Project One Fall 2017Due date is October 25Scenario.docx

Project One Fall 2017
Due date is October 25
Scenario:
Create a business proposal for a small retail store (you can
make up this store).
The new retail store is going to choose among the business
proposals (other companies will be giving proposals also) as to
which database would be appropriate to use for their new
business.
The retail store is in the initial phase of operations and would
like to start with a small database that contains information
about their customers, their products, suppliers and sales. In
your proposal, you have included examples of the tables,
queries, forms and reports.
1. Before you write this proposal, List at least 5 questions you
would have asked in order to design the database.
2. Design the tables in your database and explain how they are
related. Assign primary and foreign keys where necessary.
Explain the purpose of each table.
· Design at least four tables for the business (ex: customer,
supplier)
· Add at least 6 rows of information (ex: 6 customers to the
customer table)
3. Design one query that the business owners may be interested
in.
4. Design one form that you think would be valuable for the
business owner to have.
5. Design one report that would be valuable for the business
owner to have.
6. In the Business Proposal you should include the follow:
· Problem Statement (In this case, state the purpose)
· Problem

Solution
(this is where you can describe your tables, how they are
related, how they are useful and the purpose of the tables,
query, report and form.
· Pricing (Be creative, remember this is a new company with not
much capital)
· Why should they choose you over a competitor?
You will submit both the database and the report in blackboard
it will be listed under assignments.
The Project is due at the start of class on the due date. Each day
late there will be a 5 point deduction per day.
PSY-100 Required Readings
Topic
Resource Readings
Topic 2:
Social Learning Theory: How Close Is Too Close
Read "Characteristics of an Emotionally Healthy Person" from

the Mobility Forum: The Journal of the Air Mobility
Command's Magazine (2002), located in the GCU eLibrary.
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/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=8634490&site=ehost-
live&scope=site
Read "Intelligence, Emotional" from Encyclopedia of Special
Education: A Reference for the Education of the Handicapped
and Other Exceptional Children and Adults (2006), located in
the GCU eLibrary.
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e.com/content/entry/wileyse/intelligence_emotional/0
Read: Harmon-Jones, E., & van Honk, J. (2012). Introduction
to a Special Issue on the Neuroscience of Motivation and
Emotion. Motivation And Emotion, 36(1), 1-3.
doi:10.1007/s11031-012-9281-x
/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2012-06287-
001&site=ehost-live&scope=site
Read Do You See What I See? Learning to Detect Micro
Expressions of Emotion. Motivation & Emotion, 36(3), 371-
381. doi:10.1007/s11031-011-9257-2
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lopes.idm.oclc.org/docview/1030207021?accountid=7374
Read: Bower, B. (2013). The Bright Side of Sadness: Bad
Moods Can Have Unappreciated Mental Upsides. Science News,

184(9), 18-21.
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live&scope=site
PSY-100 Optional Readings
Topic
Resource Readings
Topic 2:
Read "Has Someone Overstepped Your Boundaries?" by Katy,
from Lesbian News (2002), located in the GCU eLibrary.
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m/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=17913936&site=ehost-
live&scope=site
Read "With a Little Help" by Laursen, from Scientific American

Mind (2008), located in the GCU eLibrary.
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live&scope=site
© 2013. Grand Canyon University. All Rights Reserved.
Lecture 2
Introduction
Social psychology is the bridge between the fields of
psychology and sociology; it is the study of how an individual's
thoughts, feelings, and actions are affected by others in a social
setting (Feldman, 2010). This branch of psychology focuses on
different behaviors and what causes different behaviors in
social situations. In addition, it examines how situations
influence our behavior.
Social Influence
There are three factors associated with social influence
including conformity, compliance, and obedience. Conformity
refers to subtle or indirectly influenced, which is caused by a

desire to follow the beliefs of another person or group of
people. Compliance occurs when an individual or group makes a
request for assistance. It is direct and obvious. Obedience is the
change in behavior in response to the command of another
individual.
Social Problems
A central concept in the field of social psychology is
persuasion, which refers to changing an individual's attitudes.
Attitudes influence our behavior. Our attitudes are strongly
influenced by people in our lives such as our parents, peers,
coworkers, and the media. Prejudice is a specific type of
attitude defined as the negative evaluation of a group and its
members (Feldman, 2010). Prejudice is made up of stereotypes
or generalized beliefs about a particular group or the members
of the group (Feldman). Discrimination, or the behavioral
component of prejudice, refers to the behavior directed toward a
particular group or the members of the group (Feldman).
Social Behaviors
There are social behaviors that impact our relationships at
school, work, and home through "cause and effect." One of
these is aggression, which is a social behavior used to describe
the intent to physically or mentally harm another individual.
This relates to conformity. When individuals refuse to comply
with authority, the strength of the authority is diminished
(Feldman, 2010). Hitler provides an example in history of

strength in authority as it relates to compliance and conformity.
Another popular example today is violence in video games and
television shows that children play and watch.
Hundreds of studies have been done, which link violence in
video games and television violence to children's violent
behavior (American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, 2002). According to the American Academy of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, exposure to violence on
television leads to the child becoming immune to the horror,
allows the child to accept violence as a problem solving
technique, leads to modeling behaviors they view, and causes
them to identify with the violent characters as well as victims of
the violence.
Another cause and effect relationship is altruism, which refers
to the willingness to help another person in need without the
expectation of anything in return. In recent years, communities
are encouraging a "pay it forward" mentality. In this concept,
individuals are looking at ways to help each other through
difficult times and offer time, emotional support, and/or funds
to increase hope and commitment to their environment.
Examples of this are seen when natural disasters occur and
individuals put themselves in harm's way to save innocent
victims. For an example of the impact of this phenomenon, visit
the Pay It Forward Web site at http://payitforwardday.com/.
Intimate, Personal, and Social Space

Culture, gender, age, personality, and situations will influence
personal space. In psychology, personal space is referred to as
the zone around the human body that people feel is "their" space
(Personal Space, 2004). The study of personal space is called
proxemics. From the names of each zone, it is apparent that the
distance between people gets wider from the intimate to public
zone (Communication Exchange, 2009).
In Communication Exchange (2009), Hall identified four
personal space zones:
1. Intimate (0-2 feet): This zone is generally used by those
with whom people are really intimate, usually their loved ones;
however, this zone can also be violated by invading a person's
physical space (as when an adversary sticks a fist in the
person's face).
2. Personal (2-4 feet): This zone is used in conversations
with friends and peers.
3. Social (4-12 feet): This zone is used in business meetings
and when talking to an employer.
4. Public (12 feet and up): This zone is used in formal
speaking presentations (Communication Exchange, 2009).
Emotional Intelligence
Emotional intelligence (EI) addresses the personal, emotional,
social, and survival dimensions of intelligence. It differs from
social intelligence, which refers to our ability to understand and
manage relationships (Kotz, 2011). Emotional intelligence

includes the components of social intelligence and adds self-
awareness and self regulation of emotions as components to the
model (Kotz). EQ has been connected to academic and
professional success. By reflecting on how a person applies
knowledge to an immediate situation, EQ helps to predict
success (Smith, 2009).
References
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. (2002).
Children and TV violence. American Academy of Child and
Adolescent psychiatry, 13, 1-2. Retrieved September 16, 2011,
from
http://www.aacap.org/galleries/FactsForFamilies/13_children_a
nd_tv_violence.pdf
Communication Exchange. (2009, July 25). Proxemics: What is
your distance? Retrieved September 16, 2011, from
http://communicationexchange.blogspot.com/2009/07/proxemics
-what-is-your-distance.html
Feldman, R. S. (2010). Psychology and your life. Boston:
McGraw-Hill.
Kotz, D. (2011, August 11). Straight-A students, take note. U.S.
News and World Report, 2, 32-33.
Personal Space. (2004). In Encyclopedia of Applied
Psychology. Retrieved September 16, 2011, from
http://library.gcu.edu:2048/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2F2.zoppoz.workers.dev%3A443%2Fhttp%2Fwww.c
redoreference.com/entry/estappliedpsyc/personal_space

Smith, J. (2009). Emotional intelligence and professional
education: The use of narrative journaling. International Journal
of Learning, 16(7), 81-92. Retrieved September 16, 2011, from
EBSCOhost.
EBSCO Publishing Citation Format: APA (American
Psychological Assoc.):
NOTE: Review the instructions at
http://support.ebsco.com.lopes.idm.oclc.org/help/?
int=ehost&lang=&feature_id=APA and make any necessary
corrections before using. Pay special attention to
personal names, capitalization, and dates. Always consult your
library resources for the exact formatting
and punctuation guidelines.
References
Bower, B. (2013). The bright side of sadness: Bad moods can
have unappreciated mental upsides. Science
News, 184(9), 18. doi:10.1002/scin.5591840918
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The bright side of sadness: Bad moods can have unappreciated
mental upsides
Thomas Jefferson defended the right to pursue happiness in the
Declaration of Independence. But that's
so 237 years ago. Many modern societies champion everyone's
right to be happy pretty much all the
time. Good luck with that, says psychologist Joseph Forgas of
the University of New South Wales in
Sydney. A lack of close friends, unfulfilled financial dreams
and other harsh realities leave many people
feeling lonely and forlorn a lot of the time. But there's a mental
and social upside to occasional downers
that often goes unappreciated.
"Bad moods are seen in our happiness-focused culture as
representing a problem, but we need to be
aware that temporary, mild negative feelings have important
benefits," Forgas says.

Growing evidence suggests that gloomy moods improve key
types of thinking and behavior, Forgas
asserts in a new review paper aptly titled "Don't worry, be sad!"
For good evolutionary reasons, positive
and negative moods subtly recruit thinking styles suited to
either benign or troubling situations, he says.
Each way of dealing with current circumstances generally works
well, if imperfectly.
New and recent studies described by Forgas in the June Current
Directions in Psychological Science
illustrate some of the ways in which periods of sadness
spontaneously recruit a detail-oriented,
analytical thinking style. Morose moods have evolved as early-
warning signs of problematic or
dangerous situations that demand close attention, these reports
suggest.
One investigation found that people in sad moods have an
advantage remembering the details of
unusual incidents that they have witnessed. And a little
gloominess could help job applicants; lousy
moods cut down on the tendency to stereotype others, thus
boosting the accuracy of first impressions.
People in sad moods also show a greater willingness to work on

demanding tasks, communicate more
persuasively and are more concerned with being fair to others
than are peers in neutral or happy
moods.
Alternatively, good moods trigger a loose mode of thought
conducive to creativity and seeing the big
picture. Happiness signals that a situation is safe, or at least not
immediately threatening, Forgas
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suggests. As a result, people in a cheery state have the luxury of
focusing on themselves rather than on
their environments.
Whether good or bad, moods are relatively low-intensity,
background feelings that can last for anywhere
from a few minutes to the whole day. A person may feel
somewhat good or bad, happy or sad, without

knowing why or even being aware of such moods. Sad moods
fall far short of clinical depression's
constant feelings of helplessness and hopelessness. But moods
linger much longer than emotions,
which typically flare up and burn out fairly quickly. In contrast
to a mood, joy, anger and disgust feel
intense and are experienced as having definite causes.
Feelings as Information
Like Forgas, psychologist Norbert Schwarz of the University of
Michigan in Ann Arbor sees mental value
in sadness. "It's shallow and untrue to assume that positive
feelings can only have positive
consequences and negative feelings can only have negative
consequences," he says.
When Schwarz was a graduate student in the late 1970s, an
influential line of research held that happy
moods make people more likely to remember positive events
and sad moods more often revive
memories of negative events. That account of how feelings
influence thought seemed incomplete to the
aspiring psychologist. On "good" days, he reasoned, everything
just felt right without any past triumphs
coming to mind. On "bad" days, life felt lousy in the moment,

without any tragic memories returning for
an encore.
Schwarz launched a series of studies indicating that people use
low-intensity moods as a source of
information when forming judgments. Good and bad moods are
usually experienced as being about
whatever problem or situation a person currently faces, he and
his colleagues found. Treating moods in
this way often works out, as when a supervisor recommends
someone for a raise based on feeling good
about that person's recent job performance. Feelings can
mislead if, say, a boss feels happy because
it's a sunny Friday and thus approves a raise for someone who
pleads for a salary hike but doesn't
deserve it.
By 1990, Schwarz and his colleagues had conducted a few
studies suggesting that positive and
negative moods spontaneously shape how people think. Sad
moods fostered attention to details, they
discovered, whereas happy moods promoted playfulness and
creativity. More work was needed,
though, to confirm those results and explore their implications
for making decisions in various situations.

Individuals aren't slaves to their moods, Schwarz cautions. A
sad person can think outside the box if
necessary, say, to solve problems at work. And a happy person
can accurately fill out tax forms or
complete other detail-heavy tasks.
Evidence from many labs supports Schwarz's view that moods
inform people's judgments, often
advantageously and outside of awareness, psychologist Rainer
Greifeneder of the University of Basel in
Switzerland and his colleagues reported in the May 2011
Personality and Social Psychology Review.
Moods provide surprisingly keen insights into one's
environment, the team concluded. Provocative
support for that idea appeared in the October 2012 Journal of
Consumer Research. A team led by
business professor Michel Tuan Pham of Columbia University
in New York City found that volunteers
who trusted their feelings did better at predicting events such as
how the stock market would perform in
the next week and how upcoming movies would fare at the box
office than volunteers who mistrusted
their feelings.

