Second ARC(14th report)- strenghthening financial management systems

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

SECOND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

fouRTEENTH REPORT

Strengthening
Financial Management Systems

APRIL 2009

Government of India
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions
Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances
Resolution
New Delhi, the 31st August, 2005
No. K-11022/9/2004-RC. — The President is pleased to set up a Commission of Inquiry
to be called the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) to prepare a detailed
blueprint for revamping the public administration system.
2.

The Commission will consist of the following :
(i)
Shri Veerappa Moily - Chairperson
(ii)
Shri V. Ramachandran - Member
(iii) Dr. A.P. Mukherjee - Member
(iv) Dr. A.H. Kalro - Member
(v)
Dr. Jayaprakash Narayan - Member*
(vi) Smt. Vineeta Rai - Member-Secretary

3.
The Commission will suggest measures to achieve a proactive, responsive,
accountable, sustainable and efficient administration for the country at all levels of the
government.
The Commission will, inter alia, consider the following :
(i)
Organisational structure of the Government of India
(ii)
Ethics in governance
(iii) Refurbishing of Personnel Administration
(iv) Strengthening of Financial Management Systems
(v)
Steps to ensure effective administration at the State level
(vi) Steps to ensure effective District Administration
(vii) Local Self-Government/Panchayati Raj Institutions
(viii) Social Capital, Trust and Participative public service delivery
(ix) Citizen-centric administration
(x)
Promoting e-governance
(xi) Issues of Federal Polity
(xii) Crisis Management
(xiii) Public Order
i

Organisation

Some of the issues to be examined under each head are given in the Terms of Reference
attached as a Schedule to this Resolution.
4. The Commission may exclude from its purview the detailed examination of administration
of Defence, Railways, External Affairs, Security and Intelligence, as also subjects such as
Centre-State relations, judicial reforms etc. which are already being examined by other
bodies. The Commission will, however, be free to take the problems of these sectors into
account in recommending re-organisation of the machinery of the Government or of any
of its service agencies.
5. The Commission will give due consideration to the need for consultation with the State
Governments.
6. The Commission will devise its own procedures (including for consultations with the
State Government as may be considered appropriate by the Commission), and may appoint
committees, consultants/advisers to assist it. The Commission may take into account the
existing material and reports available on the subject and consider building upon the same
rather than attempting to address all the issues ab initio.
7. The Ministries and Departments of the Government of India will furnish such information
and documents and provide other assistance as may be required by the Commission. The
Government of India trusts that the State Governments and all others concerned will extend
their fullest cooperation and assistance to the Commission.
8. The Commission will furnish its report(s) to the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances
& Pensions, Government of India, within one year of its constitution.

Second Administrative Reforms Commission

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Dr. M.Veerappa Moily, Chairman*
Shri V. Ramachandran, Member**
Dr. A.P. Mukherjee, Member
Dr. A.H. Kalro, Member
Dr. Jayaprakash Narayan, Member***
Smt. Vineeta Rai, Member-Secretary

Officers of the Commission

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Shri A.B. Prasad, Additional Secretary
Shri P.S. Kharola, Joint Secretary#
Shri R.K. Singh, PS to Chairman#
Shri Sanjeev Kumar, Director
Shri Shahi Sanjay Kumar, Deputy Secretary

*Dr. M. Veeerappa Moily – Chairman, resigned with effect from 1st April, 2009
(Resolution No.K-11022/26/2007-AR, dated 1st April, 2009)
**Shri V. Ramachandran was appointed Acting Chairman
(Resolution No. K-11022/26/2007-AR, dated 27th April, 2009)
***Dr. Jayaprakash Narayan – Member, resigned with effect from 1st September, 2007
(Resolution No.K-11022/26/2007-AR, dated 17th August, 2007)
# Till 31.03.2009

Sd/(P.I. Suvrathan)
Additional Secretary to Government of India
*Dr. Jayaprakash Narayan – Member, resigned with effect from 1st September, 2007
(Resolution No. K.11022/26/207-AR, dated 17th August, 2007).

ii

iii

Table 4.3: Unspent Provision was More than the

Supplementary Grant / Appropriation

CONTENTS
Chapter

1

Introduction

1

Chapter

2

Public Finance Management -
Concepts and Core Principles

3

Table 4.4:

Analysis of Observations by CAG in case of Civil Ministries/
Departments
Extent of Cost Overrun in Projects with Respect to Original Cost (Status
as on 30.06.2008)

Chapter
3

An Overview of the Existing Financial
Management System in India

22

Table 4.5:

Chapter

Analysis of Budgetary Process

43

Table 4.6:

Extent of Time Overrun in Projects with Respect to Original Schedule
(Status as on 30.06.2008)

Chapter
5

Flow of Funds from Union to the States –
Centrally Sponsored Schemes

91

Table 4.7 :

Demand for Grants Covered under the Modified Cash
Management System

Chapter

6

Accrual System of Accounting

100

Table 4.8 :

Outcome Budget – Illustrative Cases (2007-08)

Chapter

7

Internal Control and Audit

119

Chapter
8

External Audit and Parliamentary Financial
and Budgetary Control

138

Table 6.1:

Operational Framework of Accrual Basis of Accounting in
Government

Chapter

Financial Management in State Governments

159

Table 8.1:

Does the Legislature Generally Approve the Budget as presented by
the Government

Conclusion

164

Table 8.2:

Parliamentary Powers to Amend the Budget

Summary of Recommendations

165

Table 8.3:

What Best Describes the Committee Structure for Dealing with
the Budget?

4

9

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

Table No.

Figure No.

Table 3.1:

Types of Fund Release Mechanism (Select Cases)

Fig.3.1:

Devolution of Funds from Union to States

Table 4.1:
Due Dates for Rendition of Estimates by
Union Ministries/Departments

Fig.4.1:

Month-wise Plan Expenditure (Rs. in Crore) for April
2004-February 2009

Table 4.2:

iv

Title

Fig.4.2:

Month-wise non-Plan Expenditure (Rs. in Crore) for April 2004February 2009

Details of Persistent Unspent Provision of Rs.100 Crore
or More Under Grant / Appropriations

Title

v

Fig.4.3: Actual Expenditure (Plan) for 2007-08 (up to December, 2007) in
case of Ministries/Departments having a BE of more than Rs. 1000
crore

BIA

Board of Internal Aduit

Fig.8.1: Summarised Position of Outstanding Action Taken Notes

CAS Core Accounting System

C&AG/CAG Comptroller and Auditor General of India
CAPART Council of Advancement of People’s Action and Rural Technology
CAs Controller of Accounts

LIST OF BOXES

CBS Core Banking Systems

Box No.

Title

CCAs Chief Controller of Accounts

Box 3.1:

Allocation between Capital and Revenue Expenditure on a Capital
Scheme

CDA Controller of Defence Accounts
CEO Chief of Excellence for Internal Audit
CFSS Consolidated Fund Standing Services

Box 4.1:

Accounting Deficiencies in case of Centrally Sponsored Schemes
(CSS)

CGDA Comptroller General of Defence Accounts

Box 4.2:

Decision Units and Decision Packages in Zero-base Budgeting

COA Chart of Accounts

Box 4.3:

Shift in Focus from Inputs to Outcomes

Box 4.4:

Distinction between Plan and Non-plan

Box 4.5:

Planning Commission on Plan and Non-Plan Expenditure

LIST OF ANNEXURES
Annexure-I (1): Speech of Chairman, ARC at the National Workshop on

Strengthening Financial Management Systems, NIPFP,
on 23rd July, 2008
Annexure-I (2): List of Participants
Annexure-I (3): Recommendations Made by Groups
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIA Chief Internal Auditor
COPU Committee on Public Undertakings
CSR Comprehensive Spending Review
CSS Centrally Sponsored Schemes
DDO

Drawing and Disbursing Officer

DEL

Departmental Expenditure Limited

DFPR

Delegation of Financial Power Rules

DoH

Department of Health

DoIT

Department of Information Technology

DRDA

District Rural Development Agency

EU

European Union

EYF

End Year Flexibility

FA&CAO

Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer?

FRA

Fiscal Responsibility Act

FRAB

Financial Reporting Advisory Board

Abbreviation

FRBM

Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management

AME

Annually Managed Expenditure

GAR

Government Accounting Rules

ATNs
vi

Full Form
Action Taken Notes

GASAB

Government Accounting Standards Advisory Board
vii

GDP

PWD

Public Works Department

GFR

General Financial Rules

QEA

Quarterly Expenditure Allocations

GOI

Government of India

RBI

Reserve Bank of India

GPRA

General Performance Results Act

SIAFI

IFAs

Integrated Financial Advisers

Integrated System of Federal Government Financial
Administration (Brazil)

IFMIS

Integrated Financial Management Information System

TME

Total Managed Expenditure

IFRS

Integrated Financial Reporting Standards

USA United States of America

IGs

Inspector Generals

ZBB

IIA

Institute of Internal Auditors

MCI

Medical Council of India

MEP

Monthly Expenditure Plan

MoF

Ministry of Finance

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

MTEF

Medium-term expenditure framework

MTFP

Medium Term Fiscal Plan

NDPBs

Non-departmental public bodies

NeGP

National e-Governance Plan

NGOs

Non Governmental Organizations

NIF

National Insurance Fund

NIPB

National Institute of Public Finance & Policy (Mimeo)

NIPFP

National Institute of Public Finance and Planning

NMAM

National Municipal Accounts Manual

NPA

National Performance Assets

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAC

Public Accounts Committee

PAO

Principal Accounts Officer

PHED

Public Health Engineering Department

PPBS

Planning, Programming and Budgeting System

PRI

Panchayati Raj Institution

PSUs
viii

Gross Domestic Product

Public Sector Undertakings

Zero-based Budgeting

ix

Introduction

1

1.1 One of the terms of reference of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission is
‘Strengthening financial management systems’. It has been specifically asked to look into
the following aspects of financial management systems:
“4. Strengthening Financial Management Systems
4.1 Capacity building in financial management systems at all levels of Governance, to
ensure smooth flow of funds for programmes / projects, proper maintenance of accounts
and timely furnishing of necessary information / documents for this purpose.
4.2 Strengthening of internal audit systems, to ensure proper utilisation of funds for the
purposes/outcomes for which they have been provided, and checking that unit cost of
delivery/outcome is as per benchmark developed for this purpose.
4.3 An institutionalised method of external audit and assessment of the delivery and
impact of programmes.”
1.2 Collection of sufficient resources from the economy in an appropriate manner along
with allocating and use of these resources efficiently and effectively constitute good financial
management. Resource generation, resource allocation and expenditure management
(resource utilization) are the essential components of a public financial management system.
The TORs of the Commission basically focus on expenditure management. Efficient and
effective expenditure management calls for expenditure planning, allocation of resources
according to policy priorities and good financial operational management and control. Good
financial operational management focuses on minimizing cost per unit of output, achieving
outcome for which these outputs are intended and enhancing the value for money spent.
1.3 The Commission is of the view that reforms in the financial management system are an
integral part of the reforms in governance in general. Therefore, these reforms are critical
in achieving the national development objectives. The financial management system is
quite wide and encompasses resource mobilization, prioritization of governmental efforts,
resource allocation, formulation of detailed plans, setting up information systems that assist
x

xxi
1

Strengthening Financial Management Systems

decision making, having meticulous accounting systems and creation of robust internal
and external accountability mechanisms.
1.4 In the present Report, the Commission has focused primarily on expenditure
management. The Commission studied various reports and literature on the subject. It also
examined some of the best national and international practices and had consultations with
experts on the subject. The Commission organized a national workshop, jointly with the
National Institute of Public Finance and Planning (NIPFP), to discuss various aspects of the
financial management system in the government. The workshop was attended by officers
of the Ministry of Finance, Comptroller and Auditor General’s office, State Governments,
faculty from the NIPFP and experts on the subject. The NIPFP also prepared a document
on the subject which was useful for the Commission in drafting this Report. Another study
was commissioned on internal and external audit mechanisms. Besides, the Commission
discussed the subject with the State Governments during its visits to the States.
1.5 Though this Report was finalized in April 2009 and printed in May 2009, the
Commission would like to record its appreciation for the contribution made by
Dr. M. Veerappa Moily in arriving at the conclusions. Before resigning from the position of
Chairman, ARC on 31st March, 2009, Dr. Moily had played an important role in guiding
the deliberations of the Commission on this subject.
1.6 The Commission is grateful to Shri Vinod Rai, Comptroller and Auditor General of
India, for his valuable suggestions. The Commission would like to thank Dr Govind Rao,
Director, NIPFP, for organizing the national workshop and also for preparing a useful
document for the Commission. The Commission would like to place on record its thanks to
Shri V K Shunglu, former Comptroller and Auditor General of India, who made very well
reasoned suggestions for improving the system. The Commission also places on record its
thanks to all the State Governments for their help. The Commission would like to take this
opportunity to thank Shri I.P Singh, former Dy. CAG, who wrote a paper on the internal
and external audit mechanisms. The Commission is grateful to Shri R. Sridharan, Joint
Secretary (SP) & Adviser (FR), Planning Commission, for sharing his views on the subject
and providing major insights. The Commission is grateful to Shri C.R. Sundaramurti,
Controller General of Accounts and his team of officers for making a presentation before
the Commission. The Commission is also grateful to Shri Naved Masood, AS&FA, Ministry
of Health and Family Welfare, for his useful suggestions.

Public Finance Management-Concepts and
Core Principles

2

2.1 Definition of Public Finance Management
2.1.1 Public Finance Management (PFM) basically deals with all aspects of resource
mobilization and expenditure management in government. Just as managing finances is a
critical function of management in any organization, similarly public finance management
is an essential part of the governance process. Public finance management includes resource
mobilization, prioritization of programmes, the budgetary process, efficient management of
resources and exercising controls. Rising aspirations of people are placing more demands on
financial resources. At the same time, the emphasis of the citizenry is on value for money,
thus making public finance management increasingly vital.
2.1.2 For a long time, financial management in developing countries was viewed as a
process that enabled central agencies like the Ministry/Department of Finance to keep
“spending agencies under control through continuous review and specification of inputs and
verification of documents, submitted for payment. As an extension of this approach, financial
management was viewed as being restricted to budget implementation, administration of
payment systems, accounting and reporting in the states of funds received and spent. This
approach with a long lineage continues to be prevalent even now, through a declining
scale”.1
2.1.3 Reforms in financial management have concentrated on taxation reforms, the use
of government budget as a vehicle for economic development, through improved budget
classification system, accounting system reforms etc. Cost-benefit analysis techniques were
also applied. From the 1970s, the need for containment of fiscal deficits through tightened
fiscal management, pre-occupied the economists. In the 1980s, the management approach
came to be prevalent which included a corporate type of financial management within an
overall framework of accountability. The overall assessment is that the system of financial
management in developing countries has generally been slow in adapting itself to changing
requirements. Basically, there has been a segmented approach to reforms.
2.1.4 A review of the literature on public finance management shows that initially the term
‘public finance management’ was defined quite narrowly and was confined to budgeting,

2

3
A. Premchand (2005), Controlling Government Spending, the Ethos, Ethics, and Economics of Expenditure Management, Oxford, p.5

1


accounting, monitoring and evaluation. But, it is now widely accepted that it includes
taxation and other resource mobilization, debt and cash management, budgetary process,
accounting systems, information systems and internal and external audit. Thus, reforming
the public finance system would entail several measures:2
i.

Improving the collection of revenue is critical. No country can be run properly
without revenue. Moreover, tax can help to establish a government’s authority.
Tax policy itself is increasingly limited by external forces: in a globalised world,
governments’ choices are less about the tax rate than about the efficiency with which
tax is collected and the reach of the tax net. Thus, the revenue services must be
properly resourced and motivated to collect tax more efficiently.

ii.

Debt and cash must be managed efficiently. In particular, sound principles for
deficit funding should be established, efficiencies sought and proper risk management
procedures introduced. Proper management of the government’s borrowing program
will reduce the cost of funding.

iii.

Effective planning and allocation of resources is key and government should develop
and institutionalise planning processes at all levels of government. The budgeting
process must be transparent and inclusive. There should be focus on outputs rather
than on mere expenditure and related inputs, with strong accounting and reporting
procedures. The office of the accountant-general must be properly resourced and
funded to fulfil this function.

iv.

Effective oversight and monitoring are crucial to sound governance and PFM
reform. A well functioning PFM system must have clear rules on transparency and
reporting, as well as enforceable sanctions for failure. Oversight should be established
by internal mechanisms in the national treasury as well as external oversight by
bodies like independent parliamentary committees, a public ombudsman, a free
media and civil society, and an independent auditor-general.

2.2 Elements of Reforms in the Public Finance Management in Other Countries
2.2.1 The last few decades have witnessed large scale reforms in the public finance
management systems in most countries of the world. These reforms include taxation,
monetary and budgetary reforms. In line with its Terms of Reference, the Commission has
focused on budgetary processes and expenditure management in this Report.

Public Finance Management - Concepts and Core Principles

2.3 Evolution of Budgeting
2.3.1 The Line item Budget
2.3.1.1 Budgeting is the process of estimating the availability of resources and then allocating
them to various activities of an organization according to a pre-determined priority. In most
cases, approval of a budget also means the approval to various spending units to utilize
the allocated resources. In the early nineteenth century, government budgeting in most
countries was characterized by weak accounting procedures, adhocism, little central control
and poor monitoring and evaluation. In the late nineteenth century, line-item budgeting
was introduced in some countries. Indeed line item budgeting which is the most common
form of budgeting in a large number of countries and suffers from several drawbacks was
a major reform initiative then. The line item budget is defined as “the budget in which the
individual financial statement items are grouped by cost centers or departments. It shows the
comparison between the financial data for the past accounting or budgeting periods and estimated
figures for the current or a future period” 3
2.3.1.2 In a line-item system, expenditures for the budgeted period are listed according to
objects of expenditure, or “line-items.” These line items include detailed ceilings on the
amount a unit would spend on salaries, travelling allowances, office expenses, etc. The focus
is on ensuring that the agencies or units do not exceed the ceilings prescribed. A central
authority or the Ministry of Finance keeps a watch on the spending of various units to
ensure that the ceilings are not violated.
2.3.1.3 The line item budget approach is easy to understand and implement. It also facilitates
centralized control and fixing of authority and responsibility of the spending units. Its
major disadvantage is that it does not provide enough information to the top levels about
the activities and achievements of individual units.
2.3.1.4 The weaknesses of the line item budgeting were sought to be remedied by introducing
certain reforms. Performance budgeting was the first such reform.
2.3.2 Performance Budgeting
2.3.2.1 Unlike the traditional line item budget, a performance budget reflects the goal/
objectives of the organization and spells out performance targets. These targets are sought to
be achieved through a strategy(s). Unit costs are associated with the strategy and allocations
are accordingly made for achievement of the objectives. A Performance Budget gives an
indication of how the funds spent are expected to give outputs and ultimately the outcomes.
However, performance budgeting has a limitation - it is not easy to arrive at standard unit
costs especially in social programmes which require a multi-pronged approach.

4

5
Guidelines for public financial management reform - http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/kokkin/tyousa/1803pfm_17.pdf

2

http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/line-item-budget.html

3


2.3.3 Zero-based Budgeting (ZBB)
2.3.3.1 The concept of zero-based budgeting was introduced in the 1970s. As the name
suggests, every budgeting cycle starts from scratch. Unlike the earlier systems where only
incremental changes were made in the allocation, under zero-based budgeting every activity
is evaluated each time a budget is made and only if it is established that the activity is
necessary, are funds allocated to it. The basic purpose of ZBB is phasing out of programmes/
activities which do not have relevance anymore. However, because of the efforts involved
in preparing a zero-based budget and institutional resistance related to personnel issues, no
government ever implemented a full zero-based budget, but in modified forms the basic
principles of ZBB are often used.
2.3.4 Programme Budgeting and Performance Budgeting
2.3.4.1 Programme budgeting in the shape of planning, programming and budgeting system
(PPBS) was introduced in the US Federal Government in the mid-1960s. Its core themes
had much in common with earlier strands of performance budgeting.
2.3.4.2 Programme budgeting aimed at a system in which expenditure would be planned
and controlled by the objective. The basic building block of the system was classification
of expenditure into programmes, which meant objective-oriented classification so that
programmes with common objectives are considered together.
2.3.4.3 PPBS went much beyond the core elements of programme budgeting and was
much more than the budgeting system. It aimed at an integrated expenditure management
system, in which systematic policy and expenditure planning would be developed and closely
integrated with the budget. Thus, it was too ambitious in scope. Neither was adequate
preparation time given nor was a stage-by-stage approach adopted. Therefore, this attempt
to introduce PPBS in the federal government in USA did not succeed, although the concept
of performance budgeting and programme budgeting endured.
2.3.4.4 Many governments today use the “programme budgeting” label for their performance
budgeting system. As pointed out by Marc Robertson, the contemporary influence of the
basic programme budgeting idea is much wider than the continuing use of the label. It
is defined in terms of its core elements as mentioned above. Programme budgeting is an
element of many contemporary budgeting systems which aim at linking funding and results.
“The extent of ongoing influence of programme budgeting is partly obscured by a wide variety of
terminology used today to refer to programme such as “outcomes” or output groups (Australia)
and ‘Requests for Resource’ (UK)”.4


2.3.4.5 In 1993, the US Congress enacted the General Performance Results Act (GPRA)
to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of federal programmes, where
agencies have to focus on programme results. GPRA requires agencies to plan and measure
performance using the “program activities” listed in their budget submissions. So it is again
performance through programme/activities. GPRA had a 7-year implementation time-frame,
from the initial pilot projects to government-wide performance reports, incorporating
feed-back mechanisms. GPRA’s implementation approach also provided for a 2-year pilot
project of alternative performance budget approaches in at least five agencies, with regard
to their spending decision. GPRA aims for a closer linkage before resource and results. As
a report of the General Accounting Report in Performance Budgeting states “In the sense,
GPRA can be seen as the most recent event in al almost 50-year cycle of federal government
efforts to improve public sector performance and to link resource allocation to performance
expectation.”5
2.3.4.6 The GAO Report states that the GPRA differs from prior initiatives in two
important respects. First, past performance budgeting initiatives were typically implemented
government-wide within a single annual budget cycle; GPRA, in contrast defines a multiyear and iterative implementation process that incorporates pilot task and formal evaluations
of key concepts. In this manner, GPRA increases the potential for integration of planning,
budgeting, and performance measure, while guarding against the unreasonably high
expectations that plagued earlier initiatives. Second, GPRA will face operating environments
unknown to earlier reform processes, that is, persistent efforts have to be made to constrain
spending.6
2.3.4.7 But the GAO Report on performance budgeting also makes two important points
when it talks of outcome oriented budget: (i) past initiatives demonstrate that performance
budgeting is an evolving concept that cannot be viewed in simple mechanical terms. It
states “The process of budgeting is inherently an exercise in political choice – allocating scarce
resources among competing needs and priorities – in which performance information can be
one, but not the only factor underlying decision,” (ii) GPRA “states a preference for outcome
measurements while recognizing the need to develop a range of measures, including output
and non-quantitative measures. Focusing on outcome shifts, the definition of accountability
from the traditional focus on inputs, processes and projects to a perspective centered on the
results of federal programs. However, the difficulties associated with selected appropriate
measures and establishing relationships between activities and results will continue to make
it difficult in many cases to judge whether changes in funding levels will affect the outcomes
of federal programmes”.7

6

7
Mark Robinson, (2007) “Performance Budgeting Models and Mechanism”, in Marc Robinson (ed) Performance Budgeting, IMF, p 5.

4

Report to Congressional Committee, (1997) Performance Budgeting, US General Accounting Office, March
Ibid
7
Ibid
5
6


2.3.4.8 The above points need to be kept in view by the reformers who are attempting
to introduce `outcome’ budgeting in government budgeting. Since this is a challenging
task, the experience of some other countries in this regard would be useful, for example,
in South Africa, where attempts have been made to introduce outcome budgeting, in the
later half of the 1990s, with the introduction of the medium-term expenditure framework
(MTEF). The South African government began restructuring its budget format to show
the programmes towards which the departments were allocating funds. The question to
be asked is how well have the reforms worked in introducing result-orientation into the
budgeting process?. As an informed commentator puts it, the answer is less than sanguine
for the following three reasons:8


2.4 Weaknesses in the Budgetary Process
2.4.1 The World Bank after analyzing the budgetary processes of several countries came to
the conclusion that government budgets generally have the following shortcomings:
“WEAKNESSES IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND USE10
Weaknesses that undermine public sector performance include:
i.
ii.

No links between policy making, planning and budgeting;

iii.

Poor expenditure control;

iv.

Inadequate funding of operations and maintenance;

v.

Little relationship between budget as formulated and budget as executed;

vi.

• Firstly, even though performance targets are being developed, they are actually
kept separate from the budget not only in South Africa, but also in countries
like Malaysia, Singapore, and in most US States, “which undermines their
legitimacy,”

Poor planning;

Inadequate accounting systems;

• Secondly, in the South Africa case, as regards performance information, “outputs
are confused with inputs and outcomes remain unconsidered.” Targets appear to
have been technocratically identified which therefore lack real world value. Targets
are not spelt out in detail making actual measurement unlikely.

vii. Unreliability in the flow of budgeted funds to agencies and to lower levels of
government;

• Thirdly, and the most important point is that even when effective targets are
provided, the budgets in South Africa and many other nations moving toward
this kind of system fail to specify who should be accountable for their results, and
who should hold them accountable. “Very little thought appears to have been
given to the process of institutionalizing political or accountability for the targets
identified in their budget”.9

ix.

Poor cash management;

x.

Inadequate reporting of financial performance; and

xi.

Poorly motivated staff.”

2.3.4.9 So programme budgeting by itself may not bring the outcome orientation. It is
also difficult to make performance targets as part of the budget formulation process unless
managers at various levels get involved in the budgeting process, involving prioritization
of activities and resource allocation on that basis.

8

viii. Poor management of external aid;

Many of the weaknesses in budgeting reflect the failure to address linkages between the various
functions of budgeting. The following factors contribute to budget systems and processes that
create a disabling environment for performance in the public sector, both by commission and
by omission:11
• Almost exclusive focus on inputs, with performance judged largely in terms of spending
no more, or less, than appropriated in the budget;
• Input focus takes a short-term approach to budget decision making; failure to adequately
take account of longer-term costs (potential and real), and biases in the choice of policy
instruments (e.g., between capital and current spending and between spending, doing,
and regulation) because of the short-term horizon;

2.3.4.10 These experiences make it clear that unless there are institutional reforms, like
bringing in the ‘agency’ concept, where the heads of the agencies are made accountable for
delivery of services in an efficient and effective manner, the reform in budgeting process
would be difficult to implement. Only with these institutional changes would there be
an inner compulsion within the organization to bring about changes in the budgetary
process. The Commission has examined the concept of executive agencies in its Thirteenth
Report.
Mathew Andrews, (2005), “Performance Based Budgeting Reforms.” in Anwar Shah (ed) Fiscal Management, The World Bank, p.32
Ibid

• A bottom-up approach to budgeting that means that even if the ultimate stance of
fiscal policy was appropriate (and increasingly after 1973 it was not) game playing by
9
Handbook of public expenditure, 1998
Handbook of public expenditure, 1998

8

10

9

11


both line and central agencies led to high transaction costs to squeeze the bottom-up
bids into the appropriate fiscal policy box;
• A tendency to budget in real terms, leading either to pressure on aggregate spending
where inflation is significant (which was often validated through supplementary
appropriations) or arbitrary cuts during budget execution with adverse consequences
at the agency level;


2.4.2 Attempts are continuously being made to overcome as many of the shortcomings as
possible. A good example is the trend in OECD countries. The common elements of the
budgetary reforms in OECD member countries are:12
i.

medium-term budget frameworks;

ii.

prudent economic assumptions;

iii.

top-down budgeting techniques;

• Cabinet decision making focused on distributing the gains from fiscal drag across new
spending proposals;

iv.

relaxing central input controls;

v.

focus on results;

• Cabinet and/or central agencies extensively involved in micro-decision making on all
aspects of funding for ongoing policy;

vi.

budget transparency; and

• Last minute, across-the-board cuts, including during budget execution;
• Weak decision making and last-minute cuts cause unpredictability of funding for
existing government policy; this is highlighted to the centre by central budget agencies
on the alert to identify and rake back “fortuitous savings;”

vii. modern financial management practices.
2.4.3 Although they are identified as seven separate features, they do in fact build on each
other and must be seen as a package. Each of these features is discussed below in detail:13
“Medium-term budget frameworks: Medium-term budget frameworks form the basis
for achieving fiscal consolidation. They need to clearly state the government’s mediumterm fiscal objectives in terms of high-level targets such as the level of aggregate revenue,
expenditure, deficit/surplus, and debt. They then need to operationalise these high-level
targets by establishing hard budget constraints for individual ministries and programmes
over a number of years. This lends stability and credibility to the government’s fiscal
objectives.

• Strong incentives to spend everything in the budget early in the year and as quickly as
possible, since the current year’s spending is the starting point for the annual budget
haggle and the fear of across-the-board cuts during execution;
• Existing policy itself (as opposed to its funding) subject to very little scrutiny from one
year to the next. (This and previous point epitomize the worst dimension of incremental
budgeting);

By their very nature, high-level fiscal targets are set in a medium-term context. They aim
to achieve a certain fiscal outcome over a number of years. Budgets are however enacted
for a time period of one year, and are notorious for their short-term focus. This short-term
time horizon is often criticised for impeding effective expenditure management; decisions
on resource allocation are said to be made on an ad hoc or piecemeal basis with the
implications of past and present decisions beyond the next year being neglected. This is not
a new criticism. Medium-term budget frameworks aim to bridge this gap. Their successful
implementation has been nothing short of a “cultural revolution” in governments.

• Poor linkages between policy and resources at the centre, between the center and line
agencies, and within line agencies because of incremental budgeting;
• A lack of clarity as to purpose and task and therefore poor information on the performance
of policies, programmes and services, and their cost because of poor linkages;
• The linking together (in association with the point above) within government
departments of policy advising, regulation, service delivery and funding and an aversion
to user charging; and

Although the level of detail of such frameworks varies from country to country, they generally
mirror the format of the budget, i.e. the medium-term frameworks are at the same level
of detail as the annual budget. This means that a formal framework (or hard budget
constraint) exists for each and every appropriation, most often for three years beyond the
current fiscal year. These are rolling frameworks that are presented with the budget each

• Overall, few incentives to improve the performance of resources provided.

