C-LRA Program Evaluation and Needs Assessment

USAID/Democratic Republic of Congo
Performance Evaluation and Needs Assessment Report of
USAID Programming to Communities Affected by the
Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa
Submitted November 2, 2015
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development.
It was prepared by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI) under AID-623-I-13-00001

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USAID/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Performance Evaluation and Needs Assessment
Report of USAID Programming to Communities
Affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army in
Central Africa
AID-623-I-13-00001
AID-623-TO-15-00003
Authors: Rob Grossman-Vermaas, Paul Bukuluki, Cecile Collin, Joseph Ogeto,
Kara Federico, Sam Malmberg
Submitted: November 2, 2015
Prepared for Dan Hicks, C-LRA Needs Assessment & Evaluation COR
United States Agency for International Development/DRC
C/O USAID Health and Nutrition Office
USAID/KEA
United Nations Avenue, Gigiri
P.O. Box 629, Village Market 00621
Nairobi, Kenya
Prepared by
International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI)
8618 Westwood Center Drive Suite 400
Vienna, VA 22182
USA
Tel: (703) 749-0100
Cover Photo: Djabir, DRC, Early Warning HF Station
DISCLAIMER
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency
for International Development or the United States Government.

IBTCI – USAID/DRC C‐LRA Programming Performance Evaluation & Needs Assessment – AID‐623‐I‐13‐00001
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF FIGURES...................................................................................................................III
TABLE OF TABLES.....................................................................................................................III
LIST OF ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................IV
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................... I
A. PROGRAM KEY CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS ................................................................................II
B. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS.......................................................................................................................... IV
I. PURPOSE ................................................................................................................................ 1
II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 2
III. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................ 4
A. DATA SOURCES.................................................................................................................................................6
B. SAMPLING STRATEGY......................................................................................................................................7
C. LOGISTICS PLAN ...............................................................................................................................................9
D. RISK MITIGATION.............................................................................................................................................9
IV. KEY CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................ 10
V. NEEDS ASSESSMENT........................................................................................................ 19
A. PRIMARY FINDINGS........................................................................................................................................19
SECURITY AND DISAMAMENT .......................................................................................................................19
EDUCATION..........................................................................................................................................................22
ROADS AND INFRASTRUCTURE...................................................................................................................24
HEALTH AND WASH..........................................................................................................................................25
FOOD SECURITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND LIVELIHOODS........................................................25
SOCIAL COHESION, TRAUMA MANAGEMENT, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT.....................26
GOVERNANCE......................................................................................................................................................27
EXISTING LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE COMMUNITIES ...............28
COORDINATION ................................................................................................................................................28
B. SECONDARY FINDINGS................................................................................................................................29
VI. C-LRA PROGRAMMING EVALUATION........................................................................ 30
VII. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................................... 51
ANNEX 1: SCOPE OF WORK.................................................................................................. 56
ANNEX 2: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS......................................................................... 69
ANNEX 3: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS ........................................................................... 77
ANNEX 4: INSTRUMENTS....................................................................................................... 80
ANNEX 4A: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE.....................................................................................80
ANNEX 4B: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE........................................................................................85
ANNEX 5: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DRC AND CAR......................................... 92
ANNEX 6: FIELD ITINERARIES............................................................................................. 101
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO ......................................................................................................... 101
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC......................................................................................................................... 101
GANTT WORK PLAN .......................................................................................................................................... 102
ANNEX 7: USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING..................................................................... 104
A. KEY DEVELOPMENTS.................................................................................................................................. 105
CURRENT EVENTS............................................................................................................................................ 105
INSECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN ACCESS......................................................................................... 105
DISPLACEMENT ................................................................................................................................................. 106
HEALTH, NUTRITION, AND PROTECTION............................................................................................ 106
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE......................................................................................................................... 107
B. CONTEXT........................................................................................................................................................ 108
C. PUBLIC DONATION INFORMATION................................................................................................... 111

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TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Sampling Frame........................................................................................................................................8
Figure 2: CAR Site Selection ..................................................................................................................................8
Figure 3: DRC Site Selection ..................................................................................................................................9
Figure 4: Performance of Sub-objectives........................................................................................................11
Figure 5: Performance of SO1 .............................................................................................................................12
Figure 6: Performance of Output 1.1.3 - Number of incidents affecting the security of
individuals or the community which occur in target communities...................................................12
Figure 7: Overall Performance of SECC CAR (Percentage of Targets Achieved)....................13
Figure 8: Theory of Change Development Chart.......................................................................................14
Figure 9: ICT Locations in Bas- and Haut-Uélé, DRC:.............................................................................30
Figure 10: EWS Flow of Information................................................................................................................34
Figure 11: Comparison of attacks, deaths, and abductions in Haut- and Bas-Uélé...................39
Figure 12: Community Participation in Program Development........................................................49
TABLE OF TABLES
Table 1: Alerts Reported per Month in the DRC and CAR from the SECC database.............32
Table 2: Incidents in Haut- and Bas-Uélé and CAR from 2009-2015................................................39
Table 3: Percentage of attacks, deaths and abductions per year from 2008-2015 ....................40

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LIST OF ACRONYMS
3Bs Binding, Bonding, and Bridging
4Ds Discovery, Dream, Design and Deliver
AI Appreciative Inquiry
AJEDEC US Youth Community Development Association
AU-RTF African Union Regional Task Force
CAR Central African Republic
CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CLOC Local Committees for Community Organization
C-LRA Counter-Lord's Resistance Army
CMM USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
COOPI Cooperazione lnternazionale
CPC Community-based Protection Committee
CPP Community-based Protection Program
CRCN Community Radio Correspondent Network
CRS Catholic Relief Services
CVE Countering Violent Extremism
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DDRRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement
DO Development Objective
DOS Department of State
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EWS Early Warning System
FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FGD Focus Group Discussion
FM Frequency Modulation
GBV Gender Based Violence
GPS Global Positioning System
GRI Global Research Insights
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
HF High Frequency
IBTCI International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc.
ICT Information and Communications Technology
IPTT Indicator Performance Tracking Table
KII Key Informant Interview
LRA Lord's Resistance Army
MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MSC Most Significant Change
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

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PII Personally Identifiable Information
PNDDR National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
RJDH Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l’Homme
RTF Regional Task Force
SGBV Sexual and Gender-based Violence
SECC Secure, Empowered, Connected Communities
SFCG Search for Common Ground
GBV Gender-based Violence
SO Sub-objective
SOF Special Operations Forces (US)
SOW Scope of Work
SPLA Sudan People's Liberation Army
TOC Theory of Change
ToT Training of Trainers
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UPDF Uganda People's Defense Force
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USAID/DRC United States Agency for International Development DRC Mission
USAID/EA United States Agency for International Development East Africa Regional Mission
USAID/KEA United States Agency for International Development Kenya and East Africa
USG United States Government
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report was prepared by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI) under IDIQ Number
AID-623-I-13-00001, Task Order Number AID-623-TO-15-00003. The USAID Scope of Work (SOW) is
contained in Annex 1. This report aims to inform USAID by reviewing the agency’s counter-Lord’s Resistance
Army (C-LRA) programming generally since 2010/2011, but more specifically as embodied in the Secure,
Empowered, Connected Communities (SECC) activity. The report evaluates program outputs, outcomes, and
impacts relative to the proposed goal and Theory of Change (TOC), and in the wider United States Government
(USG) C-LRA context. The team assessed and evaluated USAID C-LRA programming more broadly and then,
where appropriate, specifically under the SECC program. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), in partnership with Search
for Common Ground (SFCG) and Caritas Bangassou, comprises the SECC team.1
The purpose of this study is to inform future USAID programming in LRA-affected areas through two parallel tasks
and one synthesis task. Task 1 is a situational analysis—or needs assessment—whereby IBTCI identified the
immediate needs from a sampling of LRA-affected communities that have been affected by, or are at risk from, the
LRA and describes the impacts of the LRA in the identified communities. Task 2 is a process evaluation that will
test the theory of change of existing and previous US-funded C-LRA programming by answering eight discrete
questions about USAID’s C-LRA programming. Task 3, the synthesis task, provides actionable recommendations to
USAID on how perceived and actual outputs, outcomes, and relative impacts of its programming can inform future
C-LRA programming in LRA-affected areas of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic
(CAR). The primary audience for this report is USAID. Additional recipients of this report are the wider USG and
regional stakeholders. The report applied a meta-evaluation approach, looking retrospectively at data from 2010-
2015, and at numerous data sets, including partner annual and quarterly reports; evaluations, reviews, and
assessments; verifications reporting; annual and quarterly indicator data derived from the SECC Monitoring and
Evaluation (M&E) plan; Key Informant Interviews (KIIs); Focus Group Discussions (FGDs); and, normative
literature associated with the LRA and the wider regional conflict.
The analysis of the data was comprised of four analytical approaches:
1. Comparison Analysis. The team compared targets against actuals to assess the extent to which the
USAID-funded C-LRA activities, and primarily SECC’s intermediate results, objectives, and goal have been
achieved.
2. Summary Statistics. Where appropriate, the team used summary statistics to analyze quantitative data
obtained from the indicators within SECC’s M&E Plan, using cross-tabulation analysis. Because SECC had
very cursory output targets and actuals in its reports, this analytical method did not adequately inform the
study.
3. Content, Pattern, and Trend Analysis. For data from KIIs, the team documented narrative responses to
allow for a systematic content analysis of these data, and of the frequency of responses to questions.
4. Response Convergence/Divergence Analysis. The team reviewed the data collected to determine where
there was significant response convergence from the varied stakeholders. When divergence was found,
the team reviewed the data to better understand the context and reasons for divergence in facts,
perceptions or opinions.
For site selection in CAR and DRC, IBTCI employed a stratified sampling strategy to select a representative
sample of the LRA-affected intervention and non-intervention communities. This allowed for some degree of
comparison between those communities that received consistent and regular C-LRA intervention, and those that
did not. The respondent communities were stratified by the following notional parameters:
1. Geographic regions: Mbomou, Haute-Mbomou, and Haute Kotto in CAR; and Haute-Uélé and Bas-Uélé in
DRC.
2. Status of conflict: post-conflict (within the last five years), current conflict, and no conflict.
3. Crisis type: civilian death, abductions, civilian injury, displacement, looting, LRA encounter and returnee.
1
It should be noted that throughout the report findings differentiate between broader USAID C-LRA programming, and more specific findings
related to recent SECC outputs, outcomes and impacts.

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CAR Sites
 Intervention sites: From the initial scope of work of the Community Radio Correspondent Network
(CRCN) activity, the team focused on two prefectures: Mbomou and Haut Mbomou in southeast CAR.
The CRCN intervention targeted communities located in the sub prefectures of Zemio, Djemah, Mboki,
Obo, Rafai, and Bangassou. The team, in consultation with USAID, selected six communities, one from
each of the six sub-prefectures.
 Comparison sites: Three sub prefectures - Bakouma (a sub-prefecture of Mbomou), Issa Mazangue, and
Bria were purposively chosen based on 1) lack of coverage by CRCN; and 2) ease of access. The team
randomly selected three communities, one from each of the three sub prefectures.
DRC Sites
 Intervention sites: USAID supported the construction of four transmission stations at Bangadi, Niangara,
Ango, and Doruma. The team selected four communities, i.e., one community in close proximity to each
of the four locations. In addition, the team included Isiro and randomly selected two communities from
Dungu territory (of Haute-Uélé district) and Bondo territory (of Bas-Uélé district) that received USAID
intervention.
 Comparison sites: Four territories - Bili, Buta, and Faradje were purposively selected based on 1) the
target geographic location of this needs assessment i.e. Haute-Uélé and Bas-Uélé districts of the Orientale
Province; 2) absence of USAID intervention; 3) ease of access. For the purposes of this evaluation, the
team selected three communities, one from each of the three territories.
The IBTCI field teams faced access, logistics and security constraints during the data collection in DRC and CAR,
but were able to access all proposed sites except for Yalinga. This comparison sites in CAR was substituted with
an alternate site meeting the same selection criteria: Issa Mazangue. Moreover, in the DRC, the team was able to
conduct additional KIIs and FGDs in Djabir, and additional KIIs in Naguero, Bunia, and Goma, exceeding the SOW
requirements.
A. PROGRAM KEY CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS
Based on a review and analysis of the data the assessment team suggests the following Key Conclusions and
Findings:
1. LRA-affected communities in DRC and CAR have been empowered since 2010. SECC has
contributed to this outcome, but is by no means the sole contributor. All of the KII and FGD
respondents were in agreement that since 2010 there has been a marked increase in the effectiveness of
early warning systems (EWS) and community protection programs. A thorough review of documentation
from other actors, such as Invisible Children, SFCG, Caritas and CRS also suggests positive initial
outcomes of such programming. What is unclear is the specific impact that USAID-funded C-LRA
programming has in the affected areas when compared to non-USAID-funded programming. This is, in
part, due to the lack of a performance monitoring baseline and a clearly defined, defensible, theory of
change aligned directly to performance monitoring indicators.
2. SECC achieved many of its performance targets in CAR, but the evidence from DRC is
inconclusive due to its later start-up. There was considerable progress made in CAR from Year 1 to
Year 2. According to SECC’s self-reported output data, SECC CAR performed better in Year 2 than Year
1, improving in all three sub-objectives. Since the team received no corresponding data for DRC due to
implementation commencing in the spring of 2015, an analysis of these performance monitoring results
was not possible.
3. USAID’s C-LRA objectives are sound, but its theory of change (TOC) was not explicitly
stated and is difficult to validate. There was no explicit TOC per se either for USAID’s C-LRA
activities, or for the SECC program. This is not necessarily a bad thing – a TOC can be developed at any
stage of the USAID Project Cycle – but it does impact the assessment team’s ability to validate it. Also,
the fact that the USAID TOC was developed after implementation – and not as a guiding tool to help
determine activity contribution to actual results (i.e., correlation), and to inform programming
effectiveness and progress over time – presented a performance monitoring challenge.
4. There have been both positive and negative perceptions of the effectiveness of interagency
and inter-program cooperation during the implementation of C-LRA activities in the region.

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While the majority of USG and regional stakeholder KII respondents expressed positive perceptions of
the effectiveness of USG interagency cooperation during the implementation of C-LRA activities, there
was a small minority of respondents who were critical. Criticism was primarily associated with a
perceived slow start-up for the SECC program. While being affected by the obvious operational, access,
and logistics challenges associated with a start-up in this environment, the program was also affected by
management challenges within CRS and within USAID. Perceptions also varied at what can be termed the
strategic and tactical levels. There is clear evidence from both Washington and field-based KIIs with USG
personnel, particularly from DOS, that inter-agency collaboration at the policy level is strong, despite the
fact that USG policy in the region has evolved considerably since the Seleka rebellion broke out in CAR in
late 2012. KII responses suggest that USAID and Special Operations Forces (SOF), and more broadly
USAID, DOD and DOS, have an amicable relationship of necessity in implementing complementary C-
LRA activities in the region. However, SECC was singled out by the majority of respondents as being
averse to working closely with SOF and other military actors in CAR and DRC. Finally, collaboration – or
at least coordination – between CRS/SECC and international and regional C-LRA and humanitarian actors
providing comparable services to affected communities has been poor. This was evident in the
relationship between CRS and Invisible Children, resulting in two challenges: 1) a redundancy of services
provided by actors to affected communities; 2) a perceived sense of mistrust between actors addressing
acute security, governance and humanitarian needs in affected communities.
5. Examples of social tensions have developed a) between communities that received
consistent C-LRA treatment and those that have not, and b) within communities between
beneficiaries who have received consistent C-LRA treatment and those who have not. This is
a common dilemma that could potentially harm communities. FGD respondents in “have” and “have not”
communities were vocal about this issue. Evidence suggests friction between community members who
have directly benefitted from USAID C-LRA intervention, and those who have not. Indeed some
community members expressed during FGDs that certain programming might start to divide members
into those who are “well off,” i.e., receiving assistance, and those who are not, giving rise to a form of
class structure that had not previously existed.
6. There were considerable delays in SECC implementation, caused in part by a lack of
consistent—and in situ—management and oversight by USAID. According to KIIs with USG,
INGOs and regional NGOs, SECC was delayed in its implementation, damaging perceptions of CRS,
SECC and USAID. This was noted most acutely by respondents at DOS/AFR. Understandably, the
conflict in CAR contributed to implementation delays, even causing CRS to re-develop its intervention
strategies and work plan accordingly. Whether real or perceived, the evidence suggests the lack of
consistent USAID management and oversight also hindered implementation.
7. As described more fully in the evaluation section of this report, the key components of USAID-
funded C-LRA activities are successfully working, but not always consistently and effectively.
a. ICT efforts are widely perceived by beneficiaries as working well, especially in terms of improving
communication and connectedness between and amongst communities that were historically
isolated due to LRA activities. ICT has also facilitated the strengthening of community-based
protection systems by bridging gaps in communication between LRA-affected communities, local
authorities, humanitarian agencies and the military (and in particular UPDF and SOF). ICT has
increased the effectiveness of EWS and community-based early responses to LRA attacks (and
potential LRA attacks). For example, communities in CAR have been able to warn other
communities of possible attacks using HF radios, allowing them to implement their risk mitigation
plans. ICT has also made a strong contribution to broader needs relating to security,
governance, humanitarian issues, and social networking. As such, it is used by a number of
stakeholders including territorial administration, other international and national NGOs, focal
points, community members, traders, and religious leaders. Finally, the presence of HF radios in
communities has contributed to a shift in the LRA’s own tactics, i.e., the LRA is now more likely
to avoid communities where there is a community HF radio.
b. Community-based trauma healing, theater and reconciliation activities have been largely
successful, and are in increasingly high demand. In all FGDs and KIIs conducted in CAR, trauma
healing was perceived as one of the most significant interventions designed to assist affected
communities and leaders to recover. There is as of this report’s submission no direct trauma
healing component as part of the SECC program in the DRC, but there has been successful

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training of trainers (ToT) sessions on trauma healing and SGBV. Evidence has revealed that these
activities have been successful in building local capacities on trauma healing, and in disseminating
knowledge and best practices on trauma healing.
c. Incident and alert reporting to C-LRA stakeholders is working, but is still nascent and
inconsistently applied. SECC has made efforts to widely disseminate its incident information with
an email alert system, a newsletter, and a website tracking LRA incidents similarly to the LRA
Crisis Tracker.2
But dissemination has been spotty, with only 250 recipients on the SECC alert
email list to date, and several key stakeholders such as the UN protection clusters, MONUSCO,
MINUSCA and the UN Panel of Experts (CAR) not receiving information at all.
B. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the Key Conclusions and the supporting evidence that supports these Conclusions, the team suggests the
following Key Recommendations. They are presented thematically according to Program Implementation and
Design, Management, Coordination, Performance Monitoring of USAID C-LRA Activities, and Strategic
Considerations. Of course the finite pool of funding for USAID’s C-LRA activities will require USAID to
undertake a prioritization exercise to target the focus of future programming.
USAID Program Implementation and Design
1. The team recommends that any future USAID C-LRA activity develop and implement a clear sustainability
strategy for building the capacity of community structures to continue managing, maintaining, and
operating ICT for community-based protection and EWS (and in particular the FM radios and HF radios).
FM radios require a management and technical approach that may benefit from a public-private
partnership arrangement or a community-private-public partnership arrangement. For sustainability, FM
stations should run on a hybrid model that is sensitive to the strengthening of community-based
protection programming, but is also open to the private sector for advertising to earn much-needed
maintenance revenue.
2. As a precursor to developing a prioritized needs assessment among affected communities, the team
recommends that USAID – with the international community – broaden the definition and scope of “LRA-
affected” individuals to include those people who remain in the isolated communities and those who are
displaced and have therefore lost livelihoods and social-support networks. Prioritization can, for example,
be based on relative levels of vulnerability and risk exhibited by respective communities.
3. The team recommends that USAID consider, as part of a conflict analysis for a follow-on C-LRA activity, a
plan for how it will implement conflict sensitivity and ‘Do No Harm’ principles into its programming and
its selection criteria.
4. Based on the data from the needs assessment, the team recommends that USAID C-LRA activities
consider the following priority needs:
a. Education – USAID C-LRA activities should build upon the current investments in SECC to
strengthen the social contract between citizens and their government through increased information
sharing, expanded spaces for dialogue between people and the state, and new opportunities for
participatory decision-making;
b. WASH and Health – USAID should address needs of LRA victims through the provision of multi-
sector assistance that covers health in the cases of physical abuses such as SGBV and AIDS
prevention;
c. Social Cohesion, Trauma Management and Psychosocial Support – USAID C-LRA activities should
continue to implement programs focused on sensitization managed by community leaders/trainers
trained by SECC. Activities should also support CPCs to perform their duties in peace promotion,
prevention of SGBV, social cohesion, avoidance of stigmatization, and mitigation of local conflicts;
d. Coordination – USAID should seek to improve its coordination with regional and local actors to help
ensure the sustainability of its interventions, and the dissemination of information.
2
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=zqVd5InQSalg.k-Rlc3ws1DFg

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Management
1. The team recommends USAID initiate an analysis on how to better implement community-based conflict
recovery programs and activities as contributing and enabling parts of an overarching (but integrated) set of
USG and USAID goals in the region. The analysis should also look at how best to measure the
achievement of its activity outputs, outcomes and impacts. The team recommends that USAID consider
including USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), DOS and specifically DOS CSO,
in this analysis process. This latter recommendation is based on the need for more strategic, coherent and
consistently coordinated inter-agency approach.
2. The team recommends that any follow-on USAID C-LRA programming include an analysis of how to
monitor and measure contributory factors to recovery and development in affected communities, and
that this analysis be used to inform activity design. Focus should be on measurable contributions to allow
USAID to make definitive, evidence-based statements about proposed and actual contributions, as well as
factors that facilitate or hinder achievement of USAID’s goals.
3. The team recommends that the current inter-agency construct for designing and conceptualizing USAID
C-LRA approaches remain within the inter-agency community, but that they be managed by USAID in
Kinshasa.
4. The team recommends that the management of the C-LRA portfolio remain field-based. Should it remain
in Kinshasa, the team recommends that the portfolio more closely integrate within the DOs of the
USAID/DRC CDCS.
5. KIIs noted the significant positive change in the management and oversight of the USAID C-LRA portfolio
since June 2015 when dedicated personnel were assigned to manage the portfolio from Kinshasa.
Therefore, the team recommends that it continue to be managed in the field, under at least one dedicated
USAID program officer.
Coordination
1. The team recommends that USAID consider a conceptualization of its C-LRA activities that more clearly
delineates and de-conflicts competing or redundant programming between Invisible Children and USAID’s
C-LRA programming. One suggestion by several KII respondents is that USAID consider a more
integrated approach with itself and its partners, leveraging their vast experience and resources supporting
‘soft’ approaches such as community based protection trauma healing, social reconciliation, and
psychosocial efforts. At the same time, Invisible Children would leverage its significant network and past
performance to focus on EWS, information-sharing, information flow, and reporting.
2. The team recommends that any future USAID C-LRA activity develop a clear stakeholder engagement
and an information-sharing plan that includes ways to better coordinate with humanitarian agencies. This
plan would suggest clear and precise terms of reference with indicators that measure the degree of
coordination between the stakeholders. It would aim to better facilitate technical coordination and
programming between USAID, regional humanitarian actors, and the key players in community-based
protection, ICT, and human protection programming in affected areas.
Performance Monitoring
1. The team recommends that any future refinement and redevelopment of USAID C-LRA activities include
a rigorous, yet operationally flexible and responsive, monitoring and evaluation plan. This plan would
ensure measurements toward the achievement of the TOC and all goals and objectives are in place, and
that they are analyzed as part of an overall accountability, performance monitoring and lessons-learned
plan.
2. The team recommends that USAID consider formalizing its C-LRA TOC and that this TOC inform future
USAID C-LRA activities. The TOC should provide the bridge between the conflict analysis conducted by
USAID or its partner(s) and programming, helping USAID and its partner(s) ensure the relevance of its
programming. The TOC should make explicit assumptions about what change is expected and how and
why this change is expected.
3. The team recommends that as part of the TOC development, USAID consider including outcome as well
as output indicators, with the former being much more relevant to determining the effectiveness and
value for money of C-LRA programming.
4. In order to better measure the impact of USAID C-LRA programming, the team recommends that USAID
consider applying Most Significant Change (MSC) to its measurability tool-kit. MSC is an approach to

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evaluations that involves assessing the changes, and in turn, the impact that people experience as a result
of a program from the perspective of program participants and beneficiaries.
Strategic Considerations
1. At its heart, the LRA problem is nested within much broader security and development issues. Therefore
any solution to this problem will require a more holistic, multi-sector approach.
a. At the strategic level, the team recommends that any future USAID C-LRA activity be planned
and implemented within the broader security and development context of the region. It should
include a study (beginning with the TOC) of the additional impact on affected communities from
stressors such as natural resources exploitation; human migration from the pastoralist peoples
such as the Mbororo; and from other armed groups such as the Seleka, the anti-Balaka, and the
SPLA.
b. At the community level, the findings in this report stress the importance of focusing on long-
term community recovery needs within a more integrated USAID C-LRA strategy.
2. As part of the natural evolution and maturity of SECC, the intervention logic of the project has led to
opportunities to further structure and consolidate data collection in collaboration with relevant
stakeholders. Ensuring the accurate and timely collection of information relating to the movements of
armed groups, smuggling, trafficking in the area (e.g., of people, ivory, minerals, weapons, ammunition,
fuel, etc.) not only alerts stakeholders to security threats, but also allows for the development of more
anticipatory and/or preventive approaches to mitigate the impact of these threats. The team therefore
recommends that any future USAID C-LRA programming leverage these gains.
3. The team recommends that USAID consider incorporating EWS into a more comprehensive strategy that
includes addressing affected communities’ basic needs such as WASH, livelihoods, access to health
services, and access to education.
4. The team recommends an increased focus on social resilience and healing mechanisms relating to trauma
healing, reconciliation and integration in C-LRA activities as means to ensure the development of
sustainable, healthy, and prosperous communities.
5. The LRA is but one of the many organizations benefiting from poaching and the illicit trafficking of tusks
for revenue. The LRA is also highly dependent on the financial resources that poaching provides to them.
Subject to USAID’s level of prioritization, the team recommends that USAID strengthen its synergies with
natural resource management institutions in the region, as well as within USAID, and within its C-LRA
portfolio support to national natural resource conservations and to national park ranger training and
capacity building to identify armed groups in particular in Garamba Park. Based on the evidence, there is a
clear connection between revenue generation for armed groups such as the LRA from poaching, the
looting of diamonds and gold, and the illicit trafficking of ivory and conflict minerals in DRC, CAR and
South Sudan, much of which occurs in and around the national parks.

1
I. PURPOSE
This report was prepared by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc., (IBTCI) under the IDIQ Number
AID-623-I-13-00001, Task Order Number AID-623-TO-15-00003, and in response to the USAID Scope of Work
(SOW) (Annex 1). This report aims to inform USAID by thoroughly and rigorously reviewing its counter-Lord’s
Resistance Army (C-LRA) programming generally since 2010/2011, but more specifically as embodied in the
Secure, Empowered, Connected Communities (SECC) activity, by evaluating its outputs, outcomes, and impacts
relative to its proposed goal and Theory of Change (TOC), as well as within the wider United States Government
(USG) C-LRA context. The team assessed and evaluated USAID C-LRA programming more broadly, and then
where appropriate specifically under the SECC program. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), in partnership with Search
for Common Ground (SFCG) and Caritas Bangassou, comprises the SECC team.
The purpose of this study is to inform future USAID programming in LRA-affected areas through two parallel tasks
(described in more detail below), and one synthesis task. Task 1 is a situational analysis – or needs assessment -
whereby IBTCI identified the immediate needs from a sampling of communities that have been affected or are at
risk from the LRA and describes the impacts of the LRA in the identified communities. Task 2 is a process
evaluation that will test the theory of change of existing and previous US-funded C-LRA programming. Task 3, the
synthesis task, involves providing program recommendations to USAID based on the findings and conclusions to
result from the first two tasks.
The report also provides actionable recommendations to USAID on how perceived and actual outputs, outcomes,
and relative impacts of its programming can inform future C-LRA programming in LRA-affected areas of
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR). The primary audience for this report
is USAID. Additional recipients of this report are the wider USG and regional stakeholders. The report applied a
meta-evaluation approach, looking retrospectively to 2010, and at enormous data sets. These included partner
annual and quarterly reports; evaluations, reviews, and assessments; verifications reporting; annual and quarterly
indicator data derived from the SECC Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) plan; Key Informant Interviews (KIIs);
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs); USAID; and, normative literature associated with the LRA and the wider
regional conflict.
Task 1. Community Needs Assessment and Mapping
As part of the needs assessment process, the team identified whether the needs of the affected communities have
actually been addressed effectively through the USAID C-LRA programming, or indeed identify: a) what other
needs exist that are currently not being addressed by the USAID C-LRA programming, and b) what other
programming can be applied to meet the needs of the affected communities. Where possible, the team took
advantage of opportunities for direct observation of implementer-enabled activities, which will be documented
with photographs. Additional sources of data to support the needs assessment included project descriptions and
annual/quarterly reports from the implementers of C-LRA programs, The Resolve/LRA Crisis Tracker, the Enough
Project, and “grey” literature including academic papers, research papers, documents from international
organizations (United Nations Security Council Group of Experts, MONUSCO, World Bank, OECD, OCHA), as
well as reports from the Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l’Homme (RJDH) and other national
organizations.
As part of this task, the team described the perceived impacts of the LRA and of C-LRA programming funded by
USAID in purposively sampled communities as a means to represent more holistic outcomes and impacts of
programming in the affected region. The team also indicated whether these communities remain under threat and
illustrated the nature of their humanitarian, protection, reintegration, early warning, and healing priorities. During
the KIIs and FGDs, the team described existing community resiliencies and protection strategies, and described to
the degree possible some existing local and international efforts to assist the visited communities, including those
implemented by Invisible Children.
Task 2.Process Evaluation and Testing the Theory of Change
The objectives of this task are as follows:
1. To test the validity of the program’s theory of change and increase understanding of the extent to which
access to information is translated into self-protection. Broadly stated, the still-untested theory of change
holds that increased communication among communities leads to better protection from the LRA; and

2
2. To understand if the package of C-LRA services offered by USAID has had an observable impact on how LRA-
affected communities better prepare for, mitigate and respond to, and/or protect themselves from LRA
actions through the application of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and/or community
protection enablers; whether these communities have sustained the use and application of these USAID-
funded services; and whether these specific services can be improved upon by adding other services. The
needs assessment will also inform this objective.
Below are the evaluations questions for Task 2, grouped into categories of access, outcomes, and sustainability.
These questions are designed to guide the team’s efforts, and in particular, inform the methodology and design, the
analysis plan, and the KII and FGD instruments.
Access
1. How has access to ICT affected community response and protection initiatives in areas affected by the LRA?
2. How has access to community-based protection programs (CPPs) affected community response and
protection initiatives in areas affected by the LRA?
3. What has been the perceived influence of increased access to ICT, community response and protection
initiatives in areas affected by the LRA?
Outcomes
4. What have been the observable outcomes of ICT, information-sharing, and community-based protection
programs in areas affected by the LRA?
5. What information has been communicated within and between communities affected by the LRA?
6. How have USAID-funded ICT programs, community response and protection plans in LRA- affected areas
interfaced with complementary efforts such as the LRA Crisis Tracker and the Invisible Children projects, for
example?
7. What are the programmatic lessons learned from USAID-funded ICT and community-based protection
programs in LRA-affected areas since 2011?
Sustainability
8. To what extent have USAID-funded ICT programs, community response and protection programs in LRA-
affected areas been sustained since their inception?
Task 3. Programmatic Recommendations
Based on the analysis from Tasks 1 and 2, IBTCI provides, at the conclusion of the report, programming
recommendations to address the most significant needs of communities that continue to be affected by the LRA or
are the stage of early recovery.
II. BACKGROUND
For nearly three decades, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has plagued central Africa, brutally attacking,
abducting, and displacing tens of thousands of men, women, and children. Making it one of Africa’s oldest, most
violent, and persistent armed groups. The LRA was formed in Northern Uganda by Joseph Kony in 1986 with the
intent to over throw the Museveni regime of Uganda and operated in Uganda from 1986 to 2006. Lacking public
support, the LRA resorted to forcible recruitment to fill its ranks. Under increasing pressure, Kony ordered the
LRA to withdraw completely from Uganda in 2005 and 2006, and moved west into the border region of the DRC,
CAR, and what would become South Sudan. The LRA has continued to operate in this border region. National
military forces working as part of the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) have significantly reduced the
LRA's capacity to attack civilians; however, significant needs remain. USAID continues to play a critical role in
efforts to mitigate the negative impacts of the LRA on civilians and communities throughout Central Africa. This
region, characterized by minimal government influence and limited international humanitarian presence, enables the
LRA to evade regional security actors and to terrorize communities. They also engage in illicit trafficking - including
in ivory, diamonds, and gold.

