Targeted disinformation warfare how and why foreign efforts are

Creative Components
Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and
Dissertations
Summer 2020
Targeted Disinformation Warfare: How and Why Foreign EffortsTargeted Disinformation Warfare: How and Why Foreign Efforts
are Effective, and Recommendations for Impactful Governmentare Effective, and Recommendations for Impactful Government
ActionAction
Ethan Guge
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/creativecomponents
Part of the Other Political Science Commons
Recommended CitationRecommended Citation
Guge, Ethan, "Targeted Disinformation Warfare: How and Why Foreign Efforts are Effective, and
Recommendations for Impactful Government Action" (2020). Creative Components. 584.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/creativecomponents/584
This Creative Component is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones,
Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Creative
Components by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact digirep@iastate.edu.

Targeted Disinformation Warfare: How and Why Foreign Efforts are Effective, and
Recommendations for Impactful Government Action
Ethan Guge
Political Science
Iowa State University
2020

Guge 2
Executive Summary
Targeted disinformation campaigns are a cheap and effective way to create real harms that have
a society-wide impact. This form of information warfare capitalizes on inherent features of the
internet messaging platforms and the free nature of democratic societies to spread false and
malicious content designed to increase discord by exacerbating existing social and political
chasms, promote chaos and fear, and generate distrust toward government. A better
understanding and immediate action to mitigate this problem are vital. Right now, Russia is in
the process of using online disinformation to influence American democracy in the lead up to the
2020 election1
. Additionally, Russian efforts are being employed to spread lies about the current
ongoing global health emergency caused by Covid-192
. Even more alarming are indications that
China is beginning to use these very tactics of information warfare to promote fear and panic
regarding Covid-193
.
The following model illustrates the tactics used by foreign disinformation actors. Using
knowledge of existing political and social fissures within a society, foreign disinformation actors
target specific populations for influence. First, false and malicious content is created to appeal to
these pre-determined audiences. These false narratives are then spread into the information
ecosystems of societies through the manipulation of online social media platform algorithms that
are designed to increase user activity and advertising revenue.
Goal: Spread false and malicious content to exacerbate existing societal tensions, stoke negative
emotions, and promote chaos, discord, and distrust.
1
Rosenberg, M., Perlroth, N., & Sanger, D. E. (2020, January 10). 'Chaos Is the Point': Russian Hackers and Trolls Grow
Stealthier in 2020. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/us/politics/russia-hacking-disinformation-election.html
2
Barnes, J. E., Rosenberg, M., & Wong, E. (2020, March 28). As Virus Spreads, China and Russia See Openings for
Disinformation. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/politics/china-russia-coronavirus-disinformation.html
3
Wong, E., Rosenberg, M., & Barnes, J. E. (2020, April 22). Chinese Agents Helped Spread Messages That Sowed Virus Panic
in U.S., Officials Say. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/politics/coronavirus-china-
disinformation.html?action=click&module=Top Stories&pgtype=Homepage
Create Push Share and Discuss Challenge
Create false and
malicious content to be
distributed to a target
audience that picks up
on divisive social and
political issues.
Amplify malicious
content by
manipulating social
media platform
algorithms and
inflating popularity
statistics through bots
to increase content
exposure and the
appearance of
legitimacy.
Interact with unwitting
members of the public
to promote false
narratives, stoke
negative emotions, and
get domestic voices to
spread disinformation
on their own accord.
Maintain false social
media accounts to
interact with the public
using inflammatory
messaging to add chaos
to the information
landscape, increase
anger, and distrust.
Disinformation has
now become a real part
of everyday
conversation.
Create Push Share Discuss Challenge

Guge 3
Immediate government action can be taken to combat the threat of targeted online disinformation
campaigns. The following response framework has four components to address each stage of the
disinformation model: allocating government responsibility, increasing information-sharing
capabilities, increasing online platform reliability, and building public resilience.
Introduction
The purpose of this analysis is to give a historical overview of foreign state-backed
disinformation efforts, insight into modern disinformation tactics and why they are effective, and
apply this analysis to a real-world scenario to inform the general public and key decision-makers
while identifying potential areas of government action to combat this threat. Modern
disinformation campaigns are being utilized to sow discord in the American democratic system.
They creatively use social media platforms to plant and spread false narratives designed to
generate chaos and distrust within a targeted environment. These tactics are low cost and have
the potential for a devastating impact. Currently, this form of information warfare is being
conducted by foreign state actors and is a threat that will not dissipate without effective
government action. Disinformation tactics are so destructive because they use precise aspects of
democratic societies to create harm, at the same time eroding the very mechanisms used to
generate solutions to challenging issues.
The subsequent analysis seeks to answer two specific research questions. First, what are the
tactics of modern disinformation campaigns, and why are they so effective? Second, what
government action can be taken to combat the threat of targeted disinformation campaigns that
effectively focuses on the specific aspects of modern disinformation efforts while being mindful
of threats to civil liberties and the need for a swift, bi-partisan response? Undoubtedly, a greater
•The foundation of an effective response. Establishes
guidelines and procedures for a clear and cohesive response
strategy.
Allocate Government
Responsibility
•Quickly identify threat actors and the content that they have
produced, and communicate this vital information to front
line actors.
Increase Information
Sharing
•Platforms (under the direction of national security experts) can use
their technical expertise to take down harmful content produced by
threat actors.
•Limits to the application of personal data decrease a threat actor’s
ability for algorithmic exploitation.
Increase Online
Platform Liability
•A critical component of a cohesive, whole-of-society
approach to combat disinformation. Gives citizens more
opportunities to use their critical thinking to limit the impact
of false narratives that have broken through.
Build Public
Resilience

Guge 4
understanding of the intricacies of targeted disinformation warfare, and the highlighting of
potential bi-partisan government action can lead to progress on this issue. These questions are
examined through the lens of disinformation efforts supported by the Russian government.
Russian backed targeted disinformation campaigns and their historical development are both
well documented and pertinent to American national security. The threat posed by Russia is high.
However, targeted disinformation warfare extends beyond Russia and can be utilized by a wide
range of state actors that wish to harm free democratic societies.
Overview of Disinformation
What sets disinformation apart is the intention of an actor. While misinformation is the sharing
of false information that is believed to be accurate, disinformation is the spread of false and
inflammatory information, correct or otherwise, by an actor with the intent to mislead and cause
harm4
. The ultimate objective of modern disinformation actors is to create a disorganized and
chaotic information landscape5
. As disinformation spreads, consumers will have an increasingly
difficult time distinguishing what information is real and what is not.
The consequences of targeted disinformation campaigns, also known as information warfare, are
far-reaching. For example, purposefully dishonest news stories can lead to more emotional
reactions among the public6
. Disinformation efforts focus on exacerbating existing social and
political cleavages within a society and thus have the potential to increase existing divisions7
.
The combination of social divisiveness, heightened emotional states, and a chaotic information
landscape produced by disinformation makes instances of harassment and violence within
targeted societies more likely8
. Disinformation efforts, apart from increasing general discord
within a targeted environment, also have the potential to harm personal reputations9
, financial
markets10
, and public health11 12
.
4
Claire Wardle, “Information Disorder: The Essential Glossary,” First Draft. Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics, and Public
Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2018,
https://firstdraftnews.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/infoDisorder_glossary.pdf?x19860.
5
Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried, “Democratic Defense Against Disinformation 2.0,” Atlantic Council, June 13, 2019,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/democratic-defense-against-disinformation-2-0/.
6
Katie Langin, “Fake News Spreads Faster than True News on Twitter—Thanks to People, Not Bots,” Science, March 8, 2018,
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aat5350.
7
Lisa Reppell and Erica Shein, “Disinformation Campaigns and Hate Speech: Exploring the Relationship and Programming
Interventions,” International Foundation for Electoral Systems, April 2019,
https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2019_ifes_disinformation_campaigns_and_hate_speech_briefing_paper.pdf.
8
Paul Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar's Military,” New York Times, October 15, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html.
9
Amanda Seitz, “NOT REAL NEWS: Anderson Cooper Didn't Fake Flood Broadcast,” AP NEWS, September 18, 2018,
https://www.apnews.com/f1b624dc8154458d8c193d3d6be341de; “2019 Brand Disinformation Impact Study,” New Knowledge,
January 2019, https://www.newknowledge.com/articles/2019-brand-disinformation-impact-study/.
10
Max Fisher, “Syrian Hackers Claim AP Hack That Tipped Stock Market by $136 Billion. Is It Terrorism?,” Washington Post,
April 23, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/04/23/syrian-hackers-claim-ap-hack-that-
tippedstock-market-by-136-billion-is-it-terrorism/.
11
Marc Trotochaud and Matthew Watson, “Misinformation and Disinformation: An Increasingly Apparent Threat to Global
Health Security,” The Bifurcated Needle, Center for Health Security, John Hopkins University, November 29, 2018,
http://www.bifurcatedneedle.com/new-blog/2018/11/29/misinformation-and-disinformation-an-increasingly-apparent-threat-
toglobal-health-security.
12
Emma Woollacott, “The Viral Spread Of Ebola Rumors,” Forbes, October 9, 2014,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2014/10/09/the-viral-spread-of-ebola-rumors/#191c27f219d8.

Guge 5
Targeted disinformation threatens democratic societies in particular. Democratic societies rely
upon public support to advance policy initiatives13
. Informed, rational, and civil debate is vital to
form favorable public opinion, the lifeblood of democracy14
. In a chaotic information landscape,
such as that produced by targeted disinformation, rational discussion is made more difficult,
leading to a decreased ability to build a public consensus and thus limiting the ability of
democratic governments to enact meaningful change. Public opinion influences every area of
government operation, including foreign policy. For example, it was public opinion that
ultimately led to the withdrawal of US troops from the Vietnam War, rather than actual
battlefield results15
.
Background of Russian Disinformation Efforts
Governments of nation-states have always been interested in actively shaping public opinion. For
instance, the British army utilized false news stories about the German military to form British
public opinion during the First World War16
. Also, Nazi Germany extensively tried to influence
public opinion, of both their citizens and those of foreign countries, during the Second World
War17
. Additionally, and perhaps most pertinent to current US foreign policy, the Soviet Union
utilized disinformation through tactics termed “active measures” against the west during the Cold
War18
.
The Soviet strategy of active measures, which sought to control and influence the press and
public opinion in pre-determined foreign countries, has long been a critical component of
Russian foreign policy19
. Efforts to spread disinformation have become a vital component
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Information warfare that utilizes targeted
disinformation allows Russia to exert influence despite its reduced economic and military
capabilities. Active measures were regarded as an “equalizer,” making up for hard-power
weaknesses in comparison to western states20
.
During the Cold War, active measures were central to Soviet intelligence operations. These
tactics of subversion were designed to weaken western democracies, drive wedges within
13
Cheryl Boudreau and Scott A. Mackenzie, “Wanting What Is Fair: How Party Cues and Information about Income Inequality
Affect Public Support for Taxes,” The Journal of Politics 80, no. 2 (2018): 367–81, https://doi.org/10.1086/694784.
14
Eggers, W.D., & O’Leary, J. (2009). If we can put a man on the moon….: Getting big things
done in government (Chapter 3). Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. ISBN 1422166368.
15
W.L. Lunch and P. W. Sperlich, “American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” Political Research Quarterly 32, no. 1
(January 1979): 21–44, https://doi.org/10.1177/106591297903200104; William M. Darley, “War Policy, Public Support, and the
Media,” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 2005, 121–34,
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/05summer/darley.pdf.
16
Roy Greenslade, “First World War: How State and Press Kept Truth Off the Front Page,” The Guardian, July 27, 2014,
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jul/27/first-world-war-state-press-reporting.
17
Nicholas O'Shaughnessy, “The Nazis' Propaganda Trick: Invite the Public to Help Create an Alternate Reality,” Slate, March
14, 2017, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/03/how-nazi-propaganda-encouraged-the-masses-to-co-produce-a-
falsereality.html.
18
Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb, “Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency
Group Made a Major Difference (Strategic Perspectives, No. 11),” Strategic Perspectives, June 2012,
https://doi.org/10.21236/ada577586.
19
Abrams, S. (2016). Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia. Connections, 15(1), 5-31.
20
DISINFORMATION: A PRIMER IN RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS. HEARING
BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED
FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION. (2017, March 30). Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg25362.htm