By embracing their moods, superior forecasters gained
unconscious access to a vast amount of learned
information that informed their predictions, Pham speculated.
"In natural situations, feelings provide mostly valid information
about whether there is a problem or not
and how to respond to current tasks," Schwarz says.
Power of sad
Many emotion theorists now agree that negative moods direct
attention to tasks at hand and promote
analytical thinking, whereas positive moods broaden attention
and prompt original thinking. Researchers
in a field dubbed "positive psychology" have put a lot of recent
focus on exploring how happiness profits
mind and body.
Forgas sees no need for a special field of research to study
"negative psychology." He would settle for
"more awareness that negative feelings are so common and
widespread that they must have adaptive
functions." Reports of specific ways in which sadness benefits

thinking are beginning to accumulate.
Consider memory. In the January 2009 Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, Forgas and his
colleagues found that shoppers in a suburban store remembered
more details about what they saw in
the store when they reported being in bad moods on rainy, cold
days than when they felt happy on
sunny, warm days.
Sad moods also improve eyewitness memory, apparently by
lowering the tendency to incorporate false
and misleading details into accounts of what was observed. In a
2005 study in the Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, college students witnessed a
staged altercation between a lecturer
and a woman who angrily interrupted the talk.
One week later, while in happy or sad moods induced by
watching emotional film clips, participants read
questions about the incident that included misleading
information. Those in sad moods remembered
what had happened much more accurately than their happy
peers, Forgas and his colleagues reported.
Fewer pieces of false information twisted the memories of sad

students.
Sad moods can also make first impressions of others more
reliable, Forgas says. People often judge
those that they meet for the first time by assuming that obvious
but often irrelevant traits, such as
physical attractiveness, reflect intelligence, agreeableness and
other as yet unknown traits.
Psychologists refer to this much-studied phenomenon as the
halo effect.
Negative moods topple the halo effect off its cockeyed perch,
Forgas reported in the December 2011
European Journal of Social Psychology. After reminiscing about
happy, sad or neutral personal
experiences, volunteers read a one-page philosophical essay.
Forgas attached a photograph of the
writer to each copy of the essay, showing either a casually
dressed young woman or a middle-aged man
wearing a suit and glasses.
Happy participants rated the essay far more positively when
they thought it was written by the
academic-looking man. This halo effect largely disappeared
among sad participants. Those in a neutral

mood preferred the man's essay, but not to the extent that happy
volunteers did.
Sad folks took longer to read and rate the essays than happy and
neutral participants did. That's
probably because feeling sad fostered a more careful appraisal
of essays and photos, Forgas suggests.
As a result, he proposes, sad volunteers largely rejected the
stereotype of philosophers as tweedy,
professorial men, helping to minimize the halo effect.
Cheerless cooperators
Sadness also confers some surprising social benefits. "While a
positive mood may increase self-focus
and selfishness, a negative mood can increase concern for
others and the quality of communication,"
Forgas says.
When asked to divide raffle tickets or other prizes with a
partner shown in a photo on a computer
screen, sad volunteers handed out nearly even portions while
happy volunteers kept the bulk for
themselves, Forgas and a colleague reported in the January

Computers in Human Behavior.
In another computer game, participants were informed that a
partner seen only in a photo could accept
or reject offers of how to divvy up prizes. No partner actually
existed, but players were told that a vetoed
offer would leave them empty-handed.
Again, sad volunteers shared valuables more evenly than their
happy cohorts did. Sad players took
longer to reach their decisions, consistent with having thought
more carefully about how to make fair
offers.
A gloomy mood also increased participants' concern with
fairness when the tables were turned and they
had to evaluate offers from a player who didn't really exist.
Relative to the happy crowd, a substantially
greater proportion of sad volunteers rejected unfair divisions of
prizes, such as being offered two out of
10 lottery tickets.
In these experiments, moods were induced either by having
participants watch happy or sad film clips or
by falsely telling volunteers that they had scored extremely well

or poorly on a test of spatial abilities.
Another study by Forgas and his colleagues, published in the
August European Journal of Social
Psychology, indicates that sad moods also prompt people to
share information with others particularly
effectively.
In one set of trials, volunteers watched clips of ambiguous,
unemotional movie scenes. While in happy,
sad or neutral moods, the volunteers then either verbally
described the episode while pretending to talk
with a friend or wrote a brief description of the scene for a
friend.
In both conditions, raters determined that sad volunteers
communicated more information relevant to
the movie scenes and less unrelated information than the other
two groups did, especially the happy
folks. Those in a sad mood were especially good at keeping
accounts brief, clear and to the point.
Moods were induced after participants watched movie clips but
before they described the scenes,
ensuring that the clips didn't sway their manipulated moods.

Sad feelings may influence communication differently in
situations where conversation partners don't
expect to share all relevant information, such as diplomatic
negotiations or sales encounters. Still,
Forgas contends, "everyday moods have a subtle but reliable
influence on communication strategies."
That's something that mental health workers and medical
personnel should keep in mind, he advises.
Being somewhat sad may enable better communication with sick
or troubled individuals. A jovial mood
could promote creative insights into a patient's condition or
needs.
Gloomy payoffs
Fittingly, happiness researchers such as psychologist Sonja
Lyubomirsky of the University of California,
Riverside take a positive but measured position on evidence that
sadness has an upside. "Transient
negative moods are absolutely beneficial when orientation to
detail is warranted," Lyubomirsky says.
Problems occur when sad moods become so frequent that they

blend into an extended downer, she
holds. "Happy people experience a lot more positive than
negative moods, and their negative moods are
not chronic."
Chronic happiness creates its own discontents. Yale University
psychologist June Gruber has reported
that the sustained, one-note joy of people experiencing the
manic phase of bipolar disorder leads to all
sorts of personal and social misjudgments (SN Online: 2/2/11).
Even brief sad moods such as those studied by Forgas
sometimes provoke bad decisions, says
Harvard University psychologist Jennifer Lerner. Mild sadness
tends to make people more impatient and
thus more apt to focus myopically on taking money now rather
than waiting for a bigger financial payoff
in the not-too-distant future, Lerner and her colleagues reported
in the January Psychological Science.
In one experiment that involved real payoffs, sad participants
typically required $37 immediately to forgo
receiving a mailed check for $85 in three months, whereas
neutral-mood volunteers usually held out for
$56 in hand. Participants who reported feeling mildly disgusted

by the topics of film clips and writing
assignments needed about as much money as neutral individuals
to pass up a delayed, $85 windfall. So
unlike sadness, being briefly disgusted didn't make people more
likely to snap up immediate, low-ball
payoffs.
Sadder isn't wiser when it comes to making prudent financial
decisions, Lerner concludes. A sad person
may urgently need a shot of self-esteem, stoking a preference
for instant over delayed gratification. If
that's the case, then people may make particularly rash and ill-
informed financial decisions after job
losses, loved ones' deaths and other distressing events.
From Forgas' perspective, a take-the-money-and-run approach
seems reasonable if sadness accurately
alerts a person to a dangerous or unstable environment.
But moods may not engage specific mental strategies as
proposed by Forgas, says psychologist Jeffrey
Huntsinger of Loyola University Chicago. Several recent
investigations, described by Huntsinger in the
August Current Directions in Psychological Science, suggest
that positive moods prompt individuals to

double down on any current thinking style, while negative
moods trigger a shift to an alternative thinking
style.
Among neutral-mood volunteers focusing broadly on an
experimental task, those induced to be happy
thought even more expansively about the task, whereas those
prodded into sadness switched to
concentrating on details. When already in a detail-oriented
frame of mind, volunteers who became
happy maintained that perspective, while those who became sad
moved to a broad focus.
If these findings hold up, happy and sad moods simply signal
whether or not to change one's current
thinking style, Huntsinger says, rather than indicating whether
to adopt an analytical or playful thinking
style. Researchers have yet to test which of these two
possibilities best explains mood-related
behaviors.
Forgas acknowledges that much remains unknown about
precisely how moods influence thought. If
moods work as Huntsinger suggests and not as orchestrators of
specific thinking styles, Forgas says, it

won't get him down.
Not that there would be anything wrong with that.
Explore more
Joseph Forgas. "Don't worry, be sad! On the cognitive,
motivational and interpersonal benefits of
negative mood." Current Directions in Psychological Science.
June 2013.
A good mood or a bad mood can spontaneously shape how
people think.
Positively moody Different moods may trigger distinct thinking
styles that allow people to respond
appropriately to whatever situation they find themselves in,
scientists speculate. There are likely
benefits, and costs, to each thinking style.
Good mood benefits
1. Creativity

2. Multitasking advantage
3. Ability to delay gratification
Bad mood benefits
1. Detail-orientation
2. Accurate recall
3. Fairness to others
GRAPH: Mind on mood Bad moods may make for better juries
and eyewitnesses. Volunteers watching
interviews with accused thieves were more likely to label liars
as guilty, but those in a sad mood were
best at detecting deception (left). Being happy upped the chance
of being misled by researchers into
inserting false details into descriptions of a car crash or
wedding scene (right). SOURCES: J.P.
FORGAS AND R. EAST/J. EXP. SOCIAL PSYCH. 2008; J.P.
FORGAS/J. EXP. SOCIAL PSYCH. 2005
GRAPH: Fair share A gloomy attitude may make a person more
discriminating in deciding what counts
as a square deal. Volunteers in a bad mood (purple) were more

likely to reject an unfair split of a
reward, such as $2 out of $10, than their cheerier peers
(yellow).
PHOTO (COLOR)
PHOTO (COLOR)
PHOTO (COLOR)
PHOTO (COLOR)
~~~~~~~~
By Bruce Bower
Copyright of Science News is the property of Society for
Science & the Public and its content may not
be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv
without the copyright holder's express
written permission. However, users may print, download, or
email articles for individual use.

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dates. Always consult your library resources for the exact
formatting and punctuation guidelines.
References
Katz, D. (2005). Has Someone Overstepped Your Boundaries?.
Lesbian News, 31(1), 47.
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Section:
lifestyles
Self-Help

Has Someone Overstepped Your Boundaries?
I'm certain that we all have met someone who wouldn't take no
for an answer and continued to push
their way until we almost had to scream the word, "NO." Some
people come into our lives who just don't
want to listen to our needs and desires and go ahead and do only
what they want to do.
Why don't people respect our boundaries? It's impossible to
give a pat reason that fits all situations.
Some people react and respond in a way that is to them, most
comfortable and familiar. Sometimes
these poor fools don't know any better. They have there own
issues that obviously have not been
resolved. They may have difficulty controlling their own actions
due to huge insecurities within
themselves. However, the bottom line as to why they overstep
our boundaries is simply because we
allow them to.
Boundaries are established by us in our lives to make us feel
more comfortable and secure, such as
boundaries in our love life. The following two lists were
developed from those mentioned in Sex and
Love Addicts Anonymous, The Augustine Fellowship, Sex and

Love Addicts Anonymous. The first list
illustrates examples of situations where boundaries have never
been introduced. The second list are the
same situations but now they illustrate how boundaries can be
set up and established.
WITHOUT BOUNDARIES:
Falling in love with the first available person who comes along.
Discussing your whole life in intimate detail on the very first
date.
Having sex on the first date.
Catering to the needs of others to pacify them and eliminate the
fear of losing them.
Lying to your mate so he will not abandon you.
Agreeing with others in order to win their approval.
Making excuses for your mate's dysfunctions.
Confiding in friends, relatives or coworkers for solutions to
personal issues rather than confronting your
partner.
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ESTABLISHING BOUNDARIES:
Getting to know someone you admire and not letting hormonal
activity call the shots.
Not disclosing the intimate details of your life until a bond has
been established with a person you are
dating and using discretion even then. Over time, some personal
information can gradually be shared as
appropriate, when the relationship is more secure and the timing
is right.
Taking time to really establish your relationship prior to
engaging in sexual activity.
Letting others know what is and what is not acceptable to you.
Being honest with your partner even if it means a possible
break-up.
Not being a people pleaser. Saying "no" when you mean "no."
Making sure that your voice and body
language do not infer yes or maybe, when you really mean no.
Allowing your mate to live up to the consequences of actions
taken without excusing the actions out of
denial or guilt.

Confronting your partner or mate to solve problems rather than
always discussing your difficulties with
others.
We need to ask ourselves the question, "What is it about us that
allows these people to treat us in
inappropriate ways?" Like the 12-step Anonymous Groups say,
"When we are sick and tired of being
sick and tired, we'll do something about it." Well, right now is
the time to step up to the plate and refuse
to let others take advantage, abuse us or overstep our
boundaries. Let's decide now, to never allow
anything but the behavior we rightfully deserve to occur.
Some of us actually allow our boundaries to be abused because
we don't know how to be firm and say
"no!" Learning to say the simple word "no" can be difficult if
we were not allowed to say it as a child.
Even as adults, we may find ourselves still feeling fearful of the
repercussion of saying "no." We can't
allow our own insecurities to give a go signal for others to walk
all over us. We need to really examine
our desires and goals so we can speak our minds and be treated
as we want to be treated.
Let's begin with our first step. This first step involves figuring

out exactly what our needs are. We need
to examine what we can handle and what we can't. If we don't
know our needs, then how do we expect
others to respect our wishes? Take a look at the things that
make us feel uneasy with some people.
What is it that is making us feel this way? Are they wanting
things from us that we don't want to give?
Why do we allow them to make all the decisions? Perhaps it's
very stressful to have to argue to get our
needs met. Sometimes it feels like just giving in to what they
want will be much easier than getting our
needs met. That way, we don't have to deal with the tension,
anger or bickering. Stop! We must realize
WE are important, too and our feelings count! Therefore, the
first step is to realize that our needs
deserve to be heard and the second, finding the strength to say
so.
We've now decided we are deserving. What next? To realize it's
not when we say no but how. For
example, if someone is yelling at us in a vicious tone and we
say gently, "please don't talk to me like
that" the yelling probably won't cease. When we say things in a
soft or light manner, the response we

are looking for is also going to be soft or nonexistent. However,
if we start saying what we need in a firm
(but loving) manner, we are more apt to have ourselves heard.
We also need to use the "broken record" tactic. In other words,
if the other party doesn't get or
understand what we are saying, we need to say it again and
again until he or she does get it. Constant
repetition will help to reinforce what we want. If others don't
understand what we need, we can try
saying things in other ways but again, always remembering to
be firm but loving.
Another area that can be difficult for some is "saying what we
mean and meaning what we say" Some of
us display a more passive-aggressive communication style
because again, we fear what will happen if
we say what we really mean. So, we can say one thing just to
keep everything calm and collected but
may not feel that way inside. In fact, we might even be seething
with anger internally, but don't feel like
we dare express it. A healthy way to communicate would be to
voice our anger, express our boundary

and stand for nothing less than that.
If we are too fearful to say what we mean to a particular person,
we can practice saying things to a
trusted confidant. We can role play in order to build our own
confidence. If we don't have anyone to
practice with we can use the Mirror Technique. Here, one looks
in the mirror and pretends she is talking
to the other party. It's surprising how well this works. The
bottom line is building your confidence.
These are just a few tips on learning how to ask for what we
need and want. No one is allowed to step
all over us and ignore what we feel is wrong. Always remember,
it's not really their fault if they try. It is
up to us to say, "Hey, that's not what I want. This isn't OK with
me." If we don't do this, we'll just be back
to square one--used and abused.
~~~~~~~~
By Dian Katz, MS
Dian has a master's in counseling with emphasis in marriage,
family and child counseling. The above
excerpts were taken from her book LOVE HURTS: A Spiritual