3
The national governments of CAR, DRC, Uganda, and the Republic of South Sudan bear primary responsibility for
the protection of their citizens. However, they face significant challenges including limited resources, lack of
mobility, and poor transportation and communications infrastructure in the region as well a multitude of other
conflicts they are working to address. The lack of political will has also, at times, hindered adequate protection
response. As a result, communities residing in LRA-affected areas face displacement, violence, abduction, and
property destruction, as well as disruptions to market systems that can result in high incidence of malnutrition and
food insecurity.
The high number of people displaced by the LRA places a strain on host communities that often receive very little
outside assistance. As of June 30, 2014, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs reported that roughly 160,000 people remain internally displaced or refugees in LRA-affected areas of CAR,
DRC, and RoSS.
Countering the LRA threat and the protection of civilians continues to be a Presidential Policy Directive for Sub-
Saharan Africa. In 2010, grassroots advocacy, Congressional interest, and Executive branch concerns led to the
creation of a U.S. Government interagency strategy to counter the LRA. Prior to the August 2014 U.S.-Africa
Leaders’ Summit, 76 members of the U.S. Congress signed a letter to President Obama, urging him to continue
U.S. Government Engagement on this issue.
Due to the above mentioned Counter-LRA efforts, the LRA is currently only comprised of 150-2003
active fighters
and are operating in DRC, CAR, and South Sudan. “Since 2012, a significant number of the LRA’s senior
commanders have defected, been killed by the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) and other forces, or been
executed on Kony’s orders. Their loss, combined with losses in the LRA’s rank-and file, poses a major threat to
Kony’s ability to motivate and control remaining fighters.” Today, the LRA attacks and abductions are focused on
survival, i.e. looting basic goods and abducting adults for transporting goods. Most abductees either escape or are
released after a few days. “There remains little evidence that the LRA is abducting young children in order to
rebuild its fighting capacity.” While overall LRA attacks, killings, and abductions have significantly declined since
2010 there was a slight uptick in 2014. LRA attacks rose by 10 percent and abductions rose by 32 percent since
2013. “The unpredictability of LRA attacks from year-to-year is partly why the LRA is able to destabilize such a
vast swath of territory despite its reduced fighting capacity. Farmers become discouraged from planting crops in
rural areas even if LRA attacks drop, knowing they may increase in just a few months”. (State of the LRA, Resolve,
2015)
U.S. Government-funded Humanitarian and Civilian Protection Efforts:
USAID assistance responds to the needs of LRA-affected communities as well as communities vulnerable to other
armed groups, and includes multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance efforts to address acute needs and support early
recovery where feasible in CAR and DRC. USAID humanitarian assistance in LRA-affected communities in CAR
and DRC includes child protection, health and psychosocial services, food security, and limited livelihoods
activities.
In addition to humanitarian assistance, USAID efforts also promote community-based protection. From
2010-2013, USAID and the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration funded
Community Protection and Early Warning System projects implemented by Catholic Relief
Services (CRS) through Caritas partners to help 48 remote communities in LRA-affected areas of DRC to develop
community-based protection plans and connect with other communities through a high frequency (HF) radio
network. This included the creation of Local Committees for Community Organization (CLOCs). In a public
private partnership with Vodacom in northern DRC from 2011-2013, USAID enhanced civilian protection to
communities vulnerable to attacks by the LRA by providing cellular telecommunications coverage in Haut and Bas-
Uélé. USAID supported the construction of four lower-cost base transmission stations, which provide cell phone
connectivity to 1,200 mobile phone users living in areas previously lacking coverage.
3
The Resolve reported in the “State of the LRA” presentation at the LRA focal points meeting in Entebbe on September 8-9, 2015 that there
are 190 active members as of January 1, 2015. Additionally the Enough Project stated in its recent report, “Tusk Wars: Inside the LRA and the
Bloody Business of Ivory” published on October 26, 2015, that the LRA is "weakened to an unprecedented point, counting only 120 armed
fighters in its ranks. “

4
USAID provided support to lnternews for a Community Radio Correspondents Network (CRCN) program to
improve and reinforce two-way communication flows between local communities affected by the LRA conflict and
humanitarian agencies. The CRCN project focused in Mbomou and Haut Mbomou provinces where the U.S.
organization Invisible Children planned to install high frequency radios at churches. lnternews identified and trained
20 individuals from affected communities to serve as local correspondents for the Network of Community Radios.
All 20 correspondents received equipment and support to guarantee continuous reporting. The CRCN project
also supported the only community radio in Southeastern CAR, Radio Zereda in Obo, a village with a population
of 4,000 people in the center of the LRA threatened zone.
Although the U.S. Government is no longer providing financial support to the community-based protection
programs in DRC and the CRCN in CAR, the partnership with local partners was designed to provide programs
that could be sustained by communities after U.S. Government assistance ended. With the help of local partners,
Invisible Children compiles and distributes an "LRA Crisis Tracker" on all alleged LRA-related incidents.
In 2012, USAID launched the Secured, Empowered and Connected Communities (SECC) program in southeast
CAR to help communities susceptible to the LRA develop security plans to better anticipate and respond to
threats, implement community-based protection plans with the help of small grants, and reduce isolation and
vulnerability, partly through the provision of communications technology. Through this program, USAID fosters
community dialogue, provides HF radios to improve connectivity between target communities and surrounding
communities, and increases information shared on frequency modulation (FM) radio broadcasts. Targeted
communities will have increased capacity to engage with the local government and to access and share information
about their security context and available humanitarian services. The SECC team uses Appreciative Inquiry (AI)
methodology throughout the program, to identify and build upon communities’ existing strengths and assets.
Technical trainings will be conducted to empower target communities and ensure the project’s overall
effectiveness and sustainability. The SECC program also reintegrates LRA survivors through targeted trauma
healing workshops, participatory theater, and FM radio programming adapted to the local context.
USAID has obligated $14.9 million to CRS and sub-recipients Caritas and Search for Common Ground to
implement SECC. In December 2014, CRS expanded the SECC program into LRA-affected areas of DRC, including
in communities previously supported by U.S. Government assistance described above.
In addition to programming specifically to address the LRA, USAID also provides broader humanitarian assistance,
rehabilitation and recovery services to vulnerable populations in CAR and DRC.
III. METHODOLOGY
The Period of performance for the needs assessment and evaluation was June 19 – November 17, 2015. IBTCI
implemented a cross-sectional study design using qualitative methods for both Tasks 1 and 2. In both cases, the
unit of analysis is the community. In both cases, IBTCI gathered substantial primary and secondary data which was
analyzed within the framework of the above evaluation questions, i.e., each question will have an evidentiary set of
base data from the collection to support the answering of that question (see Annex 5). Analyzed data resulted in
key findings and conclusions. All conclusions were supported by at least two findings and all findings were
supported by at least two data sources, i.e., documentation, KIIs, and FGDs. Data for this project was elicited
primarily through purposive KIIs with various stakeholders and in particular community members in CAR and
DRC, and through FGDs held with members of communities in the LRA-affected areas. The universe of LRA-
affected communities was drawn from the LRA Crisis Tracker, as well as the CRS implementer, which has recently
conducted community assessments, and is, to date, the sole USAID implementer programming against active LRA
threats under the SECC program.
Description of Methods
Document Review: The document review process provided the requisite background information on LRA
activities, humanitarian, and civilian protection efforts over time, and was critical in helping the team shape the
technical approach of the evaluation and needs assessment components, including the KII and FGD guides
Key Informant Interviews: The team conducted KIIs with 243 individuals directly or indirectly involved in C-LRA
activities in the region. Each KII was facilitated using a KII guide that aligned questions to specific elements of either

5
the needs assessment or the evaluation questions (see Annex 4A). Interviews were conducted in-person in
Washington, DC; Kampala, Uganda; Nairobi, Kenya; Entebbe, Uganda, and at several sites in the DRC and CAR
(see Annex 2 and 3 for KII and FGD collection sites).
Focus Group Discussions: With the support of a local subcontractor, Global Research Insights (GRI), IBTCI
conducted 43 FGDs with community members at LRA-affected intervention and comparison sites described in
more detail below. Each FGD consisted of six to 12 respondents and was conducted according to USAID standard
rapid appraisal methodology. Each FGD was facilitated using a FGD guide that aligned questions to specific
elements of either the needs assessment or the evaluation questions (see Annex 4B). Each FGD team included a
local facilitator, an interpreter, and a note-taker and each FGD was recorded for subsequent analysis. The FGD
guide included questions aimed at probing responses about USAID C-LRA outcomes, results, and perceived
impacts over time. It was also aimed at generating forward-looking C-LRA needs. The FGDs were held in
convenient locations, easily accessible to participants, and GPS coordinates were noted (see Annex 3).
All team members, including GRI, attended an instrument finalization and training session in Kinshasa, July 20-24,
2015. This was led and facilitated by the Senior Technical Advisor. This session was immediately prior to the field
data collection, and included an alignment of the analytical framework to the KII and FGD guide questions; a
substantive review of the guide questions; discussion and finalization of the protocols; a review of the security plan
for both DRC and CAR; and a finalization of the logistics plan for DRC and CAR. It should be noted that unlike a
survey instrument, the KII and FGD guides included open-ended questions that allowed the interviewer to probe
using techniques such as repeating questions, adopting a “sophisticated naiveté” posture, using pausing placement
and inserting neutral statements, such as “Anything Else?” The transcripts will be analyzed looking for thematic
and/or word patterns; context analysis, i.e., how statements are made and in what context; analysis of internal
agreement, consensus of central tendency on specific topics, e.g., the utility of ICT for community warning.
Data Management and Analysis
The team processed the raw primary source data (FGD and KII notes) prior to analysis. Audio recordings of the
FGD sessions were transcribed to ensure completeness of the raw data. Participants’ responses were then
organized by evaluation question, in the form of an analytical “code book”. The team used the analytical framework
to guide the analysis. Findings were triangulated to ensure only well-grounded findings are reported instead of
relying on anecdotes. It should be noted that all KII and FGD collections followed the “common rule” for human
subjects (USAID) (22 CFR Part 225) ensuring that all respondents were protected and provided anonymity if they
so wished and that their personally identifiable information (PII) be secured and not made public. This was an even
more critical consideration given the nature of this project, and the sensitivity of the information.
The assessment Task 1 and the more evaluative Task 2 utilized a mixed-method approach. As such, IBTCI
systematically integrated the secondary data collection method, and the two primary data collection methods,
drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data to address the objectives of the assignment. Each Evaluation
Question has been answered with more than one data collection method. Data and the subsequent findings to
emerge from the data were triangulated in order to validate, corroborate, and in some cases refute findings
identified from corresponding data methods. For example, project and activity Quarterly and Annual reports often
included self-reported outputs and performance monitoring data which while informative, were not necessarily
descriptive of outcomes, and so the data within these reports was triangulated with those to emerge from the KIIs
and FGDs, thereby providing a more holistic – and balanced - set of findings. This approach also ensured that any
bias to emerge from one source was minimized. During the analysis of the data the team both triangulated
methods in parallel combinations in which methods are used concurrently to answer the Evaluation Questions, and
in sequential combinations in which methods are used in sequence (desk review and then KIIs and FGDs) to
answer the Evaluation Questions.
Finally, the team minimized bias by using standardized guides to ensure uniformity in questionnaire administration
for the FGDs and KIIs. The interviewer’s bias was further mitigated by convening daily team debriefs, rolling data
analysis, and presentation of transcripts within 24 hours of FGDs and KIIs. Our team used stratified purposive
sampling for selection of communities in both the administrative regions in each county, to ensure a representative
sample of project beneficiaries.

6
The analysis of the data was comprised of four analytical approaches:
1. Comparison Analysis. The team compared targets against actuals to assess the extent to which the
USAID-funded C-LRA activities, and primarily SECC’s intermediate results, objectives, and goal have
been achieved.
2. Summary Statistics. Where appropriate, the team used summary statistics to analyze quantitative data
obtained from the indicators within SECC’s M&E Plan, using cross-tabulation analysis. It should be
noted that SECC had very cursory output targets and actuals in its reports, and so this analytical
method did not adequately inform the study.
3. Content, Pattern, and Trend Analysis. For data from KIIs, the team documented narrative responses
to allow for a systematic content analysis of these data, and of the frequency of responses to
questions.
4. Response Convergence/Divergence Analysis. The team reviewed the data collected to determine
where there was significant response convergence from the varied stakeholders. When divergence
was found, the team reviewed the data to better understand the context and reasons for divergence
in facts, perceptions or opinions.
A. DATA SOURCES
IBTCI collected its data from a number of sources including key informants, focus group participants, the KII and
FGD protocols, and primary and secondary documentation.
KII Respondents
For the purposes of this project, KII respondents were purposively selected. This ensured that participants who
are most informed on LRA activities in the Central Africa Region are included in the sample. As mentioned above.
243 interviews were conducted, and the full KII list is in Annex 2. Interviewees were from the following
respondent groups: partner stakeholders; state institutions; international NGOs; local NGOs; humanitarian
organizations; ICT providers; international and regional security actors; religious organizations and beneficiaries.
Additional KII respondents were the result of “snowballing” from the FGDs and included household
representatives, community leaders, elders, and purposive focus group discussion “exit interview” participants.
FGD Respondents
IBTCI exceeded expectations in the SOW by conducting 43 FGDs with community members at intervention and
comparison sites. They included FGDs with religious leaders, community protection committee personnel, as well
as FGDs with general community members, disaggregated by men, women, and youth. This latter demographic can
be particularly critical for gathering data on the use of ICT as a means to connect and inform community members.
Left: IDP widow from Ngilima (DRC) settled in Bamokandi IDP village, Dungu. Right: Child abductee in
Bangadi, DRC. Returned after 6 years in captivity.

7
KII and FGD Protocols
To address Tasks 1 and 2, the KII and FGD protocols focused on the following themes:
Access to information communication technology (ICT) and community-based programming in LRA-affected areas: The team
assessed the role, viability, and utilization of ICT by communities, security actors, and international humanitarian
and development actors to promote community protection and livelihoods, and whether this ICT can be sustained.
Types of information and means of communication: The team assessed what means of communication; cell phones,
satellite phones (Thurayas), High Frequency (HF) radio networks, community correspondents, community
protection planning committee activities, traditional communication strategies (e.g., warning drums) are being used
and which have the most local support.
Information utilization: The team determined the extent to which information is used for community protection,
governance, livelihoods, and/or health, and whether this use of information can be sustained.
Information-based protection strategies: The team assessed whether other community-based protection strategies are
viable (e.g., using HF radios to convey information about market prices versus repairing a bridge to provide shorter
routes to the market).
Approaches to community-based protection: To the extent possible, the team directly observed how community
protection plans are implemented.
Other issues: The IBTCI team also investigated the following:
 Sustainability of community-based protection programs;
 Existence and role of CLOC;
 Key gaps or opportunities to further leverage ICT and/or community-based protection efforts to strengthen
communities’ resiliency to violence and economic and political shocks; and
 Challenges of earlier program implementation, and whether problems with lack of access, infrastructure,
insecurity, weather, and local partner systems were addressed.
B. SAMPLING STRATEGY
IBTCI employed a stratified sampling strategy to select a representative sample of the LRA-affected intervention
and non-intervention communities in CAR and DRC. The respondent communities were stratified by the following
notional parameters:
1. Geographic regions: Mbomou, Haute-Mbomou, and Haute Kotto in CAR; and Haute-Uélé and Bas-Uélé in
DRC.
2. Status of conflict: post-conflict (within the last five years), current conflict, and no conflict.
Crisis type: Civilian death, abductions, civilian injury, displacement, looting, LRA encounter and returnee.
Left: Focus Group Session among male youth in Dungu. Right: Focus Group Session participants among older women in Bangadi.

8
Using the LRA Crisis Tracker, a sampling frame comprising a list of the affected areas/communities over the last
five years was identified. The table below shows the affected communities stratified by crisis type, region and status
of conflict. It represents the total sampling frame.
In summary, KIIs were conducted in-person in Washington, DC; Kampala, Uganda; Nairobi, Kenya; Entebbe,
Uganda, and at several sites in DRC and CAR (see Annex 2 and 3 for the collection sites). FGDS were conducted
in 18 sites, and are illustrated below in the corresponding site-visit maps.
CAR Site Selection Criteria
Intervention sites: From the initial scope of
work of the Community Radio
Correspondent Network (CRCN) activity,
the team focused on two prefectures:
Mbomou and Haut Mbomou in southeast
CAR. The CRCN intervention targeted
communities located in the sub prefectures
of Zemio, Djemah, Mboki, Obo, Rafai, and
Bangassou. The team, in consultation with
USAID, selected six communities, one from
each of the six sub-prefectures.
Comparison sites: Three sub prefectures -
Bakouma (a sub-prefecture of Mbomou),
Issa Mazangue, and Bria were purposively
chosen based on 1) lack of coverage by
None Civilian Death Abduction Civilian Injury Displacement Looting LRA encounter Returnee
Bas-Uele No conflict Bondo
Current Conflict
Bambangane, Pasi, Samatari, Bili,
Bandueli
Bili, Samatari, Bandueli Bambangana, Gwane,
Dgiba, Bandueli
Bulumasi, Banda,
Gwane, Naparka,
Bambangana
Post-conflict
Bili, Api,
Digba, Buye
Bili, Api, Ango, Dakwa, Digba,
Sukadi, Gwane, Banda, Dikuma,
Buye, Zangabai, Masombo
Digba, Buye,
Zangabai, Bangalu
Digba Api, Ango, Digba,
Gwane, Dakwa, Banda,
Pasi, Zangabai
Bili, Digba, Babile Bili, Digba,
Nakorda, Disolo
Haute-Uele No conflict Doruma
Current Conflict
Banda, Tongotongo, Nakale,
Tadu (near Faradje)
Kpaika (near Duru) Banda, Tongotongo,
Bitima, Kpaika, Nakale,
Tadu (near Faradje),
Simbia, Gangala
Nakale (near Duru),
Kiliwa (Togo),
Bangadi, Nambia
(Near Niangara)
Post-conflict
Nagilidangwa,
Ngilima, Djabir
Makpelenga, Diebio-Adala rd,
Bambangana, Diagbe, Zikilingi,
Bangadi, Mabadabada, Wawe,
Niangara, Gungu, Ngilima,
Nakwa, Mbiangu, Taduru,
Kpaika, Anduala, Kumbolongo,
Kiliwa, Bitima, Gangala na Bodio,
Nakpudu
Banda, Ngilima,
Zikilingi, Dungu-
Duru rd,
Kumbolongo,
Kpaika
Kulugbangu,
Dungu
Diagbe, Naparke,
Bangadi, Kana,
Mbiangu, Ngilima,
Nambia, Wawe,
Kulugbangu,
Mabadabada, Gungu,
Pilipili, Anduala,
Kiliwa, Kumbolongo
Ngilima, Taduru,
Kiliwa(Togo),
Anduala, Niangara,
Nambia, Yabwa,
Yamba, Bangadi,
Nambili, Napopo,
Naparka
Nambia, Wawe,
Bangadi, Ngilima
Mbomou No conflict Bangassou
Current Conflict Rafai Rafai Rafai
Post-conflict Fode, Agoumar, Rafai Lougba Bakouma Bakouma
Fode
Haute-MbomNo conflict
Current Conflict
Mboki, Bassigbiri
(east of Obo)
Post-conflict
Zemio-Obo rd Djemah, Ifourou, Zemio-Obo rd,
Mabousso, Kamanda, Banangui,
Kpabou, Mboki, Obo-Mboki rd,
Obo
Kamande, Zemio-
Obo rd, Kpabou,
Obo-Mboki rd,
Obo
Djemah, Banangui,
Mboki, Obo
Banangui, Djemah,
Obo
Zemio, Ifourou,
Mboki, Obo
Haute Kotto No conflict Pipi
Current Conflict Sam Ouandja Yalinga
Post-conflict
Ouadda-Sam
Ouandja
Akocho, Sam Ouandja, Yangou-
Pendere
Bria, Dangbatro Bria Sam Ouandja
Figure 1: Sampling Frame
Figure 2: CAR Site Selection

9
CRCN; and 2) ease of access. The team randomly selected three communities, one from each of the three sub
prefectures.
DRC Site Selection Criteria
Intervention sites: USAID supported the construction of four transmission stations at Bangadi, Niangara, Ango, and
Doruma. The team selected four communities, i.e., one community in close proximity to each of the four
locations. In addition, the team included Isiro and randomly selected two communities from Dungu territory (of
Haute-Uélé district) and Bondo territory (of Bas-Uélé district) that received USAID intervention.
Comparison sites: Four territories - Bili,
Buta, and Faradje, were purposively
chosen based on 1) the target geographic
location of this needs assessment i.e.
Haute-Uélé and Bas-Uélé districts of the
Orientale Province; 2) absence of USAID
intervention, benefits from intervention,
and/or awareness of intervention 3) ease
of access. For the purposes of this
evaluation, the team selected multiple
communities from each of the four
territories. (See Annex 3 for FGD Sites
and Dates Table)
In Bili the team performed FGDs in the
communities of Lalu, Dekula, Tombo, and
Pangali. In Faradje FGDs and KIIs were conducted in Lalibe and Tadu, and in Buta FGDs were done in Lifaki and
Buta Center. All communities are within the locality of the central sites named on the map, i.e. Bili, Faradje, and
Buta.
It should be noted that while the team faced overall access, logistics and security constraints during the data
collection in DRC and CAR, we were able to access all proposed sites save for Yalinga. This comparison site in
CAR was substituted with an alternate site meeting the same selection criteria: Issa Mazangue. Moreover, the team
was able to conduct additional KIIs and FGDs in Djabir, and KIIs in Naguero, Bunia, and Goma, exceeding the
SOW requirements.
C. LOGISTICS PLAN
A detailed logistics plan for DRC and CAR, as well as a Gantt work plan, is in Annex 6. The total period of
performance for the study was 16 weeks, the fieldwork was conducted over four weeks each within the DRC and
CAR with the teams traveling sequentially from site-to-site to conduct the KIIs and to oversee, and in some cases
lead, the FGDs. During the week of July 27, the CAR co-Team Lead deployed to Bangui (and moved eastward),
while the DRC co-Team Lead conducted KIIs in Kinshasa prior to deploying to Goma (and moved northward and
then westward). Data collection in Bangui, Kinshasa, Goma, and Kisangani included only KIIs and were considered
neither intervention or comparison sites.
D. RISK MITIGATION
IBTCI recognizes that the LRA-affected areas in the CAR and DRC where project activities will be conducted are
high risk and non-permissive areas. IBTCI also recognizes that the security posture of the field teams will have had
a direct impact on the successful gathering of meaningful data necessary to complete the assignment. The IBTCI
Security Department worked closely with the Senior Technical Advisor to determine the safest and most effective
way to pursue data gathering activities in each selected field site.
Conducting fieldwork in both DRC and CAR, particularly in the LRA-affected areas can be challenging in terms of
logistics and general operationalization. In mitigating the risks associated with access, security for the project team
and that of respondents, IBTCI ensured that prior to conducting the FGDs it made direct contact with the area
village “chief” as a courtesy call for him to be aware of the team’s presence in their jurisdiction(s). This was in
Figure 3: DRC Site Selection

10
addition to the relevant permissions sought from the relevant local administration(s) and security actors. The team
also ensured that relevant authorities, including at the national level, were aware of the mission.
Many of the areas of this study were remote, inaccessible, and conflict sensitive. Therefore, the IBTCI/GRI
recruitment teams employed supervisors and recruiters from the areas in which the conducted the FGDs. The
supervisors acted as both reconnaissance that preceded the research teams, and as oversight through
implementation. In the event that the preceding team had strong reasons for the change of location due to security
concerns, the GRI field team made decisions on possible change of location/site visit.
IBTCI had communication issues during travel days. Whereas areas or villages that have sizeable populations had
access to GSM networks, the distances between villages or towns meant that teams were momentarily cut off
during travel periods, save for the use of an issued satellite phone. IBTCI and GRI have in the past used satellite
phones and HF two-way radio communications to keep track of teams on the ground.
Based on current guidance from IBTCI's Security Director and our independent security provider on the
accessibility, security and risk levels in CAR and DRC, IBTCI is adjusting its method of execution for the task as
follows:
 In both CAR and DRC, IBTCI limited the sites to be visited by the international staff. This was a result of
the restricted options regarding road and air movement, but more importantly the threat levels. GRI,
under IBTCI guidance and coordination, covered all proposed sites.
 IBTCI’s security provider assigned a dedicated Expat Security Manager with extensive country experience
and language skills for each country, to travel with the team and serve as a point of contact for the group
giving guidance on security, logistics planning, method of operations, liaison, and information gathering, as
well as the incident management lead for events ranging from loss of passport, to physical injury, and to
victim of crime or terrorism.
 Two teams of two vetted and locally sourced security-trained drivers (total of two drivers and two cars
for DRC and two drivers and two cars for CAR) were hired. This was a requirement for movement
outside of the capitals of Kinshasa and Bangui, and would provide the capability to cross deck (transfer all
staff from one immobilized vehicle to another) in order to continue the journey to the nearest safe haven.
 Where commercial flights were not possible, IBTCI used charted aircraft to shuttle the teams in DRC and
CAR.
IV. KEY CONCLUSIONS
LRA-affected communities in the DRC and CAR have been empowered since 2010
through community-based protection efforts and increased access to information. SECC has
contributed to this outcome, but is by no means the sole contributor.
All of the KII and FGD respondents were in agreement that since 2010 there has been a marked increase in the
effectiveness of early warning systems (EWS) and community-based protection programs. A thorough review of
other actors such as Invisible Children, SFCG, Caritas and CRS documentation also suggests positive initial
outcomes of such programming. What is unclear are the specific impacts that USAID-funded C-LRA programming
has had in the affected areas when compared to non-USAID-funded programming. This is, in part, due to the lack
of a performance monitoring baseline and a clearly defined, defensible, theory of change aligned directly to
performance monitoring indicators.
Additionally, the evidence does not suggest that SECC’s activities were either innovative or unique in supporting
affected communities. According to three documents,4
fundamental to the development of the SECC program, a
lack of reliable communications In Bas- and Haut-Uélé was identified as a key factor enabling a high-level of
violence against citizens in these areas. This combined with a requisite response to the horrific massacre at
Makombo in late 2009 which prompted a rapid assessment team to explore “what types of communication system
would be the most appropriate and effective to dramatically improve the access to communications and
4
Enhancement of Community-Based Early Warning Capacity in USAID/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Bas- and Haut-Uélé, Province
Orientale Assessment and Program Design Trip Report, November 30, 2010; Community Radio Correspondents Network (CRCN):
Empowering Eastern CAR Residents with Information Benefitting their Safety and Economic Livelihoods; No Date;

11
information in the Uélés, and indeed to other affected communities in Uganda, DRC, and CAR.”5
This attempt was
firmly in line with President Obama’s counter-LRA strategy. The team was originally sent to examine the possibility
of increasing peace and security by extending cell phone coverage to selected areas in the LRA-affected areas of
Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé through a public-private partnership. The groundwork for this idea was eventually realized
through a public-private partnership with local mobile network operators. The assessment also recommended
other community early warning communications options, including shortwave (SW) radio broadcasts; frequency
modulation (FM) stations and/or repeaters; handheld, stationary and moveable high frequency (HF) radios; satellite
emergency locator beacons; solar-powered/hand-cranked radio receivers; satellite telephones; low-tech and/or
traditional warning signals and employing either short message service (SMS) or interactive voice response (IVR) as
a part of a cell tower approach for the purposes of information collection or distribution. Many of these options
were implemented either in tandem or sequentially by organizations such as Invisible Children, Caritas and the
CRS consortium that eventually became SECC. Similarly, SECC’s programming activities in CAR evolved from an
assessment conducted in 2011 on the requirement for a more robust, and geographically expansive, means of
linking technologies, humanitarian responders, local media and affected populations. This assessment
recommended the development, and more importantly the sustainment of information technology to empower
communities affected by conflict or humanitarian crisis.6
Therefore, the SECC program can be seen as more of a
parallel, or consequent, effort aimed at empowering communities through the provision of ICT. Finally, while the
consensus among KII and FGD respondents was that SECC’s EWS activities were impactful in the targeted
communities in DRC and CAR, These activities cannot be effectively disaggregated from comparable or similar
EWS efforts implemented by other organizations.
The relative outcomes and impacts of USAID-funded C-LRA EWS programming are generally
recognized, and supported by the evidence. While positive outcomes associated with the “softer”
implementation activities were perceived by the majority of KII respondents and all of the FGD
respondents as being effective, they were also perceived as either incomplete or insufficient.7
As described more fully in the
needs assessment section of the
report, support to psychosocial
activities; trauma healing; DDRRR
(and especially reintegration); and
reconciliation activities has not
been sufficient. Arguably, and
indeed as even the SECC COP
has highlighted, while EWS
activities are an enabler to
empowering communities,
psychosocial and trauma healing
support activities are critical for
long-term and sustained recovery
and development. Most critically
INGOs, regional NGOs, civil
society and religious leaders have
all stressed the importance of
reintegration efforts to re-building sustainable, healthy, communities. At the September 2015 LRA Focal Points
meeting UNMISS, The Resolve, Invisible Children, MINUSCA, MONUSCO, USAID, the Inter-Church Committee,
World Vision, and SAIPED all stressed the importance of properly reintegrating well-trained ex-LRA combatants
5
Enhancement of Community-Based Early Warning Capacity in USAID/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Bas- and Haut-Uélé, Province
Orientale Assessment and Program Design Trip Report, November 30, 2010; USG Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance
Army, November 24, 2010.
6
Central African Republic – Assessment Prepared for Internews Network, April 30, 2011.
7
Soft approaches to implementation differ from “hard” approaches such as those centered on infrastructure development and the delivery of
tangible, physical items. Soft approaches relate to implementation efforts aimed at affecting individual and collective perceptions of change to
psychological, socio-cultural, drivers such as trauma, willingness to reconcile, etc.
Figure 4: Performance of Sub-objectives
(Aggregate Percentage ofTargets Achieved by SO byYear)

12
back into affected communities. Father Kumbonyaki, from the Inter-Church Committee, also called on USAID to
extend its reintegration programming to South Sudan.
One item to note is that USAID’s C-LRA programming has had several secondary positive effects. EWS is being
used to connect communities and families that were previously isolated from each other; used by humanitarian
agencies to pass on information to each other and to the communities; used to communicate outbreaks of
epidemics/diseases of public health concern like mumps, cholera, etc.; and, used to mobilize people for
vaccinations. Communities also anticipated that EWS would, in the future, be used to mobilize people to register
for elections, carry out voter education, and pass on/receive information from local authorities and institutions on
substantive issues such as security, health and education
SECC achieved many of its performance targets in CAR, but the evidence from DRC is inconclusive
According to SECC’s self-reported output data, SECC CAR performed surprisingly much better in Year 2 than
Year 1, improving in all three sub-objectives. See Figure 4. Due to programming starting in only the spring of 2015,
the team had no or very limited corresponding data for DRC, and so an analysis of these performance monitoring
results was not possible. The team calculated performance in the CAR on the sub-objectives (SOs) and then on
the overall goal as a whole.
The team conducted an analysis of summary statistics of the
percentage of SECC targets achieved by year, to determine that
Year 2 was significantly more successful than Year 1. This is,
presumably, because start-up in CAR was so challenging in Year
1. The evidence also suggests that there were appreciable
advances in Year 2, but that there were considerable challenges
in achieving SO1: Target communities employ adaptive strategies to
address their security and community challenges, with an emphasis
on the threat posed by the LRA. See Figure 5.
A closer look at SO1 – a sustainability objective - suggests that
performance toward Output 1.2.1: Number and percentage of
target communities which have submitted at least one small grant
project proposal, and Output 1.2.2 relating to overall
performance on grants awarded, managed and monitored were
not realized. See Figure 5. Therefore the reported performance
data from SO 1 appears to hinder SECC from achieving overall success towards the program's goals as they were
only able to achieve 43% of their Intermediate Result goals
(Figure 5).
That being said Year 2 data is only representative of
implementation through May of 2015. With this in mind it
appears that SECC is on course to meet their goals for
SO 1 and to perform higher than expected in SO 2 and 3.
One piece of data that goes against the success of the
SECC CAR program, is the data from Output 1.1.3 -
Number of incidents affecting the security of individuals or the
community which occur in target communities. The number of
incidents has risen in the CAR by 886% in year 2 from 22
to 195. See figure 6. This is a telling number that could be
due to either increased incidents of conflict, or improved
reporting mechanisms leading to increased reporting of
incidents.
Finally, it should be noted that according to the output
data, SECC was generally successful in meeting its targets for Year 2, save for Outputs 1.2.2, 1.3.1, 1.3.2, and 2.2.3.
See Figure 7.
Figure 5: Performance of SO1
(Aggregate PercentageTargets Achieved byYear)
Figure 6: Performance of Output 1.1.3 - Number of
incidents affecting the security of individuals or the
community which occur in target communities

13
USAID’s C-LRA objectives are sound
but its theory of change (TOC) is post
hoc ergo propter hoc or “after this,
therefore because of this” and is thus a
logical fallacy. The TOC is also difficult
to validate as it deviates from the SECC
project goal and is devoid of associated
progress indicators.
It should be noted that there was no explicit
theory of charge (TOC), either for USAID’s
C-LRA activities, or for the SECC program.
Also, the very fact that the USAID TOC was
developed after implementation – and not as a
guiding tool to help determine activity
contribution to actual results (i.e., correlation), and to inform programming effectiveness and progress over time -
presented a performance monitoring challenge. The team does not suggest that in the absence of a TOC outputs,
outcomes and impacts cannot be identified, or that progress cannot be meaningfully measured. It does suggest
that when tied to a logical TOC output, outcome and impact indicators are more defensible as correlates of
change. There is also deviation between USAID’s objectives and SECC’s project goal, which while reflective of the
evolving regional security situation, also hampers the ability of USAID to monitor SECC’s progress as a part of its
overall C-LRA strategy.
According to ADS 200, a TOC is a description of the logical causal relationships between multiple levels of
conditions or interim results needed to achieve a long-term objective. It may be visualized as a roadmap of change,
and outlines pathways or steps to get from an initial set of conditions to a desired end result. A TOC is analogous
to a USAID development hypothesis or project hypothesis. A robust TOC also makes explicit any critical
assumptions that are necessary to ensure, or that may possibly undermine, program success. The ‘problem’ that
USAID has sought to address with its C-LRA activities was, it seems, to empower vulnerable communities through
programs such as community protection strategies and information sharing.
The team was tasked to determine C-LRA TOC validity. In defining TOC validity – and in this case the validity of
the USAID C-LRA TOC - there are three principles that are applicable in critiquing a TOC: relevance, sound logic,
and effectiveness. These same general principles are echoed in the wider literature of TOC, and are characteristics
specifically mentioned when it comes to the evaluability of a program. If it is possible to demonstrate that USAID’s
TOC contains these three essential characteristics, the TOC can be considered ‘valid.’ Without concrete evidence
from the literature, KIIs, or the FGDs, the team assumed that the brainstorming technique used by USAID to
develop its objectives and TOC met the standard of relevance, i.e., that USAID correctly identified the issues that
should be focused on, and the reasons why. As discussed above, validity may also be determined as contingent
upon the principles of logical correctness and effectiveness. A logically correct TOC should be justifiable with
evidence supporting the sequence of cause-and-effect events from past projects and/or objective context studies,
situational analyses or baseline studies. A TOC should also be plausible, i.e., if there is no prior evidence
supporting the sequence of events, it should be nested logically within what is known about the intervention and
context, and specifically, all of the underlying assumptions should be made explicit with key constraining or
enabling contextual factors identified.
Next, according to ADS 201, the TOC should explain “why” and “how” the proposed investments from USAID
and others collectively lead to achieving the Development Objectives in a CDCS. This being the case, the very fact
that the C-LRA activities are not explicitly within a CDCS with an overarching, high-level objective from which the
DOs, IRs and sub-IRs logically stem, certainly presents a challenge in justifying the TOC’s validity.
Next, analysis of the evidence indicates that there was a discrepancy between USAID’s objectives and SECC’s
stated goal. Again, the design of the initial C-LRA non-northern Uganda programming (the CRS community-based
protection combined with the HF radio network, and the Vodacom cell towers) did not have an explicitly
Figure 7: Overall Performance of SECC CAR (Percentage ofTargets
Achieved)