10

11
Budget Reform in OECD Member Countries: Common Trends. Meeting of Budget Directors from the G-7 Countries. Berlin, Germany, 5-6 September
2002.
13
Budget Reform in OECD Member Countries: Common Trends. Meeting of Budget Directors from the G-7 Countries. Berlin, Germany, 5-6 September
2002.
12


year; year-1 in the previous year’s framework becomes the basis for the budget and a new
year-3 is added. This has greatly increased the effectiveness of planning and eased the
annual budget process. These frameworks are not, however, enacted into legislation; they
are planning documents that reflect the political commitment to fiscal discipline.
…
Prudent economic assumptions
Deviations from the forecast of the key economic assumption underlying the budget
are the government’s key fiscal risk. There is no single factor more responsible for “derailing” fiscal consolidation programmes than the use of incorrect economic assumptions.
Great care must be taken in making them and all key economic assumptions should be
disclosed explicitly. Sensitivity analysis should be made of what impact changes in the
key economic assumptions would have on the budget. Furthermore, a comparison should
be made between the economic assumptions used in the budget and what private sector
forecasters are applying for the same time period where practicable. The establishment of
an independent body to recommend the economic assumptions to be used in the budget
may be considered as well. All this serves to place safeguards against the use of unrealistic,
or “optimistic,” economic assumptions.


new policy decisions were made. The political decision is whether to increase expenditures
for a high-priority area, for example education, and to reduce expenditures, for example
defence programs. Only the largest and most significant programmes reach this level of
political reallocation. The key point is that each ministry has a pre-set limit on how much
it can spend.
Once this decision is taken, the Finance Ministry largely withdraws from the details of
budgetary allocations for each ministry. The Finance Ministry concerns itself only with
the level of aggregate expenditure for each ministry; not the internal allocations. “Each
minister is his own Finance Minister,” is the saying in some countries. Each ministry
has a total amount and it can freely reallocate that money among its various agencies
and programmes. This has several advantages to it. It serves to hamper creeping increases
in expenditures as new policies are funded by reallocations from other areas within the
ministry. It creates ownership in the respective ministries for the actions that are taken.
Decisions are also better informed as spending ministries are in the best position to judge
the relative merits of their programmes. The role of the Ministry of Finance is to verify
that the offsetting cuts to finance new programmes are real.
…

Top-down budgeting techniques

Relaxing central input controls

Budgeting has traditionally operated on a bottom-up principle. This means that all agencies
and all ministries send requests for funding to the finance ministry. These requests greatly
exceed what they realistically believe they will get. Budgeting then consists of the Finance
Ministry negotiating with these ministries and agencies until some common point is found.
This bottom-up system has several disadvantages to it. First, it is very time consuming and
it is essentially a game; all participants know that the initial requests are not realistic.
Second, this process has an inherent bias for increasing expenditures; all new programmes,
or expansion of existing programs, are financed by new requests; there was no system for
reallocation within spending ministries and there were no pre-set spending limits. Third,
it was difficult to reflect political priorities in this system as it was a bottom-up exercise
with the budget “emerging” at the end of this process. This manner of budgeting is now
being abandoned and replaced with a new top-down approach to budget formulation.
This has been of great assistance in achieving fiscal consolidation.

Relaxing central input controls is another feature of successful fiscal consolidation strategies
in Member-countries. This is based on the simple premise that the heads of individual
agencies are in the best position to choose the most efficient mix of inputs to carry out the
agency’s activities. The end-result is that an agency can produce the same services at less
cost, or more services at the same cost. This greatly facilitates fiscal consolidation strategies
by mitigating their effects on services.

The starting point for the new system is for the government to make a binding political
decision as to the total level of expenditures and to divide them among individual spending
ministries. This decision is made possible by the medium-term expenditure frameworks
which contain baseline expenditure information, i.e. what the budget would look like if no
12

Relaxing central input controls operates at three levels. First, the consolidation of various
budget lines into a single appropriation for all operating costs (salaries, travel, supplies,
etc.). Second, the decentralisation of the personnel management function. Third, the
decentralisation of other common service provisions, notably accommodations (buildings).
The can be seen as the public sector’s version of “deregulation.”
The consolidation of budget appropriation lines is rather straightforward and simple.
It is now common for agencies to receive one single appropriation for all of their
operating expenditures. (It should be clear that this does not apply to transfers or capital
appropriations, only to operating expenditures). This single appropriation is, however, not
13


enough to generate managerial flexibility as various central management rules inhibit
this flexibility.
It is in the area of human resource management where most of the central management
rules exist. The cost of staff is generally the largest component of operating expenditures, and
it makes little difference to consolidation budget lines if central rules in this area prevent
any flexibility. All countries are increasing flexibility in this area, although to significantly
varying degrees. The country that has gone the farthest in this area is Sweden.
Personnel management in Sweden has historically been decentralised with the outstanding
exception of collective bargaining arrangements. Directors-general of agencies are, and
have been, responsible for the recruitment, grading and dismissal of their staff. There
are no restrictions on whom they may hire. There is no “civil service” encompassing the
government as a whole. Vacancies are generally advertised in the press with all qualified
applicants being treated equally. Staff are not tenured in Sweden. They can typically be
dismissed at two- to twelve-month notice depending on how long they have been employed
by the agency. In fact, there are essentially no difference between the labour legislation
governing the public sector and the private sector in Sweden.
…
An increased focus on results
An increased focus on results is a direct quid pro quo for relaxing input controls as described
above. Accountability in the public sector has traditionally been based on compliance with
rules and procedures. It didn’t matter what you did as long as you observed the rules.
Now, when the public sector is deregulated, a new results-based system is needed to hold
managers accountable. This is a fundamental change: holding managers accountable for
what they do, not how they do it. Effectively implementing this is, however, very difficult
in practice. The difficulties can be divided into several groups of issues.
At the most basic level, some government activities simply lend themselves to results
measurement much more readily than others. For example, an agency that produces a single
or a few homogenous products or services can be rather easily measured. An agency that
issues passports is a good example. On the other hand, agencies that produce heterogeneous
and individualised services can be very difficult to measure. The majority of government
services fall into the latter category. Various social services are the outstanding example.
We are also faced with the choice of defining results either in terms of outputs or outcomes.
Outputs are the goods and services that government agencies produce. Outcomes are the
14


impact on, or the consequences for, the community of the outputs that are produced. An
example highlights this. A government may wish to reduce the number of fatalities on
highways caused by drunk drivers. This would be the outcome. In order to achieve this, it
may launch a series of advertisements in the media highlighting the dangers of drunken
driving. It’s easy to measure the output, i.e. that the prescribed number of advertisements
were in fact shown in the media. Let’s, however, assume that at the same time the number
of fatalities went up, not down. The link between the advertisements and this outcome
is very unclear, since many other factors than the advertisements would impact on the
outcome. But what lessons do we draw from this. Do we abandon the advertisement
campaign? Do we expand it? Do we try other outputs? Do we wait to see if this is a oneoff or a sustained trend?
From an accountability point of view, the question arises whether you hold managers
responsible for outputs or outcomes. Outputs are easier to work with in this context; but
outcomes are what matters in the final analysis. Do we want an accountability regime
based on outputs even though the outputs may not be contributing to the desired outcome?
Or do we have an accountability regime based on outcomes, even though a number of
factors outside the control of the director-general of the agency may have contributed to it?
Of course, a combination of the two is the optimum choice, but experience in Membercountries shows that one will always dominate.
It is a well known phenomenon in management that “what gets measured, gets managed.”
As noted above, some activities lend themselves to measurement more readily than others.
This also applies within agencies in that certain of their activities are more easily measured
than others. If the agency’s measurement systems is biased in favour of those activities that
are more easily measured, there’s every likelihood that management will focus its attention
disproportionately on those activities since their accountability is based on that. This may
lead to all sorts of unforeseen and undesired consequences. This creates a huge onus on
those designing the agency’s measurement system to ensure that it captures all aspects of
their activities.
Budget transparency
Increased transparency in budgeting made significant advances in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. This was a period associated with unfavourable budget conditions in most
Member- countries; high annual deficits and increasing levels of outstanding debt.
Governments needed to institute large fiscal consolidation programmes. These were often
painful and getting the public’s understanding of the problems was necessary. The most
effective manner for achieving that was simply to throw open the books and say to the
15


public: “Look, things are really as bad as we told you, we’re not hiding anything.” This
may sound a bit sinister at first, but in actuality it is government at its best: Being honest
with citizens, explaining the problem to them in order for an understanding to emerge
as to the best course of action to take.
This time period also coincided with increased attention being paid to good governance in
general. The budget is the principal policy document of government, where the government’s
policy objectives are reconciled and implemented in concrete terms. Budget transparency
– openness about policy intentions, formulation and implementation – is therefore at the
core of good governance agenda.
If we take a look at fiscal transparency in concrete terms, we can say that it has three
essential elements:
• The first is the release of budget data. The systematic and timely release of all relevant
fiscal information is what we typically associate with budget transparency. It is an
absolute pre-requisite, but it is not enough.
• The second element is an effective role for the legislature. It must be able to scrutinise the
budget reports and independently review them. It must be able to debate and influence
budget policy and be in a position to effectively hold the government to account. This
is both in terms of the constitutional role of the legislature and the level of resources
that the legislature has at its disposal.
• The third element is an effective role for civil society, through the media and nongovernmental organisations. Citizens, directly or through these vehicles, must be in a
position to influence budget policy and must be in a position to hold the government
to account. In many ways, it is a similar role to that of the legislature albeit only
indirectly.
These three elements work together. The scrutiny of fiscal information by the legislature
and by civil society can only take place if the information is released in the first place.
Similarly, released budget information is only of value if it is effectively scrutinised by
the legislature and by civil society. The legislature and civil society have a very similar
function, one is responsible for shaping budget policy and for holding government directly
to account while the other performs this role indirectly.
…
Modern financial management practices
16


The modernisation of financial management within governments made great advances
during the past ten years. The sheer scale of government means that such improvements
had a material effect on fiscal outcomes. These include the introduction of accruals, capital
charges, carry-overs of unused appropriations, and interest-bearing accounts. Each of these
is discussed below.
Accruals
Cash and accruals represent two end points on a spectrum of possible accounting
and budgeting bases. The cash end of the spectrum has traditionally been applied by
Member-countries for their public sector activities. In recent years, there has been
a major trend towards accruals end of the spectrum in Member-countries. About
half of Member-countries have now adopted accruals to one degree or another.
This is a very rapid migration; it was only in the early 1990s that the world’s first
accrual basis financial statements and budget were produced by a government
(New Zealand).
The objective of moving to accruals is to make the true cost of government more
transparent. For example, accruals attributes the pension costs of government
employees to the time period when they are employed and accumulating their pension
rights rather than having this as an unrelated (and uncontrollable) expenditure once
they have retired. Instead of spikes in expenditures when individual capital projects
are undertaken, accruals incorporate them into the annual operating expenditures
through an allowance for depreciation. Treating loans and guarantee programmes
on an accrual basis fosters more attention to the risks of default by those who have
been granted them, especially if there is a requirement for such default risks to be
pre-funded. In a cash system, outstanding government debts can be designed in
such a way that all interest expenditure is paid in a lump-sum at the end of the
loan rather than being spread through the years when the loan was outstanding as
would be the case under accruals. All of these examples show how a focus on cash
only, can distort the true cost of government.
A further objective for adopting accruals is to improve decision-making in
government by using this enhanced information. This needs to be seen in a wider
context. The countries that have adopted accruals have generally been at the forefront
of public management reforms in general. These reforms have been highlighted in this
paper. A key aim is to hold managers responsible for outcomes and/or outputs while
reducing controls on inputs. In this context, it is expected that managers should be
responsible for all costs associated with the outcomes and/or outputs produced, not
17



just the immediate cash outlays. Only accruals allow for the capture of these full
costs, thereby supporting effective and efficient decision-making by managers. In
short, when managers are given flexibility to manage their own resources (inputs),
they need to have the necessary information to do this. The adoption of accruals is
therefore an inherent part of these wider reforms…

limit) from one year to the next. Only in cases where an agency continuously, yearon-year, builds up carry-overs does the Ministry of Finance intervene. The advent
of medium-term expenditure frameworks also gives a benchmark for agencies to see
that their appropriations are in fact being carried-over.
Interest-bearing accounts

Capital charges

Some countries have also introduced interest-bearing accounts for agencies. This
means, for example, that the appropriation of an agency is divided into twelfths
(representing each month) and deposited into an agency’s account (either within
the finance ministry or with a commercial bank.) If an agency spends at less than
this rate, they will receive interest on the difference. If they spend at a faster rate,
they will pay interest on the difference. The ability of individual agencies to vary
their spending patters, does of course vary significantly but they are now much more
aware of cash management practices.

Capital has tended to be viewed as a free good in the public sector. Once an asset
was in place, there was no mechanism to track and charge for the cost of capital
tied up in the asset. A number of Member-countries have been making headway
in this regard.
Capital charging regimes generally operate as follows. The government decides to
levy a charge on the cost of capital tied up in all assets in an agency. For example,
if an agency has $10 million in assets, the government will levy a charge (often
equivalent to the long-term government bond rate), of 10%. This means that the
agency will have to pay the finance ministry 1 million dollars annually. When the
system is first introduced, the appropriations to all agencies will be increased by
the amount of their capital charge, so there’s no net impact on agencies or for the
government as a whole. However, agencies will in future be allowed to dispose of
the assets and thus relieving themselves of the capital charge while retaining the
original appropriation to cover it (or part thereof ). This creates the incentive. Thus,
they could decide to sell excess assets or move from high-priced areas to lower-priced
areas and use the amount of the capital charge they save for other purposes. This has
had a great impact on asset management in government, a field that was simply
neglected previously.
…

All of these practices – accruals, capital charges, carry-overs of unused appropriations and
interest-bearing accounts – serve to improve the information available for agency heads and
giving them increased freedom to act on that information. Although a very technical area,
the impact on the government’s finances is great given the sheer size of government.”
2.5 Core Principles of Reforms
2.5.1 The Commission broadly endorses the common elements of the budgetary reforms
suggested by the OECD member-countries as mentioned in paragraph 2.4.2. The
Commission feels that after incorporating suitable additions relevant to the Indian context,
these could constitute the core principles for reforming the financial management system
in the country. These core principles are described below:
i.

Reforms in Financial Management System are part of overall governance
reforms: Governance reforms to bring about improved transparency, greater
accountability, streamlining the structure of the Government, elimination of
corruption, and fiscal and environment sustainability have to be backed by
reforms in the financial management system in order to deliver the desired
results. At the same time, it needs to be understood that reforms in the
management system are not an end in itself but a means to achieving good
governance.

ii.

Sound financial management is the responsibility of all government departments/
agencies: Maintaining financial prudence, discipline and accountability, while

Carry-overs
All countries operate on the principle of an annual budget. Previously, this meant
that all appropriations lapsed at the end of the fiscal year thus creating a great
and irrational rush to spend moneys before the end of the fiscal year. Not only
because they would otherwise lose the money this year, but also because future years
appropriations would take account of this underspending as well. You were losing
what you did not spend in one year, permanently. This has now changed with
operating expenditures generally being freely transferable (sometimes up to a certain
18

19


at the same time, ensuring prompt and efficient utilization of resources towards
achieving organizational goals is the responsibility of all government agencies/
organizations and not only of the Finance wing/Finance Ministry.
iii.

Medium-term plan/budget frameworks and aligning plan budgets and accounts:
Medium-term plan/budget frameworks attempt to bridge the gap between the
short-term time horizon of annual budgets with the medium-term objectives
of the schemes and programmes of government. Even when there are mediumterm frameworks like five-year development plans, there is need for aligning the
annual budgets explicitly with the plans and with the accounting mechanisms
so that there is a clear ‘line of sight’ between the medium term developmental
plan and the annual budget exercise.

iv.

Adopting modern financial management practices: Modern financial management
tools like accrual accounting, information technology, financial information
systems etc. need to be used to improve decision making and accountability.
However, care needs to be exercised to ensure that a congenial environment is
created and adequate capacity is developed before adopting new practices.

x.

Budgeting to be realistic: Unless the projections made in the budget are reasonably
accurate, the budgetary exercise loses credibility.

Top-down budgeting techniques: There is need to shift from the traditional
bottom up approach to budgeting to a top-down framework where the desired
outcomes should point to the resources required which should be allocated
thereafter at the macro level sector-wise. This in turn would lead to focus on
outputs and outcomes rather than on inputs and processes.

vi.

ix.

Prudent economic assumptions: The economic assumptions that underline the
budget have to be prudent and accurate in order to ensure that the budgetary
estimates do not go haywire. The tendency to be overly optimistic has to be
avoided.

v.


Transparency and simplicity: The budget documents should be simple and easy
to comprehend and be available in the public domain. Also the procedures
involved in operating the budget and release of funds should be simple. Suitable
financial management information systems need to be developed in order to
ensure that all transactions are captured and ultimately made available for
public scrutiny.

vii. Relaxing central input controls: Government agencies need to be given greater
operational autonomy and flexibility by consolidating budget items and
decentralization of administrative and financial powers.
viii. Focus on results: Accountability in government needs to shift from compliance
with rules and procedures to achievement of results. This is all the more
necessary with relaxed central input controls. There should be emphasis on
‘value for money’.
20

21

An Overview of the Existing Financial Management System in India

3

Article 202 contains similar provisions with regard to annual financial statement of a State
Government.

AN Overview of the Existing Financial
Management System in India

Introduction
The basic framework of the financial management system in India is provided in the
Constitution. This has been elaborated further through Legislations and Rules. In this
Chapter, the legal provisions regarding the financial management system in the country are
described. It focuses on the Constitutional provisions on legislative ‘procedure in financial
matters’, general Constitutional provisions regarding ‘finance’, framework for preparation
of accounts, external and internal audit and flow of funds in case of Centrally Sponsored
Schemes (CSS).
3.1 Financial Statements and Accounts
3.1.1. Constitutional Provisions on Legislative Procedure on Financial Matters
3.1.1.1 The Constitution of India provides that in respect of every financial year, a statement
of the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Government of India or the Government
of any State for that year, is to be laid down before both the Houses of Parliament/
State Legislature. This is referred to as the “annual financial statement” of the concerned
Government (Articles 112 & 202). As per Article 112, this statement should show, inter
alia, the following:
“112. (2) The estimates of expenditure embodied in the annual financial statement shall
show separately(a) the sums required to meet expenditure described by this Constitution as expenditure
charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India; and
(b) the sums required to meet other expenditure proposed to be made from the Consolidated
Fund of India, and shall distinguish expenditure on revenue account from other
expenditure.
…”
22

3.1.1.2 To meet such expenditure, appropriations have to be made out of the Consolidated
Fund of India (or of the respective States). The appropriations are required to be made in
the manner provided in the Constitution. The procedure in these matters in relation to
the Parliament is provided in Articles 113 to 117 and 119. These pertain to the procedure
in Parliament with respect to estimates, Appropriation Bills, supplementary, additional or
excess grants, votes on account, votes to credit and exceptional grants, special provisions as
to financial Bills and regulation by law of procedure in Parliament in relation to financial
business. These provisions are mentioned below:
“113. Procedure in Parliament with respect to estimates.- (1) So much of the estimates as
relates to expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India shall not be submitted
to the vote of Parliament, but nothing in this clause shall be construed as preventing the
discussion in either House of Parliament of any of those estimates.
(2) So much of the said estimates as relates to other expenditure shall be submitted in
the form of demands for grants to the House of the People, and the House of the
People shall have power to assent, or to refuse to assent, to any demand, or to assent
to any demand subject to a reduction of the amount specified therein.
(3) No demand for a grant shall be made except on the recommendation of the
President.
114. Appropriation Bills.- (1) As soon as, may be after the grants under Article 113 have
been made by the House of the People, there shall be introduced a Bill to provide for the
appropriation out of the Consolidated Fund of India of all moneys required to meet(a)

the grants so made by the House of the People; and

(b)

the expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India but not exceeding in
any case the amount shown in the statement previously laid before Parliament.

(2) No amendment shall be proposed to any such Bill in either House of Parliament
which will have the effect of varying the amount or altering the destination of
any grant so made or of varying the amount of any expenditure charged on the
Consolidated Fund of India, and the decision of the person presiding as to whether
an amendment is inadmissible under this clause shall be final.
23


(3) Subject to the provisions of Articles 115 and 116, no money shall be withdrawn
from the Consolidated Fund of India except under appropriation made by law
passed in accordance with the provisions of this article.
115. Supplementary, additional or excess grants.-(1) The President shall(a)

(b)

if the amount authorised by any law made in accordance with the provisions of
Article 114 to be expended for a particular service for the current financial year
is found to be insufficient for the purposes of that year or when a need has arisen
during the current financial year for supplementary or additional expenditure upon
some new service not contemplated in the annual financial statement for that year,
or
if any money has been spent on any service during a financial year in excess of the
amount granted for that service and for that year, cause to be laid before both the
Houses of Parliament another statement showing the estimated amount of that
expenditure or cause to be presented to the House of the People a demand for such
excess, as the case any be.

(2) The provisions of Articles 112, 113 and 114 shall have effect in relation to any such
statement and expenditure or demand and also to any law to be made authorising
the appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India to meet such
expenditure or the grant in respect of such demand as they have effect in relation
to the annual financial statement and the expenditure mentioned therein or to a
demand for a grant and the law to be made for the authorisation of appropriation of
moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India to meet such expenditure or grant.
116. Votes on account, votes of credit and exceptional grants.(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, the House
of the People shall have power(a)

(b)

24

to make any grant in advance in respect of the estimated expenditure for a part of
any financial year pending the completion of the procedure prescribed in Article
113 for the voting of such grant and the passing of the law in accordance with the
provisions of Article 114 in relation to that expenditure;
to make a grant for meeting an unexpected demand upon the resources of India
when on account of the magnitude or the indefinite character of the service the


demand cannot be stated with the details ordinarily given in an annual financial
statement;
(c)

to make an exceptional grant which forms no part of the current service of any
financial year; and Parliament shall have power to authorise by law the withdrawal
of moneys from the Consolidated Fund of India for the purposes for which the said
grants are made; and

(2) The provisions of Articles 113 and 114 shall have effect in relation to the making
of any grant under clause (1) and to any law to be made under that clause as they
have effect in relation to the making of a grant with regard to any expenditure
mentioned in the annual financial statement and the law to be made for the
authorisation of appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India to
meet such expenditure.
Similar provisions are contained in Articles 203 to 207 and 209 with regard to the State
Legislatures.
3.1.1.3 Provisions contained in Chapter I, Part XII of the Constitution of India necessitate
the maintenance of government accounts in three parts with regard to receipts – (1) the
Consolidated Fund of India / separate Consolidated Funds of the States, (2) the public
account of India/public accounts of the States and (3) the Contingency Fund of India/
Consolidated Funds of the States. This is based on the provisions of Articles 266 and 267.
Thus, Article 266 provides for the Consolidated Funds and Public Accounts of India and
of the States in the following manner:
“266. Consolidated Funds and public accounts of India and of the States.- (1) Subject
to the provisions of Article 267 and to the provisions of this Chapter with respect to the
assignment of the whole or part of the net proceeds of certain taxes and duties to States, all
revenues received by the Government of India, all loans raised by that Government by the
issue of treasury bills, loans or ways and means advances and all moneys received by that
Government in repayment of loans shall form one consolidated fund to be entitled “the
Consolidated Fund of India”, and all revenues received by the Government of a State, all
loans raised by that Government by the issue of treasury bills, loans or ways and means
advances and all moneys received by that Government in repayment of loans shall form
one consolidated fund to be entitled “the Consolidated Fund of the State”.
(2) All other public moneys received by or on behalf of the Government of India or the
Government of a State shall be credited to the public account of India or the public
account of the State, as the case may be.
25


(3) No moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India or the Consolidated Fund of a
State shall be appropriated except in accordance with law and for the purposes and
in the manner provided in this Constitution.”
3.1.1.4 The provisions regarding the Contingency Funds of India and of the States are
contained in Article 267 of the Constitution:
“267. Contingency Fund.- (1) Parliament may by law establish a Contingency Fund in
the nature of an imprest to be entitled “the Contingency Fund of India” into which shall
be paid from time to time such sums as may be determined by such law, and the said Fund
shall be placed at the disposal of the President to enable advances to be made by him out
of such Fund for the purposes of meeting unforeseen expenditure pending authorisation
of such expenditure by Parliament by law under Article 115 or Article 116.
(2) The Legislature of a State may by law establish a Contingency Fund in the nature
of an imprest to be entitled “the Contingency Fund of the State” into which shall
be paid from time to time such sums as may be determined by such law, and the
said Fund shall be placed at the disposal of the Governor of the State to enable
advances to be made by him out of such Fund for the purposes of meeting unforeseen
expenditure pending authorisation of such expenditure by the Legislature of the
State by law under Article 205 or Article 206.”
3.1.2 The Budgetary Process14
3.1.2.1 Annual Financial Statement
3.1.2.1.1 Based on the Constitutional provisions and provisions contained in the General
Financial Rules (GFR), General Accounting Rules (GAR), Budget Manual (in the States) etc,
a statement of its estimated annual receipts and expenditure is prepared by each Government
and presented to its Legislature. This “Annual Financial Statement” is commonly known as
the Budget. In this statement, the sums required to meet the expenditure charged15 upon
the Consolidated Fund of India or the Consolidated Fund of the State or the Consolidated
Fund of the Union Territory and the sums required to meet other expenditure proposed to
be met from the Fund are shown separately. Further, the expenditure on revenue accounts
is distinguished from other expenditure (Articles 112 & 202 of the Constitution and
Section 27 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963). As stated earlier the Annual
Financial Statement shows the receipts and expenditure of Government in three separate
parts under which Government accounts are maintained viz. (i) Consolidated Fund of
India (ii) Contingency Fund of India and the (iii) Public Account.
26


3.1.2.1.2 The part of the estimates pertaining to expenditure charged upon the Consolidated
Fund is not submitted to the vote of the Legislature (although it is open to discussion in the
Legislature). The part of the estimate which is concerned with other expenditures is submitted
to the Legislature concerned in the form of Demands for Grants on the recommendation
of the President or the Governor of the State or the Administrator of the Union Territory
with legislature, as the case may be.
3.1.2.1.3 Normally, a separate demand is presented for each Department or the major
services under the control of a Ministry/Department. The number of Demands for Grants
and their coverage is decided by the Ministry of Finance. Each demand generally includes the
total provisions required for a service, that is, provisions on account of revenue expenditure,
capital expenditure, Grants to States and Union Territories and also loans and advances
relating to that service. The estimated expenditure included in the Demands for Grants
are for gross amounts. The receipts and recoveries taken in reduction of expenditure are
shown by way of footnotes.
3.1.2.1.4 The Finance Bill containing the annual taxation proposals is considered and
passed by the Legislature only after the Demands for Grants have been voted and the total
expenditure is known. Then it enters the statute as the Finance Act.
3.1.2.1.5 The House of the People (and the Legislative Assemblies) also has the power to
authorize by law the withdrawal of moneys from the Consolidated Fund of India for the
following purposes (Article 116/206):
• Vote on Account – for making any grant in advance in respect of the estimated
expenditure for a part of any financial year pending the completion of the
parliamentary procedure;
• Vote of Credit – for making a grant for meeting an unexpected demand upon the
resources of India when on account of the magnitude or the indefinite character
of the service the demand cannot be stated with the details ordinarily given in an
annual financial statement; and
• Exceptional Grant – for making provision for an exceptional grant that does not
form part of the current service of any financial year.
3.1.2.1.6 As per the requirements of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management
Act, 2003 three Statements are to be presented to the Parliament, which form a part of the
budget documents: (a) the Macro-economic Framework Statement, (b) the Medium term
Fiscal Policy Statement, and (c) the Fiscal Policy Strategy Statement. The Macro-economic
27

Mainly based on ‘Introduction to Indian Government Accounts and Audit’
Expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India is not submitted to the vote of Parliament (Article 113) or State Legislature

14
15


Framework Statement contains an assessment of the growth prospects of the economy.
The Medium term Fiscal Policy Statement indicates the three-year rolling targets for four
specific fiscal indicators in relation to GDP at market prices, namely, (i)Revenue Deficit,
(ii) Fiscal Deficit, (iii)Tax to GDP Ratio, and (iv) Total Out-Standing Debt at the end of
the year, while the Fiscal Policy Strategy Statement seeks to outline the strategic priorities
of the Government in the fiscal area for the ensuing year.
3.1.2.2 Appropriation Act
3.1.2.2.1 After the Demands have been passed by the Legislature, an Appropriation Bill is
introduced to provide for the appropriation out of the Consolidated Fund of India or of
the State or of the Union Territory with Legislature for all moneys required to meet:
a.

The Grants made by the Legislature and

b.

The expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund, but not exceeding in any
case the amount shown in the statement previously laid before the Legislature.
(This charged expenditure is referred to as Appropriation).

3.1.2.2.2 No money can be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund until this Bill is passed
by the Legislature. Once this Bill is passed, it becomes the Appropriation Act. The sums
authorized in the Appropriation Act are intended to cover all the charges including the
liability of past years to be paid during a financial year or to be adjusted in the accounts of
that year. Any unspent balance lapses and is not available for utilization in the following
year.
3.1.2.3 Allotments and Re-appropriations
3.1.2.3.1 Within the amount of each Grant or Appropriation as shown in the schedule to the
Appropriation Act, all allotments and re-appropriations within sub-heads and sub-divisions
of sub-heads may be sanctioned by Government or by such subordinate authorities as are
duly authorized to do so. This is, however, subject to the limitation that any expenditure
not falling within the scope or intention of a Grant may not be authorized from funds
provided under that Grant. Any allotment or re-appropriation may be authorized at any time
before, but not after the expiry of the financial year to which such Grant or Appropriation
relates. Generally, re-appropriations from one Grant or Appropriation to another Grant
or Appropriation are not permissible.