Guge 6
domestic populations, and sow discord among western alliances21
. Russian active measures, first
utilized in World War I and continued throughout World War II and the Cold War, were used
specifically to target western liberal democracies and the NATO alliance22
. The manipulation of
information environments was considered a cheap and effective strategy to harm western rivals
and one that traditional military alliances had trouble defending23
.
Russian active measures have long been employed against the United States. One of the best-
known instances was the spread of disinformation about the AIDS epidemic in the US during the
Cold War. False and conspiratorial news stories claiming that the US government manufactured
and was responsible for the AIDS virus, ultimately spread their way into mainstream news
coverage24
. It is estimated that 10,000 different disinformation operations, involving 15,000
operatives, were carried out by the Soviet Union during the Cold War25 26
. Although the Cold
War has ended, Russian active measures have not, and have given Russia a platform to further
their foreign policy goals as western countermeasures have subsided27
.
Aspects of Modern Russian Disinformation Efforts
As times have changed, the theme of targeted disinformation campaigns has not. During the Cold
War, Russian disinformation efforts continue to sow discord through the use of issues that elicit
fear, such as nuclear war, environmental catastrophe, and the collapse of the world economy28
.
This strategy relies on mass hysteria as its main motivational force, playing on the hopes and
fears of those living in western liberal democracies29
. Currently, this strategy is being used to
undermine western democracies to further Russia’s foreign policy goals, such as the dissolution
of NATO and the EU, as well as disrupt free and fair democratic elections, most notably in
Germany, France, and the United States30
.
Current disinformation efforts aim to attack western liberal societies through citizens’
relationships with their democratic institutions31
. The main goal is for the information
environment in democratic societies to be too confusing for ordinary consumers to accurately
21
O1eg Kalugin, "Inside the KGB: An interview with retired KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin," CNN, January J998.
22
Roy Godson, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg25362.htm
23
Report of the Senate Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference
in the 2016 U.S. Election. Volume 2: Russia's Use of Social Media. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf
24
Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive & the Secret History of the
KGB, Basic Booksi 1985, p. 244.
25
Thomas Rid, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at
https://www.intelligence.senate~gov/hearings/open.
26
Dr. Roy Godson, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at
27
Dr. Roy Godson, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at
28
29
30
Dr. Eugene Rumer, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at
31

Guge 7
identify the truth of an issue32
. This strategy looks not to directly convince or persuade, instead to
distract and confuse, to increase distrust toward traditional media outlets and democratic
institutions33
.
As with disinformation strategies employed during the Cold War, efforts are unconstrained by a
particular ideology or viewpoint34
. Throughout the world, disinformation efforts to exacerbate
divides and create echo chambers of support favorable to Russian foreign policy positions are in
effect. For instance, this strategy has been employed following the downing of Malaysian
Airlines Flight 17 in Ukraine, chemical attacks in Syria, and the poisoning of intelligence
operatives in England, all efforts utilizing both far-left and far-right messaging35
.
From Russia’s perspective, the world has entered a second Cold War period that is being fought
through the manipulation of information. Rather than create new divisions within a society,
Russian active measures look to exploit ones that already exist with the hope of exacerbating
existing weaknesses, increasing polarization, and overall increasing vulnerability36
. According to
experts on the information warfare frontlines, there are multiple long-term goals of modern
Russian disinformation efforts37
. These goals are to undermine citizen confidence and erode trust
in democratic institutions, exacerbate divisive political fissures, popularize Russian foreign
policy agendas, and create general distrust, confusion, and chaos – ultimately blurring the lines
between fiction and reality.
Use of Social Media
Before the internet, Russian active measures sought to produce and spread disinformation
through more traditional means. Early efforts were often carried out by individual actors on the
ground, bringing with them higher risks and time inefficiencies38
. However, targeted
disinformation tactics have been updated by the introduction of the internet and social media.
Russia has utilized the internet, in particular social media platforms, to effectively wage
information warfare. Online social media platforms provide Russia with cheap, efficient, and
effective access to foreign audiences while being able to deny any official involvement in a
believable manner39
.
32
Joby Warrick and Anton Troianovski, "Agents of doubt," Washington Post, December 10, 2018.
33
Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, "The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and
Money," Institut~ of Modern Russia, 2014, https://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Michael_ Weiss_ and _Peter_Pomerantsev
_The_ Menace_ of_ Unreality.pdf.
34
Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, "The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and
Money," Institut~ of Modern Russia, 2014, https://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Michael_ Weiss_ and _Peter_Pomerantsev
_The_ Menace_ of_ Unreality.pdf.
35
Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer, et al., "Information Manipulation: A Challenge for our Democracies," Policy Planning
Staff(CAPS) of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) of the Ministry for
the Armed Forces, Paris, August 2018, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdli'information _manipulation_ rvb _ cle83
8736.pdf.
36
Thomas Rid, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee. on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at
https:1/www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open.
37
Clint Watts, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at
38
39
https://viww.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open.

Guge 8
Russian online efforts began domestically in the mid-2000s to suppress political opposition and
have since turned toward western liberal democracies40
. The impact of disinformation
disseminated through social media platforms on democratic systems, especially ones with
existing social divisions, is the main threat posed by disinformation campaigns41
. Russia has
become adept at identifying and influencing democratic elections, in particular, choosing close
political contests where slight influences and stoking of existing tensions can have the most
significant impact. For instance, in the 2016 US presidential campaign, alt-right audiences angry
about immigration, automation, and economic hardship were prominently targeted for influence
through social media42
.
The ability for Russian active measures to utilize social media platforms to spread false and
damaging narratives has come with the rise of public internet use. The growth of public reliance
on the internet and social media to obtain information has been steep, and will only continue.
Following an explosion of interconnectivity, Wi-Fi, and smartphone use, social media platforms
have become a primary source for news gathering around the world43
. In general, younger people
are relying less on television and more on social media for information and newsgathering.
Currently, the evidence suggests that 68% of Americans get news from social media sources, and
43% of Americans get news directly from Facebook44 45
. Further, less than 38% relied on print
media for news46
.
The capacity for users to share information online easily and quickly without the need to verify
accuracy makes these platforms especially susceptible to targeted disinformation campaigns47
48
. As a result, 23% of Americans have inadvertently shared fake news online49
. The inherent
mechanisms of the internet provide disinformation actors with a great advantage. Tools such as
account anonymity, unlimited audience access, low cost, and plausible deniability make targeted
disinformation efforts exceedingly efficient and effective50
.
According to disinformation experts within the US intelligence community, social media
40
Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, "Russia's Approach to Cyber Warfare," CNA Analysis and Solutions, Occasional Paper
Series, March 2017.
41
42
Weisburd, A., Watts, C., & Berger, J. M. (2016). Trolling for Trump: How Russia is trying to destroy our democracy. War on
the Rocks, 6.
43
“The Mobile Economy 2018,” GSM Association, 2018,
https://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/The-Mobile-Economy-Global-2018.pdf.
44
“News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2018,” Pew Research Center, September 12, 2018,
https://www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2018/.
45
A.W. Geiger, “Key Findings about the Online News Landscape in America,” Pew Research Center, September 11, 2019,
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/11/key-findings-about-the-online-news-landscape-in-america/.
46
Elisa Shearer, “Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a News Source,” Pew Research Center, December 10,
2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/social-media-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/.
47
Paul Oliver, “The State of Disinformation on Social Media,” NYU Center for Data Science, April 23, 2018,
https://medium.com/center-for-data-science/the-state-of-disinformation-on-social-media-397d3c30f56a.
48
Mike Wood, “How Does Misinformation Spread Online?,” Psychology Today, December 6, 2018,
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/web-mistrust/201812/how-does-misinformation-spread-online.
49
Denise-Marie Ordway, “Fake News and the Spread of Misinformation,” Journalist's Resource, September 1, 2017,
https://journalistsresource.org/studies/society/internet/fake-news-conspiracy-theories-journalism-research/.
50
the Rocks, 6.

Guge 9
increases the power of disinformation efforts in five key ways51
. First, the insight into
relationships and interests that social media provides, given the high number of individuals who
place their data there, allow disinformation actors to target a particular audience efficiently and
accurately. Second, online platforms provide the ability to create accounts anonymously, giving
a place to effectively host content that can reach millions of people and the ability for official
government actors to deny any involvement. Then, online platform algorithms can be
manipulated through statistical inflation, mainly through the use of bots and strategically placed
human-operated accounts, increasing the chances of disinformation being spread by innocent
bystanders and seeping into the general public conversation.
If It Trends, It Becomes True
The revenue model of online platforms produces specific mechanisms that foreign
disinformation actors can exploit. The issue of targeted disinformation campaigns is not a truth
of information problem. Instead, it is a system manipulation problem52
. Social media platforms
offer uncensored communication channels that do not require an intermediary between creators
and consumers53
. The ease with which individuals can communicate provides an excellent outlet
for free-speech. However, nefarious and insidious actors looking to cause damage can take
advantage also.
There is a trade-off for the low barrier of entry. In exchange for free access, platform owners can
freely gather user data, enabling advertisers and platforms to share content with specific users
that conforms to their determined interests, sparing consumers from seeing content that they are
not passionate about. Online platforms use customer data to study behavior to learn how to
maximize a user’s time spent online, increasing the effectiveness of targeted advertising and
overall revenue generation54
.
Modern disinformation warfare is computationally driven and enhanced by the revenue models
of online social media platforms. Platforms gain revenue from attention, such as clicks and
shares, and have become experts at utilizing the attention of users. Platforms employ algorithms
to show content to users for which they express a predisposition. This mechanism is a tool for
propagandists. A piece of content, authentic or otherwise, can reach and influence a broad
audience if it gains enough momentum through online platform algorithms. In other words, once
something has trended, it can become real55
.
51
Clint Watts, Statement Prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism:
“Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions.”, October 31, 2017. Retrieved
from https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-31-17 Watts Testimony.pdf
52
Renee Diresta, Statement for the record from Renee DiResta, Director of Research, New Knowledge, October 1, 2018.
Retrieved from https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-rdiresta-080118.pdf
53
“Indicators of News Media,” Gallup, Inc., 2018, https://kf-site-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/media_elements/files/000/000/216/original/KnightFoundation_Panel4_Trust_Indicators_FINAL.p
df.
54
Combatting Targeted Disinformation Campaigns: A Whole-of-Society Issue, October, 2019. Retrieved from
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ia/ia_combatting-targeted-disinformation-campaigns.pdf
55
Renée DiResta, “Computational Propaganda: If You Make It Trend, You Make It True,” The Yale Review, October 12, 2018,
https://yalereview.yale.edu/computational-propaganda.