14
articulated TOC, but there was a clearly defined USAID objective that can suggest a TOC. Although these were
two awards, the cell towers that were intentionally put into communities where there was CRS intervention were
meant to augment the community-based protection programming more broadly, and feed into the broader TOC
and programming objectives. As one USAID adviser has recently done, a quick reframing of the objective into a
TOC would be:
If LRA-affected communities are empowered through community-based protection planning and increased
access to information and options for communication within and across communities, then they will be
better able to avoid or reduce their exposure to threats associated with the presence of armed groups and
ongoing conflict.
The SECC program is primarily an expansion of this work and has a similar objective (as does Invisible Children,
for that matter). This is clearly articulated in the RFP for SECC, which describes the underlying objectives and
concepts. In terms of the CRCN program, this was also driven by a similar TOC, although according to one
USAID adviser, “the empowerment model was less around community-based protection and it tended to focus
more on developing journalist skills and empowering key individuals in the community to increase access to
information.” Interestingly, however, SECC’s project goal is much more comprehensive. Given this lack of
specificity it is also much more difficult to evaluate or to monitor performance over time. Unlike USAID's typically
decentralized approach of focusing on a specific country or region as stipulated in a CDCS or RCDS, and then
determining objectives, DOs, IRs, and indicators based on the country’s-specific or region-specific TOC, the C-
LRA activities were very much driven from Washington. USAID's efforts were one piece of the USG C-LRA
strategy, and although not explicitly, including wider regional stability efforts, the evolving security situation in the
CAR in particular affected USAID’s programming there, and as a result SECC itself was utilized to absorb
resources to respond to the broader security concerns in the country. Its objective – loosely defined and clearly
reflecting the broader USF strategy – is:
[To] enable cohesive, self-directed, and connected communities to avoid or reduce their exposure to threats
associated with the presence of armed groups and ongoing conflict in areas most vulnerable to attack by LRA
forces.
The objective deviates from the USAID TOC in that it is much more holistic, and without explicit outputs,
outcomes, and impacts, more difficult to monitor and/or evaluate.
Finally, there are several missing pieces in the cause and effect results chain necessary for the C-LRA TOC to be
valid. A valid TOC can be considered as the reasoning that connects the intervention to the changes it is expected
to cause. In Figure 8 below, this reasoning, or assumed causality, is represented by arrows linking the proposed
intervention to a sustainable result. The C-LRA TOC assumes that in order for increased community resilience,
awareness or security, empowerment through a combination of community protection planning and increased
access to information is necessary and perhaps also sufficient for it to be sustainable, sustainability being the
ultimate desired result in USAID programming. It is also clear from the C-LRA TOC that there is an assumptive
logic in the IF, THEN statements, or steps, that lead toward this desired final result of intervention, sustainability.
This assumptive logic is also missing other critical intervention outputs and outcomes that would ensure its
sustainability such as trauma healing, psychosocial support to victims and families, regional and/or local government
‘buy-in’, strong governance structures, and the inclusion of achievable livelihoods goals.
There have been both positive and negative perceptions of the effectiveness of interagency and
inter-program cooperation during the implementation of C-LRA activities in the region, but an
overwhelmingly positive perception of military-to-military collaboration.
Figure 8:Theory of Change Development Chart

15
While the vast majority of USG and regional stakeholder KII respondents expressed positive perceptions of the
effectiveness of USG interagency cooperation during the implementation of C-LRA activities, there was a small
minority of respondents who were critical. Described more fully below, the criticism is associated with what was
perceived as an unnecessarily slow start-up for the SECC program. Perceptions also varied at what can be termed
the strategic and tactical levels. There is clear evidence from both Washington and field-based KIIs with USG
personnel, and in particular DOS personnel, that the inter-agency collaboration at the policy level was – and
remains – strong despite the fact that USG policy in the region has evolved considerably since the Seleka rebellion
broke in CAR in late 2012. At the tactical level there is also evidence of strong collaboration among USG C-LRA
partners, one that has developed out of necessity: the USG C-LRA community often shares critical operational and
tactical information with SOF on C-LRA messaging; defections; LRA sightings and movements; community
protection planning and resilience strategies; natural resource management and exploitation; and, locations of
recent LRA attacks, abductions, robberies and lootings. There continues to be a joint determination to “finish off”
the LRA militarily in the affected areas and to bring Kony and the LRA leadership to justice. This is supported by
evidence that there remains a strong – and essential - collaboration between civilian and military actors at all levels,
one that a current senior DOS Director suggested is one of the “best examples, past and present,” of tactical-level
civil-military coordination.
KIIs have also suggested that while USAID and SOF, and more broadly USAID, DOD and DOS, have an amicable
and jointly necessary relationship in implementing complementary C-LRA activities in the region, SECC was singled
out by the majority of respondents as being averse to working closely with SOF in CAR and DRC. As senior
implementing staff at CRS itself has confirmed this aversion is historical; in an effort to stress objectivity and
neutrality, CRS has typically operated in conflict settings without perceived or real operational, logistical or tactical,
alignment to military forces. According to a smaller number of KIIs, this may also be a decision based in part on
the CRS and SECC management’s unwillingness to collaborate with military actors. The decision, whether
historical or consciously driven by management, has hampered SECC’s ability to implement in a timely and efficient
way, however. According to the SECC COP, there is no official corporate policy defining CRS’s position towards
collaborating with military actors, except that like all the humanitarian stakeholders, CRS wishes to adhere to key
humanitarian principles such as independence, neutrality and the importance of beneficence and ‘Do No Harm’.
Any coordination and communication with military actors therefore will depend on the specific context and would
ultimately be debated through discussions between CRS senior level staff in the field and at headquarters. Simply
put, neither CRS, nor SECC more broadly, wish to be perceived as militarizing civilian protection. There is also an
aversion to the risk of associating civilians, partners and ICT operators with military actors, thereby bringing them
into the military “fight” against the LRA.
It should be noted however that SECC and SOF (as well as RTF) do collaborate to some degree with information
dissemination. For example, SOF members are currently on the distribution list for SECC alerts from the
community-based EWS. There is also evidence of information sharing with the RTF in Dungu. While such cases are
seen as successful examples of information sharing they are also seen as ad hoc and not systematized.
Conversely, SOF has provided other C-LRA activities such as Invisible Children with critical logistics and
transportation support while Invisible Children has supported SOF’s mission with the provision of incident
information derived from community EWS, as well as the requisite psychosocial and integration support functions
to ensure the sustainability of C-LRA efforts. Of course while there are key similarities or even redundancies in
the work performed by SECC and Invisible Children, there are also fundamental differences that have affected each
organization’s willingness to collaborate with military actors. The most glaring difference is that Invisible Children
has historically been a one-issue organization focusing on the defeat of the LRA, a defeat enabled through
responsive incident reporting. CRS’s primary goal as the prime for SECC has historically been to ensure the
development and sustainment of self-protection mechanisms in LRA-affected communities.
Collaboration – or at the very least coordination – between CRS/SECC and international and regional C-LRA and
humanitarian actors providing comparable or complementary services to affected communities has been poor.
This has resulted in two challenges: 1) a redundancy of services provided by actors to affected communities; 2) a
perceived sense of mistrust between actors addressing acute security, governance and humanitarian needs in
affected communities. It was made abundantly clear during the September 2015 LRA Focal Points meeting that
there has historically been a lack of coordination between USAID-funded C-LRA activities and other activities in

16
DRC, CAR and South Sudan. Ironically, this concern was also expressed at the March 2015 LRA Focal Points
meeting, to no avail. KIIs with the UN Panel of Experts (CAR), civil society actors, the Enough Project, and
Invisible Children, for example, highlighted what was perceived as poor tactical information-sharing on attacks,
robberies, abductions, etc. on the part of CRS. This lack of information-sharing has had a detrimental effect on
working relationships between CRS and other actors in affected areas, with its relationship with Invisible Children
being most noticeably frayed.
The affiliation between CRS/SECC and Invisible Children is a long and complex one. Both are perceived as
providing almost identical EWS services to affected areas (including some of the same areas), and yet both provide
much more “soft” interventions. CRS/SECC’s role in working with communities through the Appreciative Inquiry
(AI) method to prioritize C-LRA needs has been a success, and has introduced – and in some cases leveraged
existing – methods of developing and reacting to community-based protection plans; trauma healing; reconciliation;
psychosocial support; and, reintegration, expanding recently into northwest CAR. In addition to incident reporting,
and in partnership with Save the Children, Invisible Children has more recently evolved to providing support to a
reintegration transit center in CAR, to include the provision of psychosocial support; working with civil society
actors in South Sudan to develop a trauma-healing tool-kit; supporting and disseminating trauma-healing
programming on FM radio stations in affected areas; supporting victims associations in Obo and Mboki; and,
supporting Community Defection Committees with defection messaging on FM radio stations.8
But there is
flexibility and responsiveness to Invisible Children’s operating model that SECC does not have. Being funded
through an institutional cooperative agreement with USAID has, according to KIIs with INGOs and regional NGOs
in operating alongside CRS, inhibited and at times delayed CRS’s ability to implement activities as responsively,
efficiently and effectively as Invisible Children. For example implementation was delayed considerably when CRS’s
early interventions involved multiple tiers of management as was the case with its subcontracting relationship with
Caritas Congo, and the latter’s administrative and financial management challenges,
Military-to-military collaboration was perceived by all KIIs as a universal success. US personnel are authorized to
provide information, advice and assistance to the RTF (and the FARDC and UPDF) the LRA across CAR, South
Sudan and DRC, and while combat-equipped, are prohibited from engaging LRA forces unless in self-defense. SOF
involvement in C-LRA activities has been a key enabler. Recently some US policymakers have considered options
to withdraw SOF advisers from the region and transitioning to a more traditional training mission, but the flexible,
agile and responsive nature of the SOF advisory role to RTF has been a primary reason for the overall success of
USG C-LRA activities in the region. US advisers have greatly improved intelligence collection and analysis. They
have supported C-LRA activities with aerial surveys, satellite surveillance, and predictive mapping. They have
supported Invisible Children in providing some local community leaders with Thuraya satellite phones to
strengthen their community’s EWS and promote quick, efficient transmission of information about LRA incidents
to RTF. In generally inaccessible terrain, SOF provides much-needed logistics support to RTF (and civilian C-LRA
actors such as Invisible Children) with fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Perhaps most critical, SOF advisers
provide specialized training to RTF on intelligence gathering and dissemination; patrolling; surveillance and
reconnaissance techniques; medical care; using specialized tracking equipment; and on duty of care. As a result of
this advisory role, the RTF has evolved into a much more effective force. That said, the effectiveness of the RTF is
also compromised by regional politics and overall regional military coordination is poor between troop
contributing countries. As a result there are calls in the C-LRA community for the deployment of a larger, joint
mission with a full AU mandate.
Some social tension has developed a) between communities who received consistent C-LRA
treatment and those who have not, and b) within communities between beneficiaries who have
received consistent C-LRA treatment and those who have not.
This is a common dilemma in assistance and/or development contexts, and is one that can cause irreparable harm
to communities and their residents. For example, under the PEACE II program along and between border
communities in Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya targeted, purposively selected communities received various conflict
mitigation and reconciliation interventions. While the program was seen as largely successful there was evidence
that some members of the communities that did not receive intervention or that received less consistent
8
It should be noted that USAID’s aversion to defection messaging as part of its C-LRA programming is based on its adherence to ‘Do No
Harm’ and conflict sensitivity principles rather than on a deliberate choice not to add this to its program design.

17
intervention, exhibited perceptions of inequity. In this study FGD respondents were vocal about this issue. For
example, while respondents from intervention communities such as Djemah (CAR) and Bondo (DRC) described a
feeling of disgruntlement due to their being inconsistent and/or unsustainable C-LRA programming aimed in their
communities, FGD respondents in non-intervention communities or villages in Bili and Faradje described irritation
and frustration with there being no comparable level of C-LRA support. It should be noted that a non-intervention
site refers to no, minimal, or non-functioning intervention provided. To be clear this finding does not imply that such
perceptions of inequitable treatment are associated solely with USAID-funded C-LRA activities, but more broadly
to C-LRA activities in the region. It is also not a widespread sentiment, rather being exhibited in some
communities and among some members. The main source of this disaffection seems to be that communities in
general expected C-LRA activities would cut across all affected communities equally, since all of the communities
were affected by the LRA in one way or another. Respondents in Bili felt intentionally excluded from
programming that they felt would have provided them with very existential support such as means to self-
protection; early warning; trauma healing and psychosocial support; and, integration activities. In non-intervention
communities members expressed a sense of exclusion: activities aimed at protection, early warning and even
subsistence such as the provision of community radios (both HF and FM); mobile telephony network reach; and
even access to water points, were felt to be basic needs, and therefore should be provided to all communities
equally. FGD responses in the non-intervention sites suggest that targeted USAID C-LRA programming might in
the long term - and contrary to ‘Do No Harm’ principles – may actually contribute to inter-communal friction.
This is a complex issue of concern, and is one that is ultimately also affected by the levels of conflict and violence in
each of the respective communities.
Evidence also suggests that there are frictions between individual community members who have directly
benefitted from USAID C-LRA intervention, and those who have not. Indeed some community members
expressed during FGDs that certain programming might start to divide members by those who are “well off” i.e.,
in direct receipt of assistance, and those who are not, giving rise to a form of class structure that had not
previously existed.
There were considerable delays in SECC implementation, caused in part by a lack of consistent -
and in situ - management and oversight by USAID
According to KIIs with USG, INGOs and regional NGOs, SECC was delayed in its implementation and this has had
a detrimental effect on perceptions of CRS, SECC and USAID. This was noted most acutely by respondents at
DOS/AFR. This finding is supported by a thorough review of CRS’s quarterly reports and its newsletters. The
evidence also supports the conclusion that SECC made tremendous gains in 2014 and 2015, and has had marked
effects on the communities within which it has worked. Quite understandably too the conflict in CAR contributed
to implementation delays, even causing CRS to re-develop its intervention strategies and work plan accordingly.
But whether real or perceived, the evidence also suggests that the lack of consistent management and oversight on
the part of USAID contributed significantly to the poor implementation. There were three contributing factors
affecting USAID’s abilities to manage effectively: 1) It was not until July 2015 that management and oversight for
USAID’s C-LRA activities migrated from the former regional USAID/East Africa (EA) in Nairobi to Kinshasa, which,
given USAID/DRC’s conflict and governance portfolio in eastern Congo, is a more viable home; 2) Given the
mounting workload at USAID/East Africa from 2012-2015, and that it was also ‘rightsizing’ into USAID/Kenya and
East Africa, the management of USAID’s C-LRA efforts in DRC and CAR did not receive adequate oversight.
According to one KII, during one18-month period in 2012/2013 USAID/EA visited field C-LRA implementation
sites in one afternoon visit; 3) While continuing to receive attention from Washington, USAID/East Africa and
from Kampala, it was not until June 2015 that USAID had a dedicated field manager in situ in Kinshasa to provide
oversight and guidance to the C-LRA portfolio. Of course there was a degree of oversight provided by a field
manager in USAID/East Africa, and in Kampala as the portfolio was being transitioned to Kinshasa, but an
overwhelming majority of KII respondents suggested that this was insufficient.
The LRA ‘problem’ is a small piece of a large and complex regional stabilization and development
puzzle and therefore USAID’s C-LRA activities should reflect this dynamic
The evidence suggests that the LRA is still very active. Its overall operational base has expanded over the past five
years to include remote areas of South Sudan, DRC and CAR. And, while according to The Resolve, its numbers

18
have dwindled exponentially since 2008, it is a force that continues to affect dozens of communities in central
Africa with acts of violence and criminality. Its legacy is perhaps even more impactful with hundreds of thousands
displaced and traumatized; thousands killed, wounded, raped or suffering from psychosocial illnesses; and, entire
communities torn apart after suffering more than twenty years of fear and conflict.
Put into perspective, however, the LRA has more recently become a symptom of much greater security and
governance issues in the region. Central state collapse in CAR and South Sudan and continued insecurity in
eastern DRC territory have resulted in a security vacuum involving large swathes of land and hundreds of
thousands of people. There has been a rise in the number of militia and armed groups in the region, many of
which operate with impunity, crossing porous international borders to gain access to resources and weapons.
Since 2013 Seleka and anti-Balaka forces have operated throughout CAR, with each, according to Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International, committing mass atrocities against civilians. The Seleka have also had some
contact with the LRA, including reportedly brokering deals with the LRA to provide them with food in exchange
for reduced attacks on civilians along the Bria-Nzako corridor, and trading in diamonds and gold. In the eastern
DRC LRA attacks, killings and abductions continue, but have abated dramatically since 2010, but the LRA has an
extensive area of operations and trafficking network ranging from the Garamba National Park in the DRC,
northwest through Haute-Uélé, Bas-Uélé and Western Equatoria, and into Haut Mbomou, Mbomou and Haut
Kotto in CAR and then to Kafia-Kingi enclave. While ivory trafficking provides critical, existential, income to the
LRA, the team does not wish to over-exaggerate its role in the process noting that recent estimates suggest that
the LRA are perhaps involved in no more than 5% of all trafficking in the region. It should also be noted that this
estimate is based not on the primary data collected for this study (none of the KII or FGD respondents could
accurately estimate the level of LRA involvement in ivory trafficking) but on document review. There is also a
wider security issue associated with resource plundering, poaching and illicit trafficking. According to The Resolve,
and supported by civilian accounts, diamonds and gold have been looted by the LRA in CAR and sold in markets in
the Kafia-Kingi and into Sudan. Civilians also claim to have witnessed the LRA (and the Seleka and SPLA, for that
matter) poaching of dozens of elephants in CAR and DRC. LRA defector Michael Onen himself claimed to have
taken part in a poaching operation led by Vincent ‘Binany’ Okumu in the Garamba in 2012. Gold, diamonds and
ivory are sold in exchange for food and weapons or are in some cases buried along travel routes for safekeeping.
Illicit trafficking has become a vastly destabilizing issue affecting not only the DRC and CAR LRA-affected areas, but
the wider region and well into Chad, South Sudan, and Sudan, and involves dozens of criminal, militia and armed
groups as they pursue alternate means to fund their operations.
At the community level, the findings in this report stress the importance of focusing on broader – long-term -
community recovery needs within a more integrated USAID strategy. This is not to suggest that USAID deviates
its C-LRA portfolio entirely away from funding EWS networks and community-based protection programming, but
rather that it includes EWS into a more comprehensive – and impactful – regional strategy with the respective
governments. Such an approach includes addressing needs that are categorically outside of USAID’s mandate in the
region, and in some cases not within USAID’s manageable interests. It is also unrealistic to conclude that funding
for C-LRA activities be a replacement for development funds or that USAID C-LRA activities act as a replacement
for the requisite responsiveness of the CAR and DRC governments to support the development priorities of its
own citizens, but the team does suggest that USAID’s C-LRA activities be designed and implemented within a
broader long-term regional recovery and development context.. Arguably, in addressing these needs, communities
can recover more sustainably and progress. These include, for example, and in no priority order: assurances of
sustained security and protection; increased access to markets and neighboring communities; increased and
equitable access to education; increased access to health services; increased access to psychosocial, reconciliation
and trauma care for entire communities; a more inclusive defection, reintegration and, more importantly
alternative livelihoods model that includes community-participation noting that the impact of the LRA and other
armed groups was not limited to those who were abducted or members of the LRA, but were felt by entire
communities. Indeed the targeting of ex-combatants to receive special services could have significant negative
consequences. Ironically, and as discussed further in the Key Recommendations section, the very nature of the
USAID C-LRA earmark precludes a more comprehensive approach to supporting communities in CAR and DRC.
USAID can, however, integrate future C-LRA programming into more holistic assistance and development
programming in the region.

19
Of course, USAID community-based and early recovery efforts in LRA-affected areas have had a broader focus
than just EWS. These have included SECC program itself, which also has ‘soft’ components, including trauma
healing workshops and theater; the provision and support to health services, including on GBV; food security and
agriculture, and child protection support. In Northern Uganda, for example, as part of a broad portfolio in support
of the Government of Uganda Government’s Peace, Recovery and Development Plan, USAID supported the
Access to Justice, Fostering Peace and Equity (SAFE) project., For example, in all FGDs and KIIs in CAR, trauma
healing was perceived as one of the most significant USAID interventions, particularly for youth and women who
experienced LRA attacks, had been kidnapped, or had been traumatized. This trauma healing process was also
perceived by communities as impactful in areas that have been affected by the recent Seleka/anti-Balaka crisis in
CAR. All study participants requested additional trauma healing workshops indicating that they had generated
significant demand.
V. NEEDS ASSESSMENT
A. PRIMARY FINDINGS
This assessment found that the primary needs in the LRA-affected communities are: security; access to education,
roads and infrastructure; health and WASH services; restoration of livelihoods and income- generating activities;
food security; trauma management and reintegration efforts; restoration of the functionality and legitimacy of state
institutions; humanitarian interventions; and increased coordination.
Due to the limited funds and deliberate objectives of C-LRA activities, USAID will not be able to address all the
priority interventions outlined in this section. Additional assistance will be needed from the CAR and DRC
national governments and the wider international community. USAID (perhaps in collaboration with other
stakeholders) can continue its mandate when needed initiatives relate directly to its C-LRA activities. This section
will outline the primary and secondary needs among the communities sampled and address which stakeholders are
best positioned to respond to each need.
SECURITY AND DISAMAMENT
Continuous LRA attacks perpetuate insecurity across a vast territory in the DRC and CAR and deter displaced
populations from returning home.9
Although the LRA is weakening, it continues to operate, exerting influence over
expansive LRA-territory that is minimally controlled and monitored by state law enforcement agencies. Moreover,
the LRA maintains a presence along the porous border of South Sudan. In the DRC this presence is felt mostly in
Bas Uélé, in Garamba Park.
DRC authorities currently play a limited role in dealing with the LRA. This is due both to lack of resources and an
overall sensitivity of the subject. In light of the history between the DRC and its neighboring countries. if DRC
officials were to overtly recognize the threat of the LRA’s presence it may create an entry point for foreign army
interventions (such as the UPDF), thus further exacerbating tensions in the region.
9
Some collectivities disappeared, with all their villages, for example, in Haut Uélé, in Mondo or Kakwa in Faradje territory, or Bagbele at the
Sudanese border, and the Northern belt at the CAR border in Bas Uélé.
Left: A convoy of civilian vehicles awaiting MINUSCA escort in Bangassou en route to Bakouma, CAR. Right: A MINUSCAR escort team in
Bangassou, CAR.

20
Resources are also scarce: the military have no (or very limited) means and equipment. For example the FARDC
has no car in Bas Uélé—a territory as huge as Spain—and are tracking the LRA by foot. This has caused severe
casualties and several FARDC soldiers were killed in the spring of 2015 while fighting against the LRA. Making
matters worse, the military are poorly paid and underfed. Although MONUSCO is providing them with food
rations, a soldier may only receive two cans of food a week. In some cases, when the FARDC are deployed to fight
the LRA, the administration does not pay them. This causes new problems because the local population has to
provide the soldiers with food and other basic necessities.
According to the communities interviewed,10
the need for locals to provide for security forces adds to other
existing insecurity factors such as poachers. These looting, local bandits add to the number of casualties and
instigate violence (including gender-based violence). According to the FARDC, a main source of insecurity is
caused by local DRC criminals who pretend to be the LRA. Community conflicts also have reportedly increased
due to the demographic, social and economic changes caused by displaced people that have left their rural
communities for cities, according to interviewees, although no accurate figures are available on this.
Displacement also is destroying traditional community cultures and increasing the social and economic pressure on
local populations who are faced with rising poverty and limited access to natural resources. Youth unemployment
and a failure to reintegrate LRA defectors further destabilizes communities. Some efforts have been made to assist
ex-child soldiers, but local NGOs assert that thousands of youth who left the LRA have not been helped. They
have not had access to vocational training, for example, which other LRA-affected provinces in the DRC have
offered. (Note: the number of defectors is now too small to justify implementing the National Program for
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration activities in the Haut and Bas Uélé). This issue of youth defectors
primarily concerns the Congolese since Ugandans have access to DDR activities in their country.
Additional donor support and cooperation is needed to bolster the security forces’ limited capacities. A focus on
joint preventive measures instead of crisis management is especially important and relevant to the FARDC and the
guards in Garamba Park. Several donors, including the US Fish and Wildlife Service, support the park, but
interviewees indicated a need for increased intervention. The park lacks sufficient capacity with only 80 guards
employed when 300 are needed.Any initiatives here should involve the local authorities and the local population. The
European Union currently is preparing a project to support Garamba Park. EU member states have agreed to
implement a 120 million Euro environmental and sustainable agriculture program in five sites including Garamba,
Virunga, Salonga, Yangambi and Upemba. Although the specific activities are not detailed yet, coordination with the
local authorities and populations will be important to maximize synergies and avoid duplication.
The park also is collaborating with local communities in the area of natural resource conservation. (Note: here
again, all interested stakeholders should work together.) The park is actively addressing the issue of ivory poaching
10
Poachers include SPLA renegade, Janjawid or Udas, a traditional international poacher group from Chad, Libya, or Sudan.
Left: A local town crier in Bamokandi village, Dungu. In the absence of functional systems to offer EWS, the local communities have
maintained traditional systems to protect themselves in cases of emergency. Right: A military patrol base in Diagbe en route to Doruma.The
National army in DRC (FARDC) is felt to be grossly under-equipped to counter the LRA attacks.

21
in the park. For example, in the DRC, SAIPED created six Community Protection Committees11
and reported
information on ivory poaching to the park management.12
According to LRA defectors, poaching is a mainstay of LRA activities today. LRA founder, Kony, is believed to have
tasked two member groups with collecting 45 ivory tusks each month. The two groups receive transportation to
Sudan facilitated by one of the group leaders, Kony’s son, who is based in the CAR, and who oversees logistics,
administration and finance. There are also references to an old and large LRA-stockpile of ivory in the park that
authorities were trying to retrieve.
Others involved in ivory poaching include Sudanese/Arabic horsemen who are connected to an old international
poaching group named Uda, and poachers coming through South Sudan with heavy weapons and helicopters. (A
helicopter attack that killed eight elephants reportedly took place in September 2015). The Park did not share its
statistics with the evaluation team. In some locations, data is difficult to retrieve. For example, the natural reserve
in Bas Uélé gets less attention (as a reserve and not a park) and is remotely located.
Key informants interviewed at the international, national and local levels stated that security, elimination of the
LRA and disarmament of all armed groups operating in the region was a shared priority for all. Communities
placed continued security, ongoing protection and extended protection to new LRA-controlled areas (where the
LRA relocates to elude the RTF, UPDF and US forces) as top priorities. For communities to return and to
accelerate recovery and restore their livelihoods, security is mandatory. Some respondent direct quotes are
provided below to demonstrate community sentiments.
“The need is security and safety—main[ly] because they cannot go on the farm as they want and the children cannot go
to school and people cannot do business as they want and cannot move freely throughout the villages—so the major
need is security.” (KII, Prefet, Obo)
“How do you expect our soldiers that are struggling with low salaries, limited rations and lack of sophisticated equipment
to react to such attacks? First, their families have been left far back in their homes, and they are not sure if their children
are going to school because they cannot afford . . . their living conditions are bad. I can’t blame them sometimes; they are
sacrificing but the authorities need to support them.” (FGD, Bangadi- DRC)
“Our local talking drums help us a lot during an emergency.You know the mobile phones don’t cover a large area, but with
our drums, the message will somehow get the seriousness it deserves. . . . Bad news about impending danger gets to people
fast but if the telephones were going past ten to twenty kilometers that would help our people.” (KII, Village elder,
Bamokandi village, Dungu, DRC)
Current conditions indicate an ongoing need for USAID coordination with defense forces fighting against the LRA
and to ensure networking with the national forces. As an example of need: UDPF reports that Bas Uélé, in the
DRC, is still an LRA refuge. USAID support for increased coordination could also be extended to cover the
Garamba Park guards
The team noted that security is a broader and multi-dimensional issue that requires a strategy extending beyond
USAID’s mandate. It calls for multi-lateral or multi-agency collaboration. USAID would function as one of the
contributing entities rather than the only entity. Therefore, USAID should consider working with other agencies,
especially with the RTF, MINUSCA, MONUSCO and the respective CAR and DRC national governments, to
effectively address the need for restoration and maintenance of security among the LRA-affected communities.
The issue of security also goes beyond the C-LRA activities to address broader issues affecting the CAR and DRC
as a whole. For example, several armed militia, including the Seleka and Anti Balaka, occupy the CAR and have yet
to be disarmed. The CAR also faces the crucial task of transitioning from an interim government to an elected
government. A smooth transition hinges on sustaining the peace and security in the LRA-affected areas and in the
CAR as a whole. In line with these observations, a recent report published by the International Rescue Committee
(IRC) on the CAR conflict stated that “Chronic insecurity, misrule and failed governance are the biggest obstacles
11
Duru, Mpaïka, Kiluwa, Linaï, Naguerro, Djabir.
12
The park management changed, and this information sharing has not been put in place with the new team to date.

22
to meeting the humanitarian needs of Central Africans.”13
This report further observed that the impact of
humanitarian assistance “is muted by the lack of comprehensive investment designed to bring stability to the
country and support long-term institution building.” For this reason, there is growing skepticism that the country
will manage peaceful elections and transition to a new government.
The destruction and insecurity caused by the LRA in conjunction with insufficient infrastructure in the LRA-
affected territories contributes to other developmental issues such as access to basic services and related social
and economic deficiencies. Poverty also has increased as a result of the insecurity and livelihoods are at risk.
Poverty, in turn, has affected social cohesion, forced social changes and instigated population movements.
Additionally, the conflict has caused significant trauma in the social fabric of the population. Those vulnerable from
the effects of the LRA include: LRA victims; ex-members and defectors of the LRA; disaffected youth who have
little access to livelihoods, who have lost their moral compass, and who often are seduced to join criminal groups;
and LRA-born children, who are ostracized from the community.
While USAID cannot address all these needs, the agency plays an important role in documenting these challenging
security, social and economic conditions and in measuring progress. USAID also has much to offer in stakeholder
coordination and could advocate directly for support from bilateral and multi-lateral donors and other
international organizations while working closely with the CAR and DRC governments. An important initiative
would be to support local development plans for the region, especially in the provinces of Haut and Bas Uélé.
These two provinces can play a leading role in planning; they also benefit from relevant funding from the Fonds
Social for such interventions. Also, the development of a local security force managed at the provincial level would
allow closer field management and accountability to the population and could improve the overall management of
the limited security forces involved in countering the LRA. Without addressing (and diminishing) these difficult
conditions, further security risks are possible in this strategic and cross-border region.
USAID also could focus interventions in the DRC in the communities most affected by the LRA (based on attack
patterns). This would help ensure that these high-risk communities receive concentrated assistance, such as
community-based protection and telecommunications. USAID might also consider offering cross-sectoral
assistance to the most vulnerable groups, notably youth. Youth would benefit from: livelihoods programs; social
programs for healing trauma and addressing physical abuse, such as SGBV; and health interventions, e.g., on
HIV/AIDS prevention. Assistance in trauma healing and social cohesion—especially to prevent stigmatization—
should build the capacity of local institutions, community protection committees and civil society organizations
(including all religious leaders) and consider using those trained through the training of trainer (TOT) program
already in place.
EDUCATION
Communities identified access to education services as an important area for assistance. Some communities have
not had functional education systems for the last ten to fifteen years. Even before the LRA was a factor, these
communities were suffering from an inadequate education infrastructure indicating a mismatch between demand
13
IRC (2015). Too Soon to Turn Away Security, Governance and Humanitarian Need in the Central African Republic. New York: IRC.
Left: A primary school in Bangadi. Enrolment has dropped from over 500 pupils to 150 currently due to lack of money to pay for
“contribution” of 2,500 francs per month. Right: A primary school in Bamokandi with two sessions, morning and evening to cater for a large
population of local communities and IDPs.

