Bond Market Development:The Case of South KoreaBond Market Development:The Case of South Korea
Presented By: Yuvraj Samant
Roll No: 784
BBA(H) LLB(H), National law university, Jodhpur
VII Semester FMRS
OverviewOverview
Development of Korean Bond Market: History1
Development of Korean Government Bond Market2
Development of Korean Corporate Bond Market3
Special Topics: New Asset Backed Securities4
Development of Korean Bond Market: History1
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1980 1990 1995 2000 2003.10 2005
Money Market Bond Market Stock Market
Development of Korean Bond Market: HistoryDevelopment of Korean Bond Market: History
Source: Bank of Korea
USD Billion
IMF Crisis
Amounts Outstanding
0
50
100
150
200
250
1990 1995 2000 2003 2005
YearGov. Bank MSB Agenc y Corp.
Source: Bank of Korea
USD Billion
Development of Korean Bond Market: HistoryDevelopment of Korean Bond Market: History
Development of Korean Bond Market: HistoryDevelopment of Korean Bond Market: History
Source: Asia Bond Monitor 2005
Development of Korean Government Bond Market2
Before & After the CrisisBefore & After the Crisis
After the currency crisis: Dazzling Development
– Government bond Market: To finance public fund for financial
restructuring and boost depressed economy by fiscal pump
priming (Government-led Development)
– The government dramatically increased the size of KTB issuance
from around W7 trillion ($billion) in 1997 to W56 trillion ($billion) in
2004.
– In terms of outstanding balance, the total amount of KTBs has
increased from W25 trillions as of the end of 1996 to more than
W123 trillion as of end 2004.
Before the currency crisis: small and under-developed
 Markets for government bonds and government-guaranteed bonds
were not well-developed (conservative fiscal policy)
 As a result, the 3-yr corporate bond emerged as the benchmark
bond
Government Bond Market -Institution BuildingGovernment Bond Market -Institution Building
Reforms in KoreaReforms in Korea
1998.8 Announcement of ‘Government Bond Market Stimulus Plan’
1999.3 Establishment of Inter-Dealer market (IDM)
1999.3~1999.6 Test period of Primary Dealer system
1999.7 Enactment of Primary Dealer system
1999.9 Introduction of government bond futures
1999.11 Introduction of DVP system
2000.2 Introduction of Inter-Dealer Brokers (IDB)
2000.3 Securities financing facilities for primary dealers
2000.5 Introduction of reopening system
2000.8 Switch from multiple price auction to Dutch auction
2002.10 Mandatory Exchange trading requirement for benchmark issues
2003.1 Strengthening obligations of primary dealers
Unifying interest payment dates in preparation for introducing
STRIPS
2005 Introduce STRIPS
2006 Issue 20 year bonds
Issue Inflation-Indexed Bonds
Design products for retail investors
The Fungible Issue System (Reopening System)The Fungible Issue System (Reopening System)
• Bonds have identical
maturities and coupon rates.
• Reopening System expands
the size of bond issuances
of the same maturities.
Effect of Reopening SystemEffect of Reopening System
Volume of Benchmark Issues
3.5 times
greater
Treasury bonds
Corporate
bonds
Turnover Rates
The turnover
rates of GB is 6
times larger than
that of CB.
• 1999.3 Establishment of Inter-Dealer market (IDM)
• 1999.7 Introduction of Primary Dealer system
- 24 institutions designated as primary dealers
- 2% Minimum requirement: Acquisition & Trading
• 2000.2 Introduction of Inter-dealer brokers (IDB)
• 2000.3 Providing financing facilities for primary dealers
- Line of credit provided (at cheaper rate)
History of PD SystemHistory of PD System
PrivilegesPrivileges ObligationsObligations
- Exclusive participation in
government bond auctions
- Access to securities financing
facilities for secondary market trading
- Regular consulting partners for the
treasury department at the Ministry of
Finance and Economy
- 5% minimum underwriting & trading
(every 6 months)
- Provide bid/ask quotes (min vol and
max spread constraint)
- 40% Mandatory exchange trading
- Reporting requirement of position and
trading information of the government
bonds (To Treasury)
• Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) & OTC Market
• New Policy measures for activating KSE market
2002.10 Mandatory exchange (KSE) trading requirement
- 20% of Benchmark Issues
2003.01 Obligations of primary dealers strengthened
- Exchange trading requirement increased from 20% to 40%
- Minimum trading amount increased from 2% to 5%
Primary dealers should trade benchmark issues
of the Government Bonds in KSE.
Primary dealers should trade benchmark issues
of the Government Bonds in KSE.
VS
.
Mandatory Exchange Trading RequirementMandatory Exchange Trading Requirement
The proportion of benchmark issue trading within the
exchange has significantly increased since Oct. 2002.
The proportion of benchmark issue trading within the
exchange has significantly increased since Oct. 2002.
Benchmark Non-benchmark
Exchange Trading Proportions (%)
(Benchmark vs. Non-Benchmark)
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
Jan-02
Mar-02
May-02
Jul-02
Sep-02
Nov-02
Jan-03
Mar-03
May-03
Jul-03
Sep-03
Nov-03
Jan-04
Mar-04
May-04
Mandatory Exchange Trading RequirementMandatory Exchange Trading Requirement
Gov Bond Trading Volume (KSE vs. OTC)Gov Bond Trading Volume (KSE vs. OTC)
The Trading volume in the OTC market has not been decreased.The Trading volume in the OTC market has not been decreased.
Strengthening
obligations of
primary dealers
Mandatory Exchange
Trading Requirement
For benchmark issues
Mandatory Exchange Trading RequirementMandatory Exchange Trading Requirement
Bid-Ask Spreads of Benchmark IssuesBid-Ask Spreads of Benchmark Issues
Bid-ask spreads of the benchmark issues
decreased sharply after the new policy in 2002.
Bid-ask spreads of the benchmark issues
decreased sharply after the new policy in 2002.
18.1bp
6.7bp
Mandatory Exchange Trading RequirementMandatory Exchange Trading Requirement
3-Year KTB Futures – Global Status3-Year KTB Futures – Global Status
(Source: FIA, January~June 2003)
<Top 10 Gov Bond Futures Contracts>
(in 1,000 contract)
Rank Contract(Maturity) Volume Exchange
1 Euro Bund(10) 129,320 Eurex
2 Euro Bobl(5) 78,297 Eurex
3 T-Note(10) 66,531 CBOT
4 Euro Schatz(2) 59,605 Eurex
5 T-Note(5) 33,204 CBOT
6 T-Bond(30) 30,452 CBOT
7 T-Bonds(3) 9,190 SFE
8 KTB(3) 5,452 KOFEX
9 Long Gilt(10) 4,883 Euronext-Liffe
10 JGB(10) 4,501 TSE
Liquid Gov. Bond Futures MarketLiquid Gov. Bond Futures Market
Recent Trends in Government Bond MarketRecent Trends in Government Bond Market
-Institution Building Reforms in Korea-Institution Building Reforms in Korea
Before 2005, reform focused on measures to reduce
issuing cost by improving liquidity of the benchmark
issues
After 2005, reform focuses on measures to reduce
issuing cost by meeting diverse investors’ need
2005
2006
• Introduce STRIPS
• Issue 20 year Bonds
• Issue Inflation-Indexed Bonds
• Design products for retail
investors
Development of Korean Corporate Bond Market3
Development of Corporate Bond MarketDevelopment of Corporate Bond Market
Financial Crisis
(97.11)
Daewoo Crisis
(99.8)
SKG & Credit Card
Crisis (03.3)
Credit shock
Market Impact
ABS (Asset
Backed
Securities)
development
to handle
NPLs
Massive Corp.
Bond Issuance
to Refi Bank
Debts (From
Banks to ITCs)
Market Impact
MTM accounting
for ITCs
 Establish Bond
Pricing Agency
 Improve Post-
Trade
Transparency
Improve Credit
Rating
Market Impact
Credit card
debt roll-over
problems
 Realizing the
need for
systemic risk
monitoring
system
 Realizing the
Importance of
Credit Bureau
 Plunge of ABS
markets
Credit shock Credit shock
Market Impact
Issuance of P-
CBOs to Refi
Corp Bond Debt
 Rapid Pick-Up of
ABS Markets
Credit shock
Maturity Concentration
Crisis
(2000)
 Establishment of a securitization vehicle
- Onshore ABS SPC- Trust company
- Offshore ABS SPC
 Registration of a securitization plan with
the FSC
 Acquisition of securitization assets by
the securitization vehicle
 Appointment of servicer and transaction
administrator
 Issuance of asset-backed securities
 In September 1998, the Asset Backed
Securitization Act (the “ABS Act”) was
passed.