Journey to Wholeness. You can visit Dian
at: www.diankatz.com.
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Publishing, Inc. and its content may not be
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E D I T O R I A L
Introduction to a special issue on the neuroscience of
motivation
and emotion
Eddie Harmon-Jones • Jack van Honk
Published online: 28 February 2012
� Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Neuroscience methods have gained widespread use in
many areas of psychological and behavioral sciences. Their
use has likewise increased in research and theory on
motivation and emotion. As a consequence of this explo-
sion of interest, we organized this special issue. In orga-
nizing this issue, we thought it important to have
contributions from a range of neuroscience methods,
because addressing issues concerning motivation and
emotion requires multiple methods, each with their own
benefits and limitations, particularly when used in studying
emotive processes in humans. In addition, we invited sci-
entists to contribute who are making programmatic neu-

roscientific contributions to the study of motivation and
emotion, and were pleased that all invited agreed to
contribute.
The study of physiological and biological processes in
motivation and emotion dates back several decades in non-
human animal research and human research. Indeed, sci-
entists studying motivation and emotion were some of the
first to employ physiological measurements in their work.
Consider Walter Cannon’s (1915) classic experiments on
the fight or flight response, and Albert Ax’s (1953) classic
experiment elucidating physiological differences between
anger and fear. However, different names of the
field(s) employing these methods and models have been

used over time. The field has been referred to as biological
psychology, psychobiology, physiological psychology,
neuropsychology, psychophysiology, as well as other
names. Although some of these terms are still used to
describe specific types of conceptual and/or methodologi-
cal approaches, in our view, these fields are all associated
with neuroscience, the term most commonly used today in
describing research into physiological and biological pro-
cesses involving brain/mind.
The explosion of interest in neuroscience within the
study of motivation, emotion, and other psychological
processes is likely due to several factors. One prominent

factor contributed to the explosion of interest is the advent
of new and more readily available methods. For example,
the signal of most interest in functional magnetic resonance
imaging, the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD)
signal, was first successfully measured in the human brain
in the early 1990s (Kwong et al. 1992), and it has since
gained widespread research usage. Also, within the last
decade, several companies produced easy-to-use acquisi-
tion and signal processing systems for use with physio-
logical responses such as electroencephalography (EEG),
event-related brain potentials (ERPs), and electromyogra-
phy. At the same time, the growing interest in the neuro-
science of human motivation and emotion coincided with

the advent of salivary measurement and methods for acute
single administrations of the hormones oxytocin and tes-
tosterone, and in research these hormones subsequently
proved to be critical motivators for numerous human social
and affective behaviors (Bos et al. in press).
Emotive neuroscience integrates diverse literatures,
theories, and methodologies to address questions about
brain, mind, and behavior and thus creates a science
E. Harmon-Jones (&)
University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: [email protected]
J. van Honk
Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

J. van Honk
Cape Town University, Cape Town, South Africa
123
Motiv Emot (2012) 36:1–3
DOI 10.1007/s11031-012-9281-x
presumably closer to yielding answers to important ques-
tions. This interdisciplinary research approach can poten-
tially provide a bridge to other knowledge that may
ultimately help to explain or better understand a condition
or behavior. For example, activity in a brain region may be
associated with other behaviors, neurotransmitters, or
hormones that may in turn might shed light on the original

behavior or condition of interest (Carver and Harmon-
Jones 2009). Also, neuroscience methods can be used in
tests of theoretical interpretations of behavioral effects, as
several papers in this special issue illustrate.
In addition, neuroscience methods provide sources of
information that subvert some of the problems with self-
report and other behavioral measures. For example, mea-
sures of brain activity, such as EEG, ERP, and fMRI, allow
researchers to record rapid, online changes in motivational
and affective responses that would otherwise be impossible
to assess without interrupting a participant’s engagement in
an experimental manipulation or impossible to assess

because these processes are not available in consciousness.
As noted above, the contributors, who are making
important programmatic neuroscientific contributions to
the study of motivation and emotion, employ a range of
neuroscience methods and address a range of questions
related to motivation and emotion. We briefly review their
contributions below.
Jaak Panksepp, a pioneer in the field who coined the
term affective neuroscience, leads off with an essay
pointing to the necessity of studying primary emotional
feelings in non-humans. He differentiates these processes
from secondary-processes concerning learning and mem-
ory and tertiary processes concerning cognitive thinking

and rumination. In the end, he posits that this conceptual
view integrates basic and dimensional approaches to
emotions.
Alexander Todorov reviews findings from primate and
human neuroscience on face processing and the amygdala.
He considers faces as imperative stimuli, and suggests that
cognition, affect and motivation intersect in face percep-
tion. One of the key functions of the amygdala would be to
direct attention to faces that are atypical or ambiguous.
Todorov’s in-depth framework is also consistent with
amygdala findings that do not involve faces, and is there-
fore a universal account for the role of the amygdala in

perception.
Tom Price and Eddie Harmon-Jones review research
suggesting that manipulated facial expressions, hand con-
tractions, and changes in physical posture influence
approach motivation or the inclination to move toward a
stimulus as assessed by physiological measures (i.e.,
asymmetric EEG alpha power over the frontal cortex, the
late positive potential of the ERP, and the startle eyeblink
response). They conclude that bi-directionality may exist
between certain bodily movements and other components
of approach- or avoidance-related emotions.
Jennifer Beer reviews recent research on motivated
social cognition. Her review reveals what can be learned by

examining motivational influences on the neural systems
underlying social cognition. In particular, her review sug-
gests that unrealistically positive evaluations of oneself and
one’s close other causes reduced orbitofrontal cortex acti-
vation compared to evaluations of others. Thus, these
results contribute to the debate over whether unrealistic
positivity reflects active distortion or cognitive conserva-
tion and they are more consistent with the cognitive miser
perspective.
Dennis Schutter and Gennady Knyazev expertly review
electrophysiological studies on the relations between
motivation, emotion and cross-frequency coupling of brain

oscillations. They suggest, on basis of this evidence, that
the study of interdependencies of brain oscillations may be
a valuable approach for studying processes associated with
motivation and emotion. For instance, amplitude–ampli-
tude coupling between delta-alpha and delta-beta is asso-
ciated with state anxiety and approach-avoidance-related
motivation. Also, the coupling of delta-beta oscillations
changes following successful psychotherapy.
John Jost and David Amodio provide a timely review
integrating previous behavioural research on motives
underlying political orientation with emotive neuroscience
research concerned with reactions to uncertainty, ambigu-
ity, threat, and disgust. Their review suggests that right-

(vs. left-) wing political orientation is associated with
greater neural sensitivity to threat and a larger amygdala
region, as well as less sensitivity to response conflict and a
smaller anterior cingulate region.
Estrella Montoya, David Terburg, Peter Bos, and Jack
van Honk put forward a framework for the interactive role
of steroid hormones cortisol and testosterone and the
monoamine serotonin in impulsive aggression. First
focusing on steroid hormones, they review evidence that
suggests that high testosterone-to-cortisol ratio sets a pre-
disposition for social aggressive behaviour in general.
Next, they review evidence that suggests that serotonin

may differentiate between impulsive and instrumental
aggression, in that low prefrontal serotonin synthesis in
combination with a high testosterone-low cortisol ratio
produces a socially explosive mind.
Alicia Salvador in her insightful review discusses the
interactive role of the hypothalamic–pituitary–gonadal
(HPG) axis and the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA)
axis in a broad spectrum of social behaviors. The interac-
tions between these axes and their end products, the hor-
mones testosterone and cortisol, are highly adaptive in
social situations that involve competition and challenge
and have components of social stress.
2 Motiv Emot (2012) 36:1–3

123
Anna Weinberg, Anja Riesel, and Greg Hajcak review
over two decades of research and theories about the error-
related negativity (ERN), a negative-going wave in the
event-related brain potential that occurs following the
commission of an error. After presenting and critically
evaluating cognitive theories of the ERN, they review
research that suggests that the ERN is neural index of a
neurobehavioral trait and variation in its amplitude is
partially related to individual differences in defensive
reactivity.

Collectively, these papers illustrate the multifarious
ways in which the inclusion of neuroscience can benefit the
study of motivation and emotion. They demonstrate how
neuroscience approaches can lead to better understandings
of phenomena; generate new predictions and new theories,
even at the behavioural level; inform established psycho-
logical theories; and be used in tests of competing theories.
References
Ax, A. F. (1953). The physiological differentiation between fear
and
anger in humans. Psychosomatic Medicine, 15, 433–442.
Bos, P. A., Panksepp, J., Bluthé, R.-M., & van Honk, J. (in
press).
Acute effects of steroid hormones and neuropeptides on human

social—emotional behavior: A review of single administration
studies. Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology.
Cannon, W. B. (1915). Bodily changes in pain, hunger, fear and
rage:
An account of recent researches into the function of emotional
excitement. New York, NY: D. Appleton & Company.
Carver, C. S., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2009). Anger is an
approach-
related affect: Evidence and implications. Psychological Bulle-
tin, 135, 183–204.
Kwong, K. K., Belliveau, J. W., Chesler, D. A., Goldberg, I. E.,
Weisskoff, R. M., Poncelet, B. P., et al. (1992). Dynamic
magnetic resonance imaging of human brain activity during
primary sensory stimulation. Proceedings of National Academy
of Science USA, 89, 5675–5679.
Motiv Emot (2012) 36:1–3 3

123
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Intelligence, Emotional
from Encyclopedia of Special Education: A Reference for the
Education of Children,
Adolescents, and Adults with Disabilities and Other Exceptional
Individuals
View article on Credo

Although all humans experience emotions, individuals markedly
differ in the extent to which they
experience, attend to, identify, understand, regulate, and use
their emotions and those of others. The
term emotional intelligence (EI) first appeared in a book by
(Van Ghent), soon followed by an article by
(Leuner). Because the former was unrelated to psychology and
the latter was published in German, the
concept remained largely unnoticed. The first English
occurrence in Psychology was in a doctoral
dissertation by (Payne). (Peter Salovey and John Mayer) opened
a modern line of research, started a
hot topic in psychology, and coined a catchphrase that has made
its way into the common vernacular.
The subsequent fame and widespread use of the term emotional
intelligence is due mostly to the
popular best seller of the same name by (Daniel Goleman). This

enormous popularity, however, has
come at the unfortunate cost of obscuring Salovey and Mayer’s
original conception of emotional
intelligence and overshadowing subsequent empirical research.
This resulted in the formation of three
distinct concepts of EI, each containing its own definition and
approach. (Caruso, Mayer, and Salovey)
dubbed two of these approaches the mixed model and the ability
model. The mixed model, the more
popular of the two, merges EI with characteristics of personality
and certain skills. The ability model
characterizes emotional intelligence as a class of intelligence
where emotions and thinking are
integrated (Caruso et al.,). Other authors held that EI was
conceptually (inversely) related to the
personality dimensions of neuroticism and alexithymia (among
others) and should therefore be

conceived as a set of affect-related traits (Petrides & Furnham,).
The idea that emotion is a significant part of our intellectual
being has roots in Darwin and Freud and,
more recently, in the work of (Howard Gardner). In Gardner’s
theory of multiple intelligences, two of his
proposed seven intelligences involve emotions: interpersonal
intelligence (understanding other people)
and intrapersonal intelligence (understanding one’s self). Robert
Sternberg’s theory of successful
intelligence (also known as practical intelligence) is another
major theory of intellect that takes into
consideration the importance of emotional well-being (see
Sternberg & Kaufman,). The common
historical view, however, is that emotions are secondary—
indeed, inferior to intellect (Mayer, Salovey, &
Caruso,).