23
and supply. There also is a need to rebuild the infrastructure that once existed but that is now destroyed (by the
LRA and other bad actors) and to build new infrastructure where populations have increased. The assessment
revealed a need for education that targets adults as well as school-age children. For example, vocational skills
training would be useful for those who never went to school and those who dropped out.
Poverty and limited infrastructure has led to a decrease in school attendance. Also contributing to this decrease is
the growing number of children whose parents or guardians leave them behind. This occurs when parents go back
to their villages to cultivate crops; they leave their children in urban centers where there are no structures or
organizations to care for them. This is notable in the DRC, in Dungu, where this feedback was collected. There is
little comparative data to measure the extent and severity of this phenomenon among the different urban centers
where populations have been displaced. Some of the affected towns in the CAR include Zemio, Obo and Rafai.
This childhood neglect also may be causing behavioral issues. For example, interviewees noticed an increase in
prostitution and that very young girls are becoming pregnant. Limited access to education causes social
consequences at different levels, including instruction (lack of school curriculum and basic knowledge), socialization
(inability to function in a group setting), and structuralization (limited moral values and the inability to project
oneself in the future). Therefore, communities expressed the need for “soft” and “hard” education infrastructure
and scholastic materials. Here are some of their comments:
“The first time they attacked here for two months the children could not go to school and some of them until now do not
come back to school. If the children do not go to school and learn, who will lead the country? What is our future?” (FGD,
Religious Leaders, Obo)
“In public schools you can find only two teachers and the rest are parents who come to help 80 pupils in one class.” (KII,
NGO staff, Obo)
“Most of the schools are made of temporary materials; most of the schools infrastructure is already destroyed.” (KII, Former
Mayor Obo)
“In terms of needs in the east, education is the number one priority because for the last 15 years no new schools or
rehabilitation of education infrastructure have taken place. This led to marginalization because people from this region are
disfranchised from the national debate and dialogue because they have not had education.” (KII, Presidential Candidate
from East CAR, Bangassou)
While education needs do not specifically fall under the
mandate of USAID C-LRA activities, the team noted that
this an area where USAID and its partners, like OFDA and
other donors, can take the lead, working in collaboration
with the transitional government and future governments
in the CAR and DRC. They also could work with such
humanitarian agencies as Catholic Relief Services, ACTED,
Save the Children and others to improve the status of the
education infrastructure and human resources in the
affected communities. Education initiatives should focus on
primary education as well as secondary and business,
technical and vocational education. The latter would cater
to adolescents and young people who have been out of
school and who need skills (and livelihoods) for self-
sustenance.
In the education sector, there also is a need to build the
capacity of the citizens of the CAR and DRC to hold their governments accountable. USAID itself should build on
its current activities in SECC to strengthen the social contract between the citizens and their governments
through increased information sharing, expanded space for dialogue between the people and the state, and new
opportunities for participatory decision-making.
Impassable roads in the dense forests of CAR render intervention
impossible.

24
ROADS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
The road infrastructure is very poor in the LRA-affected regions of both the CAR and DRC, and as a result LRA-
affected communities are disconnected from the rest of the country and from their neighboring countries. A
recent study by the IRC (2015) also noted that roads and bridges in the CAR are so dilapidated that their
condition severely impedes the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It was noted by humanitarian agency staff that
in some areas it takes up to four hours to travel a stretch of 120 kilometers. For purposes of recovery, impassable
roads have been cited as a major impediment to economic growth and security. The top priority in the CAR
communities is the construction of a road from Obo to Bambouti near the border with South Sudan. In the DRC,
the main priority would be road access to Uganda.14
This would facilitate logistics, trade, and supplies and would
also enhance security and development in the region.
The lack of roads also has made it extremely difficult for the UPDF in the CAR and the RTF/FARDC in the DRC
to respond quickly to intelligence information about any known LRA presence. Interviewees from the UPDF and
security organizations in the DRC emphasized the need for secured roads to facilitate the elimination of the LRA.
The UPDF and local authorities have said that passable roads and bridges are key to empowering the military to
succeed in pursuing the LRA and other armed groups. Some of the military commanders prefer to refer to these
roads as “security roads.” UPDF Commanders in Obo and Zemio noted with concern that most of their heavy
military vehicles are breaking down due to impassable roads. This slows down their pursuit of the LRA. Some
stakeholders indicated that the improved roads around Garamba Park or the LRA hubs would allow better access
to the areas targeted by the LRA. Additionally, improved roads would contribute to trade among the most isolated
communities and the urban centers. Due to impassable roads, urban centers suffer shortages of agricultural
products. In the DRC, the road at the DRC and South Sudan border was specifically flagged as a priority. Some
relevant comments are provided below:
“Roads connecting this region with neighboring countries especially Sudan would open it up for trade and would
provide easy access to the base commodities. It would address most of the logistical challenges and break the Isolation of
the communities in the East.” (KII, One of the Presidential Candidates from East CAR, Bangassou)
“Roads are a huge need; the challenge is accessibility to the communities and it allows the forces to react quickly if there is an
attack. Now, even if there is early warning, lack of good roads affects early response. . . . Lack of road is a key impediment to
security and development.” (KII, NGO staff, Obo)
The lack of passable roads also contributes to poverty in the region. In the DRC, the road between Isiro and
Niangara is a key route in the region and it has not been rehabilitated. The national roads in the DRC fall under
the responsibility of the Office des Routes. A budget was made available for road repairs, but the funds are
insufficient, and the problem has caused violent riots and protests in the community. Road rehabilitation needs to
be linked to a strong and clear commitment by the relevant entities to maintain the roads.
Roads are also problematic for humanitarian access. In the DRC, close to 4,500 people are displaced in the Bili and
Bondo territories and do not receive any assistance due to a lack of access. This lack of access also has contributed
to the seemingly weak local capacity in Bas-Uélé where there has been no significant interventions. A few, local
NGOs may operate there, but an international presence is lacking due to logistics. Recently some INGO
interventions had to halt implementation due to poor roads and other logistical issues. This was the case in a
refugee support program implemented by Solidaritès International and funded by UNHCR. Road construction and
maintenance is a key priority; a lack of passable roads leaves communities insecure and without access to what
they need for protection and economic growth.
While the team noted that the construction of roads and infrastructure is a major need in the DRC and CAR,
USAID’s mandate will not go far enough. To improve these countries’ roads and infrastructure, a multi-lateral and
inter-agency approach is required. Donors and other interested stakeholders must engage with the transitional and
regional governments that stand to benefit from the improved roads and infrastructure in terms of security and
trade. There is, therefore, a need to raise this issue in an inter-agency forum where donors can agree on a
strategic direction that will address the challenges of roads and infrastructure and include a master plan as part of
14
There used to be a connection railway, which facilitated connection to the Congo River and then Kinshasa. This is not functioning anymore,
but was operating in Bas Uélé, linking the Congo River / Bumba to Isiro, Buta and Bondo. Its rehabilitation is estimated to cost 357 million USD,
but such an investment would be justified by a sufficiently high level of production.

25
the larger security and development assistance portfolio.
HEALTH AND WASH
The need for sanitation, hygiene and access to clean water cuts across all communities affected by the LRA. Lack of
safe water exposes communities to preventable diseases. Additionally, trekking long distances in search of water
exposes people, especially women, to risks of abduction (and sexual violence) by the LRA. For example, in the
CAR, specifically in Bambouti in Obo, and its surrounding areas, communities sometimes have to walk more than
five kilometers in search of water. In Dungu and Faradje, in the DRC, a number of wells no longer function.
Access to health facilities, particularly maternal and child health services, was cited by all study participants as a
need that requires urgent attention. There are very few health facilities and these suffer from chronic lack of
capable and adequately paid staff;15
inadequate supplies of essential medicines and health-related products and
equipment; a weak health infrastructure; and a lack of available health information. Additionally, health centers have
been looted and/or destroyed by the LRA. Two to three centers, at least, were destroyed in each DRC territory
and all twelve were destroyed in the Doruma territory.16
In the CAR, a high HIV prevalence was noted, but no
robust HIV prevention, care, and treatment interventions are available.
In most villages in Doruma, Bangadi and Faradje (in the DRC), community members claim that they have resorted
to using alternative medication (self-remedies or from traditional herbalists or witchdoctors) since the available
clinics do not have sufficient capacity. All the NGOs that offered medical services to communities closed down in
2013 and these communities feel let down by the state. It is not uncommon to find in most of the study locations
where clinics existed that women and children travel distances of over 30 to 35 kilometers to access medical care.
While general WASH and health initiatives fall outside USAID’s C-LRA activities, the agency could address the
needs of some LRA victims by providing multi-sectoral assistance that covers health in the case of physical abuse,
such as SGBV and AIDS prevention. Further, collaborative WASH and health activities should be undertaken in
LRA-affected regions, most importantly access to water in communities where populations are displaced.
FOOD SECURITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND LIVELIHOODS
Field supervisors, local and religious leaders, and victims of the LRA, among others, noted that displacement, fear
of traveling to farmlands far from community centers, and limited engagement in fishing and hunting, have
negatively affected food, livelihoods, and security. This has increased the level of destitution among LRA-affected
communities. Women in particular underscored the need for income-generating projects and for support from the
existing village savings and loan associations to boost their access to income-generating activities. The DRC KII
team met with two women who were abducted by the LRA.Their first need, they said, before trauma healing or any
15
In Akua (DRC), the main doctor was also killed, and other staff have been abducted.
16
Nyalanya, Itm Aba, the 12 health centers in Doruma territory have been visited by the LRA, notably Kana, Kapili, Naparka, Weneki, in Duru
territory, Kiliwa, Duru and Bitima, in Faradje, Tomati, Akua, in Niangara, Mangada, Tapili, Nambia.
Left: A community member in Bangadi administering a ‘drip’ medication at home due to lack of medical facilities.
Right: Water borehole projects have collapsed in most of the villages: compromising security and WASH initiatives.

26
other social support, was for agriculture and income-generating activities so they could provide for their children
and pay school fees. Due to the debilitating poverty, some interviewees said they sought out other sources of
income, such as prostitution. To stop the vicious cycle that can compel a person from poverty to prostitution,
access to livelihoods is crucial, especially for youth. Young people need to minimize their social and economic
insecurities; they need an occupation, a wage, a purpose, and reason to resist criminal opportunities.
Food security is an issue particularly for the populations
displaced by the LRA in the central areas of the CAR, like
Obo, Zemio and Rafai. In the DRC, according to
interviewees, the number of daily rations decreased from
three to one. Agriculture still remains subsistence-based and
only small portions of land are cultivated. This limits the food
available for market and trade. Making matters worse, the
LRA often plunders the harvests. Additionally, people are
reluctant to transport goods to market for fear of attack
along the way. This is an issue in some of the larger urban
centers (e.g., Faradje, in the DRC) where goods don’t make
it to market. Various reports indicate that the LRA receives
intelligence about the availability of goods in certain
communities. Then the LRA targets the market roads (for
example, the roads to Nambia at the end of the week). These LRA interventions restrict the movement of the
local population, which, in turn, reduces the amount of goods available in the urban areas. LRA interference also
can diminish agricultural production. In the past, for example, to create famine, the LRA would cut the rice plants
and leave them to rot in the paddy fields.
Because of movement restrictions due to LRA intimidation, agricultural production and the availability of goods
have diminished. Consequently, populations exchange goods (using a barter system) which limits cash circulation
and furthers economic disparity. In some families, the women and children are left behind in urban centers while
the men (risking LRA abduction) return to their original communities to farm. Some relevant comments follow:
“People displaced by the LRA in the east who are living in the town centers, left their communities and lost their livelihoods
and lost family members and nobody is targeting them because they are not under the mandate of UNCHR.” (KII, Political
leader, Bangui, CAR)
“Access to food is a challenge. Because of the bad roads, getting food to the country is a problem, but production is low
because of disruptions with the LRA.” (KII, program staff ACTED, Bangui, CAR)
“Our people live in fear of being attacked in the fields whenever they think of going to plant or harvest their crops . . . and
even when they manage to harvest, the attackers come and steal their harvest . . . and make them carry the produce to
the forests before they release them.” (KII, Religious leader, protestant church, Bangadi, DRC)
While agricultural interventions are not within the scope of USAID C-LRA activities, USAID/DRC should work
with the international community and the CAR and DRC governments to develop efforts to promote more
sustainable and efficient farming practices. USAID may also want to consider providing equipment and/or training
to process crop yields, add value to the products, and facilitate conservation of products in LRA-affected areas.
Current cultivation habits are to farm the same field for three or four years, or to burn lands for cultivation, which
actually reduces the quality of the soil. A related KII quote follows:
“In the towns, the supply of logistics in these places remains the same, [but] the prices of basic commodities including food has
gone up. There are no employment opportunities in the towns of Obo, Zemio and Rafai. In the towns, girls have taken to
commercial/survival sex while the youth are abusing drugs.” (KII, SECC, Bangui, CAR)
SOCIAL COHESION, TRAUMA MANAGEMENT, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT
Due to stigmatization and limited support (for trauma healing, education, and livelihoods), vulnerable populations can
weaken a country’s social fabric. Such vulnerable populations in the CAR and DRC include:
 Ex-affiliates of the LRA (defectors, in particular) who, in some cases, spent several years with the LRA.
They have indicated difficulties reintegrating into society and find it difficult to find jobs. As a result, they
A market day in Ango, DRC: Women and children walk
long distances to access markets

27
may adopt criminal behaviors or express a willingness to go back to the LRA (and some have). This
category also includes youth who were previously associated with the LRA. Jobless youth also are
particularly vulnerable to joining criminal groups. Illustrating this outcome are the increasing number of
attacks by criminals who use the disturbing ruse of impersonating LRA members.
 LRA dependents who have been released (women and children notably). This also includes GBV victims of
the LRA. Children have been supported to some extent by COOPI, the Commission Justice et Paix, and
AJEDEC for vocational training, but a significant share (close to 1,000) have still not benefited from any
support.
 LRA-born children, who are still young, may be stigmatized and ostracized. Some social workers
expressed concern on how these children will be able to integrate into their communities as healthy
adults.
 Orphans and the disabled. Social affairs in Dungu identified an addition 240 street children—a new
phenomenon.
 In addition to IDPs, who comprise sometimes half the population in urban centers, the existing urban
populations who act as hosts are affected by the arrival, but do not receive additional benefits (such as an
increase in basic services) for their support. This is not only the case in LRA-affected towns, but also
affects most remote communities, such as Isiro or Aru.
“Women who had children with the LRA: We had a woman who had a young girl [from a LRA fighter] and when she
escaped she gave birth to a girl, but now she acts like a mad person. She was traumatized. . . . They tell us that LRA
killed people and prepared them for food to eat. They eat human beings. She sometimes behaves as if she wants to kill
and eat the child. She now traveled to Obo, and we do not know what is happening.” (FGD, Women Leaders, Zemio)
There is a need for truth telling and reconciliation among communities, especially where the Seleka attacked,
looted, and killed or tortured people. There is a huge demand for trauma healing and trauma management services
across the board (women, children, youth, local leaders, etc.). Victims of the LRA need special attention to help
them reintegrate in their communities. Additionally, they need psychosocial support and supportive social
environments in their families and communities. They also need livelihood skills.
These issues are direct consequences of the LRA and should remain a core focus of USAID C-LRA interventions.
Activities could engage the already trained (by CRS) community leaders to offer sensitivity exercises. These leaders
could work to ensure that the Community-based Protection Committees (CPCs) perform their duties in
sensitizing communities on peace promotion, the prevention of SGBV, social cohesion, avoiding stigmatization, and
mitigating local conflicts. Overall, a multi-sectoral assistance approach to vulnerable populations (as identified
above) also should be a USAID priority. This could take the form, in some cases, of increased collaboration with
existing food security interventions, taking into account the vulnerabilities created by the LRA. In addition,
activities could focus on some areas where the LRA is not operating or where it is minimally operating.
GOVERNANCE
State authorities and governance institutions, including the justice and law and order sectors, are very weak and
dysfunctional. They have lost legitimacy among the population because they are not able to provide essential
services. This leaves the CAR and DRC populations with a feeling of abandonment. The state has lost control over
territories manned by armed groups, including the Seleka and other splinter rebel groups, who loot and extort
money from the population.
A critical need exists to support the local administrations, generally, with particular attention paid to the strategic
position of the northeastern region of the DRC (that is affected by the LRA). The newly created provinces of Haut
and Bas Uélé may offer an opportunity to strengthen local governance and development plans. At the USAID-
programming level in the provinces, the governance component also can be integrated in a cross-cutting, multi-
sectoral approach for initiatives in health, education, economic growth, and social support. USAID could work to
ensure that interventions are included in local development plans and involve the relevant local authorities (such as
Social Affairs in Dungu). They also should coordinate initiatives with national, governance programs. Governance
activities also would need to encompass civil society, which is organized in federations at the provincial level. Civil
society organizations would be well positioned to interface with youth. They could help implement useful
programs to address social, health and employment issues.

28
“. . . Here there is no office and no home for the civil servants and no means of transport to visit and supervise the
various areas under his jurisdiction. We lack materials and furniture in offices to help us do our work as state
institutions. If we can have computer, generators, and printers it would help us to serve the community better and to
coordinate with the humanitarian agencies.” (KII, Sub Prefet, Zemio)
The review of literature from other sources clearly shows that the CAR has suffered a governance crisis since the
country’s independence in 1960. For example, in 2007, the International Crisis Group (ICG) labeled the CAR a
“phantom state . . . lacking any meaningful institutional capacity at least since the fall of Emperor Bokassa in
1979.”17
This suggests that the current crisis is not a new phenomenon; it is embedded in decades of state fragility
that have climaxed during the current crisis. Current governance failures are reflected in the state’s inability to
provide basic public services and its erosion as a legitimate authority. This has led to a feeling by communities that
they have been “abandoned by the government.”18
The governors in Bangassou and Obo noted, for example, that
although they have been deployed to manage their communities, without the required resources, they function
more as figureheads. USAID has a wealth of experience that they can share from their governance programs in
fragile states and, therefore, have a crucial role to play in partnership with other actors in addressing the
governance and accountability challenges in the CAR and DRC.
EXISTING LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE COMMUNITIES
Very few stakeholders are present and active in the Haut and Bas-Uélé
provinces in the DRC. Most humanitarian actors have now left, but they
were numerous until 2012 (and included Malteser, Première Urgence,
Solidarités, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR and others). Overall, humanitarian
interventions have focused on LRA-affected areas to the neglect of the
host communities. The main concerns are insufficient state services and
the lack of follow up by development stakeholders. There are strong
needs for early recovery and, more generally, for development in the
regions, notably in terms of infrastructure such as sustainable basic
facilities (schools, health centers, hospitals, WASH infrastructure, power
plants, etc.). Interventions are limited to date and the SECC is reported
to be one of the larger projects in the area with $2.6 million in funds.
Samaritan’s Purse receives USAID funding for food security
interventions, and several organizations are involved in protection, mostly for monitoring, including UNHCR,
COOPI, Intersos and the International Committee of the Red Cross. USAID should ensure that there is follow-up
with host and beneficiary communities and coordination with the national governments of the CAR and DRC and
among the international community to develop programs for infrastructure improvement.
COORDINATION
There are mechanisms for coordination among community-based interventions, notably with security forces,
although this can be limited between the humanitarian stakeholders and security forces. Coordination is
orchestrated mostly through intermediaries such as local administrations or MONUSCO. A few challenges may
occur by strengthening coordination: the potential risk of being associated with security forces still exists but is
limited, and radio operators can constitute targets, but so far no other clear, negative effects have been identified. In
any case, the first need of the community is for security interventions.
Overall, all the stakeholders indicated that the key role played by the United States is in mobilizing stakeholders
for C-LRA efforts. No other bilateral donors are involved in this to date, and institutions from concerned
countries do not appear to be part of the regional task force in which civil society is strongly represented. This
means that local (in-country) stakeholders (and the final beneficiaries of assistance) do not take responsibility for
development interventions and this hampers sustainability. To remedy this weakness, USAID should seek to
improve its coordination with regional and local actors. This will help ensure local ownership, which will, in turn,
inspire sustainable solutions.
17
IRC 2015: 11
18
Ibid
A grandmother with her orphaned grandchild as
a result of LRA sexual violence in Bangadi, DRC.

29
B. SECONDARY FINDINGS
The major secondary finding of the needs assessment is the creation of “have” and “have not” communities. The
“have not” communities are isolated from each other due to a lack of a basic ICT infrastructure. As a result, these
communities do not have access to the development initiatives available in the other “have” communities.
“The politics in the CAR has been largely about being and no attention to the east. People from the east have a rational
identity issue because they do not feel a part of the CAR as citizens. The state citizen contract is not felt by the people.
There are no services especially education health and security. This makes the people from the east alienated and many
easily be manipulated to participate in rebel activities . . . for the last 15 years no focus on health and health.” (Political
Leader from the East, Bangui)
C-LRA interventions have benefited communities that have been affected by the LRA, while surrounding
communities affected by other militias and armed groups can be left without assistance. However, even within the
C-LRA activities, not all communities affected by the LRA are covered by the SECC activities or other
humanitarian agency programs. For example the LRA have now moved to Haute Kotto, an area that was not
originally earmarked for the SECC.
Communities participating in C-LRA interventions have benefited from many positive outcomes. Through access to
ICT, EWS, social cohesion, trauma healing and micro projects they are no longer isolated and have increased their
community-based protections and their resilience. On the other hand, communities without access to C-LRA
activities are left to struggle. KIIs and FGDs in town centers like Obo, Bangassou, Zemio, and Rafai—towns that
are not fully targeted by the SECC—revealed that there is a skewed definition of LRA-affected communities. The
current definition favors beneficiaries who continue to live in the LRA-affected communities; it does not provide
for people who left their homes in the LRA-affected communities. This ends up excluding the IDPs who have been
displaced by the LRA and who now live in unfamiliar towns losing their livelihoods and social support networks.
These people, especially the women and youth, express feelings of frustration and exclusion.
Left: The Gendarmerie office in Djemah (CAR)- Overgrown bushes being signs of abandoned structures and personnel. Right: Deserted
government offices in Bangassou. State authority is not visible eastern parts of the CAR.

30
VI. C-LRA PROGRAMMING EVALUATION
EVALUATION QUESTION 1 – HOW HAS ACCESS TO ICT AFFECTED COMMUNITY
RESPONSE AND PROTECTION INITIATIVES IN AREAS AFFECTED BY THE LRA?
Conclusion: Access to ICT has contributed to reduced attacks in affected communities.
Additionally, it has allowed various information exchanges that have helped to an inform
community responses, awareness and protection initiatives, including CRS projects and those
undertaken by other stakeholders, security forces, state institutions, or humanitarian organizations.
The introduction of ICT initiatives has made a visible and positive contribution to improve community interactions
and connectivity, especially among communities facing similar problems. For example, with the integration of high
frequency (HF) radio networks, communities have increased, to some extent, their self- and inter-community
reliance. Communities have suggested that the positive impact of the HF radios could be enhanced further if they
were combined with satellite phones (called Thurayas). While the HR radios are vulnerable to theft when the LRA
attacks, Thurayas are easily transported and can keep vulnerable citizens connected to each other and to
emergency assistance. In most LRA-affected communities where ICT systems and equipment is not available,
people believe that imminent attacks could be forestalled if they had access to radio or GSM network coverage.
Thurayas are not a substitute for HF radios, but they are a useful back-up when, for example, the radios need
repair or are robbed during an attack. Thurayas can keep the affected communities in touch with the local
authorities and other actors, such as humanitarian agencies and military officials. The COP of the SECC program
explained the disadvantages of the Thurayas as a sole means of communication:
“Thurayas don’t work for large projects connecting hundreds of communities (several hundred villages).
Disadvantages include, [they can only make] one-way calls . . . . Thurayas] are cost prohibitive . . . not easy to use . .
. use lots of energy . . . and [are unable] to connect with other communities over a large territory.”
The key ICT components in the CAR and DRC implemented by CRS and other organizations like Invisible
Children, include High Frequency Radios,19
five FM stations installed and operational (two community FM radio
stations constructed, two rehabilitated and one supported) and the distribution of powered/hand-crank radios to
the LRA-affected communities. (See the SECC Program Annual Report.)
Interviewed stakeholders observed that targeted messaging delivered through the ICT platforms has encouraged
19
HF Radios include: In the CAR: 3 Invisible Children radios and 35 CRS radios; in the DRC: 28 Invisible Children radios and 48 radios are in
place of the 80 CRS radios planned for in the DRC as part of the SECC program. Invisible Children also distributed 27 Thurayas to community
defection committees, local protection committees, and community leaders in the CAR.
Figure 9: ICT Locations in Bas- and Haut-Uélé, DRC:

31
preparedness, knowledge exchange, and victim reintegration.
Prior to such ICT capabilities, communities relied on traditional messengers, who often needed to cycle or walk to
other communities. Messengers also used traditional communication systems such as drums, but these have limited
reach. KIIs in all sites visited in the CAR revealed that the use of HF radios supplemented (in some sites like Zemio
and Obo) with FM radios have made it possible for communities to keep abreast of the nature and locations of
recent LRA attacks. This advance warning has allowed communities to devise and implement plans to minimize and
mitigate the risks and impact of being attacked. The distribution of hand-crank radios also helped improve access
to information which was aired by FM stations.
The bottom line is, however, that HF radios are the most critical ICT component to date. Their introduction has
positively affected community response and improved protection in the LRA-affected communities. While ICT
does not work in isolation, it improves communication significantly in combination with the community protection
structures, especially the Community-based Protection Committees (CPCs), the radio operators and the
community animators. ICT is, therefore, a key initiative and one that has improved the effectiveness of community
protection structures as an integral component of a community’s early warning system (EWS).
ICT also complements the Community-based Protection Programs (CPPs) that are developed through an
appreciative inquiry (AI) processes by CRS that includes the 4Ds (Discovery, Dream, Design, and Deliver)
approach. Through the 4Ds: communities discover their assets and security vulnerabilities, drawing on individual and
collective knowledge and identifying connectors and dividers; communities dream of ways to build on their existing
assets to strengthen social cohesion and combat feelings of isolation and insecurity; communities design activities to
increase social cohesion and security; and, communities deliver on their plans to achieve a more secure and
connected future.
While the CPP approach is also implemented by Invisible Children, the focus on community based protection using
the 4Ds is unique to SECC/CRS. Through AI, communities now engage in identifying risks and strategies for using
the available resources, including ICT, to enhance early warning, response, and community-based protection
initiatives. For example, KIIs and FGDs have revealed that quick alerts to neighboring communities in case of
suspected LRA activity have been instrumental in community protection initiatives. One of the KIIs in CAR noted
that “communities in Dembia noticed suspected LRA movements and communicated to the community in
Derbissaka (Rafai area). When the LRA arrived they found an empty community. The LRA were cited in Kpabo
and information was circulated quickly. By the time they arrived in Maboussou the community was empty, and they
had already dismantled their HF radio.” (KII, SECC Bangui)
Quick alerts are particularly important for LRA-affected communities that have certain characteristics as follows:
They have limited or no state presence; they have no state-provided civilian protection; they are isolated from
major infrastructure; and they have poor roads, that prevent the military, like the UPDF, from responding
quicklyto attacks or threats from the LRA. Therefore access to ICT is generally perceived by KII and FGD
respondents to have broken the isolation of communities and enhanced their capacity to share information (about
security threats) and to act on this information Key informants who work closely with LRA-affected communities
at the grassroots level, particularly animators and field supervisors, noted that ICT has helped reduce the
vulnerability of these communities.
“If there is an alert about a possible [LRA] attack, the person in charge of the HF radio informs the CPC, which then
informs the village head and the population responds accordingly to the alert. CPCs create self-protection groups. They
identify a safe place, and in case of attack, the population stays there until the risk of attack is over. The alert system
has an effect on reducing vulnerability to being attacked and helps the community to protect itself better. The LRA
know that when they attack a community with a HF radio, information will be communicated and the UPDF will be
deployed.” (KII Field Coordinator, Obo, CAR)
“Each time there is someone or a group of defectors, it is through the radio that we get to hear about this. The radios
are helping us a lot by also sensitizing the LRA in the forests to come out and join us in the community. . . . Also, the
radio is teaching us to accept our brothers who have defected from the LRA . . . it’s not their fault.” (FGD, Female,
Zemio, CAR)

32
According to CRS’s Indicator Performance Tracking Table (IPTT), as of October 2015, 773 message alerts to
communities in the DRC and 125 message alerts in the CAR were transmitted effectively through the systems in
2015. Data are lacking for the previous years, which indicates an issue in knowledge capitalization and institutional
memory across all C-LRA activities. There also is limited follow-up on the change in the context of the
environment where C-LRA activities are taking place. Early recovery indicators, demonstrated, for example, that
there is a reopening of the markets or improved access to goods. (Note: some local NGOs are monitoring this to
some extent in cities, in Faradje, for example.)
Table 1:Alerts Reported per Month in the DRC and CAR from the SECC database
Noticeably, several alerts came from communication with Invisible Children. In CAR, they communicated 26
incidents out of 77, and in the DRC, they communicated 26 incidents out of 141. A very limited number came
from security meeting (four in the DRC, concerning Nagugu, Limolo, Naule River, and Avunku). This means that
almost all the incidents are captured by the early warning network system.
The Vodacom telephone transmission stations have been lauded by beneficiary communities in the DRC as a
strong intervention mechanism. In fact, the majority of the community members in the FGDs openly showed their
approval for the mobile telephone system as the fastest way of offering self-defense/protection in cases of LRA
threats of attack. Despite the misunderstanding that the local communities have had with the Vodacom system
operators in Doruma, there is widespread approval of the mobile telephone system as a sure way of reassuring
communities of their security in the wake of LRA attacks. Mobile phones are not accessible to all, however, and
are costly. For example the chief of a small urban center cannot afford one.
USAID funded four antennae in the DRC (Doruma, Bangadi, Ango, and Niangara) which triggered an overall
increase in the Vodacom network over the year in both provinces. Vodacom indicated that they installed 212
antennas on the road south of the park between Faradje and Dungu. The antenna in the key areas, such as
Naguero and Guangala, are not yet functional due to a disagreement between Vodacom and the ICCN/Garamba
Park management. The park wants to charge $500 USD a month to rent the field where the antenna is placed, but
Vodacom does not want to pay because the area is not profitable. As a result Vodacom is considering removing
the antenna to put it closer to Nguilima and Sambia. They cannot develop the network around Doruma and the
South Sudan border for security reasons.
It should be noted that the initial transmission stations that were powered by diesel generators have been
considered for migration to solar powered systems. Where this has happened, e.g., in Bangadi, Niangara, and
Doruma, the immediate effect has been erratic network coverage, which has caused some problems. Due to
community conflicts on the migration of the system to solar power in Doruma, for example, the network has been
cut off. When Vodacom wanted to replace the gas generator-powered antenna (which covered 18 kilometers) in
Doruma with an antenna based on solar panels (yielding only five kilometers of coverage), technicians received
death threats. Some believe the local population were not given a sufficient explanation to understand the merits
of the solar-powered system and, therefore, wanted to keep the generator. The network also stopped because the
gas that MONUSCO had requisitioned had not arrived
Whether the mobile phone system is gas or solar-powered, Vodacom is reluctant to send its technicians into
insecure areas, especially since some of them have witnessed killings and have strong feelings of personal
insecurity. In addition, the network suffers from bandwidth limitations; only a small number of people can be online
SECC Database
DRC CAR
February 29 12
March 31 16
April 24 20
May 18 7
June 20 5
July 18 17

33
at the same time. In fact, even in areas like Dungu which qualifies as a fairly busy center, the Vodacom system has
been downgraded from 3G to the basic Edge system, according to the Vodacom agents in the town.
“Most of the areas that we used to reach with our phones are no longer reachable . . . we don’t know why they [Vodacom]
did that but it’s not helping us as people going as far as 10 kilometers to 15 kilometers to harvest crops in the farmlands.
[We] cannot communicate fast enough to alert community members of any danger they encounter there.” (FGD, Female,
Bangadi)
A positive outcome of ICT has been the clean flow of information. The operators and community committees have
been trained to triangulate data and ensure a sufficient level of detail, which has resulted in better reporting to and
by external stakeholders. The uses by stakeholders are detailed below:
1. The information provided helps security stakeholders, in their respective mandates, to intervene when
necessary. This is especially applicable for the FARDC, who are usually located close to the communities in
DRC.
2. The information also feeds, to some extent, to the Regional Intervention Unit, which has a slightly different
mandate and is more proactive in the deep bush where the LRA is positioned. MONUSCO’s mandate does
not include LRA interventions, and they are limited to patrolling on the main axis, as a prevention measure.
However, they are using the information provided by the system for the general monitoring of the security
situation and are able to identify priority areas.
3. Humanitarian stakeholders also indicate that the communication system is used as a focal point by their staff
to transfer data and report back. The detailed and comprehensive information collected and shared by the
project staff informs the whole of the humanitarian community and assists in orienting their interventions.
The level of emergency over the past years has not triggered humanitarian funding, however, and
development stakeholders were barely involved in the region.
4. Local authorities (e.g., territory administrators) and institutions also specified that the communication
channels are key for governance purposes. The various institutions use the radio to transfer their
instructions. Officers use it to report back and to provide situation reports in agriculture, education, health
and religious organizations are also using the radio to communicate.
Despite the demonstrable, positive effects and the potential of ICT to enhance community protection and
response initiatives, its effectiveness has been met with some challenges. KIIs with animators and field supervisors
working on the SECC program revealed that when the LRA attack, they target HF radios and it can take
considerable time to replace them. For example, in the community of Kpabou (90 kilometers from Obo), the LRA
attacked and took an HF radio. It took six months to replace the radio because there were no spare parts (all
parts have to be imported) and no expertise available to repair the equipment.
The LRA targets ICT installations as a strategy to isolate communities and prevent them from communicating
outside their communities, to reach security agencies, for example. Furthermore, when HF radios become
dysfunctional due to mechanical problems, it takes over six months to have them repaired and functional. This was
noted in KIIs with respondents who work at the community level in the CAR communities of Bambouti and
Bambossou in Upper Mbomou Prefecture. While operational and logistical challenges are the known reasons for
these delays, nevertheless, it makes affected communities vulnerable and exposed. This is why local authorities and
field staff have suggested combining HF radios and satellite phones to maximize ICT effectiveness in the early
warning systems. This issue was less significant in the DRC.
“It is working, but I wish it could be replaced by satellites phones because if LRA attack, the first thing they do is to
steal or grab the HF radio, e.g., in Maboussou, the LRA attacked and took the HF Radio and the community could not
report/communicate. Satellite phones are better because people can move with it in case of attacks, but HF Radios
are fixed, and if the LRA attack, they can easily take the radios, but if it is a satellite phone people can move with it in
a secret place and make calls.” (KII, Prefet, Obo, CAR)
“The radio in the church helps us, but the messages come late when the damage has been done. By the time the
communities are told of impending danger, the attackers have come in and damaged, looted, raped and even killed . .
. we like the radio system but being fixed in one place, it cannot help 100 percent.” (FGD, Male, Zemio, CAR)
Of the funded interventions, an additional performance gap identified by KII and FGD respondents concerns the

