Velasquez vs. Lisondra Land Inc.
In 1998, Perfecto Velasquez, Jr. and Lisondra Land Inc. entered a joint-
venture to develop a memorial park on a 7,200 m² parcel. Lisondra Land
failed to secure HLURB permits, provide insurance, pay realty taxes, and
allegedly collected kickbacks and gifted lots—violating its financing
obligations.
Velasquez sued for breach of contract before the RTC (Civil Case
No. 18146). Lisondra Land contested jurisdiction, citing HLURB’s
exclusive authority over real estate business practices.
• The RTC upheld its jurisdiction;
• Lisondra Land filed a Rule 65 petition with the CA, which quashed the
RTC’s proceedings, ruling that the issue fell within HLURB’s
competence .
• Velasquez then filed before HLURB, which ruled in his favor on July 20, 2007.
• Lisondra Land appealed to the Office of the President, after an unfavorable
HLURB decision and argued that the HLURB lacked jurisdiction.
• The Office of the President affirmed HLURB’s jurisdiction in August 2013.
• The CA later nullified that decision in December 2016.
ISSUE
• WON Perfecto has the personality to sue Lisondra Land for unsound
real estate business practices before the HLURB
RULING
NO.
Section 1 of P.D. 1344 vests in the HLURB the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
(a)
unsound real estate business practices;
(b)
claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and
(c)
cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium
units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
• In the context of the evident objective of Section 1, it is implicit that
the "unsound real estate business practice" would, like the offended
party in paragraphs (b) and (c), be the buyers of lands involved in
development.
• Here, it is undisputed that Perfecto is a business partner of Lisondra
Land and is not a buyer of land involved in development. Applying the
above case doctrines, Perfecto has no personality to sue Lisondra
Land for unsound real estate business practices before the HLURB
because he is not a buyer. The regular courts have authority to decide
their dispute. Nonetheless, we hold that Lisondra Land is already
estopped from questioning the HLURB's jurisdiction.
• In interpreting the law, the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction of cases
involving "unsound real estate business practice" provided that the
offended party is a buyer. Otherwise, the RTC has jurisdiction if the
offended party in a case involving "unsound real estate business
practice" is not a buyer.
HOWEVER
THERE IS AN ESTOPPEL IN THIS CASE.
Prior to T[jam, this Court already came up with an edifying rule in People v.
Casiano52 on when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not:
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of
jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court
actually had jurisdiction or not.
If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the
theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal,
from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel"
(5 C.J.S., 861-863).
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard
and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court
had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will
not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position - that
the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel
applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not
depend upon the will of the duties, has no bearing thereon.
Here, Perfecto originally filed his complaint against Lisondra Land before the
RTC which, as discussed earlier, has jurisdiction over the controversy between
the parties. However, Lisondra Land claimed that the case is within the
HLURB's exclusive authority. It maintained this theory before the CA which
eventually ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Thereafter, Perfecto relied on the final and executory decision of the
appellate court and refiled the action against Lisondra Land with the HLURB.
Lisondra Land actively participated in the proceedings before the HLURB.
After receiving an adverse decision, Lisondra Land questioned the jurisdiction
of the HLURB and claimed that the RTC has the authority to hear the case.
This is where estoppel operates and bars Lisondra Land from assailing the HLURB's
jurisdiction.
Lisondra Land cannot now abandon the theory behind its arguments before Civil
Case No. 18146, CA-G.R. SP No. 72463 and the HLURB.
The Court cannot countenance Lisondra Land's act of adopting inconsistent
postures - first, by attacking the jurisdiction of the trial court and, subsequently, the
authority of the HLURB.
Otherwise, the consequence is revolting as Lisondra Land would be allowed to
make a complete mockery of the judicial system.
In fact, Lisondra Land's conduct had resulted in two conflicting appellate court
decisions in CA-G.R. SP No. 72463 and CA-G.R. SP No. 131359 eroding the stability
of our legal system and jurisprudence.
To conclude, the law apportioned the jurisdiction of courts and
tribunals for the orderly administration of justice.
Thus, the doctrine of estoppel must be applied with great care and only
when strong equitable considerations are present.
Here, the unfairness is not only patent but revolting.
Lisondra Land should not be allowed to declare as useless all the
proceedings had between the parties and compel Perfecto to go up to
his Calvary once more.
Considering the above doctrines, we rule that the present case is
exceptional and calls for the application of jurisdiction by estoppel.