Guge 10
Once a piece of content is trending, it gains legitimacy, especially in the eyes of sympathetic
users. This process means that disinformation actors must simply amplify a false narrative to
earn a certain amount of momentum and popularity to give it the appearance of truth, and thus
influence over a target audience56
. Online platforms have an incentive to utilize user data in this
manner and display content that conforms to personal interests, increasing the revenue generated
by selling online advertisements57
. Here, the more alluring the content, the longer the time spent
on a platform, and the higher the potential profit58
.
Within the scientific literature, two particular aspects inherent to online and social media
platforms exacerbate the impact of disinformation efforts. The echo chamber phenomenon and
homophilous sorting. First, online echo chambers are formed where users become more likely to
see and interact with content that agrees with their worldview. Online platforms feed users what
they want to know, not necessarily what they ought to know59
. Platform search algorithms
provide results tied to prior behavior, meaning content viewed will likely conform to a user’s
pre-existing biases, seeming more credible than content that does not60
. Credibility is gained,
especially with emotionally compelling information, as the emotional appeal of information will
connect a user more strongly and outweigh one’s interest in trustworthiness61
.
Second, going hand in hand with the formation of echo chambers is homophilous sorting.
Homophilous sorting is the propensity of individuals who share the same perspective to form
close-minded groups with one another62
. The internet and social media have been shown to
56
Renee Diresta. Statement for the record from Renee DiResta, Director of Research, New Knowledge, October 1, 2018.
Retrieved from https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-rdiresta-080118.pdf
57
Allcott Hunt and Matthew Gentzkow, “Social media and fake news in the 2016 election,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
vol. 31, no. 2. 2017, pp. 1–28, https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews.pdf.
58
Tim Hwang, “Digital Disinformation: A Primer,” Atlantic Council, September 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Digital_Disinformation_Primer_web_0925.pdf.
59
60
Denise-Marie Ordway, “What Research Says about How Bad Information Spreads Online,” Journalist's Resource, July 19,
2018, https://journalistsresource.org/studies/society/news-media/fake-news-bad-information-online-research/.
61
Joe Andrews, “Fake News Is Real - A.I. Is Going to Make It Much Worse,” CNBC, July 12, 2019,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/12/fake-news-is-real-ai-is-going-to-make-it-much-worse.html
62
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. Annual review of
sociology, 27(1), 415-444.
Content is
introduced to a
target audience that
is sympathetic to a
particular viewpoint
on a topic
Content designed to
be emotionally
compelling to a user
is then spread
through the
manipulation of
sharing functions,
reaching further
members of a
similar audience
Content gains
legitimacy from
statistical inflation
(number of
interactions and
shares)

Guge 11
encourage the grouping together of like-minded individuals63 64 65
. Search functions and online
platform algorithms show users content that reinforces their previously held beliefs based on
their history66
. Homophilous sorting creates niches on online platforms where individuals
become less likely to be exposed to information that challenges their perspectives67
. As biases
and prejudices are endlessly reinforced through personalized news feeds, individuals hear only
their own opinion and have the ability to restrict themselves to only their point of view68
. Due to
these mechanisms of online platforms, ideological boundaries are rarely crossed. For instance,
those who discuss political issues with others who share their perspective are more likely to end
up in more extreme ideological positions69
.
Wired for Manipulation
The mechanisms of online communication platforms do not merge well with the human brain. In
an already muddied and overwhelming information ecosystem, particular facts of how the human
brain operates highlight just how vulnerable targeted populations are to information warfare.
Individual concepts can illustrate how rational decision-making falters in the face of
overwhelming amounts of information. The first concept is the majority illusion.
A majority illusion is created as a result of computational propaganda70
. Here, particular
members within a social network can give the appearance that an idea, opinion, or product is
more popular than it is 71
. The more a piece of content is inflated statistically through the
exploitation of social media algorithms, the more likely real people are to believe its credibility.
In other words, the more attention something has, the more it has trended, the more truthful it
looks to the human brain. When the information landscape is muddied, and the truth is
indistinguishable from fiction in many areas, individuals resort to trusting information that
supports their personal biases and preferences, especially the higher its popularity72
.
The second concept aiding disinformation actors is the vast array of confirmation biases that
exacerbate the echo chamber phenomenon73
. Confirmation bias is where individuals give
unequal attention and weight to information that supports their position. As a result, individuals
seek and interpret evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs. Personalized news feeds
63
Adamic, L. A., & Glance, N. (2005, August). The political blogosphere and the 2004 US election: divided they blog. In
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Link discovery (pp. 36-43). ACM.
64
Hargittai, E., Gallo, J., & Kane, M. (2008). Cross-ideological discussions among conservative and liberal bloggers. Public
Choice, 134(1-2), 67-86.
65
Conover, M. D., Ratkiewicz, J., Francisco, M., Gonçalves, B., Menczer, F., & Flammini, A. (2011, July). Political polarization
on twitter. In Fifth international AAAI conference on weblogs and social media.
66
Farrell, H. (2012). The consequences of the internet for politics. Annual review of political science, 15.
67
Baum, M. A. (2011). Red state, blue state, flu state: Media self-selection and partisan gaps in swine flu vaccinations. Journal of
health politics, policy and law, 36(6), 1021-1059.
68
Sunstein, C. R. (2018). # Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media. Chapter One. Princeton University Press.
69
Van Alstyne, M., & Brynjolfsson, E. (2005). Global village or cyber-Balkans? Modeling and measuring the integration of
electronic communities. Management Science, 51(6), 851–868. doi:10.2307/20110380.
70
the Rocks, 6.
71
Lerman, K., Yan, X., & Wu, X. Z. (2016). The" majority illusion" in social networks. PloS one, 11(2).
72
Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P. N. (2019). The global disinformation order: 2019 global inventory of organised social media
manipulation. Project on Computational Propaganda.
73
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2(2),
175–220. doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175.

Guge 12
give aid to these unconscious forces and only increase one’s selectiveness. Further, motivated
skepticism is a concept which states that individuals tend to end up with more extreme positions
after seeking out dissimilar information74
. This effect causes individuals to evaluate similar
arguments to their own higher than ones that are not. As with confirmation biases, social media
algorithms exacerbate this concept by actively presenting users with arguments corresponding to
their point of view. In the case of disinformation, as targeted individuals receive false narratives
through the exploitation of online algorithms, this information can solidify incendiary ideological
positions, decreasing civility as a result and causing overall harm to a democratic society.
Prior beliefs significantly impact individuals’ evaluation of evidence, and humans will take
advantage of opportunities to be selective. Humans are wired to limit their exposure to situations
in which personal views may be threatened, and are more likely to select the information that
conforms to their previously held social goals and beliefs75
. For example, individuals are more
likely to remember and believe the first sources of information they receive on a divisive
topic76
. Due to how crucial first impressions are to the recall and internalization of information,
disinformation actors can quickly introduce and amplify narrative-shaping content on sensational
issues to powerful effect.
Predispositions account for a large portion of individuals’ overall information consumption77
.
For instance, individual preferences for newspaper content are related to one’s sex, race, and
level of education78
. These preferences have also been shown regarding the selection of online
news topics79
. Additional research has demonstrated that individuals are more willing to choose
online news outlets and news stories that run parallel to their ideological leanings80 81
.
Further, an underlying factor is that emotions, rather than rationality, hold influence on human
day-to-day decision making82
. The fact that emotionality is more pervasive than rationality is
evident from recent studies that examined voter allegiances in the 2016 US electoral campaign83
.
These studies provide support for the fact that it takes far more than mere facts and logic to
change someone’s mind. This difficulty is due to a tension in the brain between responding to
new information and resisting overwhelming amounts of conflicting data84
. The pressure here is
74
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. American Journal of Political
Science, 50(3), 755–769. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006. 00214.x.
75
Tewksbury, D., & Riles, J. M. (2015). Polarization as a Function of Citizen Predispositions and Exposure to News on the
Internet. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 59(3), 381-398.
76
Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, "The Russian 'Firehose ofFalsehood,' Propaganda Model," RAND Corporation, 2016,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE198/RAND_PE198.pdf.
77
Katz, E., Blumler, J. G., & Gurevitch, M. (1974). Utilization of mass communication by the individual. In J. G. Blumler & E.
Katz (Eds.), The uses of mass communication: Current perspectives on gratifications research (pp. 19–32). Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.
78
Bogart, L. (1989). Press and public: Who reads what, when, where, and why in American newspapers. Psychology Press.
79
Dutta-Bergman, M. J. (2004). Complementarity in consumption of news types across traditional and new media. Journal of
Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 48(1), 41-60.
80
Lyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use. Journal of
Communication, 59, 19–39. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01402.x
81
Knobloch-Westerwick, S., & Meng, J. (2009). Looking the other way: Selective exposure to attitude-consistent and
counterattitudinal political information. Communication Research, 36, 426–448. doi:10.1177/0093650209333030
82
Al-Rodhan, N. (2013). The Future of International Relations: A Symbiotic Realism Theory.
83
Jacewicz, N. (2016, May 3). Why Trump and Clinton Voters Won't Switch: It's in Their Brains. Retrieved from
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-trump-and-clinton-voters-won-t-switch-it-s-in-their-brains/
84
Fineberg, S. K., & Corlett, P. R. (2016). The doxastic shear pin: delusions as errors of learning and memory. Cognitive
neuropsychiatry, 21(1), 73-89.

Guge 13
enough to prevent opinion change altogether in the event of information overload. The internet
and social media are home to overwhelming amounts of opinions and information, leading to
information overload, only heightening this neurological phenomenon.
Additional evidence suggests that decision making regarding opinion change takes place in the
self-reference section of the brain85
. More specifically, opinion formation occurs through the
construction of personal narratives that persist in the face of conflicting information. Paying
attention to details that one would typically ignore floods the brain with contradictory
information, and delusions are the brain’s adaptation to facing this uncertainty. Misconceptions
of this manner are primarily a survival mechanism86
. In life-threatening situations, decisions
need to be made quickly in the face of overwhelming amounts of conflicting data. Therefore,
there is a trade-off between accuracy and speed in the brain.
Humans make decisions based on constructed narratives of self-reference. Once a decision has
been made, the brain plays catch-up. Further evidence has supported the idea that decisions are
prepared before the brain has fully processed all information87
. This evidence is supported
further regarding opinions held on issues ties to community values, such as abortion and gun
rights88
. Individuals tend to moderate their views on these issues as they are forced to explain the
mechanisms behind their position. However, this does not hold for community value-based
issues. Instead, opinion change for these issues hinges on one-to-one in-person conversations that
help individuals relate to the group in question89
.
False narratives strategically spread and then amplified through social media can have an
immense and destructive impact as a result. Foreign actors can utilize sensitive issues, such as
race-relations or other issues tied to community values like abortion and gun rights, to spread
disinformation effectively. Once false narratives successfully gather momentum, they will
influence and drive individuals within particular communities toward harmful conclusions based
on incorrect information that drives fear, anger, and discontent, weakening society and
increasing polarization and distrust as a result.
Model of Targeted Disinformation
Foreign actors using modern disinformation tactics utilize a particular model to accomplish their
foreign policy goals and produce chaos by spreading incendiary and false narratives within a
target audience. These efforts look to first effectively create disinformation suitable for a
particular target audience. Actors then use content amplification techniques through online social
media platform algorithms to ensure a direct impact on an unwitting target audience.
Specifically, intelligence experts at the center of combatting foreign targeted disinformation
85
Izuma, K. (2013). The neural basis of social influence and attitude change. Current opinion in neurobiology, 23(3), 456-462.
86
Fineberg, S. K., & Corlett, P. R. (2016). The doxastic shear pin: delusions as errors of learning and memory. Cognitive
neuropsychiatry, 21(1), 73-89.
87
Van Den Berg, R., Anandalingam, K., Zylberberg, A., Kiani, R., Shadlen, M. N., & Wolpert, D. M. (2016). A common
mechanism underlies changes of mind about decisions and confidence. Elife, 5, e12192.
88
Fernbach, P. M., Rogers, T., Fox, C. R., & Sloman, S. A. (2013). Political extremism is supported by an illusion of
understanding. Psychological science, 24(6), 939-946.
89
Broockman, D., & Kalla, J. (2016). Durably reducing transphobia: A field experiment on door-to-door
canvassing. Science, 352(6282), 220-224.