- The ABS Act provides a means to
engage in securitization transactions
with legal certainty.
- Tax benefits are conferred on
transactions under the ABS Act.
- Processes such as perfection of
security interests against third parties
are streamlined.
 The ABS Act was originally intended to
facilitate the disposal of non-
performing loans.
Korea’s ABS system: IntroductionKorea’s ABS system: Introduction
Securitization Process under the ABS ActThe introduction of ABS Act in 1998
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
KAMCO
(A)
8,345.3 22,253.9 7,761.1 1,040.7 3,816.3 43,217.3
Banks (B) - 16,010.2 18,036.9 35,891 38,192.2 108,130.3
Total (C) 8,345.3 38,264.1 25,798 36,931.7 42,008.5 151,347.6
(B) / (C) 0% 42% 70% 97% 91% 71.4%
(billion won)
1998 1997 2000 2001 Total
Collected 5,491.7 5,048.2 8,357.9 9,969.7 28,867.5 (25.8)
Write off 265.2 5,170.7 10,779 11,600 30,514.9 (27.3)
ABS 802.1 4,433.7 10,894.1 16,129.9 (14.4)
Direct Sale 3,937.9 1,831.1 5,769 (8.6)
Debt – Equity
Swap
693.9 1,504.6 1,077.7 3,276.2 (2.9)
Other 7,553.3 6,322 6,877.9 2,722.9 23,476.1 (21)
Sales to CRV 96.7 96.7 (0.1)
Total 16,010.2 18,036.9 35,891 38,192.2 108,130.3
(billion won, %)
Troubled Loan DisposedTroubled Loan Disposed
By Banks
 Contribution: “Spare-Tire theory”
* Corporations mitigated credit crunch problems by issuing massive
amount of corp. bonds.
 Capital market as a parallel circuit to bank financing
* Market interest rates were stabilized since corp. credit crunch
problems were mitigated & thereby it contributed to high growth in
1999.
Corporate Bonds in Bank RestructuringCorporate Bonds in Bank Restructuring
- 1500
- 1000
- 500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
1997 1/ 4 1998 1/ 4 1999 1/ 4 2000 1/ 4 2001 1/ 4 2002 1/ 4
government bank financ ial Ins t. c orporation
unit: 10 billion won
Amount of bond Issuance (Net)Amount of bond Issuance (Net)
 ITCs assumed credit risk with little discipline.
 Unviable firms could extend their lives.
 Easy financing reduced Chaebol’s incentive to restructure
their businesses.
 - massive default and recurrent credit crunch
- increased ultimate costs of restructuring!
 Maturity Concentration & credit crunch in 2001!
Credit Shocks: Daewoo Default and MaturityCredit Shocks: Daewoo Default and Maturity
ConcentrationConcentration
No Free Lunch!!!!!!!
Development of Corporate Bond MarketDevelopment of Corporate Bond Market
Financial Crisis
(97.11)
Daewoo Crisis
(99.8)
SKG & Credit Card
Crisis (03.3)
Credit shock
Market Impact
Massive Corp.
Bond Issuance
to Refi Bank
Debts (From
Banks to ITCs)
 ABS (Asset
Backed
Securities)
development
to handle
NPLs
Market Impact
MTM accounting
for ITCs
 Establish Bond
Pricing Agency
 Improve Post-
Trade
Transparency
Improve credit
rating
Market Impact
Credit card
debt roll-over
problems
 Realizing the
need for
systemic risk
monitoring
system
 Realizing the
Importance of
Credit Bureau
 Plunge of ABS
markets
Credit shock Credit shock
Market Impact
Issuance of P-
CBOs to Refi
Corp Bond Debt
 Rapid Pick-Up of
ABS Markets
Credit shock
Maturity Concentration
Crisis
(2000)
Bond Pricing Agencies for Mark-to-Market System in KoreaBond Pricing Agencies for Mark-to-Market System in Korea
KIS PRICING
Paid-in Capital
KRW 3 billion
BPBP
Korea Bond
Pricing
Paid-In Capital
KRW 5 billion
Paid-In Capital
KRW 4.75 billion
The KSDA monitors these
companies.
- Nov. 1997: decided to
introduce “Mark to
Market”
- Dec. 1999:KSDA
provided Matrix Pricing
- Jun. 2000:3 credit
rating agencies
launched 3 BPAs
under government
approval
-Oct. 2000: BPAs began
pricing on MTM fund
- 2002: MTM applied to
Bank’s Trading book,
Trust account ,
Insurance Co.’s
special Trust account,
securities Co.’s
accounts
- Oct. 2003: KDSA stops
Improve Post Trade TransparencyImprove Post Trade Transparency
of Bond Marketsof Bond Markets
 KSDA requires dealers to report all bond transactions
(including both corporate and government bonds) to
KOSCOM CHECK Terminal within 30 minutes in 1999
(and 15 minutes since 2004)
 NASD begins full dissemination of transaction and price
data on the entire universe of corporate bonds to retail
investors using TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance
Engine). Dealers must report corporate bond transactions
to TRACE within 30 minutes, and that window will be
reduced to 15 minutes in July 2005
Paid-in Capital: 33.5 billion won
Seoul Credit Rating
& Information
Paid- in Capital: 13.7 billion won
227 Employees
KOREA
INFORMATION
SERVICE
Paid-in Capital: 23.8 billion won
163 Employees
Paid-in Capital:
24.3 billion won
183 Employees
Improve the Quality of Credit Rating AgenciesImprove the Quality of Credit Rating Agencies
(CRA)(CRA)
In 2006, Ministry of Finance and Economy of Korea plans to lower the
barriers in entering the Korean credit rating industry in 2006, so that
foreign agencies, such as S&P, Moody’s and Fitch may easily get into the
Korean market.
Korean CRA Market
Foreign CRAs
Development of Corporate Bond MarketDevelopment of Corporate Bond Market
Financial Crisis
(97.11)
Daewoo Crisis
(99.8)
SKG & Credit Card
Crisis (03.3)
Credit shock
Market Impact
 Massive Corp.
Bond Issuance
to Refi Bank
Debts (From
Banks to ITCs)
 ABS (Asset
Backed
Securities)
development
to handle
NPLs
Market Impact
 MTM
accounting
for ITCs
 Establish Bond
Pricing Agency
 Improve Post-
Trade
Transparency
 Improve Credit
Rating
Market Impact
 Credit card
debt roll-over
problems
 Realizing the
need for
systemic risk
monitoring
system
 Realizing the
Importance of
Credit Bureau
 Plunge of ABS
markets
Credit shock Credit shock
Market Impact
 Issuance of
P-CBOs to Refi
Corp. Bond Debt
 Rapid Pick-Up
of ABS Markets
Credit shock
Maturity Concentration
Crisis
(2000)
 Create a systemic risk (due to credit crunch problem)
 A temporary problem: Chaebols paid off debts (low interest rate, higher earning, less
investment)
0
5, 000
10, 000
15, 000
20, 000
25, 000
1998/ 1 1999/ 1 2000/ 1 2001/ 1 2002/ 1 2003/ 1 2004/ 1 2005/ 1 2006/ 1
Above A BBB BB- B below CCC unrated
1 billion won
Maturity Concentration (Rollover) ProblemMaturity Concentration (Rollover) Problem
 Credit guarantees for a pool of
corporate bonds / loans
Combining mechanisms of ABS
and credit guarantee
Facilitated corporate financing
in a short period of time
Credit Crunch: Securitization & Credit GuaranteeCredit Crunch: Securitization & Credit Guarantee
Credit Guarantee Services by KCGF
23 SMEs
Small Business Corporation
SPCSPC
Senior bonds
(2yr 8.5 bil., 3yr 36 bil.)
Credit Enhancement
By Korea Housing Bank
(10 bil.)
Junior bonds
(27.5 bil.)
