question arose as to where an individual was domiciled at the time
of death; in the case of Bell v Kennedy,
• the facts were as follows: Mr Bell had Jamaica as domicile of origin. Educated in
Scotland he returned to Jamaica where he married. In 1837, he left Jamaica and
went to live with his mother in law while deciding whether to live in Scotland,
England or the South of France. When his wife died in September 1838, the question
arose as to where he was domiciled. The House of Lords overruled the Court of
Session and decided that he retained his domicile of origin in Jamaica.
• The case illustrates that to acquire a domicile of choice it is necessary to produce
unequivocal evidence of both the facts of residence and the intention to
permanently reside.
• In Puttick v Attorney General, it was held that
a domicile of choice could not be acquired by
illegal residence.
• In Munro v Munro , Lord Cottenham made it
clear that the domicile of origin will prevail
until a party manifestly intends to abandon
one ’ s former domicile and acquire another as
one ’ s sole domicile.
• Winans v AG, the facts were as follows:
• William Winans was born in Baltimore in 1823 but, in 1859, he came to England and
lived there all his life at various places until his death in 1896. He built railways in
Russia and helped that country in the Crimean War (1853–56) by constructing
gunboats.
• He retained plans for his properties in Baltimore. He disliked England and appeared
to be without friends. The evidence indicated that his sole remaining ambition was
to enable the USA to acquire world maritime supremacy at the expense of England.
On his death in 1896, the question arose as to his place of domicile..
• In giving judgment for the House of Lords and reversing the Court of Appeal, Lord
Macnaghten emphasised that domicile of origin is more enduring than domicile of
choice and that, on the evidence, it could not be said that Mr Winans had acquired a
domicile of choice in England. His hatred of Britain eventually convinced the House
of Lords that, despite his long residence here, he lacked the intention to acquire a
domicile in England. Since Mr Winans had not acquired a domicile in England he
remained domiciled in Baltimore.
• IRC v. Bullock
• Group Captain Bullock, a Canadian, lived in England for forty-
four years. He had married an Englishwoman and in
deference to her wishes set up home in England. He often
expressed an intention to return to Nova Scotia should she
predecease him.
• The Court of Appeal held that he had not acquired a domicile
in England. Group Captain Bullock’s intention indeed
depended upon a contingency which might not occur, but it
was quite possible that it would, for it was nearly as likely
that his wife would predecease him as that he would
predecease her.
 Burden of Proof
The burden of proving the acquisition of a domicile of choice rests on the person who alleges
it.
In Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary George Bowie, a Scotsman born in Glasgow with a
Scottish domicile
of origin, stopped working when he was thirty-seven and when he was
forty-six went to Liverpool to live with (or sponge off ) members of his
family. He died there aged eighty-seven. He had only left Liverpool on two short trips, and
refused to return to Glasgow, even for his mother’s funeral. He always took a Glasgow
newspaper, and called himself a ‘Glasgow man’, stating this in his will. He made a will which
was formally invalid under English law, but valid by Scots law The House of Lords held that
he died domiciled in Scotland. Though his residence in England was lengthy, it was
‘colourless’ and
motivated only by his attachment to a member of his family who would keep him despite his
disinclination to work. The burden of proving his acquisition of a domicile in England had not
been
discharged. His will was thereby held to be valid.
• The cases of Ramsay illustrate that long residence by itself will not be
sufficient to acquire a domicile of choice. Long residence may go some way
to demonstrating the factum but it will still be necessary to show the
animus. In examining the questions of animus, one writer has argued that
the case law reveals four common evidentiary situations:
(a) an intention to reside for a definite period, for example, a year and then
leave;
(b) an intention to reside in a territory until a definite purpose is achieved, for
example, to leave when a particular project is completed;
(c) an intention to reside in a country for an indefinite period unless and until a
particular event happens, for example, relative dies; and
(d) an intention to reside forever regardless of domestic or external events.
It is quite clear that the first two forms are insufficient to acquire a domicile
of choice. But, Winansand Ramsay represent examples of class (c) and
• would appear to indicate that such a state of
conditional animus is not sufficient. It might be
argued that the cases are unsatisfactory as they
place considerable emphasis on the desires of
an individual rather than what he proposed to
do. Thus, in Bell, Winans and Ramsay, while it
was possible to produce evidence of the fact of
residence, the difficulty arose as to the
inferences to be drawn as to intention.
THE NATURE OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY

• Problems arise in respect of corporations as

to:
• (a) whether the corporation is present within
the jurisdiction;
• (b) the precise residence of the company;
• (c) the domicile of the corporation; and
• (d) the nationality of the corporation.
 Residence of Company
• Whether a company is resident in England or not is an important
consideration under a number of taxation statutes, since liability to tax is
often contingent on a finding that the company is resident in England.
The broad rule is that a company will be resident where its centre of
control exists, that is, where its seat and direction is located.
• In Cesena Sulphur Co, the company had been incorporated under the
Companies Act 1862, but conducted all its mining operations at Cesena
in Italy. The evidence indicated that none of its products was sent to
England. However, the memorandum of association provided that the
board of directors should meet in London; the shareholders meetings
took place in England. In addition, the dividends were declared in
England. On such facts, the court found that the central acts of direction
took place in England and, thus, the company was resident in England for
the purposes of income tax
 Domicile of Company
• the domicile of a company will normally be
the place of its incorporation.
• it may be necessary to consider questions
relating to the constitution of a company or
whether it has been dissolved; such questions
will be governed by the law of domicile which
will be the law of the place of incorporation
 Nationality of the Company
• The nationality of the corporation is rarely relevant in the
English conflict of laws. In general, English law takes the
view that the nationality of a company is the country of
its incorporation.
• It is sensible to distinguish this common law approach
from those in civil law countries where the nationality of
the company will be determined by the real seat of the
corporation. The concept of the real seat is a technical
one but normally means where the board of directors
meets and where the general meeting takes place and
the administrative center is located.
• It should be mentioned that international conventions that have codified
private international principles have taken a broader approach when ascribing
domicile, nationality, and residence to companies.
• Brussels Regulation I (Recast), which has codified rules on jurisdiction on civil
and commercial matters, has provided for domicile as the main connecting
factor. Unlike the classical approach, the Regulation has not equated the
domicile of a company solely with its place of registration, but has also
ascribed the domicile of a company to either its statutory seat, central
administration, or principal place of business.
• Similarly, the recently concluded 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters elevates
habitual residence as the main connecting factor. The 2019 Convention defines
the habitual residence of a company broadly to include either its statutory
seat, under the law of which it was incorporated or formed, its central
administration, or the state where it has its principal place of business.
 Major Criticism of Domicile
• The difficulty of proving an intention permanently to reside
despite a long stay is evident in multiple cases.
• there is the persistence of the domicile of origin and its revival,
which some consider to be very illogical because sometime it
takes you to application of law which is completely
unconnected to the issue.
• From the 1950s onwards in England, there have been several
proposals for abolishing the doctrine of the revival of the
domicile of origin and replacing it with the doctrine of the
continuance of a domicile of choice until a new one is acquired
(as in the US). Nevertheless, the proposals have been rejected
by Parliament and have not become a part of legislation.
 Difference between Nationality and
Domicile
Nationality Domicile
• Nationality is determined by • domicile is acquired by
birth, parentage, registration, residence in a particular
and naturalisation. country with the intention
of residing there
permanently

• Nationality is a more stable • Less stable as it can be

concept than domicile as it changed by the parties
cannot be changed without concerned.
the formal consent of states
3. But a person may be stateless or 3. the fundamental principle of
simultaneously may be nationals domicile dictates that no person
of more than one country can be without a domicile and that
4. Mainly followed by Continental no person can have more than one
legal System. domicile at the same time.

4. Mainly followed by Common Law

5. In Hari Narayanan v Meenakshi
system
Narayanan , the court
5. In Hari Narayanan v Meenakshi
interpreted nationality to
Narayanan domicile to owe
denote allegiance to a country
allegiance to the place of one ’ s
permanent home.
 Nationality
• Nationality represents a person ’s political status, by virtue
of which one owes allegiance to some particular country.
• As a connecting factor, nationality has dominated the
scene in the private international law of Continental
Europe. Virtually all choice-of-law rules concerning
personal and family affairs are determined by reference to
the law of nationality.
• Nationality is determined by birth, parentage, registration,
and naturalisation, whereas domicile is acquired by
residence in a particular country with the intention of
residing there permanently.
• The concept of nationality as a connecting factor
was popular in Europe and partly follows upon the
Code Napoleon 1804 (see, also, Austria (1811) and
Holland (1829)). The employment of nationality
was also an attempt by emerging national States to
establish a distinct identity: see the Italian Civil
Code 1865, Art 6. This was particularly important
in Italy, where the emphasis was on building a
nation State and asserting independence from
foreign rule.
 Residence, Ordinary Residence, Habitual
Residence
• Residence connotes more than mere presence, in that it carries
with it a notion of time. Of itself, however, it does not convey any
particular duration, so it would not be a misuse of English to say
that someone was resident in a hotel for one night. A period of
residence, however short, does suggest that someone was living
in a particular place and it is this idea of living there which makes
the concept of residence a potential candidate for the personal
law.
• The main weakness of nationality lies in the fact that there is no
necessary connection between the State of which one is a
national, and the country in which one lives. This defect is entirely
overcome by the concept of residence, provided that a
satisfactory degree of attachment can be established.
• What has still to be determined, is the necessary quality of intention and residence
which will suffice. ‘Residence’, ‘ordinary residence’ and ‘habitual. residence’?