Guge 14
warfare have highlighted five steps that threat actors use: create, push, share, discuss, and
challenge90
.
Create
Foreign disinformation actors create content to target specific audiences, picking up on already
divisive themes91
. An actor will first seek to analyze the target audience, determine how
information flows through the target environment, and identify which societal fissures to
exploit92
. In this first stage, Russian disinformation efforts, in particular, use a blend of overt and
covert operations. First, hacking and obtaining sensitive data that highlights relevant
characteristics of a target audience, followed by spreading false narratives through the use of
captured user data, often initially through state-funded online media sources93
.
The messaging topics of created content can be political, financial, or social. Social messages
promote fear of global calamity and the collapse of the western liberal order, while political
messages are designed to undermine political leaders and institutions94
. Financial messages look
to weaken confidence and trust in the free market95
. Social messages are particularly dangerous
because they pick up on divisive social issues easily gathered through user data on online social
media platforms. This messaging looks to exacerbate social tensions and undermine the social
fabric of society by promoting fear, discord, and distrust in the status quo96
.
After false and misleading content is created, a campaign is launched to deliver content to initial
seeding locations such as online forums or social media platforms97
. Delivery to these sources
sets the stage, creating the illusion that there are multiple sources for a particular story. Written
articles, blog posts, and social media posts are created as references, adding momentum to
previously concocted false news stories. Here, operatives are performing what is known as
90
Clint Watts, Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 27, 2017, available at https://www.fj:Jri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Watts-Testimony-Senate-Arrried-Services-email-distro-Final.pdf.
91
92
93
Jim Rutenberg, "RT, Sputnik and Russia's New Theory of War," The New York Times Magazine, September 13, 2017.
94
Richard Gooding, “The Trashing of John McCain,” Vanity Fair, September 24, 2008,
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2004/11/mccain200411; Jennifer Steinhauer, “Confronting Ghosts of 2000 in South Carolina,”
New York Times, October 19, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/19/us/politics/19mccain.html.
95
A.J. Perez, “Bogus Nike Coupon featuring Colin Kaepernick offers discount to ‘people of color,’” USA Today, September 13,
2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2018/09/13/fake-nike-colin-kaepernick-coupon-offers-discount-people-
color/1294875002/.
96
William Broad, “Your 5G Phone Won’t Hurt You But Russia Wants You to Think Otherwise,” New York Times, May 12,
2019, https://www.nytimes.com › science › 5g-phone-safety-health-russia/.;
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-china.html
97

Guge 15
“information laundering,” or adding legitimacy to disinformation by discussing it, ultimately
laying the groundwork for further spread and amplification98
.
Push
The second step is to amplify created content that supports false narratives. The manipulation of
online social media platforms sharing functions and revenue generation algorithms pushes
disinformation into mainstream conversations99
. Strategic online social media accounts and
“bots” work to amplify the number of views a piece of content receives. The idea is to earn the
attention of a significant number of unwitting members of a target audience, and even members
of the mainstream media100
.
Automated accounts, or “bots,” are an essential aspect of pushing disinformation into the
communication channels of a target audience. Bots are computer algorithms designed to execute
specific online tasks autonomously and repetitively. By simulating the behavior of human actors
in social networks, they can believably and strategically interact with others and share
information on social media101
. These social media automated accounts allow disinformation
actors to easily amplify and spread content, creating the illusion of popularity, and thus add to its
legitimacy. Altogether, 190 million automated accounts on social media platforms existed to
amplify disinformation leading up to the 2016 US presidential election, more than half the
population of the United States102
. Overall, it is estimated that 45 percent of Russia’s current
activity on Twitter is through mostly automated accounts103
.
Modern foreign-backed disinformation efforts utilize every popular social media platform, such
as Instagram, Reddit, YouTube, Tumblr, 4chan, and Pinterest104
. Disinformation operatives use
social media to spread disinformation and operate under two main principles: high volume and
multiple channels. Threat actors use a wide variety of online methods to create a “fire hose of
falsehood” through the sheer volume of false content spread to targeted audiences through a wide
variety of channels105
. High volume and repetition of disinformation messaging on a wide range
of platforms flood the information landscape to overwhelm a target audience106
.
98
99
100
101
“How Is Fake News Spread? Bots, People like You, Trolls, and Microtargeting,” Center for Information Technology and
Society, U.C. Santa Barbara, accessed September 17, 2019. https://www.cits.ucsb.edu/fake-news/spread.
102
“How Is Fake News Spread? Bots, People like You, Trolls, and Microtargeting,” Center for Information Technology and
Society, U.C. Santa Barbara, accessed September 17, 2019. https://www.cits.ucsb.edu/fake-news/spread.
103
Samuel Woolley and Phil Howard, "Computational Propaganda Worldwide: Executive Summary," Computational
Propaganda Research Project, Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, November 2017, http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Casestudies-ExecutiveSummary.pdf.
104
Laura Rosenberger, Written Testimony, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, August l, 2018,
available at https://vww.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open.
105
Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, "The Russian 'Firehose ofFalsehood,' Propaganda Model," RAND Corporation, 2016,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEl00/PE198/RAND_PE198.pdf
106
Report of the Senate Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election. Volume 2: Russia's Use of Social Media. (n.d.). Retrieved from

Guge 16
Additionally, speed is vital to modern disinformation efforts. Due to the importance of first
impressions on the human mind, the rate of spread can have a significant effect on the influence
of misleading content that discusses a sensitive, community-value based issue. Also, the sooner
that false information seeps into a target audience, the more influential it becomes, and the more
difficult it is to debunk given the slow decision-making apparatuses in western liberal
democracies107
. For instance, Russian active measures were being employed within hours of the
downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine, spreading conspiracy theories and false
narrative surrounding the downing of the plane to benefit Russian interests108
.
Share and Discuss
As purposefully false information is pushed into the information ecosystem of a targeted
audience, false narratives are further spread by domestic voices, adding to the illusion that a false
narrative is legitimate. Individuals sympathetic to the interests of foreign actors, and covert
social media accounts operated by foreign operatives discuss and share malicious content to
make unwitting Americans feel as though improbable information is part of a legitimate
conversation109
. Here, there is a substantial reliance on “useful idiots” or unwitting Americans
who pick up on and discuss false narratives110
. Unwitting agents, such as useful idiots, are
perceived to be sympathetic to an actor’s cause but do not comprehend the objectives of their
campaign. These innocent bystanders ultimately spread disinformation without knowing they are
actively participating in information warfare111
. Also, foreign operative-controlled online
accounts will look to share incorrect information with key public figures in the online
information space. These vital public figures will sympathize with a particular inflammatory
viewpoint, have legitimate influence in some capacity, and carry a substantial online
following112
.
A disinformation actor needs to control the effect of a false narrative and manipulate the reaction
of a target audience. This control is gained through the infiltration of public online conversations,
inciting conflict, and strengthening the illusion of consensus by trolling comment sections of
online posts113
. “Trolls” and covert operatives, backed by foreign actors, use online platforms to
discuss content that connects with real people in the target audience. This organic connection is a
vital pillar of disinformation efforts. Attraction and exploitation of real individuals in the target
107
108
Margaret Harjmann, "Russia's 'Conspiracy Theory': MHl 7 Shot Down by Ukrainian Fighter Jet or Missile,"
New York Magazine,· July 22, 2014.
109
110
111
112
113

Guge 17
audience to “retweet” or spread content, or even to host events in the real world, is a primary
goal of targeted disinformation campaigns114
.
Challenge
Lastly, false personas on online platforms look to heckle and troll to create confusion and chaos,
making truth increasingly indistinguishable from fiction115
. These “trolls” seek to stifle
democratic debate online, overwhelming social media users with a glut of false information that
works to promote doubt and paranoia116
. “Trolling” is a prominent aspect of targeted
disinformation campaigns. A “troll” is a real person who spreads inflammatory, aggressive,
harassing, and misleading messages on online platforms to provoke emotional responses from
other users of social media117
. To advance the goals of disinformation operations, Russia has
built trolling operations on an industrial scale, spreading disinformation and stoking emotional
reactions both domestically and abroad118
. For instance, Russian trolls have been hard at work
for years, undermining political opposition to Vladimir Putin and supporting those who hold
positions that align with Russian foreign policy aims119
. During the onset of the conflict in
Ukraine, Russian backed trolls aggressively attacked those with views opposite to Russian goals
with offensive slurs, utilization of sarcasm, promoting false information with indigestible
amounts of unsourced data, and overall seeking to emphasize and capitalize on social
divisions120
.
Case Study – Russian Interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election
Overview
Leading up to and during the 2016 US presidential election, Russia conducted a targeted
disinformation campaign to interfere with and undermine the American democratic system.
Russian efforts were carried out through a privately contracted group called the Internet
Research Agency (IRA), which was financially backed by the Kremlin121 122
. The IRA, at the
114
115
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Watts_04-27-17.pdf
116
Adrian Chen, "The Real Paranoia-Inducing Purpose .ofRussian Hacks." The New Yorker, July 27, 2016.
117
118
119
Miriam Elder; "Hacked emails allege Russian youth group Nashi paying bloggers," The Guardian. February - 7, 2012.
120
Sanda Svetoka, et al., "Social Media as a Tool ofHybrid Warfare," NATO Strategic Communications Centre ofExcellence,
May 2016, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/social-media-tool-hybrid-warfare.
121
Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller,
III, March 2019.
122
Indictment, United States v_ Internet Research Agency, et al_, Case 1: l 8-cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, ,2018).

Guge 18
behest of the Kremlin since 2013, looked to influence the 2016 presidential election by
exacerbating existing societal tension123 124
.

The IRA operated like an assembly line, generating false and misleading content on an industrial
scale125
. The IRA functioned like any stable PR or marketing organization would, making
strategic business-like moves designed to reach as many people as possible126
. In 2016, the IRA
sought to impact the primary process for both parties directly, potentially ruining the hopes of
candidates more hostile to Russian interests127
. Recently, other initiatives to influence the
democratic process have been used by Russia in places such as Syria and Ukraine128
.
Efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election were part of a much broader campaign to
harm the United States and western democracies. IRA efforts were one component of a
comprehensive and sophisticated information warfare strategy to fuel discord and discontent in
western democratic politics and society129
. These recent and ongoing efforts do not obsess with
the outcome of a single election. Instead, it is the downfall of the electoral system that is
desired130
. Undermining public faith in democracy and interfering with political conversations in
western liberal states was the central goal during the run-up to the 2016 US presidential
election131
.
With that overarching goal in mind, in 2016, the IRA engaged in a social media campaign
designed to provoke and amplify social and political discord within the United States132
. Russia’s
funding for the IRA was part of a more extensive information warfare operation entitled “Project
Lakhta,” to spread disinformation both within Russia and abroad133
. IRA efforts to amplify false
content, promote discord and divisiveness among targeted populations, and engage unwitting
Americans are visible leading up to the 2016 US presidential election.
Create
First, the IRA would create fake, yet organic-looking, social media accounts, and online websites
123
124
ODNI, "Assessing Russi.an Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections," Intelligence Community Assessment
(Declassified Version), January 6, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_0l.pdf.
125
Anton Troianovski, "A former Russian troll speaks: 'It was like being in Orwell's world,"' Washington Post, February 17,
2018.
126
Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election, Vol. 1, Special Counsel Robert S.
Mueller, III, March 2019.
127
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open.
128
129
Indictment, United States v_ Internet Research Agency, et al_, Case 1: l 8-cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, ,2018).
130
John Kelly, SSCI Transcript of the Closed Briefing on Social Media Manipulation in 2016 and Beyond, July 26, 2018.
131
Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence (ODNI), "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections,"
Intelligence Community Assessment (Unclassified Version), January 6, 2017,
https://www.dni.gov/filesfdocuments/ICA_2017_O1.pdf.
132
III, March 2019.
133
Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., Case 1: l 8-cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018).