In 1990, Salovey and Mayer proposed a model of emotional
intelligence that had three factors:
appraisal and expression of emotion, regulation of emotion, and
utilization of emotion. Appraisal and
expression of emotion is comprised of emotion in the self
(which can be both verbal and nonverbal),
and emotion in others. Emotion in others consists of nonverbal
perception of emotion and empathy.
The second factor, regulation of emotion, is the ability to
regulate emotion in the self, and the ability to
regulate and alter emotions in other people. The final factor,
utilizing emotional intelligence, has four
aspects: flexible planning, creative thinking, redirected
attention, and motivation. Flexible planning refers
to the ability to produce a large number of different plans for
the future, enabling the planner to better

respond to opportunities. This production of many plans can
result from using emotion and mood
changes to one’s advantage and from looking at a wide variety
of possibilities. Creative thinking, the
second aspect, may be more likely to occur if a person is happy
and in a good mood. Redirected
attention involves the idea that when strong emotions are
experienced, a person’s resources and
attentions may be tuned to new problems. People who can use
this phenomenon to their own benefit
url=http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/wileyse/intel
ligence_emotional/0
will be able to use a potentially stressful situation to focus on
the most important or pressing issues
involved. Motivation emotions, the final principle of emotional

intelligence, refers to the art of making
one’s self continue to perform difficult tasks by focusing one’s
anxiety or tension toward the
performance of that task.
Mayer and Salovey compressed their theory into four branches
of ability: (1) perceiving, appraising, and
expressing emotions; (2) accessing and producing feelings in
aid of cognition; (3) comprehending
information on affect and using emotional knowledge; and (4)
regulating emotions for growth and
contentment (Mayer & Salovey,). These branches are
categorized in a certain order to show how much
ability is incorporated into personality (Mayer et al.,). The
branches create a hierarchy where the ability
to regulate emotions is positioned at the top and the capacity to
perceive emotion is placed at its

bottom. The first branch, perception of emotion, is the degree to
which one is able to distinguish
emotion in other individuals, by utilizing cues from facial
expression and body language. The second
branch, facilitation, comes into play once emotion is
recognized, which involves the integration of
emotion with cognitive processes. The third branch, the
understanding of emotions, is the ability to
analyze emotions, to recognize the most likely path they will
take over time, and to become aware of
their aftereffects. The fourth branch, the management of
emotion, is the ability to control emotions in
order to meet an individual’s set goals, having an understanding
of one’s self, and having societal
awareness (Mayer et al.,).
Contrary to the ability perspective that was theory-driven and
then empirically tested, the trait EI

perspective was empirically driven and then theorized. To
facilitate EI testing in research, educational,
and business settings, several authors translated ability models
into self-report instruments (e.g. Schutte
et al.,). The high correlations found between self-reported EI
scores and personality traits led (Petrides
and Furnham) to coin the term trait emotional intelligence.
From the trait EI perspective, EI is a
constellation of emotion-related dispositions capturing the
extent to which people attend to, identify,
understand, regulate, and utilize their emotions and those of
others. Greater trait EI corresponds to a
profile of dispositions that leads to greater adaptation.
The trait EI perspective views EI as a cluster of lower-order
personality traits (Petrides, Pita, &
Kokkinaki,). EI therefore encompasses two kinds of variance:

one portion of variance already covered
by established personality taxonomies (e.g., the Giant Three or
the Big Five) and one portion of
variance that lies outside these dimensions (Petrides et al.,). In
accordance with this view, trait EI has
been evaluated using personality-like questionnaires.
The trait EI perspective uses self-reports, which barely reflect
self-perceptions and therefore constitute
unreliable assessments of objective competencies. Although this
premise appears acceptable in the
first instance, this argument proved to be incorrect as trait EI
does relate to objective criteria. First, trait
EI has neurobiological correlates, such as the level of
asymmetry in the resting activation of frontal
cortical areas (i.e., Kemp et al., ) or the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal axis reactivity in stressful situations

(Mikolajczak, Roy, Luminet, Fillée, & de Timary,; Salovey,
Woolery, Stroud, & Epel,). Studies on individuals
with lesions in key emotion brain areas also revealed that these
people have lower levels of trait EI
than normal controls (Bar-On, Tranel, Denburg, & Bechara,). It
is noteworthy that the effect sizes in
these studies were not only statistically significant, but that
most of them were large according to
(Cohen’s norms). Second, trait EI correlates with the speed of
emotional information processing (Austin,,
). Third, trait EI predicts objective life-outcomes such as work
performance (e.g., Bradberry & Su,; Law,
Wong, & Song,; Van Rooy, & Viswesvaran,), income (Petrides
& Furnham,), number of school exclusions
or unauthorized absences (e.g., Mavroveli, Petrides, Shove, &
Whitehead, ), cooperation (Schutte et al.,

ligence_emotional/0
2001) or peer-rated sociability and popularity (Petrides,
Sangareau, Furnham, & Frederickson,).
The second critique addressed to the trait EI perspective is that
it correlates too much with existing
personality traits to be useful. According to (Gignac, Jang, and
Bates), the common practice of comparing
EI to the NEO PIR is flawed logic, as the NEO is such a big
construct that it encompasses almost
everything and is so general that there is redundancy within the
NEO itself. The trait EI construct is
useful because it organizes under a single framework the main
individual differences in affectivity, which
have been up to now scattered across the basic Big Five
dimensions (neuroticism, extraversion,

openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) and other
models (Gignac,). This critique is also
refuted by the numerous studies showing that trait EI explains
additional variance over and above
related traits such as alexithymia or the Big Five, to predict
criteria as diverse as cortisol secretion amid
stress (e.g., Mikolajczak et al.,), academic success (e.g., Van
der Zee, Thijs, & Schakel, ), and work
performance (e.g., Van Rooy, & Viswesvaran, ), to name but a
few.
The trait EI perspective is criticized for measuring abilities that
may not have been put into practice.
However, it is not because abilities are not always used that
they ought not to be measured. On the
contrary, it is extremely useful to know whether the individuals
who behave in a nonemotionally

intelligent manner lack the underlying abilities or just do not
use their abilities. Remediation perspectives
(therapies in clinical settings, trainings in organizational
settings) would indeed drastically differ
depending on the source of the problem. The second critique
addressed to the ability perspective
concerns the psychometrical properties of its measures (i.e.,
scoring method at odds with the theory,
low reliabilities), which would prove that abilities cannot be
measured. However, the fact that the tests
are not yet optimal does not undermine the quality of the
underlying idea. Moreover, abilities have long
been successfully measured in assessment centers (e.g., through
role plays) or in laboratories (e.g., by
asking people to regulate their emotions and measuring their
physiological parameters; Mikolajczak,).
(Mikolajczak) suggests a unifying three-level model of EI.

According to the three-level model, EI aims to
capture individual differences in emotion-related knowledge,
abilities, and dispositions. Knowledge
refers to the complexity of emotion-related knowledge. Abilities
refer to emotion-related abilities to
implement a given strategy in an emotional situation and
dispositions refer to the propensity to behave
in a certain way in emotional situations.
Can emotional intelligence be measured? There are some tests
of emotional intelligence that exist:
The Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQI; Bar-On,), the
Self Report Emotional Intelligence Test
(SREIT; see Brackett & Mayer,), the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso
Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT;
Brackett & Mayer,), the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS;
Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai,), the

Schutte Self Report Emotional Intelligence (SSREI: Schutte,
Malouff, & Bhullar, ), the adolescent
Swinburne University Emotional Intelligence Test (Adolescent
SUEIT; Luebbers, Downey, & Stough,
2003). The validity of such tests has been called into question
as most of these measures are self
reports and have psychometric properties that are largely
unknown. However, the MSCEIT uses a
consensus to score participants in place of self reports (Mayer
et al.,) and measures emotional
intelligence based on cognitive ability (Brackett & Mayer,),
making it a more reliable measure than tests
solely using methods of self-report.
(Mayer et al.) argue that emotional intelligence meets many of
the current standards used to measure
intelligence. Indeed, they make the assertion that emotional
intelligence works through cognitions that

deal directly with matters of personal, or emotional, importance.
In their study, they showed that
measures of emotional intelligences meet three standard criteria
of a new intelligence by using the
ligence_emotional/0
MSCEIT. The first criterion is that the test questions could be
confirmed as either correct or incorrect.
The second condition is that there are connections in emotional
intelligence that directly relate to the
ones of a standard intelligence. The third decisive factor is that
when time passes, emotional
intelligence continues to develop within that individual.
Emotional intelligence is still a young discipline, and much of

the research and scholarship to date has
been in defining exactly what are the parameters and boundaries
of “emotional intelligence.” While
Salovey, Mayer, and colleagues define emotional intelligence in
terms of how well people can
understand and control their own emotions and those of others,
there are several other extensions of
the terms. Motivation, cognition, and morality have also been
dubbed aspects of emotional intelligence
(Salovey et al., 1999). (Goleman), in his popular book on the
topic, extended the definition even further.
His conception of emotional intelligence encompasses impulse
control, enthusiasm, social acumen, and
persistence, as well as the other variables already mentioned. In
1998, Goleman revised his model of
emotional intelligence (Mayer,), extending its fields to include
self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation,

empathy, and social skills.
Future directions in emotional intelligence research, according
to (Mayer et al.), will likely be
concentrated in the following areas: finding the correlations
between emotional intelligence and more
traditional types of intelligence and personality traits; assessing
cultural differences and similarities in
emotional intelligence (both abilities and definitions);
developing more empirical measures of the
construct, and determining if these measures predict an
advantageous effect on academic, personal,
and professional success; and using a larger range of age groups
to determine how emotional
intelligence develops over time.
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Van Rooy, D. L.; Viswesvaran, C. (2004). Emotional
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Raul Salcedo
James C. Kaufman
California State University, San Bernardino San Bernardino
California
Copyright © 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights
reserved.
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APA
Salcedo, R., & Kaufman, J. C. (2013). Intelligence, emotional.
In C. R. Reynolds, K. J. Vannest, & E. Fletcher-

Janzen (Eds.), Encyclopedia of special education: a reference
for the education of children, adolescents,
and adults with disabilities and other exceptional individuals
(4th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Retrieved from
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Chicago
Salcedo, Raul, and James C. Kaufman. "Intelligence,
Emotional." In Encyclopedia of Special Education: A
Reference for the Education of Children, Adolescents, and
Adults with Disabilities and Other Exceptional
Individuals, edited by Cecil R. Reynolds, Kimberly J. Vannest,
and Elaine Fletcher-Janzen. 4th ed. Wiley,
2013. https://lopes.idm.oclc.org/login?

Harvard
Salcedo, R. and Kaufman, J.C. (2013). Intelligence, emotional.
In C.R. Reynolds, K.J. Vannest & E. Fletcher-
Janzen (Eds.), Encyclopedia of special education: a reference
for the education of children, adolescents,
and adults with disabilities and other exceptional individuals.
(4th ed.). [Online]. Hoboken: Wiley. Available
from: https://lopes.idm.oclc.org/login?
[Accessed 10 October 2017].
MLA
Salcedo, Raul, and James C. Kaufman. "Intelligence,
Emotional." Encyclopedia of Special Education: A
Reference for the Education of Children, Adolescents, and
Adults with Disabilities and Other Exceptional

Individuals, edited by Cecil R. Reynolds, et al., Wiley, 4th
edition, 2013. Credo Reference,
ligence_emotional/0?institutionId=5865.
Accessed 10 Oct 2017.
ligence_emotional/0
http://support.ebsco.com/help/?int=ehost&lang=&feature_id=AP
A and make
any necessary corrections before using. Pay special attention to

personal names, capitalization, and
dates. Always consult your library resources for the exact
formatting and punctuation guidelines.
References
Laursen, L. (2008). With a Little Help. Scientific American
Mind, 19(5), 12.
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End of citation-->
Section:
Head Lines
With a Little Help
PERCEPTION Illusions of Steepness and Height When we judge
vertical distances,
environmental cues trick our brain
When deciding whether to climb a hill, we try to take into
account both how it rises and how steep the
ascent will be. Chances are good, however, that our estimates of
both these variables will be wrong.

