Meurbanwar
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This document discusses urban warfare in the Middle East and related humanitarian concerns. It notes that over 60% of people in the Middle East live in urban areas, and lists examples of past urban conflicts. Urban warfare puts a premium on deception, political/media warfare, and is preferred by some Arab forces. Fighting in cities involves dense populations, narrow streets, and challenging terrain for combatants. The presence of civilians greatly complicates urban conflicts and can be exploited by defenders, while also creating humanitarian concerns for attackers. Effective civil affairs and psychological operations are important for mitigating non-combatant impacts and achieving long-term success in urban military operations.
Meurbanwar
- 1. MIDDLE EASTERN URBAN WARFARE AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS
- 2. • The Middle East is an urban environment. • More than 60% of the people of the Middle East live in towns and cities of 50,000 or more. Baghdad
- 3. HISTORY 1 • HISTORY OF MIDDLE EAST URBAN WARFARE. THE RECENT PAST – Jerusalem in 48 – Gaza in 56 – Jerusalem in 67 – Amman in 1970 (PLO vs JAA) – Suez City in 1973 – Beirut (75 to 91) – Khoramshahr in 1980
- 4. HISTORY II • Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut in 1972 • 1980 and 1982 Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hamah and Aleppo • Intifadah I in Palestine 1987 • US in Mogadishu in 1993 • Intifadah II in 2000 • Jenin 2002
- 5. URBAN WARFARE I • Arab Culture and urban Warfare – Urban warfare preferred method – Better at set piece defensive battles, minimize offensive warfare, combined arms, and mechanized warfare – Arabs have skill and have shown determination in past urban warfare. – Examples include Beirut, Gaza, Jerusalem, Amman and Jenin.
- 6. Urban warfare II • Urban warfare puts premium on deception, political and media warfare, less on C3 and mobility. • Often the defender is fighting for home and family as well as a cause. • He will know the urban terrain
- 7. Nature of Middle East Cities.I • Stone, cement composition of buildings • Walled in courtyards, with gardens • Narrow twisting streets and blind alleys • Haphazard growth, street addresses rare. • Inadequate municipal services or non- existent • Sewage, water supply, lacking. Water tanks on top of houses.
- 8. Nature of Middle Eastern Cities II • Ethnic religious quarters, patrilocal families • Lack of civil society,or civic responsibility • Neighborhoods run by za’ims. (Godfathers) • Massive overcrowding.Arab view of privacy • Dense squatter settlements on outskirts • Each city has own history. Great rivalries among cities and between rural and urban people.
- 9. Nature of Middle East Cities III • Demographically tend to have higher population of young unmarried males • People tend to settle in areas ethnically or religiously segregated. Ex. Chia district in Beirut • Increased sectarianism seems to have replaced extended family ties in the city. • Higher social classes tend to congregate in mixed religious, or ethnic neigborhoods • There is very little local city government. All centralized at national level
- 10. Nature of Middle East Cities IV • Using a buzzword….cities are the “center of Gravity.” • “The Arab city is not only a center of industry,commerce and finance but also administration and jurisdiction, of religion and culture.Activity in all these field is concentrated in the city, to the almost complete exclusion in the village. – Gabriel Baer, Population and Society in the Middle East
- 12. Humanitarian Considerations Urban Conflict • Anthony Cordesman depicted 3 basic types of middle east urban war
- 13. Urban Warfare Approach 1 • Urban light – Use missiles or air attack on key targets – Quick commando raids against key targets or leaders – Israelis have used this method many times – Limited success. Civilian casualties, excessive collateral damage. Absolute need for precise real time intelligence.
- 14. Gunship attack on Gaza city
- 15. Urban War;Approach 2 • Fight on equal terms. Use same type weapons as defenders, e.g., avoid use of heavy weapons such as armor and artillery. • This was the method used in Jenin and it cost the Israelis heavily. Not using main tank gun or artillery gives advantage to defender but minimizes civilian casualties.