Guge 19
run by IRA employees to produce false and misleading content134
. These fraudulent accounts and
online sites would believably claim to be associated with US political and grassroots
organizations, posing as groups with strong views on relevant and sensitive political and social
issues in the United States135
. Often, false narratives would be quickly picked up by Russian state
media outlets such as Russia Today (RT). RT is Russia’s foremost state-sponsored news
organization and a propaganda vehicle of choice for the Russian government. RT created
content, mainly disseminated through YouTube, has been viewed over five billion times and is a
means to develop and pick up on other false narratives that have been concocted136
.
Overall, IRA efforts may have reached as many as 126 million people during the time leading up
to and immediately following the 2016 election137
. For instance, 81 Facebook pages associated
with the IRA, followed by 3.3 million Americans, created 60,000 organic posts during this
time138
. In September of 2016 alone, around 1,000 pieces of IRA content were created weekly,
reaching an estimated 20 to 30 million Americans139
. These efforts, while centered around the
time frame of the 2016 election, looked to accomplish more than influencing the election. Very
little of the content created was in direct reference to any particular candidate140
. Instead, IRA
efforts showed a sophisticated understanding of American psychology, and where the rawest
social sensitivities of the American political debate lied141
.

To help gain this understanding, the IRA sent a group of agents to America to determine divisive
and exploitable social issues and talking points142
. Agents ultimately picked up on sensitive
topics such as race and religion that would become the focus of future efforts. Misleading
content created on social media discussed these inflammatory subjects and sought to amplify
divisive rhetoric and increase the polarity of political narratives143
. Further, Russian intelligence
services were able to exploit online social media platforms and hack into sensitive materials,
providing further ammunition144
. For instance, it was emails stolen by Russian intelligence
134
III, March 2019.
135
III, March 2019.
136
ODNI, "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections," Intelligence Community Assessment
(Unclassified Version), January 6, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documentstICA_2017_O1.pdf
137
III, March 2019.
138
139
Hannah Levintova, "Russian Journalists Just Published a Bombshell Investigation About a Kremlin- Linked 'Troll Factory,'"
Mother Jones, October 18, 2017. Original report in Russian available at https://www.rbc.ru/magazine/2017/l l/59e0cl
7d9a79470e05a9e6cl.
140
Renee DiResta, Dr. Kris Shaffer, Becky Ruppel, David Sullivan, RobertMatney, Ryan Fox, Dr. Jonathan Albright, and Ben
Johnson, "The Tactics and Tropes ofthe Internet Research Agency," New Knowledge, December 17, 2018,
littps://www.newknowl~dge.corri/articles/the-disinformation-report/.
141
Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, "The Plot to Subvert an Election - Unraveling the Russia Story So Far," New York Times,
September 20, 2018.
142
III, March 2019.
143
the Rocks, 6.
144
Adam Entous, Elizabeth Dwoskin, and Craig Timberg, "Obama tried to give Zuckerberg a wake-up call over fake news on
Facebook," Washington Post, September 24, 2017.

Guge 20
services that initiated the WikiLeaks publication just before the 2016 US presidential election145
.
These efforts are part of a broader operation to track and study the online activity of Americans
and better understand the political and social divisions within the United States. IRA employees
made strides to contact unwitting individuals in the US to refine information warfare tactics and
targets. For instance, IRA operatives posed as Americans and spoke with specific grassroots
organizations and learned to focus disinformation efforts on “purple” states, or states with
ideological flexibility, such as Colorado, Virginia, and Florida146
. Content material, social media
account names, and specific target audiences reflect IRA efforts to research and exploit existing
tensions, ultimately picking up on divisive social issues such as race, immigration, and the
Second Amendment147
. IRA operatives created content on IRA-run accounts that looked to
capitalize on these hot-button societal divisions and stoke anger, provoke outrage and protest,
increase distrust in government institutions, and ultimately push American citizens further away
from one another.
IRA content creators would receive a list of “technical tasks” at the beginning of each workday
that revolved around divisive themes and the latest news stories148
. On relevant topics, IRA
content creators were instructed to create “political intensity” by supporting radical groups and
users that felt dissatisfied and discontented with current situations, and the political and social
landscape in general149
. IRA content creation activity would increase around campaign and
elections events such as presidential debates and party conventions150
. Efforts would also
increase in response to real-world events, such as Hilary Clinton’s physical collapse at the World
Trade Center memorial while on the campaign trail151
.

Race and race-related issues were the primary targets of Russian disinformation efforts to sow
discord and divide the US in 2016152
. No single group of Americans was targeted by the IRA
more than African-Americans. For instance, 66 percent of advertising done by the IRA on
Facebook was concerned with topics related to race and was explicitly aimed at metro areas with
high African American populations153
. Also, the top-performing IRA operated Facebook page
was centered on race-related issues, generating over 11 million engagements154
.
145
Craig Timberg and Shane Harris, "Russian operatives blasted 18,000 tweets ahead of a huge news day' during the 2016
presidential campaign. Did they know what was coming?" Washington Post, July 20, 2018.
146
147
148
Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., Case 1:18-cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018).
149
Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., Case 1:18-cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018).
150
Renee DiResta, SSCI Transcript of the Closed Briefing on Social Media Manipulation in 2016 and Beyond, July 26, 2018.
151
Jim Galloway, "Clemson researchers crack open a Russian troll factory," Associated Press, August 7, 2018.
152
153
Phil Howard, Bharath Ganesh, Dimitra Liotsiou, John Kelly, and Camille Francois, "The IRA, Social Media and Political
Polarization inthe United States, 2012-2018," Computational Propaganda Research Project, Oxford Internet Institute, December
2018: https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/534-oxford-russia~intemet-research
agency/c6588b4a7b940c551c38/optimized/full.pdf.
154

Guge 21
Push
The IRA, financed by Russian shell companies, worked to spread disinformation into indigenous
audiences pre-determined to be susceptible to messaging on a specific topic155
. Once created
content is pushed into information circles, it becomes increasingly difficult to disprove.
Successful IRA efforts weaved malicious narratives into regular conversations, even attracting
high profile individuals to push false stories even further. For instance, high-profile individuals
in the US, such as Roger Stone, Sean Hannity, and Donald Trump Jr., unwittingly spread content
created by the IRA leading up to the 2016 election, undoubtedly growing the IRA’s audience as
a result156
.
A primary method that the IRA used to push disinformation was targeted online advertising.
Over the two years leading up to the 2016 election, the IRA spent a total of $100,000 on targeted
advertisements157
. These advertisements reached out to specific populations, mostly in swing
states, and primarily concerned incendiary and divisive political and social issues such as race,
sexuality, gender, immigration, and Second Amendment rights. Most targeted advertisements
encouraged social media users, particularly on Facebook, to follow IRA-created pages dedicated
to these inflammatory issues. As audiences were drawn in from targeted advertising, organic
content could directly entice those sympathetic to the theme of an IRA source. The IRA
purchased around 3,400 Facebook and Instagram advertisements that were seen by an estimated
11.4 million Americans158
.

Another asset to the IRA is social media platform algorithms that are designed to recommend
appropriate content to users that correspond to their interests. IRA created content, taking
advantage of computational algorithms, was recommended to people following similar pages or
who had viewed related content, making it relatively simple to spread falsehoods across a
specific target audience159
. IRA operatives utilized the mechanisms of online platforms to
enhance the effectiveness of their operations precisely as they were engineered to be used. For
instance, the IRA could use Facebook’s geographic targeting feature to pump advertisements
down to a specific state, city, neighborhood, or university160
.
155
156
157
Polarization in the United States, 2012-2018," Computational Propaganda Research Project, Oxford Internet Institute, December
2018: https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/534-oxford-russia~intemet-research
agency/c6588b4a7b940c551c38/optimized/full.pdf.
158
Colin Stretch, Responses by Facebook to SSCI Questions for the Record from hearing on November 1, 2017, submitted
January 8, 2018, available at
https://www.intelligence,~enate.gov/sites/default/nles/documents/Facebook%20Response%20to%20Committee%20 QFRs.pdf.
159
Colin Stretch, Responses by Facebook to SSCI Questions for the Record from hearing on November 1, 2017, submitted
January 8, 2018, available at.;
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Facebook%20Response%20too/n'20Committee%20 QFRs.pdf.
160

Guge 22
Due to the speed and reach that it provides, Twitter is a particularly useful platform for pushing
disinformation. Original content, primarily created on platforms such as Facebook and
Instagram, was pushed out mainly through Twitter to vulnerable target audiences161
. The sheer
volume of posting and ease of spreading information via the “retweet” function assisted in
reaching large amounts of people and obscuring the source and motivation for a particular false
narrative162
. The volume of IRA Twitter posts leading up to the 2016 election was
overwhelming, averaging around 50,000 tweets per month163
. Twitter eventually uncovered over
3,800 accounts related to the IRA, which generated approximately 8.5 million tweets with 72
million user engagements164
.
The use of automated accounts, or “bots,” was heavily utilized on Twitter. This tool gave the
IRA an ability to amplify and push out disinformation by inflating the popularity and reach of a
post through the manipulation of the “retweet” function165
. Content promoting false narratives
would become popular than it was, increasing its ability to reach a target audience and appear as
a genuine piece of credible information166
. Twitter uncovered over 50,000 automated accounts
tied to Russian disinformation efforts around the 2016 US presidential election167
.

One example of successful IRA efforts to push dishonest content on Twitter is the case of a fake
Twitter account claiming to be related to the Republican Party in Tennessee. This phony account
accumulated over 150,000 followers by the time it was shut down in 2017, and worked to push
false and divisive content into the political mainstream during the run-up to the general
election168
. False narratives promoted from this account and amplified through the coordinated
use of bots, found its way into the US mainstream media. For instance, content originating from
the account was interacted with and spread by multiple individuals associated with the Trump
campaign, such as Donald Trump Jr., Kellyanne Conway, and General Michael Flynn169
.
Eventually, content would appear in mainstream outlets such as the BBC, USA Today, and The
Huffington Post170
. Once content had been created and amplified into a target audience, and then
161
Renee DiResta, Dr. Kris Shaffer, Becky Ruppel, David Sullivan, Robert Matney, Ryan Fox; Dr. Jonathan Albright, and Ben
Johnson, "The Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency," New Knowledge, December 17, 2018,
https://wwW.newknowledge.com/articles/the-disinformation-report/.
162
163
164
165
Renee DiResta, Dr. Kris Shaffer, Becky Ruppel, David Sullivan, Robert Matney, Ryan Fox, Dr. Jonathan Albright, and Ben
Johnson, "The Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency," New Knowledge, December 17, 2018,
https://www.newknowledge.com/articles/the-disinformation-report/.
166
Renée DiResta, “Computational Propaganda: If You Make It Trend, You Make It True,” The Yale Review, October 12, 2018,
https://yalereview.yale.edu/computational-propaganda.
167
Jack Dorsey, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 5, 2018, available at
168
Kevin Collier, "Twitter Was Warned Repeatedly About This Fake Account Run By a Russian Troll Farm· and Refused to take
it Down," BuzzFeedNews, October.18, 2017.
169
Philip Bump, "At least five people close to Trump engaged with Russian Twitter trolls from 2015 to 2017," Washington Post,
November 2, 2017.
170
Laura,Rosenberger, Written Statement, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, August 1, 2018, available
at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open.