3.1.3 Form of Accounts
3.1.3.1 Article 150 of the Constitution states the following regarding the form of
Accounts:
“150. Form of the accounts of the Union and of the States. – The accounts of the Union
and of the States shall be kept in such form as the President may, on the advice of the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India, prescribe.”
3.1.3.2 As per Notification No. CD-896/80 dated 27th September, 1980, the function of
prescribing the form in which the accounts of the Union and the States are to be maintained
has been delegated to the Controller General of Accounts (CGA) by incorporating entry
7A (i) in the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules (for Department of
Expenditure under the heading Ministry of Finance) –
“General principles of accounting relating to the Union or State Governments and form
of accounts, and to frame or revise rules and manuals thereto.”
3.1.3.3 The general principles of government accounting are presently prescribed by the
Government Accounting Rules, 1990 (GAR). Rule 21 of GAR provides for cash system of
accounting in the government in the following way:
“21. Cash basis of Accounts
With the exception of such book adjustments as may be authorized by these rules or by any
general or special orders issued by the Central Government on the advice of the Comptroller
and Auditor General of India, the transactions in Government accounts shall represent
the actual cash receipts and disbursements during a financial year as distinguished from
amounts due to or by the Government during the same period.”
This is reiterated by the General Financial Rules, 2005 (GFR) in Rule 68.
3.1.3.4 As per GAR (Rule 23), in consequence to the constitutional provisions mentioned
earlier, government accounts are kept in three parts:
Part-I Consolidated Fund
Part-II Contingency Fund
Part-III Public Account

28

of India (including Union Territory Administration or of
the State or Union Territory Government concerned.

of India (including Union Territory Administration/
Government) or of the State concerned.
29


3.1.3.5 In case of Part I of the accounts, there are two main divisions:16
(i)

Revenue - consisting of sections for ‘Receipt heads (Revenue Account)’ and
‘Expenditure heads (Revenue Account)’.

(ii) Capital, Public Debt, Loans - consisting of sections for ‘Receipt heads (Capital
Account)’, ‘Expenditure heads (Capital Account)’, and ‘Public Debt’, ‘Loans’,
and ‘Advances’.
3.1.3.6 The first division comprises the section ‘Receipt heads (Revenue Account)’ dealing
with the proceeds of taxation and other receipt classified as revenue, and the section
‘Expenditure heads (Revenue Account)’ dealing with expenditure met therefrom.
3.1.3.7 The second division comprises the following sections:–
(a)

The section ‘Receipt heads (Capital Account)’ dealing with receipts of a Capital
nature which cannot be applied as a set off to Capital Expenditure.

(b) The section ‘Expenditure heads (Capital Account)’ dealing with expenditure
met usually from borrowed funds with the object of increasing concrete assets
of a material and permanent character. It also includes receipts of a Capital
nature intended to be applied as set off to Capital expenditure.
(c)

The section ‘Public Debt’, ‘Loans’ and ‘Advances’, comprises loans raised and
their repayments by Government such as, Internal Debt, External Debt of the
Union Government and loans and advances made by Governments and their
recoveries; transactions relating to ‘Appropriation to Contingency Fund’ and
‘Inter-State Settlement’.

3.1.3.8 In Part II of the accounts, the transactions recorded are connected with the
Contingency Fund set up by the Government of India or of a State or Union Territory
Government under Article 267 of the Constitution/ Section 48 of the Union Territories
Act, 1963.
3.1.3.9 In Part III (i.e. Public Account) of the accounts, the transactions relating to Debt
(Other than those included in Part I), ‘Deposits’, ‘Advances’, ‘Remittances’ and ‘Suspense’
are recorded. The transactions under Debt, Deposits and Advances in this part are such
in respect of which Government incurs a liability to repay the moneys received or has a
claim to recover the amounts paid, together with the repayments of the former (Debt
and Deposits) and the recoveries of the latter (Advances). The transactions relating to
30


‘Remittances’ and ‘Suspense’ in this Part embrace all ‘merely adjusting heads’ under which
appear such transactions as remittances of cash between treasuries and currency chests and
transfer between different accounting circles. The initial debits or credits to these heads are
cleared eventually by corresponding receipts or payments either within the same circle of
account or in another account circle.
3.1.3.10 Within each of the divisions and Sections of the Consolidated Fund as referred
to above, the transactions are grouped into Sectors such as, “General Services”, “Social
Services”, “Economic Services”, under which specific functions or services are placed. These
Sectors are further sub-divided into ‘Major Heads of Account’. However, in some specific
cases, the Sectors are sub-divided into sub-sectors before their division into Major Heads
of Account.
3.1.3.11 In case of the Contingency Fund, there is a single Major Head and all the transactions
met out of the Box 3.1: Allocation between Capital and Revenue Expenditure on a Capital Scheme
Contingency
The allocation between capital and revenue expenditure on a capital scheme for which
Fund are recorded separate capital and revenue accounts are to be kept are determined in accordance with
such general or special orders as may be prescribed by the Government on the advice of
under it.
3.1.3.12 In the
case of the Public
Account, the
transactions are
a g a i n g ro u p e d
into sectors and
sub-sectors,
which are further
sub-divided into
Major Heads of
Account.
3.1.3.13 Major,
Minor
and
Detailed Heads:
The main unit of
classification in
accounts is the
major head which
is divided into

the Comptroller and Auditor General. The main principles governing the allocation of
expenditure on a Capital Scheme between Capital and Revenue accounts are as follows:

a. Capital account should bear all charges for the first construction and equipment of
a project as well as charges for intermediate maintenance of the work while not yet
opened for service.
b. Subject to (c) below, revenue account should bear all subsequent charges for maintenance
and all working expenses. These embrace all expenditure on the working and upkeep
of the project and also on such renewals and replacements and such additions,
improvements or extensions as prescribed by government.
c. In the case of works of renewal and replacement which partake both of a capital and
revenue nature, the allocation of expenditure should be regulated by the broad principle
that revenue should pay or provide a fund for the adequate replacement of all wastage
or depreciation of property originally provided out of capital grants and that only the
cost of genuine improvements, whether determined by prescribed rules or formulae or
under special orders of Government should be debited to Capital account.
d. Expenditure on account of reparation of damage caused by extraordinary calamities
such as flood, fire, earthquake, enemy action, should be charged to Capital account or
to Revenue account or divided between them in such a way as may be determined by
Government according to the circumstance of each case.
e. Capital receipts in so far as they relate to expenditure previously debited to Capital
heads, accruing during the process of construction of a project, should be utilized in
reduction of capital expenditure. Thereafter, their treatment in the accounts will depend
on circumstances, but except under a special rule or order of Government, they should
not be credited to the revenue account of the department or undertaking.
(Source: Based on Rule 31, GAR, 1990)

31
Based on GAR, 1990

16



minor heads, each of which has a number of subordinate heads, generally known as subheads. The sub-heads are further divided into detailed heads. Sometimes major heads may
be divided into sub-major heads before their further division, into minor heads. Thus,
the Sectors, Major heads, Sub-heads and Detailed heads together constitute a five-tier
arrangement of the classification structure of Government Accounts.

charged appropriation for different purposes as specified in the schedules appended to the
Appropriation Acts passed by the Parliament or Legislature, to exhibit the excess or savings
as the case may be, over the final grant or appropriation. These accounts are complementary
to the accounts of the annual receipts and disbursements of Government otherwise known
as Finance Accounts.18

3.1.3.14 The Major Heads of Account falling within the Consolidated Fund generally
correspond to ‘Functions’ of Government, such as different services like ‘Crop Husbandry’,
‘Defence’ etc being provided by Government, while minor heads subordinate to them
identify the ‘Programmes’ undertaken to achieve the objectives of the function represented
by the major head. A programme may consist of a number of schemes or activities and these
generally, correspond to sub-heads below the minor head represented by the programme.
In certain cases, especially in regard to non-developmental expenditure or expenditure of
an administrative nature, the sub-heads may denote the components of a programme, such
as ‘Organizations’ or the different ‘Wings of Administration’.

3.1.4.3.2 From 1961-62, Appropriation Accounts are complied by group-heads to
eliminate unimportant matters and to enhance their usefulness. The Appropriation Accounts
include:

3.1.3.15 A ‘detailed head’, is termed as an object classification. On the expenditure side of
the accounts particularly in respect of heads of accounts within the Consolidated Fund,
detailed heads are primarily meant for itemized control over expenditure and indicate the
object or nature of expenditure on a scheme or activity or organization in terms of inputs
such as ‘Salaries’, ‘Office Expenses’, ‘Grants-in-Aid’, ‘Loans’, ‘Investments’.
3.1.4 Preparation of Accounts
3.1.4.1 The annual accounts of the Government comprise the Appropriation Accounts
and the Finance Accounts. The Finance Accounts show the details of receipts and
expenditure for all the three Funds in the form of various statements including liabilities
of the government such as guarantees etc. and loans given to States, Union Territories and
public sector undertakings. Through the Appropriation Accounts, Parliament is informed
about the expenditure incurred against the appropriations made by the Parliament in the
previous financial year.

i.

A consolidated statement tilted “Summary of Appropriation Accounts”
showing the total amount of funds (original and supplementary) provided by
the Parliament/Legislature under each voted grant and charged appropriation,
actual expenditure incurred against each and the saving or excess and

ii.

Appropriation accounts of each grant/appropriation indicating original grant/
appropriation, additional funds provided during the year by supplementary
grant/appropriation as a whole and the amount surrendered during the year.

3.1.4.3.3 This is followed by “Notes and Comments” which bring to the notice of the
Parliament/Legislature (giving relevant particulars of the group heads) excesses over grants/
appropriations requiring regularization, expenditure booked against the grant/appropriation
but not really debitable to it, expenditure incurred on a “New Service” without specific
authority of the Parliament/Legislature unjustified or excessive provision of funds leading
to large savings and lapses and also cases of defective control over expenditure e.g. excessive,
irregular or unjustified re-appropriations or surrenders within the grant/appropriation.
3.1.4.3.4 In the summary of Appropriation Accounts, provision is made for:
i.

ii.

3.1.4.3 Appropriation Accounts17
3.1.4.3.1 Appropriation Accounts are accounts of the expenditure, voted and charged of
the government for each financial year compared with the amounts of the voted grants and

Reconciliation of the total expenditure according to Appropriation Accounts
with the total expendire as shown in the Finance Accounts after taking into
account recoveries of expenditure; and

iii.

3.1.4.2 These documents are presented before the Parliament after their statutory audit by
the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. Preparation and submission of Appropriation
Accounts to the Parliament completes the cycle of budgetary process.

Indicating the expenditure met by advances from the contingency Fund which
were not reimbursed to the fund during the year by authorization of the
Legislature;

Drawing attention to cases of excesses over grants/ appropriations requiring
regularization.

32

33
Source: Based on ‘Introduction to Indian Government Accounts and Audit’, Fifth Edition, 1987; issued under the Authority of the Comptroller and
Auditor General of India

17

http://cga.nic.in/html/app.htm

18


3.1.4.3.5 The general rule is that a grant is voted or an appropriation is authorized for the
gross expenditure required for each service. The expenditure shown against each grant or
appropriation in the Appropriation Accounts thus exclude recoveries of expenditure relating
to respective grants or appropriations. The Finance Accounts, on the other hand, show
the net expenditure after taking into account the recoveries. A reconciliation statement
showing:
a.

Total expenditure according to Appropriation Accounts

b.

Total of recoveries and

c.

Net total expenditure as shown in the Finance Accounts is therefore included
below the summary of Appropriation Accounts. A detailed statement showing
recoveries relating to each grant/appropriation is also included as an appendix
to the Appropriation Accounts.

3.1.4.4 Finance Accounts
3.1.4.4.1 As soon as the accounts of a year are closed, the Finance Accounts of each
Government of a State or Union Territory with Legislature for the year are prepared by the
Accountant General concerned and submitted to the Comptroller and Auditor General for
approval and the transmission to the Governor of the State/Administrator of the Union
Territory to be laid before the respective Legislature. The Finance Accounts of the Union
Government which comprise transactions of Civil as well as Railways, Defence, Posts and
Telecommunication are prepared by Controller General of Accounts and submitted to the
Comptroller and Auditor General for certification and transmission to the President for
being laid on the table of the Parliament.
3.1.4.4.2 The Finance Accounts present the accounts of the receipts and outgoings of
the Government for the year together with the financial results disclosed by the revenue
and Capital accounts, the accounts of the Public Debt and the liability and assets of the
Government concerned as worked out from the balances recorded in the accounts.
3.1.4.4.3 The statement in Part I is intended to give, in a summarized form, information
in regard to:
i.
ii.
34

Transactions of the year relating to the Consolidated Fund, Contingency Fund
and the Public Accounts.
(a) Capital outlay outside the Revenue Accounts and progressive Capital
expenditure to end of the year.


(b) Revenue expenditure temporarily capitalized

iii.

Financial results of irrigation and electricity schemes.

iv.

Debt position of Government including expenditure incurred on the service
of debt.

v. Loans and advances by Government.
vi.

Guarantee given by Government

vii. Cash balance and investments of cash balances
viii. Summary of balances under Consolidated Fund, Contingency Fund and Public
Account.
3.2 Audit19
3.2.1 The Comptroller & Auditor-General of India
3.2.1.1 Article 148 of the Constitution provides that there shall be a Comptroller and
Auditor-General of India (CAG) who shall be appointed by ‘the President by warrant
under his hand and seal and shall only be removed from office in like manner and on the
like grounds as a judge of the Supreme Court ’.
3.2.1.2 Article 149 of the Constitution provides that the Comptroller and Auditor-General
of India (CAG) shall perform such duties and exercise such powers in relation to the
accounts of the Union, the States and of any other authority / body as may be prescribed
under law by Parliament. It also provides that until such law is passed, the Auditor-General
of India would continue to perform such functions as were exercised by him before the
commencement of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Parliament passed The Comptroller
and Auditor General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971. The functions
and duties of the CAG are described in the following paragraphs.
3.2.1.3 Accounting Functions
3.2.1.3.1 Article 150 of the Constitution mandates that the Accounts of the Union and
the States shall be kept in such reforms as prescribed by the President on the advice of
the CAG. Before the commencement of The Comptroller and Auditor General’s (Duties,
Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, the accounts of Defence, Railways, certain other
department of the Union Government, Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha Secretariats and the
35
19
Based on ‘Introduction to Indian Government Accounts and Audit’, Fifth Edition, 1987; issued under the Authority of the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India



Union Territories of Goa, Daman and Diu and Puducherry were not being compiled by
the C&AG. This arrangement was not revoked by this Act.
3.2.1.3.2 Under the Act, the CAG has been made responsible for preparing each year the
accounts showing, under the respective heads, the annual receipts and disbursements for the
purpose of the Union, the States and each Union Territory having a Legislative Assembly.
However, the President and the Governor may, after consultation with the CAG, may relieve
him from this responsibility in case of the Union / UTs and States respectively. With respect to
the accounts for which the CAG is responsible for compilation / keeping, necessary assistance
is to be rendered by him in preparation of respective ‘Annual Financial Statements’.
3.2.1.3.3 An exercise towards departmentalization of accounts in the Union with the main
objective of integrating accounts with the administrative Ministries and Departments was
conducted in a phased manner from 1976 onwards. Under this scheme, accounts and
finance form an integral part of overall financial management. Administrative Ministries
are entrusted with the responsibility of arranging payments and timely compilation and
rendering of accounts. As mentioned earlier, the CAG was relieved of the accounting
functions as a consequence of this scheme.

him or received by him, and consolidating the accounts of the Department as
a whole on the basis of the compiled accounts received from the regional Pay
and Accounts Offices and his own office.
3.2.1.3.5 However, as yet, there is no separation of accounts and audit functions at the
State Government level.
3.2.1.3.6 The accounting function in the Ministries/Departments has now been delegated
to the CGA under the General Accounting Rules, 1990.
3.2.1.4 Audit Functions
3.2.1.4.1 Article 151 of the Constitution provides that the CAG shall submit his/her reports,
in case of the Union, to the President who shall cause them to be laid before each House
of Parliament. Similar provisions exist in case of the States. Under Sections 13, 16 and 17
of the Comptroller and Auditor General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act,
1971, it is the responsibility of the CAG:20
a.

To audit all receipts which are payable into the Consolidated Fund of India
and of each State and each Union Territory having a Legislative Assembly and
to satisfy himself that the rules and procedures in that behalf are designed to
secure an effective check on the assessment, collection and proper allocation
of revenue and are being duly observed and to make for this purpose such
examination of the accounts as he thinks fit;

b.

To audit all expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India and of each State
and of each Union Territory having a Legislative Assembly and to ascertain
whether the money shown in the accounts as having been disbursed was legally
available for and applicable to the service or purpose to which they have been
applied or charged and whether the expenditure conforms to the authority
which governs it;

c.

To audit all transactions of the Union and of the States relating to Contingency
Funds and Public Accounts;

d.

To audit all trading, manufacturing, profit and loss accounts and balance sheets
and other subsidiary accounts kept in any department of the Union or of a
State; and

e.

To audit the accounts of stores and stock kept in any office or department of the
Union or of a State and in each case to report on the expenditure, transactions
or accounts so audited by him.

3.2.1.3.4 The salient features of the scheme are briefly indicated below:
a)

The Secretary of the Department/Ministry acts as the chief accounting
authority and discharges this responsibility through and with the assistance
of the Integrated Financial Adviser of the Ministry / Department.

b)

Payment and accounting functions of the Ministry / Department is discharged
through departmental Pay and Accounts Offices functioning at the headquarters
of the Department / Ministry and regional Pay and Accounts Offices
functioning in various regions of the country. The formation of regional Pay
and Accounts Offices is determined with reference to the number and spread
of field organizations in various regions of the country.

c)

The payments as well as receipt transactions relating to the Ministry /
Department and its attached and subordinate offices are transacted at the
branches of the Reserve Bank of India and State Bank of India or its subsidiaries
or at specified branches of the public sector banks accredited to the department
without intervention of the treasury.

d)

The regional Pay and Accounts Offices compile the accounts of the region
and render them to the central accounts office at the headquarters, which is
responsible for compiling the accounts of transactions directly paid for by

36

37
20
Based on ‘Introduction to Indian Government Accounts and Audit’, Fifth Edition, 1987; issued under the Authority of the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India


3.2.1.4.2 Apart from the above, the CAG is also authorized by the Act to audit the receipts
and expenditure of bodies or authorities substantially financed by grants or loans from
Union or State or Union Territory revenue. In fact, the President or the Governor of a State
or an Administrator of a Union Territory having a Legislative Assembly may also request
the CAG to undertake the audit of accounts of any authority / body which has not been
entrusted to him under law.
3.2.1.4.3 The Reports submitted by the CAG and laid before each House of Parliament
is examined by the Committee on Public Accounts (PAC) under Rule 308 of ‘Rules of
Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha’. In case of the Public Undertakings,
these Reports are examined by Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings (COPU).
These are further discussed in Chapter 8 of this Report.


• Providing an effective monitoring system to facilitate mid-course corrections.
The above revised functions are to be carried out as per the guidelines issued by the CGA
from time to time.
3.4 New Charter for the Integrated Financial Adviser (IFA)
3.4.1 A scheme of Integrated Financial Advisers was put in place in 1975.23 In general, the
IFAs were made responsible for:24
1)

Preparation of the budget of the Department/Ministry, distribution of budget
allocations to the various wings, departments/formations;

2)

Arranging payments directly to the bodies, corporations and authorities of
grant-in-aid, loans, etc., as may be sanctioned by the Department;

3)

Arranging payments through Pay and Accounts Offices under him in various
regions of the country, all pay and allowances, office contingencies, miscellaneous
payments, all admissible loans and advances to government servants including
provident funds claims in accordance with prescribed financial and treasury
procedures;

3.3 Internal Audit
3.3.1 Presently, ‘internal audit’ is recognized as an aid to the management for monitoring
the financial performance and effectiveness of various programmes, schemes and activities.
In Government of India, internal audit is conducted through the Internal Audit Wings in
the Principal Accounts Offices of various Ministries/Departments.21
3.3.2 The scheme of departmentalization of Union Government Accounts provided for
setting up an internal audit organization. Accordingly, these were set up in most Union
Government Ministries under the Chief Controller of Accounts/Controller of Accounts. The
Secretary of the Ministry/Department acts as the Chief Accounting Authority. However, it
is the Financial Adviser who, for and on behalf of the Secretary, is responsible for internal
audit of payments and accounts from the records maintained by the various secretariat and
field formations and Pay and Accounts Offices of the Ministry/Department.22
3.3.3. The revised charter of the role and responsibilities of the Chief Controller of Accounts
(CCA)/Controller of Accounts (CAs) envisages that the internal audit wing working under
the control and supervision of the CCAs/CAs would move beyond the existing system of
compliance/regulatory audit and would focus on:
• The appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of individual schemes;
• Assessment of adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls in general, and
soundness of financial systems and reliability of financial and accounting reports
in particular;
• Identification and monitoring of risk factors (including those contained in the
Outcome Budget); critical assessment of economy, efficiency and effectiveness of
service delivery mechanism to ensure value for money; and

4) Compilation and consolidation of the accounts of the Department/ Ministry
in accordance with the instructions issued by the Union Government and/
or the Comptroller and Auditor General and rendering the appropriation of
accounts;
5)

Introduction of a system of management accounting suited to the functions
and requirements of the Department/Ministry;

6)

Installation of a sound system of internal inspection within the department to
ensure both accuracy in accounts and efficiency in operation as a part of the
management.

3.4.1 This scheme was reviewed in 2006. The new charter of the Integrated Financial Advisers
is analysed in Chapter 7. In brief, it redefines the role of the IFAs in financial management
within Ministries/Departments ranging from formulation of the Budget Estimates to cash
management and internal audit.
3.5 Flow of Funds Related to Union Government Programmes
3.5.1 Transfer of funds from the Union to the States due to the inadequacy of sources of
generation of revenue takes place through various means. The first and foremost is by way

38

39
http://cga.nic.in/html/iaudit.htm
Introduction to Indian Government Accounts and Audit

OM F.No.10(29)-E.Coord/73, dated 6.10.75
Introduction to Indian Government Accounts and Audit

21

23

22

24


of devolution as per the recommendations made by the Finance Commission (in terms of
Articles 280 and 281 of the Constitution). The second channel is through the Planning
Commission. In this case, the States receive Plan funds from the Planning Commission in
the form of ‘Central Assistance’ under the ‘Scheme of Financing of States’ Annual Plan.
They also receive Plan Funds through various Union Government Ministries/Departments
in respect of certain schemes implemented by State Governments. These schemes are known
as ‘Centrally Sponsored Schemes’ (CSS). The mechanisms of transfer of funds in case of
the CSS are as contemplated in the design of the respective schemes. A schematic diagram
of flow of funds from the Union to the States is presented in Fig 3.1.25


3.5.2 In this Report, the Commission has focused on the transfer of funds from the
Union to the States in case of the CSS only. The Centrally Sponsored Schemes do not
fall within the subjects allocated to Union Government in List I of the Seventh Schedule
of the Constitution. However, they are funded by the Union Government to achieve
certain national objectives. The flow of funds from the Union Government to the ultimate
implementing agencies for any scheme is through one of these two channels.
i)

Funds are transferred to the Consolidated Fund of the State Governments
which spend the money through the implementing agencies.

ii)

The Union Government transfers funds directly to implementing agencies
in the States through normal banking channels.

3.5.3 The types of fund release mechanism in case of some Schemes is illustrated in
Table 3.1.26
Table 3.1: Types of Fund Release Mechanism (Select Cases)
Sl.
No.

Type-I

Type-II

Type-III

Type-IV

To State Governments through
credit to the state government
account at the RBI by the
Finance Ministry

To State Governments
through credit to the
state government account
at the RBI by concerned
Administrative Ministry/
Department or a
subordinate office of that
Department

To separate agencies at State
or district level directly by
the concerned Administrative
Ministry / Department or
a subordinate office of that
Department

To State Government
departments by
means of a bank draft
by the concerned
Administrative
Ministry / Department
or a subordinate office
of that Department

1.

Hill Area Development
Programme

Integrated Dairy
Development Project

Employment Assurance
Scheme

North Eastern Council

2.

Slum Development Scheme

Special Central Assistance
Tribal Sub Plan

Balika Samridhi Yojna

3

Prime Minister’s Gramodaya
Yojna

National Pulses
Development Programme

Indira Awas Yojna

4

Prime Minister’s Gram Sadak
Yojna*

National Oilseed
Production Programme

National Programme on
Biogas Development

Operation Blackboard
National AIDS Control
Programme
National TB Control
Programme
Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar
Yojna**
* In 2000-2001, the release was made in this fashion and from 2001-2002 it moved to a type III mechanism.
** In practice, most states have not established a registered state level agency and the concerned state government office is receiving the funds
but instead of depositing these in the state government account and securing budgetary allocation for further disbursing to implementing
agencies, they have been routing these through bank accounts. In effect, they have been functioning in much the same fashion as a
registered state level agency would be expected to.

40
Source: Based on ‘Central Transfers to States & Centrally Sponsored Schemes’, by Naresh C. Saxena; http://pmindia.nic.in/nac/concept%20papers/
Central%20Transfers.pdf

25

http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/sereport/ser/stdy_flwfnds.pdf

26

41


3.5.4 Actual expenditure under the CSS is incurred only when payment is made either
to a beneficiary of the scheme or to the supplier of goods and services. However, due to
lack of a proper information system, the tracking of fund flow and correlation between
the amount released and expenditure made could not be determined without a degree of
uncertainty. Further, when funds are transferred directly to the implementing agencies
in the States, it has to be done in advance which results in a substantial accumulation of
funds in the pipe line.

Analysis of the Budgetary Process

4

3.6 Earlier Initiatives in Budgetary Reforms

4.1 The Budgetary System

3.6.1 Initiatives relating to Performance Budget (1969), Zero-based Budget (1986-87)
and Outcome Budget (2005-06) have been briefly outlined in Chapter 2. They are
further discussed in the following Chapter while considering issues related to budgetary
reforms.

4.1.1 In an input-based budget system the linkages of budget outlays with productivity
of public expenditure and delivery of public services generally remain nebulous. In the
conventional line-item budgeting, the major focus is on ensuring that agencies do not
exceed the specified allocation.27 Financial compliance is sought to be achieved in this
system through a detailed budgetary specification of inputs and to achieve this, detailed
procedures are designed for expenditure control. The budgeting system in India, both at the
Union and State levels, continues to be conventional and inputs based though the recently
introduced outcome budgeting is a major reform towards achieving results.
4.2 Parliamentary Procedures
4.2.1 As per Rule 204(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Lok
Sabha, the Budget is presented to the Parliament on such date as is fixed by the President.
The present convention is to present the Budget at 11.00 am on the last working day of
February i.e. about a month before the commencement of the financial year except in the
year when General Elections to the Lok Sabha are held. In an election year, the Budget may
be presented twice, first to secure a Vote on Account for a few months and later in full.
4.2.2 The General Discussion on the Budget is held on a day appointed by the Speaker,
subsequent to the day of presentation of the Budget and for such period of time as the
Speaker may decide. During the general discussions, the House is at liberty to discuss the
budget as a whole or any question of principle involved therein, but no motion can be
moved nor can the budget be submitted to the vote of the House. The Finance Minister
has a right to reply at the end of the discussions. The scope of discussions at this stage is
confined to general examination of budget, policy of taxation as expressed in the Budget
speech of the Finance Minister and general schemes and structures etc. Specific points or
grievances can be discussed on the floor of the House when it takes up relevant Demands
for Grants or the Finance Bill.
4.2.3 After the conclusion of the General Discussion, the Demands for Grants of individual
Ministries/Departments are taken up in the Lok Sabha for discussion as per the time table

42

43
27
For example, General Financial Rules (GFR) 52(3) stipulates that no disbursements be made which might have the effect of exceeding the total grant or
appropriation authorised by Parliament for a financial year except after obtaining a supplementary grant or an advance from the Contingency Fund.



decided by the Business Advisory Committee of the House and is subjected to vote. In order
to facilitate proper examination of different Demands for Grants, different Departmentally
related Standing Committees of the Parliament are constituted every year to consider the
concerned Demands for Grants and make a report on them to the House. However, these
Committees are not empowered to suggest anything in the nature of ‘cut motions’ and
they have only persuasive value.

of Finance issues a Budget Circular annually which contains the guidelines applicable to
the particular year along with instructions and guidelines issued by different authorities in
the form of annexures.