Two recent studies show how our perception of vertical
distances is skewed — perhaps for good
evolutionary reasons.
The walk to and from school can't be uphill both ways, but
going it alone might make it seem that way.
When judging the steepness of a hill, people overestimated its
angle more when alone than when they
were accompanied by — or even thinking about — a friend,
reports an international group of
researchers led by Simone Schnall of University of Plymouth in
England. The longer the volunteers had
been friends with their companions, the less steep the hill
seemed.
The authors hypothesize that psychosocial resources, such as
having a trusted friend nearby, help
people to see challenges in their surroundings as easier to
navigate. In similar studies, subjects who
were fatigued, out of shape or wearing a heavy backpack
perceived hills as steeper and distances as
longer than they really were.
Such built-in perceptual illusions may provide an evolutionary
advantage, says Emily Balcetis of Ohio

University, who was not involved with the study. Exaggerating
a challenge's difficulty, she explains,
"might better help you prepare to encounter it."
PHOTO (COLOR)
PHOTO (COLOR)
~~~~~~~~
By Lucas Laursen
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articles for individual use.

Topic 2: Social Learning Theory: How Close Is Too Close
Objectives:
1. Identify personal Emotional Intelligence (EQ).
2. Explain social pressures and how they influence behavior.
3. Describe intimate, personal, and social space.
4. Recognize "cause and effect" relationships that contribute to
problems in social settings.
Topic Material:
Lecture Note1. PSY-100 Lecture 2
Read Lecture 2.
PSY-100 Lecture 2
Electronic Resource1. Topic 2 Optional Readings
Utilize the attached doucment to supplement your learning for
this topic.
PSY100.T2OptionalReadings.docx2. Topic 2 Required Readings
Utilize the attached document to complete assignments and
discussion questions for this topic.
PSY100.T2RequiredReadings.docx3. Initial Course Survey
In an effort for continuous improvement, Grand Canyon
University would like you to provide feedback about your
experience with the university. Your participation is
appreciated. Click on the link to begin the survey.
http://survey.gcu.edu/initial_course_survey/initial_course_surve

y.htm?q0.a=20411758
Website1. Health and Human Potential Website
Complete “Test Your EQ,” located on the Institute for Health
and Human Potential website for your Topic 2 assignment
Emotional Intelligence Paper
http://www.mhhe.com/business/management/buildyourmanagem
entskills/updated_flash/topic5a/quiz.html
Additional Material1. Emotional Intelligence Paper
Use the "Emotional Intelligence Paper" resource to complete the
assignment.
PSY100.T2EmotionalIntelligence_1-5-15.docx
Gradable Items
Details
Points Possible
Assignments
Emotional Intelligence (EQ) Paper
Complete “Management Stress Assessment” located on the
McGraw-Hill website
(http://www.mhhe.com/business/management/buildyourmanage
mentskills/updated_flash/topic5a/quiz.html)
Compose a GCU style paper (750-1,000 words), describing your
Emotional Intelligence (EQ) findings. Being aware of what
emotional responses look like and its importance when
interacting in social settings.
Compare and contrast your EQ to someone you interact with.

Please include three to four references from the readings and
videos this week to support your ideas. Use appropriate citation
and referencing.
Address the following in your paper:
1. How can we be “in check” with our emotions? What are
some consequences of not being “in check” with our emotions?
What are some strategies for managing our emotions? How do
we ensure that our emotional state is appropriate when
interacting with our family, friends, significant others, and
peers?
2. Compare and contrast your EQ results to someone you
interact with? How does this impact your relationship with that
individual?
Refer to the Topic 2 readings to assist in completing this
assignment.
Prepare this assignment according to the guidelines found in the
GCU Style Guide, located in the Student Success Center.
This assignment uses a rubric. Please review the rubric prior to
beginning the assignment to become familiar with the
expectations for successful completion.
You are required to submit this assignment to Turnitin. Please
refer to the Student Success Center for directions.
100.0
Discussion Questions
Topic 2 DQ 2

Discuss your results from the EQ assessment. How do your
results provide insight into how you interact with family
members, friends, and coworkers? What advice would you give
to someone who had a low EQ? How could they improve their
EQ? Please use appropriate citation and reference from the
readings and/or videos for this week’s topic.
5.0
Topic 2 DQ 1
Select a character that has low EQ from a television show or
movie. Based on your Topic 2 Readings, describe the actions
this person displays that demonstrate low EQ. If you were a
psychologist working with this person on improving their EQ,
what recommendations would you give to improve the
character's EQ?
Please use appropriate citation and reference from the readings
and/or videos for this week’s topic.
5.0
Participation
20.0

O R I G I N A L P A P E R
Do you see what I see? Learning to detect micro expressions
of emotion
Carolyn M. Hurley
Published online: 11 November 2011
� Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011
Abstract The ability to detect micro expressions is an
important skill for understanding a person’s true emotional
state, however, these quick expressions are often difficult
to detect. This is the first study to examine the effects of
boundary factors such as training format, exposure, moti-
vation, and reinforcement on the detection of micro
expressions of emotion. A 3 (training type) by 3 (rein-

forcement) fixed factor design with three control groups
was conducted, in which 306 participants were trained and
evaluated immediately after exposure and at 3 and 6 weeks
post-training. Training improved the recognition of micro
expressions and the greatest success was found when a
knowledgeable instructor facilitated the training and
employed diverse training techniques such as description,
practice and feedback (d’s [ .30). Recommendations are
offered for future training of micro expressions, which can
be used in security, health, business, and intercultural
contexts.
Keywords Micro expression � Facial expression �
Emotion � Training
Introduction

If facial expressions of emotion were delivered uniformly
each and every time an emotion was elicited, eventually all
of us would be near perfect perceivers of others. However,
pressures to conceal or mask one’s true feelings may result
in emotional displays that are quick or fragmented (called
micro momentary expressions, Haggard and Isaacs 1966;
or micro expressions, Ekman and Friesen 1969). Since
daily life features many pressures to conceal or mask one’s
emotions, as a function of status, culture, context, polite-
ness, and so forth (Ekman 1972), the ability to accurately
perceive and interpret these quick expressions would
improve our interpersonal skills, allowing us to better

understand individuals’ true emotional states.
The ability to ‘‘read’’ others is advantageous for the
average person, but in particular for clinicians and security
practitioners where the ability to understand others can
result in more informed judgments regarding threats to
oneself and others. Practitioners are already utilizing web-
based micro expression (ME) training in security (e.g.,
Department of State, Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Defense) and health contexts, although
testing of these efforts has been largely limited to clinical
populations (e.g., Marsh et al. 2010; Russell et al. 2006,
2008). Identifying effective training methods is imperative,
especially in these critical situations where a superior

understanding of emotion can significantly improve our
national security and quality of life.
The best available research in concealment of emotion
suggests that these masked emotional signals, particularly
MEs, are very difficult to detect (Ekman and Friesen 1969,
1974a; Etcoff et al. 2000; Porter and ten Brinke 2008).
Recent research has found that it is possible to train these
skills in a short period (Matsumoto and Hwang, in press),
This work was submitted in partial fulfillment of a Doctor of
Philosophy degree at the University at Buffalo by the author.
Any
opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations
expressed in

this material are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the
views of the Transportation Security Administration, the
Department
of Homeland Security, or the United States of America. The
author
would like to thank Dr.’s Mark Frank and David Matsumoto for
loan
of the Micro Expression Training Tool, second edition.
C. M. Hurley (&)
Transportation Security Administration, 601 South 12th street,
Arlington, VA 22202, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
123
Motiv Emot (2012) 36:371–381
DOI 10.1007/s11031-011-9257-2

yet few boundary factors that may affect training success
have been explored. This manuscript examines the train-
ability of MEs of emotion, the optimal method of training,
the role of motivating factors, the effect of reinforcement,
and the retention of training materials over a 6-week per-
iod. This will help identify more effective training meth-
ods, which can be used to train individuals—such as those
in national security contexts—who may encounter con-
cealed emotions like MEs.
Background
Micro expressions of emotion

Emotions can be defined as ‘‘short-lived psychological-
physiological phenomena that represent efficient modes of
adaptation to changing environmental demands’’ (Levenson
1994, p. 123). Emotions are automatic responses that are
triggered—aroused in a fraction of a second—by environ-
mental stimuli that alter our attention and organize biological
responses, preparing us to react. Emotions are complex and
involve a number of bodily response systems such as
expression, muscular tonus, voice, and autonomic nervous
system activity (Levenson 1994).
Besides unique internal signals, emotions also generate
external signals—such as facial expressions—that provide
clues of these internal changes. A significant body of lit-

erature has examined the basic emotions of anger, con-
tempt, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise,
revealing that each appears to have a characteristic
expression that is universal across cultures (e.g., Ekman
2003; Elfenbein and Ambady 2002). The universal pro-
duction of these facial signals suggests that these emotional
expressions are genetically determined and biology is lar-
gely responsible for establishing which facial movements
are associated with certain emotions (DeJong 1979;
DeMyer 1980).
A ME is a special case of the basic emotional expression,
which was first discovered by Haggard and Isaacs (1966)

while studying clinical interviews. They believed MEs were
caused by an unconscious repression of conflict and that
those expressions occurred too quickly to be seen in real
time. Ekman and Friesen (1969, 1974b) undertook a more
rigorous program of study that fully articulated the nature of
MEs. After examining recorded psychiatric interviews
frame-by-frame they found that MEs were emotional
expressions that ‘‘leaked’’ out when individuals attempted to
inhibit or manage their facial displays (Ekman, 2003). They
concluded that these quick expressions represented signs of
concealed emotion, as uninhibited or naturally occurring
emotional expressions generally last several seconds in
length or more (Hess and Kleck 1990).

The existence of MEs has been verified in studies of
concealment (Porter and ten Brinke 2008) and is relevant to
high-stakes contexts like law enforcement and national
security. For example, if someone is transiting a security
checkpoint and is in possession of illegal drugs, he may
have a fear of discovery. He will in all likelihood try to
hide these feelings, so any emotional clues he produces
may be more subtle then in a context where he is not trying
to manage his behavior. Research has shown that the
ability to detect MEs is related to skill at detecting
deception in high-stakes scenarios (Ekman and O’Sullivan
1991, 2006; Ekman et al. 1999), likely because it is easier

to judge veracity when an observer is able to accurately
understand how the target is feeling. This research
emphasizes the importance of ME recognition skills for
any individual whose profession requires interpersonal
interaction or deception detection.
Facial and micro expression training
Scientists have long endeavored to train people to better
recognize facial expressions. As early as the 1920s
researchers had students study pictorals or verbal descrip-
tions of facial expressions (Allport 1924; Guilford 1929;
Jarden and Fernberger 1926; Jenness 1932). However, the
absence of clear stimulus materials (drawings versus pho-
tographs) and clear identification of expressions limited

this training research. After researchers began to system-
atically study and define the muscle movements inherent in
emotional expressions they were able to create detailed
facial coding systems (e.g., Ekman and Friesen 1978; Izard
1979). This allowed researchers to create standardized sets
of valid emotion training and testing materials (e.g.,
BART, Ekman and Friesen 1974b; PoFA, Ekman and
Friesen 1975; JACFEE, Matsumoto and Ekman 1988;
JACBART, Matsumoto et al. 2000).
The Japanese and Caucasian Brief Affect Recognition
Test (JACBART) was the first published test of micro
expression recognition accuracy (MERA) that was rigor-

ously evaluated (Matsumoto et al. 2000). The JACBART
created the appearance of more dynamic expressions, as
each poser’s neutral face was imposed before and after the
emotional expression face, reducing the after effects of the
stimuli. All expression images were scored with the Facial
Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman and Friesen 1978)
to ensure the same muscle actions occurred for each
emotion and were consistent with universally recognized
expressions (Ekman 2003). Additionally, these images
were tested with an international audience to ensure cross-
cultural agreement (Biehl et al. 1997). Matsumoto and
colleagues provided evidence of internal and temporal
reliability and convergent and concurrent validity for this

test across five studies and found similar accuracy patterns
372 Motiv Emot (2012) 36:371–381
123
even with the differences made to presentation speed and
judgment task (Matsumoto et al. 2000).
This ME testing procedure evolved into a self-instruc-
tional training tool, originally called the Micro Expression
Training Tool (METT; now available as the METT
Advanced at face.paulekman.com and the Microexpression
Recognition Tool [MiX] at www.humintell.com). The
METT is presented as a stand-alone training tool; it offers a

pre-test, a training section, practice examples with feed-
back, a review section, and a post-test. The stimuli used in
these training tools are laboratory produced which provides
the necessary consistency and reliability of expression,
poser, intensity, angle and so forth to provide scientific test
of MERA. However, use of this type of materials limits the
ability to generalize to naturally occurring spontaneous
expression, which have more dynamic features (Naab and
Russell 2007).
Researchers have used versions of the METT to
train department store employees and trial consultants
(Matsumoto and Hwang, in press) and individuals with
Schizophrenia (Marsh et al. 2010; Russell et al. 2006,

2008) to detect MEs. A 2-h instructor led session using the
MiX not only significantly improved Korean department
store employees’ ability to identify MEs (N = 81, 18%