Guge 23
filtered into the mainstream media sources, it becomes nearly impossible to stop and has already
accomplished its primary objective171
.
Share and Discuss
IRA operations then turned to more involved interaction with target audiences. Overall, IRA
operatives look to stoke emotional reactions on inflammatory issues by weaving false, malicious
narratives into the consciousness of unsuspecting members of the public. Once accomplished,
members of a target audience will spread fake stories on their own, strengthening the illusion that
disinformation on divisive social and political issues was accurate.
Leading up to the 2016 US presidential election, IRA employees operating false accounts
worked to engage and increase public interaction with misleading content. IRA employees were
tasked with creating and maintaining fake, yet believable online personas to seed false narratives
into normal day-to-day online activities172
. These personas looked to inflate audience
participation, attract similarly-minded individuals, and then use divisive rhetoric to stoke
negative emotions from the curated audience173
. These IRA content administrators would portray
themselves as proponents and advocates on an assortment of sensitive social issues such as
immigration, Second Amendment rights, police brutality, race, and sexuality, both from left-
wing and right-wing perspectives174
.
False accounts were successfully woven into the political discourse of the US during the 2016
election, gaining influence, engaging, manipulating, and radicalizing members of targeted online
communities175
. The IRA had an estimated 400 employees interacting with malicious content
created by IRA pages176
. IRA employees posted an average of 50 times per day and were
expected to maintain a certain number of followers and level of audience interaction177
.
Operatives would make efforts to establish credibility with like-minded users by occasionally
making detailed, innocuous, character-building posts, waiting for the opportune time to deliver
inflammatory content. The objective was to weave propaganda into what appeared to be the
everyday conversation of an ordinary American178
. Publishing factual information increased the
chance that audience members would take a phony account seriously, and increase the potency
171
Brandy Zadrozny and Ben Collins, "How a right-wing troll and a Russian Twitter account cr~ated2016's biggest voter fraud
story," NBC News, October 30, 2018.
172
173
Clint Watts, Statement Prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism:
“Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions.”, October 31, 2017, Retrieved
from https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-31-17 Watts Testimony.pdf
174
DiResta, R., Shaffer, K., Ruppel, B., Sullivan, D., Matney, R., Fox, R., ... & Johnson, B. (2018). The tactics & tropes of the
Internet Research Agency. New Knowledge.
175
Polarization in the United States, 2012-2018," Computational Propaganda Research Project, Oxford Internet Institute, December
2018, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/534-oxford-russia-internet-research-
agency/c6588b4a7b940c55lc38/optimized/full.pdf.
176
Adrian Chen, "The Agency," The New York Times Magazine, June 2, 2015.
177
Max Seddon, "Documents Show How Russia's Troll Army Hit America," BuzzFeed, June 2, 2014.
178
Adrian Chen, "The Agency," The New York Times Magazine, June 2, 2015.

Guge 24
of divisive content179
.

Additionally, the IRA, using false personas, would communicate with unwitting Americans and
convince them to engage in offline activities180
. The IRA would seek to persuade individuals to
deepen their engagement with IRA operatives to create, organize, and promote real-life events
such as political rallies181
. Posing as grassroots activists, primarily on Facebook, IRA operatives
would often organize two opposing ideological groups to come together at similar times and
places to create images of conflict, generating opinions that the US was engulfed in racial and
political strife182
. At least 130 events were promoted and organized online as a result of IRA
activity, and over 300,000 Facebook users engaged with content promoting these physical
events183
. Organizing physical events was Russia’s way of arming opposing sides in an attempt
to create civil conflict184
.
Organizing efforts primarily targeted African-American populations and hoped to develop and
recruit particular individuals as assets185
. IRA efforts sought to influence targeted individuals to
sign petitions, stage events, and share personal information186
. For instance, an IRA operated
Facebook page called “Black4Black” got unaware businesses within the African-American
community of Cleveland, Ohio, to give out personal information that would benefit IRA efforts
in exchange for free promotion on social media187
. Also, an IRA page called “BlackFist” was
able to organize and fund a self-defense program for African-Americans in local parks188
.
Inciting political events and protest through social media became a central focus of IRA efforts
leading up to the 2016 election189
. During this period, the IRA would spend almost $100,000
supporting activists to organize 400 different protests and events across the United States190
. An
example of the IRA’s commitment to insight negative emotions on inflammatory political and
social issues can be seen in a real-world event organized by IRA operatives through Facebook in
May of 2016. Here, IRA operatives, using Facebook’s targeted advertising feature, manipulated
anti-Muslimism groups through a right-wing Facebook page with a quarter of a million followers
179
John Kelly, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, August I, 2018, available at
180
181
182
III, March 2019.
183
Colin Stretch, Responses by Facebook to SSCI Questions for the Record from hearing on November 1, . 2017,, submitted
January 8, 2018, available at
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Facebook%20Response%20to%20Committee%20QFRs.pdf
184
John Kelly, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, August 1, 2018, available at
185
186
Shelby Holliday and Rob Barry, "Russian Influence Campaign Extracted Americans' Personal Data," Wall Street Journal,
March 7, 2018.
187
Shelby Holliday and Rob Barry, "Russian Influence Campaign Extracted Americans' Personal Data," Wall Street Journal,
March 7, 2018.
188
189
Ben Collins, Gideon Resnick, et al., "Exclusive: Russians Appear to Use Facebook to Push Trump Rallies in ',, 17 U.S. Cities,"
The Daily Beast, September 20, 2017.
190

Guge 25
to organize an event called “Stop the Islamization of Texas.” 191
On the opposing side, IRA
operatives used the same means to arrange a similar event through the “United Muslims for
America” Facebook group. The events organized by the IRA took place at the same time and
place as each other in Houston, Texas. At the cost of just $200, the IRA organized events
resulted in a physical confrontation and verbal abuse that was picked up and spread widely by
local news agencies192
.
Challenge
Following election day in 2016, IRA activity would increase. IRA controlled accounts remained
highly active and produced more than a million tweets on a typical day193
. After content had
been created, amplified, and effectively shared with target audiences, the IRA, using false
personas, worked to interact with target audiences, further stoking emotional responses on
inflammatory issues. Long after the 2016 presidential election, IRA operatives would
simultaneously take polar opposite sides of an argument to play unwitting members of a target
audience off of each other194
.
IRA “trolls” would monitor societal divisions and were ready to react when new events provoked
unrest195
. For instance, when NFL players began kneeling for the national anthem in the United
States, IRA operatives took to social media for comment, appearing to represent both left and
right sides of the ideological spectrum, spewing inflammatory content to galvanize like-minded
supporters and fuel negative emotions196
. Those performing this role within the IRA were taught
how to comment on social media platforms without being detected, blocked, or removed
altogether197
. For instance, IRA trolls commenting on divisive issues were taught not to mention
anything directly related to Russia or Vladimir Putin198
. The goal was not to convince Americans
of Russian foreign policy positions directly; it was to turn Americans against their government,
digging up feelings of anger and discontent.
The IRA used their well-trained understanding of chasms in American discourse, such as
taxation, race, gender and LGBT rights, and the Second Amendment, to “rock the boat” and
increase polarization199
. Understanding the American political environment is critical for the IRA
191
192
193
Matthew Hindman and Vlad Barash, "Disinformation, 'Fake News' and Influence Campaigns on Twitter," Knight Foundation,
October. 4, 2018, https://knightfoundation.org/articles/seven-ways-misinformation-spread- during-the-2016-election.
194
John Kelly, SSCI Transcript of the Closed Briefing on Social Media Manipulation in 2016 and Beyond, July 26, 2018.
195
Shaun Walker, “Salutin” Putin: Inside a Russian Troll House,” The Guardian, April 2, 2015.
196
Laura Rosenberger, Written Statement, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, August 1, 2018, available
at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open
197
Max Seddon, “Documents Show How Russia’s Troll Army Hit America,” BuzzFeed, June 2, 2014
198
199

Guge 26
trolling operation. IRA operatives would examine thousands of comments to gain a better
understanding of trends and language used before strategically posting content that would look at
home in a particular social media thread200
. IRA trolls were paid based on their ability to
maintain these real-looking personas on social media, and their ability to effectively attack and
defend both sides of relevant issues such as race relations201
.
Russia’s ability to play different ideological positions off of each other was a critical component
of their strategy. For instance, following the 2016 election, IRA efforts shifted from focusing on
provoking members of the far-Right, to stirring anti-Trump sentiment on the far-Left202
. As
Russian efforts to influence the 2020 election ramp up203
, it may be misguided to characterize
those efforts in a way that makes it look like a pro-Donald Trump operation. Perhaps a greater
focus on the overarching goals of Russian information warfare efforts would be beneficial,
especially for framing the problem as a whole-of-society issue and getting the executive branch
not to see efforts to call out Russian efforts as a challenge to the Presidential administration.
Recommendations
200
Meduza, “An ex-St. Petersburg ‘troll’ speaks out”, October 15, 2017,
http://cs.brown.edu/people/jsavage/VotingProject/2017_10_15_Meduza_AnExStPetersburgTrollSpeaksOut.pdf
201
Shaun Walker, “Salutin” Putin: Inside a Russian Troll House,” The Guardian, April 2, 2015.
202
203
Goldman, A., Barnes, J. E., Haberman, M., & Fandos, N. (2020, February 20). Lawmakers Are Warned That Russia Is
Meddling to Re-elect Trump. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/us/politics/russian-interference-trump-
democrats.html
•The foundation of an effective response. Establishes
guidelines and procedures for a clear and cohesive
response strategy.
Allocate Government
Responsibility
•Quickly identify threat actors and the content that they
have produced, and communicate this vital information to
front line actors.
Increase Information
Sharing
•Platforms (under the direction of national security experts) can
use their technical expertise to take down harmful content
produced by threat actors.
•Limits to the application of personal data decrease a threat
actor’s ability for algorithmic exploitation.
Increase Online
Platform Liability
•A critical component of a cohesive, whole-of-society
approach to combat disinformation. Gives citizens more
opportunities to use their critical thinking to limit the
impact of false narratives that have broken through.
Build Public
Resilience

Guge 27
The focus of the following recommendations is on government action to mitigate the impact of
targeted disinformation campaigns. Given legitimate concerns over the restriction of First-
Amendment rights, any effective government action must be bi-partisan, relatively
uncontroversial, and easily implemented. As modern disinformation operations are not married
to a particular election cycle, political candidate, or political party, efforts to combat them need
to be sustainable in the long-term and involve a cohesive government approach.
With these concerns in mind, there are multiple options to combat targeted disinformation. US
law prohibits foreign participation in US elections and permits extensive regulation of
commercial advertising204
. This fact gives ample room to develop a measured, bi-partisan,
cohesive, and time-sensitive government response that covers each stage of the disinformation
model. A practical, government-led response will have four main components. First, to allocate
government responsibility. Second, to strengthen and promote methods of information sharing
between the public and private sectors. Third, to increase the liability of online social media
platforms. Lastly, to build resilience through public education.
Social media platforms have made recent efforts to combat disinformation, such as the use of
third-party fact-checkers and a greater focus on identifying and deactivating inauthentic
accounts205 206
. Also, Facebook and Instagram now permit organizations that buy political or
issue-oriented advertising to run them only under identities that the platform has first verified207
.
In recent months, following the takedown of disinformation regarding the Hong Kong protests,
Twitter updated its advertising policies whereby it “will not accept advertising from state-
controlled news media entities. Any affected accounts will be free to continue to use Twitter to
engage in the public conversation, just not our advertising products.”208
. Despite this, most
efforts could be considered reactive and would benefit from centralized and cohesive
government leadership. Since social media platforms have a financial incentive to permit content
that attracts user attention, whether factual or false, they are unlikely to adjust their business
models without external pressure209
.
Allocate Government Responsibility
The first step is to centralize counter-disinformation efforts and allocate responsibility to a single
governmental party. No one section of the United States government explicitly accepts a
leadership role in the area of foreign disinformation. An agency, such as the Department of
204
205
“Working to Stop Misinformation and False News,” Facebook, April 7, 2017,
http://www.facebook.com/facebookmedia/blog/working-to-stop-misinformation-and-false-news.
206
Davey Alba, “Facebook Tightens Rules on Verifying Political Advertisers,” New York Times, August 28, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/technology/facebook-election-advertising-disinformation.html.
207
Nancy Scola, “Facebook Revamps Election Ad Rules amid Disinformation Fears,” POLITICO, August 28, 2019,
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/28/facebook-election-ad-rules-disinformation-1476638.
208
“Information Operations Directed at Hong Kong,” Twitter, August 19, 2019,
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/information_operations_directed_at_Hong_Kong.html; “Updating Our
Advertising Policies on State Media,” Twitter, August 19, 2019,
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/advertising_policies_on_state_media.html.
209
Michael Posner, “How Social Media Companies Need To Address Disinformation Globally,” Forbes, June 16, 2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelposner/2019/06/16/how-social-media-companies-need-to-address-
disinformationglobally/#2d2e178e3f9f.