4.2.4 When a Demand is taken up for discussion, any Member may seek reduction in the
amount of the Demand by moving any of the following types of Cut Motions:
• Disapproval of Policy Cut (by moving “that the amount of the Demand be
reduced to Re. 1”, thereby representing a disapproval of the policy underlying
the demand);
• Economy Cut (by moving “that the amount of the demand be reduced by a
specified amount”, thereby representing the economy that can be effected); and
• Token Cut (by moving “that the amount of the demand be reduced by Rs. 100”,
in order to ventilate a specific grievance).
4.2.5 At the end of the period allotted for discussion on the Demands for Grants, the
Speaker puts all the outstanding Demands for Grants to the vote of the House. This
process is known as ‘Guillotine’ which acts as a device for bringing the debate on financial
proposals to an end within a specified time with the result that several Demands have to be
voted by the House without discussions. At the same time, Cut Motions which have been
moved are also put to vote and disposed of. The Appropriation Bill for withdrawal from
the Consolidated Fund of India is introduced in the Lok Sabha with the prior approval
of the President. For its introduction, consideration and passing on the same day, special
permission has to be sought from the Speaker. The scope of debate on an Appropriation
Bill relating to Demands for Grants for the financial year after the remaining demands
have been guillotined is restricted to matters of public importance or administrative policy
implied in the grants covered by the Bill which have not already been raised while relevant
Demands for Grants were under consideration.
4.3 Preparation of the Budget
4.3.1 Preparation of the Annual Budget in the Government of India follows both the
top-down and bottom-up approaches. While guidelines and instructions are issued by the
Ministry of Finance and Planning Commission, the spending Ministries/Departments
make requests for budgetary allocations based on their own estimates. The provisions which
govern the preparatory process are contained in the General Financial Rules. The Ministry
44

4.3.2 The process of preparation of the Budget begins with the issue of the Budget Circular
by the Budget Division of the Ministry of Finance in the month of September. This Circular
is issued for the guidance of Ministries/Departments in framing the Revised Estimates for
the current year and the Budget Estimates for the ensuing year. It gives detailed instructions
about the preparation of estimates of receipts and expenditure, the required format and the
various statements that are to be appended to the estimates. It also specifies the processes
to be followed and their scheduled dates. The procedure for preparing the estimates for
expenditure is briefly outlined in the following paragraphs.
4.3.3 The first step to be taken by the Ministries/Departments is to review the existing
Expenditure Budget so as to prioritise the activities and schemes, both on the Plan and
Non-Plan side and identify those activities and schemes, which can be eliminated or reduced
in size or merged with any other scheme. Thus, all ongoing schemes/programmes need to
be evaluated to determine their continued relevance.28 Schemes that are not to continue
beyond the current year, need to be excluded from the BE of the ensuing year. From the
Eleventh Five Year Plan onwards, Planning Commission’s guidelines regarding inclusion of
new Schemes in the Plan, enhancement of Five Year Plan/Annual Plan outlays and major
changes in the scope and investment approval of the Plan Schemes is to be adhered before
firming up the estimates.29
4.3.4 Instructions are issued regularly giving due consideration to past performance, the
stages of formulation/implementation of the various schemes, the institutional capacity of the
implementing agencies to implement the scheme as scheduled, the constraints on spending
by the spending agencies, and most importantly the quantum of Government assistance
lying with the recipients unutilised/ unaccounted for etc. while making estimates. These are
all aimed at minimising the scope for available surrenders at a later stage.30 The Ministry
of Finance has issued instructions on the need for the individual Ministry/Department to
put in place effective mechanism for realistically assessing their requirement of funds in a
way that would ward off the occurrence of unwarranted surrender of savings at a later date.
Under the standing instructions of the Ministry of Finance, no provision should normally
be made in the Budget without completion of a pre-Budget scrutiny of a project/scheme.
However, the Budget Circular also provides that where, such a provision has been made
without the necessary scrutiny, such scrutiny should be completed and appropriate approvals
obtained therefor before the commencement of the financial year or latest by the time the
Budget is passed by the Parliament.31

Secretary (Expenditure)’s O.M. F. No. 7(5)/E-Coord/2004 dated 24.09.2004
29
Planning Commission U.O. No. N- 11016/4/2006-PC dated 29.8.2006
30
O.M. F. No. 7(6)-B(R)/2001 dated 20th July, 2001; F.No.7(1)/B(D)/2006 dated 31st July, 2006
31
Para 3.2.6; Budget Circular, 2009-10
28

45


4.3.5 The departmental estimates are examined and analysed by the Financial Adviser and
then forwarded to the Budget Division in the Finance Ministry. This is followed by prebudget meetings with the Secretary (Expenditure). Once this stage is over, the expenditure
ceilings are communicated (which include ceilings on both revenue and capital expenditure).
The Departments then prepare the Statement of Budget Estimates (Final). In case of the
2009-10 Budget, the due dates for rendition of estimates by Ministries/Departments to
the Budget Division are given in in Table 4.1 : 32


ii.

Delay in implementation of projects: Resources are being spread thinly with only
token provisions in some cases, often leading to inordinate delays in execution
of projects.

iii.

Skewed expenditure pattern: The expenditure pattern is skewed, with a major
portion getting spent in the last quarter of the financial year, especially in the
last month.

iv.

Inadequate adherence to the multi-year perspective and missing ‘line of sight’
between plan and budget: Though the Five Year Plan provides the basis for
multi-year perspective, often ad hoc deviations from it distort the long-term
plan objectives. The Plan schemes get dispersed into line-items in the budget
estimates and there is no consolidation afterwards – both in the estimates and
the final accounts. There is need for alignment between the plan, budgets and
accounts.

v.

No correlation between expenditure and actual implementation: The expenditure
figures do not reflect actual expenditure made towards receipt of goods and
services.

vi.

Mis-stating of financial position: Parking of funds by implementing agencies,
outside the government accounts portrays an incorrect picture of the financial
position of government. This also means that the Government’s financial
position is not known with reasonable accuracy at any given point of time.

Table 4.1: Due Dates for Rendition of Estimates by Union Ministries/Departments
Statement of Budget Estimates (proposed):

October 24, 2008
(followed by pre-budget discussions)

Statement of Budget Estimates (Final):

Immediately after ceilings are
communicated

SBE with BE 2009-10 (Plan) and statement
showing provision for externally aided projects
in Central Plan

Within 3 days of receipt of Plan allocation
from Planning Commission

Notes on Demands for Grants for Expenditure
Budget Vol. 2

Within 3 days of rendition of SBE (Final) for
Plan Expenditure 2009-10

Material for Statements to be appended to
Demands for Grants/Expenditure Budget

-Do-

4.3.6 In the following paragraphs, different issues related to strengthening of the financial
management system, so far as the budgetary processes are concerned, and the agenda for
reforms in the budgetary process are discussed.
4.4 Weaknesses in the Budgetary System and Implementation
4.4.1 The Commission has analysed the recent Annual Budgets and their implementation
and has found that they have the following weaknesses:
i.

Unrealistic budget estimates: The amounts budgeted are often not realistic.
Weakness in preparing proper estimates leads to frequent revisions and
supplementaries. On the other hand, there are major unspent provisions at
the end of the year.

46

vii. Ad hoc project announcements: Indiscriminate announcement of projects/
schemes not included in the plan/budget is regularly made, often without
proper consideration and detailing.
viii. Emphasis on compliance with procedures rather than on outcomes.
ix.

Irrational plan / non-plan distinction leads to inefficiency in resource
utilization.

4.5 Unrealistic Budget Estimates
4.5.1 The Report of the CAG on Union Government Accounts 2007-08 mentions
in paragraph 8.4 that “Unspent provisions in a grant or appropriation indicate either
poor budgeting or shortfall in performance or both. Unspent provisions of more than
Rs. 100 crore, which need a detailed explanatory note to the Public Accounts Committee
(PAC), occurred in 60 cases of 47 grants (including Civil, Posts and Defence) during the
47

Budget Circular 2009-10

32



year 2007-08. The unspent provisions were attributed by the Ministries/Departments to
some of the schemes failing to take off.” In fact, this Report also points out that there were
24 sections of 20 grants/appropriations including six capital sections which had persistent
savings of Rs. 100 crore and above during the last three years (2005-08). These are presented
in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Details of Persistent Unspent Provision of Rs.100 Crore or More under Grant /
Appropriations

Table 4.2: Details of Persistent Unspent Provision of Rs.100 Crore or More under Grant /Contd.
Appropriations

(Rupees in crore)

Grant No. Year

Savings during
the year

Revenue (Voted)
56 – Department of School Education and Literacy

2005-06

505.92

(Rupees in crore)

2006-07

373.19

Grant No. Year

Savings during
the year

2007-08

2668.29

61 – Department of Law and Justice

2005-06

217.74

2006-07

199.72

Revenue (Voted)
6 – Nuclear Power Schemes

104.73

2007-08

309.78

2006-07

205.83

65 – Ministry of New and Renewable Energy

2005-06

276.18

2007-08

709.46

2006-07

207.85

18 – Department of Food and Public Distribution

2005-06

3299.01

2007-08

139.67

2006-07

205.13

81 – Department of Science and Technology

2005-06

205.09

2007-08

495.87

2006-07

490.04

33 – Payments to Financial Institutions

2005-06

1523.18

2007-08

271.06

2006-07

1687.99

85 – Department of Road Transport and Highways

2005-06

448.17

2007-08

1224.47

2006-07

515.54

35 – Transfers to State and Union Territory Governments

2005-06

1106.34

2007-08

335.62

2006-07

722.37

88 – Department of Space

2005-06

435.95

2007-08

1481.30

2006-07

505.09

46- Department of Health and Family Welfare

2005-06

1406.50

2007-08

374.81

2006-07

2274.91

89 – Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation

2005-06

154.41

2007-08

1467.46

2006-07

145.50

48 – Department of Heavy Industry

2005-06

1183.7

2007-08

138.76

2006-07

138.52

91 – Ministry of Textiles

2005-06

118.28

2007-08

477.77

2006-07

763.18

52 – Police

2005-06

117.82

2007-08

147.35

2006-07

600.93

99 – Department of Urban Development

2005-06

718.29

2007-08

285.07

2006-07

197.19

48

2005-06

2007-08

118.11

49



Contd.

Table 4.2: Details of Persistent Unspent Provision of Rs.100 Crore or More under Grant/
Appropriations

(Rupees in crore)

Grant No. Year

Savings during
the year

4.5.2 Further, in paragraph 8.14, the Report states that in 25 cases relating to 25 grants/
appropriations, while supplementary provisions aggregating to Rs. 65887.93 crore were
obtained during 2007-08 in anticipation of higher expenditure, the final expenditure
was less than even the original grants/appropriations resulting in unspent provisions of
Rs. 70108.62 crore. This is presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Unspent Provision Were More than the Supplementary Grant / Appropriation

Revenue (Voted)
102 – Ministry of Water Resources

2005-06

112.53

2006-07

195.08

2007-08

102.75

Sl.
No.

35- Transfer to State and Union Territory Governments

2005-06

740.51

Civil

2006-07

1161.69

Revenue - Voted

2007-08

3748.34

1.

14 – Department of
Tecommunications

2.

Revenue (Charged)

Capital (Voted)
5 – Department of Atomic Energy

2005-06

298.17

2006-07

164.03

2007-08

458.65

6 – Nuclear Power Schemes

2005-06

1013.46

2006-07

713.49

2007-08

1240.53

52 - Police

2005-06

152.81

2006-07

192.72

2007-08

1788.67

72 – Ministry of Power

2005-06

1417.13

2006-07

737.70

2007-08

775.28

Capital (Charged)

(Rupees in crore)
Grant/
appropriation

Supplementary
grant obtained

Actual
disbursements

Unspent
provision

5445.00

377.01

4788.22

1033.79

19 – Ministry of Culture

882.61

115.00

850.52

147.09

3.

20 – Ministry of Defence

6865.08

229.79

6842.77

252.10

4.

43 – Indirect Taxes

1689.80

59.70

1636.08

113.42

5.

Health & Family Welfare

16270.63

280.54

15083.71

1467.46

6.

50 – Ministry of
Home Affairs

765.77

28.27

763.42

30.62

7.

School Education & Literacy

33535.22

49.15

30916.08

2668.29

8.

58 – Ministry of Information
& Broadcasting

1391.76

4.94

1363.71

32.99

9.

69 – Ministry of Personnel,
Public Grievances & Pensions

320.88

6.47

306.46

20.89

10.

72 – Ministry of Power

4883.91

2.27

4309.97

576.21

11.

Biotechnology

694.70

8.30

636.62

66.38

12.

Road Transport & Highways

12003.90

161.88

11830.16

335.62

585.41

4.08

486.35

103.14

85.50

4.27

81.04

8.73

35 – Transfer to State and Union Territory Governments

2005-06

350.53

2006-07

1000.00

2007-08

1000.15

13.

86 – Ministry of Micro,
Small & Medium Enterprises

27 – Capital Outlay on Defence Services

2005-06

2033.97

14.

90 – Ministry of Steel

50

Original
provision

2006-07

3653.05

2007-08

4417.70

51

Sl.
No.

Grant/
appropriation

Original
provision

Supplementary
grant obtained

Actual
disbursements

Unspent
provision

In 14 cases relating
to 13 grants,
actual expenditure
was less than the
original provision
(Rs. 295.89 crore)

(Rupees in crore)

In five cases,
actual expenditure
was less than the
original provision
(Rs. 17 crore)

Contd.
Supplementary
grants without
requirement

Table 4.3: Unspent Provision Were More than the Supplementary Grant / Appropriation

to 15 grants,
actual expenditure
was less than the
original provision
(Rs. 317.33 crore)



8.35

19.

46 – Department of Health &
Family Welfare

725.59

51.25

261.66

515.18

20.

Heavy Industry

628.58

165.79

615.81

178.56

21.

51 – Cabinet

33.36

0.26

17.02

16.60

22.

52 – Police

4529.81

81.10

2822.24

1788.67

23.

Science and Technology

73.90

1.95

72.59

3.26

24.

94 – Andaman &
Nicobar Islands

816.90

1.00

813.93

3.98

25.

37 – Appropriations
Repayment of Debt

1611645.92

64230.60

1604110.47

70108.62

Total

65887.93

4.5.3 The Commission has analysed the Reports of the CAG pertaining to the Civil
Ministries in the Union Government from year 2000 onwards with regard to unspent
provisions, injudicious re-appropriations, supplementary grants without requirement, rush
of expenditure in the month of March etc. The findings are presented in Table 4.4.

52

Rs.17.64 crore in
17 cases of
12 grants/
appropriations
where even the
original provision
could not be utilised

Rs.324.97 crore
in 28 cases
of 17 grants/
appropriations
where even the
original provision
72

147.78

Rs.0.44 crore
in one segment
of one grant /
appropriations

1.76

34 cases of
24 grants
and two
appropriations.

154.37

138164.89
(19.61%
of total
authorization)

28 – Ministry of Development
of North Eastern Region

2002
(200001)

18.

75

Capital - Voted

Rs.0.57 crore
in 2 segments
of two grants /
appropriations

150.53

32 cases

1357.18

68017.08
(10.15%
of total
authorization)

18.42

2001
(19992000)

1489.29

Rs.9481 crore in
32 cases of 16 grants
/ appropriations
where even the
original provision

3.81

77

52.93

Rs.11824.46
crore in
56 segments
of 42 grants /
appropriations

3.48

25 cases of
20 grants
and one
appropriation

53.26

35021.40
(5.44%
of total
authorization)

93 – Ministry of Tribal Affairs

0.81

2000
(199899)

17.

2.78

Excess
Disbursements
over Grants /
Appropriations

62 – Appropriation –
Supreme Court of India

0.65

Unspent
provision of
Rs. 100 crore
or more

16.

2.94

Year of
Unspent
CAG
provision
Report /
(Rs. crore)
FY

52 – Police

Table 4.4: Analysis of Observations by CAG in case of Civil Ministries/Departments

15.

Charged
Injudicious
Expenditure
reappropriations
as % of total
expenditure

Revenue - Charged

53

54
59849.32
(7.69%
of total
authorization)

(Excess
Expenditure
of 12386)

2004
(200203)

2005
(200304)

Rs. 42190.20
crores in seven
segments of
seven grants /
appropriations

72

70

Rs.40.88 crore in
7 cases of 6 grants/
appropriations
where even the
original provision
could not be utilized

Rs.52.27 crore in
29 cases of
18 grants/
appropriations
where even the
original provision

10772 (4.40%
of total
authorisation)

2009
(200708)

171.32 crores
in
4 segments
of 4 grants /
appropriations

Rs. 36637.20
crores in 4
segments of
4 grants /
appropriations

60 cases of
47 grants
(including
Defence etc.)
(Excess
expenditure
of Rs. 1034
crore)
2008
(200607)

60 cases of 47
grants and one
appropriation
(including
posts and
defence)

Rs. 97062.69
crores in 8
segments of
8 grants /
appropriations

53 cases of
44 grants

(Excess
Expenditure
of Rs. 66896
crore)

Rs. 33784.53
crores in three
segments of
three grants /
appropriations
2007
(200506)

48 cases of
38 grants
and one
appropriation

Excess
Disbursements
over Grants /
Appropriations
5194 (0.52%
of total
authorization)

Unspent
provision of
Rs. 100 crore
or more

78

80

81

74

Rs.430.76 crore in
appropriations where
even the original
provision could not
be utilized

Rs.426.23 crore
in 17 cases
of 11 grants/
appropriations
where even the
original provision

Rs.194.65 crore
in 20 cases
of 13 grants/
appropriations
where even the
original provision

Rs.33.09 crore in
appropriations
where even the
original provision

Charged
Injudicious
Expenditure
reappropriations
as % of total
expenditure

25 cases relating
to 25 grants,
actual expenditure
was less than the
original provision
(Rs.65887.93 crore)

to 33 grants,
actual expenditure
was less than the
original provision
(Rs. 3432 crore)

to 20 grants,
actual expenditure
was less than the
original provision
(Rs.443.80 crore)

to 22 grants,
actual expenditure
was less than the
original provision
(Rs.2259.81 crore)

Supplementary
grants without
requirement

Contd.

to 12 grants,
actual expenditure
was less than the
original provision
(Rs.2044.46 crore)

to 20 grants,
actual expenditure
was less than the
original provision
(Rs. 916.34 crore)

to 16 grants,
actual expenditure
was less than the
original provision
(Rs. 1202.01 crore)

70

Rs.499.62 crore
in 21 cases
of 17 grants/
appropriations
where even the
original provision

Supplementary
grants without
requirement

Contd.

Charged
Injudicious
Expenditure
reappropriations
as % of total
expenditure


46 cases of
38 grants
and one
appropriation

Rs. 1864.47
crore in nine
segments in
eight grants /
appropriations

Rs. 878.67
crores in five
segments of
five grants /
appropriations

Excess
Disbursements
over Grants /
Appropriations

2006
(200405)

Year of
Unspent
CAG
provision
Report /
(Rs. crore)
FY

37 cases of
29 grants
and two
appropriations

24290.85
(3.47%
of total
authorization)

2003
(200102)

57 cases of
48 grants
and one
appropriation

Unspent
provision of
Rs. 100 crore
or more

Year of
Unspent
CAG
provision
Report /
(Rs. crore)
FY



55



4.5.4 Table 4.4 shows that despite having such an elaborate and time consuming system
of making budgetary estimates, large amounts of unspent money have been surrendered
every year at the lapse of the financial year. Large-scale unspent provisions are indicative of
lack of efficiency in programme management at the departmental level in an annual budget
cycle and undermine efficient use of public money which is one of the major objectives
of any budgeting system. Excessive provision under various sub-heads during the budget
preparation stage due to lack of a realistic assessment of departmental requirements is the
major reason for this. It also shows that proper forecasting methods are not used to estimate
expenditure on account of various items.

of the PAC (14th Lok Sabha) in observing that “large sacle unspent provisions under Grants/
Appropriations by the civil Ministries/Departments have become an almost recurring feature
and the position is still to improve. The Committee is inclined to conclude that the concerned
Ministries/Departments have not made any serious attempts to apply effective corrective measures
in accordance with the Committee’s recommendations.”35 This time, reliance was placed on the
role of the Financial Adviser under the new Charter, wherein he was required to provide
analytical inputs into the budget formulation process in such a way that large savings/
unspent provisions were reduced if not altogether avoided. Thus, the Financial Advisers
were enjoined to take the following steps in this regard:

4.5.5 In fact, the serious nature of this state of affairs has also been taken note of by the
Public Accounts Committee in its reports. Thus, the observations of the PAC (13th Lok
Sabha) in para 13.1 of their 16th Report were communicated by the Ministry of Finance
(MoF) to all Ministries/Departments in the following manner: “the Public Accounts
Committee while taking adverse note of the whopping saving of Rs. 44231.22 crore in the
grants pertaining to civil Ministries/Departments for the year 1996-97 has noted that out of the
above savings, Rs. 29466.03 crore was on account of less withdrawal of 31 days Treasury Bills.
Excluding these Treasury Bills savings, the effective saving of Rs. 14765.13 crore constituted
more than two times the supplementary grants of Rs. 7326.86 crore and 3.5 per cent of the
total provision of Rs. 420902.71 crore. The Committee has further observed that there was
aggregate savings (both Revenue and Capital Sections) amounting to Rs. 11266.16 crore in the
Voted portion and Rs. 32965.06 crore in the Charged portion.”33 It was further mentioned
that the PAC has observed that “this indicates the lack of earnestness on the part of Ministries/
Departments concerned reflecting on the injudicious formulation of budget estimates/utilisation
of funds, where such savings could have been significantly reduced, if not avoided altogether,
by making realistic budgetary projections by the concerned Ministries/Departments.” To avoid
this ‘recurring malady’, the Ministry of Finance advised the Ministries/Departments to
gear up the ‘existing mechanism of review, monitoring and control’ as to make a careful
formulation of plan/schemes having regard to ‘ground realities and achievable targets’ and
also to make ‘realistic assessment of funds’.34

• Budget Estimates and Revised Estimates should be prepared with reference to
the measurable/monitorable commitments made in the Outcome Budget. Fiscal
discipline should be enforced in implementation of programmes/projects to ensure
‘value for money’.

4.5.6 However, apparently, the ‘existing mechanism of review, monitoring and control’ could
not be geared up to take into account the ground realities and make realistic assessment of
funds in the ensuing period as another OM was issued in 2006 which cited the 17th Report

• Ministries/Departments may review the expenditure profile of each major scheme/
programme at regular intervals and apply the result of such analysis at the time
of initial budget formulation so that a more realistic estimation of expenditure is
made.
• Ministries/Departments may, after carrying out such review, intimate the MoF at
the time of finalisation of Revised Estimates of the current year about the possible
savings so that they could be re-deployed.
4.5.7 However, there has been little improvement in the situation. This shows that in spite
of repeated observations by the PAC, CAG and MoF, Ministries/Departments are actually
not in a position to make a true assessment of fund requirement or gauge the ground realities
regarding implementation of schemes/programmes. The Commission is of the view that
the root cause of the problem lies in the prevalent method of formulation of the annual
budget by getting details from different organizations/units/agencies and fitting them into
a pre-determined aggregate amount leading to unrealistic budget estimates. This method
should be given up along with the method of budgeting on the basis of ‘analysis of trends’.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, many countries have now adopted top-down budgeting
techniques where a medium-term expenditure framework provides baseline expenditure

56

57
OM No.F.7(6)-B(R)/2001, dated 20th July, 2001
ibid

33

34

Para 14; cited in F.No.7(1)/B(D)/2006 dated 31st July, 2006

35

58

49.48
172782.57
115591.01
308
13.47
421158.34
901
Total

371156.82

109.80
41.96
20.00
1
33.84
86.86
2
Information Technology
16.

64.90

118.64
1187.00
542.90
1
118.64
1187.00
1
Water
Resources
15.

542.90

6.95
8714.14
8147.92
2
3.69
15852.97
15289.53
20
14. Urban

Development

34.72
1472.06
1092.65
9
-8.31
10658.38
11624.31
Telecommunication
13.

52

44.84
807.97
557.83
12
3.50
6544.85
6323.79
Shipping
& Ports
12.

30

15.68

113.96
67739.93

6512.34
5629.72

31660.29
189

19
1.11

82.27
79497.96

61443.39
60771.27

43615.77
264

220

Railways

Road Transport &
Highways

10.

11.

522.58
443.15
71.18
1
522.58
443.15
71.18
Health & FW
9.

1

15.56
30701.02
26567.42
24
2.92
111467.04
108303.40
Power
8.

71

33.09

41.55
14698.20

32618.55
24509.47

10383.57
11

15
8.90

27.08
20234.77

60680.90
55719.67

15922.88
45

40

Steel

Petroleum

6.

7.

0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
4091.51
4091.51
Mines
5.

1

0.00
0.00

7404.08
6065.60

0.00
0

16
4.41

0.00
35.00

23342.48
22357.34

35.00
1

116

I&B

3. Coal

4.

29.12
442.17
342.46
8
4.68
2231.82
32
2. Civil

Aviation

2132.11

0.00
0.00
-3.83
23360.26
5
Atomic
Energy

24291.26
1.

%

0

(Rs. Cr)

(Rs. Cr)

0.00

increase
Cost
Cost
Projects
Over run
pated Cost
Cost (Rs. Cr)

(Rs. Cr)

No. of
Sector

Projects

%
Anticipated
Original
No. of

Total Projects

4.6.1 Another aspect of financial management concerns the delays in implementation
of projects. In fact, time and cost overruns have been a major problem affecting the
central sector projects. The analysis made by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation shows that 308 projects have accounted for a cost over run of Rs. 57,193
crore (i.e. 49.48%) with respect to their original sanctioned cost during the April-June,
2008 quarter. This is shown in Table 4.5.

4.6 Delay in Implementation of Projects

No.

Internal capacity for making realistic estimates needs to be developed.

Cost

c.

Antici-

The method of formulation of the annual budget by getting details
from different organizations/units/agencies and fitting them into a predetermined aggregate amount leads to unrealistic budget estimates. This
method should be given up along with the method of budgeting on the basis
of ‘analysis of trends’. This should be replaced by a ‘top-down’ method by
indicating aggregate limits to expenditure to each organization/agency.

Original

b.

Sl.

The assumptions made while formulating estimates must be realistic. At
the end of each year the reasons for the gap between the ‘estimates’ and
‘actuals’ must be ascertained and efforts made to minimize them. These
assumptions should also be subject to audit.

a.

Total Projects

4.5.8 Recommendations

Table 4.5: Extent of Cost Overrun in Projects with Respect to Original Cost (Status as on 30.06.2008)

information leading to fixing of the total level of expenditure (the medium-term perspective
and expenditure limits are discussed in paragraph 4.8 of this Report). This is then allocated
among different Ministries/Departments. These Ministries/Departments are thus free to
reallocate moneys among its various agencies or programmes in accordance with their
priorities. In case a new policy decision is made, it is funded by reallocations from other
areas within the Ministry/Department. The Finance Ministry, however, generally examines
the appropriateness of these reallocations. The Commission is of the view that such a
‘top-down’ method may be adopted in India also. Further, it also needs to be ensured that
assumptions made while arriving at estimates are realistic.

22.07



59



180013.17
13.47

4.6.3 As stated in an earlier paragraph, the Report of the CAG on Union Government
Accounts 2007-08 mentions that in a large number of cases, many Ministries/Departments
have reported that there were unspent provisions due to various schemes not taking off.
In many cases, such delays and unspent provisions are due to token provisions made on
account of ill-conceived or hastily conceived projects which fail to take off leading to
wastages on the one hand and tying scarce resources on the other, thereby resulting in
delayed implementation of other schemes/programmes which are starved of funds.
4.6.4 Thus, the Commission feels that there is need for stricter adherence to project
formulation norms so that budgetary provisions are made only when administrative and
technical sanctions have been obtained and a detailed feasibility report and cost-benefit
analysis have been made. In the same vein, clear and unambiguous provisions should be
made for jettisoning of projects where justifiable reasons are on record. Further, a more strict
regime needs to be put in place to prevent cost and time over-runs which would contain
measures to deal with various factors causing delays in projects. However, there is also a
need for taking holistic approach as there is a whole host of factors, apart from financial
constraints, which leads to delays in implementation of projects.
4.6.5 Recommendation
a.

Projects and schemes should be included in the budget only after detailed
consideration. The norms for formulating the budget should be strictly
adhered to in order to avoid making token provisions and spreading
resources thinly over a large number of projects/schemes.

4.7 Skewed Expenditure Pattern - Rush of Expenditure towards the End of the Financial
Year
4.7.1 There is a tendency to incur a significant part of the annual expenditure in the last
quarter of the financial year, especially during the month of March. The details of monthwise Plan expenditure in case of Union Ministries/Departments for the period April 2004
to February 2009 are shown in Fig.4.1. This Figure clearly indicates that every year, there is
a rush for expenditure in the month of March, which is represented by the peaks observed
in the figure. The figures for monthly non-plan expenditure during the same period show
similar trends. This is shown in Fig 4.2.

901
Total

371156.82

421158.34

372

210153.36

--0.00
0.00
33.84
2
Information Technology
16.

64.90

86.86

0

60
1187.00
542.90
118.64
1
Water
Resources
15.

542.90

1187.00

1

3-56
9067.93
8502.21
3.69
20
14. Urban

Development

15289.53

15852.97

11

1-127
8278.55
8851.74
-8.31
Telecommunication
13.

52

11624.31

10658.38

30

4-96
1766.63
3.50
Shipping
& Ports
12.

30

6323.79

6544.85

1625.61

1-80

17

3-159
28402.09

35567.43

14473.32

34875.67
1.11

67
82.27
79497.96
43615.77
264
Railways

Road Transport &
Highways

10.

11.

220

60771.27

61443.39

144

-0.00
0.00
522.58
Health & FW
9.

1

71.18

443.15

0

1-49

1-68

36759.48

55236.22

28869.58

52726.59

21

30

8.90

2.92

60680.90

111467.04
108303.40

55719.67
40

71

Petroleum

Power

7.

8.

4-20
15151.96
11017.48
27.08
Steel
6.

45

15922.88

20234.77

14

-0.00
0.00
Mines
5.

1

4091.51

4091.51

0.00

--

0

4 – 108

0.00
0.00

1232.86
1079.87

0

4.41

0.00
35.00
35.00
1

116

I&B

3. Coal

4.

22357.34

23342.48

17

2-41
916.95
861.94
4.68
32
2. Civil

Aviation

2132.11

2231.82

17

13-25
16586.26
-3.83
5
1.

Atomic
Energy

24291.26

23360.26

16586.26

(Months)
(Rs. Cr)
%

(Rs. Cr)

(Rs. Cr)

3

delay
Cost
Projects
Over run
pated Cost
Cost (Rs. Cr)
Projects
No.

60

Cost

Anticipated
Original
No. of
Cost
Antici-
Original
Sector

No. of
Sl.

Projects with time overrun
Total Projects

Table 4.6: Extent of Time Overrun in Projects With Respect to Original Schedule (Status as on 30.06.2008)

Range of

4.6.2 The details of time over-runs are given in Table 4.6.

61



Ministry/Department concerned would have to limit issuing of cheques accordingly are
arrange prior consent of Ministry of Finance. The MEP now needs to be finalized taking
into account the following:
a)
b)

i.

ii.

Obtaining greater evenness in the budgeted expenditure within the financial
year, especially in respect of items entailing large sums of advance releases and
transfers to corpus funds.

MEP for the months of January-March may be so fixed that the QEA for the
last quarter may not exceed 33 per cent of the budgeted provision; and

c)
4.7.2 A modified exchequer control-based expenditure management system was put in
place in December 2006 to curb this rush of expenditure in the last quarter of the financial
year. The Modified Cash Management System36 seeks to achieve, inter alia, the following
objectives: –

MEP for the month of March may not exceed 15 per cent of the budgeted
provision [Budget Estimate];

The extant guidelines of the Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure,
including D.O.No.7(3)/2006/E.Coord, dated December 21, 2006.