Corp. bonds
(72billion
won)
Asset
sales

Investor
Repurchased by Small
Business Corporation
Introduction
Stage
(’99~’00)
Financial Restructuring &
Securitization of NPLs
Developing Stage
(‘00-’01)
Financing tools for
companies
to overcome flight-to-quality
(maturity concentration)
problems
Maturing Stage
(’02~’04)
Deepening of
ABS market
Financing tools for SMEs,
credit card companies
mortgage, student loans,
Future Cash Flow
Securitization & others
Evolution of ABS Market in Korea
0.5
28.6
8.7
1.9
6.9
0.2
4
20.6
22.2
0.9
2.5
1
4.6
5.3
4.6
13.1
19.7
10.5
12.6
14.4
0.6 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.8
3 3.5
9.9 9.6
111
13.4%
25.4%
56.6%
41.2%
8.3%
3.2%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Securities Cardloans Lease,Autoloans
Accountablereceivables Real-estate RatioofCreditloans
KRWtrillion
Bonds
Lessons from Korean Experiences
 USA : Mortgage  Lease/Cards  Junk Bonds/CBOs  Future Cash Flows
 Korea: NPLs  CBOs  Cards  Future Cash Flows
 Securitization can be an effective policy tool for overcoming
credit crunch problems (or credit quality gap)
 Public sectors can facilitate securitization
 Securitization evolves as market need arises
Development of Corporate Bond MarketDevelopment of Corporate Bond Market
Financial Crisis
(97.11)
Daewoo Crisis
(99.8)
SKG & Credit Card
Crisis (03.3)
Credit shock
Market Impact
Massive Corp.
Bond Issuance
to Refi Bank
Debts (From
Banks to ITCs)
 ABS (Asset
Backed
Securities)
development
to handle
NPLs
Market Impact
MTM accounting
for ITCs
 Establish Bond
Pricing Agency
 Improve Post-
Trade
Transparency
Improve Credit
Rating
Market Impact
Credit card
debt roll-over
problems
 Realizing the
need for
systemic risk
monitoring
system
 Realizing the
Importance of
Credit Bureau
 Plunge of ABS
markets
Credit shock Credit shock
Market Impact
Issuance of P-
CBOs to Refi
Corp Bond Debt
Rapid Pick-Up of
ABS Markets
Credit shock
Maturity Concentration
Crisis
(2000)
Credit Card Industry in KoreaCredit Card Industry in Korea
◇ Untapped new market of consumer
finance
• Before 1998, individuals had a lower
pecking order in the credit market
• After 1998, business entities stopped
financing new investment
• Every financial company in Korea
began to enter consumer loan market
◇ In the beginning it was lucrative!
 Average lending rate of bank: 6~7%
per annum
 Cash advance fee: over 20% per
annum
 Financing cost of credit card
companies: 6~7% per annum
◇ Especially Credit card companies with
less financial market experience
which are subsidiary of business
conglomerate used market share
maximization strategy.
◇ Credit card companies financed its
lending by issuing corporate bonds
and by securitizing credit card
receivables.
Cards Issued
(thousands)
Cards per
economically
active individual
1990 10,384 0.6
1995 33,278 1.6
2000 57,881 2.6
2002 104,807 4.6
2005.6 82,765 3.4
Growth of Consumer Finance
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
100.0%
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year
%outoftotalcredit
Beginning of Crisis in Credit Card Industry in KoreaBeginning of Crisis in Credit Card Industry in Korea
◇ SK Global event (February 2003)
• Family owner was arrested as a suspect of accounting fraud
• Investors of Money Market Fund which invested in debt
instruments issued by SK Global suffered loss.
◇ Investors getting more sensitive about over-issued credit card companies’ bonds
• Increasing concern about credit card companies’ loss
◇ Past due ratio (excluding rescheduled debt) increased
◇ Investors began to redeem investment trust funds in the fear of loss
◇ Investment trust companies had to sell or stop rolling over credit card bonds
◇ Other institutional investors were deeply concerned about their investment
positions in credit card bonds
Market Situation
End of 2001 End of 2002 End of 2003
2.0% 5.9% 13.6%
Government Measures in 2003Government Measures in 2003
• Initiatives by the Government in April 2003
 Rolling over maturing debt securities issued by credit card companies
 Funding a pool to support refinancing credit card companies’ debt securities held by investment
trust companies
 Large shareholders joining in new capital raising
(8 credit card companies with their own plans to raise capital in the amount of U$
80m~U$ 400m)
 Credit card companies reconstructing cost structure and asset management
• Strengthening guidance on sound management
 Reintroduction of loan service ratio
 In calculating past due ratio, liquidated asset should be included
 In calculating adjusted capital ratio, 20% of liquidated asset should be included in the denominator
• Starting Credit Counseling & Recovery Service (founded in 2003)
 1 out of 10 economically active population is registered as insolvent and the number was increasing
 Increasing personal insolvency not only hurts financial institutions profitability but becomes the
reason of social unrest
 Financial companies co-founded CCRS to reschedule personal debts and help finding jobs for
troubled people
 Number of applications for debt rescheduled: 2003: 62,550 → 2004: 287,352
Credit Card Industry after CrisisCredit Card Industry after Crisis
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005.9
Assets+
ABS
60 84 46 30 26
Liabilities+
Financing
from ABS
52 75 45 28 23
Net income 2.1 0.2 -8.8 -1.1 0
ROA 5.8 0.4 -21.6 -3.9 0
• Credit card companies are recovering from crisis
• Assets are still shrinking
• Past due ratio (including rescheduled debt) has decreased to
11.9%(Sep 2005) from 28.3%(end of 2003)
• Number of credit card companies has reduced
- Three companies were merged into mother banks
- Six credit companies left on business
(billion U$, %)
Monitoring Systemic RisksMonitoring Systemic Risks
• Concentration Index
• Credit Spread Index
• Market Sentiment Index
• Strengthen credit bureau business
• Create individual credit risk index
Create indices to monitor systemic risks in bond markets
Create indices to monitor individual credit risks
ABS related business guidelineABS related business guideline
• Clarify the role and responsibilities of ABS related party
• Embody device for surveillance among ABS related parties
• Strengthen ABS related disclosure
Market’s self-regulatory guideline for those engaged in ABS business
(from ’05.5)
Minimize instability in the ABS market and create an environment
favorable to ABS investment
Minimize instability in the ABS market and create an environment
favorable to ABS investment
New Asset-Backed Securities: Student
Loan Securitization
4
Establishment ofEstablishment of
Korea Housing Finance CorporationKorea Housing Finance Corporation
• Korea Mortgage Corporation was established as a joint venture with IFC in 1999.
• Establishment of State-run Secondary Mortgage Market Enterprise
– Korea Housing Finance Corporation Act enacted in Dec. 2003
– KHFC officially established on Mar. 1, 2004
– Korean government & Bank of Korea are sole contributors of the capital.
– Losses, in excess of reserves, to be covered by the government (KHFC Act)
• Major Lines of Business
– Purchases mortgages and issues MBS
– Purchases mortgages and Issues MBB (Mortgage-Backed Bond)
– Mortgage Portfolio Business (Issuance of MBS or MBB required)
– Provides credit lines to lenders to support the origination of mortgages
• Mortgage Securitization Business
– As of Jan. 31, 2006
 7.6 trillion won of mortgages originated (104,496 mortgages)
Currently mortgages are originated by 22 Approved Lenders
 9 Approved Lenders started to originate mortgages from Mar. 25, 2004
 17 MBS Issuances completed (Total 7.3 trillion won)
 The first MBS issuance completed in June, 2004
 The first SLBS Issuances completed in Oct. 2005 (517 billion won)
 Now preparing the 2nd
and 3rd
SLBS issuances scheduled to be completed in the
coming Apr. and May
MBS Issuance StructureMBS Issuance Structure
Sales of
Mortgages
Trust Issuance of MBS
Borrowers
Monthly
Repayme
nt of P&I
Servicing Fee
Guarantee
Fee
Trustee Fee
Lenders
(Seller/Servicer)
KHFC Trust
(Trustee: KHFC)
Investors
FSC
MBS P&I
Repayment
Mortgages
Registration of Securitization
Plan, Transfer/Trust
Guarantee on
MBS P&I
payment
Existing Subsidized Student LoanExisting Subsidized Student Loan
- Need to lengthen the Repayment Period
- Mismatch in the bank’s Asset-Liability Management
- Government’s excessive burden for subsidization
 Major Problems of the old Student Loan Program
- Need to support the cost of living besides the tuition
 Short-term deposits vs. Long-term loans with fixed interest
rate
- Need to develop stable supply system of student loans
 Heavily depends on the banks’ discretion or business
strategy
 Max. 7 years of Repayment Period needs to be lengthened.