Guge 28
Homeland security, should be designated as a lead agency on this issue210
. Identifying and
establishing a government agency to own the issue of targeted disinformation will have several
positive impacts across each stage of the disinformation model.
First, all government actors could come together effectively and form best practices for
combatting foreign disinformation. These best practices would spread to other areas on the
frontline, creating a more cohesive and efficient response altogether. Additionally, this unified
front could aggressively call out and respond to false narratives in a unified fashion, before they
take on a power of their own. Second, this unification would centralize information sources, and
lead to improved knowledge sharing with those in the private sector. Social media outlets such as
Facebook have already accepted some responsibility for removing false and malicious content
from their platform211
. Strengthening the bond between them and the intelligence community
would enhance efficiency, effectiveness, and the speed of which false narratives and their
sources are identified and shut down.
These system-level improvements would combat foreign disinformation in its early phases. A
better understanding of what particular activity to look for, and a clear, unified defense strategy
would identify and eliminate false and malicious narratives before they spread into the
information ecosystem. Also, a centralized government response that allows high-speed
information sharing means a better overall understanding of disinformation actor intentions.
Understanding these intentions is a critical component of defense and enables social media
platforms to identify and take down disinformation more quickly and effectively212
. Online
platforms with greater access to real-time intelligence of how foreign actors are specifically
targeting a particular audience allow for identifying threats more purposefully and efficiently213
.
Promote Information Sharing
Due to the complexities of modern disinformation efforts, cooperation is necessary to limit the
spread of disinformation. It takes action from platforms themselves that understand the
technology, governments to provide proper oversight, and independent researchers to continually
offer insight. Investment into a multi-stakeholder approach that integrates government, private,
and outside initiatives is critical to sharing information responding effectively. A multi-
stakeholder approach is the status quo in other industries. Information sharing and analysis
centers exist in health care, financial services, and aviation, and facilitate threat information
sharing between the public and private sectors.
There are similar coalitions in the technology industry. For instance, the Global Internet Forum
to Counter Terrorism (GICT) is a coalition where the UN, technology companies, non-
210
211
Combating COVID-19 Misinformation Across Our Apps. (2020, May 7). Retrieved from
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/combating-covid-19-misinformation/
212
213
Clint Watts. Statement Prepared for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing: “Disinformation: A Primer In
Russian Active Measures And Influence Campaigns.” March 30, 2017. Retrieved from
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-cwatts-033017.pdf

Guge 29
governmental organizations, and academics collaborate to disrupt extremist online content214
.
This coalition, formed through efforts of large technology companies in 2017, focuses on joint
technology innovation, knowledge sharing, and conducting and funding research to identify and
remove extremist content from online platforms more effectively215
. A similar initiative to
combat disinformation could use an independent advisory committee, as the GICT does, that
includes government representatives to ensure action taken is in line with US national security
interests.
Also, this initiative could utilize technological advances such as the Hash database formed
through the GICT. The Hash database was developed as a tool to contain “hashes” or digital
fingerprints of known terrorist images and videos which are shared with each company that joins
the GIFCT’s Hash Sharing Consortium216
. Once a company has access to the hash database, it
can deploy tools to automatically spot duplicates of the same content when it is uploaded on their
platform. There is an existing tool in the disinformation space, called ‘Hamilton 68’, that could
play a similar role. “Hamilton 68” is an online dashboard launched through the Alliance for
Securing Democracy that provides a real-time look into Russian propaganda and disinformation
efforts online. This initiative would assist online platforms, governments, and independent
researchers to share valuable information, rather than operating independently. Hamilton 68 is a
system that brings together messaging from overt and covert Russian propaganda outlets, and
automated accounts to identify central themes and messaging priorities. The project’s stated
objective is to help identify Russian messaging themes and detect active disinformation
campaigns as soon as they begin217
.
Exposing these themes puts a spotlight onto actor intentions and makes disinformation easier to
identify and remove before it spreads. Efforts such as this will be crucial to provide social media
companies the information necessary to take down accounts and pages that are spreading
disinformation swiftly. Multi-stakeholder initiatives such as this ought to be backed by the
federal government. Identifying relevant foreign disinformation sources and their messaging
themes is a meticulous and tiresome process, and efforts to make the job of social media
platforms simpler would have a substantial impact.
Increase Online Platform Liability
Due to the inherent revenue models of social media platforms, a valid government response must
apply pressure to increase the responsibility and liability of platforms to take action to combat
disinformation. This added responsibility will motivate platforms to take down malicious
content, but also make efforts to decrease the ability of disinformation actors to push and amplify
false narratives through algorithmic manipulation. Ways to increase the liability and
responsibility of companies that operate online platforms are gaining attention within the
government. Senator Mark Warner, a leading congressional figure in the fight against
214
Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism: Evolving an Institution. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://gifct.org/about/
215
Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism: An update on our progress two years on. July 25, 2019. Retrieved from
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/07/24/global-internet-forum-to-counter-terrorism-an-update-on-our-progress-two-
years-on/
216
Joint Tech Innovation: Hash Sharing Consortium . (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.gifct.org/joint-tech-innovation/
217
Rosenberger, L. Hamilton 68: A New Tool to Track Russian Disinformation on Twitter. September 4, 2019. Retrieved from
https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-68-a-new-tool-to-track-russian-disinformation-on-twitter/

Guge 30
disinformation, argues that platforms will need to be made more liable for claims like
“defamation, invasion of privacy, false light, public discourse of private facts, and doctored
footage.”218
Online social media platforms must identify inauthentic accounts and actively
referee the spread of disinformation with a threat of sanction, perhaps by a government body
such as the Federal Trade Commission. Significant and realistic steps toward increasing platform
liability and responsibility will be to follow through on existing proposals to change the
Communications Delivery Act, enact common-sense advertising reform, and create a “nutrition
label” for internet privacy.
Communications Delivery Act
Changes to section 230 of the Communications Delivery Act should be made. These changes
would increase the obligation that platforms have to monitor disinformation. Section 230 of the
Communications Delivery Act was created for two reasons219
. First, to ensure that online
platforms are not liable for content posted by users, similar to publisher standards in other
industries. Second, to give platforms legal impunity to use their technical expertise to police and
moderate their sites as they see fit without the fear of lawsuits. Here, the central purpose is to
empower online platforms to moderate themselves.
Changes to section 230 should be centered around increasing the liability of platforms for
targeted disinformation that is created and disseminated by foreign actors. An increase in
responsibility could lead influential platforms to more actively referee, and potentially identify
and remove disinformation before it gains momentum. A compelling voice for section 230 has
been US Senator Ron Wyden. Senator Wyden has stated that section 230 is intended to be both a
“sword” and a “shield.”220
These statements are contrary to a prevailing view that section 230
gives companies an excuse not to moderate their platforms221
. Section 230 has a broad
interpretation and requires a greater focus on the liability it produces for online platforms. A
debate is needed over whether companies are adequately using their immunity, and the
subsequent responsibility to create novel and consistent ways to moderate their technologies.
The immunity that section 230 provides ought to better align with a centralized government
strategy to fight disinformation. Some have argued that taking down content with a political
leaning should void section 230 immunities222
. Perhaps, in the context of disinformation, not
acting on shared information about sources of disinformation, or working to find novel ways to
moderate would void section 230 protections in the form of sanctions. This argument rests on the
basis that the internet is not neutral; rather, it ought to exist for society’s overall benefit. The
public’s opportunity to make rational judgments is of paramount importance, and the presence of
218
219
47 U.S. Code § 230 - Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230
220
Stewart, E. (2019, May 16). Ron Wyden wrote the law that built the internet. He still stands by it - and everything it's brought
with it. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/16/18626779/ron-wyden-section-230-facebook-regulations-
neutrality
221
Wakabayashi, D. (2019, August 6). Legal Shield for Websites Rattles Under Onslaught of Hate Speech. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/technology/section-230-hate-speech.html
222
Laslo, M. (2019, August 13). The Fight Over Section 230-and the Internet as We Know It. Retrieved from
https://www.wired.com/story/fight-over-section-230-internet-as-we-know-it/

Guge 31
disinformation disrupts the public’s ability to form reasonable opinions and make sound
judgments.
Advertising Reform
Common sense advertising reform can combat algorithmic manipulation. Here, improvements
ought to center around curbing advertisers’ ability to target and track potential customers online.
Foreign disinformation actors can capitalize on online platforms’ use of user data to target
specific audiences that are vulnerable to particular messaging. Two existing proposals do well in
this area, have bipartisan support, and should be passed. First is the “Do Not Track Me Online
Act,” introduced in 2011. This legislation includes enforcement for an online opt-out
mechanism, enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, to ensure that platforms or websites
may not use personal data to target and track an individual. Under this act, unsolicited use of user
data would be regarded as an unfair and deceptive act or practice affecting commerce prescribed
under the Federal Trade Commission Act223
.
Second is the Honest Ads Act. This legislation was introduced by US Senators Mark Warner,
Amy Klobuchar, and Lindsey Graham. The goal of this legislation is to prevent foreign
interference in US elections and improve the transparency of online political advertising. The act
was put forth as a response to Russia’s buying and placing of ads during the 2016 election,
utilizing online platforms usage of user data to target specific populations. The Honest Ads Act
would deter foreign actors from influencing elections by taking steps to ensure that the same
rules cover advertisements sold online as ads sold on TV, radio, and satellite224
. Providing the
disclosure of this information improves overall transparency, thus preventing foreign actors from
using personal data to target vulnerable segments of the general population through advertising.
The Honest Ads Act would make companies disclose how much money specific ads cost, the
number of views an ad gets, how the ad specifically targets potential consumers, and the contact
information of who is buying an ad225
. Specifically, the Honest Ads Act would improve online
advertisement disclosure by amending the definition of “electioneering communication” in
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, to include paid internet and digital
advertisements226
. It would also require digital platforms with at least 50,000,000 monthly
visitors to maintain a public file of all electioneering communications purchased by a person or
group who spends a significant amount of money on online advertising227
. These steps require
that online platforms more actively ensure that foreign actors cannot purchase political
advertisements to influence the American public.
223
Speier, & Jackie. (2011, February 18). H.R.654 - 112th Congress (2011-2012): Do Not Track Me Online Act. Retrieved from
https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/654
224
Klobuchar, & Amy. (2018, June 26). S.1989 - 115th Congress (2017-2018): Honest Ads Act. Retrieved from
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1989.
225
Klobuchar, & Amy. (2018, June 26). S.1989 - 115th Congress (2017-2018): Honest Ads Act. Retrieved from
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1989.
226
The Honest Ads Act Explained. (2019, August 14). Retrieved from https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/honest-ads-act-explained
227
The Honest Ads Act Explained. (2019, August 14). Retrieved from https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/honest-ads-act-explained

Guge 32
Nutrition Label
A “nutrition label” for internet privacy would be a simple tool that consumers could look at to
understand what the privacy impact of an online platform is before they use it. Due to the
inherent revenue model of online social media platforms, advertisers and technology companies
are continually finding new ways to collect and monetize data. A significant barrier to consumers
understanding where and how their data is being used is the privacy policies of online platforms.
These policies are usually convoluted and ever-changing.
This label would be as easy to use as a standard nutrition label, with its content managed by a
government agency similar to the FDA228
. The label would fully disclose what actions platforms
take with an individual’s data, and provide notifications to any change in company policies.
Protecting and educating consumers in this way would help them to gain a better understanding
of where their data might be going, and less likely to share data on platforms that can be utilized
by foreign disinformation actors. This action would strengthen the publics’ ability to make
informed decisions about the data they are putting online and increase their digital literacy.
The nutrition label approach is a consumer consent strategy, rather than a harm-based one. The
label would give individuals the power to make decisions based on the information they gather
themselves. For this reason, a nutrition label for online privacy could be passed in a bipartisan
manner. Privacy policies are typically difficult to understand, allowing companies not fully to
disclose how personal data is used. Greater transparency of data usage means that consumers can
be more skeptical of specific policies, more mindful of where their data go, and how they are
used, with the end goal of a greater understanding of how foreign actors can utilize personal data.
As the usage of sites with unclear data usage policies decreases due to this understanding, it will
become more difficult for disinformation actors to use personal data to spread purposefully false
and malicious content.
Building Public Resilience
A vital aspect of combating targeted disinformation campaigns is to build public resilience.
Public resilience is essential for two main reasons. First, creating a climate favorable to solutions
on foreign disinformation is necessary as any government solutions will require favorable public
opinion229
. Second, the brunt of the effort to combat disinformation campaigns ultimately falls
on the users of online communication platforms. Without users willing to endorse and share
disinformation, disinformation campaigns would be deprived of the fuel that powers them230
.
Malicious online content can infect the thought process of a population similar to a virus231
. The
antidote, in this case, is the knowledge that foreign actors are actively trying to influence public
opinion through social media, and what their strategy entails.
228
“What Is the Trust Project and What Does It Do?,” The Trust Project, accessed September 17, 2019,
https://thetrustproject.org/faq/#what_does_it_do.
229
230
Thomas Fingar (Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University),
quoting the Pogo comic strip from 1971 in discussion with the authors, June 28, 2019.
231
Jon Roozenbeek and Sander van der Linden, “The Fake News Game: Actively Inoculating Against the Risk of
Misinformation,” accessed September 17, 2019, https://www.cam.ac.uk/sites/www.cam.ac.uk/files/fakenews_latest_jrr_aaas.pdf.