4.7.4 Under the new system, savings would not be available for automatic carry forward
to the next quarter. The Ministry/Department concerned has to approach the Ministry of
Finance for revalidation of such savings. Further, even in case of Demand for Grants not
covered by the modified exchequer management system, the expenditure in the last quarter
of the financial year may not exceed 33 per cent of the budget allocation. The 23 Demands
for Grants covered under the modified system are given in Table 4.7 below:
Table 4.7: Demands for Grants Covered under the Modified Cash Management System

Reducing rush of expenditure during the last quarter, especially in the last
month of the financial year.

Sl.No.

Demand No

Name of the Ministry / Department

1.

1

Department of Agriculture and Cooperation

iii.

Reducing tendency of parking of funds.

2.

2

Department of Agricultural Research and Education

iv.

Effectively monitoring the expenditure pattern.

3.

8

Department of Fertilizers

v.

Better planning of Indicative Market Borrowing Calendar of the Central
Government.

4.

11

Department of Commerce

5.

14

Department of Telecommunications

6.

18

Department of Food and Public Distribution

7.

31

Ministry of External Affairs

8.

32

Department of Economic Affairs

9.

41

Indian Audit and Accounts Department

4.7.3 The implementation of this modified system has been entrusted to the Financial
Advisors. In accordance with the modified system, a Monthly Expenditure Plan (MEP)
has to be worked out for each Demand for Grant. There has to be a separate MEP for Plan
and Non-plan expenditure which would be annexed to the Detailed Demand for Grant.
The MEP would form the basis of a Quarterly Expenditure Allocations (QEA) and the

62

63
F.No.21(1)-PD/2005 Dated 27th November, 2006, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs.

36



Table 4.7: Demands for Grants covered under the Modified Cash Management System
Sl.No.

Demand No

Name of the Ministry / Department

10.

42

Department of Revenue

11.

43

Direct Taxes

12.

44

Indirect Taxes

13.

47

Department of Health & Family Welfare

14.

57

Department of School Education and Literacy

15.

58

Department of Higher Education

16.

68

Ministry of Panchayati Raj

17.

71

Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas

18.

73

Ministry of Power

19.

79

Department of Rural Development

20.

86

Department of Road Transport and Highways

21.

92

Ministry of Textiles

22.

100

Department of Urban Development

23.

104

Ministry of Women & Child Development

4.7.5 The modified exchequer-based expenditure management is basically a Cash Management
System which emphasises the time value of money. The Ministries/Departments covered
under the Cash Management System are required to annex a Monthly Expenditure Plan
(MEP) along with their Detailed Demand for Grants. By identifying specific Demands
for Grants, it aims at ensuring greater evenness in the budgeted expenditure within the
year especially in respect of items entailing large sums of advance releases. Thus, it enables
the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank of India to plan their market borrowing
calendar-based on more predictable patterns of cash flows.
4.7.6 However, in spite of this cash management system, these targets have not been achieved
in many cases. For example, the actual expenditure (Plan) up to December 2007 in case
of Ministries/Departments having a BE of more than Rs. 1000 crore (Fig 4.3) shows that
in the FY 2007-08, a number of Ministries/Departments were not able to spend 67% of
the BE (Plan expenditure) in the first three quarters of the year.37

64

4.7.7 Thus, it is seen that the rush of expenditure in the last quarter of the financial year
and especially in the month of March continues. While the Modified Cash Management
System introduced in some Demands for Grants has shown improvement in this area, the
Commission feels that there is scope for further improvement in this regards. It is also of
the view that apart from stricter adherence to the system, there is need for its extension to
all Demands for Grants as soon as possible.
a.

The Modified Cash Management System should be strictly adhered.
This System should be extended to all Demands for Grants as soon as
possible.

65
Source: CGA website

37



4.8 Inadequate Adherence to the Multi-year Perspective and Missing Line of Sight
between Plan and Budget

4.8.4 An improvised framework for the planning and control of public expenditure has
been in operation in the UK since the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR).40
This framework is based on the following key principles:

4.8.1 Multi-year budgeting addresses the basic problem faced in budgeting, - how to
integrate planning and budgeting. Multi-year budgeting essentially refers to budgeting
in the medium-term, i.e., a perspective covering 3 to 5 years including the current year
budget. A medium term perspective for budgeting becomes necessary because a single year
budget is not sufficient to meet the expenditure priorities. Given the rigidity of committed
expenditures and their large share in the budget, success of any new programme and
associated adjustments in expenditure priorities require several years beyond the annual
budget. The preparation of rolling multi-year expenditure planning leads to improvement
in budget preparation by providing advance expenditure ceilings to the departments,
increasing predictability of resource availability, and by improving efficiency of public
spending. Today, a realistic multi-year budget framework (medium-term) is considered as
the cornerstone of performance oriented budgeting, linking resources to policy objectives
that defines performance.

• consistency with a long-term, prudent and transparent regime for managing the
public finances as a whole;
• the judgement of success by policy outcomes rather than resource inputs;
• strong incentives for departments and their partners in service delivery to plan
over several years and plan together where appropriate so as to deliver better public
services with greater cost effectiveness; and
• the proper costing and management of capital assets to provide the right incentives
for public investment.
The framework has two components:

4.8.2 A step towards such a medium-term framework was attempted in the 1980s also.
Thus, the then Finance Minister, in the Budget Speech for 1985-86 mentioned that:

Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) spending, which is planned and
controlled on a three-year basis in Spending Reviews; and

“71. The formulation of the Budget is an annual exercise but, to be meaningful, it has
to be set in a longer time frame. Our fiscal system has served us well. However, over the
years, objective conditions have changed calling for new responses. I am quite aware that
it is not possible to usher in all the changes at one stroke, yet we have to initiate a process
of reform which can be completed in a phased manner in a time-bound frame. We will be
moving towards the formulation of a long-term fiscal policy co-terminous with the Plan.
I hope to initiate a debate on this after the budget session is over.” 38

66

i.
ii.

Annually Managed Expenditure (AME), which is expenditure which cannot
reasonably be subject to firm, multi-year limits in the same way as DEL. AME
includes social security benefits, local authority self-financed expenditure, debt
interest, and payments to EU institutions.

4.8.3 A medium-term fiscal policy was indeed drawn up in 1985. This, however, was
concerned only with taxation. Further, it was not followed up in later years.39 The basic issue
here is to arrive at a reasonably true picture of the resource situation in a medium-term of
3-5 years and formulate truer estimates of different developmental schemes/programmes/
projects within the limits suggested by the availability of resources and follow it up with
well formulated annual budgetary estimates for executing the schemes. In the end, the
accounts for the actual expenditure, the budgetary estimates and the plan document (the
medium-term framework in the Indian context) should be integrated in such a way that a
holistic picture emerges and the outcomes could be evaluated. Such a system has been put
to practice in the UK where the process of reforms is still continuing. As its governance
structures, at least at the Central level, are very similar to that of India, these reforms and
developments need consideration. These are described below.
Budget Speech of the Finance Minister (1985-86); http://www.indiainfoline.com/per-budg/bs/bs198586.pdf
Source: http://www.hindu.com/2007/01/01/stories/2007010101961500.htm

38
39

4.8.5 In Spending Reviews, firm DEL plans are set for Departments for three years. To
ensure consistency with the Government’s fiscal rules, departments are set separate resource
(current) and capital budgets. To encourage Departments to plan over the medium term,
Departments are allowed to carry forward unspent DEL provision from one year into the
next and, subject to the ‘normal tests for tautness and realism of plans’, these may be drawn
down in future years also. This facility is called ‘End Year Flexibility’ (EYF). This EYF also
removes any incentive for Departments to use up their provision as the year-end approaches
with less regard to value for money. To reap the full benefits of this facility, it is expected that
EYF and three-year budgets should be cascaded from Departments to executive agencies
and other budget holders, ultimately resulting in improved public service delivery. This
ensures that the benefits of this facility is also passed on to lower levels.
4.8.6 The basic principle at work behind three-year budgets and EYF is that the implementing
agencies and administrative departments need the stability to plan their operations on a
67
Source: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spend_plancontrol.htm

40



sensible time scale. Further, the implementation of this system also means that
departments cannot seek to bid up funds each year (before 1997, three-year plans
were set and reviewed in annual Public Expenditure Surveys).

4.8.12 Thus, these initiatives not only integrated the planning process to the budgetary
process and provided a medium-term perspective to annual expenditure estimates but it
also put a stop to the phenomenon of the ‘March rush’ by providing for the EYF facility.

4.8.7 Departments now have certainty about their budgetary allocation over the
medium-term and these multi-year DEL plans are strictly enforced. Departments are
expected to prioritise competing pressures and fund these within their overall annual
limits, as set in Spending Reviews. So the DEL system provides a strong incentive to
control costs and maximise value for money.

4.8.13 It was also felt that the financial information presented before the House of Commons
needed ‘alignment’ in order to:
i.
ii.

4.8.9 As mentioned above, the second component of the public expenditure framework
is the AME. This typically consists of programmes which are large, volatile and
demand-led, and which therefore cannot reasonably be subject to firm multi-year
limits. In the UK, the biggest single element in this category is social security spending.
Other items include tax credits, Local Authority Self Financed Expenditure, Scottish
Executive spending financed by non-domestic rates, and spending financed from the
proceeds of the National Lottery. AME is reviewed twice a year as part of the Budget
and Pre-Budget Report process. Although AME is not subject to the same three-year
expenditure limits as DEL, it is still part of the overall envelope for public expenditure.
Given an overall envelope for public spending, forecasts of AME affect the level of
resources available for DEL spending. Cautious estimates and the AME margin are
built in to these AME forecasts and reduce the risk of overspending on AME.
4.8.10 The Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) and Annually Managed
Expenditure together amount to ‘Total Managed Expenditure’ (TME). TME is
a measure drawn from national accounts and represents the current and capital
spending of the public sector. The public sector is made up of central government,
local government and public corporations.
4.8.11 It needs to be mentioned here that the Budget and Spending Reviews in the
UK are roughly equivalent to Five Year Plans in the Indian context and should not
be mixed up with the Annual Budget as presented to the Parliament in India. In the
UK, annual Parliamentary authority for the expenditure of individual departments
is sought through ‘Supply Estimates’ following the plans announced in Spending
Reviews.

have the opportunity to influence the Government’s financial decisions;

iii.

4.8.8 Apart from the above, there is also a small centrally held DEL Reserve. Support
from the Reserve is available only for genuinely unforeseeable contingencies which
Departments cannot be expected to manage within their DEL.

make the Government’s financial decisions transparent, including the
relationship between its stated priorities and its funding decisions;

hold the Government, individual Departments and other public bodies to
account for their financial decisions and financial management;

and thereby contribute to an improvement in the quality of Departments’ financial decisions
and management and improved value for money in public services.41 It was felt that under
current arrangements, there were a number of different systems for presenting Government
expenditure. The Government uses budgets to plan what it will spend; it then presents
Estimates to Parliament for approval; and finally, after the year-end, it publishes resource
accounts. However, there were two main issues with these arrangements:42
i.

there is significant misalignment between the different bases on which financial
information is presented to Parliament; and accordingly

ii.

Government financial documents are published in different formats, and
on a number of different occasions during the year, making it difficult to
understand the links and inter-relationships between the bases on which
financial information is presented.

4.8.14 Thus, the UK Government came out with a “Vision” for the Alignment Project in
order to simplify its financial reporting to Parliament:
“to create a single, coherent financial regime, that is effective, efficient and transparent,
enhances accountability to Parliament and the public, and underpins the Government’s
fiscal framework, incentivises good value for money and supports delivery of excellent
public services by allowing managers to manage”.
4.8.15 The frameworks in case of the National Accounts, budgets, Supply Estimates and the
‘Resource Accounts’ had developed in different ways over the years as they served different

68

69
Alignment (“Clear Line Of Sight”) Project; Memorandum submitted by HM Treasury
ibid

41
42



purposes. However, it was found that this has resulted in significant misalignment between
the different frameworks, with only about two-thirds of government expenditure fully
aligned across budgets, estimates and resource accounts.43 The following misalignments
were noticed:44
i.

• For estimates, the aim should be to align with whatever is needed in
budgets to control public spending, consistent with the requirements of
Parliament.
• For resource accounts, if it is not desirable in the context of alignment
to implement IFRS strictly in specific areas, it may be possible to achieve
alignment in other ways through seeking adaptations to IFRS – in limited
cases and subject to the agreement of the Financial Reporting Advisory
Board (FRAB) – while still satisfying its overall intentions.

Differences in the various boundaries – i.e. the entities and spending included
in budgets, estimates and accounts – covering both:
• different types of income and expenditure within the budgets, estimates and
accounts boundaries – for example, payments from the National Insurance
Fund (NIF) and Consolidated Fund Standing Services (CFSS), which are
covered by separate legislation and are included in budgets and resource
accounts, but not in estimates; and
• different treatment of entities within the respective boundaries – for example,
non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs). NDPBs’ spending scores in
budgets, but it is the grant-in-aid paid to these bodies which scores in
estimates and resource accounts.

ii.

iv.

4.8.17 In accordance with these general principles, the UK Government has proposed the
following in order to effect the desired alignment:45
i.
ii.

Parliamentary controls in estimates should be on a net (rather than both gross
and net) basis, to line up with budgetary controls, with details of income shown
in the estimates and appropriate safeguards in place so that firm control is
maintained over the use of incomes by Departments.

iii.

The estimates and accounting boundaries should be extended to accommodate
NDPBs and other bodies classified to the central government sector.

iv.

The budgeting concepts of near-cash and non-cash should be removed from
budgets, so that there is a single Resource DEL budget.

v.

Parliamentary controls over government spending should be aligned with
the Treasury’s budgeting controls, consistent with the Treasury Committee’s
recommendation.

vi.

Differences in the policies – specific transactions are often treated differently
between the three frameworks. Examples include capital grants, provisions and
other non-cash items within budgets.

All non-voted expenditure and income within budgets should be brought
within the coverage of estimates.

Resource accounts should, as far as practicable, be based on IFRS, as adapted
in the public sector context. The Government’s proposals in this Memorandum
have, where appropriate, been agreed in principle by the independent Financial
Reporting Advisory Board (FRAB).

4.8.16 In order to effect the ‘alignment’, the following key principles have been
pronounced:
i.

Alignment should not be pursued if the results are likely to be manipulated,
or if doing so risks causing serious damage, bearing in mind that the different
purposes of various frameworks may lead to the conclusion that different
treatments may, in certain cases, be legitimate.

ii.

Alignment will not change the National Accounts, nor the way in which they
measure economic or fiscal performance. There will be no increased residual
risk to fiscal control – although the places where risk is managed, and the
nature of the mitigations, may change.

iii.

Flexibility may be needed in certain areas to achieve alignment:
• For budgets, while the overriding need is to maintain firm control over
public spending while incentivising value for money, it may be possible to
achieve this in different ways in order to achieve better alignment.

70

‘Alignment (Clear Line of Sight) Project’; March 2009; HM Treasury Cm 7567
ibid

43
44

It is unlikely to be possible to achieve full alignment in all areas, given the
different purposes for which the different frameworks have been developed, for
good reasons, over the years. In the absence of full alignment, the aim should
be to ensure that any necessary reconciliation is kept as simple as possible.

71
ibid

45


vii. The number of departmental and HM Treasury expenditure documents should
be reduced to just three “publication events” each year.
4.8.18 The UK Government expects that if implemented, the Government’s proposals would
mean that budgets and estimates would be fully aligned for the generality of departments.
It is also of the view that the whole “package” of changes outlined above need to be
implemented in full, otherwise it would lead to a situation where budgets and Estimates
were not fully aligned for the generality of Departments and there were further continuing
misalignments between estimates and accounts, all resulting in a very complex situation.
In such circumstances, the benefits for Parliament and the public would be significantly
reduced, since more reconciliations would be needed between budgets and estimates, and
between estimates and resource accounts. Accordingly, it is proposing these changes as a
single package.
4.8.19 One of the reasons why the UK Government is pushing for the whole package
of reforms under the alignment project relates to ‘Non Departmental Public Bodies’
(NDPBs), which has great significance in the Indian context. The UK Government feels
that “In fact, the implications for alignment would be particularly severe if misalignments
remained which affected the majority of Departments. If, for example, NDPBs were not
consolidated in Departments’ estimates and resource accounts, this would result in a
continuing misalignment, for all Departments with NDPBs, between budgets and estimates/
accounts; or if it did not prove possible to secure agreement to moving to net control in
estimates, this would result in a continuing misalignment, for all departments, between
budgets/accounts and estimates.46
4.8.20 The changes regarding the NDPBs would be effected through a legislation which
would contain an explicit provision that consolidation of NDPBs and other bodies into
Departmental accounts and estimates will not change the status of the consolidated bodies
or their relationship with the Department sponsoring them. The purpose of this is to ensure
that the independence of NDPBs is not compromised, and that they are not subject to any
additional control as a result of consolidation.
4.8.21 The significance of this and the need for having such alignment in case of NDPBs
would become apparent in Chapter 5 of this Report while discussing flow of funds from
the Union to implementing bodies in the States in relation to the Centrally Sponsored
Schemes.

72


4.8.22 In India, the Five Year Plans provide the basis for a medium-term multi-year
perspective for resource allocation. On the basis of this, each year the Planning Commission,
in consultation with the Ministry of Finance, allocates annual limits for plan expenditures
to each Ministry/Department. It has been noticed, however, that often, major projects and
schemes are launched by government which are not provided for in the plan. This results
in change in allocation for other projects and schemes thereby diluting plan objectives.
4.8.23 Another weakness of the current budget exercise is the absence of a clear link between
the plan and the budget. While preparing the budget estimates, the allocations indicated by
the Planning Commission get dispersed over various heads and sub-heads of expenditure.
Further, while the plans are formulated scheme-wise and sector-wise, the budgets are
formulated under different heads and sub-heads which is also the case with accounts. Thus,
in the Indian context also, this ‘clear line of sight’ is not present. Consequently, even the
final accounts reflect the expenditure only under various heads. This makes it difficult to
link the expenditure under various heads to the objectives sought to be achieved by the
different developmental schemes/projects. Thereby the accounting process loses its potential
as a measuring tool for achievement of government objectives.
4.8.24 Accounting is an integral part of the budgetary process. A good accounting system
should be able to reflect the objectives of any amount being spent by government, where
and how is the amount spent and finally what have been the results of any such expenditure.
For the accounting exercise to be meaningful it should be able to measure the extent to
which the results envisaged from expenditure have been achieved.
4.8.25 The Commission is of the view that the developments in the UK need examination
in the Indian context, especially the need and ways for having similar medium-term
expenditure limits for Ministries/Departments through the Five Year Plans and linking
them to annual budgets with carry forward facility in relation to funds for plan schemes.
Further, to bring about clarity, transparency and consolidation, a similar ‘alignment’ project
with regard to the plan, budgets and accounts may be required to be implemented in India
too. The Commission is of the view that a High Powered Committee should be constituted
to examine and recommend on these issues.

73
ibid

46



a.

b.

A High Powered Committee may be constituted to examine and recommend
on the need and ways for having medium-term expenditure limits for
Ministries/Departments through the Five Year Plans and linking them to
annual budgets with carry forward facility.
In order to bring about clarity, transparency and consolidation, the
ways and means for implementing an ‘alignment’ project, similar to that
in the UK, may also be examined by the High Powered Committee so
constituted.

4.9 No Correlation between Expenditure and Actual Implementation
4.9.1 At present, the release of funds from any head of account is deemed as an expenditure.
In a large number of cases, especially in
Box 4.1: Accounting Deficiencies in case of
Centrally Sponsored Schemes, such releases
Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS)
cannot be construed as expenditure because An increasing proportion of fund transfers to the States
funds lie in the pipeline with various project in the recent years take place under CSS. These funds are
authorities and there is considerable lag routed to States and district level bodies directly from the
Central Government. This practice is motivated by the
before they are actually utilized. Thus desire to avoid delays and to prevent diversion of CSS funds
the accounts do not reflect the correct by the States to support their ways and means position. Of
late, the emerging concern is ensuring accountability on
position as regards the implementation of the usage of these funds.
government schemes and programmes.
4.9.2 This issue is examined in the chapter
on flow of funds from the Union to the
States.
4.10 Mis-stating of Financial position

The existing system of accounting for plan schemes, both
for States and the Centre, does not adequately support
informed planning, budgeting, effective monitoring, and
decision making. The current accounting system does not
capture transaction-oriented information. It also does not
distinguish between transfer to States, final expenditure,
and advance payments against which accounts have to
be rendered. The extantaccounting framework is not
structured to generate State-wise and scheme-wise releases
of funds by the Central Government to States, and other
recipients, and also the actual utilization for the intended
performance.

4.10.1 The present system of release of
funds to project authorities outside the
government often leads to parking of funds Economic Survey 2007-08
which is often resorted to in order to prevent
lapsing of funds. This leads to idle funds
being maintained outside government accounts and thus portrays an incorrect picture of
government funds besides causing loss of interest to government.
74

4.10.2 This underlines the need for a modified fund flow system backed up by a
comprehensive financial information system that captures the entire range of transaction
in government accounts. This has been discussed in the Chapter on flow of funds from the
Union to the States.
4.11 Adhoc Project Announcements
4.11.1 Even though detailed exercises are made over a length of time to prepare and get
the Five Year Plans approved by the National Development Council and the Union and
State Cabinets, projects and schemes are announced on an ad-hoc basis in almost every
budget of the Union and the States. They are also announced on important National Days
(e.g. Independence Day, Republic Day, Birthday of Mahatma Gandhi etc.) and during
visits of dignitaries to States, in the form of ‘packages’. Such announcements of large sums
seriously distort the plan allocations and disturb the faithful implementation of schemes
already approved and under implementation. This often leads to announcements not being
followed by formal approvals thereby resulting in discontent and disaffection. The proper
method would be to include projects that may be considered absolutely essential at the
time of preparing the annual plans or during the mid-term appraisal.
a.

The practice of announcing projects and schemes on an ad-hoc basis in
budgets and on important National Days, and during visits of dignitaries
functionaries to States needs to be stopped. Projects/schemes which are
considered absolutely essential may be considered in the annual plans or
at the time of mid-term appraisal.

4.12 Emphasis on Meeting Budgetary Financial Targets rather than on Outputs and
Outcomes
4.12.1 At present, government departments often measure their performance in relation
to the expenditure targets laid down in the budget without adequate regard to outputs
and even less to outcomes. Furthermore, little emphasis is placed on efficient utilization
of resources.
4.12.2 Various reforms measures have been attempted in the past to move away from the
compliance aspects of the annual budget towards measurement of actual outcomes of
the expenditure made. The first significant step in this regard was suggested by the First
Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) in the form of ‘Performance Budget’. This is
described below.
75



4.12.3 Performance Budget
4.12.3.1 The Report of the Study Team on Financial Administration (Volume I & Volume
II, May 1967) presented the concept of Performance Budgeting, as essentially ‘a technique
of presenting Government operations in terms of functions, programmes, activities and
projects’. Thus, governmental activities were sought to be identified in the budget in
financial and physical terms so that a proper nexus between inputs and outputs could be
established and performance assessed in relation to costs. Under performance budgeting,
the emphasis would get shifted, as the ARC hoped, from the means of accomplishment to
the accomplishments themselves. The important thing under this technique was the precise
definition of the work to be done or services to be rendered and a correct estimate of what
that work or service would cost. A performance budget is prepared in terms of functional
categories and their sub-division into programmes, activities and projects and not merely
in terms of organizational units and the objects of expenditure. A performance budget thus
developed in terms of costs and results facilitates management control by bringing out the
programmes and accomplishments in financial and physical terms closely interwoven into
one comprehensive document.
4.12.3.2 In the view of the First ARC, three basic steps were required in the introduction
of the system of performance budgeting. These were:

4.12.3.4 Performance budgets were initially presented for a few Departments on a
supplementary basis in 196947 and later its scope was enlarged to cover all the Ministries.
Some State governments also made efforts on their own to prepare performance budgets.
But the efforts came to be substantially diluted as the scope of the document was limited
to plan programmes. The Departments continued the practice of preparing performance
budgets annually in addition to their regular budget. The preparation of performance
budget has become a routine affair without any discernible influence on expenditure
management.48 It, however, needs to be pointed out that the Working Group constituted
by the First ARC had clearly warned against this approach. In their own words, “The
Working Group has given careful consideration to these aspects and is of the opinion that
it would not be sufficient to have the performance budget document as a supplementary
one to the existing set of documents, as in that case it will not have any impact whatsoever
on the existing system. For one, the performance budget is being evolved to overcome
the deficiencies in the existing budgetary process and framework and not to supplement
it. The idea of a supplementary document in such a context would inevitably mean the
continuation of the existing procedures, financial practices, accounting classification, etc.,
with their inadequacies. Indeed, if performance budgeting is not made an integral part of
the budgetary process, but only an additional exercise, unconnected with the main process,
the advantages that are expected of it would not materialize. Secondly, performance budget
is not merely a matter of form; it represents a change in concepts that has significant
effects on the approach to the budget and the decision-making process. The performance
budget as a supplementary document would be somewhat in the nature of a fifth wheel
to the coach.”

a)

establishing a meaningful functional, programme and activity classification of
governmental operations;

b)

bringing the system of accounting and financial management into accord with
this classification: and

4.12.4 Zero-Base Budgeting

c)

evolving suitable norms, yardsticks, work units of performance and unit costs,
wherever possible under each programme and activity for their reporting and
evaluation.

4.12.4.1 A system of Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) was first introduced in the United States
Department of Agriculture in its 1964 fiscal year budget. It was based on the concept that
all programmes of the Department were to be reviewed afresh from the base zero and not
merely in terms of incremental changes proposed for the budget year.49

4.12.3.3 The First ARC was of the view that in the context of planned economic development,
accountability is not merely confined to ensuring that the amounts have been spent for
the various purposes and within the limits laid down in the budget. It also extended to
ensuring that the expected results are achieved. Thus, it was necessary to ensure that the
budget reflects the pattern of the Plan both in content and classification. The performance
budget was a step towards achieving this.

4.12.4.2 In India, the first application of Zero-Base Budgeting was in the Department of
Science and Technology, which through its Memorandum50 of December 1983 conveyed
Government’s acceptance in principle that the budgets of all S&T Departments / Agencies/
Institutions should be formulated each year on the principles of Zero-Base Budgeting. The
Seventh Five Year Plan also emphasized the need for introducing Zero-Base Budgeting.
The Plan document stated that :
F.No.2(1)Pers/E-Coord/OB/2005, dated 30th December, 2005
A Premchand (2007), Trapped in the Comfort Zone of denial: 50 Years of expenditure management in India, National Institute of Public Finance and
Policy, (Mimeo), p 16
49
Based on ‘Zero-Base Budgeting’ by Prof K.L. Handa; http://cgda.nic.in/rt/rtcblr/website/Training%%20Material/R%20&%20D/R&D%20
Purchase%20Training%20Material/D-%20Availability%20of%20Funds/Advanced/Zero-based%20Budgeting.htm
50
Government of India, Department of Science and Technology, Office Memorandum No. DST / JSF / 17(3) (1) / 83 dated 28th December, 1983.
47
48

76

77



“ The principle of Zero-Based Budgeting which requires the expenditure on even on-going
activities to be justified needs to be introduced. It is to be applied not only to items of
non-development expenditure, but also to those of development expenditure.” 51
4.12.4.3 Subsequently, the Economic Survey, 1985-86, also stated that :
“The Government has recognised, in principle, the need for Central Government
Departments to adopt Zero-Base Budgeting. This would require identification and
sharpening of objectives, examination of various alternatives of performing identified
tasks, cost-benefit analysis, prioritisation of objectives and activities, identification and
elimination of redundant activities and designing and ranking of decision-packages.”
4.12.4.4 The Ministry of Finance formally introduced Zero-Base Budgeting through their
letter of 10th July, 1986, addressed to all Ministries and Departments of the Government,
asking them to adopt Zero-Base Budgeting approach with effect from the budget for
1987-88. The letter also emphasized the need for applying Zero-Base budgeting approach
in Public Sector Enterprises, Departmental Undertakings and Autonomous Bodies under
the administrative control of Ministries / Departments, adopting such methodology in
each case as would suit the culture and requirements of each organisation.
4.12.4.5 The methodology employed in applying Zero-Base Budgeting involves
(i)

Identification of Decision Units,

4.12.5 Outcome Budget
4.12.5.1 Due to the realisation that ‘certain weaknesses … have crept in the performance
budget documents such as lack of clear oneBox 4.2: Decision Units and Decision Packages in
to-one relationship between the Financial
Zero-Base Budgeting
Budget and the Performance Budget and A Decision Unit is a distinct segment of an organization
inadequate target-setting in physical terms for which budget is prepared. It can also be a programme,
project, or an operation. A
for ensuing years’...52 it was felt that there scheme,request which should containdecision package is a
budget
the following :
was need for tracking ‘outcomes’ and not  A description of the function or activity of the decision
the readily measurable ‘outputs’. This
unit
 The goals and objectives of the various functions /
found mention in the Budget speech of the
activities of the unit
Finance Minister (Budget 2005-06) which
 Benefits to be derived from financing the activity /
was re-emphasised by the Prime Minister in
programme
his letter to all Union Ministers in March  Relevance of the activity / programme to the overall
objectives of the Organisation / Department in the
2005. The first outcome budget was passed
present context.
in the Parliament on August 25, 2005. The
 The consequences of its non-funding
guidelines for the 2006-07 outcome budget
 The projected / estimated cost of the package
provided that each Ministry/Department  The yearly phasing of the proposed expenditure / project
will separately prepare the outcome budget
cost
 Alternative ways of performing the same activity or
documents in respect of ‘all Demands/
achieving the same objectives.
Appropriations controlled by them’. These
Source: ‘Zero-Base Budgeting’ by Prof K.L. Handa
contained:
i.

(iii) Evaluating and ranking Decision Packages in order of priority, and
(iv) Preparation of budget by allocating resources to activities or decision packages
by utilising hierarchical funding cut-off levels.
4.12.4.6 However, due to lack of capability building, this concept did not prove to be
effective in the Indian context. Another important issue involved in the application of
ZBB is the distinction being followed in India between Plan and Non-Plan expenditure.
Ideally, prioritisation should be done among all items of expenditure whether on-going
or new, Non-Plan or Plan. But the system in which Plan and Non-Plan expenditure are
treated differently and assigned varying priorities, ZBB would have to be applied separately
to Plan and Non-Plan expenditures.