increase), but also led to higher social and communication
skills scores (Matsumoto and Hwang, in press). A similar
experiment using a small group of trial consultants also
showed improvements in accuracy (N = 25, 18%
increase). Further analyses revealed no skill decay over a
2-week period for both groups (Matsumoto and Hwang, in
press).
The METT has also been used to train clinical patients
with emotion recognition deficiencies to more accurately

recognize emotion (Marsh et al. 2010; Russell et al. 2006,
2008). Training individuals with Schizophrenia to read
facial expressions using the METT resulted in a significant
improvement in ME recognition at the post-test (9%
increase, Russell et al. 2006; 18% increase, Russell et al.
2008), illustrating the tool’s robustness to different popu-
lations. These studies support a meaningful training-accu-
racy relationship for identifying MEs, as well as, highlight
some possible social benefits.
Researchers have used other materials to teach others
about facial expressions. Stickle and Pellegreno (1982) and
Elfenbein (2006) used the Pictures of Facial Affect (PoFA,
Ekman and Friesen 1975) to train American students to

recognize emotional expressions (Elfenbein also used a
subset of Chinese posing facial expressions Wang and
Markham 1999). Although both studies reported success
for training, the authors did not report either the pre and
post accuracy scores and within subjects change (Stickle
and Pellegreno 1982) or the baseline recognition accuracy
(Elfenbein 2006). Those limitations inhibit interpretation of
these data. These studies also did not examine the ability to
detect quick expressions—such as MEs—further limiting
the ability to compare these methods to standardized tools
such as the METT or MiX.
Boundary factors to training

While research demonstrates the validity of using
commercial ME training tools to train recognition skills
(Matsumoto and Hwang, in press; Russell et al. 2006,
2008), little research has analyzed the underlying factors
associated with these skill improvements. Training formats
such as simple feedback (Elfenbein 2006), lecture and
practice (Stickle and Pellegreno 1982), and the METT/MiX
(Matsumoto and Hwang, in press) have all improved
expression recognition; but it is unknown which methods
have produced the greatest improvements or had the
greatest retention, due to differences in both testing mate-
rials and measures of effectiveness. It is also unknown
which format and materials are optimal for training indi-

viduals to detect MEs.
These studies revealed that individuals can be trained to
recognize laboratory produced MEs fairly quickly and
effectively, however, retention has only been examined in
one study and only at 2 weeks (Matsumoto and Hwang, in
press). Although training with the METT can improve
individuals’ recognition in as little as a few hours, the
length that this training outlasts the post-test is unknown.
Skill decay is an important variable to examine as many
military or government employees may only be able to
receive ME training once a year or once in a career span.
Another factor to consider is that understanding emo-

tional expressions is a skill that may improve with practice.
People who have repeated exposure to individuals who try
to conceal their emotions or who scrutinize nonverbal
behavior for their jobs—such as law enforcement officers,
judges, clinical psychologists, and secret service person-
nel—are often more accurate judges of how others are
feeling (Ekman and O’Sullivan 1991; Ekman et al. 1999).
Studies that have repeatedly tested the same participants
have found they improved without training (Matsumoto
et al. 2000). This suggests that repeated exposure to the
task or stimuli may serve as a training function as well and
should be examined.
Motivation can also influence a person’s ability to learn

material. Even though micro expression training may
improve MERA for all individuals, those who are more
motivated may learn and retain more material. Motivation
to learn is positively related to skill acquisition (Colquitt
et al. 2000), deeming it an important area for investigation.
It is important to examine individuals’ motivation to learn
Motiv Emot (2012) 36:371–381 373
123
both at the start and completion of each testing phase, as
motivation may be affected by external factors such as the
quality or content of the training or assignment to the

training or control group. Any differences must be con-
trolled for to insure that any gains made post-training can
be properly attributed to the training.
Overall, the previously published studies raise questions
regarding the optimal method of training, the role of
exposure and motivating factors, and the persistence of
training effects over time. It is important to examine these
boundary factors that may reduce skill loss so that
researchers can identify more effective training techniques.
The METT is an ideal instructional tool for testing these
differences. This training can be self-administered or
administered by an instructor in a group setting and pro-
vides enough stimulus materials to examine skill retention.

This will allow us to assess these factors in an existing and
well-used training.
Based on the above literature review, which found sig-
nificant improvements in MERA with different iterations
of the METT training (Matsumoto and Hwang, in press;
Russell et al. 2006, 2008), the following set of specific
hypotheses are proposed:
H1 ME Training will significantly improve participants’
MERA and result in greater skill retention, opposed to the
control conditions, which will experience no change in
MERA.
Although training by feedback alone has significantly

improved expression recognition skills (Elfenbein 2006),
ME recognition is an advanced skill which requires
understanding of subtle differences among expressions.
Thus,
H2 An instructor-led, multi-faceted ME training condi-
tion will produce the greatest increases in MERA, opposed
to ME training conditions that are self-led, or only provide
feedback to participants.
Any increased exposure to training material should also
provide an advantage to the exposed group. Thus,
H3 Reinforcement will significantly improve retention of
MERA.
Previous studies have assumed that a comparison group

assigned to do nothing during the training time serves as an
adequate control for examining training effects. Factors
such as mere exposure to stimuli or motivation to learn
could affect ME post-test scores or moderate effectiveness
of training. Thus, three control groups will also be exam-
ined to answer the following research question:
RQ1 What is the effect of motivation and simple expo-
sure on MERA?
Method
Participants
Three hundred thirty four (334) participants were recruited
from large introductory communication courses. An in-

class announcement advertised the study as ‘‘an evaluation
of students’ nonverbal communication skills’’ and inter-
ested students signed up for three 1-h appointments through
an online sign-up system. Participants who completed the
study received 3 h of research credit in partial fulfillment
of their 5 h departmental requirement.
Design
The study employed a 3 (training type—instructor feed-
back; instructor feedback plus description; or self led) by 3
(reinforcement—none; at time 2 only; or at time 3 only)
fixed factor design with three control groups (traditional
control; control with additional exposure of items; or
control with a motivating lecture). The four times at which

participants’ accuracy at judging MEs was assessed (pre-
training, immediately after training, 3 weeks later, and
6 weeks later) was treated as a within-subject independent
variable. The dependent variable was the participants’
accuracy on the various ME tests. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to each condition.
Conditions
Participants in the control conditions received no training
to serve as comparison groups to the training manipula-
tions. Participants in the ‘‘traditional’’ control condition
occupied themselves for the length of the manipulation and
were not exposed to any other emotional expression items.

Participants in the ‘‘exposure’’ control condition were
exposed to the same stimulus items (photographs of facial
expressions) as the training conditions during the manip-
ulation period, but received no feedback or other infor-
mation to facilitate their judgment. Participants in the
‘‘motivating lecture’’ control condition were provided with
a lecture on the importance of accurately perceiving and
interpreting human emotion based on the work of Ekman
(2001, 2003), but were not exposed to any other facial
expression material.
Training techniques previously published were com-
bined to allow for a fair comparison and evaluation of these
different training methods. Participants in both the ‘‘feed-

back only’’ training and ‘‘full instruction’’ training condi-
tions received the METT training led by an instructor
highly knowledgeable in the area of facial expressions of
emotion (the author). The difference was that the feedback
only training manipulation consisted solely of feedback
374 Motiv Emot (2012) 36:371–381
123
regarding the MEs of emotion (available in the practice
section of the METT), whereas in the full instruction
training manipulation the instructor also discussed subtle
differences among expressions (according to the ‘‘training’’

and ‘‘review’’ sections of METT) and answered questions
raised by participants. Participants in the ‘‘self-led’’ train-
ing condition also received training via the METT. These
participants led themselves through the training, feedback,
and review sections of the METT on a personal computer
(monitored by the instructor). The self-led training group
was exposed to the same materials as the full instruction
training group except the instructor was not allowed to
answer questions or discuss subtle differences to mirror a
true self-led training environment. The length of time was
standardized (25 min) for all six manipulations (both
training and control).
Reinforcement was manipulated by randomly assigning

the training participants to either receive or not receive
re-training at their second and third appointments.
Refreshers were identical in format to participants’ original
training conditions (i.e., feedback only, full instruction, or
self-led) although the instruction time was reduced to
15 min. Trained participants were randomly assigned into
one of three Refresher conditions: approximately one-third
received no refresher training, one-third received refresher
training at time 2, and one-third received refresher training
at time 3.
Stimulus materials
The second version of the METT was used for the testing

and training of MERA. The laboratory produced METT
expression items involve full-face flash displays that show
a subject’s neutral expression, a quick expression flash
(1/15th of a second), and then a return to the subject’s
neutral face. The METT training is divided into five sec-
tions: (1) a 14-item pre test (anger, contempt, disgust, fear,
happiness, sadness, and surprise, each shown twice), (2) a
training section in which each of the universal expressions
are introduced and described, (3) a 42-item practice sec-
tion, (4) a review section, and (5) a 28-item post-test (the
same seven emotions shown four times). Elements of this
training program were manipulated to form the stimulus
materials used to assess MERA as well as functioned as the

training materials in the training manipulations. To enable
three post-training assessment periods, a pilot test was
conducted to evaluate the difficulty of the expression items
so they could be grouped into equivalent post-tests. (The
third post-test was also used to assess MERA at the pre-test
period.) The 42 ME items taken from the pre-test and post-
test sections of the METT were shown separately to 12
communication undergraduates, who judged each of these
items at the speed of 1/15th second. These 42 items were
then divided into three sets to create three MERA post-
tests, each having two examples of each emotion. Paired
samples t-tests revealed no significant differences in test

difficulty among the three tests. The mean difficulty for
each of these tests based on the pilot data was 0.63 (post-
test 1), 0.66 (post-test 2), and 0.62 (post-test 3).
Procedure
Time 1
This study was conducted over an 8-week period and was
approved by the University’s Institutional Review Board.
Participants were scheduled in small groups for hour-long
sessions at three points in the semester. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the six conditions and each
condition was run separately. One instructor (the author)
led all sessions. After arrival, participants completed an
informed consent document and then completed a demo-

graphic questionnaire and personality indexes. Then the
instructor provided an overview of the experiment and
explained the ME test procedure to the group. The format
and procedure of each ME test was identical. At this point
in the experiment the pre-test was administered according
to the procedure described below.
Before each test, participants were asked to indicate
their confidence in their ability to perform well, as well as
their motivation to correctly identify the ME items. Con-
fidence was measured using a 1 (Very poor) to 7 (Very
good) rating to the question: How well do you think you
will do at recognizing the upcoming facial expressions of

emotion? Motivation was assessed using a 1 (Not Moti-
vated) to 7 (Very Motivated) rating response to the ques-
tion: How motivated are you to recognize people’s
emotional expressions?
Next, participants viewed the fourteen-item ME test.
Each item was projected on a blank wall in the research
room at the speed of 1/15th of a second. Participants were
given approximately 10 s to judge each expression by
circling the appropriate response on the provided answer
sheet (choices included anger, contempt, disgust, fear,
happiness, sadness, surprise, and none of the above). After
all items had been judged, participants indicated their
confidence in their judgments. Post-confidence was mea-

sured using a 1 (Very poor) to 7 (Very good) rating to the
question: How well do you think you did at recognizing
these facial expressions of emotion?
After the pre-test was completed, the next 25 min served
as the manipulation period for the experiment. Control
participants received no training, and training participants
received ME training in one of three styles described pre-
viously. After the manipulation, all participants completed
the fourteen-item ME post-test (1) according to the
Motiv Emot (2012) 36:371–381 375
123

procedure described above. After the post-test participants
were reminded of their next research appointment, and
dismissed from the research space.
Time 2
Exactly 3 weeks after the first session, participants returned
to the research space. At this time participants in the
training conditions were randomly assigned as a group to
one of the three Reinforcement conditions: none, refresher
at time 2, or refresher at time 3. Participants assigned to a
refresher at time 2 received 15 min of training based on
their original training condition. After the manipulation
participants completed the fourteen-item ME post-test (2)
according to the procedure described previously. After all

participants completed the post-test they were reminded of
their next research appointment, and dismissed from the
research space.
Time 3
Exactly 6 weeks after the original training, participants
returned to the research space. Participants assigned to a
refresher at time 3 received 15 min of training based on
their original training condition. After the manipulation
participants completed the fourteen-item ME post-test (3)
according to the procedure described previously. After the