 To mitigate the repayment burden
 Annual subsidization increases as the outstanding balance
of student loans increases
 Difficult to increase the government-sponsored student
loans
New Government-Guaranteed Student LoanNew Government-Guaranteed Student Loan
 Student Loan Securitization
– KHFC issues Student Loan-Backed Securities(“SLBS”) backed by
Student Loans purchased from 15 designated Banks
 KHFC guarantees SLBS P&I payment
– Student Loans are funded from the Bond Market
– Banks will not hold Student Loans under their balance Sheets
– Banks act as the Servicers once they sell Student Loans to KHFC
 Borrower repay P&I through the Banks (Originator/Servicer)
 Banks get Servicer Fee Income
 Banks are free from Credit Risk
Student Loan Securitization ProgramStudent Loan Securitization Program
 Current Status
– In the 2nd
half of 2005, 15 Banks originated student loans and sold them
to KHFC for securitization
 Origination period : Aug. 12 ~ Sep. 28, 2005
 SLBS Issuance : Oct. 25, 2005 (517 billion won)
– Currently 16 banks are originating student loans for securitization
 Origination period : Feb. 2 ~ Mar. 24, 2006
 Targeted volume : 800 billion won (1st
half of 2006 only)
 SLBS Issuance : Apr. & May, 2006 (400 billion won respectively)
Student Loan Securitization(SLBS)Student Loan Securitization(SLBS)
 SLBS Issuance Structure
Sales of Student Loans Trust Issuance of SLBS
Borrowers
Monthly
Repaymen
t of P&I
Servicing Fee
Guarantee Fee
Trustee Fee
Banks
(Seller/Servicer)
KHFC Trust
(Trustee: KHFC)
Investors
FSC
SLBS P&I
Repayment
Student
Loans
Registration of
Securitization Plan,
Transfer/Trust
Guarantee on
SLBS P&I
paymentStudent Loan
Credit Guarantee
Fund
Guarantee
Guarantee Fee
Student Loan Credit Guarantee FundStudent Loan Credit Guarantee Fund
• Specialized Fund for Credit Guarantee
– Korean Government established 「 Student Loan Credit Guarantee Fund 」
 On July 18, 2005
 To enhance the credit of student loans
 By providing 90% Partial Loss Coverage
– Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development directs the Fund
 KHFC appointed as the Manager of the Fund
 Borrowers apply for the guarantee through 16 designated Banks which
originate the student loans
– Provided guarantee related to the origination of 522 billion won of student loans
in the 2nd
half of 2005
 The Fund plans to provide guarantee to support 1.6 trillion won of student
loans in 2006
 Targeted Number of Student Loans : 500,000
Bond Market in Korea

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Bond Market in Korea

  • 1. Bond Market Development:The Case of South KoreaBond Market Development:The Case of South Korea Presented By: Yuvraj Samant Roll No: 784 BBA(H) LLB(H), National law university, Jodhpur VII Semester FMRS
  • 2. OverviewOverview Development of Korean Bond Market: History1 Development of Korean Government Bond Market2 Development of Korean Corporate Bond Market3 Special Topics: New Asset Backed Securities4
  • 3. Development of Korean Bond Market: History1
  • 4. 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003.10 2005 Money Market Bond Market Stock Market Development of Korean Bond Market: HistoryDevelopment of Korean Bond Market: History Source: Bank of Korea USD Billion IMF Crisis
  • 5. Amounts Outstanding 0 50 100 150 200 250 1990 1995 2000 2003 2005 YearGov. Bank MSB Agenc y Corp. Source: Bank of Korea USD Billion Development of Korean Bond Market: HistoryDevelopment of Korean Bond Market: History
  • 6. Development of Korean Bond Market: HistoryDevelopment of Korean Bond Market: History Source: Asia Bond Monitor 2005
  • 7. Development of Korean Government Bond Market2
  • 8. Before & After the CrisisBefore & After the Crisis After the currency crisis: Dazzling Development – Government bond Market: To finance public fund for financial restructuring and boost depressed economy by fiscal pump priming (Government-led Development) – The government dramatically increased the size of KTB issuance from around W7 trillion ($billion) in 1997 to W56 trillion ($billion) in 2004. – In terms of outstanding balance, the total amount of KTBs has increased from W25 trillions as of the end of 1996 to more than W123 trillion as of end 2004. Before the currency crisis: small and under-developed  Markets for government bonds and government-guaranteed bonds were not well-developed (conservative fiscal policy)  As a result, the 3-yr corporate bond emerged as the benchmark bond
  • 9. Government Bond Market -Institution BuildingGovernment Bond Market -Institution Building Reforms in KoreaReforms in Korea 1998.8 Announcement of ‘Government Bond Market Stimulus Plan’ 1999.3 Establishment of Inter-Dealer market (IDM) 1999.3~1999.6 Test period of Primary Dealer system 1999.7 Enactment of Primary Dealer system 1999.9 Introduction of government bond futures 1999.11 Introduction of DVP system 2000.2 Introduction of Inter-Dealer Brokers (IDB) 2000.3 Securities financing facilities for primary dealers 2000.5 Introduction of reopening system 2000.8 Switch from multiple price auction to Dutch auction 2002.10 Mandatory Exchange trading requirement for benchmark issues 2003.1 Strengthening obligations of primary dealers Unifying interest payment dates in preparation for introducing STRIPS 2005 Introduce STRIPS 2006 Issue 20 year bonds Issue Inflation-Indexed Bonds Design products for retail investors
  • 10. The Fungible Issue System (Reopening System)The Fungible Issue System (Reopening System) • Bonds have identical maturities and coupon rates. • Reopening System expands the size of bond issuances of the same maturities. Effect of Reopening SystemEffect of Reopening System Volume of Benchmark Issues 3.5 times greater Treasury bonds Corporate bonds Turnover Rates The turnover rates of GB is 6 times larger than that of CB.