34
overall context and capacities of the interventions and the lag in response time by security forces once an alert is
transmitted. Security forces do react following an alert, although stakeholders report that this reaction sometimes
can take several days, especially if there are no security bases positioned nearby. Additionally, the authority to act
on and mobilize for an alert has to go through the entire military hierarchy, which is not a fast process. In some
cases, forces don’t have the logistical means to reach the area rapidly. In the vast majority of cases, they come
following an attack, attempting then to track the LRA by foot in the bush. In Bas and Haut Uélé (in the DRC), the
FARDC do not have functioning vehicles. They need to rely on MONUSCO or to borrow vehicles from the local
population in order to pursue the LRA. In May 2015, a FARDC unit was deployed on foot 180 kilometers into the
bush to track the LRA. They then confronted the LRA with poor weapons and seven soldiers died as a result. That
said, the level and flow of information transmitted through ICT has helped to inform the positioning and the
number of security forces (FARDC notably), allowing security forces to react more efficiently and effectively to
LRA attacks and activities.
EVALUATION QUESTION 2 – HOW HAS ACCESS TO COMMUNITY PROTECTION
PROGRAMS (CPPs) AFFECTED COMMUNITY RESPONSE AND PROTECTION
INITIATIVES IN AREAS AFFECTED BY THE LRA?
Conclusion: CPPs are perceived to work well in LRA-affected communities; they have facilitated
peace promotion and community cohesion and better preparedness to respond to LRA threats.
Implementation of the CPPs limited conflicts and diminished the potential attractiveness of armed
groups. Additionally, they have allowed communities to experience a greater understanding of
themselves, their assets, their vulnerabilities, their collective decision-making and their ownership
of their environment. As a result of CPPs, communities tend to be more confident that, even without the
presence of state authorities, they now can engage in activities for self-protection and mitigate risks as they wait
for a response from local authorities and the RTF/UPDF and other defense forces who pursue the LRA.
Despite these gains, however, at the general level, the cause of vulnerability to attacks, such as ambushes and
kidnappings by the LRA, are still prevalent. Women, children and youth, in particular, are vulnerable to attack as
they trek long distances to schools, health
facilities, water sources, and in search of flat
places/stones for drying cassava and for areas
to farm and fish. The perpetual lack of roads
and bridges prevents security forces and
humanitarian agencies from responding in time
to alerts from community protection programs
and EWSs. Therefore, achievements in the
areas of community-based protection can be
consolidated through strategic investments in
infrastructure as cross-cutting measures in the
sectors of health, education, water and
sanitation, roads and livelihoods.
CPPs are developed and drills are organized to
simulate various scenarios of possible LRA
attacks in the community. The simulations
focus on what to do before, during, and after
an attack. Communities have become aware of
their own environment and have learned how
to mitigate risks related to LRA attacks. Additionally, KII respondents indicated that the CPPs have sensitized
communities to diminish the allure of becoming a member of an armed group. This has helped communities better
understand the risks and consequences of collaboration with the LRA. It should be noted that in small segments of
the population, factors such as poverty and a lack of social cohesion have contributed to the LRA’s appeal.
The major achievements of the CPPs implemented by SECC in the LRA-affected communities include the
establishing and training of Community Protection Committees (CPC) and the establishing and training of
EWS Flow of Information
Witness: Hunter,
fisher, farmer, herder,
traveler, resident
‐ CPC
‐ Chef du village
– HF radio
operator
SECC Project
USAID
Local and national
authorities and
security forces
Regional / Intl
Humanitarian
& Security
Actors
Figure 10: EWS Flow of Information

35
Community Animators and HF Radio Operators. These structures work together with the aid of ICT (especially
the HF radios) to implement community protection plans that are developed through the AI processes using the 4
D approach described earlier in this report.
One of the key aspects of the community protection system is its ability to break intra- and inter-community
isolation by promoting social cohesion. Due to very scattered and low density population, people tend to be
individualistic. For example, in the past, even if interviewees noticed an LRA presence in their community, they
would keep the information to themselves and possibly flee without informing their neighbors or the greater
community. SECC community-based interventions and the promotion of information sharing has contributed to
increased linkages between individuals and created a sense of community. Now community members are more
inclined to avoid isolated places. They will farm, herd, and fish in groups and even regroup to live as communities
to ensure that they are less susceptible to attacks and abductions.
The CPPs have largely focused on helping communities understand their environments using risk and resource
mapping and connecting them with other communities through the alert system. By knowing what is happening in
communities 30 kilometers away, communities are able to prepare against LRA threats more effectively and to
take precautions for self-protection. Tools such as resource mapping, risk analysis, and security planning are rather
sophisticated, but communities have indicated a strong interest in these. They also have established community
documents, which are establishing a foundation for local (grassroots) governance, particularly on security issues. In
the DRC, most of the documents are being finalized at CRS. These interventions are little known to date in the
DRC by external stakeholders since the SECC program recently started. In addition, the documents are rather
sensitive (risk and resource mapping, LRA pathways mapping, security plans), but there is no dissemination policy.
The dissemination strategy should be done on a case-by-case basis depending on the expected use of the
information. This could be useful, for example, to inform those interested in agriculture and food security
initiatives and in the case of community history / risk analysis to inform psychosocial support in order to better
tailor activities to fit the experiences each community has had with the LRA and understand the risks that are
unique to each community.
Findings from various KIIs reveal that these CPP systems have helped increase awareness among members of LRA-
affected communities concerning the risks of LRA attacks and the best ways to avoid these attacks. Communities
now are more aware about how suspected LRA can be identified (e.g., they are not always in uniforms; they speak
Lingala, Acholi; they walk with civilians carrying their goods; and they sometimes wear FARDC uniforms, etc.). The
KIIs indicated that most of the alerts about suspected LRA come from fishermen, hunters and others who are
working or traveling in the forests. It was noted also that although the main focus is the LRA, in the CAR,
communities use the CPP systems to communicate with each other concerning other tensions, such as those
between Christians and Muslims and between communities and the Mbororo pastoralists. They also described
being affected by other armed groups.
“Community-based protection programs have used HF radios to break the isolation of communities. Now information
can be shared about security, community tensions, and other issues of interest. We are working only in isolated
communities and the criteria is that the community must have experienced [an] LRA attack. . . . There was an alert
that came in from the communities that a man [was] posing as a Ugandan soldier. Local authorities were informed
and responded in coordination with the CPC.” (KII, SECC Bangassou Learning Event, CAR)
“At least I know where to hide and how to protect my family as you chase and hunt down the LRA… We are giving
them knowledge and making them aware [of our] own resources and supplementing this with technology: HF radios,
FM stations, transistors and training of CPCs and animators.” (KII, SECC Bangui, CAR)
According to the FGDs and KIIs in the DRC and CAR: in the context of weak state institutions, the absence of a
functional Justice Law and Order sector and weak civilian protection programs, the CPPs should continue to be a
major priority intervention.
“We need to get more into communities’ capacity to protect themselves until the state will be in [a] position to deploy
the authority of the law through the Justice, Law and Order sectors.” (KII, MINUSCA DDR, Bangui, CAR)

36
Facilitating social cohesion efforts was perceived as a relevant intervention related to the CPP and one that would
help to enhance community protection and resilience against the LRA. Interviews with SECC staff at the learning
event in Bangassou, CAR, revealed that in order to realize social cohesion in the communities as a strategy for
strengthening community protection and resilience, they use the concept of the 3Bs (binding, bonding, and
bridging). Binding involves constructing the individual—building the individual; bonding involves restoring the
relationship between the individual and his/her own group (e.g., reconciling Catholics as a group); and bridging
focuses on connecting the various groups together. For example, bridging was used in the selection and
constitution of a CPC, which drew upon representatives from all groups in the community. Members were elected
by the local population, including the Mbororo, Azande and the refugees, and invited to participate in community-
based protection activities. This is an improvement from what was previously put in place with the Local
Committees for Community Organization (CLOC), which were sometimes little known by the population, or
were unrepresentative of the population. The new CPCs are now much more aware of their role and the
importance of social cohesion.
“We have seen more social cohesion in the communities because before there was no collaboration between
communities, but now the CRS/SECC projects allow inter-community cohesion and intra-community cohesion.” (KII,
Mayor, Zemio, CAR)
One of the key strategies promoted to complement the social cohesion programs has been trauma healing.
Trauma management and psychosocial support have become one of the central activities in the SECC’s portfolio,
complementing the EWS as a mechanism to strengthen community-based protection.
A review of SECC reports indicates that 450 participants in the CAR participated in a three-day trauma-healing
and SGBV workshop. The trainings involved a broad range of stakeholders (e.g., civil society, religious leaders,
etc.). Notably, in the DRC, it was the first time that Imams were involved in activities by any stakeholders. In
addition, 35 faith and community leaders in the CAR were trained to serve as “healing companions” and were
helped to lead their own initiatives following a one-week Training of Trainers (ToT). These workshops address the
causes, symptoms, stages, and consequences of trauma—and the accompanying emotions of loss, grief, and
mourning. They also use a three-stage, non-linear model for the stages of healing: active listening; traumatic anger;
and community trust-building.
Trauma awareness/healing interventions have been well received in the affected communities and are on high
demand. They also are beginning to improve social cohesion and reduce tensions between Muslims and non-
Muslims, including the Mbororo, especially in communities that were affected by the Seleka. This was particularly
reported in the CAR, in Bangassou, Zemio, and Rafai. The need for truth telling and reconciliation among—and
within—communities is more acute in some communities than in others. This is particularly the case in Bangassou
and Rafai (CAR). These communities continue to harbor tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims and between
communities and the Mbororo/Fulani, who are suspected of benefitting from and even collaborating with the
Seleka and the LRA. They also are suspected on occasions of guiding the LRA to transit routes in the forests and
jungles of CAR.
Based on the concept of the SECC program, one of the key strategies is to foster social cohesion through micro-
projects, for example, by providing social services in schools and establishing healthcare centers and sources of
water, among others, to build bridges between different groups by engaging them in shared activities that serve
common goals and interests. Communities have to choose their micro-projects, which implies that they must
discuss and analyze their needs and express priorities. These micro-projects also serve as mechanisms for reducing
risks of exposure to LRA attacks by improving facilities and infrastructure (in some cases road access). They also
can create livelihood opportunities, for example, when maintenance is needed for the upkeep of facilities. In the
DRC, the team could not get the list of micro-projects implemented in previous projects for Haut and Bas Uélé,
and projects apparently were not implemented in Haut Uélé. Hence, their results are hardly documented.
“There are times when communities are surprised by the LRA attacks. When they step away from their communities,
they are susceptible to being kidnapped by the LRA. That is why we introduce the micro-projects to address the
major risks and vulnerability factors. For example, when women travel three to five miles looking for flat stones on
which to dry their cassava; they could be kidnapped. I have seen children travel almost 15 kilometers to go to
school.” (KII, SECC, Bangu, CAR)

37
However, it should be noted that apart from the construction of the cassava drying places built closer to women’s
communities and the two health facilities in Zemio, most of the micro-projects have yet to be implemented. A
review of the project M&E Plan shows that the performance of the micro-projects component of the SECC has
been sub-optimal (and has been measured inadequately). This has been attributed to logistical challenges that led to
increasingly high costs and extended the time needed to complete these projects. In Haut Uélé, in the DRC,
stakeholders indicated that the micro-projects from the previous Protecting Communities from Violence through
Improved Communication project, funded by DoS/BPRM, could not be funded because of financial issues
encountered at the end of the project. Due to insufficient funds, the salaries of some staff and mission costs went
unpaid.
Additionally, there were issues in project management. In Bas Uélé, micro-projects were undertaken and in some
cases continue to bear fruit, especially in small cattle breeding. However, the amount dedicated to these micro-
projects was very small ($2,200 USD in Bas Uélé in the previous project) especially taking into account the high
logistics and procurement costs in the area. While this would not make a substantial impact possible, nevertheless,
it would allow the community to come together around the support of livelihoods or infrastructure. It should be
noted that as of August 2015, the SECC was rethinking its micro-projects strategy to focus on micro-projects
achievable in the current (and challenging) logistical context.
“A truck of items from Bangui to Rafai or Zemio can take several months. It is very difficult to manage logistics.
Everything has to come from Bangui. You cannot find anything here. Going into the communities during the rainy
season is almost impossible. Out of the 28 planned [micro-projects], we have done only two and they are in Zemio
but [they are] not yet completed.” (KII, SECC Bangassou, CAR)
Overall, in the absence of functional state institutions and civilian protection programs, KII and FGD participants
believe that the CPPs augment the principles of the EWS (building capacity and working with community-based
protection structures, such as CPCs and animators) and that attendant social cohesion efforts contribute
immensely to the communities’ social stability. CPPs also facilitate community action and enhance the communities’
understanding of risks, vulnerabilities, and resources. This knowledge can be used to improve community
responses and protection initiatives. However, despite these gains, the root causes of community vulnerability to
attacks remain, i.e., the basic needs of roads, WASH facilities, and access to health and education services. USAID,
through the SECC program, and other partners like Invisible Children should consolidate the achievements of the
CPPs and expand their activities to reach all LRA-affected communities. USAID should also consider gradually
building the capacity of the CPPs to become CBOs that will continue the SECC program activities once the project
closes.
EVALUATION QUESTION 3 – WHAT HAS BEEN THE PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF
INCREASED ACCESS TO ICT COMMUNITY RESPONSE AND PROTECTION
INITIATIVES IN THE AREAS AFFECTED BY THE LRA?
Conclusion: The ICT initiatives are lauded in communities as an effective means of enabling and
ensuring community protection through the EWS. The LRA has created a communal psychosis which the
USAID/CRS interventions (along with other interventions, in the first place from Invisible Children) have been able
to attenuate as communities have become more connected, feel externally supported and improve their
knowledge and capacities for resilience. The ICT initiatives, in particular, have opened up increased opportunities
for affected communities to communicate with each other in the event of attacks and have helped facilitate
reconnections (and social networks) in towns and other areas that have HF radios. ICT also has helped to improve
coordination of humanitarian agencies with their teams in the field, which, in turn, has improved program
implementation. However, communities have expressed concerns about the construction, operationalization and
the amount of time it has taken to install the FM radios. The involvement of the local authorities in the ICT
installations in the communities has been perceived as sub-optimal. Furthermore, at the general level, communities
are frustrated with the ongoing insecurity and the state authorities’ lack of assistance. In non-intervention areas,
there is also a noticeable fear among FGD participants that a disconnected community, i.e., one that does not have
communication within itself, or with the outside world, is one more exposed to attack.

38
KII and FGD respondents see that increased ICT (in the form of increased community access to HF radios, FM
stations, and hand-crank radios) has improved information collection, information sharing, and overall
communications capacity. They also noted that communities are more confident in their abilities to protect
themselves. ICT is seen as having the potential to transform the EWS and response through the provision of
information and alerts that will better prepare, connect and protect affected communities. In all the FGDs, there
was unanimous agreement that enhanced ICT usage over time would mitigate LRA incursions because people will
be able to communicate faster and more easily.
Communities also now have better knowledge of their capacities and the levels of risks they face. This means they
can take a clearer and more pragmatic approach in addressing the psychosis that the LRA has created in the past.
Community members interviewed indicated that the SECC activities have contributed to “Mopoko” (social
cohesion), creating more solidarity and connection between the communities. It was observed that when all FM
stations are operating at full scale and complementing the other ICT equipment for the EWS, it makes it more
difficult for the LRA and other armed groups to attack communities. The impact of the ICT initiatives is so positive
that local and regional political leaders have taken note and are pushing for a more formal establishment of these
systems in their communities. Finally, the FGD respondents in the CAR universally heralded the ICT and the EWS
initiatives for being context sensitive given that a large part of the population in the east is illiterate.
“FM radio stations complement the EWS in an area where there is no TV, no national Radio. Zemio is already
broadcasting and Rafai starts by [the] end of August. For Zemio and Rafai, the project is distributing 2100 radios or
transistors for the communities to use to listen to the established FM stations. HF alerts are sent to the FM stations
and the FM stations broadcast this information widely. [Let’s] also discuss the success stories of the EWS. . . . When
this robust system becomes operational in all the communities, the LRA will get worried. A combination of HF radios,
FM stations, CPCs and Animators—all these assure the community of protection. . . .” (KII, SECC Bangui, CAR)
Increased access to ICT also has contributed to better coordination of activities for humanitarian assistance. ICT is
used by agencies, like ACTED, Save the Children, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) to communicate with their
staff in the field, receive timely situation updates, and to ascertain the security status of areas where they want to
go using HF radios. It was further noted that the HF radios also have facilitated quick reporting of disease
outbreaks, e.g., mumps, which attracted responses from humanitarian agencies.
In spite of all of the positive effects of the ICT systems, there were concerns that the construction and
operationalization of FM radios has taken a long time, and the involvement of local leaders was sub-optimal.
“We are not involved in the implementation of the projects. They only inform us that they have installed HF Radios,
but they do not involve us as leaders to hand over the radios and officially hand them over to the communities. Up to
now I do not know the number of HF radios installed in the communities. When we talk to them they do not give us
valid reasons. They only say they are waiting for the boss. (KII, Mayor Zemio, CAR)
Additionally, various stakeholders expressed significant frustration relating to the persistence of insecurity,
particularly taking into account the weakness of the LRA. Other studies have highlighted the erosion of legitimate
authority, the inability to provide services, and the loss of control of territory as major factors in shaping people’s
psychological outlook on insecurity. This coupled with widespread corruption and criminality, the involuntary
movement of populations, and sharp economic declines have been perceived as markers of a failed state.20
In this
context, current interventions are perceived as useful, but rather limited because they are not dealing with the
root causes of conflict, nor do they address the extensive basic needs of the communities. Based on the team’s
sample of both the CAR’s and the DRC’s LRA-affected communities, the population feels totally abandoned by the
state, which they believe is not able to counter “those small criminals.” In the DRC, because the dominant ethnic
group in Haut Uélé is largely Zande, there is also a tendency to victimize this ethnic group. As a result, the strong
feelings of insecurity in a number of places have affected people’s psychosocial outlook. Some displaced people are
still reluctant to return to their area of origin, and cultivation practices are also still limited to small areas close to
their communities. People fear that if they cultivate large fields, their harvest will be looted.
20
IRC, 2015: 11

39
EVALUATION QUESTION 4 - WHAT HAVE BEEN THE OBSERVABLE OUTCOMES
OF ICT, INFORMATION-SHARING, AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION PROGRAMS IN
THE AREAS AFFECTED BY THE LRA?
Conclusion: In all intervention sites there is a feeling that as a result of increased EWS activities
communities have more enhanced forms of security. The interventions have contributed to
reducing LRA-related casualties and have saved lives. They have also strengthened social cohesion, even in
the context of population displacements, as well as reduced community-based conflicts, strengthened community
coping mechanisms, and initiated community-based security governance. The ICT interventions also have instilled
more confidence in affected communities allowing them to go about their daily activities despite perceived danger;
promoting increased reporting of suspected persons; encouraging people within a five- to ten-kilometer radius of
their community to return home; and providing more knowledge of the situation to local stakeholders. Limitations
of the ICT interventions relate to the restrained coverage of the network and protection mechanisms. There is
also a general level of limited results in terms of defection, DDR, and persistence of insecurity. A weak integration
of socio-cultural elements also limits effectiveness. Additionally, it was noted that EWS and community protection
initiatives at the community level do not elicit early response from the external security actors and humanitarian
agencies. This was partly attributed to the poor roads and infrastructure, making it difficult for the military to
respond in a timely manner.
Table 2: Incidents in Haut- and Bas-Uélé and CAR from 2009-2015
In terms of security, key results have been an increased knowledge on the dangerous areas and risks, which,
according to interviewees, has contributed to saving lives and reducing the casualties related to the LRA. People
were able to avoid dangerous areas or be alerted to the likeliness of an attack. For example, in April 2015, in
Bouroumassi, in the DRC, communities were alerted to an LRA incursion and when the LRA arrived they found
the villages empty. Along with the different forms of security pressure exerted by the FARDC, the AU RTF or
MONUSCO, the project also possibly influenced LRA
strategies; the LRA knows that the community is not
isolated and can transfer information rapidly. These
factors make the group more reluctant to attack. They
also know that strong casualties would trigger the
intervention of the various security forces in place in
the country and that these forces would chase them
into the bush close to the attacks. However, abductions
generally remain high (e.g., 32 people were abducted in
May 2015 according to the CRS Newsletter, May
2015).
“In my own experience, the LRA attacks reduce when
the LRA learns that there is an EWS to quickly report
incidents of attack. When they know that there is a
possibility to transmit information quickly, even when
they attack, they leave quickly and they do not engage
in attacking an entire community but only engage in
isolated ambushes on roads and other isolated place.”
Haut Uélé –
Total
incidents
Civilian
fatalities
Civilian
Abductions
Bas Uélé
Total
Incidents
Civilian
fatalities
Civilian
Abductions
CAR
Total
Incidents
Civilian
fatalities
Civilian
Abductions
2009 157 913 664 71 122 575 71 122 575
2010 513 776 1495 56 78 204 56 78 204
2011 197 97 293 28 12 118 28 12 118
2012 197 12 245 25 1 49 25 1 49
2013 109 6 109 15 10 82 15 10 82
2014 111 3 197 25 6 120 25 6 120
2015
(to Oct)
89 3 271 42 2 173 34 3 71
Figure 11: Comparison of attacks, deaths, and abductions in
Haut- and Bas-Uélé

40
(KII, Bangassou, CAR)
Statistics available from the LRA crisis tracker show the relative improvement of the security situation, although
the number of abductees remains significant and insecurity is maintained with relatively low casualties across a very
broad territory, hampering socio-economic activities.
At the social level, interventions have contributed to increased social cohesion. The KIIs revealed that people in
the affected communities are beginning to move in closer to each other, particularly in areas near places with HF
radios, CPCs, and animators. Communities that had very few people now have a considerable number of people
who live in the same locality served by a HF radio and a CPC. People, therefore, are clustering around the HF
radios and the community protection and early warning structures. Informants believe that this has helped reduce
the vulnerability of communities to LRA attacks.
“The HF radios: reduces impacts of the LRA because if anything happens they inform people and they are able to
protect themselves. It is true but they need more security even if there are HF radios, [the] LRA can still attack.”
(FGD Religious Leaders, Obo, CAR)
Table 3: Percentage of attacks, deaths and abductions per year from 2008-2015
Additionally, the intervention has promoted peace practices and conflict mitigation strategies. Several testimonies
were collected by the team on the effects of a theater activity implemented by the SECC partner, Search for
Common Ground. In this activity, the SECC hires community members (who are interested in becoming writers
and comedians) to write plays for the theater. Their tasks include identification of local community conflicts and
other social cohesion issues, including those that are not directly related to the LRA. They write theater pieces
tailored to these identified issues and during the show, the audience participates and has to provide a solution to
the problems presented. Issues have concerned, for example: land disputes (occupation, limits); gender; conflicts
with security forces and with non-state armed groups; humanitarian assistance; access to social services; neighbor
disputes; and children. The team collected several testimonies from community members. Interviewees said that
they had faced situations in which they could have reacted violently, but instead they remembered what was
discussed in the play and decided to act accordingly.
The SECC activities have also supported collective action and changes of practice in response to the security risks.
For example, it has sensitized individuals not to go alone in the bush and to prefer group movements and
transportation. It also has contributed to strengthening the coping strategies of the communities, and improved
community-based contingency planning, preparedness, and pre-positioning, which could form the basis of a
community-based Disaster Risk Reduction approach. This approach would comprise a joint analysis of risks
(including LRA pathways and at-risk areas), and decide on coping mechanisms to respond to those risks.
The communities also have benefited from capacity building as a result of ICT interventions. The SECC project has
given them an organizational structure and the methodological tools to better anticipate and plan accordingly. They
are better equipped, organized (meeting regularly), and are able to make decisions about their own future. The fact
that the committee members are volunteers also indicates their level of commitment.
Attacks Deaths Abductions
2008 4% 29% 20%
2009 25% 51% 46%
2010 16% 12% 9%
2011 17% 4% 6%
2012 13% 1% 4%
2013 12% 2% 5%
2014 9% 1% 8%
2015 3% < 1% 2%
100% 100% 100%

41
On a practical note, there have been cascading economic effects of the intervention. The Vodacom network in the
DRC has contributed to increased economic trade and exchanges. Now there is a money transfer service available
with Vodacom (but no statistics in that respect have been collected). Micro-projects and infrastructure projects
also aim to increase exchanges, economic activities, and trade.
Discussions with local authorities and field staff indicated that some people from communities within a radius of
five to ten kilometers have started returning to their communities to farm and harvest. This indicates some level of
confidence in the CPPs and speaks to the improved access to information from ICT/EWS. For example, in the
CAR, the majority of the people who had come from Tambourah and Koumboli, and who had been displaced to
Zemio, have returned. In Rafai, some of the able-bodied people travel up to 20 kilometers to camp and plant and
then return to harvest. In Obo, communities within a radius of five kilometers from the center camp travel back
and forth to their fields for planting and harvesting. Most people consider their return to the communities they left
temporary, maintaining a foot in the cities/towns where they have relocated to and the communities in which they
are from and plant and harvest their crops. Despite the transient nature of returnees, people are moving about
more freely and this is a clear indication that ICT, information sharing, and the CPPs in the LRA-affected areas are
beginning to yield results.
“All people who had come from Tambourah and Koumboli to Zemio returned. In Obo, during the planting season,
people go and camp in the jungle and then return to Obo. During the harvesting time, they go to harvest and then
return with the harvest in Obo town.” (KII, SECC field staff, CAR)
The KIIs with SECC field staff indicated that for those communities that remained behind in the LRA- affected
areas in the CAR, and who did not move to the centers in Zemio, Obo, or Rafai, the ICT initiatives and
information-sharing is helping to strengthen their resilience and social cohesion.
In the DRC, although this cannot be attributed to the project, but to the overall evolution of the security context
and the difficult living conditions in the urban centers,21
more than 150,000 returns were recorded in the Dungu
area in the DRC since June 2015, after several years of displacements. Some territories still remain empty or are
occupied by Mbororo. This is notably the case of Zigbi and Malingindo, according to OCHA.
It was noted in the KIIs with community leaders and field staff that the CAR EWS alerts of attacks or possible
attacks do not necessarily always trigger responses from local authorities or the RTF. This was partly attributed to
the poor roads and infrastructure making it difficult for the military to respond in a timely manner. Therefore early
warning only triggers an early response from the communities themselves when they implement their community
protection plans.
“EWS is very helpful, but our response time is slow because we rely on air CAR is big. We are operating in an area
bigger than Uganda. Our operations as military are mainly intelligence led. . . . [The]EWS [is] good, but response is
slow due to poor infrastructure. When looking for the enemy, you need to be troops heavy to identify and engage the
enemy. Air power has limits; you need troops on the ground, but with poor roads infrastructure, this is a challenge.”
(KII, UPDF, Obo, CAR)
It also was noted that the maintenance of the radios is not fully assured, even in affected areas such as Faradje,
Nambia, Duru or Niangara. A number of communities expressed their interest to be included in any follow-on to
the SECC. These include communities on the northern axis of the DRC, for example in Nabyapaï, Dikwoto,
Yanawelangwa, Nakale, and on the western axis in Marcoussa, Mbamu, Tiapapa, and Kutala.
Limitations come also from more contextual drivers that can be integrated into future project design. The
communication network represents a first step of awareness and information, but it only leads to positive changes
if it is followed up by appropriate actions, some of which can be done by the community. The decrease in the
threats and the post-crisis recovery, however, depends largely on external stakeholders. This means that synergies
between different stakeholders are key; improved coordination and synergy among communities and other actors
on the ground will improve conditions for quicker reactions to LRA activities. This implies that there is also a need
21
40 percent of the population in Dungu territory do not have access to drinkable water and out of 50 dwellings built in Dungu Center by the
humanitarian agencies, only 12 are still functioning.

42
for an integrated approach in the short term (e.g., security, reinsertion, trauma healing) and in the long-term (e.g.,
governance, justice, sustainability of basic services). There is also a need to address key conflict drivers (e.g.,
conservation and governance of natural resources, security governance and performance of security services,
border control).
Finally, according to some civil society members, socio-cultural elements could be integrated further. Not all
potential communication lines with the LRA are being explored from either traditional leaders in Uganda or
interactions between the LRA and local populations. For example some messages have been received from the
LRA indicating that they needed food to be positioned in some places, the population did this, but then no follow-
up took place. Communities can sometime—though rarely—interact with the LRA by asking hunters to leave
messages in the bush.
EVALUATION QUESTION 5 – WHAT INFORMATION HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED
WITHIN AND BETWEEN COMMUNITIES AFFECTED BY THE LRA?
Conclusion: Using the ICT infrastructure and the community-based protection structures, several
aspects of information are communicated including: information about the LRA movements;
information to help defectors to get to the Safe Reporting Sites, information on disease outbreaks,
information on social issues, information related to economics, and information about community
or intergroup tensions between Mbororo Muslims and Christians. HF radios have also contributed to
better coordination and information sharing between humanitarian agencies, their field staff, local authorities, and
the community structures. Only information concerning security is recorded at the headquarter level and only
LRA-related information is disseminated during the alerts. Systems for information exchanges are partly formalized,
with the use of codes, and daily collective round-calls. This could be further formalized.
Using the ICT infrastructure and the community-based protection structures, several aspects of information are
communicated intra and inter-community. People in isolated communities use their agency and ingenuity to
innovate various ways to maximize the use of HF radios and FM stations to meet their needs and goals. Some
limitations come from the fact that some phones are broken, in some cases for several months. KIIs and FGDs
indicated that the common information communicated between and within communities include: information
about the LRA movements; information to help defectors to get to the Safe Reporting Sites, information on
disease outbreaks especially mumps in Zabe (this was circulated by SECC to humanitarian agencies and triggered
action from MSF, ACTED etc.), social news (births, funerals greetings), and information about community or
intergroup tensions between Mbororo Muslims and Christians. It also has made it possible to organize money
transfers between family members (reconnecting, checking in on family member) or to share information on road
conditions. Authorities and state institutions (e.g. territorial administration, health, education, and social affairs)
would also report back to their superiors using the radio. The system is also used to share information on natural
hazards, such as wind and hippos. It has, therefore, a broader scope than just the focal point or protection
monitoring system.
“….the radio has helped us get news of our loved ones in far places in
Nambia, Niangara and even paces like Ango,” (Female, FGD, Doruma,
DRC)
No correlation can be made between the type of users of the HF
radio systems and the type of information communicated. In
theory, everybody has access to the radio and can use it,
according to the interviewees. The radios are used by youth,
CPCs, IDPs, and FARDC (although CRS try to avoid letting them
use it in military uniform). This indicates a strong potential for
integration. However, in the DRC foreigners, and Mbororo in
particular, never used the HF radio system, while they are the
major users of the HF radios in CAR, owing to the nature of their
activities (nomadic and trade oriented).
A hunter returning from a five-day game hunting
expedition near Ango. Lack of access to ICT to
communicate imminent danger means hunters offer
first line information sources to communities on what
they see in the forests.

43
The EWS has enabled sharing of information about LRA attacks, attacks within and between communities, and
other security incidents such as poaching. In some cases, the HF radios were used to report abusive behaviors
from the FARDC, for example, an illegal barrier was reported and removed by the general following a radio
notification. Information is shared from hunters, fishermen, and from the Mbororo, and warning is given to the
communities to take precautionary measures.
“In June hunters in the forest saw armed men in tottered uniforms. They alerted the head of the village and he went
to the radio operator and warned the community members…Similarly, in Tabane, hunters saw a suspected LRA
group and informed the head of the village. The village head informed the HF radio operator and they put up the
message and the community nearby (Bahr) received the information. The CPC of Bahr went into the community and
let them know that the LRA are in the vicinity of their community. This information was passed on to the UPDF and
they went to the bush to pursue the LRA” (KII, SECC Animator Zemio, CAR).
Ad hoc economic information can also be provided by radio. Information on the availability of goods and prices in
some markets can be shared, which is a great advantage as it allows people to sell goods at the best price and to
avoid the transportation costs of going to a market and turning back, as they had done in the past. In Niangara,
DRC, people interviewed indicated that implementation of the Vodacom antenna meant less information was
transferred through the radio, which had been broken for months, and that traders would mostly use their mobile
phone to exchange news. Mobile phones and credits are hardly accessible to all the population categories;
however, even chiefs of small urban centers may not own a mobile phone.
Information is also communicated through HF radios and hub radios between isolated people who remained
behind in communities and their relatives in other communities and towns. KIIs revealed that HF radios are seen
as a center for community interaction, learning and sharing of information, and resources within and between
communities. It was noted that in Zemio and Obo, FM stations were being used to air out messages to encourage
communities to accept returnees or formerly abducted women, men, and children in the community. People no
longer have to risk moving long distances to deliver information. It was perceived to save time and money they
would spend sending messengers and reduces their susceptibility to LRA ambushes and abductions.
“It is very important to have HF radios e.g. in Ligua-the population thinks it is great-they can be informed about what
happens and they can also share with them what happens to them. Since they have a radio, they do not need to
come to Obo to carry and bring a message. This saves time instead of moving a long distance” (FGD Religious
Leaders, Obo, CAR).
HF radios have also contributed to better coordination and information sharing between humanitarian agencies,
local authorities, and the community structures.
All though this was never the intent, recently an expectation has evolved originating within security forces that
EWS would generate a response from security forces. Since this has not happened most community members still
feel the information is not of any use if security agencies including the UPDF, are not able to act on the information
in a timely manner. The feeling among the RTF (specifically the UPDF) in Obo and Zemio was that they rely more
on their intelligence and less on the info from the EWS. Indeed, the only options left for villagers on getting
information on impending attacks is to take off into safer places. Another concern is that the HF radio system
suffers from a lack of confidentiality, as several stakeholders need to be involved, the radio facility is often in the
middle of the village and people all around can hear, and all the communities connected to the frequency can
receive the information. A coded system has been put in place to mitigate those risks. However, the codes remain
the same from the beginning to date and could possibly be broken (e.g. regarding the number and types of
casualties). Besides, in some cases, a significant cost of 1000 Congolese Franc was requested to transfer private
information (not for security alerts) via the HF radio, which seems relatively high considering the average revenue
and increased poverty in the region. This is not a standard practice though, and in most cases, when the radio is in
the church it is free, which is a key advantage for the users, who have very limited resources. In the meantime, it
compromises sustainability. In the future there may be potential for exclusion by having radios located in churches.
In some communities in the context of CAR where there are tensions between Muslims (including the Mbororo)
and non-Muslims. Therefore conflict sensitivity in this context is important. Future location of HF radios may have
to give consideration to existing community tensions to mitigate risks for social exclusion of particularly
marginalized groups.