- 16. Searching homes in Jenin
- 17. Urban Warfare ;Approach 3 obliterate • Using decisive force to destroy insurgents • If the command or ruler cares little for amount of damage or civilian casualties. • This has proved most successful in Middle East conflict. • Example Hamah and Aleppo in Syria
- 18. Urban Warfare Middle Eastern Style • Hamah in 1982 Hafez Assad
- 19. NON-COMBATANTS • WAYS IN WHICH NON-COMBATANTS AFFECT URBAN COMBAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
- 20. Impact of non-combatants on urban conflict I • Mobility of attacker is slowed by massive refugee exodus. Defender can use as shields or as a distraction and delay in order to re- supply and regroup. The Palestinians have used this ploy a number of times. • Example. Palestinian fighter boasted of this type ploy as being effective in Jenin fighting with Israelis.
- 21. They are among and part of the population
- 22. NON-COMBATANTS II • Civilians in the Middle East conflicts often try to stay in their homes despite the carnage around them. This surprising trend can be partially answered by the historical truism in the Middle East that if you leave your home you will not live there again. A lesson learned by Palestinians, Separdin Jews, Assyrians, Armenians, Kurds, and many others.
- 23. Home destroyed…. but we stay!
- 24. Non-Combatants III • Use of firepower by attacker is severely curtailed by presence of civilians (assuming humanitarian principles are applied). Israeli attacks on several Palestinian camps in 1982 were virtually dictated tactically by presence of civilians. Could only fire at buildings from which incoming fire was observed.
- 25. A problem if they leave; A problem if They do not.
- 26. Non-Combatants IV • The presence of civilians in the combat areas also leads to pilferage,sabotage, and terrorism. • Troops entering homes in the combat areas also leads to vandalism, stealing, and the presence of helpless intimidated civilians can easily lead to crimes such as rape. Discipline erodes. • This was the story of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Initially greeted as liberators from Palestinian oppression, ill-discipline among some IDF units created deep hostility.
- 27. Non-Combatants V • The psychological impact on soldiers also very debilitating; – The feeling of isolation in the closed-in structures as well as a feeling that the battlefield is all around you – The impact of seeing the suffering of innocent civilians Both factors have had an adverse effect on IDF soldiers in Lebanon and Palestinian battles,e.g,. Reservists walking away from battlefield, etc.
- 29. Non-Combatant VI • Maintaining law and order always a major issue in Middle East. The prevalence of revenge for past injustices or insults, tribal, sectarian and ideological hatreds spill over into orgies of killing • A major example was the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Lebanese refugee camps after Israelis had secured the area This was in retaliation for earlier killing and raping of Christians in Damour by Muslim and Palestinian militia.
- 30. Sabra and Shatilla An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Elie Hobeika
- 31. Non-Combatant VII • The Media is unlikely to be your friend in city combat. “If it bleeds it leads”. The journalists will see the aftermath….the destruction, the civilian suffering, stories of ill-treatment etc…not likely to observe civilians used as human shields, the fire coming from the buildings, the intensity of combat or understand the psychological handicap of seldom knowing where the fire is coming from or from whom. As David Hackworth famously observed about journalists in the Gulf war . “Most journalists do not know a tank from a turd”
- 32. Guilty until proven innocent! BBC HEADLINES • Jenin 'massacre evidence growing' 18 April 2002 • Eyewitness: Inside ruined Jenin much later…………. • 'No Jenin massacre' says rights group 3May • (IDF attack on Jenin following suicide bombing of bus.)
- 33. CONCLUSION I • To state the obvious. The role and effectiveness of the civil affairs and psychological operations will decide the middle and long term success or failure of the enterprise. They must work in tandem with one another and with the local leadership from the previous regime. To a large measure the success or failure of the post-tactical operations will be dependent on how CA and Psyops do their jobs
- 34. CONCLUSION II • The level of Psyops and Civil Affairs effectiveness will be directly proportional to the amount of study, particularly of religion, society, culture, and history, in preparation for the operation.