Guge 33
Media literacy campaigns can be an effective means of protecting users against the disease like
qualities of disinformation. The U.S.-based National Association for Media Literacy Education
defines media literacy as “the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, create, and act using all forms
of communication…Media literacy empowers people to be critical thinkers, effective
communicators, and active citizens”232
. There are indications that the American public senses the
need to become more media literate. Studies indicate that news consumers admitted difficulty
distinguishing between real news and false information during the 2016 US presidential
election233
. Additionally, individuals believed that accuracy, impartiality, and transparency were
the most critical factors in trusted news sources, and wished that the news industry did a more
thorough job of vetting information234
.
Investing in public education and strengthening public awareness addresses the “useful idiot”
problem, where unwitting members of a target population spread disinformation that has been
targeted towards them. The spreading of false narratives through domestic voices is a primary
means of effectively implementing a disinformation campaign. Making the general public more
aware and less likely to believe information from dubious sources decreases a foreign actor’s
ability to influence the general public. There ought to be a wide-ranging effort to empower
citizens and ensure the public is well-informed and well-equipped to use critical thinking skills
when consuming information online235
. A government-led media literacy campaign should focus
on communicating how algorithmic ranking works and why disinformation spreads. Federal
funding for media literacy programs will help consumers sort through information online,
limiting the spread and overall impact of intentionally false and malicious content.
Recent education efforts around the world should be studied. For instance, Finland has been
conducting counter-disinformation efforts centered around public education and bolstering the
critical-thinking skills of the Finnish public. Simple, yet effective, slogans such as “do not repeat
lies,” are part of Finland’s comprehensive strategy to educate the public and counter Russian
disinformation236
. These efforts become less about correcting false information, and more about
creating a positive counter-narrative, promoting the idea that combatting disinformation is a
fundamental civic duty.
Strong public education efforts are observable in other European countries such as Sweden and
Estonia. Sweden has actively produced educational content for recent election cycles that explain
what signs to look for regarding targeted disinformation237
. Estonia has long been combatting
disinformation campaigns of Russian origin and has a robust response with an active component
232
“Media Literacy Defined,” National Association for Media Literacy Education, accessed September 17, 2019,
https://namle.net/publications/media-literacy-definitions/.
233
Darrell M. West, “How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation,” Brookings, December 18, 2017,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/.
234
“Indicators of News Media Trust,” Knight Foundation, September 11, 2018,
https://www.knightfoundation.org/reports/indicators-of-news-media-trust.
235
Senate Intel Committee's Initial Recommendations on Election Security for 2018 Election Cycle. (2018, March 20). Retrieved
from https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/3/senate-intel-committee-s-initial-recommendations-on-election-
security-for-2018-election-cycle.
236
Standish, R. (2017, March 1). Why Is Finland Able to Fend Off Putin's Information War? Retrieved from
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/01/why-is-finland-able-to-fend-off-putins-information-war/.
237
Taylor, M. (2019, July 31). Combating disinformation and foreign interference in democracies: Lessons from Europe.
Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/07/31/combating-disinformation-and-foreign-interference-in-
democracies-lessons-from-europe/.

Guge 34
of public education238
. Estonia actively counters the pro-Russian narrative by publically calling
out false stories and directly blaming those responsible. The Estonian government regularly
debunks stories emerging from Russian language media, and elected officials will carefully
consider what outlets to provide comments.
Conclusion
This analysis has examined how targeted disinformation campaigns operate and why they are so
useful in addition to highlighting avenues for potential time-sensitive and bi-partisan government
action. An increased understanding of how information warfare is being conducted to influence
democratic societies is vital. Modern targeted disinformation campaigns are currently being
utilized for sowing discord within American democracy. These ongoing efforts are a cheap and
effective way to create real harms that have a society-wide impact. This form of information
warfare capitalizes on the inherent features of internet messaging platforms and the tenants of
free democratic societies. In doing so, these tactics spread false and malicious content to promote
chaos and fear, generate distrust toward government, and exacerbate existing social and political
divides.
Immediate government action can be taken to combat this threat. Modern disinformation
operations are not married to a particular election cycle, political candidate, or political party,
and efforts to combat them need to be sustainable in the long-term and involve a cohesive
government approach. An effective, government-led response has four main components. First,
to allocate government responsibility and centralize efforts to combat threat actors. Second, to
strengthen and promote methods of information sharing between the public and private sectors.
Third, to increase the liability of online social media platforms. Lastly, to build resilience
through public education.
Allocating government responsibility for the issue of targeted disinformation would establish
guidelines and procedures, leading to a more transparent and cohesive response strategy. A
centralized command structure would improve every other aspect of the response, especially
regarding the ability to share information. Improved information sharing capabilities would
strengthen the capacity to identify threat actors and the content that they produce quickly, and
then communicate this vital information to those actively combating disinformation in the private
sector.
Further research should continue investigating ways to establish linkages between the public and
private sectors. The private sector has a significant role to play in combating targeted
disinformation as their platforms are the space where information warfare is taking place. As
information and communications technology advance, information sharing to address policy
issues becomes more feasible. Given the importance of quickly sharing information to an
adequate response, identifying factors that can influence and strengthen information sharing at
intra-organizational, inter-organizational, and interpersonal levels is critical239
.
238
Sarlo, A. (2017, June). Fighting Disinformation in the Baltic States. Retrieved from
https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/07/fighting-disinformation-baltic-states/.
239
Yang, T. M., & Maxwell, T. A. (2011). Information-sharing in public organizations: A literature review of interpersonal,
intra-organizational and inter-organizational success factors. Government Information Quarterly, 28(2), 164-175.

Guge 35
Additionally, increasing platform liability is necessary. Increasing accountability would
empower online platforms, under the direction of national security experts, to take down harmful
disinformation produced by foreign actors and work toward novel technological solutions. Also,
limits to the use of personal data by online platforms would decrease a threat actor’s ability to
exploit the powerful algorithms used to generate revenue. Multiple policy solutions should be
considered for this aspect of the response framework.
First, further research is needed regarding changes to section 230 of the Communications Act.
This research ought to explore whether changes to section 230 of the Communication Act would
be an effective response to increasing platform liability. It is necessary to understand how
platforms would react to these changes, and if overall efforts to combat disinformation would
increase compared to a more open model that relies on the utilization of third-party fact-checking
resources. Additionally, how would a more robust enforcement policy operate? Determining
whether enforcement should run on an incentivized “carrot and stick” model, or a punishment-
based model with the threat of sanctions from a government body is a requirement to move
forward with any changes.
Another essential question to consider is whether an increased liability to remove malicious
content produced by foreign actors would reduce the overall impact of targeted disinformation,
and would this progress be worth the legal battle that would stem from increasing the liability of
online platforms? Here, efforts should build on and apply existing research into what the legal
ramifications of these changes would be240
. The following area of study brings up a vital limit to
research in the field of disinformation. The difficulty lies in being able to pin down the real
impact of targeted disinformation on the public. Determining whether an individual or collective
would or would not have formulated a particular opinion based on exposure to disinformation is
fruitless, due to the wide variety of alternative causal mechanisms. Rather than measures of
influence such as public opinion or levels of polarization, researchers should utilize more precise
tests that examine levels of activity. For instance, the amount of disinformation content created
by foreign actors, how quickly and effectively this content is spread, and how many users are
exposed to and interact with dishonest content.
Second, additional research into the Honest Ads Act is required. Specifically, research should
address how increasing advertising transparency would decrease the ability for algorithmic
manipulation. Over time, would there be a significant reduction in targeted ads places by foreign
actors designed to manipulate and amplify false content? Also, ways to strengthen the relatively
loose definition of “political ads” should be examined, as this policy would not reach ads that are
not considered to be political. Would this be a loophole that threat actors could manipulate? An
additional gap may be the particular limits on spending required for advertising transparency.
Research should explore how exactly foreign actors can buy advertising on smaller scales and
through disguising operations to make foreign efforts look like domestic ones. Also, further
research into a “nutrition label” for internet privacy is needed. Research questions should
examine how information consumers would utilize such a tool. Would this label make consumers
less likely to place their information in online spaces that have an unclear policy and are ripe for
manipulation?
240
Hwang, T. (2017). Dealing with Disinformation: Evaluating the Case for CDA 230 Amendment. Available at SSRN 3089442.

Guge 36
These policy initiatives are a useful place to begin combatting targeted disinformation. However,
these efforts do not reach the logic of social media sites that reward outrage and bias
confirmation like organic social media posts, personalized feeds, and troll farms. Understanding
ways to reach these aspects without changing the ability of social media platforms to operate
freely is vital. The overall difficulty of addressing the fundamental characteristics of social media
revenue generation makes the element of building public resilience critical.
A central component of a cohesive, whole-of-society approach to combat disinformation is to
invest in public education. This investment would give citizens more opportunities to use their
critical thinking to limit the impact of false and malicious content that is created and
disseminated by foreign actors. Further research should address what specific components of
successful education efforts, particularly in Baltic and Scandinavian countries, would be
transferable to the United States. Research questions should examine how precisely an American
social media literacy curriculum would look. Aspects of past successful public education
initiatives that utilize online marketing, including the successful and federally funded anti-
smoking campaign, should continue to be studied and applied241
. Research questions should also
examine the development and implementation of a critical-thinking news consumption
curriculum for elementary education to instill long-lasting positive habits.
Effectively responding to the challenges that society faces require substantial cooperation.
Societies’ ability to cooperate is threatened when the means of gathering and analyzing
information is disrupted. The chaos and discord produced by targeted disinformation campaigns
are real and ongoing. However, swift and decisive government action can be impactful, primarily
as the United States builds up to the 2020 presidential election, and works toward finding
solutions in response to critical issues such as the Covid-19 pandemic and subsequent economic
crisis, racial injustice and inequality, and climate change.
241
Impact of first federally funded anti-smoking ad campaign remains strong after three years. (2016, March 24). Retrieved from
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2016/p0324-anti-smoking.html

Targeted disinformation warfare how and why foreign efforts are

More Related Content

What's hot (19)

Similar to Targeted disinformation warfare how and why foreign efforts are (20)

More from archiejones4 (9)

Recently uploaded (20)

Targeted disinformation warfare how and why foreign efforts are