44
Moving forward it was noted that there is a desire to further structure the information flow from/to the
communities, for security related information or humanitarian needs. This could be accomplished through
community-based reporting using a grid with specific indicators and details. Previous attempts were made with
mixed results. Relating to the specific protection issues, a limitation in the transfer of information concerned
SGBV, which cannot be reported by the HF system, except when witnesses of the act take care to do this.
Generally, there are difficulties in reporting SGBV cases, especially as the families do not see the benefit of it, and
this can cause problems for the victims.
The HF radio system gives more structure and institutionalization of community-based security mechanisms, as
compared with other communication channels, as a first step for local governance. There is a potential to
structure this further, through gathering trends on a periodic basis. In order to more accurately guide potential
security interventions, CPC and operator capacities could be developed further. The scope of information shared
could also be extended to include not only alerts in the case of attacks, but also information which would allow a
more proactive or investigative approach, such as identification of traces, clues or signs, including on various types
of security threats and smuggling / armed group financing / arms transfer and weapons circulation to which security
forces have limited overview. This is already done to some extent by SECC, but those types of information are not
disseminated during the alerts yet. The level of risks faced by the population would depend on how the
information is actually treated, and could be assessed on a case by case basis. This is not clear to what extent this
would put communities more at risk than the current reporting on LRA attacks. In the case of reporting on ivory,
some organization indicated that they use the HF radios for it, but only indicating by radio that there was a need
for a discussion, and hence project managers would go to the community to collect the information during a face
to face meeting. This aims to ensure confidentiality and protection of the reporters. Some communities have hence
already been trained in reporting ivory trafficking issues.
EVALUATION QUESTION 6 – HOW HAVE USAID-FUNDED ICT PROGRAMS,
COMMUNITY RESPONSE AND PROTECTION PLANS IN LRA-AFFECTED AREAS
INTERFACED WITH COMPLEMENTARY EFFORTS SUCH AS THE LRA CRISIS
TRACKER AND THE INVISIBLE CHILDREN PROJECTS, FOR EXAMPLE?
Conclusion: The project aligns well with most other interventions, despite potential overlaps and
differences in approaches. Many of the stakeholders in LRA-affected areas come together for regular
coordination meetings. While these meetings provide an opportunity for engagement in strategic issues, there are
no effective and well planned technical meetings between partners that are run and managed with clear agenda,
actions points to follow through on, and a coherent plan for partners to follow. There are also gaps in linkages and
awareness of these initiatives on the part of the humanitarian organizations working in the area. Although SECC
shares information through its alerts system for those who are subscribed to their emails and in coordination
meetings held every week with local authorities and humanitarian agencies, there were concerns by some
humanitarian agencies that they do not get adequate and timely access to information from SECC EWS. The access
to the email alerts and stakeholders receiving these alerts do not seem to have been planned very strategically and
proactively at the general level, as some key stakeholders were not aware about them. Additionally, it is important
to note that SECC/CRS by ‘policy is cautious in how it shares information from the HF radios with UPDF and
MINUSCA military components, possibly for fear of compromising CRS and its partners’ neutrality. They
emphasize the need not to militarize the community based civilian protection strategies particularly to avoid
putting civilians in harms-way. Overall, the project fills a gap in terms of international assistance, for community
preparedness, support to community-based development, and local governance, however, the linkage between
humanitarian efforts and development is still missing, which threatens sustainability of short-term lifesaving actions.
Advocacy to development stakeholders would be key so that they relay humanitarian assistance, and support signs
of early recovery.
Invisible Children and CRS C-LRA projects are rather similar, for what concern early warning system, and interact
with various degrees of coordination and communication. However, integration between programming is unclear
and gaps in programming have resulted. This was recognized at the Entebbe focal-points meeting by the C-LRA
stakeholders who were in consensus that there needs to be closer coordination between CRS and Invisible
Children. For example, in Dungu, DRC, Invisible Children used to run a reinsertion center that was used to

45
support children previously affiliated with the LRA (not the
adults or youths). The center has been closed for nine
months because of the shortage of funding. According to
SECC project team in Dungu, the reinsertion component
was not included in the SECC project because of the
existence of this Invisible Children initiative, while USAID
specifies that this was not included in the Request for
Proposal. There is a clear gap now, especially since the
facilities are available and could be easily used for
workshops or seminars, and equipment for vocational
training available there. Additionally, Caritas broke their
MoU with Invisible Children early in 2015 because radios
were not well maintained due to Invisible Children’s
limited funding – while they took care of, and maintained CRS radios when the previous project stopped (a
detailed matrix of the maintenance undertaken is available). However, as both organizations run similar
interventions, a tendency for competition has been observed. The differences in terms of approach are also
reported to be on the level of coordination with military forces, which is stronger at Invisible Children. This is in
part due to the fact that both IC’s and the military forces primary objective is to get rid of the LRA as soon as
possible, whereas CRS’s mandate is broader and more grounded in implementing with neutrality and keeping its
humanitarian independency. Both organizations run separate networks, although they can interact, and neighboring
communities are likely to be in touch. Hence, each organization has its own daily round-call, although the coverage
is interrelated, meaning that they don’t cover distinct shares of the territory. According to the central radio
operator, CRS and Invisible Children use the same code, meaning that both can communicate easily, with security.
It is also clear from the KIIs that attempts have been made by Invisible Children and SECC/CRS to establish some
formal partnerships but these have not been effectively pursued due to the lack of a concrete memorandum of
understanding that spelled out clearly how SECC and Invisible Children should have collaborated. The main offices
for SECC and Invisible Children are also in different locations further limiting the chances for interface by top
management of Invisible Children and SECC, a very necessary requirement to make key, informed, decisions.
Finally, while CRS/SECC is a multi-issue agency, Invisible Children is more of a single-issue agency and as a result
the two organizations, while perhaps sharing some very specific interests in C-LRA activities, their organizational
cultures, structures, and policies are very distinct and different In such cases, there is need for very concrete and
specific activities and deliverables with clear resources implications and timelines. It is therefore important to avoid
grey areas or abstraction in developing and setting implementation modalities and reporting relationships. There
are however a number of efforts in that respect and frequent communications between the two organizations.
Coordination between SECC/CRS and other stakeholders takes place mostly during the security meetings, which
occur twice a week in Dungu, and once a week in Ango. Information shared during those meetings is then used by
the different organizations, including MONUSCO, and fed into the LRA Crisis Tracker, for which the functioning
and accuracy of communication systems is central. A number of other initiatives aim to create information
channels from the field, although this does not take the form of communication equipment for the communities.
They consist mainly of protection monitoring (Intersos), focal points (local civil society), or relay, based mostly on
one individual, and focus mostly on protection related issues. SAIPED also created six community protection
committees, in some cases, in the same communities as SECC, duplicating the structures. They also relay
information on protection issues and security (including ivory poaching).
Strategic meetings are held semi-annually in Entebbe with LRA issue stakeholders. However, it was noted by KII
respondents that although these meetings provide an opportunity for engagement in strategic issues, there are
normally no effective and well planned technical meetings between partners that are concurrently run with clear
agendas, actions points to follow, and a coherent plan for partners. Some management coordination meetings have
been held on weekly bases, with local authorities and humanitarian agencies. In Obo for example, these meetings
are coordinated by IC, while in other areas they are coordinated by SECC. In Bangui, they are coordinated by UN
OCHA. Although these meetings were at once point perceived as useful for routine coordination, they were also
seen as inadequate in terms of technical planning, coordination, harmonization of approaches, leveraging on each
partner’s resources, streamlining operating procedures, and strategies for the avoidance of duplication. Therefore,
constructive and engaging technical meetings between agencies working in LRA-affected areas have not been
Invisible Children reinsertion center in Dungu

46
effectively realized. One of the arguments given is that the SECC project staff in Obo cannot make decisions; they
are largely implementers and supervisors, not decision makers. There have been no serious engagements and
conversations with action points on how best to integrate or ensure that what is reported by the LRA Crisis
Tracker reflects what is generated through the SECC EWS data. SECC share LRA alerts from its EWS and
produces monthly newsletters but these are not systematically factored into the LRA Crisis Tracker. Additionally,
some stakeholders in the field – SECC project staff or local organizations for example - seem to use the LRA
Crisis Tracker on a limited basis. Project staff are not always aware of the existence of such a tool and it does not
feed into the prioritization of the area of interventions.
However, this notwithstanding, some partners who get alerts and newsletters from SECC EWS appreciate the
relationship they have with SECC especially in terms of sharing information from the isolated communities, notably
given the lack of data available on those areas. For example, during a recent outbreak of the mumps, SECC EWS
was the first to break the news that triggered responses from other humanitarian agencies like MSF. SECC has also
held meetings with MSF and the management is discussing with MSF the possibility of training radio operators to
report on health issues.
It was noted that at the local level, there have been attempts to share information between HF radio operators of
Invisible Children and SECC. There have also been some attempts to try and harmonize training protocols but
these have not systematically done and followed through. At the operational level however, Invisible Children in
Dungu indicated that there were daily synergies between both organizations, both organizations constituted “the
two wings of the same bird”.
However, it was observed by the team that stakeholders at the national level have limited information about SECC
and its activities related to EWS, community-based protection, trauma healing, and social cohesion. Most of the
UN agencies including MINUSCA and the UN panel of experts on CAR noted that they had limited or no
information about SECC activities yet on learning about what SECC does, they were very excited and see SECC
project activities and strategies as complementing their mandate.
“We need to have more & closer collaboration; need for SECC to link flash reports to our systems. MINUSCA is not
only military we have many civil components. Your work must be made visible to the international community
because you are partly doing part of MINUSCA mandate or complementing it. We need to get more into building
communities capacity to protect themselves until the state builds its capacity. The issue is what we can do as
international community as we wait for the state to build its capacity” (KII, DDR MINUSCA, Bangui, CAR).
“We have weekly meetings. I am happy to bring SECC on board and create an opportunity for SECC to make a
presentation to high level international group about the excellent work you are doing on community-based protection.
Nobody at the national level is talking about the LRA issue or sharing what is being done and it is time to start to do
this…” (KII, MINUSCA, Bangui, CAR).
This suggests that some humanitarian agencies do not have adequate and/or timely access to information from
SECC.
EVALUATION QUESTION 7 – WHAT ARE THE PROGRAMMATIC LESSONS
LEARNED FROM USAID-FUNDED ICT AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION PROGRAMS
IN LRA-AFFECTED AREAS SINCE 2011?
Conclusion: Several lessons have been learned including that interagency program implementation
efforts need to work more closely in order to be more effective and harness each other’s
comparative advantages;
 A stakeholder analysis and management plan is crucial for avoiding duplication and for
maximizing synergies among humanitarian agencies and other actors in LRA-affected areas;
 Competition between various actors could potentially hinder efforts to secure communities
and this requires clear a clear MoU and harmonization of strategies;
 Social cohesion mechanisms are crucial for building resilient and sustainable CPPs;

47
 In fragile states that have limited governance presence, community-based protection
systems help to build the capacity of communities for their own self-protection and
resilience; and
 Logistical challenges in emergency and early recovery settings require delicate but
necessary civil-military cooperation.
Stakeholder coordination is a prime challenge in ICT and CPPs and therefore needs very clear, firm, and concrete
strategies to effectively address it. A stakeholder analysis and management plan is crucial for avoiding duplication
and for maximizing synergies among humanitarian agencies and other actors in emergency and early recovery
contexts. It is important to have clear MoUs and to harmonize strategies in order to exploit the synergistic effects
of well-structured coordination, resource, and information sharing. Working relationships between single-issue
agencies and multiple issue agencies require well-orchestrated plans for coordination and partnerships. This is
because the organizational cultures, philosophies, and policies tend to differ.
Coordination among implementing partners is key to the sustainability of ICT and CPPs. For example, SECC and
Invisible Children have the potential to transform their relationship and harness each other’s comparative
advantages by working more closely together and in harmony. SECC has a wealth of experience in community-
based protection systems and building resilience of communities while IC, as a single-issue organization, has a
comparative advantage in information flow, advocacy and managing defections, as well as building relationships with
the military and humanitarian agencies in CAR and DRC.
Furthermore, due to the weakness of the state in this region there is a need for stronger inter-region state
cooperation. This can be accomplished through an integrated multi-sector approach to the region, which must be
capable of handling cross-border issues between four countries, three of which are subject to conflict with large
amounts of natural resources. The different pillars for an integrated approach should cover governance, security,
development, and natural resource conservation, while ensuring the involvement of the communities. This
integrated approach should be replicated at the USAID level by ensuring that, in the case of significant strategic
investment in a region, this region gets prioritized in the different sector approaches in the country and in the sub-
region. This would mean more synergies between the various USAID funded projects (e.g. Samaritan’s Purse,
governance programming). Similarly, managing the delicate relationships between horizontal and vertical social
cohesion is complex but necessary in unstable civil and political environments. Strategies that help to bridge the
gap been the governed (community and the various groups in it) and the governors (representatives of a fragile
state) are critical for facilitating early recovery and contributing to gradual restoration of state legitimacy without
negatively affecting the achievements registered in building health relationships, community-based protection, and
resilience among communities.
At the community level there is a need for consolidation of achievements and an expansion of the focus of social
cohesion mechanisms for building resilient and sustainable CPPs through AI processes and trauma healing which
has shown to be effective as reflected in the high demand for trauma healing workshops. The LRA issue is just one
of the conflicts communities are facing; there are internal issues and tensions which have been also exacerbated by
what is happening at the national level, e.g. the CAR crisis in 2013. It is also not clear when state authorities and
legitimacy will be restored. Thus, for now the philosophy is to build community protection and resilience, which
takes time and requires skills. It is about building a set of value systems for securing, empowering, and building
resilience of the community to do things using its own resources.
There is also a need in the communities for more focus on defection - the involvement of traditional leaders to
support DDRRR and defection was indicated as an opportunity, notably for Ugandan combatants of the LRA who
don’t have a solution for return. This would mean a strengthened integration of socio-cultural dynamics in DDRRR
or support to defection and reintegration (e.g. communication between LRA and communities, role of hunters in
knowledge of the environment, traditional practices). While they remain out of USAID’s scope, USAID could play
a role in terms of advocacy and documentation of the issue, as well as support the livelihoods and vocational
trainings of vulnerable groups, such as youth and women head of households, including defectors.
In terms of ICT, the implementation of HF radio provides an added value versus a standard communication
network if it includes strong CPCs who are able to play a role in ensuring information quality, as well as leadership

48
to promote information exchanges and linkages with other communities and stakeholders. There is a need for a
knowledge management component for information generated by ICT to ensure institutional memory and
handover. There should be analysis at the community level to generate reaction from the security forces,
structuration to report on the humanitarian indicator, and wider outreach to humanitarian stakeholders. This need
is reflected in KIIs and project documents which show that most delays are related to capacity of human resources
and the high level of attrition among SECC staff. Almost half of the staff that have been recruited and trained by
SECC left to go work with United Nations agencies and many past and potential staff are unwilling to be based in
the field. It is also very difficult to find staff with the specific knowledge base, skills, and experience to replace the
staff that leave the project. It was noted by senior management that it takes up to between 6-9 months to identify
and recruit qualified staff.
“Challenge of human resources: in these areas, it is extremely difficult to find qualified staff and the staffs
hired from Bangui are susceptible to high turnover because of the nature of the working conditions. It takes
up to six months to find a suitable candidate and recruit someone into a position” (KII, SECC, Bangassou,
CAR)
In terms of security, there is a need to ensure strong linkages between the alert system and the response capacity
in order to improve effectiveness of the response and credibility of the interventions. Capacity building of state
authorities is key to strengthen response and intervention. The linkages between C-LRA and interventions against
poaching, smuggling of natural resources, and natural resource conservation is key at both the community and
security forces level in order to ensure that all actors of insecurity are targeted. There should be stronger
involvement and ownership by the state and other stakeholders through inclusion in development plans, at local
and provincial levels, and through focusing on general security drivers and conflict factors and avoiding the political
debate on the LRA. There is also interest in an integrated and community-based approach, with participation of
the community at every step of the project.
Logistical challenges in emergency and early recovery settings require delicate but necessary civil-military
cooperation in order to address the logistical challenges related to security and poor infrastructural barriers to
effective and timely deliverables by humanitarian agencies.
EVALUATION QUESTION 8 – TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE USAID-FUNDED ICT
PROGRAMS, COMMUNITY RESPONSE AND PROTECTION PROGRAMS IN LRA-
AFFECTED AREAS BEEN SUSTAINED SINCE THEIR INCEPTION?
Conclusion: There is evidence supporting the sustainability of the ICT and CPP components of
USAID-funded C-LRA activities, despite the fact that sustainability will be better appreciated in the
long run, considering that the project just started a few months ago in the DRC. Dynamics for CPPs
have just started in the case of the DRC, and trainers need to prove their ability to replicate what they learned as
well as to institutionalize the process. This will require further support from international agencies, first USAID,
for the organization of the trainings and sensitization and refreshing workshops of the competences. While the HF
radio can function once a project ends, depending on the community committee leadership and management, at
the same time the ICT program has been challenged due to costly hardware repairs. The low remuneration
offered to radio operators (or an expectation that they be volunteers), the maintenance of equipment, and the
training of personnel all remain a challenge to communities. This means that projects for the implementation of HF
radio and telecommunication should include the creation of income generation and training of local technicians,
despite the free nature of the support that Caritas originally planned. There has also been no clear strategy for
linking in more concrete and programmatic capacity building of community level structures and state structures
especially the relevant local authorities to co-own and co-engage with community structures, in the DRC,
especially at the sectorial level, while territorial administration is involved – in CAR, the administration vacuum
complicates further sustainability. Horizontal capacity building at the community level is happening to some extent
at a faster pace than vertical capacity building for sustainability at the local government levels. There were also no
clear plans for identifying and working with community based organizations to build their capacity to continue the
ICT interventions when the project eventually closes out. Building capacity of local-indigenous community based
organizations has been used elsewhere in USAID funded projects especially in Uganda. SECC should consider
identifying and building capacity of local indigenous CBOs to take continue implementing and consolidating its

49
achievements when the SECC eventually closes out. Sustainability of the soft activities such as trauma healing, also
depends on various factors. It will be key to create dynamics and mechanisms to institutionalize the practice, which
means involving State authorities, community leaders and possibly integrate this into development plans.
Organizational competences at the local level to replicate the knowledge also condition the sustainability. This
implies having effective training of trainers, which are able to facilitate workshop at their level and disseminate the
practice.
At the beneficiary level, some results have been indicated, but the different fragilities of the environment (at
security, economic, social and political levels) make their sustainability quite uncertain. Some tendencies to
aggressive behaviors have been noted, notably amongst children, in relations with the dismantlement of traditional
solidarity mechanisms with insecurity and displacements.
Overall, evidence supports the finding that the community-based, bottom-up, approach using AI (4Ds)
complemented by the 3Bs are building community capacity, ownership, and sustainability. The community
participates in identifying, prioritizing, designing, and implementing plans to address their priority needs. This
approach particularly is important for building resilience where the state institutions are either absent or weak.
This also constitutes a first and key step of local governance of particular interest.
KII and FGD respondents stated that some elements of the EWS were sustainable while others needed further
support. For example, the HF radio operators, with back-up support from the animators and CPCs, were more
likely to continue with the EWS. There was also some added degree of sustainability in the previous projects, as
the HF radios of the previous projects were still functioning, owing to Invisible Children maintenance. The project
encompasses 24 old HF radios and will implement new ones in 16 communities. However, the challenge of spare
parts and their replacement as well as general maintenance will need further capacity building to be sustainable.
There is also a risk that HF radios have not yet fully been handed over to the communities and that they will still
be owned or co-owned by SECC despite the project’s eventual close-out.
It is not yet clear how the system would run independent of SECC. For example, SECC field supervisors noted
that there have been incidents in affected communities where some radio operators have taken sides in
community tensions and that the field supervisors have had to step in to refer them to the terms of reference for
operations of the HF radio. There is a need for more capacity building here too, as well as on continued
investment in social cohesion related activities. Some progress has been made in creating sustainability structures
for the local running of FM stations in the various centers in CAR, such as Zemio, Obo, and Rafai where they are
now fully operational.
At the moment, there is no clear policy for
self-sustainability of the FM stations. Models
of community-private sectors or public-
private partnerships have not yet been
tested to assess how these may contribute
to self-sufficiency and sustainability of the FM
stations. In addition, the question of who
owns these FM stations is not clearly
understood by the local leadership. There
are also fears that if the FM stations are
handed over before clearly defining the
relationship with the government and
national radio policies, they could be abused
by various groups including politicians to fuel
tensions and negatively affect social
cohesion. This reflects the need for a clear
and succinct strategy for managing and
sustaining the FM radios and protecting
them from abuse.
Figure 12: Community Participation in Program Development

50
There was no detailed overview of the level of sustainability of micro-projects implemented in the previous
projects in Bas-Uélé, DRC. The effects of some interventions are reportedly visible, such as some income
generating activities, despite the lack of follow-up. Because of financial issues, no proper exit strategy was put in
place, and the sustainability of the project. Still, in Kpaika (DRC), an activity of brick production was put in place
and it was still functioning (bricks were sold to ensure the maintenance of the radio). However, all the staff are
volunteers and this volunteerism, though a resource, has its own limitations for sustainability.
“We think about these issues-We ask the radio to submit micro-projects to help it earn money and sustain the radio
operation. We have a technician and professional journalists who supports the local journalists. It can be successful if
the administrative council of the radio has good management. Radio Administrative Council-one of these is the Director
and another Program Director, Treasurer and Advisors and 10 Journalists and 5 Technicians-all these are volunteers”
(KII, Search for Common Grounds/SECC, Zemio, CAR)
The sustainability of CLOCs, in the previous CRS projects before SECC, was also limited, although in some cases,
they were still organizing periodic meetings and able to transfer information. Other committees had limitations to
their work because of internal conflicts, poor management of resources for micro-projects, or displacement of
people. In communities facing frequent attacks, it is also more difficult for the population to get organized and for
the CLOC to be fully functional. One example of success which has been reported, is the strong political support
received by the project from a Member of Parliament in Tomati (DRC). He relayed the claims of the community
and advocated for a health center and community work. The CLOC was still effective there, as well as the radio,
which was relaying alerts.
In DRC there was a general concern among all local authorities, including the prefet, sub-prefet and mayors, that
they have not been effectively engaged in SECC activities at the community level, and that this may have
implications for sustainability as the state structures are restored and gain legitimacy. Recently however, CRS
indicated that they organized an event in Goma with the territorial administration. Communities in CAR are
experiencing signs of early recovery and local authorities are therefore gradually more interested in being part of
what is happening at the community level.
“HF Radios-it is useful to the community but my complaint is that they give it to the population without authorities-this
raises issues of how to sustain these radios when the SECC projects end. Same for the FM radios-it is not handed over
to the local authorities and they have not been involved. If CRS search for common ground hands FM radios to the
community, how are they going to be managed? But if we are involved in the management, these radios will be
sustained even if the partners live” (KII, sub Prefet, Zemio, CAR).
Overall, however, the evidence indicates that there has been no clear strategy for linking in more concrete and
programmatic capacity building of community level structures and state structures especially the relevant local
authorities to co-own and co-engage with community structures. Therefore, horizontal capacity building at the
community level is happening at a faster pace than vertical capacity building for sustainability at the local
government levels. As the communities move from an emergency mode to early recovery, bringing on board local
structures to facilitate capacity building at the local government level that is in charge of supervision and supporting
structures at the community level is important for ownership and sustainability. There is need to build the same
set of values and skills in the communities and the local authorities. Although there have been meetings arranged
between local authorities and representatives of the community, these have been largely for awareness rather than
developing a strategic direction required for co-ownership and sustainability. The lack of implementation of a local
development plan, supported by the government, is an issue in that respect. CRS does aim to involve the state
agents in the micro-projects, notably because their authorization and support will be required to open new health
centers or basic public service facilities. SECC has started to involve local authorities in learning events like one
recently held in Bangassou. SECC should build on lessons learned by involving local authorities in learning events
to draw up a strategy for meaningful involvement and engagement of local leadership in soft activities.
Some efforts have been undertaken to integrate sustainability into the SECC project design and implementation.
The project ensures that there was involvement of the community at the different stages of the project cycle, and
they remained accountable to the affected population. Based on the collectively designed resource map,
communities agree how they can contribute to the projects (for example, by supplying sand or other natural
resources). Communities also contributed by making the bricks and building the radio facilities and other

51
infrastructure (e.g. schools, health center). The level of motivation of the communities is also an indicator of the
potential sustainability. Seventeen communities contacted CRS in order to be included in the project. In some
cases, the communities also made volunteer contributions to the project, such as paying the motorbike for the
facilitator.
VII. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
Key Recommendations follow each Key Conclusion. The Key Recommendations are in addition to the discrete
recommendations provided in the needs assessment and evaluation sections of the report.
LRA-affected communities in DRC and CAR have been empowered since 2010 through community-
based protection efforts and increased access to information. SECC has contributed to this
outcome, but is by no means the sole contributor
1. The team recommends that any future USAID C-LRA activity develop and implement a clear sustainability
strategy for building the capacity of community structures to continue managing, maintaining, and operating
ICT for community-based protection and EWS (and in particular the FM radios and HF radios). FM radios
require a management and technical intensive approach that may benefit from a public private partnership
arrangement or a community-private public partnership arrangement that is both robust and effective. For
sustainability, FM stations should run on a hybrid model that is sensitive to the strengthening of community-
based protection programming but is also open to the private sector for use in advertising to earn much-
needed maintenance revenue.
2. The team recommends that as part of its sustainability strategy, USAID identifies and builds capacity of local-
indigenous community based organizations (CBOs) and mentors them to continue implementing and
consolidating its achievements once SECC program closes. In areas where CPCs are strong, these could be
used to form the CBOs and to further develop their capacity in programming and organizational development.
3. The team recommends that any follow-on USAID C-LRA programming include an analysis that includes how
to monitor and measure contributory factors to recovery and development in affected communities, and that
this analysis informs activity design. Focus should be on measurable contributions so as to allow USAID to
make definitive, evidence-based statements about its proposed and actual contributions, as well as the factors
that will facilitate or hinder the achievement of USAID’s goal(s). This may include a review of partner
monitoring and evaluation systems, indicators in use, USAID’s own Performance Management Plans in the
region, and if appropriate the USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for DRC.
4. Associated with the above recommendation, the team recommends that the management of the C-LRA
portfolio remain field-based. Should it remain in Kinshasa, the team recommends that the portfolio more
closely integrates within the Development Objectives (DO) of the USAID/DRC CDCS.
5. The team recommends USAID initiate an analysis on how to better implement community-based conflict
recovery programs and activities as contributing and enabling parts of an overarching (but integrated) set of
USG and USAID goals in the region, and how best to measure the achievement of its activity outputs,
outcomes, and impacts. This approach need not be time-consuming or exhaustive, but should include
consultations with stabilization and/or transition experts, conflict and recovery monitoring experts,
reintegration experts, trauma and psychosocial experts, illicit financing experts, and regional experts. The team
recommends that USAID consider including CMM, Department of State (DOS) and specifically DOS Bureau of
Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), in this analysis process. This latter recommendation is based on
the need for more strategic, coherent, and indeed consistently coordinated inter-agency approaches to
intervention success.
USAID’s C-LRA portfolio would benefit from a more rigorous M&E system to track and
demonstrate progress.
1. The team recommends that any future refinement and redevelopment of USAID C-LRA activities include a
rigorous, yet operationally flexible and responsive, monitoring and evaluation plan and a dedicated M&E
officer. This plan would ensure that measurements toward the achievement of the TOC, and all goals and
objectives, are in place, and that they are analyzed as part of an overall accountability, performance
monitoring, and lessons learned plan. There are several peacebuilding and recovery measurement tool-kits in
existence. The team recommends that USAID review and use one or more of these tool-kits where feasible

52
to better measure progress achieved (and outcomes and relative impacts) in this very challenging environment
and beyond the output-level.
2. In order to better measure the impact of USAID C-LRA programming, the team recommends that USAID
consider applying Most Significant Change (MSC) to its measurability tool-kit. MSC is an approach to
evaluations which involves assessing the changes, and in turn, the impacts that people experience as a result of
a program from the perspective of program participants. Programming can be informed by the MSC technique
since it focuses on impact monitoring by supplying information at impact and outcome levels—rather than
activity, output, or indicator levels—thus allowing the review of program performance as a whole. This also
implies that MSC is a useful methodology for evaluations of interventions that have undefined outcomes or
face a shortage in monitoring data due to obstacles to data collection, such as the operating environment.
Furthermore, the very structure of the MSC approach directly contributes to capacity building efforts in
several ways. MSC in LRA-affected communities can help identify unexpected changes—both positive and
negative—and deliver a more intricate and rich picture of what is happening, since the pool of stories from
stakeholders is as wide as the experiences that the respondents have had throughout the duration of the
project. Through the compilation of experiences and storytelling, the approach engages participants in the
analysis of information, as there is need to provide a compelling argument when developing criteria for
significance. The process involves stakeholders discussing stories which revolve around the perceived changes
that have taken place as a result of the intervention, and then selecting the stories they consider most
significant on the basis of a series of criteria defined by the group during discussions. The MSC methodology is
sometimes referred to as monitoring-without-indicators, because it does not make use of indicators that can
be tracked. Rather, it uses a ‘story’ approach, given that the data collected is in the format of informal
community-centric stories describing the change that occurred, when it occurred and the reasoning behind it.
MSC is not meant to be used as a stand-alone methodology outside of traditional USAID performance
monitoring techniques, but can be used in combination with the other evaluation methods to inform USAID
and its implementing partner, as well as the community members themselves.
USAID’s C-LRA objectives are sound but its theory of change (TOC) is post hoc ergo propter hoc or
“after this, therefore because of this” and is thus a logical fallacy. The TOC is also difficult to
validate as it deviates from the SECC project goal and is devoid of associated progress indicators.
1. The team recommends that USAID consider formalizing its C-LRA TOC and that this TOC informs future
USAID C-LRA activities. The TOC should provide the bridge between the conflict analysis conducted by
USAID or its partner(s) and programming, helping USAID and its partner(s) ensure that its programming is
relevant. The TOC should make explicit assumptions about what change is expected and how and why this
change is expected to happen. It should also help:
a. To uncover gaps in programming when there are steps missing in the project hypothesis.
b. To make sure everyone involved in designing and implementing the program has the same
understanding of why a program is structured as it is, and how to implement it according to that
structure. This would have been helpful to SECC, in particular.
c. To help communicate and be more transparent with beneficiaries and communities about programs.
d. To provide a basis for assessing relevance, effectiveness, and impact in monitoring and evaluation
(M&E), and therefore, to help identify reasons for success or failure.
e. To identify where adjustments or modifications in the program may be needed to achieve the desired
outcome/result.22
2. In an era of fiscal austerity and competition for resources, the team recommends that as part of the TOC
development USAID consider including outcome as well as output indicators, with the former being much
more relevant to determining the effectiveness and value for money of C-LRA programming.
22
USAID, Theories and Indicators of Change in Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2013.