Details about the mandate, goals and objectives as well as the policy framework
and vision statement of the Ministry/Department

ii.

(ii) Formulation and Development of Decision Packages,

Details in indicated tabular format comprising financial outlays, projected
physical outputs and projected/budgeted outcomes.

4.12.5.2 The key words used here are ‘Outlays’, ‘Outputs’ and ‘Outcomes’. It has been
recognised in the guidelines that converting ‘outlays’ into ‘outcomes’ is a complex process
addressing “value for money” concerns; being more a management process than merely a
financial process and admitting possibilities of different approaches and modalities, which
may differ from Ministry to Ministry and programme to programme. It has also been stated
that preparation of the Outcome Budget is an evolving and dynamic process, which will
require detailed scrutiny and examination on yearly basis, with value addition based on
the preceding year’s experience. The guidelines have prescribed the following steps in this
conversion process:

78

79
Government of India, Planning Commission, Seventh Five Year Plan, Vol.1, new Delhi, 1985, P.70

51

F.No.2(1)Pers/E-Coord/OB/2005, dated 30th December, 2005

52


a

Defining intermediate and final outcomes specifically in measurable and
monitorable terms;

b

Standardizing unit cost of delivery;

c

Benchmarking the standards/quality of outcomes and services;

d Capacity building for requisite efficiency at all levels, in terms of equipment,
technology, knowledge and skills;
e

Ensuring adequate flow of funds at the appropriate time to the appropriate
level, avoiding both delay and ‘parking’ of funds;

f )

Setting up effective monitoring and evaluation systems, to indicate the
directions for further calibration and honing the processes, to deliver the
intended outcomes; and

g)

Involving the community/target groups/recipients of the service, with easy
access and feedback systems.

4.12.5.3 The guidelines have defined the three terms used in the performance budget. Thus,
‘outlays’ imply total financial resources deployed for achieving certain outcomes. Part of
this money may come directly from the Government budget and part may be contributed
by other stakeholders such as the State Governments, Public Sector Undertakings or even
private parties in the growing area of Public Private Partnerships. It has been mentioned
that the outlays should be segregated scheme-wise, covering both Plan / Non-Plan budget
(as shown in the Expenditure Budget Vol II) for the financial year in monetary terms. In
case of projects (whether Government or parastatal) spanning multi-year time frames, total
sanctioned cost of the project and the planned annual expenditure both should be brought
out as both are relevant ‘outlays’ for effecting linkage with outcomes.
4.12.5.4 ‘Outputs’ have been defined as the ‘measure of the physical quantity of the goods
or services produced through an activity under a scheme or programme’. They are identified
as an intermediate stage between ‘outlays’ and ‘outcomes’. For example, in case of a social
sector programme/scheme, the intermediate results before identifying, measuring and

80


arriving at the ‘final outcome’ as per the objectives of the said programme/scheme, may be
treated as ‘output’. The purpose is to capture intermediate ‘outputs’ before identifying and
measuring the ‘final outcome’.
4.12.5.5 ‘Outcomes’ are the end product/results of various Government initiatives and
interventions, including those involving partnership with the State Governments, Public
Sector Undertakings, Autonomous Bodies, private sector and the community. They involve
much more than mere ‘outputs’, since they cover the quality and effectiveness of the goods
or services produced as a consequence of an activity under a scheme or programme. The
‘outcomes’ are required to be measured keeping in mind the objectives of the programme/
scheme by following appropriate methodology.
4.12.5.6 For the year 2007-08, the Outcome Budget and Performance Budget were
merged and placed in one combined document, the latter providing information relating
to the preceding year. This has been done in order to compare the performance of the
past year vis-à-vis the performance indicators used for the budget year. The Ministries/
Departments are required to prepare their respective outcome budgets by late March
each year on the basis of the Annual Financial Statements presented in the parliament
in February. The performance budget, now part of the outcome budget, would indicate
the ‘outcome’ of the outcome budget of the previous fiscal year. Thus, while the Annual
Financial Statement and outcome budget would be for the ensuing financial year, the
performance budget would present the picture of actual achievement/performance for
the financial year gone by.
4.12.5.7 However, the outcome budget for 2007-08 shows that in many cases
the measurement of outputs and outcomes seems to have been mixed up. While the outputs
could be measured in quantifiable terms, measuring outcomes is a difficult proposition
given the fact that proposed outcomes of a specified programme could be influenced
by many other extraneous factors. It is also seen that in some cases Departments have
merely reproduced the outputs targets as outcomes and, in many other places, general
intents of the programmes are described as outcomes. Some illustrative cases are presented
in Table 4.8:

81

82
Ministry /
Department

Sl.
No.

Department of
Agriculture and
Co-operation

Department of
Agriculture and
Co-operation

2.

3.

Department of
Agriculture and
Co-operation

Ministry /
Department

1.

Sl.
No.

To provide additional agricultural
marketing infrastructure to cope up
with the large expected marketable
surpluses of agricultural and allied
commodities including dairy,
poultry, fishery, livestock and
minor forest produce, to promote
competitive alternative agricultural
marketing infrastructure by
inducement of private and
cooperative sector investments; to
promote direct marketing through
reduction in intermediaries and
handling channels thus enhancing
farmers’ income; and to provide
infrastr ucture facilities for
grading.

The main objectives of the scheme
include creation of scientific
storage capacity with allied
facilities in rural areas to meet
the requirements of farmers for
storing farm produce, to prevent
distress sale of produce, promote
pledge financing and marketing
credit and to introduce a national
system of warehouse receipts for
agricultural commodities stored
in such godowns.

Objectives /
Outcomes

1. Development of 300 new
Agricultural Marketing
Infrastructure Projects.
2. Strengthening /
Modernisation of
infrastructure in
90 Wholesale Markets.
3. Strengthening /
Modernisation of
infrastructure in 200 Rural
Primary Markets / Apni
Mandies etc.
4.Remaining work on
Modernisation and required
supplies in CAL, Nagpur
and 6 RALs.

Construction / renovation
of 15.00 lakh tonnes storage
capacity.

Quantifiable Deliverables/
Physical Outputs

National
Food Security
Mission

Name of the
Scheme

To enhance the production of
rice, wheat and pulses by 10, 8
and 2 million tons respectively
by 2011.

Objectives /
Outcomes

Demonstration (no) –
1,20,000
SRR (Qtl)
3,00,000
Seed minikits (no) – 28,000
Micronutrients (ha) 10,00,000
Gypsum (ha) – 6,00,000

Wheat

Conoweeders & other
implements (no)
33300
IPM (ha)
1,00,000
Training FFS (no) 1000

Demonstrations (No) 10,000
SRR – (qtl)
3,00,000
Micro nutrients (ha) - 20,000
Liming of acidic soils (ha) –
20,000

Rice

Physical Outputs

Table 4.8 : Outcome Budget – Illustrative Cases (2008-09)

Development
of Agricultural
Marketing
Infrastructure
Grading &
Standardisation
(Plan)

Construction of
Rural Godown
(Plan)

Name of the
Scheme


Production:
Wheat – 1m.tonnes
Rice – 2m.tonnes
Pulses – 0.5 m.tonnes

Mandies etc.
4. Remaining work on
Modernisation and
required supplies in
CAL, Nagpur and 6
RALs.

Projected Outcomes

Contd.

1. Development
of 300 new
Agricultural
Marketing
Infrastructure
Projects.
2. Strengthening /
Modernisation of
infrastructure in 90
Wholesale Markets.
3. Strengthening /
Modernisation of
infrastructure in
200 Rural Primary
Markets / Apni

Construction /
renovation of 15.00
lakh tonnes storage
capacity.

Projected Outcomes


83

84
Ministry of
Textiles

Ministry of
Information
and
Broadcasting
(Films
Division)

6.

Ministry /
Department

Ministry of
Textiles

Ministry /
Department

5.

Sl.
No.

4.

Sl.
No.

The Ministry is responsible for
policy formulation, planning and
trade regulations of the Textile
Industry

Objectives /
Outcomes

Not mentioned

Production of breeder
Seed by ICATR (qtl)
14,330
Production and distribution
of seed
(qtl) 1,21,000
Strengthening of State Seed
certification agencies (no) 20
INM (ha) 9,62,000
IPM (ha) 9,62,000
Irrigation by Sprinkler sets (ha)
44338

Pulses

Zero till seed Drill machines
(no) – 6,000
Rotavators (no) – 3000
Purchase of Pump sets (no) –
15000
Training of farmers
FFS (no) - 3000

Physical Outputs

Webcasting and
Digitalisation
of Films
Division films

Integrated
Handloom
Development
Scheme
Components

Name of the
Scheme

The objective being the exposure
of Documentar y, Shor t &
Animation Films of Films Division
to the world through the medium
of Internet. For this purpose,
films are digitally transferred to
DVD’s through the medium of
High Definition Technology. The
outcome being the availability of
FD Films in its official website
www.filmsdivision.org

i. Focus on formation of weavers
group as a visible entity.
ii. To develop the Handloom
Weavers Groups to become
self-sustainable.
iii. Inclusive approach to cover
weavers both within and
outside the co-operating fold.
iv. Skill upgradation of Handloom
weavers / workers to produce
diversified products with
improved quality to meet the
marker requirements

Objectives /
Outcomes

To webcast the films of Films
Division for global access to
audio-visual encyclopaedia of
post-independence India and
to transfer the films of Films
Division in digital format for
preservation thereof.
Quantifiable Deliverables
Continuous replacement of
filmic contents of the website
and transfer of films on DVDs.
Spill over financial liability of
the last financial year has

3,10,000 weavers

Physical Outputs


Secretariat
– Economic
Services

Name of the
Scheme


Continuous
replacement of filmic
contents of the website
and transfer of films
on DVDs.

Not mentioned

Projected Outcomes

Contd.

Not mentioned

Projected Outcomes

Contd.


85

86
Sl.
No.

7.

Sl.
No.

Ministry /
Department

Ministry
of Water
Resources

Ministry /
Department

i) Integrated Groundwater
Management Studies to
prepare ground water
management plan
ii) Groundwater exploration
utilizing scientific tools viz.
Remote sensing and GIS,
Geophysical surveys aided
by drilling to locate ground
water worthy areas.
iii) Monitoring of groundwater
levels from groundwater
monitoring stations
iv) Short term water supply
investigations for source
finding to Central/State
Government departments

Objectives /
Outcomes

Groundwater Management
studies – 1.50 lakh square
metre
Analysis of Water Samples –
20000
Groundwater Exploration -800
Wells
Geophysical survey: VES-2200
Line KM-10
Well logging – need-based
Groundwater Monitoring –
15,600
Short-term water supply
investigations – need-based
(-300)
Preparation of district report40
Groundwater Year Book – 23
Mass Awareness – 57

been cleared by passing the
outstanding bills. During
the current financial year,
1058 titles of Films Division’s
Archieve have been verified
and 507 films digitized.

Physical Outputs

Name of the
Scheme

Physical Outputs
Water Management Training
Programme – 57
Regulation of Ground Water
development in motified area
Demonstrative studies of
Artificial Recharge-15

Objectives /
Outcomes
v) Preparation of Report, Maps
for use by planners and
administrators.
vi) Demonstrative projects for
Artificial regarge to GW
for replicating the same by
State Government and other
agencies.


Ground Water
Management
and Regulation

Name of the
Scheme


Contd.
Projected Outcomes

Not mentioned.

Projected Outcomes

Contd.


87



4.12.5.8 This is in spite of the fact that the
guidelines clearly spell out that wherever
‘physical outputs’ are in a sense the ‘final
outcomes’, assessment of ‘quality of output’
through ‘appropriate indicators of quality’
should be brought out. However, the
moot question is whether there is need for
preparing an ‘outcome budget’ for each and
every item prescribed in the Expenditure
Budget Vol.II (the guidelines clearly point
out that the description of items should
exactly match with the description shown
for the different items in the Statement of
Budget Estimate as included in Expenditure
Budget Vol.II).

Box 4.3: Shift in Focus from Inputs to Outcomes
“10.35. Traditionally, government schemes are evaluated
in terms of expenditure incurred and adherence to process
requirement. It is necessary to shift the focus from vertical
input controls to horizontal coordination and monitoring
of outcomes. The need for horizontal coordination is
evident from the fact that interventions in one are, say,
rural drinking water nad sanitation, affect outcomes
in health, which affect outcomes in education. These
examples can be multiplied. Given the manner in which
government structures are organized at the Centre and
States, horizontal coordination is very necessary to achieve
the desired outcomes. Mechanisms for this coordination,
convergence and synergy at all levels have atrophied or
are non-existent. Reinstating dynamic coordination, to
break through excessive hierarchy and securing teamwork
and mechanisms for vertical coherence and horizontal
coordination to achieve outcomes is a major challenge
at all levels of government. Emphasis will be laid on
effective monitoring on outcome at all levels. The district
level and other functionaries will need to be strengthened
with authority and powers so that they are made fully
accountable for the outcomes.”

4.12.5.9 The Commission is of the view
that the Outcome Budget cannot be
prepared for all Ministries/Departments Source: Eleventh Five Year Plan
simply by way of declaration. It’s a
complex process and a number of steps
are involved before it can be attempted with any degree of usefulness. In many cases,
the ‘outcomes’ would influence and be influenced by developments in other sectors.
For example, rural electrification would influence the outcome of schemes related to
education, health, irrigation and agriculture, to name a few. The view of the Commission
is that a beginning may be made with proper preparation and training in case of the
Flagship Schemes and certain national priorities.
a.

Outcome budgeting is a complex process and a number of steps are involved
before it can be attempted with any degree of usefulness. A beginning
may be made with proper preparation and training in case of the Flagship
Schemes and certain national priorities.

4.13 Irrational ‘Plan – Non-Plan’ Distinction Leads to Inefficiency in Resource
Utilization
4.13.1 Since the country follows a PlanBox 4.4: Distinction between Plan and Non-Plan
based model of economy, the expenditure It is argued that the distinction between plan and nonof Government is divided into Plan and plan expenditure is illogical and even dysfunctional. The
ever
Non-Plan. As the name suggests, Plan distinction has led toto the increasing tendency to start
new schemes/projects
utter neglect of maintenance
expenditure is directly related to expenditure of existing capacity and service levels. The distinction
on schemes and programmes envisaged in also often leads to the misperception that non-plan
expenditure is inherently wasteful and should be avoided.
the Five Year Plans. Non-Plan expenditure This dichotomy has resulted in fragmented view of resource
is the expenditure incurred on establishment allocation to various sectors. The problem is assuming
significance with
and maintenance activities.53 Thus, ‘Plan’ in greater salary constitutes higher priority to social sectors
where
an important element of the
this context includes what is provided by the programme. The embargo imposed on recruitment for nonPlanning Commission and is included in the plan posts have caused serious problems of service delivery
in health and education sectors. A need has been felt to draw
Five-Year Plan. Non-Plan expenditure covers protocols that will specify the agency for specific function
expenditure on security, interest payments and provide arrangements for coordinated activity.
and subsidies etc. The Plan and Non-Plan Source: Economic Survey -2007-08
divide runs too deep to give a comprehensive
idea about resource availability to the departments at an early stage of budget development.
The dichotomy between plan and non-plan in expenditures has been commented upon
as an unnecessary development that has adverse effects on the quality of public services.54
Moreover, in order to find
Box 4.5: Planning Commission on Plan and Non-Plan Expenditure
funds for the plans, over the
“3.58. Other perceptions that have developed around this distinction,
years, a tendency has developed namely, that Non-Plan expenditure is inherently wasteful and has to be
to view non-plan expenditure as minimized, that Non-Plan expenditure is different in kind from Plan
far less important and subject it expenditure, etc., are patently incorrect assessments that have nevertheless
taken deep root in the process of government expenditure planning. This
to cuts and economy measures, dichotomy also results in a fragmented view of resource allocations to various
although many of them are vital sectors. The problem has become particularly acute as government’s emphasis
has shifted to the social sectors where salary costs are high. Routine bans on
in nature.
recruitment for Non-Plan posts, ostensibly imposed to conserve expenditure,
4.13.2 This distinction,
however, undermines the
budget formulation process of
the departments by bringing
in complexity. The Five Year
Plans prepared by the Planning
Commission are indicative in
nature and are operationalised
through Annual plans. The

cause serious problem for service delivery in health, education, extension
systems, etc. The case against the use of these categories, both on grounds
of illogicality and dysfunctionality, is therefore indisputable.

3.59. At the same time, it is necessary to understand that this classification
of expenditures has been used essentially as a convenient shortcut for
the performance of functions that are inherent in public expenditure
management. It is perhaps in the manner in which the Plan and Non-Plan
distinction has been denuded of its substance over the years, rather than in
any inherent conceptual inadequacy, that the causes of the present state of
affairs need to be found.”
Source: Eleventh Five Year Plan

88

89
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Government of India (2000), Report of the Eleventh Finance Commission, p.33

53
54


schemes/projects to be undertaken in the Plan are indicated in the Plan documents and
resources are made available in the annual budgets. However, if any new scheme/project
is proposed by any Department, it requires ‘in principle’ approval from the Planning
Commission and then financial resources are tied up in consultation with the Planning
Commission. This requires detailed analysis of resource requirements and availability of funds
for the existing schemes and if fund requirement exceeds the availability reprioritization
exercise needs to be undertaken. The procedures are elaborate and time consuming thus
leaving the individual Department with less flexibility in proposing new schemes. From
the budgeting point of view the relevant distinctions are in terms of revenue and capital
expenditures with sufficient disclosures relating to new expenditure proposals.
4.13.3 The plan versus non-plan distinction in expenditures needs to be abolished keeping
in view its impact on budget development and public service delivery. The Departments
should have the flexibility in formulating their budgets with prior indication of resource
availability. Though this has been considered by many Committees over the last forty years
and repeated recommendations have been made to do away this division, this has not been
done so far. Just as Public Undertakings, Autonomous Bodies, Societies etc. are required to
consider their resources as a whole and plan accordingly, the Departments should also be
allowed to work out the committed resources and plan within overall allocations.

Flow of Funds from the Union to the States Centrally Sponsored Schemes
5.1 Flow of Funds related to Centrally Sponsored Schemes

5.1.1 The Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) do not fall within the subjects allocated to
the Union Government in List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. However,
they are funded by the Union Government to achieve certain national objectives. The CSS
have formed an important part of successive Five Year Plans. As mentioned in Chapter 3,
the flow of funds from the Union Government to the ultimate implementing agencies for
any scheme is through one of these two channels:55
i.

Funds are transferred to the Consolidated Fund of the State Governments
which spend the money through the implementing agencies. In such cases, the
agency banks at the field level, honour the payment claims made by authorized
officers of the State Government and, in return, place the claim on the State
Government through the RBI office at the State Headquarters.

ii.

The Union Government transfers funds directly to implementing agencies in
the States through normal banking channels. These agencies distribute funds
progressively to lower level field formations through banking channels. The
banks honour cheques up to the amount lying as credit in their respective bank
accounts.

4.13.4 Recommendation:
a.

5

The Plan versus non-Plan distinction needs to be done away with.

5.1.2 Actual expenditure under the CSS is incurred only when payment is made either to
a beneficiary of the scheme or to the supplier of goods and services. However, due to the
lack of a proper information system, the tracking of fund flow and correlation between
the amount released and expenditure made could not be determined without a degree of
uncertainty. Further, when funds are transferred directly to the implementing agencies in
the States, it has to be done in advance which results in a substantial accumulation of funds
in the pipeline. The Report of the CAG on ‘Union Government Accounts 2007-08’ has
the following to say in the matter:
“2.2 Unascertainable unspent balances in the accounts of Implementing Agencies
In recent years, there has been a paradigm shift in the Central Government strategy for
implementation of flagship programmes and other centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) for
90

91
Source: Note received from the Office of CGA

55


poverty alleviation, health care, education, employment, sanitation etc,. Most of these
schemes were earlier implemented on cost sharing basis with transfer of central share to
State Government. The Union Government has now started transferring central plan
assistance directly to state/district level autonomous bodies, societies and non-Governmental
organisations for implementation of CSS without devolving funds through the State
Government accounts. The State and District level implementing bodies keep these scheme
funds in their accounts in banks outside Government Accounts.
For the year 2007-08, Union Government made a provision for transfer of central plan
assistance of Rs. 51259.85 crore (as per revised estimates) directly to State/District level
autonomous bodies and authorities, societies, non-governmental organisations, etc., for
implementation of centrally sponsored schemes. Since the funds are not being spent fully by
the implementing agencies in the same financial year, there remain substantial amounts
of unspent funds in their accounts. The aggregate amount of the unspent balances in the
accounts of the implementing agencies kept outside Government accounts is not readily
ascertainable. The Government expenditure as reflected in the Accounts to that extent is,
therefore, overstated.”
5.1.3 The basic issues here are:
i.

whether the simple release of funds by Union Government Ministries/
Departments to State Governments/other implementing agencies, NGOs,
societies etc in the States for implementing various centrally sponsored schemes
could be termed as expenditure in their accounts,

ii.

whether real time information about the use of funds so transferred is
available,

iii.

whether such use of funds gets adequately reflected in government accounts,
and

iv.

how to minimize the costs of raising the financial resources which are lying
unutilized.

5.1.4 The Planning Commission, realizing the import of such issues, had formed an Expert
Group to Develop Concrete Proposals for Restructuring the Centrally Sponsored Schemes.
This Expert Group submitted its Report in September 2006 which contained, inter alia, a
note from the Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General of India on the financial aspects
of these Schemes. This note pointed out the following:

92

Flow of Funds from the Union to the States - Centrally Sponsored Schemes

“In the existing system, the amounts under Centrally Sponsored Schemes are released by
the Central Government through a variety of channels. The amounts released to all or
most of them are booked as final expenditure in the books of the Union Government,
even when the whole or part of it may not have been utilized for the purpose for which
the funds were appropriated during the year.”
5.1.5 While mentioning that some of the channels of release of the funds as:
• To State Governments, when the amounts are further released / spent;
• Directly to the state autonomous bodies (viz., DRDA etc);
• To Central autonomous bodies for specific tasks / jobs (viz., research etc.);
it observed that:
“The existing procedure does no facilities capture, at any given point of time, of (i) amounts
actually utilized for the end-use, (ii) amounts in transit viz., advances to local bodies /
PRI or to the executive departments (viz. PWD, PHED, etc.) and (iii) unspent amounts
with the state governments / agencies.”
5.1.6 Thus, it was pointed out that in case of expenditure incurred on Centrally Sponsored
Schemes through the State Budget, the Accountants General (Accounts & Entitlements) in
the States would not be able to link such expenditure unless the expenditure incurred on a
scheme can be ascertained across all functional Major Heads of Accounts involved. Further,
even the accounts compiled by Accountants General (A&E) would not capture the data
distinctly under each Centrally Sponsored Schemes in the absence of uniform plan-budget
link and a distinct sub-head for the each of the Centrally Sponsored Schemes. Moreover,
the expenditure booked in the State Accounts consists of expenditure for the end-use as
well as advances to implementing agencies without any distinction between them. There
is no coding or accounting rules prescribing coding of the expenditure by their type (enduse, advance etc.)
5.1.7 Further, in many cases, transfers are recorded in registers and not made through
account books. This further aggravates the position and the link to end use gets lost in
transition. In case of transfers to societies, NGOs etc., their accounts do not get reflected in
the governmental accounts. The problem of absence of coding by the type of expenditure
exists here also, in the same manner as with the State Government.

93



5.1.8 It was, therefore, suggested that the following aspects, inter alia, would need to be
taken care of:

where transparency and accountability are not being ensured leading to a failure in getting
a complete picture of expenditure related to these schemes.

i.

As in the case of funds from the State Budget, a provision / system should be
mandatory for autonomous bodies and NGOs to capture their expenditure
that can be identified to the particular Centrally Sponsored Schemes and the
type of expenditure.

ii.

A system may be put in place to track the amount in transit to the end-use
through accounts / subsidiary accounts rather than through registers.

5.1.9 As mentioned in Chapter 4 earlier, a similar problem has been encountered in case of
Non Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) in the UK as far as their accounts are concerned.
It is not that the problem has not been identified in India. In fact, in his budget speech
(2008-09), the Finance Minister had already announced the following:56
“Robust economic growth has necessitated a need to put in place effective monitoring,
evaluation and Accounting systems for the large sums of money that are disbursed by the
Central Government to State Governments, district level agencies and other implementing
agencies.
I think we do not pay enough attention to outcomes as we do to outlays; or to physical
targets as we do to financial targets; or to quality as we do to quantity.
Government therefore proposes to put in place a Central Plan Schemes Monitoring System
(CPSMS) that will be implemented as a Plan scheme of the Planning Commission and
also a comprehensive Decision Support System and Management Information System.
The intended outcome is to generate and monitor scheme-wise and State-wise releases for
about 1,000 Central Plan and centrally sponsored schemes in 2008-09”.
5.1.10 As stated earlier, the CAG in its Report has mentioned that more than
Rs. 50,000 crore is being released by the Union Government to State and District level
bodies directly and a significant portion of this amount remains unutilized at different
levels. The practice to transfer funds directly to state and district level bodies, nongovernmental organizations, societies etc. is motivated by the desire to avoid delays on
the one hand and prevention of diversion of these funds by the State Governments in
order to support their ‘ways and means’ position. There is no doubt that when funds are
transferred to the Consolidated Fund of the States, it leads to legislative approval and
appropriations at two stages. Thus, in case of the Centrally Sponsored Schemes, first the
appropriations are approved by the Parliament in case of the Union Government Ministries
/ Departments and second when they are transferred to the consolidated fund of the States,
the appropriations are again required to be approved by the State Legislature before these
funds could be transmitted to implementing agencies. However, this has led to a position

5.1.11 In fact, the existing system of accounting for plan schemes in case of both the
Union and State Governments does not adequately support informed planning, budgeting,
effective monitoring and decision making. The present accounting system does not capture
transaction-oriented information. The main contours of this problem are presented in the
following paragraphs.
5.2 Absence of a System for Managing the Flow of Financial Information
5.2.1 There exists a hierarchical chain of implementing agencies through which GOI funds
flow to the grass roots level. A bulk of the actual expenditure is carried out at the block/
panchayat level in most schemes. The current system does not facilitate tracking of fund flow
from the point of release in GOI to final expenditure at the spending unit level. The current
system lacks a reliable reporting system for utilization of plan scheme funds. Moreover,
it does not generate (i) agency-wise (ii) geographical location-wise and (iii) scheme-wise
information on flow of funds. Huge funds are lying unutilized in the banking system parked
in different accounts of different implementing agencies across several schemes.57
5.2.2 The present Chart of Accounts allows ‘releases’ to be treated as ‘expenditure’. Further,
the Chart of Accounts followed by the Civil Ministries, State Governments, NGOs and other
agencies is not uniform and each agency adopts its own Chart of Accounts for maintaining
accounts pertaining to plan schemes. There is thus a need for a common Chart of Accounts
(COA) so as to ensure a seamless flow on information from all stakeholders.
5.2.3 The existing system of expenditure classification is one-dimensional as it flows only in
the direction namely from the fund to the sector/sub-sector. It does not permit an integration
and consolidation with regard to functions, programmes and economic categories in a single
hierarchy. Presently, budget classification focuses on compliance rather than on government
policies and priorities and the two main dimensions (functions/programmes and objects)
are clubbed together with a 15-digit accounting code, which has limited flexibility and
scope for segregating and correlating various budget dimensions. Thus, it does not allow
capture of information regarding:


Schemes as defined by Planning Commission (Schemes defined in Chart of
Accounts are often not the same as defined by Planning Commission)



Recipient agency identification



Geographical location identification

94

95
Source : http://www.cgaindia.org/pdf/International_Confereence33.pdf

56

57
Source : Adapted from ‘Development of a Management Information & Decision Support System for Plan Schemes’ by Archana Nigam and Dipankar
Sengupta



5.2.4 Moreover, the classification system between the Union and State Governments
is uniform only till the programme level - at the scheme level there is no uniformity of
classification.

the system. This will use the existing banking networks to transfer these “authorizations”
instead of real funds. A system of authorizations also implies that all these entities become
a part of the preparation process of national accounts.

5.2.5 In consultation with the Controller General of Accounts (CGA), it has now been
planned that the Government should shift over to a system of transfer of debits in respect of
the CSS. The Core Banking Systems (CBS) which most banks have now rolled out is sought
to be linked with a Core Accounting System (CAS), which is to be set by the CGA. Under
the proposed CAS, only the sanctions will move down the line to the final implementing
authority. These sanctions, through the proposed linkage between the CAS and the CBS,
would also move in parallel down the CBS to the bank branch that will make the payment
upon the authorisation of the field level implementing agency.

5.2.9 It is expected that the proposed CAS will solve two major problems being faced at
present. First, it will provide a platform for consolidating accounting data relating to all
plan schemes on a uniform basis, irrespective of the agency that is actually charged with
the receipt of funds and with programme implementation. Secondly, the CAS will have the
advantage of ensuring that expenditure is booked in the accounts of the Union Government
only at the time when the actual payment at the field level takes place.

