Externalized Spring Boot App Configuration

Externalized Spring Boot App Configuration

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  S P RI N G C L O U D C O N F I G & V A U LT C H R I S TO P H L U D W I G H A U F E G R O U P, F R E I B U R G J AVA U S E R G R O U P F R E I B U R G , 2 4 . 1 0 . 2 0 1 7
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  AGENDA • What’s thenoise about app configuration? • Spring Cloud Config • HashiCorp Vault – Generic Secrets – PKI: Vault as Certification Authority – Client Authentication • Usage Scenarios • Extensions in Haufe Projects – Vault-based Config Server Discovery (or: Where do I get the config server credentials from???) – Keystores for client & server configurations in Vault
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  E X TE R N A L I Z E D S P R I N G A P P L I C A T I O N C O N F I G U R A T I O N
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  SPRING APPLICATION CONFIGURATION –Environment Variables – Command Line Arguments – Property Files
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  1 APPLICATION –MANY DEPLOYMENTS Git Developer PC CI Environmen t Performance , Load, and Stress Test Enviroment Production Enviroment Branch A Integration Environmen t Branch B Integration Environmen t Demo Environmen t
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  TWELVE FACTOR APPS I.Codebase One codebase tracked in revision control, many deploys II. Dependencies Explicitly declare and isolate dependencies III. Config Store config in the environment IV. Backing services Treat backing services as attached resources V. Build, release, run Strictly separate build and run stages VI. Processes Execute the app as one or more stateless processes VII. Port binding Export services via port binding VIII. Concurrency Scale out via the process model IX. Disposability Maximize robustness with fast startup and graceful shutdown X. Dev/prod parity Keep development, staging, and production as similar as possible XI. Logs Treat logs as event streams XII. Admin processes Run admin/management tasks as one-off processes Source: https://12factor.net/
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  S P RI N G C L O U D C O N F I G
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  CONFIG SERVER CONCEPT •Manageable # Environment Variables: – Profile Names (Env ID, Feature Selectors) – Config Server URL – Config Server Credentials • Configuration under revision control • App fetches config details while bootstrapping • Config server scalable since state in repo Git App Imag e Config Server App Instanc e 1 App Instanc e 2 App Instanc e … Build Deploy Pull Fetch
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  SPRING CLOUD CONFIG Server: •“Normal” Spring Boot Service • URL path parameters: – App name – List of profile names – Git label (revision / branch) • Git-based: – Uses (file:///…) or clones (git://…, ssh://…) lokal Git repo – Git access via JGit library – On every client access, branch is checked out and pulled from remote • Alternative "native" profile: – Config in simple file folder – Ideal for local development Client: • Configuration in – bootstrap.yml – bootstrap-profile.yml usw. – By discovery (e.g., Consul, Eureka) • Adds PropertySources to the Environment ==> combined with other property sources • Periodic health check re-fetches config
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  H A SH I C O R P V A U LT
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  SECRETS • Don’t putplain passwords (for, say DB access) into config files! • Don’t put passwords into your Git repo! • Many developers perceive TLS key handling as complex • Secrets in environment variables / command lines easy to read from a shell account • When did you last change your DB passwords?? • All network transport of secrets must be protected by, say, TLS • …
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  HASHICORP VAULT • Toolfor secure access to secrets: – Encryption of data at rest – Elaborate access control concept – Audit log of every access • Support for dynamic secrets: – E.g., on-the-fly setup of DB users with their respective roles and credentials – Issuing of freshly created X.509 certificates • One-time tokens, cubbyhole backend • Many storage backends (filesystem, cloud storage, databases, Etcd, …) • Revocation of individual leases as well as complete immediate system lock-down. • Most parts open source (Mozilla Public License 2.0) • One shared app image serves both as daemon and as command line interface • Server exposes REST API
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  VAULT AUTHENTICATION How toauthenticate a vault client? • AppRole: – Static Role Id / ephemeral Secret Id – Secret typically created by deployment pipeline – Optional: Secret expires after use – Alternative: No secret, but CIDR • AWS: – EC2 or IAM credentials – Trusts AWS signatures • LDAP: – User credentials stored in LDAP / AD – Optional MFA • GitHub: – GitHub personal access token • Radius • Client certificates • Username / Password Underlying Token Authentication: • Explicit or under the hood by other mechanisms • Tokens bound to policies (access control) • Tokens expire if not renewed • Tokens can be revoked by admin • Most REST requests require token in HTTP header
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  DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS One-time tokensare great, but… • App operation in container clusters becomes more and more popular • Containers often replicated (scale out, disruption free deployments, …) • Cluster may migrate / restart containers at any time • So far no cluster hooks for automated re-creation of tokens (abuse potential!) ==> Multi-use secrets for container vault authentication In the Deployment Pipeline: vault write -f –format=json auth/approle/role/myapprole/secret-id | jq -r '.secret_id' | docker secret create myapprole_secretid - docker service create --name=“myapp" --secret="myapprole_secretid" myapp:alpine
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  S P RI N G C L O U D V A U LT
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  SPRING CLOUD VAULT SecretBootstrapping: • Adds PropertySource to Spring Environment (similar to Cloud Config client) • Runs in bootstrapping phase • App name + profiles translate in Vault paths: {backendName}/{appName}/{appName-profile} RestTemplates for Vault Access: • Ease Vault use from custom code • Examples: – Storage of secrets at runtime – Interactions with PKI backend – Transit backend: Encryption as a service
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  CONFIG SERVER +VAULT Git App Imag e Config Server App Instanc e 1 App Instanc e 2 App Instanc e … Build Deploy Pull Fetch Vault
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  S P RI N G C L O U D V A U LT E X T E N S I O N S @ H A U F E
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  VAULT-BASED CONFIG SERVER DISCOVERY Issue: •Even with secrets in Vault, configuration details give clues to potential attackers ==> Config Server access should require authorization • Config Server passwords are secrets, belong into Vault • Out of the box, config client won’t see properties fetched by vault client (config client configuration too early in bootstrap process) Solution: • Leverage Cloud Config Discovery mechanism • VaultPropertySourceLocator injected as @Resource into VaultBasedDiscoveryClient
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  PKI KEY- &TRUSTSTORE INTEGRATION Issue: • Keystore management (JCEKS, PKCS#12) cumbersome, frequent source of operation errors • Keystores in the file system should be password-protected Solution: • For (app) internal connections (= no “official” cert required): – Leverage Vault’s PKI backend, issue certificates on-the-fly. – Build on sample by Mark Paluch, extended with retrieval of trusted certificates • For customer / partner facing clients & services: – Represent key- and trust stores as JSON objects in Vault’s generic secret backend – Auto-configuration for Web container & HTTP clients • Fallback to keystores in the file system (for, e.g., local development, tests) • Fallback to the trusted certificates of the runtime’s default X509TrustManager