53
There have been both positive and negative perceptions of the effectiveness of interagency and
inter-program cooperation during the implementation of C-LRA activities in the region, but an
overwhelmingly positive perception of military-to-military collaboration.
1. Considered tactically, operationally, and politically necessary, the team recommends that the current inter-
agency construct for designing and conceptualizing USAID C-LRA approaches remain within the inter-agency
community, but that they are managed specifically by USAID in Kinshasa.
2. The team recommends that USAID consider a conceptualization of its C-LRA activities that more clearly
delineates and de-conflicts competing or redundant programming between Invisible Children and USAID’s C-
LRA programming, while also aiming for greater coordination of individual efforts. One consideration
suggested by several KII respondents is that USAID consider a more integrated approach with itself and its
partners leveraging their vast experience and resources supporting ‘soft’ approaches such as trauma healing,
social reconciliation, and psychosocial efforts, while Invisible Children leverages its significant network and past
performance to focus on EWS, information-sharing, flow, and reporting, for example.
3. KIIs with humanitarian agencies and the UN panel of experts on CAR has indicated that these organizations
place much value on the work of SECC, on its innovations and on the information generated through the
EWS, but that they are rarely able to access this information in time to inform their own strategic and
operational plans. The team therefore recommends that any future USAID C-LRA activity develop a clear
stakeholder engagement and information-sharing plan that includes ways to better coordinate with
humanitarian agencies. This plan would suggest clear and precise terms of reference (with indicators that
measure the degree of coordination between the stakeholders) and would aim to better facilitate technical
coordination and programming between USAID, regional humanitarian actors, and the key players in
community-based protection, ICT, and human protection programming in affected areas.
4. As part of the natural evolution and maturity of SECC, the intervention logic of the project has led to
opportunities to further structure and consolidate data collection in collaboration with some relevant
stakeholders. Ensuring the accurate and timely collection of information relating to the movements of armed
groups, smuggling, trafficking in the area (e.g., of people, ivory, minerals, weapons, ammunition, fuel, etc.) not
only alerts stakeholders of security threats, it may also allow for the development of more anticipatory and/or
preventive approaches to mitigate the impacts of these threats. The team therefore recommends that any
future USAID C-LRA programming leverage these gains. Of course, programming must adhere to ‘Do No
Harm’ principles that ensure the protection of vulnerable communities and their members first and foremost.
Some social tension has developed a) between communities who received consistent C-LRA
treatment and those who have not, and b) within communities between beneficiaries who have
received consistent C-LRA treatment and those who have not.
1. The team recommends that USAID consider as part of a conflict analysis for a follow-on C-LRA activity a plan
for how it will implement conflict sensitivity and ‘Do No Harm’ principles into its programming and its
selection criteria. It may wish to design future programming in association with a workshop that emphasizes
how to program while adhering strictly and consistently to ‘Do No Harm’ principles. Examples of good
training programs that USAID staff and implementers have undertaken in the past include those through CDA,
the Peace and Collaborative Development Network, and the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium.23
The Local
Capacities for Peace Project also has good on-line resources.
2. As a precursor to developing a prioritized needs assessment among affected communities, the team
recommends that USAID—with the international community—broadens the definition and scope of “LRA-
affected” individuals to include those people who remain in the isolated communities and those who are
displaced and have therefore lost livelihoods and social-support networks. There is also concern among
various stakeholders and local authorities that the current definition leaves out a critical constituency of LRA-
affected communities including children, youth, and women who have been displaced by the LRA. The team
also recommends the adoption of two categories LRA-affected population centers:
23
For the CDA, see: http://www.cdacollaborative.org/publications/do-no-harm/dnh-guidance-notes/general-principles-for-adapting-do-no-harm-
training-for-different-audiences/; for the PCDN, see: http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/events/do-no-harm-training-course-for-
practitioners-3#.VjJu1K6rTq0; for the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium see: http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/node/103. See also the Local
Capacities for Peace Project’s on-line ‘Do No Harm’ manual: http://www.principletopractice.org/from-principle-to-practice/a-brief-history-of-
the-do-no-harm-project/

54
a. Communities at immediate risk. This includes those targeted by the SECC project. In those cases,
priorities would indeed be ensuring communication and community-based protection mechanisms.
b. Urban centers where the population has increased, and with new communities of displaced people
and host populations whose needs are the most basic.
3. The team recommends that in the future, communities be urged to take more ownership of the reporting on
humanitarian concerns and needs, rather than this being led by the donor or implementer. Some tools (e.g.
training, grids) could be provided to enable periodic data collection of some key humanitarian indicators, gaps,
and needs.
4. In the future, the identification of priority affected communities and priority groups within a community should
be based on comparative-vulnerabilities indicators and household surveys, which are currently lacking,
including for urban centers with a strong concentration of IDPs.
There were considerable delays in SECC implementation, caused in part by a lack of consistent—
and in situ—management and oversight by USAID
1. KIIs noted the significant positive change in the management and oversight of the USAID C-LRA portfolio
since June 2015, and so the team recommends that it continue to be managed in the field, under a dedicated
USAID program officer or dedicated officers.
2. Given the regional context as well as the technical and sector focus of the USAID/DRC portfolio, the team
recommends that the USAID C-LRA portfolio continue to be managed out of USAID/DRC.
The LRA ‘problem’ is a small piece of a large and complex regional stabilization and development
puzzle. Therefore, USAID’s C-LRA activities should reflect this dynamic
1. At its heart, the LRA problem is nested within much broader security and development issues. Therefore, any
solution to this problem will require a more holistic, and indeed, multi-sector approach. At the strategic level,
the team recommends that any future USAID C-LRA activity be planned and implemented within the broader
security and development context of the region to include studying (and then disaggregating from the TOC)
the additional impacts on affected communities from stressors such as natural resources exploitation; human
migration from the pastoralist peoples such as the Mbororo; and from of other armed groups such as the
Seleka, the anti-Balaka, and the SPLA. At the community level, the findings in this report stress the importance
of focusing on long-term community recovery needs within a more integrated USAID C-LRA strategy.
2. Rather than deviating from funding EWS networks and community-based protection programming, USAID
should consider including EWS into a more comprehensive and impactful strategy that includes addressing
affected communities’ basic needs. Arguably, in addressing these needs, communities will recover more
sustainably and progress. With SECC, USAID has made a significant investment in ICT and the physical and
social infrastructure in all its DRC and CAR sub-offices. It now has a good physical foundation for addressing
future gaps in the current program, and especially in micro projects. The infrastructure and relationships built
at the micro- and meso-levels form an important foundation for the future planning and effective
implementation of early recovery projects in basic material needs such as WASH, sustainable agriculture,
health services, the building of schools, and health facilities.
a. Gaps in basic services delivery are significant in communities affected by the LRA, including for those
people who stayed behind in the isolated communities and those who were displaced to town
centers. However, there is a need for USAID to prioritize projects or interventions that address
these needs and to use them to enable or strengthen the community-based protection and resilience
programs that SECC and other players have already established in LRA-affected communities.
b. Constructing roads that break the isolation of communities and help to further link them to sources
of goods and services is a critical need. The team recommends that USAID explore this in some
capacity, and perhaps through the wider international C-LRA community. ICT and community-based
protection programs are insufficient without addressing the logistical barriers preventing the
movement of people and supplies required to deliver social services to populations. Noting that the
USAID C-LRA program is categorically not in the road business, it may wish to explore possibilities
and opportunities to work with or facilitate a dialogue on the topic with other donors about how
best to mobilize funds required to invest in capital intensive infrastructural projects like roads.
Finally, USAID may wish to consider advocating for the need for C-LRA stakeholders to include on

55
the agenda for discussion the issue of road rehabilitation/construction as a means to community
recovery.
3. The team recommends an increased focus on social resilience and healing mechanisms as means to ensure the
development of sustainable, healthy, communities:
a. Trauma was highlighted as a key issue in almost all interviews for both displaced people and
communities who live under threat of the LRA. The team therefore recommends USAID conduct a
thorough assessment on trauma, its magnitude, different manifestations, and the unmet need for
services. This process should inform the development of a comprehensive psychosocial program
targeting various groups including LRA defectors, abductees, youth involved in drug abuse, girls, and
young women who have been sexually exploited or engaged in transactional/survival sex, GBV
survivors, and parents who have lost their children or whose children are still held hostage by the
LRA. As part of the support to victims, training of trainers for trauma healing also needs to be
expanded in the different communities most affected by the conflict, as well as in communities where
victims have been displaced.
b. Defection and reintegration programming will have limited sustainable success without access to
livelihoods. There is also a risk of recidivism among defectors in the absence of means to generate
personal income. The team therefore recommends that future USAID C-LRA programming consider
including activities to improve the livelihoods of LRA-affected people, including the defectors,
returnees and immediate victims. It should be noted that USAID’s mandate would probably prohibit it
from providing services directly to LRA defectors and ex-combatants. However, USAID could
arguably still provide services to the overall communities in which defectors, returnees and ex-
combatants are being placed. These services could have a particular focus on vulnerable groups,
which include but are not limited to LRA returnees. Services could include support for food security,
field cultivation techniques, seeds, and tools, etc. These activities should also include, more broadly,
the most vulnerable groups of the communities in order to avoid creating a mechanism of “reward
for violence.” Similarly, an increase in criminality in DRC illustrates a need for civic education, social
cohesion, and vocational training among unemployed youth. This could start first with pilot projects
in key areas such as Dungu, Doruma, Duru, Faradje, Bangadi, Bondo, and Ango, where security allows
for such activities.
4. Based on the evidence, there is a clear connection between revenue generation for armed groups from
poaching, the looting of diamonds and gold, and the illicit trafficking of ivory and conflict minerals in DRC,
CAR and South Sudan. Although the LRA is but one, small perpetrator in this activity, it is a primary income
generator for it. The team therefore recommends that USAID consider strengthening its synergies with
natural resource management institutions and practitioners, including those within USAID, and considers
support to national natural resource conservations such as Garamba Park, and more tactically to park forest
guards’ training and capacity building in identifying perpetrating groups.

56
ANNEX 1: SCOPE OF WORK

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58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

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ANNEX 2: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS
Name Organization
Washington, DC
Daphne Titus U.S. Department of State
Chris Spangler Office of Central African Affairs DoS
Carl Paschall Office of Central African Affairs DoS
Marty Regan CSO, DoS
Tye Ferrell Former USAID conflict advisor
Brooke Stearns-Lawson USAID Africa Bureau
Andre Guy-Soh USAID/Washington DC
Driss Moumane CRS
Eileen Simoes
Workforce Planning, Policy, and Systems Management (PPSM);
USAID
Peter Quaranto Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
Cara Christie U.S. Agency for International Development
Lisa Dougan Invisible Children
Entebbe, Uganda
Mike Bugason African Union
Carolina Reyes United Nations
Matthew Brubacher UNOAU
Michael Copland UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Office
Mariana Garofalo UNICEF Uganda
Amy Truesdell CSO, DoS
Lisa Dougan Invisible Children
Chris VanJohnson Spirit of America
Kasper Agger The Enough Project
Richard Businge International Alert Uganda
Fred Ssali United nations, Bunia
Democratic Republic of Congo
Kinshasa
Dan Hicks USAID/CAR OU
Kirk Herbertson USAID
Scott West US DoD
Joseph Driscoll US DoD
Julie Fischer USAID
Boniface Nakwagelewi Deagbo Caritas Congo
Paul Eboma Caritas Congo
José Mbayu Caritas Congo
Prof. Grevisse Ditend Yav UEPN - DDR

70
Name Organization
Baudoin Kakura CENI / independent consultant
Olivier Mumbere WFP
Toby King European External Action Service
Daniele De Bernardi European External Action Service
Sébastien Fasanello MONUSCO
Cdr. Luc Daes MONUSCO
Joseph Inganji OCHA DRC
Metsi Makhetha OCHA DRC
Fr. Ernest Sugule SAIPED (DRC)
Thierry N'Zeng CERN-CENCO (episcopal commission on Natural Resources)
Richard Mandiangu VODACOM
Danny Mboussa COOPI
Côme Misioni Kumbanabu (François Inikwo
kelekulu)
Sous-Proved EPSP
Emmanuel Abiangama Atongboa SECOPE
Désiré Ibingo Kumbotulu Sous-Proved EPSP
RP Ernest Catholic Priest, SAIPED
Baudouin Kakura Consultant
Goma
Cecillia MONUSCO
Ir Dominique SHIMA Mining Departement
Bunia
M'hand Ladjouzi MONUSCO
Héritier UNHCR
Francesca Cozzarini UNDP
Lucian Iyemo Nziani UNDP
Aime Birido Tsatsi AJEDEC
Jean de Dieu Djari AJEDEC
Benjamin Kane AJEDEC
Nathanaelle Muzi AJEDEC
Felipe Ramirez Mockkow ICRC
Ollo Oscar Pale Solidarités
Franck Adubango Solidarités
Dr Jean Clovis Kalobu MEMISA
Marta Intersos
Willy Lukemba OCHA
Chrysostome Kaloma OCHA
José Bonyoma OCHA
Francine Shindano UNICEF

71
Name Organization
Kisangani
Bertin Basekay Kamangala FARDC
Pascal Mombi Opana Governorat Oriental Province
Willy Kalenga OCHA
Arnaud Meffre ICRC
Amani Asani UNDSS
Jean Damas Fonds Social
Daniel Yofedo Malomalo Civil Society Coordination
Jean Claude Samende Tshopo Youth Association
Jean Luc Lokilo Civil Society Coordination
Justin Mwetaminwa MONUSCO
Faustin Bengane MONUSCO
Salimata Traore MONUSCO
Sylvain Masudi MONUSCO
Rene Nsasi VODACOM
Isiro
Célestin Bekabisya Enkwene Federation des Entreprises du Congo Haut Uélé
André Mohla Division Unique
Albert Kambale Kombo Division Unique
John Abelua CEEC
Barthelemy Zombo SAESSCAM
Franck Masimo Monga SAESSCAM
Dr Lola Loway Health Department
Roger Dikongo Social Affairs
Abbé Dieudonné Abakuba Civil Society Coordination
Abbé Baudoin Tatsima Caritas
Aimable ACCO (Association of Drivers)
Mme Mbelu Chantal Société Civile & Bureau Genre
Maurice Makundaima Social Affairs
Nzombo Barthélemy SAESSAM
Masebo Martin Sous-Proved EPSP PO3
Faradje
Jean-Claude Malitano APRU
Abbé Claude Tasema Caritas
Abbé Guillaume Abiandroa Caritas
Héritier Masikini Territorial Administration
Ridouane Fertal MONUSCO
MONUSCO
Solange and Claudine LRA Victims

72
Name Organization
Ali Lysakay Religious Leader
Fr. Guillaume Catholic Priest
Manano Ung'Om Benjamin Bureau Central de la Zone de Santé
Dr. Isaac Tandro Yokoba Bureau Central de la Zone de Santé
Jean Agoyo Tasile Sous-Division EPSINC
Lt Karlos National Police
Hubert TAMPONGEHDITE Education Department
Bernadette MAWANZO VOZIYO Social Affairs
Spéciose MATIKO MADIKRIKO Gender, Family and Infant
Jean Claude Malitano APRU
Djabir
Moïse CPC
Naguerro
Jean Marc Froment African Park
Laurent Kidima Mavinga Fauna & Flora
Jean Labuschagne Garamba National Park
Erik Marav Garamba National Park
Dungu
Mahaman Souradja CRS
Deogratias Bisimwa Caritas Dungu
Sabrina Nabintu SECC Project
Patrick Assani SECC Project
Blandine Nadila SECC Project
Etienne Mbalie SECC Project
Aime Mambabua Numuda SECC Project
Martin Mbolingaba Sayo SECC Project
Antoine Mbolitini SECC Project
Jean Claude Gimiko Mbugo SECC Project
Fidel SECC Project
Marie Fumboli Search for Common Ground
General Willy Bonane FARDC
Colonel Nyembo Regional Intervention Force
John Tanomongo Invisible Children
Ferdinand Zangapayda CDJP (Commission Diocesaine Justice et Paix)
Pastor Mboligihe Ndalu RTK (DRC)
Chef Constant Zande cultural leader
Dieu Beni Mboliangba SAIPED (Solidarity and Integral Assistance to Destitute People)
Françoise Zungufuebati SAIPED
Guillaume Twaha SAIPED

73
Name Organization
John LRA Defector
Fr. Benoit Kinalegu CDJP (Commission Diocesaine Justice et Paix)
Arthur Koni COOPI
Germaine COOPI
Penda Ly MONUSCO
Djulla - Djuma MONUSCO
Moïsq Chirhakwirwa Masonga MONUSCO
Leonidas Nkingiye MONUSCO
Charles Foto MONUSCO
Lambert Danaza Territorial Administration
Marcelline Boldje Social Affairs
Lucie Ilenge Social Affairs
Prosper Abyokamba CNR (National Commission for Refugees)
Moïse Ingwegule CNR (National Commission for Refugees)
Ibrahim Muslim Community
Jean Baptiste Kumbomome AJEDEC
Fr. Michel Mivunguba Kaneru SAIPED (Solidarity and Integral Assistance to Destitute People)
Sr. Angelique Namaika CRAD (Center for Reintegration and Development)
Jean De Dieu Djari AJEDEC
Chef Marc Zande cultural leader
Pastor Mboligihe Ndalu Radio RTK
M. Benjamin Ibelenga CDJP (Commission Diocesaine Justice et Paix)
Fr. Jean de Dieu MIMBUGBE Dungu-Doruma catholic Diocese
Oren Jusu Invisible Children
Georges ANGOTOWA Bureau Central de la Zone de Santé
Marceline Mulihinde Division des Affaires Sociales
Missa Thomas PNC Commissariat de Dungu
Head teacher_Bamokandi primary school
Female victim_Bamokandi
Male_victiom family_Bamokandi
Female_family victim_Bamokandi
Old_vulnerable_female_Bamokandi IDP camp
Niangara
Jean Pierre Moïkima Elombo Territorial Administration
Léon Katabi Territorial Administration
Dominique Bombe Civil Society Coordinator
Didier Medwana Education
Adam Sadam Matsaja Muslim Community
Abbé Innocent Caritas

74
Name Organization
Raphael Caritas
Josue Bilimani Caritas
Georges Bakoyogo Intersos
Dr Didier AMUDIANDROY MOKE Health Department
IDP Camp chairman
Recent abductee_female
Member of National parliament_Niangara
Bondo
Sœur Julienne Caritas
Msgr Etienne Caritas
Paul Ronan The Resolve
Guillaume Cailleaux ex Invisible Children
Civil society rep_SCG-Bondo
Banda
Wendy Atkins
African Inland Missions
Bangadi
Catholic priest_Dungu/Doruma diocese-Bangadi
parish
Pastor
Child abductee
Male_abductee violence_victim_Bangadi
Male_trader abduction victim
Civil society rep_CIRC_Bangadi
Doruma
Catholic priest_Dungu/Doruma diocese-
Doruma parish
Central African Republic
Bangassou
Jean Baptiste SECC
Zallou Ulrich SECC
Sinzakayo Jeredie MINUSCA, Bangassou
Hadio Mounkaila MINUSCA, Bangassou
Captain Mourid UN Base Bangassou
Father Martin Modoue Peace and Justice Committee
Samba Blaise Peace and Justice Committee
Keite Albert Peace and Justice Committee
Joseph Junior Sander SECC
KII Supervisor SECC

75
Name Organization
Placide Malengo CRS/SECC
Anselme Sanon Caritas
Christian Oucangai SECC
Bangui
Eve Hackius ACTED
Leonn Hager CRS Director Country Office
Scott Campbel CRS Regional Office (Central Africa)
Dris Moumane SECC
Oren Invisible Children
Jose Carlos United Nations
Anicet CRS SECC
Ruben United Nations Experts
Hassani Mohamed United Nations (MINUSCA)
Carolina United Nations
Aurelien Llorca United Nations
Ibrahim Khalid MINUSCA
Wilfried Relwende SAWADOGO
AU/RTF Focal Point Security Sector Reform Officer/Focal Point
for the LRA Issues
Eve HACKIUS ACTED
Khaled Ibrahim MINUSCA
Fortune A. Agboton CRS
Loic Hostetter SECC
Anicet Nimeyimana SECC
Clemente Ngoaka Ministry of Education, CAR
Jolome BOUBA FACA, CAR
Norik SOUBRIER ACTED
Dembya Guy Eugene Political Science Department, University of Baungui, CAR)
Crépin Mboli-Goumba, PARTIE (Presidential Candidate from East CAR)
Anicet G. Dolguele URCA (Union Pour le Renouveau Centrafricain)
Obo
8 Religious leaders/leaders of Mbororo Religious leaders Obo
Clemente Invisible Children
Pauline Zerla Invisible Children
Babou Rukengeza Makanda Save the Children, Obo sub office
Ghislain Dieubeni Kolongo Upper Mbomou Local Government
Former Mayor Obo Obo Local Administration
Emmanuel Dapa Association for LRA Victims
Malinda Aime Crepin Association for LRA Victims
Col Kabaono Micheal UPDF
Ange Gobriel Pamongobi Victim LRA

76
Name Organization
Solyk Kongo SECC
Jude Rukubya UPDF
Goerge Kataabu UPDF
Kimera DM UPDF
Whitney SECC
Zemio
8 Religious leaders/leaders of Mbororo Religious Leaders Zemio
Artsen Zonder Grenzen MSF
Mayor Zemio Town Zemio Local Government
Gbaringba Rogou SECC/CRS
Ngbassayo Jean SECC/CRS
Koyangao Jaques Cyall SECC/CRS
Prosper Semba Serach for Common Grounds
Gadepa Gertrude Women Leaders Group
Napkio Albertine Women Leader
Guinipkara Josephine Women Leader
Abdel Kadera Women leader
Soundjikpio Josephine Women leader
KII Animator SECC
Nagirou Marie Elise Women leader
Sub Prefet Zemio Local Government

77
ANNEX 3: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS
FGD Participants Location Longitude Latitude
Democratic Republic of Congo
FEC Members
Jean Pierre Sesenge
(Company manager);
Matthieu Odiane
(Company Manager); Sean
Makogbo (Vice President)
Isiro, DRC
Members of Parliament from Haut
Uélé
8 politicians, including 1
woman
Isiro, DRC
Civil Society 10 people; Various NGOs
Faradje,
DRC
CPC
15 people including 5
women
Djabir, DRC
Africom dungu.ops@gmail.com
5 people including: Joseph
Villers (Team Leader,
DOD); Daniel Manges
(Team Leader, DOD);
Kimo Bandmann (Team
Leader, DOD)
Dungu,
DRC
6 Civil Society Organizations 6 people
Dungu,
DRC
Community Protection
Committee
15 people
Dungu,
DRC
Male_youth 18-30 Faradje N 3° 44.599 E 29° 42.4337
Female_31-45 Faradje N 3° 44.599 E 29° 42.4337
Religious leaders Dungu N 3° 37.3163 E 28° 34.1208
CLOC Dungu N 3° 37.3163 E 28° 34.1208
Male_Youth 18-30 Niangara N 3° 41.4168 E 27° 54.1773
Female_Females 31-45 Niangara N 3° 41.4168 E 27° 54.1773
Male_youth 18-30 Bangadi N 4° 8.1566 E 27° 54.5827
Fema_Youth 18-35 Bangadi N 4° 8.1566 E 27° 54.5827
Male_31-45 Doruma N 4° 42.9904 E 27° 40.9596
Female_31-45 Doruma N 4° 42.9904 E 27° 40.9596
Male_Youths 18-30 Ango N 4° 2.3433 E 25° 51.1011
Males 30-45 Ango N 4° 2.3433 E 25° 51.1011
Male_Male 31-45 Bili N 04°09' 2.96"
E 025°10'
39.34"
Female_18-30 Bili N 04°09' 2.96"
E 025°10'
39.34"
Females, 31-45 Bondo N 03°49' 23.97"
E 023°41'
9.10"
Religious Leaders Bondo N 03°49' 23.97"
E 023°41'
9.10"
Male_Male 31-45 Buta N 02° 48.371 E 024° 44.704
Female_Female 31-45 Buta N 02° 48.371 E 024° 44.704

78
Central African Republic
Female 31-45 Bangassou N 4.74945493
E
22.83677695
Male 18-30 Bangassou N 4.74945493
E
22.83677695
Male 31-45 Bakouma N 5.69881838
E
22.78423802
Female 31-45 Bakouma N 5.69881838
E
22.78423802
Males 31-45 Djemah N 6.04148941
E
25.31298887
Females 31-45 Djemah N 6.04148941
E
25.31298887
Religious leaders Rafai N 4.97290384 E 23.9324949
CLOC Rafai N 4.97290384 E 23.9324949
Female Youth 18-30 Zemio N 5.02857272
E
25.13273476
Male youth 18-30 Zemio N 5.02815055 E 25.1325889
Females 31-45 Mboki N 5.31636367
E
25.95710624
Female Youth 18-30 Mboki N 5.31636367
E
25.95710624
Male youth 18-30 Obo N 5.3972427
E
26.49268123
Males 30-45 Obo N 5.3972427
E
26.49268123
Male 31-45
Issa
Mazangue
N 6.380456 E 22.474990
Females 18-30
Issa
Mazangue
N 6.380456 E 22.474990
Males 31-45 Bria N 2.537948 E 21.989924
Females 18-30 Bria N 2.537948 E 21.989924
Non- Intervention Sites

79
Intervention and Non-Intervention Sites
DRC
INTERVENTION SITES NON INTERVENTION SITES
Bangadi Niangara Ango Dungu Bondo Doruma Bili Faradje Buta
AGE &
GROUP
DESCRIPTIO
N
Female Youth
18-30
Females 31-45 Male youth 18-
30
Religious
leaders
Female 31-
45
Males
31-45
Male 31-
45
Male youth
18-30
Male
31-45
AGE &
GROUP
DESCRIPTIO
N
Male youth
18-30
Female Youth
18-30
Males 30-45 Female 30-
35
Male 18-30 Females 31-45 Female
18-30
Female 31-
45
Female 31-
45
CAR:
INTERVENTION SITES NON INTERVENTION SITES
Zemio Djemah Mboki Obo Rafai Bangassou Issa
Mazangue
Bria Bakouma
AGE & GROUP
DESCRIPTION
Female
Youth 18-
30
Males 31-
45
Females 31-45 Male
youth
18-30
Religious
leaders
Female 31-45 Male 31-45 Male
youth
18-30
Male 31-45
AGE & GROUP
DESCRIPTION
Male youth
18-30
Females 31-45 Female Youth
18-30
Males
30-45
Female 30-
35
Male 18-30 Female 18-
30
Female
31-45
Female 31-
45

80
ANNEX 4: INSTRUMENTS
ANNEX 4A: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE
Reference
Interview Guide - KII
Projectstaff
External
Organizations
State
institutions
Communities
members
Needs Assessment
1. Which communities are more affected by the LRA? Why? What is the
trend?
X X X X
2. What conditions are most relevant and put these communities at a risk
of being attacked by the LRA? What are key natural resources and socio-
economic activities in the LRA-affected communities and the surrounding
areas?
X X X X
3. Which are the funding sources for the LRA? How are natural resources
obtained / used by LRA? Why is this possible?
X X X X
4. Who are the key actors in relation to LRA threats in the community and
what are their interests?
X X X X
5. Are there other armed groups in the affected areas? What are their
drivers, roles and effects?
X X X X
6. What are the consequences of the LRA on community governance, social
structure, psychosocial wellbeing, health, economy?
X X X X
7. To what extent and how are different categories of people affected by
the LRA and why?
Probe for:
a) How are women, men, girls and boys affected by the LRA? How
have gender relations (access to and control over resources and
decision making among others) in the family and community been
affected by the LRA conflict?
X X X X
8. What are the priorities/needs of the communities affected? To what
extent are they covered? What are the remaining gaps?
Sub-question: What are the key interventions/projects and programs helping
to address these needs?
Probe for:
Geographic coverage, reach (number and type of beneficiaries,
type/sector of interventions)?
X X X X

81
Reference
Projectstaff
External
Organizations
State
institutions
Communities
members
9. Which interventions would you describe as most helpful in addressing
the community priority needs and why? Which interventions were least
helpful and why?
X X X X
10.What are the communities’ own practices and strategies for resilience
and protection against threats? What are the perceived strengths and
gaps in communities’ own protection structures/mechanisms?
Sub-question: What are the positive and negative ways adopted by the
various categories of persons /groups of people in communities in trying to
cope with the effects of the LRA on the affected communities?
X X X X
11. To what extent were coordination of ICT and protection interventions
with other stakeholders / projects optimal?
Probe for:
a) The key coordination arrangements and structures between SECC
activities and other similar programs.
b) What have been the key effects, intended or unintended, of the
coordination arrangements and strategies between SEEC and other
programs in the communities?
X X X X
12. How strong are the linkages between communities, international
assistance organizations and military units? What linkages been created
with the various stakeholders at different levels? How is (or has) the
sharing of information with other regional and international organizations
dealing with EW and ER occurred?
Probe for:
a) Map of the linkages, strengths and gaps of existing linkages and
strategies for sharing information to facilitate early warning and early
response.
X X X X
Theory of Change
13. How and for what purposes is ICT and the possible other
communication means used by communities? What types of
information are more easily communicated? By communities? By
security actors? By international development actors? What are the
differences between the systems and the different groups of
population?
X X X X

82
Reference
Projectstaff
External
Organizations
State
institutions
Communities
members
Probe for:
a) How is information shared between or from field monitors to the
local peace/protection committees, national authorities, security
personnel, United Nations agencies, etc.?
b) To what extent are women and youth included in structures for
early warning and early response systems?
15. What are the early warning systems are in place in the affected areas?
How and to what extent do they function? Can any pattern be drawn
on the functioning of early warning systems (e,g., category of
population using them, means, timing, impact ofuse)
Probe for:
a) How coherent and relevant are early warning systems and the
information they transmit? What are the factors affecting accurate
and timely information flow from the field to facilitate early warning
and early response action?
b) How is information flow affected by transportation and IT support,
network coverage, for example?
X X X X
16. To what extent are the systems used to promote community
protection and livelihoods, or for other purposes?
X X X X
17. What are the comparative merits of information-based strategies? Can
you compare with community protection-based strategies, other
strategies?
X X X X
18. What are the approaches to community-based protection and how are
community protection plans being implemented?
X X X X
19. To what extent was sustainability integrated into the project design?
Can activities be sustained and replicated? Are CLOCs still used? To
what extent, and at which stages of the projects, is the community
involved, and how? Is there a participation in nature to infrastructure
building / purchases and in sites management by the communities?
Probe for:
a) Level of integration of activities into existing structures such as
those with the local authorities and community-based organizations.
X X X X
20. How could ICT and protection projects be better used to maximize
community resilience?
X X X X

83
Reference
Projectstaff
External
Organizations
State
institutions
Communities
members
21. What are the challenges to program implementation and how were
they overcome? To what extent do the program processes allow for
integration of lessons learned into the programming?
X X X X
Evaluation Questions
22. What have been the outcomes and changes directly resulting from the
USAID-funded ICT EW and ER support initiatives?
X X X X
23. What have been the outcomes and changes directly resulting from
USAID-funded community protection support initiatives?
X X X X
24. How do communities and local stakeholders see the effects and
changes in terms of ICT and protection? Is their perception accurate
or biased and why?
X X X X
25. What have been the observable outcomes of ICT, information-sharing,
and community-based protection programs in areas affected by the
LRA?
X X X X
26. To what extent has the information communicated had positive effects
on the communities’ resilience towards LRA interventions? What key
information are not / are hardly communicated or by specific means?
X X X X
27. What have been the synergies and mutual reinforcement between
USAID and other initiatives? To what extent was there coherence in
this activity?
X X X X
28. To what extent do EW/tools foster inclusion and integration of local
actors and authorities at the local government and community levels?
What strategies are used to ensure inclusion and integration of local
people, CBOs and local authorities in early warning and early response
interventions?
X X X X
29. How has the USAID-funded ICT program evolved to respond to the
changing needs and dynamics in LRA-affected areas over time?
Probe for:
a) How the USAID ICT program has responded to various phases of
the conflict e.g. humanitarian /emergency phase, early recovery,
transition, resettlement etc.
X X X X

84
Reference
Projectstaff
External
Organizations
State
institutions
Communities
members
30. To what extent have USAID-funded ICT programs, and community
response and protection programs, in LRA-affected areas been
sustained since their inception?
What are the effects and factors of success in terms of sustainability?
(capacity building, processes and dynamics created, governance system,
integration into existing structures and mechanisms)
X X X X
31. In addition to what was we’d discussed before, what do you think are
the overarching programmatic lessons learned from USAID-funded
ICT and community-based protection programs in LRA-affected areas
since 2011? Which are the best practices offering a potential for
replication?
X X X X
32. What would be your recommendations for future programming in the
area (priorities, set-up etc.…)? What documents should we consider
in the analysis and which other persons or organizations should we
meet with to better understand these activities?
X X X X

85
ANNEX 4B: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE
DISCUSSION GUIDE
INTERVIEWER NOTES:
RESEARCH RATIONALE & OBJECTIVES
Overall objective of the research –Evaluation and Needs assessment Of USAID programming to
communities affected by the Lord’s resistance army in central Africa
 Community Needs Assessment and Mapping:
- has a strong path to future, through planning for a future beyond oil
- Assess efficacy or drawbacks of strengthened coordination between Secured, Empowered and
Connected Communities’ (SECC) activities and similar programs in other areas (if relevant);
- Assess the level and type of coordination and interaction of programs with security actors on the
ground;
- Describe the presence and capacity of partners on the ground;
- Describe the role of natural resources and illicit trafficking in funding the LRA; and
- Analyze the linkages between communities, humanitarian/development organizations, and military
units (AU-RTF, US Special Forces, FARDC, and MONUSCO).
 Testing the Theory of Change
9. How has access to ICT affected community response and protection initiatives in areas affected
by the LRA?
10. How has access to community-based protection programs affected community response and
11. What has been the perceived influence of increased access to ICT, community response and
Outcomes
12. What have been the observable outcomes of ICT, information-sharing, and community-based
protection programs in areas affected by the LRA?
13. What information has been communicated within and between communities affected by the
LRA?
14. How have USAID-funded ICT programs, community response and protection plans in LRA-
affected areas interfaced with complementary efforts such as the LRA Crisis Tracker and the
Invisible Children projects, for example?
15. What are the programmatic lessons learned from USAID-funded ICT and community-based
protection programs in LRA-affected areas since 2011?
Sustainability
To what extent have USAID-funded ICT programs, community response and protection programs in
LRA-affected areas been sustained since their inception?

86
BACKGROUND & INTRODUCTION
 Introduce self and GRI
 Depths – face-to-face interviews last up to 1 hour
 Sponsor – GRI has been commissioned to conduct a study on behalf of IBTCI within your locality, to
help understand life in general among community members.
 Purpose:
o Provide insights/ evaluation and Needs assessment of USAID programming to communities
affected by the LRA.
 Study scope – Community members only: drawn from the general population considering gender, age
and locality of residence.
o Religious leaders: drawn from religious organizations:
 Christians
 Islam
 Animist
o Local Committee for Community Organizations (CLOC) members:
o Geography – DRC and CAR, in sample locations.
 Incentives – All participants shall be offered a token (incentive) after the FGD sessions.
 Tape recording - for analysis purposes only
 Confidentiality – reiterate the guiding code of conduct for participation in FGDs - no comments will
be attributed to you personally, only reported in aggregated form
WARM-UP (3 MINUTES)
 Please ask each participant to talk about their lives, their occupation, family etc.?
 Moderator to seek to understand the general lifestyle of the community within which the FGD
session is taking place.
SECTION A: COMMUNITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT
UNDERSTANDING THE COMMUNITY: INTRODUCTION (10 mins.)
Identify and map the communities that have been affected by LRA or are at likely future risk from the
LRA and only provide GPS coordinates of those communities visited by the IBTCI team, with the
inclusion of key informant data e.g. demographics and type of recent LRA activity affecting the
communities.
 Could you please describe life in your community today?
 What makes you happy? Why?

87
 What makes you sad? Why?
 What problems affect the community today?
 In what way do the community problems get solved? Please give me examples of this?
 How did you feel about it?
 Who is responsible for resolving conflicts in your community? How do they do it?
 What are the main sources of these problems (i.e. insecurity)
 Please tell me about the single most important problems (issues) affecting your community. Moderator to
NOTE the place of armed groups in the order of issues to be mentioned.
 Which are the most important in your community
o If not mentioned, Moderator probe for:
 Education
 Health
 Security
 Roads
 Water
 Electricity
 Food harvesting
 Livelihoods
 Thinking of insecurity, please tell me about any armed groups that you have heard of in your area?
o Moderator to Probe for: Local militias, LRA, the FARDC, the Police etc.
 How does insecurity from the armed groups manifest itself in your area?
 What do people say these groups are fighting for?
SECTION B: EVALUATION OF USAID PROGRAMS IN COMMUNITIES (1Hr. 30 Mins)
Moderator to introduce the topic of community programs in the respective areas.
 Please tell me of the different programs that different organizations are doing in your
community?
 Do you know which organizations are undertaking all these initiatives?
 Which of these initiatives do you think are relevant to the community?
 How do they help the community?
 What were they made to achieve?
 Do you think they have been successful?
Assessment of usage of ICT in local communities for security enhancement
 Please tell us, what is your main source of information?
 How frequent do you receive news/ information an anything that is of interest to you?
 Do you have access to a mobile phone?
 What do you use the phone for….most of the time? Probe for voice messages, calling and receiving,
short text messages, radio, internet etc.?
 What is your preferred medium of receiving information about your area? Why?
 What about information about security issues? Why?
 Where do you access information from most of the time? Probe: at home? Local shopping center?
Through family members?
 Thinking of the attacks from the LRA, how effective has been ‘radio’ communication in dealing with
this attacks?
 Would you say this has been successful? How and why?