8

5.2.6 In order to implement this, the CGA have proposed the use of an IT-based platform
which would address the following concerns:
• Identifying the entities involved in fund devolution,
• Identifying schemes under which funds are devolved to the agencies/spending
units,
• Identifying geographical location of the entities receiving funds, and
• Using the extensive banking network for reducing float in the system.
5.2.7 The objective here is to build a comprehensive centralized database from the source
for enhanced financial reporting for monitoring plan schemes implementation by including
sanction ID with the current system of classification of accounts. This will facilitate complete
information base for Plan Schemes about:
• Funds released under a scheme of Planning Commission
• Funds received by an agency
• Funds received geographical location-wise
5.2.8 Thus, sanctions pending release of funds under Plan schemes can be monitored more
effectively and recipient agencies/States can also use the sanction ID for referencing purposes.
A sanction in such cases would include both actual expenditure and transfer. This will create
a system in which only “authorization to spend” and not “funds to spend” flows through

96

5.2.10 The Commission has already recommended in Chapter 4, the examination of the
‘line of sight’ project (‘alignment’ project) of the UK Government in the Indian context
by a High Powered Committee. It is of the view that first, a reform in the structure of
the Chart of Accounts and its codification has to be carried out in order to arrive at an
alignment between the Plan, budget and the accounts. Further, it needs to be ensured that
the IT-based systems being thought of for implementing the CAS are in tune with the
National e-Governance Plan (NeGP), and take advantage of the connectivity offered by
SWAN and the CSCs.
5.2.11 As already observed in Chapter 3, Article 150 of the Constitution provides that the
accounts of the Union and of the States are to kept in such form as the President may, on
the advice of the C&AG, prescribed. By incorporating Entry 7A (i) in the Government
of India (Allocation of Business) Rules in case of the Department of Expenditure, the
Controller General of Accounts has been delegated to carry out the business of prescribing
‘General principles of accounting’ relating to the Union or State Governments and ‘form
of accounts’. The Commission is of the view that the Controller General of Accounts, in
consultation with the C&AG, should lay down the principles for implementing the new
system of transfer of funds mentioned in the fore-going paragraphs taking into account
the available technology, the modifications required in the Chart of Accounts and should
implement the system within a prescribed time frame.
a.

The Controller General of Accounts, in consultation with the C&AG, should
lay down the principles for implementing the system of flow of sanctions/
approvals from the Union Ministries/Departments to implementing
agencies in the States to facilitate release of fund at the time of payment.
After taking into account the available technology and infrastructure
for electronic flow of information and funds, especially under the NeGP,
97



and putting in place a new Chart of Accounts, the scheme should be
implemented in a time bound manner.
5.3 Development of Financial Information System
5.3.1 A robust financial information system is necessary as it helps in:

of such a robust financial information system has also resulted in the public having direct
access to data on government spending at the federal, state and municipal levels59 through
the transparency portal (www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br). Information about even the
smallest payment is now accessible to the public, thus providing suo motu information at
a very advanced level.

•

Providing timely and reliable information to the decision makers

•

Providing inputs to control systems

•

Monitoring financial and physical progress

5.3.5 The Commission is of the view that a robust financial information system needs to be
created in the government. This system should also make accessible to the public real time
data on government expenditure at all levels and should be available in the public domain.
This would also be honouring the spirit of the Right to Information which mandates that
government organizations should attempt to provide maximum information through
voluntary disclosures.

•

Ensuring proper utilization of resources


5.3.2 Brazil is one of the countries which has made substantial progress in implementing
a modern IT-based financial information system. Until 1986, each Federal Government
Unit in Brazil had its own accounting system and there was lack of integration among the
units. From 1987 onwards, the Federal Government implemented an integrated System
for Financial Management (SIAFI) which has been continuously improved. The main
objectives of this system were to :
• Provide Public Administration Agencies with proper mechanisms for budget daily
control as well as financial execution;
• Provide means to speed up financial programming, optimizing the usage of the
National Treasury’s resources, via unification of Federal Government’s funds;
• Ensure safety and timely information recording by Public Accounting;
• Standardize budgetary and financial management and execution procedures
throughout the Federal Government; and
• Allow the follow up and evaluation of public expenses.
5.3.3 Presently, all Federal Government Units (Executive, Legislation and Judiciary)
including all State/owned company units are required to use SIAFI.58 The outcome has
been that accounting system has become integrated with standardized procedures, on-line
automatic book keeping, data compatibility, availability of reliable and timely management
information and transparency.

a.

A robust financial information system, on the lines of SIAFI of Brazil,
needs to be created in the government in a time bound manner. This system
should also make accessible to the public, real time data on government
expenditure at all levels.

5.4 Capacity Building
5.4.1 The changes in the accounting and financial management system discussed above
would necessitate capability building in not only the accounts and finance personnel but
also non-finance personnel. Better skills would allow better preparation of estimates and
better management of expenditure. A lot would require to be done for improving the
estimating and forecasting capabilities within Ministries/Departments and implementing
agencies. Specially designed and periodic training modules for personnel at different levels
need to be designed to meet these needs.
5.4.2 The Commission is of the view that major reforms in financial management can only
be undertaken if capacity of both - individuals and institutions – is improved. For this to
happen, a proper programme of training needs to be devised and implemented in a time
bound manner.
a.

5.3.4 In fact, as far as transparency in financial matters is concerned, in Brazil, the creation

The capacity of individuals and institutions in government needs to be
improved in order to implement reforms in financial management. To
facilitate this, a proper programme of training needs to be devised and

98

99
http://www.cga.gov.in/pdf/FederalGovernmentIntegratedSystemFinance%20Management.pdf

58

http://www.brazzilmag.com/content/view/3039/54/

59


6


6.1 As mentioned in Chapter 3, both the General Accounting Rules, 1990 and General
Financial Rules, 2005 prescribe cash based accounting in the Government. The basic
reasons for maintaining accounts of the Government on cash basis and its ‘fundamental’
difference with commercial accounting has been succinctly analysed in the ‘Introduction to
Indian Government Accounts and Audit’ issued by the Comptroller and Auditor General
of India.60 This is reproduced below:
“The principles of Commercial and Government Accounting differ in certain essential points.
The difference is due to the fact that, while the main function of a commercial concern
is to take part in the production, manufacture or inter-change of goods or commodities
between different groups or individuals and thereby to make profit, Government is to
govern a country and, in connection therewith, to administer the several departments of
its activities in the best way possible.
Principles and Methods of Commercial Accounting
6.1 A non-Government commercial concern deals primarily with the utilization of Capital
for the purpose of making a profit; and it is interested to see at intervals how it stands in
relation to its debtors and creditors, whether it is gaining or losing, what are the sources
of its gain or loss, and whether it is solvent or insolvent.
6.2 In order to obtain ready answers to these questions the concern has to keep a system of
detailed accounts. In respect of each person dealt with each cases of assets held, each article
dealt in and each department of its activities, it maintains a separate account so that the
result of the transactions in each case may be ascertained. It then becomes necessary for
it to collect the result of all these accounts in one place in order to record the assets and
liabilities under different heads and finally to prepare the Manufacturing, Trading and
Profit and Loss Accounts and a Balance Sheet, which shall show what is the gain or loss
of the concern as a whole and whether it is solvent or insolvent.

100

6.3 It is the generally accepted practice in the commercial world to maintain account
books on the Double Entry System, which is based on the fact that in every transaction
or financial change two parties or accounts are involved, one giving and other receiving.
Under that system, every transaction, therefore, requires two entries in the books, one
against the party or account giving and the other against the party or account receiving.
Further, if the concern is a manufacturing one, it has also to maintain set of books for (a)
costing and (b) stores accounting in order to ascertain as regards (a) the cost of production
of each article so as to control costs or increase price suitably provided of course the market
permits, and as regards (b) that there is an efficient system of stores control.
6.4 The main concepts applicable to commercial accounts are:(1) Financial conditions – This is represented by the assets, liabilities and
shareholder equity and refers to the impressions or conclusions one might
draw from a balanced array of the Company’s assets and claim against those
assets i.e. a balance sheet and other associated accounts indicating long range
and current positions and solvency and liquidity.
(2) Results of operations – The economic results of operations aimed to show what
the enterprise has accomplished and at what cost, are generally reflected by the
Profit and Loss Accounts. In arriving at the net income, financial conservation
dictates that all foreseeable losses should be provided for, no credit should be
taken for unearned profits.
(2) True and fair view – As accounting statements contain subjective evaluation,
the results presented to the shareholders should be a fair view of the affairs of
the company. Such fairness is assured by:
- Generally accepted accounting principles which include a number of
conventions and practices which have over a period of time been found
to be most useful.
- Consistency in treatment accorded to various items which are material
to the statements to make comparisons with the earlier years possible and
meaningful.
- Full disclosure to enable informed readers to come to appropriate
conclusions.

101
Fifth Edition, 1987

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Principles of Government Accounting

Commercial Undertakings of Governments

6.5 The activities of good Government in any country are determined by the needs of
the country. The main branches of its activities being known, it is a matter for decision
what expenditure will be necessary during any year in carrying out these activities. After
a decision has been reached on this point, it becomes necessary to determine how to raise
sufficient money to meet that expenditure.

6.9 The operations of some departments of Government, however, sometimes include
undertakings of a commercial or a quasi-commercial character, e.g. an industrial factory
or a store. Even though these may be maintained almost entirely for the benefit of the
department, it is still necessary that the financial results of the undertakings should be
expressed in the normal commercial form so that the cost of the service or undertaking may
be accurately known. This implies the maintenance of suitable capital, Manufacturing,
Trading and Profit and Loss Accounts, and as the Government system of accounts, being
on a purely cash basis, is unsuitable for such commercial accounts, these are usually kept
on a proforma basis outside the general accounts of Government. The actual transactions
entering these proforma accounts except those adjusted on a liability basis find a place
primarily in the regular accounts and the commercial accounts are additional as well as
separate.

6.6 With a Five-tier classification of Government Expenditure under Sectors, major heads,
minor heads, sub-heads and detailed heads of account, the accounting is more elaborate
than that followed in commercial accounts. But the immediate objective of Government
accounting is not to ascertain the gain or loss on the transactions of the Government as
a whole in carrying out its activities. The method of budgeting and accounting under
the service heads is not designed to bring out the relation in which Government stands
to its material assets in use, or its liabilities due to be discharged at more or less distant
dates. The accounting methods adopted for commercial concerns, and the preparation
of Manufacturing, Trading and Profit and Loss Accounts and a Balance Sheet, in the
commercial sense, are, therefore, unsuitable and unnecessary. In its Budget for a year,
Government is interested to forecast with the greatest possible accuracy what is expected
to be received or paid during the year, and whether the former together with the balance
of the past year is sufficient to cover the latter. Similarly, in the compiled accounts for
that year, it is concerned to see to what extent the forecast has been justified by the facts
and whether it has a surplus or deficit balance as a result of the year’s transactions. On
the basis of the budget and the accounts, Government determines (a) whether it will be
justified in curtailing or expanding its activities (b) whether it can and should increase
or decrease taxation accordingly.
6.7 In the field of government accounting, the end products are the monthly accounts and
the annual accounts. The monthly accounts serve the needs of the day-to-day administration,
while the annual accounts present a fair and correct view of the financial stewardship of
the government during the year.
Purpose of Government and of Commercial Accounts

102

6.8 Government Accounts are designed to enable Government to determine how little
money it need take out of the pockets of the tax-payers in order to maintain its necessary
activities at the proper standard of efficiency. Non Government Commercial accounts on
the other hand are meant to show how much money the concern can put into the pockets
of the proprietors consistently with the maintenance of a profit-earning standard in the
concern.

Methods of Government Accounting
6.10 The mass of the Government accounts being on cash basis is kept on Single Entry.
There is, however, a portion of the accounts which is kept on the Double Entry System, the
main purpose of which is to bring out by a more scientific method the balance of accounts
in regard to which Government acts as banker or remitter, or borrower or lender. Such
balances are, of course, worked out in the subsidiary accounts of single entry compilations
as well but their accuracy can be guaranteed only by a periodical verification with the
balance brought out in the double entry accounts”.
6.2 Accounting in Commercial Undertakings of the Government
6.2.1 As stated above, only in case of certain commercial undertakings of the Government,
are the accounts maintained in a manner so as to reflect the true outcome of the commercial
enterprise. However, these accounts are kept separate from the normal Government accounts.
A classic example of such accounts is presented by the Railway Accounts. As the Indian
Railways function as a ‘Departmental Commercial Enterprise’, there is need for securing
the essential requirements of commercial accounting apart from conforming to the norms
of Government accounting. This is achieved in the Railway Accounts by keeping the
accounts of the railways on a commercial basis outside the regular Government account
and by maintaining a link between the two for necessary correlations. Thus, the accounts
which facilitate a review of the finances of the railways as a commercial undertaking are
known as ‘Capital and Revenue Accounts’ which are compiled annually and included in the
Annual Report of the Railways. On the other hand, the accounts maintained in accordance
103


with the requirements of the government accounts are collectively termed as the ‘Finance
Accounts’.61
6.2.3 Unlike Government accounts which record expenditure only when actually disbursed
or receipts only when actually realized, the commercial accounts of the railways record
the expenditure incurred or earnings accrued in a month irrespective of whether they
have actually been paid or realized. On the expenditure side, the revenue liabilities of the
Railways for a particular month, which are not payable within the same month, are brought
to account as working expenses for the month by taking contra credit to a suspense head
called ‘Demands Payable’. When the liabilities are actually discharged by payments, the
suspense head is debited with that amount. Thus, the balance at the end of a particular
month in the suspense head represents liability incurred but not actually discharged
during that month. In case of earnings, similar suspense account is maintained under the
head ‘Traffic Accounts’. In case of wages and allowances for a month for labour, another
suspense account is maintained under the head ‘Labour’. These three accounts thus linked
the commercial accounts with the Government accounts.
6.2.4 Thus, basically the Railway Accounts follow a modified accrual system in their accounts
so that the performance of their commercial activities could be captured in a proper way.
However, this is maintained separately from the normal government accounts.
6.2.5 In the 1990s, international financial institutions began stressing on adoption of
the accrual system of accounts while disbursing financial aid. Thus, in a loan given to
Kumbakonam Municipality (Tamil Nadu), the World Bank included the introduction of
accrual accounting as a part of its conditions. Similarly, while extending financial assistance
to the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, the USAID insisted on introduction of accrual
accounting so that the Corporation could borrow from the public market.62
6.2.6 The Twelfth Finance Commission (2005-10) in its Report has summed up the benefits
arising out of adoption of the accrual system of accounting as follows:
“14.14 The cash-based system of accounting lays emphasis on transactions vis-à-vis
the budget. It does not record and report complete financial information required for
management of resources. It does not provide a full picture of the government’s financial
position at any given point and the changes that take place over time as a result of
government policy. The system fails to reflect government’s liabilities such as accrued
liabilities arising due to unfunded pensions and superannuation benefits and current
liabilities arising from a disconnect between commitments and payments. Similarly, the
present system is unable to track current assets as well as non-financial assets. It does not
104


provide information on the assets held by the government, much less the cost of holding
and operating these assets and the impact of current consumption on the stock of assets.
Another major limitation is its inability to record the full cost of providing services by
the government’s departments or the commitments made by the government regarding
payment in future years. The cash-based accounting provides room for fiscal opportunism,
as tax revenues can be collected in excess during a period followed by high incidence of
refunds, payments can easily be deferred and passed on to future periods, revenues due in
the future could be compromised by providing for one-time payments, etc. To quote some
other examples, it takes no note of transformation of indebted government agencies into
autonomous legal entities outside government through suitable state guarantees, and on
the expenditure side, omit existing net liabilities of public enterprises and agencies outside
the government, though the latter cannot escape such liabilities.
14.15 Compared to the cash-based system, the system of accrual accounting recognizes
financial flows at the time economic value is created, transformed, exchanged, transferred
or extinguished, whether or not cash is exchanged at that time. It is different from cashbased system in that it records flow of resources. Expenses are recorded when the resources
(labour, goods and services and capital) are consumed, and income when it is earned, i.e.
when the goods are sold or the services rendered. The associated cash flows generally follow
the event after some time and may or may not take place during the same accounting
period. Thus, in addition to cash flow, unpaid consumptions (payables) and unrealized
income (receivables) are also recorded. Resources acquired but not fully consumed during
an accounting period are treated as assets (inventory and fixed assets). Payments made
for acquisition of inventory are included in the operating cost for the period in which it
is consumed. Payments made for acquisition of physical assets, that have future service
potential, are amortized over the entire useful life of the asset by charging depreciation.
14.16 The system of accrual accounting, thus, inter alia, allows better cost – price
calculations, records capital use properly, distinguishes between current and capital
expenditures, presents a complete picture of debt and other liabilities and focuses policy
attention on financial position, as shown in the whole balance sheet not just cash flows
or debts. It gives a complete measure of cost of various services, takes care of disinvestment
receipts and provides adequate information of both fiscal balance and net worth and
their changes over time. Information, as would be available under accrual accounts,
constitutes an essential input for bodies like finance commissions, not only in assessing the
revenue requirements of the centre and states vis-à-vis the available resources, but also in
appraising their fiscal performance with a view to assigning due credit to the governments,
which have performed well and providing disincentives to those, which fail to measure
up-to expectations. …”
105

Source : Indian Railways Code for the Accounts Department, Part-I: http://www.indianrailways.gov.in/Finance Code/AccCode1/Chapters/Chapter2.pdf
Source: Trapped in the Comfort Zone of Denial: 50 years of Expenditure Management in India; A. Premchand; NIPFP; pp 30-31

61

62



iv.

i.

Setting up a Task Force or Cell or designating a nodal agency preferably at
Ministry for Finance for coordination and overseeing the implementation.
Besides representative from the Ministry of Finance, the said Task Force may
comprise :

Detailed process study of various activities and accounting practices to assess the
extent of departure from the existing system in terms of accounting principles,
recognition and measurement of elements, classification and disclosure of
information.

v.

6.2.7 It needs to be mentioned here that in order to implement the recommendations of
the Twelfth Finance Commission, the Government Accounting Standards Advisory Board
(GASAB) in the Office of the C&AG has been entrusted with the task of recommending
a detailed road map and an operational framework. The Roadmap prepared by GASAB
for transition to accrual accounting envisages a 10-12 year transition period. The main
activities proposed under this Roadmap are:63

Preparation of a detailed accounting framework in line with the broad contours
of the operational framework prescribed by GASAB.

vi. Laying down accounting policies
vii. Preparation of a Chart of Accounts

representative of the office of the CAG,

viii. Devising subsidiary ledgers/records to be maintained in accounting offices

representative from the office of the CGA,

ix.

representative from Railways,

Streamlining accounting dataflow and defining role and responsibilities amongst
officials dealing with accounting data

representative from the office of the CGDA,

x.

Putting in place a new IT system

representative from Posts, and

representative from State Governments (select State Governments).

xi.

Pilot implementation of the new system in few Ministries/Departments

This Task Force would work as a nodal agency for implementation and
coordination of transition to accrual accounting. It would further consider
and suggest ways and means of setting up separate task forces in the concerned
Ministry / Department and State Governments for supervision and monitoring
of such transition. It would focus on facilitating an integrated approach
across Governments aimed at maintaining broad uniformity in the form of
accounts. Further, it would also provide a forum for evolving accounting
policies and accounting standards and facilitate resolution of issues faced by
different stakeholders. Finally, it would bring about a detailed plan of action
for scheduling of different activities involved in the transition.

ii.

Identification and collection of data required for preparation of accrual-based
Financial Statements.

iii.

Pilot Studies covering a few Ministries/Departments/State Governments with
a view to assess the gaps and problems in the existing system. This would also
be crucial for process mapping.

xii. Full implementation
6.2.8 The operational framework for this transition would have to encompass accounting
and treatment of assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses and the final accounts of the
Governments consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. Accordingly, the
operational framework suggested by GASAB takes into consideration various issues related
to this transition. It recognizes that different departments / organizations should have the
flexibility to decide the appropriate degree and extent of accrual base that is useful and
sustainable for them. Thus, accounting policies would need to be framed independently by
them which would be consistent with generally accepted accounting principles. Due to these
considerations, the operational framework designed by GASAB indicates broad deviations
from the conventional approval basis of accounting as followed by commercial / industrial
and business enterprises. This is necessitated on account of the specific requirements of
accounting and reporting owing to the nature of governmental transactions, types of assets
held, liabilities carried and revenue collected.
6.2.9 The proposed broad framework for transition to accrual accounting is presented in
Table 6.1.64

106

107
Operational Framework of Accrual Basis of Accounting in Governments in India; GASAB; February, 2007

63

Source: Operational Framework of Accrual Basis of Accounting in Governments in India; GASAB; February, 2007

64

108
Current Expense on
accrual basis and
Capital Expenditure
on cash basis
Current Expense
on accrual basis
and Capital
Expenditure on cash
basis [excluding
Expenditure on
Military Assets]

All Expenses on
accrual basis +
Depreciation

Stage I

Stage II

Stage III

Stock of Public debt
and Borrowings on
Public Account
and Borrowing on
Public Account +
Payables

Financial assets

Financial assets
+ Receivables +
Military assets

All Assets (excluding
infrastructure, land,
heritage, intangible
assets)

Non Tax Revenues
on accrual basis +
Tax Revenues on cash
basis

Do

All liabilities (except
superannuation
benefits,
compensated leaves,
provisions and
security)

and Borrowing on
Public Account +
Payables + All other
Liabilities [except
superannuation
benefits,
compensated leaves,
provisions and
social security]

Financial assets

Receipts

Receipts

All expenses on accrual
basis + Depreciation +
Provisions

All Expenses

Stage IV

Stage V

All Revenues on
accrual basis

Do

All Assets

All assets including
infrastructure and
land [excluding
heritage and
intangible]

All liabilities

Do

Stages
Expenses
Revenues
Assets
Liabilities

Table 6.1: Operational Framework of Accrual Basis of Accounting in Government

Exp – Current &
Capital

Current Stage

Stages
Expenses
Revenues
Assets
Liabilities

Table 6.1: Operational Framework of Accrual Basis of Accounting in Government

Contd.

All explicit
contingent
liabilities

Do

Contingent
Liabilities

All explicit
contingent
liabilities

Guarantees

Guarantees

Guarantees

Contingent
Liabilities


109


6.2.10 GASAB has suggested that Stage 1 depicted in the above Table should be the starting
point for introduction of the accrual basis of accounting and accounting reforms should
incrementally graduate to Stage V which represents full accrual accounting. It also noted
that certain entities within the government like the Railways may straightaway adopt full
approval on account of their preparedness and nature of activities. A description of these
stages is given below:
Stage I: Accrual-based recognition is introduced in case of current expenses leading to
recognition of payables which would be shown as a liability.
Stage II: Accrual-based recognition is introduced in case of non-tax revenues which would
lead to recognition of receivables, to be included in assets. This will also include military
assets.
Stage III: At this stage, all expenses are recognized on accrual basis and recognition of
depreciation is introduced. Further, all financial and physical assets (except for infrastructure,
land, heritage and intangibles) and inventories are recognized on accrual basis. Further,
disclosure of all explicit contingent liability begins to be made.
Stage IV: At this stage, inclusion of provisions as expense and extension of physical assets
to cover infrastructure and land would be on accrual basis.
Stage V: At this stage, all the aspects of Government accounts are based on accrual system
of accounting.
6.2.11 GASAB has proposed that successful completion of every stage should be considered
for consolidated reporting for the entire government at different levels. The time frame for
Stage I should be 3-5 years. This framework would require preparation of a Chart of Accounts
for capturing accrual based information in account books. This Chart of Accounts should
have two tiers, the first tier would capture information for use at the macro-level (uniform
for all Departments as in the case of existing Major and Minor Heads) and the second
tier would capture information for budget management in the Ministries/ Departments.
Ministries / Departments / organizations should have the flexibility to design their own
Chart of Accounts in case of the second tier.
6.2.12 GASAB has indicated that adoption of the accrual principle would necessitate
certain changes in the financial statements. The new structure of financial reporting would
comprise three inter-related statements.

110


Statement of operating performance (Income & Expenditure Account),
Statement of financial position (Balance Sheet), and
Statement of sources and uses of cash.
6.2.13 The accrual based financial statements will provide two important measures of
financial performance – Fiscal Balance and Net Assets / Equity (Net Worth). Fiscal balance
will measure the operating performance and provide an indicator of the saving-investment
gap of the government; Net Assets/Equity will provide a measure of government’s financial
position in terms of its ability to relinquish its liabilities. Changes in the net worth over
time provide a measure of the sustainability of government’s fiscal policies. However, all
information previously recorded according to the cash basis of accounting will be retained
and presented in a reorganized format in the statement of sources and uses of cash. Other
statements will serve to provide an integrated presentation of the economic operations and
positions of government.
6.2.14 The Appropriations from Parliament would continue to be obtained on cash basis
and this will necessitate preparation of Appropriation Accounts showing compliance with
parliamentary supply. Similarly, Finance Accounts would also continue to be prepared on
cash basis till the new framework stabilizes. The statement of receipts and disbursements
(Statement No.1 of Finance Accounts) would serve as the link between the accrualsbased
Statement of Operating Performance and cash-based budgets.
6.2.15 As far as the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) are concerned, the Commission in its
Sixth Report entitled “Local Governance” had recommended that the accounting system
for them as provided in the National Municipal Accounts Manual (NMAM) should be
adopted by the State Governments (Paragraph 3.9.22.a). The NMAM prescribes that
these accounts should be prepared on accrual basis. In case of the PRIs, the formats for
accounts developed by the C&AG are basically in the form of a simple receipt and payment
account on cash basis accompanied by key statements that take care of the items of accrued
income and expenditure. The Commission has recommended in its Sixth Report that it
should be ensured that the accounting standards and formats for Panchayats are prepared
in a way which is simple and comprehensible to the elected representatives of the PRIs
(paragraph 3.9.22.d).
6.2.16 However, in case of adoption of the accrual-based system, first in government
accounts, and then in budgeting, some pertinent aspects would need to be addressed:

111



i)

ii)

There is a high cost of transition from cash-based to accrual-based accounting
system as it requires higher level of trained and skilled personnel, and higher
costs are involved in identification and evaluation of assets and setting up the
technological infrastructure.
The transition period takes a fairly long time to settle, sometimes even more
than a decade.

A number of activities associated with the accrual-based accounting system involve high
level of subjectivity for example valuations and risk assessment. The nature disclosures
and reporting could change substantially based on such valuations and assessments.
Robust accounting framework for implementing such a system is also required.
6.2.17 In fact, discussions on adoption of the accrual system of accounting in the government
has been on-going for quite some time. Even the Committee on Fiscal Responsibility
Legislation, July 2000 was in favour of introduction of accrual accounting system and was
inclined to make it a part of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, as it
felt it would be an instrument of fiscal control. Its Report stated that:
“The Union Budget should progressively move towards greater disclosure on accrual basis
of all contractual liabilities, explicit contingent liabilities, revenue demands raised but
not realized, committed responsibility in respect of major works and supply contracts in
progress, hidden subsides by way of below cost supply of goods and services etc” .65
6.2.18 They expressed the view that the cash accounting system should be progressively
supplemented by accrual accounting and wherever necessary, general accounting norms
should be aligned with internationally accepted best practices. However, the offices of both
the C&AG and the CGA expressed their reservations on incorporating the accrual-based
system as part of the FRBM Act, which was accepted by the Committee: “After careful
deliberation on various issued raised by the CGA and the representative of the C&AG, the
committee felt that introduction of accrual accounting as a part of proposed fiscal responsibility
legislation would not be desirable. However, the need to gradually introduce an accrual system
of accounting may be separately examined. Meanwhile, greater disclosure of accrual-based
information in the budget document should be set as a target in the proposed FRA”. In fact, it
was pointed out that a committee headed by Shri A.C. Tiwari, former Dy. C&AG, had
examined the issue of introducing accrual accounting earlier, and was of the view that
“The requirement of accrual accounting, in government, has not yet been established, as the

112

needs of government accounting are quite different from those of commercial enterprises. Accrual
accounting is untested, difficult to implement and not really useful. There are practical problems,
huge costs and timeframes involved and it would not be cost effective”.66
6.2.19 A word of caution has also been put in the OECD document ‘Managing Public
Expenditure – A Reference Book for Transition Countries’67 in case of countries considering
the implementation of a government-wide full accrual accounting system. In their view, “Full
accrual accounting requires a comprehensive registration of assets and a sound cost measurement
system. Implementing such systems government-wide needs time and its cost-effectiveness needs
to be carefully examined. Full accrual accounting would not contribute to the development of
a performance-oriented approach to budgeting at the agency level if depreciation is roughly
estimated. If accounting standards are not clearly specified and reported, accrual accounting
leaves room for “creative accounting”, through manipulating estimates of depreciation, provisions,
recognition of losses, etc.”
6.2.20 A gradual approach was thus advocated in the OECD document: “It might start with
those areas of of government activity that require information on the value of physical assets, their
uses and full costs (e.g. agencies that charge users for services provided). Taking into account the
need to strengthen fiscal management, transition countries should focus first on implementing
methods to better recognize financial liabilities in their accounts….. Making accrual accounting
effective requires a true and fair recognition of expenses. Applying only formal accounting rules
does not increase transparency. Accrual accounting therefore requires the availability of many
highly skilled accountants both inside and outside the government. Accrual accounting can
improve transparency but only if decision-makers and the public are well informed about the
nature of the information provided and its financial implications. This is not always the case,
even in many OECD countries…”
6.2.21 They further point out that although including accrual accounting information
in budgetary documents is desirable in principle, relatively few OECD countries (e.g.
Australia, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK) have moved in
this direction. The US has decided to retain its obligations-based system of budgeting in
which information on cash transactions is supplemented by accruals information for certain
categories of transactions.68
The implementation in OECD countries is presented in Table 6.2.

Seminar in Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 2003 and its Implementation, NIFM, October 12, 2004, para 72. (cited in the Report
furnished to ARC by NIPFP)
67
Ed. Richard Allen, Daniel Tommasi; OECD, 2001; page 306
68
Ibid; page307
66

Report on the “Committee on Fiscal Responsibility Legislation July 2000”, para 46, Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 2003 and its
implementation, Seminar Volume, October 2004, National Institute of Financial Management. (cited in the Report furnished to ARC by NIPFP)

65

113


Table 6.2: OECD Member Countries : Government Accounting
OECD Member


Table 6.2: OECD Member Countries : Government Accounting

Accrual Accounting for
Individual Agencies /
Departments

Consolidated
Accrual Reporting

Accrual Budgeting

OECD Member

Accrual Accounting for
Individual Agencies /
Departments

Consolidated
Accrual Reporting

Accrual Budgeting

G7 Economies
Canada

Since FY 2002

Since FY 2002

Yes

Luxemburg

No*

No

ESA 95

France

Being introduced

Some, full accrual
being introduced

ESA 95. Intends to move to
modified accrual basis

Mexico

No*

No

No

The Netherlands

Since 1994

Introducing

France

Being introduced

Some, full accrual
being introduced

ESA 95. Intends to move to
modified accrual basis

ESA 95. For agencies since
1997. Is introducing full accrual
budgeting

Germany

Cash statements supplemented
with accrual information

No

ESA 95. In preparation

New Zealand

Since FY 1992

Since FY 1992

Since FY 1995

Italy

Yes

Yes

ESA 95. Yes

Norway

No*

No

No

Japan

Yes

Introducing

No

Poland

Some

Some

No, but will be introducing
modified accrual budgeting in
accordance with ESA 95

United Kingdom

Since FY 2000

From FY 2006

ESA 95. Since FY 2002

Portugal

Yes

No

ESA 95. Is introducing additional
accrual information

Australia

Since 1995

Since 1997

Since FY 2000

Slovak Republic

No*

No

Austria

No*

No



Spain

Modified accrual

Modified accrual

ESA 95. Modified cash

Other Members

Denmark

Some

ESA 95. Is introducing full
accrual budgeting

Sweden

Since 1994

Since 1994

ESA 95. Is introducing full
accrual budgeting

Finland

Since 1998

Since 1998

ESA 95. Yes

Switzerland

Yes

No

Is introducing full accrual
budgeting

Greece

Some

Yes

ESA 95. Modified accrual

Turkey

No*

No

No

Hungary


No


* Most countries actually use modified cash accounting.
ESA 95: European System of Accounts 1995

Iceland

Since 1992

Since 1992

ESA 95. Since 1998

Ireland


No

ESA 95. Modified accrual.