• Habitual Residence arrived as a compromise between those States which insisted on

the lex patriae as the test of the personal law and those countries which, like England,
relied on domicile for that purpose – not, it should be noted, that the countries
adopting domicile had a unified concept to offer. The compromise did not lead to
replacement of the national law or of the domiciliary law by habitual residence, it was
agreed merely as an alternative rule of reference. So, for example, the formal validity of
a will may be tested by the law of the nationality, the law of the domicile or the law of
the habitual residence.
• The first thing to notice about the English concept of habitual residence is that the
concentration is upon the quality of the residence rather than its duration, so that a
future petitioner to the English court for matrimonial relief will satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of one year’s habitual residence even if he or she has been in the country
for only one year, provided that the quality of the residence is sufficient.
• The matter has been discussed in a number of cases. An
interesting example is afforded by the first instance case of
Cruse v Chittum, where the relevant fact were as follows: an
Englishman petitioned for a declaration in the Family Division
of the High Court that his marriage had been validly
dissolved. The answer to this question depended on whether
the wife had been habitually resident in Mississippi when a
divorce decree had been granted by a court of that State. In
granting a declaration, Lane J drew a distinction between
‘ordinary residence’ and ‘habitual residence’, indicating that
for the latter to be found the residence must be actual, bona
fide and enduring.
• Prior to the judgment in Shah, there was a tendency to view the concepts as a
hierarchy commencing with ‘presence’ and ‘residence’ and then proceeding to
‘ordinary residence’ with ‘habitual residence’ being subject to more stringent criteria.
Since 1983, there has been a tendency not to draw a distinction between ‘ordinary
residence’ and ‘habitual residence’ The willingness to equate ‘habitual residence’ with
‘ordinary residence’ was demonstrated by the case of Kapur v Kapur, where the facts
were as follows: an Indian domicilary, resident in London for educational purposes,
petitioned for a decree of divorce in the Family Division. The jurisdiction of the court
depended on whether he was habitually resident in England. In deciding that he was
habitually resident, Bush J observed: In my view, there is no real distinction to be drawn
between ‘ordinary’ and ‘habitual residence’. It may be that in some circumstances a
man may be habitually resident without being ordinarily resident, but I cannot at the
moment conceive of such a situation.
• Thus, in the last decade, there has been an increasing attempt to minimise the
difference between ‘ordinary residence’ and ‘habitual residence’ and it is quite clear
that ‘habitual residence’ is less demanding in terms of animus than the more technical
concept of domicile.
 Habitual Residence/ Residence
• The difficulties associated with the application
of nationality and domicile as connecting
factors have prompted a shift to habitual
residence as a connecting factor in recent
years. Alternatively, while retaining the
connecting factor of nationality or domicile,
states may provide that, in the case of dual
nationality, the law of the country of habitual
residence is to be applied
• Habitual residence is employed as a connecting factor in many
international conventions such as Convention of 25 October
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Art 4
(adopts habitual residence as a connecting factor), Convention
on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased
Persons 1989, Art 3 (provides habitual residence as the
applicable law), Brussels Conventions on Matrimonial Matters,
the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters provides for
habitual residence as the basis of recognition.

-
• Habitual residence is a question of fact and does not need to
be established through the legal presumptions associated
with a domicile of dependency. For instance, unlike the
domicile of children, who follow that of their legal
guardians, a child ’ s habitual residence is determined by the
fact of a child ’ s stay. 69 However, the concept has also been
criticised as a weak link to determine a person ’ s civil status.
Hence, the practice of jurisdictions and codifi cations reveals
the co-existence of all three connecting factors.
• It has been adopted as connecting factor in Irish
Legislation.
 Habitual Residence
Advantages Disadvantages
• Simpler to establish. Also, • Difficult to determine if he is constantly on
the move and has no real or continuing with
intention though relevant is a less any of the countries through which he passess.
controlling factor in • While the question of intention in the case of
determination of habitual domicile may give rise to difficulty, there is at
least some reasonable degree of judicial
residence consensus as to the strength of the intention
• Doesnot involve any concept that must be establsihed: with such consensus
has yet to be attained.
similar to domicile of dependency. • The question of how long person’s residence
More importantly the injustice must continue before if may be described as
and possible unconstitutionality habitual residence may give rise to
considerable doubt in certail cases. One
of the principle of domicile of advantage of domicile in this respect is that
dependency of married women where the requisite intention is present ,a
person may acquire a domicile immediately he
donot arise in the case of arrives in the country in which he wishes to
habitual residence reside permanently.
 Position of Nepal
• Domicile ( case law sabina pandey Judgment )
to Nationality ( Citizenship ), Habitual
Residence and Immediate Residence
( Statutory Provisions )