  • 11. • 1999.3 Establishment of Inter-Dealer market (IDM) • 1999.7 Introduction of Primary Dealer system - 24 institutions designated as primary dealers - 2% Minimum requirement: Acquisition & Trading • 2000.2 Introduction of Inter-dealer brokers (IDB) • 2000.3 Providing financing facilities for primary dealers - Line of credit provided (at cheaper rate) History of PD SystemHistory of PD System PrivilegesPrivileges ObligationsObligations - Exclusive participation in government bond auctions - Access to securities financing facilities for secondary market trading - Regular consulting partners for the treasury department at the Ministry of Finance and Economy - 5% minimum underwriting & trading (every 6 months) - Provide bid/ask quotes (min vol and max spread constraint) - 40% Mandatory exchange trading - Reporting requirement of position and trading information of the government bonds (To Treasury)
  • 12. • Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) & OTC Market • New Policy measures for activating KSE market 2002.10 Mandatory exchange (KSE) trading requirement - 20% of Benchmark Issues 2003.01 Obligations of primary dealers strengthened - Exchange trading requirement increased from 20% to 40% - Minimum trading amount increased from 2% to 5% Primary dealers should trade benchmark issues of the Government Bonds in KSE. Primary dealers should trade benchmark issues of the Government Bonds in KSE. VS . Mandatory Exchange Trading RequirementMandatory Exchange Trading Requirement
  • 13. The proportion of benchmark issue trading within the exchange has significantly increased since Oct. 2002. The proportion of benchmark issue trading within the exchange has significantly increased since Oct. 2002. Benchmark Non-benchmark Exchange Trading Proportions (%) (Benchmark vs. Non-Benchmark) 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 Jan-02 Mar-02 May-02 Jul-02 Sep-02 Nov-02 Jan-03 Mar-03 May-03 Jul-03 Sep-03 Nov-03 Jan-04 Mar-04 May-04 Mandatory Exchange Trading RequirementMandatory Exchange Trading Requirement
  • 14. Gov Bond Trading Volume (KSE vs. OTC)Gov Bond Trading Volume (KSE vs. OTC) The Trading volume in the OTC market has not been decreased.The Trading volume in the OTC market has not been decreased. Strengthening obligations of primary dealers Mandatory Exchange Trading Requirement For benchmark issues Mandatory Exchange Trading RequirementMandatory Exchange Trading Requirement
  • 15. Bid-Ask Spreads of Benchmark IssuesBid-Ask Spreads of Benchmark Issues Bid-ask spreads of the benchmark issues decreased sharply after the new policy in 2002. Bid-ask spreads of the benchmark issues decreased sharply after the new policy in 2002. 18.1bp 6.7bp Mandatory Exchange Trading RequirementMandatory Exchange Trading Requirement
  • 16. 3-Year KTB Futures – Global Status3-Year KTB Futures – Global Status (Source: FIA, January~June 2003) <Top 10 Gov Bond Futures Contracts> (in 1,000 contract) Rank Contract(Maturity) Volume Exchange 1 Euro Bund(10) 129,320 Eurex 2 Euro Bobl(5) 78,297 Eurex 3 T-Note(10) 66,531 CBOT 4 Euro Schatz(2) 59,605 Eurex 5 T-Note(5) 33,204 CBOT 6 T-Bond(30) 30,452 CBOT 7 T-Bonds(3) 9,190 SFE 8 KTB(3) 5,452 KOFEX 9 Long Gilt(10) 4,883 Euronext-Liffe 10 JGB(10) 4,501 TSE Liquid Gov. Bond Futures MarketLiquid Gov. Bond Futures Market
  • 17. Recent Trends in Government Bond MarketRecent Trends in Government Bond Market -Institution Building Reforms in Korea-Institution Building Reforms in Korea Before 2005, reform focused on measures to reduce issuing cost by improving liquidity of the benchmark issues After 2005, reform focuses on measures to reduce issuing cost by meeting diverse investors’ need 2005 2006 • Introduce STRIPS • Issue 20 year Bonds • Issue Inflation-Indexed Bonds • Design products for retail investors
  • 18. Development of Korean Corporate Bond Market3
  • 19. Development of Corporate Bond MarketDevelopment of Corporate Bond Market Financial Crisis (97.11) Daewoo Crisis (99.8) SKG & Credit Card Crisis (03.3) Credit shock Market Impact ABS (Asset Backed Securities) development to handle NPLs Massive Corp. Bond Issuance to Refi Bank Debts (From Banks to ITCs) Market Impact MTM accounting for ITCs  Establish Bond Pricing Agency  Improve Post- Trade Transparency Improve Credit Rating Market Impact Credit card debt roll-over problems  Realizing the need for systemic risk monitoring system  Realizing the Importance of Credit Bureau  Plunge of ABS markets Credit shock Credit shock Market Impact Issuance of P- CBOs to Refi Corp Bond Debt  Rapid Pick-Up of ABS Markets Credit shock Maturity Concentration Crisis (2000)
  • 20.  Establishment of a securitization vehicle - Onshore ABS SPC- Trust company - Offshore ABS SPC  Registration of a securitization plan with the FSC  Acquisition of securitization assets by the securitization vehicle  Appointment of servicer and transaction administrator  Issuance of asset-backed securities  In September 1998, the Asset Backed Securitization Act (the “ABS Act”) was passed. - The ABS Act provides a means to engage in securitization transactions with legal certainty. - Tax benefits are conferred on transactions under the ABS Act. - Processes such as perfection of security interests against third parties are streamlined.  The ABS Act was originally intended to facilitate the disposal of non- performing loans. Korea’s ABS system: IntroductionKorea’s ABS system: Introduction Securitization Process under the ABS ActThe introduction of ABS Act in 1998
  • 21. 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total KAMCO (A) 8,345.3 22,253.9 7,761.1 1,040.7 3,816.3 43,217.3 Banks (B) - 16,010.2 18,036.9 35,891 38,192.2 108,130.3 Total (C) 8,345.3 38,264.1 25,798 36,931.7 42,008.5 151,347.6 (B) / (C) 0% 42% 70% 97% 91% 71.4% (billion won) 1998 1997 2000 2001 Total Collected 5,491.7 5,048.2 8,357.9 9,969.7 28,867.5 (25.8) Write off 265.2 5,170.7 10,779 11,600 30,514.9 (27.3) ABS 802.1 4,433.7 10,894.1 16,129.9 (14.4) Direct Sale 3,937.9 1,831.1 5,769 (8.6) Debt – Equity Swap 693.9 1,504.6 1,077.7 3,276.2 (2.9) Other 7,553.3 6,322 6,877.9 2,722.9 23,476.1 (21) Sales to CRV 96.7 96.7 (0.1) Total 16,010.2 18,036.9 35,891 38,192.2 108,130.3 (billion won, %) Troubled Loan DisposedTroubled Loan Disposed By Banks
  • 22.  Contribution: “Spare-Tire theory” * Corporations mitigated credit crunch problems by issuing massive amount of corp. bonds.  Capital market as a parallel circuit to bank financing * Market interest rates were stabilized since corp. credit crunch problems were mitigated & thereby it contributed to high growth in 1999. Corporate Bonds in Bank RestructuringCorporate Bonds in Bank Restructuring - 1500 - 1000 - 500 0 500 1000 1500 2000 1997 1/ 4 1998 1/ 4 1999 1/ 4 2000 1/ 4 2001 1/ 4 2002 1/ 4 government bank financ ial Ins t. c orporation unit: 10 billion won Amount of bond Issuance (Net)Amount of bond Issuance (Net)
  • 23.  ITCs assumed credit risk with little discipline.  Unviable firms could extend their lives.  Easy financing reduced Chaebol’s incentive to restructure their businesses.  - massive default and recurrent credit crunch - increased ultimate costs of restructuring!  Maturity Concentration & credit crunch in 2001! Credit Shocks: Daewoo Default and MaturityCredit Shocks: Daewoo Default and Maturity ConcentrationConcentration No Free Lunch!!!!!!!