post-test, all participants completed a questionnaire
exploring how this study had impacted their lives. Last,

participants were debriefed regarding the purpose of the
study, provided research credit, and dismissed from the
research space.
Results
Participants
A total of 334 students participated at Time 1, with a 92%
completion rate (N = 306). Analyses were conducted to
determine if there were any differences in the demographic
makeup (age, gender, and ethnicity) of the 306 final subject
sample and the 28 participants who did not complete the
study. These analyses revealed no significant demographic
differences between the group who completed the study
and the group that dropped out. From hence forth, only the

final sample (N = 306) is discussed.
The participants were 174 female (57%) and 132 male
(43%) undergraduates with an average age of 20.13
(SD = 3.08) years. Participants were mostly Caucasian
(70.9%), but there were also participants who identified
themselves as Asian or Pacific Islander (11.1%), African or
Caribbean (8.8%), Hispanic (6.2%), Middle Eastern
(1.6%), or another ethnic background (1.4%). Participants
were mostly sophomores (38.2%) and juniors (32.7%),
although some seniors (15.0%) and freshman (13.1%) also
participated (1.0% did not list class year).
Motivation

In this study, participants were asked to rate how motivated
they were on a one item scale (1 = Not Motivated to
7 = Very Motivated). Independent samples t tests were
conducted to examine motivation differences between
untrained participants and trained participants. One sig-
nificant difference was uncovered for the pre-test,
t (304) = -2.133, p = .034, d = -.24, suggesting that
trained participants (M = 5.51, SD = 1.07) were more
motivated to succeed than the controls (M = 5.23,
SD = 1.04) before the manipulation. At this point in the
experiment participants had not received any information
regarding the training manipulation so the cause of the
greater motivation level is unknown. There were no sig-

nificant differences in motivation between controls
(M = 5.18, SD = 1.06) and training (M = 5.40, SD =
1.19) participants after the manipulation was introduced. A
one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine change in
motivation at Time 1. No significant differences were
uncovered; suggesting that assignment to a training group
did not significantly increase motivation to perform well in
this paradigm.
Pearson correlations were computed to examine the
relationship between motivation and accuracy. Motivation
was not significantly related to accuracy at any test for
control participants. For trained participants, motivation

was significantly positively related to accuracy at post-test
1, r (212) = .191, p = .005, and post-test 3, r (212) =
.157, p = .021, revealing that trained participants who
were more motivated to succeed were more accurate on
these tests. Since motivation was not significantly related to
accuracy at the pre-test—the only test in which groups
differed in motivation—it was dropped as a potential
covariate in ensuing analyses.
Confidence
In the current study confidence in judgment was measured
on a one-item scale (1 = Very poor to 7 = Very good)
both before and after each ME test. Pearson correlations
were computed to examine the relationship between con-

fidence and accuracy for both trained and control partici-
pants. All but two relationships were significant (Table 1).
The only negative relationship occurred for trained par-
ticipants at the pre-test, all other relationships were posi-
tive. This suggests that people’s perceptions regarding their
376 Motiv Emot (2012) 36:371–381
123
MERA were not so different from their objective ability
after MEs had been defined.
Training effects
H1 predicted a significant main effect for training, such

that trained participants would improve in accuracy post
manipulation at Time 1 and retain this improvement,
whereas controls would experience no change in accuracy.
A mixed model ANOVA was conducted to examine the
differences in accuracy across time within each of the six
conditions. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of
sphericity had been violated, v2 (5) = 14.849, p = .011,
therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using
Huynh–Feldt estimates of sphericity (e = .994). There was
a significant main effect for time, F (2.983, 894.954) =
104.967, p .001, g2 = .259. Pairwise comparisons uncov-
ered that accuracy was significantly different (p .001) for
all tests except between post-test 2 and post-test 3, showing
that accuracy improved from pre-test to post-test 1 and
post-test 2.

There was also a significant main effect for condition,
F (5, 300) = 4.994, p .001, g2 = .077. Pairwise com-
parisons indicated that the full instruction training condi-
tion was significantly more accurate than the traditional
control and motivating lecture control conditions, but was
not significantly different from the control group with
exposure, or feedback only training, or self-led training
conditions.
A significant interaction was revealed for time by con-
dition, F (14.916, 894.954) = 5.421, p .001, g2 = .083.
To further explore this interaction, one-way ANOVAs
were conducted at each test (pre-test, post-test 1, post-test
2, and post-test 3) to examine between subject differences.

There were no significant differences at the pre-test,
revealing that all groups began at approximately the same
skill level. A significant difference was revealed at post-test
1, F (5, 300) = 7.561, p .001. Bonferroni post hoc tests
revealed that the three control conditions were significantly
less accurate than the two instructor-led training condi-
tions. There were no significant differences between the
control conditions and the self-led training condition. There
was a significant main effect at post-test 2, F (5, 300) =
3.388, p = .005. Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that the
full instruction training participants were significantly
more accurate than the traditional control participants. At
post-test 3 there was a significant main effect for condition,

F (5, 300) = 8.328, p .001. Bonferroni post hoc tests
revealed that full instruction training participants were
significantly more accurate than the traditional control,
motivating lecture control, feedback only training, and self-
led training participants. There was no significant differ-
ence between the full instruction training condition and the
exposure control condition at post-test 3.
To further explore the within subjects differences,
paired samples t-tests were conducted for each of the six
conditions to examine accuracy change over time. A total
of 3 comparisons (pre-test vs. post-test 1, post-test 1 vs.
post-test 2, and post-test 2 vs. post-test 3) were conducted
for each condition. The significant differences are outlined

in the Table 2. Between the pre-test and post-test at Time
1, all three training conditions significantly increased in
accuracy (feedback only: ?14.19%; full instruction:
?19.52%; and self-led ?10.66%), and two of the control
conditions experienced no significant increase (traditional:
?1.43%; and exposure: -0.76%), revealing support for
H1. Surprisingly one of the control conditions (motivating
Table 1 Relationship between confidence and accuracy
Condition Confidence Accuracy
Pre-test Post-test 1 Post-test 2 Post-test 3
Control Pre- -.010 .170 .223* .260*
Post- .404*** .408*** .337** .598***
Training Pre- -1.77** .246*** .215** .155*

Post- .388*** .535*** .316*** .254***
* p .05; ** p .01; *** p .001
Table 2 Within subjects comparisons for accuracy from test to
test
Condition Pre-test
versus
post-test 1, t
Post-test 1
versus
post-test 2, t
Post-test 2
versus
post-test 3, t

Control
Traditional .560 3.477** -2.065*
Exposure -.205 2.554* 1.745
Motivating lecture 2.143* 3.266** -1.929
Training
Feedback only 7.346*** 2.908** -1.586
Full instruction 8.757*** 3.106** 1.430
Self-led 5.635*** 6.289*** -3.898***
* p .05; ** p .01; *** p .001
Motiv Emot (2012) 36:371–381 377
123

lecture: ?6.15%) also significantly increased from the pre-
test to post-test 1, t (28) = 2.143, p = .041, d = -.40.
Between post-test 1 and post-test 2, all of the conditions
significantly improved in accuracy, suggesting a possible
exposure or practice effect to the stimuli, or that the
material shown in post-test 2 was easier than the other
tests, although pilot testing suggested that all three tests
were equivalent in difficulty. Between post-test 2 and post-
test 3, both the traditional control condition (-5.95%) and
the self-led training condition (-6.91%) significantly
decreased.
H1 was partially supported, as the combined training
participants outperformed control participants and more

specifically the full instruction training participants out-
performed most controls on all tests. However, the moti-
vating lecture control group also significantly improved
after the manipulation, suggesting an effect for the moti-
vating lecture. Additionally, all control groups significantly
improved from post-test 1 to post-test 2. This pattern of
results is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Type of training
H2 predicted that the full instruction training would result
in greater improved accuracy compared to feedback only
and self-led trainings. Independent samples t tests (one-
tailed) were conducted to examine the differences in

improvement from the pre-test to post-test 1 for the three
training types. Tests revealed that the full instruction
condition (?19.52%) improved significantly more than
both the self-led condition (?10.66%), t (138) = 3.021,
p .005, d = .51, and the feedback only condition
(?14.19%), t (143) = 1.811, p .05, d = .30, supporting
H2. There were no significant differences between the
accuracy change of the feedback only and self-led
conditions.
The role of refreshers
H3 predicted that refreshers would aid in retention of
training material. A mixed model ANOVA showed a sig-
nificant main effect for time, F (2, 410) = 23.338, p
.001, g2 = .102 (Table 3). Pairwise comparisons revealed

that accuracy was significantly higher for post-tests 2 and 3
compared to post-test 1 (p .001). There was also a sig-
nificant main effect for condition, F (2, 205) = 4.017,
p = .019, g2 = .038. Pairwise comparisons indicated that
the full instruction condition was significantly more accu-
rate than the self-led condition. There was no main effect
for refresher type.
There was a significant interaction for time by condition,
F (4, 410) = 4.300, p = .002, g2 = .040. This interaction
was previously explored and reported, and revealed that full
instruction condition improved significantly more than the
self-led and feedback only conditions. The two-way inter-
actions for time by refresher, and condition by refresher, and
the three-way interaction for time by refresher by condition,

were not significant.
Paired samples t tests (post-test 1 vs. post-test 2, post-
test 2 vs. post-test 3, and post-test 1 vs. post-test 3) were
conducted to evaluate MERA retention for each of the
three refresher manipulations within the three training
groups. In the feedback only condition, the time 2 refresher
group significantly improved in accuracy after the
refresher, t (21) = 3.346, p = .003, d = .71 (post-test 1 to
post-test 2). T tests also revealed that accuracy significantly
decreased from post-test 2 to post-test 3, t (21) = -3.186,
p = .004, d = -.68. No other significant differences,
Fig. 1 Accuracy across time and conditions
Table 3 Within subjects differences for ME accuracy over time

Training type Refresher
type
N Accuracy
Post-test
1 (%)
Post-test
2 (%)
Post-test
3 (%)
Feedback only None 27 74.60 78.70 78.57
At time 2 22 70.45 80.30 72.40
At time 3 25 83.43 86.67 85.14

Full instruction None 24 81.55 85.07 91.96
At time 2 25 78.00 87.33 89.43
At time 3 22 78.25 84.47 88.31
Self-led None 25 72.29 85.33 74.57
At time 2 20 71.79 80.83 76.43
At time 3 24 72.32 88.89 83.93
378 Motiv Emot (2012) 36:371–381
123
including improvements for the time 3 refresher group,
were uncovered.
In the full instruction condition, the time 2 refresher
group significantly increased in accuracy from post-test 1

to post-test 2, t (24) = 2.402, p = .024, d = .48, and post-
test 1 to post-test 3, t (24) = 3.578, p = .002, d = .72. For
the time 3 refresher group, paired samples t tests revealed
that accuracy significantly increased from post-test 1 to
post-test 3, t (21) = 3.241, p = .004, d = .69. No other
significant differences were uncovered.
In the self-led condition, the no refresher group signif-
icantly increased in accuracy from post-test 1 to post-test 2,
t (24) = 3.496, p = .002, d = .70. Accuracy at post-test 3
was significantly less than at post-test 2, t (24) = -4.064,
p .001, d = -.81. This was the only non-refresher group
that performed significantly different on one of the post-
tests. For the time 2 refresher group, paired samples t tests

revealed success for the refresher in significantly increas-
ing accuracy from post-test 1 to post-test 2, t (19) = 2.323,
p = .031, d = .52. For the time 3 refresher group, accu-
racy significantly increased from post-test 1 to post-test 2,
t (23) = 5.175, p .001, d = 1.06, and from post-test 1 to
post-test 3, t (23) = 3.646, p = .011, d = .74, revealing an
increase prior to the refresher. No other significant differ-
ences were uncovered.
These inconsistent results do not support H3. The time 2
refresher groups did experience significant increases in
accuracy after their refresher, but this result did not outlast
the time period. Actually, all groups increased at Time 2
(although not all changes were significant) suggesting that

the refresher may not have caused increases but rather by
some condition of the ME test.
Discussion
This study provides the first data comparing different
methods of training micro expressions, the effects of
motivation and exposure on recognition, and skill retention
over three points in time. As predicted, the training was
successful. At the pre-test, there were no significant dif-
ferences in accuracy based on condition, but after the
manipulation trained participants performed better on post-
tests 1, 2 and 3 (76, 84, and 82% respectively) than controls
(64, 75, and 73% respectively). Further, having an expert

present to guide participants through the subtle differences
among these expressions and answer questions was an
advantage over the other tested training methods. The full
instruction training condition continually provided consis-
tent results: it was the only training condition that was
significantly more accurate than one or more control con-
ditions on all three post-tests.
These results revealed that the best method for using the
METT in a short session was to fully explore all sections of
the program including the training and review, have a
knowledgeable instructor describe subtle differences
between the expressions, and practice identifying the ME
items and provide feedback to trainees. This suggests that

feedback paired with additional training techniques may
produce a more effective training manipulation. Although
the METT has been designed as a self-instructional tool to
train emotion recognition, this method of training was
considerably less effective compared to an instructor-led
training.
Two explanations for this finding may be that the full
instruction training provided both more material than the
self-led training (instructor answered questions) as well as
enthusiasm for the topic. This study does not definitively
show which factor provided significant benefits. However,
the surprising finding that the motivating lecture control

group also significantly increased at after the manipulation
(?6%) suggests that the instructor’s enthusiasm may have
provided motivation to concentrate or attend closer to the