88
 How would use of radio, telephone contribute to the enhancement of your local community’s
security?
 What are the advantages of using modern communication means in combatting the LRA insecurity?
MODERATOR: Ask for all examples of local community radios people are aware of and probe on
USAID funded ones (To get list from client for each area)
Thinking of the initiatives the various organizations are doing to assist the communities,
 Which ones do you associate with aiding communities in communication?
 Where are they located?
 How do they fair in addressing these needs?
 Please give me examples of some of the communication (ICT) initiatives that are active in your community?
 In the case of RADIO communication, Probe for;
o Messaging content?
o Audiences of messaging? Who is meant to get message?
o Successes and failures of ICT messaging
o Strengths and weaknesses of ICT initiatives.
Establishing existing local and international efforts to assist the communities, including those implemented by
Invisible Children;
o Please tell us….are there efforts by any organizations/ people to assist your community after the
attacks? How?
o Which organizations are involved in assisting communities get along after attacks from the LRA
and other armed groups?
o Please give us specific examples of these organizations and their activities?
o Which ones have been most helpful to your community?
o Are these activities relevant to your community’s needs? Why?
o Which areas could be made better in assisting your community?
Identify communities that may be in “early recovery” and their priorities;
Thinking about the issues of insecurity and particularly the issue of armed groups like the LRA, please
tell me…..
 When did you start hearing about the (name of armed group) in your community?
 What has this group done that affects your community?
 Are people in your community able to go to their farms or go to the markets? If no, why?
 How long ago did your community start going back to their normal activities?
Specifically thinking of the LRA….
 How long ago was the closest last attack by the LRA?
 Do you personally know someone/ people who were directly affected by these attack(s).
 What did the community do to recover?
 What activities have been taking place to assist community members recover? How?
 Who is responsible for the recovery process? How?
 Are the activities bearing fruit for the community? Why?
 What could be done to make the community members adapt better after the LRA attacks?
 Do they believe the LRA attacks are imminent? Why?
 Who do you think should/ is taking the leading role in assisting communities affected by attacks? How
should they be involved?
 How do people cope after cases of attacks from armed groups?

89
 Are there specific things that your community has done to reassure members of their security?
Describe existing community resiliencies and protection strategies;
 How do people in your community respond in cases of threats of attack?
 Who is responsible for the security of the community in your village/ community?
 Who plays the most important role in the security of the community members?
 Who is responsible for the community security currently?
 Please explain to me how this works?
o If not mentioned probe for community AUTO DEFENSE groups.
 Please describe to me how the community has responded to the threats of attacks from armed
groups?
 How do you as an individual react to these threats?
 What has been the greatest impact on people’s lives after the attacks by the LRA or other armed
groups?
 Are there organizations, or people that assist people affected in your community to get along after attacks
from the armed groups, particularly the LRA?
 Please tell us the most effective groups that are assisting the community?
 In which way do they assist?
The impact of the LRA in the identified communities;
Moderator to: (Relevant to both KII only).
 In your community, would you different between LRA attacks/ activities and other armed group’s
attacks? How?
 Would community members know when an attack is about to happen?
 What kind of links does LRA have with affected communities? What about with unaffected
communities?
 Would some communities support the LRA or other armed groups? Why?
 Would there be, in your opinion, armed groups that might want to support the LRA? Why?
 Supposing the LRA disappeared completely, do you think there are groups that might want to take
control of the areas they have been? Which ones?
 What is the level of support to LRA by community?
 In what ways has the LRA-affected your community?
 How have individuals’ lives been affected by the LRA activities?
 How long have the LRA been active in their region/ locations?
 Establish frequency of hits by the LRA in the past one/ two year (s)?
Assessment of the level and type of coordination and interaction of programs with security actors on the ground;
 Who has the greatest responsibility in addressing your security needs in your community?
 Please give me examples of what government agencies have done/ are doing in addressing the
insecurity posed by the LRA?
 How does your community work with the authorities to address the threats by the LRA?
 How would you describe your community work with the government authorities as far as security
issues are concerned?
 Do community members participate in meetings with the local security teams? Which ones?
o If not mentioned, Probe for the FADRC/FACAR and the National police/Gendarmerie service
 What is your perception of how well the security issues are addressed by the relevant security
teams?
 How well do they respond to threats of attacks by armed groups i.e. LRA? What do they do?

90
 How well are they equipped to secure your community?
 What is your perception of their local knowledge of your community’s security? Why?
Establishing the presence and capacity of partners on the ground:
 Thinking of the various partners/ organizations on the ground, kindly give me an example of the ones
close to your community?
 Which ones are more visible? What activities are they doing?
 What do they do in their activities to assist communities?
 How far are they situated from the community?
 What areas should the local and international partners concentrate on in addressing the issues
affecting the communities? Why?
 Does the presence of the partners play a role on whether the attacks happen or not? Why?
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE LRA FUNDING:
(10MINUTES)
 Please tell me, what natural resources are within your region or are accessible to your community?
 Does your community have access to these resources for its benefit? Please give me specific
examples where these resources have benefitted your local community?
 Who exploits these resources?
 How do these resources get distributed, shared by the community?
 How should the resources be managed to benefit local communities?
 Whose role is it to ensure better resource allocation/ utilization by local communities?
 Who is the most affected by the exploration of resources? How?
 Do armed groups benefit from locally available natural resources?
 Thinking of the LRA specifically, do they have access to some of the resources you just mentioned?
 Does the LRA use the resources to sustain their group? How…?
 What specific resources, according to you, does the LRA target?
o If not mentioned, probe for Ivory, wildlife trophies, minerals etc.
RELATIONS BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND MILITARY UNITS WITH LOCAL
COMMUNITIES: (10 MINUTES)
Thinking of all the development organizations operating in your locality…
 Please tell me of all the development organizations you are aware of working in your community…?
 Please tell me, what does each of them do? Please give examples.
 How effective are these organizations in assisting your community?
 What role do the NGOs play in your community development?
 How do people in your community interact with each of these organizations?
 How would you describe the relations between the military organizations operating in your region
with your community members? And with other humanitarian organizations? Why?
 If these organizations were to change anything at all about themselves….what would that be and
why?
Assessment of access to community-based protection programs and how is has affected community response and
protection initiatives
 Are you aware of any initiatives in your community aimed at protecting community members? Please
give examples?
 Are there organizations doing these activities?
 Which of the mentioned initiatives do you think are relevant and successful to your community?

91
 Are there any shortfalls in current community-based protection programs in your community? Please
name them for us?
 Are there successes in current community-based protection programs? Probe for examples.
 Are some groups of population benefitting more than others from the initiatives by organizations?
Why?
 How and at which stages have you be involved in the community protection project (CRS, SECC,
SFCG)?
 How do you contribute to the project? How will the maintenance and continuity of the activities take
place?
 How are different needs of men and women considered and taken into account? Other specific
needs of some groups of the population (victims, defectors)?
WRAP UP
Thank and close while encouraging the respondents to raise any other issues they might want to discuss within
the context of the focus group, the issue of LRA instigated attacks, the responsibilities of security agencies and
partners, the actions required of local and international partners etc.
End……

92
ANNEX 5: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DRC AND CAR
Refere
nce
Task 1 : Community Needs
Assessment and Mapping
Clarification
requested
Potential sub-questions Indicators Data Source
1, 2 1. Identify and map the
communities that have been
affected by LRA or are at
likely future risk from the
LRA and only provide GPS
coordinates of those
communities visited by the
IBTCI team, with the inclusion
of key metadata, e.g.,
demographics and type(s) of
recent LRA activity affecting
the communities.
Communities
visited only?
(see for all
questions)
When was the last time the LRA were seen in
these communities? How long and how
frequent are/ were the LRA incursions?
Based on LRA movement patterns, which
communities are likely to be affected?
What kind of linkages does LRA have with
affected and non affected communities?
What are key physical features, natural
resources and socio-economic activities in
the LRA-affected communities and their
neighborhoods?
What are the socio-demographic
characteristics of the population in the
affected communities and their
neighborhoods?
What features put these communities at a
risk of being attacked by the LRA or what in
these communities may be centers of
attraction for the LRA?
What particular areas in the community did
the LRA focus on or attack and why?
What is the level of support to LRA by
community members? Who are the key
actors in relation to LRA in the community?
Is there support to other armed groups and
for what reason? How do they position
compare with LRA and how do they evolve?
Number, extent and
frequency of casualties
Communities on the
LRA neighborhoods,
movement patterns
Type and extent of the
linkages of LRA in the
different communities
Communities without
early warning systems
Economic / natural
resources hubs
Focus group and KII
Project documents
Analysis and reports on
the context, reports of
local NGOs, UN Group
of Experts, LRA Tracker
Informal conversations
Observations
Transect walks

93
Refere
nce
Clarification
requested
6, 7 2. Describe the impacts of the
LRA in the identified
communities;
Which categories of people are affected by
the LRA and of these who are the most
affected?
How are the different socio-categories of
people in the community affected by the LRA?
What are the socio-economic and
psychosocial impacts of the LRA on the
affected communities?
What other conflicts did the LRA spur in the
community and what has been their effect?
How were families and gender relations
affected by the LRA conflict?
What needs have resulted from the LRA
presence/attacks in the affected communities?
What has been the impact of the LRA on the
livelihoods of people in the affected
communities?
What are the positive and negative ways
adopted by the various categories of persons
/groups of people in community in trying to
cope with the effects of the LRA on the
Security. Number of
casualties (death, injured,
attacks, specifying attacks
on women, evolution of
criminality statistics in
the communities)
Recruitment of the LRA
by category (women,
children, men and
potential tasks)
Social. Displacement,
solidarity mechanisms,
community composition
Psychological. Levels of
trauma and duration.
Impact of trauma.
Governance.
Composition of
governance structures,
roles and effects. Role of
the customary
institutions, versus
administrative and
position of the youth.
Economic. Prices
evolution, goods / job
availability, trade level
and frequency.
Focus group and KII
Project reports, UN and
other international
organizations reports,
LRA Tracker,
humanitarian indicators,
security, health, education,
livelihoods statistics

94
Refere
nce
Clarification
requested
5, 8 3. Identify communities that
remain under threat and
their humanitarian, protection,
reintegration, early warning
and healing priorities;
Check difference
with Point 1
Reintegration of
LRA affiliated
people or of
displaced
people?
Classification of the communities by type and
level of threat
Highlight on vulnerable groups (poor, youth,
women, disabled)
Which communities are most vulnerable to
attacks/threats from the LRA?
What are the main characteristics of these
communities? Or what factors make these
communities more susceptible to LRA
threats?
What social categories of people are most
affected by LRA threats in the communities?
What are the specific socio-economic,
livelihood and psychosocial needs of
communities that remain under threat of
LRA?
What are the eminent needs and challenges in
relation to security and protection for these
communities?
What are the health, food security and water
related needs and challenges of these
communities?
What early warning systems exist in the
communities?
What are the strengths and gaps in the
current early warning systems within the
community?
Humanitarian indicators
by community (health,
water, food security)
Security statistics by
community
Patterns of LRA attacks
Focus group and KII
Project reports, UN and
other international
organizations reports,
Humanitarian indicators
for the area
Surveys and studies on
the area

95
Refere
nce
Clarification
requested
8 4. Identify communities that may
be in “early recovery” and their
priorities;
Communities
where there are
no immediate
humanitarian
needs?
Now or over
the past years?
To what extent have communities started to
engage in livelihood and socio-economic
activities they were engaged in before the
LRA threats?
What the socio-economic and livelihood
activities these communities are currently
engaged in?
What are the major needs and challenges of
these communities?
What interventions are likely to assist these
communities to continue their path of
recovery from the effects of the conflict?
Which interventions would you describe as
most helpful in addressing the recovery
needs, resettlement/transition needs and
why?–What interventions were least helpful
and why?
Ability to restart /
develop livelihoods
Level of movement of
the population
Ability to cultivate
(seeds, tools availability)
Households revenues
Evolution of the size of
areas cultivated and
harvest
Presence of basic
services infrastructures
Focus group and KII
Humanitarian reports and
indicators
External humanitarian
surveys, data from the
early recovery cluster
5. Outline the demographics
of these communities,
including the number of
displaced persons (to the
extent possible);
Maybe this could
be put at the
beginning?
Which are the current demographics? How
did they evolve over time? Which are the
patterns and prospective?
Evolution of the size of
the population
Evolution of the
population composition :
Ratio of men to women
% under 25, % disabled
Evolution of Ethnicity
Mortality and fertility
rates
Focus group and KII
Project documents
OCHA and UNHCR data

96
Refere
nce
Clarification
requested
10 6. Describe existing community
resiliencies and protection
strategies;
Particularly
protection
strategies or all
types? Resilience
strategies in
relations to
security / LRA
only?
Before the
project or after?
What are available community structures and
resources that you consider to be most
helpful in the responding to security threats?
What strategies has the community used
before to protect itself against LRA threats?
How effective were these strategies?
What actors would you describe as most
helpful in helping the community to cope with
the LRA threats and why?
Ability of the population
to take care of vulnerable
groups
Evolution of the number
of victims by
communities and
evolution of the
community reaction to
immediate and medium-
term threats
Share of victims taken
into account
Focus group and KII
Project documents and
reports from international
/ national organizations
Studies on community
resilience and protection
strategies
8,9 7. Outline existing local and
international efforts to assist
the communities, including
those implemented by Invisible
Children;
Which local, national and international
programs or actors exist in the community?
What are the current humanitarian
interventions in place to meet these needs
(health, food, water and sanitation, security
etc.?
How adequate are these interventions
compared to the level of needs in the
communities? What is the geographic
coverage, reach (number and type of
beneficiaries, type/sector of interventions), of
USAID- and other donors funded projects
intended to meet the humanitarian needs?
other relevant information: 1)
resettlement/humanitarian aid 2) peace and
reconciliation efforts / psychosocial support
3) health 4) water and sanitation 5) education
6) governance (support for local government)
7) access to justice construction, including
utilities infrastructure, roads, water points 8)
communications / media
Level of coverage of the
different interventions
Differences in terms of
technical approaches
Areas, sectors, groups of
population not covered
Focus group and KII
Project documents
Reports of NGOs
operating in the area, of
Community-based
organizations, and State
institutions

97
Refere
nce
Clarification
requested
What is assistance are they providing to the
LRA-affected communities in the various
sectors?
What interventions would you describe as
most helpful in addressing the humanitarian
assistance needs, resettlement/transition in
the affected communities and why?–What
interventions were least helpful and why?
11 8. Assess efficacy or
drawbacks of strengthened
coordination between SECC
activities and similar programs
in other areas;
Details of other programs in other areas?
What are the key coordination arrangements
and structures between SECC activities and
other similar programs?
Which information have not been shared and
why?
How do the various actors communicate and
coordinate with each other in planning and
implementation of the various programs and
activities?
How effective were or are the coordination
structures between SECC activities and other
key programs in the communities? What has
worked well in strengthening coordination of
SECC interventions and other actors in the
communities and why?
What has not worked well in strengthening
coordination and why?
What have been the key effects, intended or
Existence of negative
effects to coordination
Level of participation of
SECC implementers to
coordination meetings
Frequency / number of
meetings and level of
information sharing
between the SECC
implementers and other
programs
Focus group and KII
Project documents
Minutes of meetings,
examples of information
exchanges

98
Refere
nce
Clarification
requested
unintended, of the coordination arrangements
and strategies between SEEC and other
programs in the communities? Does
increased coordination represent any risk?
12 Assess the level and type of
coordination and interaction
of programs with security
actors on the ground;
Between
security actors
or between
communities and
security actors?
List of security actors / security mechanisms.
Existing security programs in the areas (DDR,
SSR)
Existence and
participation of the
different programs and
communities to security
meetings
Frequency of the
contacts with the army,
police
Possible missed
opportunities
Existence of issues with
some security services
Identified cases of
misbehaviors of the
security forces
Focus group and KII
Project documents
Minutes of coordination
meetings if available and
lists of presence
Reports of security actors
and other security related
projects
10 Describe the presence and
capacity of partners on the
ground; and
Which partners?
(State / Non
State,
International,
private sector)
USAID partner?
To what extent is partner’s capacity in terms
of resources, technical and contextual
knowledge sufficient?
Geographical scope,
number of staff, budget,
division of resources,
administrative and HR
processes, number of
beneficiaries, quantitative
inputs / outputs
Focus group and KII
Project documents
External reports (OCHA,
UN organizations, other
bilateral organizations and
NGOs)

99
Refere
nce
Clarification
requested
2,3 Describe the role of natural
resources and illicit trafficking in
funding the LRA.
What were the major natural resources in the
What are the major transit routes for these
natural resources? Who are the major actors
in these transit routes and how what linkages
and networks do they have with the LRA?
Which are the other funding mechanisms for
the LRA?
Amounts and frequency
of catching and selling of
Level of linkages of the
LRA with traders
Focus group and KII
(tentatively with
defectors)
Project documents
Map of natural resources
Studies
Reports of the UN GoE,
OECD
12 Analyze the linkages between
communities,
humanitarian/development
organizations, and military
units (AU-RTF, US Special
Forces, FARDC, MONUSCO).
Details of stakeholders involved in the area
What characterizes the relations between the
military and the humanitarian and
development organizations in the area?
How do they work together in providing for
security and other needs of the community?
What are the key coordination arrangements
and structures, and work modalities between
the military and humanitarian agencies in the
How do the military and civil/humanitarian
agencies/ actors communicate and coordinate
with each other in planning and
implementation of the various programs and
activities?
How effective are the coordination structures
and strategies between the military,
communities, humanitarian/development
organizations, and other key programs in the
communities? What has worked well in
strengthening coordination of between the
Frequency of meetings,
information exchanges
Level of synergies
between interventions,
missed opportunities,
cases of duplication
Focus group and KII
Project documents
Minutes of coordination
meetings

100
Refere
nce
Clarification
requested
military/security actors, and
humanitarian/development organizations and
why?
What has not worked well in strengthening
coordination and why?
What have been the key effects, intended or
unintended, of the nature of linkages between
the communities, humanitarian/development
organizations and the military?
=) identify: a) what other needs
exist that are currently not
being addressed by the USAID
C-LRA programming, and b)
what other programming can
be applied to meet the needs
of the affected communities.
Which types of
needs, as they
are probably
significant
(access to basic
services,
humanitarian,
governance)? In
relations to
security
objectives?
Which are the alternate strategies / programs
to C-LRA?
Existence of other
dynamics to support
further
Evolution of the needs
Focus group and KII
Project documents,
reports and studies of
community-based
organizations,
international
organizations, NGOs,
local authorities

101
ANNEX 6: FIELD ITINERARIES
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Date Location
Method of
Travel
8/2 Kinshasa - Goma Flight
8/5 Goma - Bunia Flight
8/6 Bunia – Durba 12 hour drive
8/7 Durba - Faradje 6 hour drive
8/8 Faradje – Durba 4 hour drive
8/9 Durba – Dungu 9 hour drive
8/10 – 8/14 Stay in Dungu
8/14 Dungu – Niangara 3 hour drive
8/15 Stay in Niangara
8/16 Niangara - Dungu 8 hour drive
8/17 Dungu - Isiro Flight
8/19 Isiro – Kisangani Flight
8/20 Stay in Kisangani
8/22 Kisangani – Kinshasa Flight
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Date Location
Method of
Travel
8/2 Bangui - Bangassou Flight
8/8 Bangassou - Obo Flight
8/12 Obo - Zemio Flight
8/15 Zemio - Bangui Flight

102
GANTT WORK PLAN

103


ANNEX 7: USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING


A. KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• On September 26, intercommunal clashes in the Central African Republic (CAR) erupted following
the killing of a Muslim man in Bangui. As of September 30, clashes remained ongoing and had
resulted in at least 61 deaths and displaced at least 37,400 people. Relief agencies and the UN note
that the current situation represents the most significant violence in the capital since October 2014.
• Though the Government of CAR (CARG) had previously announced plans to close the displacement
site at Bangui’s M’poko International Airport by mid-September, approximately 30,000 internally
displaced persons (IDPs)—including up to 19,000 newly arrived IDPs since September 26—were
sheltering at the site as of September 30.
• In FY 2015, the USG provided nearly $125.8 million in humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected
and displaced populations in CAR and CAR refugees, including support for emergency food
assistance, health, shelter, protection, livelihoods, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH)
interventions.
CURRENT EVENTS
On August 14, UN Secretary-General (SYG) Ban Ki-moon announced the appointment of Parfait
Onanga-Anyanga as the new Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
CAR (MINUSCA). Onanga-Anyanga— who will also serve as the SYG’s Acting Special
Representative for CAR—succeeds Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, who resigned on August 12
amid allegations of sexual abuse by uniformed MINUSCA personnel against CAR nationals. As of
September 15, the UN had acknowledged 17 alleged incidents of sexual abuse and exploitation by
MINUSCA staff.
INSECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
• Intercommunal violence erupted in Bangui on September 26 following the killing of a Muslim man
on the evening of
September 25. As of September 30, clashes remained ongoing and had resulted in at least 61
deaths, injured more than 300 people, and displaced at least 37,400 people, according to the CARG
and UN. In addition, relief actors have reported increased incidents of armed robbery, looting,
protests, and road blockades, as well as attacks targeting MINUSCA peacekeepers. Following the
initial clashes on September 26, the CARG, MINUSCA, and Government of France’s Operation
Sangaris deployed security forces to control the violence in Bangui.
• Since September 26, armed actors have impeded humanitarian operations, restricted the
movement of relief actors, and looted the facilities of at least seven international relief
organizations, humanitarian actors report. As of September 30, nearly 300 UN and non-
governmental organization (NGO) personnel had relocated to safer sites in Bangui, such as
MINUSCA bases or hotels, according to the UN.
• On September 28, SYG Ban and the UN Security Council released separate statements
condemning the recent violence in Bangui, urging all groups to cease violent and retaliatory attacks,
particularly against civilians. On September 29, President of the Transitional CARG Catherine
Samba-Panza also condemned the violence in Bangui, urging community members to refrain from
attacks and calling on international peacekeepers in the country to protect civilians.


• In a September 29 statement, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for CAR Aurélien Agbénonci
condemned the recent attacks against humanitarian facilities and personnel, calling for armed
groups to allow humanitarian actors freedom of movement to reach civilian populations in need of
emergency assistance.
• The recent violence in Bangui has increased intercommunal tensions in other areas of CAR,
resulting in protests and attacks on authorities and civilians in Nana-Grébizi Prefecture’s Kaga-
Bandoro town, Nana Mambéré Prefecture’s Bouar town, Ombella-M’Poko Prefecture’s Boali town,
and Ouaka Prefecture’s Bambari town. As of September 30, the UN had received reports of
armed elements arriving in Kaga-Bandoro, causing some humanitarian organizations in the town to
relocate relief commodity stocks and medical supplies to limit looting risks.
DISPLACEMENT
• Between September 26 and 30, intercommunal clashes in Bangui caused up to 19,000 new IDPs to
flee to an existing IDP site at Bangui’s M’Poko International Airport. Among IDPs at M’Poko, the
UN identified emergency shelter support and provision of safe drinking water and relief
commodities as priority needs.
• Prior to the violence that began in Bangui on September 26, the CARG had announced plans to
close the M’Poko displacement site due to planned construction at the airport, prompting concerns
among humanitarian actors regarding forced evictions of displaced populations. The UN has
repeatedly called for the voluntary relocation of IDPs—instead of forceful eviction—to areas of
origin or other secure communities. Humanitarian organizations have promoted voluntary returns
in recent months by providing individuals with cash, food rations, mosquito nets, and plastic
sheeting. Insecurity remains a significant concern for IDPs, however, and humanitarian organizations
are advocating for the CARG and MINUSCA to improve security in identified areas of origin and
further facilitate voluntary IDP returns. As of September 30, more than 64,700 displaced
individuals were sheltering at 32 IDP sites in Bangui.
• Since early September, increased intercommunal violence between armed actors in Basse-Kotto
Prefecture has caused more than 2,000 people to flee to neighboring Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), according to the UN. These refugees were sheltering with host communities or in
spontaneous settlements in the DRC’s Equateur Province, though many will relocate to DRC’s
Mole refugee camp in the coming days, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) reports. In addition, armed clashes since early September in Basse-Kotto’s neighboring
Ouaka in CAR have reportedly displaced an additional 10,000 people to surrounding communities,
according to the UN.
HEALTH, NUTRITION, AND PROTECTION
• Late September insecurity in Bangui has restricted access to medical services in the capital,
according to Médecins Sans Frontières. Injured individuals have been unable to safely travel to
health facilities due to armed violence and road blockages, which have also prevented the
organization from operating ambulances in the city. Most Bangui health facilities that do not receive


support from humanitarian organizations had suspended their activities due to the insecurity as of
September 28, according to the UN.
• Preliminary results from an August nutrition survey by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) indicate
that malnutrition levels among IDPs remain concerning. According to the survey, IDPs in Boda
town, Lobaye Prefecture, had a global acute malnutrition level of approximately 9 percent and a
severe acute malnutrition level (SAM) of more than 2 percent. Between January and August,
UNICEF treated more than 14,000 children younger than five years of age for SAM in CAR,
including children from the country’s IDP sites and enclaves.
• On August 28, anti-Balaka elements released more than 160 children in Ouham Prefecture’s
Batangafo town, international media reported. UNICEF and MINUSCA, which facilitated the
release, continue to identify affected children and assist in preventing child recruitment. An
estimated 6,000–10,000 children are associated with armed groups across CAR; as of September
18, armed actors had released nearly 2,000 children in 2015, according to
UNICEF.
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE
• On September 10, IOM expanded its community stabilization project to Boda. The project, which
began in Bangui in March 2014, aims to bolster physical infrastructure, promote economic
recovery, and facilitate intercommunal dialogue among Boda’s conflict-affected populations,
including displaced communities sheltering at 10 displacement sites supported by USAID/OFDA
partners.
• USAID/OFDA recently provided more than $1.1 million to support international NGO Tearfund in
delivering emergency water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) interventions to approximately 35,000
conflict-affected and displaced persons in Lobaye. With USAID/OFDA support, Tearfund plans to
rehabilitate water access points that conflict has adversely affected, construct latrines in IDP sites,
and conduct hygiene and sanitation trainings. In addition, Tearfund is improving food security for
affected populations through agricultural trainings and crop restoration activities.
• USAID/FFP recently provided $1 million to the UN World Food Program (WFP) in the Republic of
the Congo to support more than 21,000 Central African refugees with locally and regionally
purchased emergency food assistance. In FY 2015, USAID/FFP provided more than $18.3 million in
assistance to WFP targeting Central African refugee populations in Cameroon, DRC, and the
Republic of the Congo.
• State/PRM recently awarded $1 million to Solidarités International to improve access to safe
drinking water and other WASH services for CAR refugees and host communities in Cameroon.
In addition, State/PRM provided $1.2 million to International Medical Corps (IMC) in support of
child protection activities and gender-based violence (GBV) prevention and response for refugees in
Cameroon.
2015 TOTAL HUMANITARIAN FUNDING*
PER DONOR


* Funding figures are as of August 13, 2015. All international figures are according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service and based on international commitments during the 2015 calendar year, while U.S.
Government (USG) figures are according to the USG and reflect USG commitments in FY 2015, which began on October 1, 2014. USG
funding addresses needs both within CAR and among CAR refugees and host communities in neighboring countries.
** Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)—a pooled humanitarian fund established and managed by the UN to support underfunded
emergencies.
B. CONTEXT
• In December 2012, the Séléka armed alliance began to advance across CAR in opposition to
then-President François Bozizé. On March 24, 2013, Séléka fighters entered Bangui, effectively
seizing control of the country and triggering a period of widespread violence.
• Security conditions in CAR further deteriorated on December 5, 2013, when clashes erupted
between militants associated with the now-dissolved Séléka alliance and anti-Balaka groups,
composed of armed fighters that oppose ex-Séléka forces. As of August 2015, the security
situation throughout CAR remained volatile, with continuing attacks against civilians. While relief
agencies are working to assist conflict-affected populations, ongoing insecurity and logistics
constraints impede humanitarian operations in more remote areas of CAR.
• In response to the ongoing humanitarian emergency, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires David E. Brown
reissued a disaster declaration for the complex emergency in CAR for FY 2015 on October 1,
2014.
USG HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE CAR CRISIS PROVIDED IN FY 20151
IMPLEMENTING PARTNER ACTIVITY LOCATION AMOUNT
USAID/OFDA2
Action Contre la Faim (ACF) WASH Ouham $500,000
Agency for Technical Cooperation and
Development (ACTED)
Agriculture and Food Security, Logistics
Support and Relief Commodities, Shelter and
Settlements
Bangui, Ouaka $1,400,000
Concern
Agriculture and Food Security, Economic
Recovery and Market Systems (ERMS),
WASH
Lobaye, Ombella-M'Poko, Ouaka $2,258,287
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Agriculture and Food Security, ERMS, Shelter
and Settlements Ouham $1,083,752
$126,792,789
$49,389,172
$25,642,646
$18,916,945 $17,749,828 $15,049,322 $12,466,783 $11,624,009 $7,235,817 $5,638,264
USG European
Commission
UK Japan Canada CERF** Sweden Netherlands Ireland France


Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
Logistics Support and Relief Commodities,
Shelter and Settlements, WASH
Ouham-Pendé, Ouham $2,500,000
IMC Health, Nutrition, Protection Ouham, Vakaga $4,280,000
International NGO Safety
Organization (INSO)
Humanitarian Coordination and Information
Management
Countrywide $1,453,786
IOM
Management, Shelter and Settlements
International Rescue Committee
(IRC)
Health, Protection Ouham-Pendé $1,500,000
Mentor Initiative Health Ouham, Ouham-Pendé $1,400,000
Mercy Corps
ERMS, Logistics Support and Relief
Commodities, Protection
Mbomou $1,000,000
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
Shelter and Settlements, WASH
Bamingui-Bangoran, Bangui, Kémo, Mambéré-
Kadéï
$2,200,000
OCHA
Management
Plan International Protection Lobaye, Ouham $855,613
Premiére Urgence ERMS Mambéré-Kadéï and Sangha Mbaéré $1,350,000
Save the Children/U.S. (SC/US) Health, Nutrition, Protection
Haut-Mbomou, Mambéré-Kadéï, NanaGrébizi,
Nana-Mambéré
$2,199,926
Tearfund Agriculture and Food Security, WASH Lobaye $1,164,045
UN Humanitarian Air Service
(UNHAS)
Logistics Support and Relief Commodities Countrywide $2,000,000
UNICEF
WASH
WFP Logistics Support and Relief Commodities Countrywide $2,000,000
World Vision
WASH
Nana-Mambéré, Ombella-M'Poko $1,243,868
Program Support $23,705
TOTAL USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE $37,412,982
USAID/FFP3


220 Metric Tons (MT) Ready-to-Use
UNICEF Therapeutic Food for Children Experiencing Countrywide
SAM, Other Nutrition Activities
$3,392,380
WFP
Title II-Funded Emergency Food Assistance for
General Food Distributions,
Supplementary Feeding Programs, Food for
Assets, and Emergency School Feeding Using
9,750 MT of U.S. and 2,958 MT of Locally and
Regionally Procured Commodities
7,430 MT of Title II-Funded Emergency
Food Assistance for Distribution to CAR
Refugees
Cameroon $10,761,900
International Disaster Assistance-Funded Cash
Transfers for CAR Refugees
DRC $5,554,287
Approximately 1,036 MT of Locally and
Regionally Purchased Commodities for
Distribution to CAR Refugees
Republic of Congo $1,000,000
TOTAL USAID/FFP ASSISTANCE $46,579,807
State/PRM
ACTED WASH, Livelihoods DRC $1,000,000
CARE GBV Prevention and Response Chad $800,000
IMC
Child Protection, GBV Prevention and
Response
Cameroon $1,200,000
International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC)
Protection and Assistance for IDPs and
Victims of Conflict
IRC GBV Prevention and Response, Livelihoods Chad $800,000
Premiére Urgence Agriculture and Food Security, Livelihoods DRC $1,000,000
Solidarités International WASH Cameroon $1,000,000
UNHCR
Protection and Assistance for IDPs and
Refugees
Protection and Assistance for Refugees Cameroon $11,700,000
UNHAS Logistics Support and Relief Commodities Countrywide $1,000,000
TOTAL State/PRM ASSISTANCE $41,800,000
TOTAL USG HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE CAR CRISIS IN FY 2015 $125,792,789


1 Year of funding indicates the date of commitment or obligation, not appropriation, of funds. USG humanitarian funding responds to urgent needs among populations inside CAR
2 Uand refugees and returnees who fled violence in CAR for neighboring countries. SAID/OFDA funding represents anticipated or actual amounts as of September 30, 2015.
3 Estimated value of food assistance.
4 State/PRM funding listed does not include contributions to countrywide humanitarian operations in Chad and the DRC, which support multiple refugee populations, including Central Africans.
C. PUBLIC DONATION INFORMATION
• The most effective way people can assist relief efforts is by making cash contributions to
humanitarian organizations that are conducting relief operations. A list of humanitarian
organizations that are accepting cash donations for disaster responses around the world can be
found at www.interaction.org.
• USAID encourages cash donations because they allow aid professionals to procure the exact items
needed (often in the affected region); reduce the burden on scarce resources (such as
transportation routes, staff time, and warehouse space); can be transferred very quickly and
without transportation costs; support the economy of the disaster-stricken region; and ensure
culturally, dietary, and environmentally appropriate assistance.
• More information can be found at:
- USAID Center for International Disaster Information: www.cidi.org or +1.202.821.1999.
- Information on relief activities of the humanitarian community can be found at
www.reliefweb.int.


USAID/OFDA bulletins appear on the USAID website at
http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/responding-times-crisis/where-we-work

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