  • 24. Development of Corporate Bond MarketDevelopment of Corporate Bond Market Financial Crisis (97.11) Daewoo Crisis (99.8) SKG & Credit Card Crisis (03.3) Credit shock Market Impact Massive Corp. Bond Issuance to Refi Bank Debts (From Banks to ITCs)  ABS (Asset Backed Securities) development to handle NPLs Market Impact MTM accounting for ITCs  Establish Bond Pricing Agency  Improve Post- Trade Transparency Improve credit rating Market Impact Credit card debt roll-over problems  Realizing the need for systemic risk monitoring system  Realizing the Importance of Credit Bureau  Plunge of ABS markets Credit shock Credit shock Market Impact Issuance of P- CBOs to Refi Corp Bond Debt  Rapid Pick-Up of ABS Markets Credit shock Maturity Concentration Crisis (2000)
  • 25. Bond Pricing Agencies for Mark-to-Market System in KoreaBond Pricing Agencies for Mark-to-Market System in Korea KIS PRICING Paid-in Capital KRW 3 billion BPBP Korea Bond Pricing Paid-In Capital KRW 5 billion Paid-In Capital KRW 4.75 billion The KSDA monitors these companies. - Nov. 1997: decided to introduce “Mark to Market” - Dec. 1999:KSDA provided Matrix Pricing - Jun. 2000:3 credit rating agencies launched 3 BPAs under government approval -Oct. 2000: BPAs began pricing on MTM fund - 2002: MTM applied to Bank’s Trading book, Trust account , Insurance Co.’s special Trust account, securities Co.’s accounts - Oct. 2003: KDSA stops
  • 26. Improve Post Trade TransparencyImprove Post Trade Transparency of Bond Marketsof Bond Markets  KSDA requires dealers to report all bond transactions (including both corporate and government bonds) to KOSCOM CHECK Terminal within 30 minutes in 1999 (and 15 minutes since 2004)  NASD begins full dissemination of transaction and price data on the entire universe of corporate bonds to retail investors using TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine). Dealers must report corporate bond transactions to TRACE within 30 minutes, and that window will be reduced to 15 minutes in July 2005
  • 27. Paid-in Capital: 33.5 billion won Seoul Credit Rating & Information Paid- in Capital: 13.7 billion won 227 Employees KOREA INFORMATION SERVICE Paid-in Capital: 23.8 billion won 163 Employees Paid-in Capital: 24.3 billion won 183 Employees Improve the Quality of Credit Rating AgenciesImprove the Quality of Credit Rating Agencies (CRA)(CRA) In 2006, Ministry of Finance and Economy of Korea plans to lower the barriers in entering the Korean credit rating industry in 2006, so that foreign agencies, such as S&P, Moody’s and Fitch may easily get into the Korean market. Korean CRA Market Foreign CRAs
  • 28. Development of Corporate Bond MarketDevelopment of Corporate Bond Market Financial Crisis (97.11) Daewoo Crisis (99.8) SKG & Credit Card Crisis (03.3) Credit shock Market Impact  Massive Corp. Bond Issuance to Refi Bank Debts (From Banks to ITCs)  ABS (Asset Backed Securities) development to handle NPLs Market Impact  MTM accounting for ITCs  Establish Bond Pricing Agency  Improve Post- Trade Transparency  Improve Credit Rating Market Impact  Credit card debt roll-over problems  Realizing the need for systemic risk monitoring system  Realizing the Importance of Credit Bureau  Plunge of ABS markets Credit shock Credit shock Market Impact  Issuance of P-CBOs to Refi Corp. Bond Debt  Rapid Pick-Up of ABS Markets Credit shock Maturity Concentration Crisis (2000)
  • 29.  Create a systemic risk (due to credit crunch problem)  A temporary problem: Chaebols paid off debts (low interest rate, higher earning, less investment) 0 5, 000 10, 000 15, 000 20, 000 25, 000 1998/ 1 1999/ 1 2000/ 1 2001/ 1 2002/ 1 2003/ 1 2004/ 1 2005/ 1 2006/ 1 Above A BBB BB- B below CCC unrated 1 billion won Maturity Concentration (Rollover) ProblemMaturity Concentration (Rollover) Problem
  • 30.  Credit guarantees for a pool of corporate bonds / loans Combining mechanisms of ABS and credit guarantee Facilitated corporate financing in a short period of time Credit Crunch: Securitization & Credit GuaranteeCredit Crunch: Securitization & Credit Guarantee Credit Guarantee Services by KCGF 23 SMEs Small Business Corporation SPCSPC Senior bonds (2yr 8.5 bil., 3yr 36 bil.) Credit Enhancement By Korea Housing Bank (10 bil.) Junior bonds (27.5 bil.) Corp. bonds (72billion won) Asset sales Investor Repurchased by Small Business Corporation
  • 31. Introduction Stage (’99~’00) Financial Restructuring & Securitization of NPLs Developing Stage (‘00-’01) Financing tools for companies to overcome flight-to-quality (maturity concentration) problems Maturing Stage (’02~’04) Deepening of ABS market Financing tools for SMEs, credit card companies mortgage, student loans, Future Cash Flow Securitization & others Evolution of ABS Market in Korea 0.5 28.6 8.7 1.9 6.9 0.2 4 20.6 22.2 0.9 2.5 1 4.6 5.3 4.6 13.1 19.7 10.5 12.6 14.4 0.6 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.8 3 3.5 9.9 9.6 111 13.4% 25.4% 56.6% 41.2% 8.3% 3.2% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Securities Cardloans Lease,Autoloans Accountablereceivables Real-estate RatioofCreditloans KRWtrillion Bonds
  • 32. Lessons from Korean Experiences  USA : Mortgage  Lease/Cards  Junk Bonds/CBOs  Future Cash Flows  Korea: NPLs  CBOs  Cards  Future Cash Flows  Securitization can be an effective policy tool for overcoming credit crunch problems (or credit quality gap)  Public sectors can facilitate securitization  Securitization evolves as market need arises
  • 33. Development of Corporate Bond MarketDevelopment of Corporate Bond Market Financial Crisis (97.11) Daewoo Crisis (99.8) SKG & Credit Card Crisis (03.3) Credit shock Market Impact Massive Corp. Bond Issuance to Refi Bank Debts (From Banks to ITCs)  ABS (Asset Backed Securities) development to handle NPLs Market Impact MTM accounting for ITCs  Establish Bond Pricing Agency  Improve Post- Trade Transparency Improve Credit Rating Market Impact Credit card debt roll-over problems  Realizing the need for systemic risk monitoring system  Realizing the Importance of Credit Bureau  Plunge of ABS markets Credit shock Credit shock Market Impact Issuance of P- CBOs to Refi Corp Bond Debt Rapid Pick-Up of ABS Markets Credit shock Maturity Concentration Crisis (2000)
  • 34. Credit Card Industry in KoreaCredit Card Industry in Korea ◇ Untapped new market of consumer finance • Before 1998, individuals had a lower pecking order in the credit market • After 1998, business entities stopped financing new investment • Every financial company in Korea began to enter consumer loan market ◇ In the beginning it was lucrative!  Average lending rate of bank: 6~7% per annum  Cash advance fee: over 20% per annum  Financing cost of credit card companies: 6~7% per annum ◇ Especially Credit card companies with less financial market experience which are subsidiary of business conglomerate used market share maximization strategy. ◇ Credit card companies financed its lending by issuing corporate bonds and by securitizing credit card receivables. Cards Issued (thousands) Cards per economically active individual 1990 10,384 0.6 1995 33,278 1.6 2000 57,881 2.6 2002 104,807 4.6 2005.6 82,765 3.4 Growth of Consumer Finance 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0% 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Year %outoftotalcredit
  • 35. Beginning of Crisis in Credit Card Industry in KoreaBeginning of Crisis in Credit Card Industry in Korea ◇ SK Global event (February 2003) • Family owner was arrested as a suspect of accounting fraud • Investors of Money Market Fund which invested in debt instruments issued by SK Global suffered loss. ◇ Investors getting more sensitive about over-issued credit card companies’ bonds • Increasing concern about credit card companies’ loss ◇ Past due ratio (excluding rescheduled debt) increased ◇ Investors began to redeem investment trust funds in the fear of loss ◇ Investment trust companies had to sell or stop rolling over credit card bonds ◇ Other institutional investors were deeply concerned about their investment positions in credit card bonds Market Situation End of 2001 End of 2002 End of 2003 2.0% 5.9% 13.6%
  • 36. Government Measures in 2003Government Measures in 2003 • Initiatives by the Government in April 2003  Rolling over maturing debt securities issued by credit card companies  Funding a pool to support refinancing credit card companies’ debt securities held by investment trust companies  Large shareholders joining in new capital raising (8 credit card companies with their own plans to raise capital in the amount of U$ 80m~U$ 400m)  Credit card companies reconstructing cost structure and asset management • Strengthening guidance on sound management  Reintroduction of loan service ratio  In calculating past due ratio, liquidated asset should be included  In calculating adjusted capital ratio, 20% of liquidated asset should be included in the denominator • Starting Credit Counseling & Recovery Service (founded in 2003)  1 out of 10 economically active population is registered as insolvent and the number was increasing  Increasing personal insolvency not only hurts financial institutions profitability but becomes the reason of social unrest  Financial companies co-founded CCRS to reschedule personal debts and help finding jobs for troubled people  Number of applications for debt rescheduled: 2003: 62,550 → 2004: 287,352
  • 37. Credit Card Industry after CrisisCredit Card Industry after Crisis 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005.9 Assets+ ABS 60 84 46 30 26 Liabilities+ Financing from ABS 52 75 45 28 23 Net income 2.1 0.2 -8.8 -1.1 0 ROA 5.8 0.4 -21.6 -3.9 0 • Credit card companies are recovering from crisis • Assets are still shrinking • Past due ratio (including rescheduled debt) has decreased to 11.9%(Sep 2005) from 28.3%(end of 2003) • Number of credit card companies has reduced - Three companies were merged into mother banks - Six credit companies left on business (billion U$, %)