post-test. Further research should examine the both the role
of content and instructor in training ME skills, as there may
be some ideal combination of content and charisma that
produces the greatest effects.
In this experiment, the same instructor was used for all
trials in attempt to keep the presentation consistent and
eliminate the possibility of attention or motivation biases
caused by the instructor’s appearance or presentation style.
However, this is also a limitation of the study since the
instructor was aware of the hypotheses and experimental

design, which could have unintentionally affected por-
trayals within the experiment.
Research examining confidence of judgment has gen-
erally not found a relationship between one’s confidence in
judgment and the accuracy of that judgment (DePaulo et al.
1997; Patterson et al. 2001). The current study revealed a
clear relationship between confidence and MERA: before
individuals were introduced to the concept of MEs, their
confidence and accuracy were not calibrated, but after
individuals had seen MEs, they became calibrated such that
accurate judges were more confident and less accurate
judges were less confident. Previous studies examining

emotion recognition have not found this strong a link. In
this study, participants’ confidence in interpreting the MEs
was significantly positively correlated to their accuracy
post-testing period, even though they had never received
feedback on their performance. This may suggest a very
parsimonious means to determine whether trainees under-
stand the material—the trainer merely has to ask. The
novelty of this finding suggests that this relationship should
be verified in subsequent research. Of particular importance
Motiv Emot (2012) 36:371–381 379
123
would be to replicate this finding with naturally occurring

MEs, which may be more difficult to spot.
In this study a possible repeated exposure effect was
found, as untrained individuals improved without train-
ing—and most markedly in the repeated exposure control.
If practice—or exposure—improves performance, this
suggests additional training time would be beneficial. One
limitation of the current study was the limited time spent
training (25 min) and refreshing (15 min) ME skills. Per-
haps this is the reason why the reinforcement sessions were
ineffective. This data suggests that exposure is an impor-
tant element for learning, and future studies should explore
increased exposure and training time manipulations.

A limitation of the current study was all conditions
performed significantly better on post-test 2 (as compared
to the pre-test and post-test 1), which suggests that the
stimuli utilized in post-test 2 may have been easier than the
other tests. Pilot tests were conducted to ensure that the ME
items were divided into equally difficult post-tests, and
while not significant the pattern revealed by the means
suggests that post-test 2 was slightly easier. Although the
availability of a subject pool was prohibitive in this sense,
future research should counterbalance the order of these
tests to insure that accuracy is due to the manipulation, not
the ease of any particular test.
Another limitation was the nature of the MEs used to

both test and train recognition. These MEs were full-face
but very quick expressions of emotion that were imbedded
within a poser’s neutral expression. Research has shown
that spontaneous expressions are more difficult to interpret
than posed expressions, as often naturally occurring
expressions blend with other emotions or expressions
(Naab and Russell 2007). Naturally occurring MEs may not
engage every action unit, do not occur at the same speed or
intensity every time, may be masked or covered by other
expressions, and accuracy of recognition may be affected
by lighting, angle, attention, and the observer’s cognitive
load (Porter and ten Brinke 2008). Length of expression

itself is an additional variable that was not examined in this
study; it is possible that good ME perceivers could identify
MEs that last for varying lengths of time, as they would
naturally occur. While this study presented a necessary first
step to understand boundary factors, these results should be
repeated using more ecologically valid stimuli.
It is important to explore this training on samples of real
world practitioners—such as law enforcement, behavior
detection officers, physicians, clinical groups, and negoti-
ators. However, this training is only useful to real world
practitioners if it relates to a real world skill. One study
under review (Frank et al. 2011) found that the METT
training resulted in significantly better ability to catch ‘‘real

life micros’’ for Coast Guard officers. Although these
officers almost doubled their abilities to accurately read
these MEs, their average post training accuracy (38%) was
much lower than ME accuracy for posed photographs seen
both in their study (78%) and this current study (81%
across all post-tests). The posed faces selected for training
with the METT are not representative of all of the facial
expressions encountered daily, and therefore future
research is required to determine whether these are the best
materials for training spontaneous expression recognition.
There is a need to correctly recognize and interpret a
person’s true feelings in any number of interpersonal,

health, business, legal, and social contexts. The detection
of concealed or masked emotions is invaluable in law
enforcement and national security settings, medical con-
texts and the corporate world—where better understanding
of our suspects, patients, or partners can allow us to make
more informed decisions about a person’s true feelings and
intent. In any context, the ability to recognize emotional
displays can make us more effective perceivers of others,
which can enhance the quality of our interpersonal rela-
tionships and reduce the potential for misunderstanding.
This study was among the first to evaluate the specific
features and use of the METT, a facial expression training
program currently in use in security and health contexts.

These findings validate use of the METT for improving
MERA, suggest the training persists at 6 weeks, and further
provide the optimal way to deploy that training. Previous
work suggests that this type of training will translate to real
time spontaneously expressed MEs, but this particular tool
requires further testing to conclusively demonstrate its utility
across the wide variety of situations seen in daily life.
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reproduction prohibited without permission.
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special issue on the neuroscience of motivation

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url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psy
h&AN=2012-06287-001&site=ehost-
live&scope=site
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live&scope=site
1. Week 2 DQ 1
Select a character that has low EQ from a television show or
movie. Based on your Topic 2 Readings, describe the actions

this person displays that demonstrate low EQ. If you were a
psychologist working with this person on improving their EQ,
what recommendations would you give to improve the
character's EQ?
Please use appropriate citation and reference from the readings
and/or videos for this week’s topic.
2. Week 2 DQ 2
Discuss your results from the EQ assessment. How do your
results provide insight into how you interact with family
members, friends, and coworkers? What advice would you give
to someone who had a low EQ? How could they improve their
EQ? Please use appropriate citation and reference from the
readings and/or videos for this week’s topic.
Instructions: Complete “Management: Self-Assessment” located
on the McGraw-Hill website; then compose a GCU style paper
(750-1000 words), describing your Emotional Intelligence (EQ).
findings. Being aware of what emotional responses look like

and its importance when interacting in social settings. Compare
and contrast your EQ to someone you interact with. Please
include 3 to 4 references from the readings and videos this week
to support your ideas. Use appropriate citation and referencing.
Address the following in your paper:
1. Complete the stress self-assessment located on the McGraw-
Hill website
http://www.mhhe.com/business/management/buildyourmanagem
entskills/updated_flash/topic5a/quiz.html
2. Address the following in your paper:
· How can we be “in check” with our emotions? What are some
consequences of not being “in check” with our emotions? What
are some strategies for managing our emotions? How do we
ensure that our emotional state is appropriate when interacting
with our family, friends, significant others, and peers?
· Compare and contrast your EQ results to someone you interact
with? How does this impact your relationship with that
individual?
Refer to the Topic 2 readings to assist in completing this
assignment.
Prepare this assignment according to the guidelines found in the
GCU Style Guide, located in the Student Success Center.
This assignment uses a rubric. Please review the rubric prior to
beginning the assignment to become familiar with the

expectations for successful completion.
Rubris:
1
Unsatisfactory
0.00%
2
Less than Satisfactory
65.00%
3
Satisfactory
75.00%
4
Good
85.00%

5
Excellent
100.00%
70.0 %Content
40.0 %Explain the importance of being in check with one's
emotions. Reflect on the consequences of not being in check
with one's emotions.
Vague or incomplete description of the importance of emotional
reflection and consequences of not managing emotions. Only
facts are stated; evidence of understanding of the concepts is
not present.
Presents a general description or aspects of the importance of
emotional reflection and consequences of not managing
emotions. Lacks coherency of material. Does touch on topics
but is limited or undeveloped in details, rationales, and/or
examples are present.
Presents direct and focused descriptions of the importance of
emotional reflection and consequences of not managing

emotions.
Presents detailed, direct, and focused descriptions of the
importance of emotional reflection and consequences of not
managing emotions. Information accurately reflects the course
materials. Theories are explored in-depth and comparisons
integrate supporting examples and details into rationale.
Attempts to make some connections that others do not make
between ideas are present.
Presents in-depth, direct, and focused descriptions of the
importance of emotional reflection and consequences of not
managing emotions. Information accurately reflects the course
materials and other scholarly sources. Theories, principals, and
behavior comparisons are explored and connected to multiple
examples and details. Draws complex factors from research.
30.0 %Compare and contrast your Emotional IQ results to the
results of an additional individual. Explain how these results
impact the relationship.
Does not provide a comparison of results. Evidence used to
support rationale is absent.

Describes and compares briefly two sets of Emotional
Intelligence results. Describes and compares briefly the impact
these results have on the relationship. Limited evidence is used
to support rationale. Rationale relies on own beliefs, and is not
supported by scientific evidence.
Broadly describes and compares two sets of Emotional
Intelligence results. Broadly describes and compares the impact
these results have on the relationship. Multiple perspectives are
integrated. Evidence is used to support rationale. Effectively
incorporates one's own beliefs supported by research.
Provides a focused and detailed explanation of the two sets of
Emotional Intelligence results, and the impact the results have
on the relationship. Multiple perspectives are integrated.
Evidence is used to support rationale. Draws unexpected, fresh,
and integrative conclusions.
Provides a thorough explanation of the two sets of Emotional
Intelligence results, and the impact the results have on the
relationship in a variety of contexts. Multiple perspectives are
integrated. Evidence is used to support rationale and takes an
original, unique, imaginative approach.

20.0 %Organization and Effectiveness
7.0 %Thesis Development and Purpose
Paper lacks any discernible overall purpose or organizing claim.
Thesis and/or main claim are insufficiently developed and/or
vague; purpose is not clear.
Thesis and/or main claim are apparent and appropriate to
purpose.
Thesis and/or main claim are clear and forecast the development
of the paper. It is descriptive and reflective of the arguments
and appropriate to the purpose.
Thesis and/or main claim are comprehensive. The essence of the
paper is contained within the thesis. Thesis statement makes the
purpose of the paper clear.
8.0 %Argument Logic and Construction

Statement of purpose is not justified by the conclusion. The
conclusion does not support the claim made. Argument is
incoherent and uses noncredible sources.
Sufficient justification of claims is lacking. Argument lacks
consistent unity. There are obvious flaws in the logic. Some
sources have questionable credibility.
Argument is orderly, but may have a few inconsistencies. The
argument presents minimal justification of claims. Argument
logically, but not thoroughly, supports the purpose. Sources
used are credible. Introduction and conclusion bracket the
thesis.
Argument shows logical progression. Techniques of
argumentation are evident. There is a smooth progression of
claims from introduction to conclusion. Most sources are
authoritative.
Clear and convincing argument presents a persuasive claim in a
distinctive and compelling manner. All sources are
authoritative.
5.0 %Mechanics of Writing (includes spelling, punctuation,

grammar, language use)
Surface errors are pervasive enough that they impede
communication of meaning. Inappropriate word choice and/or
sentence construction are used.
Frequent and repetitive mechanical errors distract the reader.
Inconsistencies in language choice (register) and/or word choice
are present. Sentence structure is correct but not varied.
Some mechanical errors or typos are present, but are not overly
distracting to the reader. Correct and varied sentence structure
and audience-appropriate language are employed.
Prose is largely free of mechanical errors, although a few may
be present. The writer uses a variety of effective sentence
structures and figures of speech.
Writer is clearly in command of standard, written, academic
English.
10.0 %Format

5.0 %Paper Format (use of appropriate style for the major and
assignment)
Template is not used appropriately, or documentation format is
rarely followed correctly.
Appropriate template is used, but some elements are missing or
mistaken. A lack of control with formatting is apparent.
Appropriate template is used. Formatting is correct, although
some minor errors may be present.
Appropriate template is fully used. There are virtually no errors
in formatting style.
All format elements are correct.
5.0 %Research Citations (in-text citations for paraphrasing and
direct quotes, and reference page listing and formatting, as
appropriate to assignment and style)
No reference page is included. No citations are used.

Reference page is present. Citations are inconsistently used.
Reference page is included and lists sources used in the paper.
Sources are appropriately documented, although some errors
may be present.
Reference page is present and fully inclusive of all cited
sources. Documentation is appropriate and citation style is
usually correct.
In-text citations and a reference page are complete and correct.
The documentation of cited sources is free of error.
100 %Total Weightage
© 2011. Grand Canyon University. All Rights Reserved.
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