  • 38. Monitoring Systemic RisksMonitoring Systemic Risks • Concentration Index • Credit Spread Index • Market Sentiment Index • Strengthen credit bureau business • Create individual credit risk index Create indices to monitor systemic risks in bond markets Create indices to monitor individual credit risks
  • 39. ABS related business guidelineABS related business guideline • Clarify the role and responsibilities of ABS related party • Embody device for surveillance among ABS related parties • Strengthen ABS related disclosure Market’s self-regulatory guideline for those engaged in ABS business (from ’05.5) Minimize instability in the ABS market and create an environment favorable to ABS investment Minimize instability in the ABS market and create an environment favorable to ABS investment
  • 40. New Asset-Backed Securities: Student Loan Securitization 4
  • 41. Establishment ofEstablishment of Korea Housing Finance CorporationKorea Housing Finance Corporation • Korea Mortgage Corporation was established as a joint venture with IFC in 1999. • Establishment of State-run Secondary Mortgage Market Enterprise – Korea Housing Finance Corporation Act enacted in Dec. 2003 – KHFC officially established on Mar. 1, 2004 – Korean government & Bank of Korea are sole contributors of the capital. – Losses, in excess of reserves, to be covered by the government (KHFC Act) • Major Lines of Business – Purchases mortgages and issues MBS – Purchases mortgages and Issues MBB (Mortgage-Backed Bond) – Mortgage Portfolio Business (Issuance of MBS or MBB required) – Provides credit lines to lenders to support the origination of mortgages • Mortgage Securitization Business – As of Jan. 31, 2006  7.6 trillion won of mortgages originated (104,496 mortgages) Currently mortgages are originated by 22 Approved Lenders  9 Approved Lenders started to originate mortgages from Mar. 25, 2004  17 MBS Issuances completed (Total 7.3 trillion won)  The first MBS issuance completed in June, 2004  The first SLBS Issuances completed in Oct. 2005 (517 billion won)  Now preparing the 2nd and 3rd SLBS issuances scheduled to be completed in the coming Apr. and May
  • 42. MBS Issuance StructureMBS Issuance Structure Sales of Mortgages Trust Issuance of MBS Borrowers Monthly Repayme nt of P&I Servicing Fee Guarantee Fee Trustee Fee Lenders (Seller/Servicer) KHFC Trust (Trustee: KHFC) Investors FSC MBS P&I Repayment Mortgages Registration of Securitization Plan, Transfer/Trust Guarantee on MBS P&I payment
  • 43. Existing Subsidized Student LoanExisting Subsidized Student Loan - Need to lengthen the Repayment Period - Mismatch in the bank’s Asset-Liability Management - Government’s excessive burden for subsidization  Major Problems of the old Student Loan Program - Need to support the cost of living besides the tuition  Short-term deposits vs. Long-term loans with fixed interest rate - Need to develop stable supply system of student loans  Heavily depends on the banks’ discretion or business strategy  Max. 7 years of Repayment Period needs to be lengthened.  To mitigate the repayment burden  Annual subsidization increases as the outstanding balance of student loans increases  Difficult to increase the government-sponsored student loans
  • 44. New Government-Guaranteed Student LoanNew Government-Guaranteed Student Loan  Student Loan Securitization – KHFC issues Student Loan-Backed Securities(“SLBS”) backed by Student Loans purchased from 15 designated Banks  KHFC guarantees SLBS P&I payment – Student Loans are funded from the Bond Market – Banks will not hold Student Loans under their balance Sheets – Banks act as the Servicers once they sell Student Loans to KHFC  Borrower repay P&I through the Banks (Originator/Servicer)  Banks get Servicer Fee Income  Banks are free from Credit Risk
  • 45. Student Loan Securitization ProgramStudent Loan Securitization Program  Current Status – In the 2nd half of 2005, 15 Banks originated student loans and sold them to KHFC for securitization  Origination period : Aug. 12 ~ Sep. 28, 2005  SLBS Issuance : Oct. 25, 2005 (517 billion won) – Currently 16 banks are originating student loans for securitization  Origination period : Feb. 2 ~ Mar. 24, 2006  Targeted volume : 800 billion won (1st half of 2006 only)  SLBS Issuance : Apr. & May, 2006 (400 billion won respectively)
  • 46. Student Loan Securitization(SLBS)Student Loan Securitization(SLBS)  SLBS Issuance Structure Sales of Student Loans Trust Issuance of SLBS Borrowers Monthly Repaymen t of P&I Servicing Fee Guarantee Fee Trustee Fee Banks (Seller/Servicer) KHFC Trust (Trustee: KHFC) Investors FSC SLBS P&I Repayment Student Loans Registration of Securitization Plan, Transfer/Trust Guarantee on SLBS P&I paymentStudent Loan Credit Guarantee Fund Guarantee Guarantee Fee
  • 47. Student Loan Credit Guarantee FundStudent Loan Credit Guarantee Fund • Specialized Fund for Credit Guarantee – Korean Government established 「 Student Loan Credit Guarantee Fund 」  On July 18, 2005  To enhance the credit of student loans  By providing 90% Partial Loss Coverage – Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development directs the Fund  KHFC appointed as the Manager of the Fund  Borrowers apply for the guarantee through 16 designated Banks which originate the student loans – Provided guarantee related to the origination of 522 billion won of student loans in the 2nd half of 2005  The Fund plans to provide guarantee to support 1.6 trillion won of student loans in 2006  Targeted Number of Student Loans : 500,000

Editor's Notes

  • #2: Thanks, Chairman. It is my pleasure to have an opportunity to discuss the current stage of bond market development in Korea and I am looking forward to learning from your expertise in this workshop. Given the time limit, let me be very brief in my presentation.
  • #11: In the fungible issue system, bonds issued during a certain period of time are made so that they have identical maturities and coupon rates to expand the size of bond issuances of the same series. In Korea, the fungible issue system was first introduced in May 2000. In the beginning, the reopening period was 3 months. (i.e., dditional issues during every three-month period were issued with identical maturity dates and coupon rates.) However, since March 2003, the reopening period and interest payment periods were extended from 3 to 6 months.
  • #12: Primary Dealer system is also introduced. The obligation of and the privileges for PDs in Korea are summarized in the slide. Frankly speaking, the privileges for PDs are not strong enough relative to their obligations yet, and most PDs in Korea still prefer to be a broker instead of being a market maker. Therefore, the government is working hard to maintain the momentum of the primary dealer system at this stage. (As can be seen in &lt;Table 2&gt;, the privileges for PDs are not strong enough relative to obligations. The number of PDs in Korea (20) also seems to be too many by international standard and relative to the size of the market to establish the prestige of the PD status. Due to the lack of private incentives, most PDs in Korea still prefer to be a broker instead of being a market maker. Considering the important role of PDs in developing efficient government bond markets, the government is trying hard to provide “ carrots ” to PDs as well as strengthening her obligations: reducing the number of PDs and increasing securities financing opportunities for secondary market trading by PDs are policy options currently in debate.)
  • #13: The introduction of ETS in Korea is a case that takes advantage of the benefits of a latecomer in developing the government bond markets. Instead of being satisfied with developing just an OTC markets, the Korean government tried to promote an electronic exchange trading platform along the lines of the MTS system in Italy. As government bonds are relatively easy to standardize and Korea has a very competitive IT industry, it decides to introduce an ETS (electronic trading system) for the government bond markets and later makes it mandatory to trade benchmark issues using electronic exchange trading system. Rather than following the path of other countries, the Korean government decided to adopt the most advanced trading system in the world from the very beginning. The following micro trading data at the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) show that the decision was right. The electronic trading system has not only improved the transparency of the market but also increased the liquidity of off-the-run issues as well as on-the-run benchmark issues.
  • #14: In October 2002, the government introduced new policies measures for activating the KSE market to enhance liquidity and transparency of government bond trading. It mandated that primary dealers (PDs) to trade benchmark issues of the government bonds only in the KSE market. PDs should also trade more than 20% of the their total government bond trading within the KSE market. In January 2003, the mandatory trading requirements for PDs ware strengthened, raising the minimum trading proportion within the exchange from 20% to 40%. As shown in the figure, after the mandatory trading requirement, the proportion of benchmark issue trading within the exchange has significantly increased since April 2002. (It was rising even before the initiation of the new requirements in October 2002, thanks to the government ’ s administrative efforts in advance of the introduction of the policies.) It is not surprising that the exchange trading proportion of benchmark issues increased from 20% to 51.5% during this period. But, it is noteworthy that, during the same period, the proportion of non-benchmark issues jumped from 5% to nearly 25%.
  • #15: The rise in exchange trading did not draw away liquidity in the OTC market. If the increase in exchange trading came at the expense of a loss of liquidity in the OTC market, then we cannot say that the mandatory trading enforcement has increased overall market liquidity. However, there is little evidence that trading volume in the OTC declined during this period. Liquidity in the OTC market remained stable, suggesting that the policies have had an overall positive effect on the market.
  • #16: The most clear evidence of the improved liquidity is the changes in bid-Ask spread of benchmark issues. Following the imposition of exchange trading requirements, the bid-ask spreads of benchmark issues fell sharply from 18bp to 6.7 bp.
  • #17: Now 3-year KTB futures belongs to the world top 10 list of treasury bond futures market.
  • #20: Now 3-year KTB futures belongs to the world top 10 list of treasury bond futures market.
  • #23: The rise of the corporate bond market has a contribution.
  • #24: However, there is no free lunch. As time went on, however, the large proportion of corporate bonds issued in 1998 was defaulted. About 22% of the total value of the corporate bonds that were issued from December 1997 to December 1999 has been defaulted during the same period and it contributed the recurrent credit crunch problems and increased ultimate costs of financial restructuring.
  • #25: Now 3-year KTB futures belongs to the world top 10 list of treasury bond futures market.
  • #26: This is an overview of Market Settlement. There are five settlement systems for KSE, KOSDAQ, ECN, INAS (Settlement system for Institutional investors) and OTC Bond market. Trade comparison for KSE, KOSDAQ and ECN are completed at the point of trade execution termed “ Locked-in Trade ” The trade comparison under INAS system, which takes place on T+1, is termed one sided confirmation because KSD send trade confirmation to Institutional investors who in turn, affirm the trades. Under OTC bond market, the buyer and seller of bonds report their trade details to KSD and KSD matches the trade. This process is done through SAFE21, the Participant communication terminal Multilateral netting and DVP settlement in KSE, KOSDAQ and ECN and bilateral netting and DVP settlement in INAS. And these markets are settled in commercial bank ’ s money, so-called next-day fund. Whereas RTGS system linking KSD ’ s settlement system and BOK wire is put in operation in OTC bond market. The settlement is done in central bank ’ s money, so-called same-day fund.
  • #27: However, there is no free lunch. As time went on, however, the large proportion of corporate bonds issued in 1998 was defaulted. About 22% of the total value of the corporate bonds that were issued from December 1997 to December 1999 has been defaulted during the same period and it contributed the recurrent credit crunch problems and increased ultimate costs of financial restructuring.
  • #28: This is an overview of Market Settlement. There are five settlement systems for KSE, KOSDAQ, ECN, INAS (Settlement system for Institutional investors) and OTC Bond market. Trade comparison for KSE, KOSDAQ and ECN are completed at the point of trade execution termed “ Locked-in Trade ” The trade comparison under INAS system, which takes place on T+1, is termed one sided confirmation because KSD send trade confirmation to Institutional investors who in turn, affirm the trades. Under OTC bond market, the buyer and seller of bonds report their trade details to KSD and KSD matches the trade. This process is done through SAFE21, the Participant communication terminal Multilateral netting and DVP settlement in KSE, KOSDAQ and ECN and bilateral netting and DVP settlement in INAS. And these markets are settled in commercial bank ’ s money, so-called next-day fund. Whereas RTGS system linking KSD ’ s settlement system and BOK wire is put in operation in OTC bond market. The settlement is done in central bank ’ s money, so-called same-day fund.
  • #29: Now 3-year KTB futures belongs to the world top 10 list of treasury bond futures market.
  • #31: Now let me move to the CBO scheme KCGF, which is public credit guarantee agency, provides P-CBO / CLO guarantee, which is categorized as special guarantee. P-CBO / CLO guarantees is provided for a pool of corporate bonds and loans. These types of guarantees were first introduced in 2000, in order to cope with the ailing capital market which had not recovered from the financial crisis in the late 1990s. Combining the mechanism of Asset-backed Securities and credit guarantees, P-CBO/CLO guarantee allowed KCGF to extend large amount of guarantees in a short period of time, which not only facilitated corporate financing but also stabilized the capital market. Its unique structure of pooling has drawn much attention at various fora on the Asian bond market development. After the credit crunch problems were solved, MOFE started SME securitization using the same structure. Our program has been motivated by another SME securitization program launched by the SBC. Regarding the SBC program, Dr. Oh, who will be taking the floor right after me, will explain in detail. So let me introduce SME securitization program ran by KCGF.
  • #33: First, Securitization can be an effective policy tool for overcoming credit crunch problems or reducing the credit quality gap. In any country, companies are bound to experience temporary difficulties in financing due to unfavorable credit ratings according to business cycles. Therefore, Korea serves as a good model. Someone said financial crisis in Korea is disguised blessing. We also learned from experience that a crisis can be an opportunity. 2. Second, securitization evolves as market need arises. Korea has experienced quite different path from that of U.S. Korea introduced relatively difficult type from the beginning, due to the economic situation. However, it was successful because there was consolidate market demand. 3. Third, Korea has developed ABS market in such a short time. In this process, there was active government role and relevant policy measures and the required regulatory reforms for the ABS market were carried out in a compressed timetable. Korea and Korean government policy initiative serves as a good benchmark to whom wants to develop ABS market in a compressed time table. 4. Fourth, large institutional investor base are necessary to ABS market both quantitatively and qualitatively. Institutional investors play a vital role in bond market development, and are critical to advancing securitization as well. They can play the facilitation of efficient pooling of long-term funds, risk mitigation and diversification, reduced reliance on commercial banks, etc. Korea has developed rapidly, mainly due to the existence of a large institutional investor base. It is not surprising that Korea, with more than 44% of the region&apos;s institutional assets under management as of year 2002, has a domestic bond market with a similar share of regional bond market assets-and by far the largest market in ABS as well. 5. Last but not the lease, an important precondition for developing an ABS market is a deep domestic bond market with an efficient infrastructure. In addition, an ABS market requires other supporting structures, including credible credit rating agencies, a modern and well-functioning trading system, a modern clearing and settlement system, and efficient market intermediaries. A sound regulatory framework and effective enforcement procedures are equally essential for the development of an ABS market. Korea has the required regulatory framework and other supporting infrastructures in place for further development of the ABS market. Bond trading system, Clearing and settlement systems, Bond pricing and Credit rating agency facilitated ABS market in full blossoms.
  • #34: Now 3-year KTB futures belongs to the world top 10 list of treasury bond futures market.
  • #39: The ABS related business guideline took effect on May first this year based on the opinions of about 70 ABS related institutions such as securities companies, banks, credit rating agencies, and financial supervisory institutions. This is like the market&apos;s self regulatory guideline of what to observe when carrying out ABS business. The guideline standardizes works of each ABS related party such as asset management company, the trustee(/consignee?), trust company and securities companies. It clearly draws the line between the works and responsibilities of each related party.   This will minimize the instability of the ABS market. And we expect it to create an environment that is favorable to investment and enables sound growth.    Furthermore, it sets a concrete device that checks and keeps surveillance on ABS related parties. ABS related disclosure has also been strengthened.  
  • #40: The ABS related business guideline took effect on May first this year based on the opinions of about 70 ABS related institutions such as securities companies, banks, credit rating agencies, and financial supervisory institutions. This is like the market&apos;s self regulatory guideline of what to observe when carrying out ABS business. The guideline standardizes works of each ABS related party such as asset management company, the trustee(/consignee?), trust company and securities companies. It clearly draws the line between the works and responsibilities of each related party.   This will minimize the instability of the ABS market. And we expect it to create an environment that is favorable to investment and enables sound growth.    Furthermore, it sets a concrete device that checks and keeps surveillance on ABS related parties. ABS related disclosure has also been strengthened.  
  • #43: Now, I will turn to Korea ’ s MBS (Mortgage Backed Securities) in Korea The Korean government established the KHFC last year like Cagamas in Malaysia, in order to help low and mid-income families buy their own houses, induce a softlanding of household debts, and develop the long-term bond market. Mortgage loans were virtually introduced. In order the enhance the reliability of the KHFC, the government and the Bank of Korea financed all of the paid-in capital and grounds for loss compensation were laid out.