Korea, Republic
of

114

Some

accounting

No

budgeting

Source : Accrual Budgeting and Accounting in Government and its Relevance for Developing Member Countries;
by A.C. Athukorala & Barry Reid; http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Accrual_Budgeting_Accounting/
default.asp

115



6.2.22 However, it needs to be pointed out that International experience also indicates
various complexities and risks involved. For example:69
1.

2.

3.

Many countries have attempted to move towards accrual accounting but success
has not been widespread. For example, even among the OECD countries,
Germany and Italy are yet to decide on the transition. The Netherlands has
retracted its steps because of the costs involved. Japan has decided not to go
for it, at least for the present. South Africa has reverted back after actively
pursuing it.
Even in countries where the system has been implemented, the cost of
implementation has been high and the system has stabilized in about a decade.
However, it has not conclusively been shown that the information provided
by accrual accounting system is being used in decision making.
Different countries have followed different approaches to adopting accrual
accounting. In Australia, accrual accounting was first implemented at the
provincial level and later at the national level. In the U.K, although departments
prepare accrual based accounts, there is no consolidation of these accounts at
the national level.

6.2.23 The enormity of the last mentioned task was also realized by the Twelfth Finance
Commission. Thus, it stated that “The change over to the accrual based system of accounting
will place considerable demands on the accounting personnel in various government organizations,
particularly at the lower and middle levels of accounting hierarchy, consisting of accounts clerks,
accountants, assistants, treasury officials and others.” As mentioned earlier, to be able to derive
meaningful inferences from the new system of accounts and to see through window dressing
exercises, all the stake holders involved in the decision making process in the government including
Parliament and public at large would have to be aware of the intricacies involved. Realising
this, the Twelfth Finance Commission also observed that “however, the transition would occur
in stages, as this is a time consuming process. While we are in favour of a change over to the
accrual based system of accounting in the medium term, we suggest that in the interim, some
additional information as mentioned below in the form of statements should be appended to
the present system of cash accounting to enable more informed decision making. An illustrative
list of statements, which could be included are:
a statement of subsidies given, both explicit and implicit;
a statement containing expenditure on salaries by various departments / units;
detailed information on pensioners and expenditure on government pensions;
116

data on committed liabilities in the future;
statement containing information on debt and other liabilities as well as repayment
schedule;
accretion to or erosion in financial assets held by the government including those arising
out of changes in the manner of spending by the government;
implications of major policy decisions taken by the government during the year or new
schemes proposed in the budget for future cash flows; and
statement on maintenance expenditure with segregation of salary and non-salary
portions.”
6.2.24 While discussing reforms in the budgetary system, the initiatives taken in the UK,
especially its ‘Alignment Project’ has been described in detail. The Commission is of the
view that a similar alignment in India would bring about the transparency as desired by
the Twelfth Finance Commission.
6.2.25 So far as accrual system is concerned, it is observed that while its implementation has
been costly and time consuming in countries where it has been adopted, empirical evidence
of its benefits has not been conclusively demonstrated. Its implementation also places a
high premium on capacity building, both in case of institutions and personnel. Views have
also been expressed about limitations in its usefulness if the system of accounting does not
cover the budgeting system also. The Commission has considered the views from both
sides of the debate. It is of the view that while adopting the accrual system of accounting
may be the ultimate objective in case of government accounts, in the present scenario the
following steps would first need to be taken:
i.

Setting up of a Task Force to examine the costs and benefits of this system. This
Task Force should also examine its applicability in case of the Appropriation
Accounts and Finance Accounts.

ii.

A few departments/organizations may be identified where tangible benefits
could be shown to be derived by implementing the new system within 2-3
years, especially departmental ‘commercial undertakings’.

iii.

The result may be studied by a committee of experts which would recommend
or otherwise its further implementation in all departments/organisations at the
Union/State level along with exclusions, if any. This may proceed in a phased
manner.
117

Source: Information provided by the Office of the CGA, Ministry of Finance

69


iv.

Training and capacity building needs of the accounting personnel and all
stake holders in the decision making process would have to be addressed and
a schedule worked out in line with the road map.

v.

Before the new system is adopted, alignment of the plan, budget and accounts
needs to be achieved and a viable financial information system needs to be put
in place.

6.3 Recommendations
a.

A Task Force should be set up to examine the costs and benefits of
introducing the accrual system of accounting. This Task Force should
also examine its applicability in case of the Appropriation Accounts and
Finance Accounts.

b.

Initially, a few departments/organizations may be identified where tangible
benefits could be shown to be derived within 2-3 years by implementing
the accrual system of accounting, especially departmental ‘commercial
undertakings’.

c.

The result of this initial implementation may be studied by a committee
of experts which would recommend on its further implementation in all
departments/organisations at the Union/State level along with exclusions,
if any. This may proceed in a phased manner.

d.

e.

Prior to its implementation, training and capacity building needs of the
accounting personnel and all stake holders in the decision making process
would have to be addressed and a meticulous schedule worked out in line
with the road map of implementation.
Before the new system is adopted, alignment of the plan, budget and
accounts, as recommended in this Report elsewhere, needs to be achieved
and a viable financial information system needs to be put in place.

INTERNAL CONTROL AND AUDIT

7

7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Internal control systems are basically management control systems with a view to
ensuring compliance with rules and regulations, reliability of financial data and reports,
and to facilitate efficiency of government operations. A sound internal control framework,
of which internal audit is an important element, is required to assure that government
operations attain some basic fiduciary standards in guarding against misuse and inefficient
use of resources; for safeguarding government assets; countering fraud and error; checking
maintenance of satisfactory accounting records; and whether budgetary objectives set out
in the government policies are being achieved. Thus, “Internal controls can be regarded as
one of the foundations of good governance and the first line of defense against improprieties.
They also provide the public with ‘reasonable assurances’ that if improprieties do occur, they will
be made transparent and made appropriately addressed.” 70
7.1.2 Though internal audit is also a part of internal control system, it has a distinct role in
that it is one of the tools for evaluating and improving the internal control system. Internal
audit in government also involves audit on the basis of standards of financial propriety (as
does the external audit) and, therefore, is required to observe upon cases of improprieties
in financial operations.
7.1.3 The function of audit has been entrusted to the Comptroller and Auditor-General
of India by the Constitution. Internal audit, as the name suggests, has to be a part of the
government organization. Presently, in Government of India, this function is discharged
by the Office of the Controller General of Accounts in the Ministry of Finance through
Chief Controllers/Controllers of Accounts in different Ministries/departments. The present
scope of internal audit is as follows:
12.2.1 The Internal Audit Unit will work directly under the Pr.CCAs/CCAs/CAs, with
overall responsibility remaining with the concerned Financial Adviser and the Secretary
of the Ministry/Department. The Principal Accounts Office, the Pay and Accounts Offices
as well as the offices of the D.D.Os in Ministries/Departments, Indian Missions and other
Govt. of India offices abroad, shall be within the jurisdiction of internal audit. In addition

118

119
Jack Diamond (2006), “Budget System Reform in Emerging Economies”, , IMF, p.44

70



to these offices, internal audit shall be required to audit the implementing agencies for
various schemes and programmes of the Ministry/Department.

Internal Audit shall also check the initial accounts maintained in the executive offices to
ascertain the extent of following of the rules and regulations, system and procedures in
accounting and financial matters. The scrutiny would cover checking of all accounting
records including those relating to fund accounts, loans and advances, disposal of confiscated
stores (in CBEC), review of the installation and operating efficiency of expensive equipments
and machinery and examination of records relating to physical verification of stores,
equipments, tools and plant. The accounts of all grantee Institutions or Organizations shall
be open to inspection by the sanctioning authority and audit, both by the Comptroller
and Auditor General of India under the provision of CAG (DPC) Act 1971 and internal
audit by the Principal Accounts Office of the Ministry or Department, whenever the
Institution or Organization is called upon to do so and a provision to this effect should
invariably be incorporated in all orders sanctioning grant in aid.” 71

(viii) To examine and report on points or irregularities brought to its notice by the Principal
Accounts Office/P.A.Os; and
(ix) Preparation and submission of ‘Annual Review’ on performance of internal audit
wing to the Controller General of Accounts.” 72
7.1.5 However, the revised charter for the Chief Controllers of Accounts includes some
additional responsibilities:
As per the new charter of duties and responsibilities of Chief Controllers of Accounts issued
by the Secretary, Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance, the following functions
will be carried out as per the guidelines issued by the Controller General of Accounts from
time to time.
(i)

(ii) Assessment of adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls in general, and
soundness of financial systems and reliability of financial and accounting reports
in particular;

7.1.4 Thus, the overall responsibility of internal audit lies with the concerned Financial
Adviser and ultimately with the Secretary of the Ministry/department. The general duties
of the internal audit organization in the Ministries/departments include the following:
(i)

(iii) Identification and monitoring of risk factors including those contained in the
Outcome Budget;

Study of accounting procedures prescribed for the department with a view to ensuring
that they are correct, adequate and free from any defects or lacunae;

(iv) Critical assessment of economy, efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery
mechanism to ensure value for money; and

(ii) Watch over the implementation of the prescribed procedures and the orders issued
from time to time;
(iii) Scrutiny and check of payments and accounting work of the accounting units;
(iv) Investigation of important arrears in accounting and other connected records;
(v)

Coordination with other Ministries and C.G.A. regarding internal audit
procedures;

(vi) Periodical review of all accounts records;
(vii) Pursuance/settlement of objections taken in test audit notes issued by statutory audit
offices and other matters relating to statutory audit;

The appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of individual schemes;

(v)

Providing an effective monitoring system to facilitate mid course corrections.”73

7.1.6 Thus, whereas the original mandate of internal audit was to ascertain whether the
rules and regulations have been followed and procedures in accounting and financial
matters have been complied with, the revised charter includes appraisal and evaluation of
individual schemes, assessment of adequacy of internal controls, monitoring of risk factors,
efficiency etc.
7.1.7 In order to move towards risk assurance based internal audit, the CGA has decided
to establish a Centre of Excellence for Internal Audit (COE) in the Office of Controller
General of Accounts. Its objectives would be:
• to ultimately develop into a repository of technical resource and guidance centre
for advising internal audit wings of line Ministries on effective, independent and
objective internal audit functions, procedures, and “best practices”. The approach

120

121
Civil Accounts Manual; Second Revised Edition -2007

71

Civil Accounts Manual; para 12.3.1
Ibid; para 12.3.2

72
73


of COE will be to cover important aspects of risk management strategy and the
management control framework and practices;
• to enhance the quality of internal audit so that the results of internal audit become
an input into the processes of planning, project formulation and implementation;
and
• to provide an assurance to the management that the “controls” in place provide
adequate protection against likely “risks”.
7.1.8 However, this initiative also realizes that ‘risk based internal audit’ would develop
‘gradually, evolving over time, as the capacity to meet the objectives gets enhanced and
standards and practices to carry out modern risk based internal audit are firmed-up’.74 In
order to formulate the future course of the Centre of Excellence, a Working Group has
also been constituted to:75
1.

Evolve guidelines and scope for the functioning of the Centre of Excellence.

2.

Examine the current and future needs and charter the future course of the
Centre of Excellence.

3.

Suggest improvements which could be brought about in the scheme of Internal
Audit being conducted by the Ministries / Departments.

4.

Periodically evaluate the performance of audit and suggest changes for constant
improvement in relation to the changing scenario.

5.

Harness technological developments to aid the objectives of audit.

7.1.9 It is thus evident that internal audit as per the revised mandate, is in its infancy in
India. It would be instructive here to look at some of the international best practices in
this regard.
7.1.10 In the private sector of the developed economies, the scope of internal audit in the
revolves around three functions: (i) risk management, (ii) control and (iii) governance of
the organization concerned. The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the leading institution
in the field of professional internal auditing, has defined the nature of work with regard
to internal audit as follows: “the internal audit activity should evaluate and contribute to the
improvement of risk management, control, and governance processes using a systematic and
disciplined approach” (Internal Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing,
Para 2100). ‘Risk’ has been defined by IIA to mean “ The possibility of an event occurring
122


that will have an impact on the achievement of objectives. Risk is measured in terms of impact
and likelihood”. ‘Risk Management’ is defined as “A process to identify, assess, manage and
control potential events or situations, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement
of the organizations objectives”. ‘Governance’ has been defined as “the combination of processes
and structures implemented by the Board in order to inform, direct, manage and monitor the
activities of the organization toward the achievement of its objectives”. Many countries of the
developed world have tried to introduce these modern concepts into government institutions.
Thus, the ‘Government Internal Audit Standards’ published by HM Treasury Audit policy
and Advice, UK (October, 2001) defines Internal Audit in the following manner:
Internal audit is an independent and objective appraisal service within an
organization:
• Internal audit primarily provides an independent and objective opinion to the
Accounting Officer on risk management, control and governance, by measuring
and evaluating their effectiveness in achieving the organisation’s agreed objectives.
In addition, internal audit’s findings and recommendations are beneficial to line
management in the audited areas. Risk management, control and governance comprise
the policies, procedures and operations established to ensure the achievement of objectives,
the appropriate assessment of risk, the reliability of internal and external reporting
and accountability processes, compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and
compliance with the behavioural and ethical standards set for the organization.
• Internal audit also provides an independent and objective consultancy service specifically
to help line management improve the organisation’s risk management, control and
governance. The service applies the professional skills of internal audit through a
systematic and disciplined evaluation of the policies, procedures and operations that
management put in place to ensure the achievement of the organisation’s objectives,
and through recommendations for improvement. Such consultancy work contributes
to the opinion which internal audit provides on risk management, control and
governance”.
7.1.11 Internal audit in the UK provides objective opinion directly to the Accounting Officer.
To facilitate this, specific internal audit standards have been prescribed which define the way
in which the internal audit should be established and undertake its functions. They apply
equally to internal audit services which are provided by in-house audit units, in-house audit
units and service level agreements and by external contractors who provide either partial
services in support of an in-house team or the whole internal audit service. The standards
are organized in two groupings. The organizational standards deal with:
123

OM No.G.25014/48/07/MF.CGA/Insp./390 dated August 22, 2007; http://cga.nic.in/pdf/CentreOfExcellence.pdf
OM No.G.25014/80/07-08/MF.CGA/COE/Insp./1275 to 1284 dated March 19, 2008; http://cga.nic.in/pdf/CentreOfExcellence.pdf

74
75



i.

scope of internal audit,

ii.

independence,

iii.

audit committees,

iv.

relationship with management etc. and

v.

staffing, training and development.

The operational standards deal with:
i.

audit strategy,

ii.

management of audit assignments,

iii.

quality assurance.

providing policy direction for and to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits
and investigations relating to the programs and operations of the estsablishment
within which he/she is functioning;

2.

reviewing existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to programs
and operations of his/her establishment and to make recommendations
regarding their impact on the economy and efficiency in the administration
of programs and operations administered or financed by his/her establishment
or the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in such programs and
operations;

3.

recommending policies for, and to conduct, supervise, or coordinate other
activities carried out or financed by his/her establishment for the purpose of
promoting economy and efficiency in the administration of, or preventing and
detecting fraud and abuse in, its programs and operations;

4.

7.1.13 In the United States, responsibilities of internal audit carry a strong element
of investigation following the enactment of the Inspector General Act of 1978. This
Act established an office of Inspector General within each of the selected government
establishments in order to create independent and objective units to:77

keeping the head of his/her establishment and the Congress fully and currently
informed, by means of the reports, concerning fraud and other serious problems,
abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and
operations administered or financed by the parent establishment, to recommend
corrective action concerning such problems, abuses, and deficiencies, and to
report on the progress made in implementing such corrective action.

conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to the programs and
operations of the selected establishments;

2.

provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies for activities
designed
a.

to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration
of, and

provide a means for keeping the head of the establishment and the Congress
fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and
progress of corrective action.

1.

7.1.12 These definitions and standards are in general agreement with those provided by the
IIA. Thus, internal audit in the government in the UK is designed to provide independent
and objective advice to the Accounting Officer (generally the Permanent Secretary in Central
Government Departments is designated as the Accounts Officer)76 and is guided by the
standards prescribed, covering the whole gamut of activities covered by such audit.

1.

to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs and operations;
and

7.1.14 Thus, investigation into government programmes and prevention and detection of
frauds therein are important objectives of these offices. In fact, this Act effectively combines
internal audit and investigations into programmes and activities under the authority of
the Inspector General of an establishment. The main functions and duties of the Inspector
General include:78

reporting and

v.

3.

due professional care,

iv.

b.

7.1.15 However, so far as conduct of audit and investigation is concerned, the Inspectors
General have to comply with the standards established by the Comptroller General of
the United States for audits of Federal establishments, organizations, programs, activities,

124

125
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/accounting_officers110608.pdf
Section 1, Inspector General Act, 1978

76
77

Ibid; Section 4

78



and functions. Further, the Inspectors General also have to pay regard to the activities of
the Comptroller General of the United States so that there is no duplication and effective
coordination and cooperation is achieved. With the objective of increasing the number of
agencies with statutory IGs, the IG Act has been amended and there are now 67 statutory
IGs.79

institutions/ autonomous bodies receiving grants loan and advances were
kept out of jurisdiction of internal audit, which defeated the purpose of
internal audit wing in the Ministry.
c.

d.

7.1.16 Thus, international best practices suggest that internal audit units, although being
part of their respective organizations, are designed to provide independent assessment of
government financial operations and programmes and prevent and identify frauds. The
overall objective is to assist the management in improving performance and increasing
efficiency and reducing risk. It is evident that the present situation in India is not in harmony
with international best practices.
7.1.17 In order to benchmark the status of internal audit in the Union Government and
determination of roadmap for its improvement, the Comptroller and Auditor General of
India constituted a Task Force on 17 July, 2006 at the request of the Ministry of Finance,
Department of Expenditure.80 Its recommendations are discussed in paragraph 7.3.

Department of Information Technology (DoIT), Ministry of Communication
and IT: The Civil Accounts Manual provided for setting up of an efficient
internal audit wing to ensure accuracy in accounts and efficiency in operation
of accounts establishment. Each Ministry/ Department was, therefore, required
to draw up a manual of internal audit specifying duties and functions of the
wing. Audit examination revealed that DoIT neither prepared an internal audit
manual nor established an internal audit wing. The internal audit plans were
being prepared in an adhoc manner on case-to-case basis. Out of 37 units,
internal audit of six, seven and 29 units was conducted during 2002-03, 200304 and 2004-05 respectively. Internal audit of 3 units had not been taken up
even once during this period. The internal audit wing could not be established
due to shortage of staff and ban on recruitment and the functions of internal
audit were being managed by the existing staff.

iii.

Ministry of Urban Development and Ministry of Urban Employment and
Poverty Alleviation : The following observations were made:

7.2.1 The existing internal audit set-up in Government of India has been described briefly
in Chapter 3. The CAG, in their Reports, also discuss the status and functioning of internal
controls (including internal audit). Thus, in their Report (No. 12 of 2006) on Union
Government, they have commented on internal audit in some of the Union Ministries in
the following manner.
Deptt. of Health (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare): The internal
audit of the Department of Health (DoH) was conducted by the internal audit
wing of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare under the administrative
control of the Chief Controller of Accounts. A test check of the internal audit
wing of DoH revealed the following deficiencies:
a.

b.

Training of Internal Audit Staff: Specific training programme for upgrading
the skills of the staff was not conducted to enable efficient checking of
various aspects of functioning of the Department.
Internal Audit of Schemes and PSUs: A large number of central and
centrally sponsored health programme financed mainly by the Ministry
and involving outlays which constituted 70% of plan allocation of DoH
were kept out of the purview of internal audit. Audit of PSUs and grantee

126

Lack of response by Auditee Units: The Ministry did not take timely
and effective measures to rectify the deficiencies or to comply with the
observations of the internal audit and statutory audit which lead to
raising of repeated persistent paras in Inspection Reports (IRs) ultimately
rendering a large number of outstanding audit observations. Thus lack
of action by the Ministry in attending to internal audit objections made
the efforts of internal audit wing ineffective.

ii.

7.2 Weaknesses of the Present System of Internal Audit

i.

Non-preparation of Audit Plan: No information regarding units planned
to be audited and actually audited during previous years was documented
nor any monthly, quarterly or annual audit plans were prepared.

a.

Training of Internal Audit Staff: For an efficient check of various aspects
of functioning of the Department including its budget and accounts with
reference to rules and orders, it was essential for the internal audit staff to
undergo periodical in-service trainings. No specific training programme
for upgrading the skills of the staff was conducted.
127

http://www.ignet.gov/
Discussion on this Task Force is based on a paper furnished to the ARC by NIPFP

79
80



b.

c.

Audit Planning: Internal audit had identified 447 units under its audit
jurisdiction, which were to be audited annually as provided in the Civil
Accounts Manual. However, due to inadequate sanctioned staff strength
only 104, 132 and 126 units were audited during 2002-03, 203-04 and
2004-05 respectively. It was also observed that the audit plan was not
documented, based on risk perception and the only criteria of selection
was the date on which the unit was last audited.
Internal Audit of Schemes and PSUs: A large number of central sector
and centrally sponsored schemes implemented were financed by the
two Ministries and the outlays thereof constituted about 70% of plan
allocation. However, these programmes were kept out of the purview of
internal audit. The audit of PSUs and grantee institutions/ autonomous
bodies was also kept out of the jurisdiction of internal audit. Out of 10
PSUs/ autonomous bodies, only 2 were audited by internal audit during
2004-05.

7.3 The Task Force on Internal Audit
7.3.1 The Comptroller and Auditor General of India had constituted a task force at the
request of the Ministry of Finance in July 2006 for benchmarking the status of internal
audit in the Union Government. The task force had issued a questionnaire to 15 Ministries
covering various aspects of internal audit.81 Some Ministries considered that the purpose,
authority and responsibility of internal audit had not been formally defined in a charter
and that it needed to be done to enable internal audit to play a constructive role as an aid
to management and function as a tool for decision-making. The other issues that emerged
from the responses were as follows:
i.

ii.

In some cases, the internal auditors are expected to function as internal advisers
on financial matters and even on operational matters. Internal audit is also
involved in pre-payment checking and other non-audit executive functions
such as budget preparation, pre-audit and revenue collection. This dilutes the
independence of internal audit.

iv.

Risk areas such as unauthorized access to information systems, threats of lawsuit,
adverse environmental impact, third party risks, fiduciary risks, etc. are not
factored in by internal audit.

v.

The practice of developing a risk assessment model and taking management
inputs into account during planning are not prevalent.

vi.

7.2.3 The above observation of the C&AG on the functioning of Internal Audit indicates
that there are serious deficiencies in the existing internal audit system making it inadequate
and ineffective. The internal audit guidelines are outdated and there are no manuals in many
cases. There are also no prescribed internal auditing standards. Because of the acknowledged
problem of under-resourcing of the internal audit service and shortage of manpower,
including that of qualified professional staff, internal audit is not being conducted in
many departments. The limited staff of the internal audit is also sometimes diverted for
accounting and budgeting purposes. In cases where internal audits have been conducted,
there is often lack of response to their reports by auditee units. As a result action is not
taken to rectify the deficiencies and irregularities and the deficiencies pointed out persist.
A large number of Central and State scheme and programmes as well as Public Sector
Undertakings and Autonomous Bodies have also been kept out of the purview of internal
audit. At the supervisory level, there is no segregation of duties relating to internal audit
and other accounting functions. The reports of internal audit are of a routine nature. It is
largely a faultfinding exercise with no positive recommendations. Extremely low priority
is accorded to internal audit and to resource allocation for internal audit both in terms of
manpower and finances.

The practice of communicating all the reports of internal audit to the top
management i.e. the Secretary is generally not followed.

iii.

7.2.2 It was also pointed out that the Ministries/Departments neither took any effective
action for rectifying the deficiencies nor complied with the observations of internal audit.
Therefore, irregularities pointed out by the Internal Audit Wing persisted.

Direct supervision is not being done regularly as a part of quality assurance
techniques. Practices such as independent working paper review, audit client
feedback and peer review are not prevalent. Assurance memos’ are not adopted
as an institutional mechanism and standards are lax.

Field audit techniques such as statistical sampling, process reviews, analytical
comparisons and physical inspections are not used regularly. Even transaction
testing is not as widely prevalent as it should be.

vii. The scope of financial audit appears to be limited. Even in areas like adequacy
of controls, accuracy, reliability and completeness of reports, usefulness of
reports, and impact of changes in policies, etc. most of the respondents have
not indicated whether these are covered by internal audit. Similarly, in the

128

129
Source: Paper furnished to the Commission by Shri I.P.Singh

81



case of operational activities, most respondents have not given any indication
whether important areas such as management system of controls, purchase
agreements, safeguarding of assets, procurements, etc. are covered by internal
audit.

iii.

There was no segregation of duties especially at supervisory levels between
those who are responsible for internal audit and those responsible for pre-audit,
disbursement and accounting functions. The internal audit set-up also did not
report directly to the chief executive in any of the organizations. For example,
in the Department of Telecommunications, internal audit functions and
accounting functions were not segregated at supervisory levels. In the Ministry
of Defence, while there was segregation of duties in respect of personnel engaged
in internal audit up to the supervisory level, they reported to Controllers of
Defence Accounts, who are responsible for other functions also. The inspection
wing of the Railways, both on the revenue as well as expenditure side, functioned
under the concerned FA&CAO, who was also responsible for accounting and
pre-audit functions.

iv.

Independence is hampered in two ways. First, in the Civil Ministries, the
oversight of internal audit vested with the Chief Controllers of Accounts, who
were also responsible for accounting and payment functions. In Defence, it is the
Chief Controller/Controller of Defence Accounts, who are responsible for both
payment functions and internal audit. This means that internal audit did not
have the required independence for its effective functioning. An independent
internal audit should be able to look into payments made after approval of the
Controller of Accounts, at least from the propriety angle. Second, as per the
revised mandate, the Financial Advisers are enjoined to `review the progress of
internal audit’. This has resulted in the (Chief ) Controller of Accounts who is
in-charge of internal audit being put under the administrative control of the
FA. This has resulted in compromising the intended independence of internal
auditing functions.

viii. Despite large-scale computerization, very few respondents have indicated
whether IT applications are audited by internal audit.
ix. Collaboration with external auditors in terms of sharing of audit plans and
reports is completely absent. Joint annual planning/ risk assessment sessions
are not held.
x.

xi.

Though there is a mechanism for the disposal of internal reports, there is no
enforcement mechanism in case of non-compliance. There is no time-bound
mechanism for enforcing accountability. There is no practice of conducting
follow-up tests for examining and implementing corrective action.
In most cases, the final internal audit report does not incorporate a certificate
indicating the status as determined by the results of internal audit.

xii. Data extraction and analysis is mostly manual. The use of desktop software
such as spread sheets/ database or packages such as ACL, IDEA, etc. is rare.
xiii. The respondents expressed a need for capacity building in terms of trained
personnel and constitution of multi-disciplinary teams.
xiv. A need for broadening of scope and greater commitment from top management
was felt necessary.
xv.

There was a need to develop Internal Auditing Standards consistent with
international standards.

7.3.2 After making a detailed study of the present internal audit system, the Task Force
observed the following:
i.

ii.
130

Restricted mandate has resulted in non-evaluation of risk associated with
various activities of the Ministries/Departments. PSUs and autonomous bodies
have been kept outside the purview of internal audit thus further diluting its
usefulness and effectiveness.

7.3.3 Based on these observations and after examination of international best practices, the
Task Force felt that the Inspector General model of the U.S.A. (already described above),
with appropriate modifications is the most suitable for effective internal audit. The main
advantage of the IG model is that it can be used to revamp the structure of internal audit
into a single authority responsible for both internal audit and investigation, so that audit
can be focused on high risk areas. As opposed to external audit, internal audit can be done
on a continuous basis as soon as the transactions take place. It is also in a much better
position to do the risk analysis because of its familiarity with the systems and procedures
in a particular department and as soon audit indicates likely fraud or serious irregularity,
investigation could follow immediately.

No standards have been evolved for internal audit.
131



7.3.4 In other words, the Accounts Departments should confine themselves to maintenance
of accounts, disbursement of payments and providing local financial advice to field level
officers. Further, internal audit functions should not be combined with financial advice.
Accordingly, the Integrated Financial Adviser should not be involved in management and
control of internal audit.

internal audit should not concern itself with investigation of cases where irregularities are
unearthed during audit. These may be dealt with by appropriate agencies created for this
purpose. In fact, the Commission has already recommended the formation of a specialised
agency to deal with serious frauds in its Fourth Report entitled ‘Ethics in Governance’.

7.3.5 However, the Task Force felt that it would be difficult to implement the IG model
immediately. Consequently, in the interim period, it recommended setting up of an Apex
Board to prescribe internal audit standards and processes across jurisdictions. This ‘Board
of Internal Audit’ (BIA) should comprise of Controller General of Accounts, Controller
General of Defence Accounts, Financial Commissioner, Railways and Member (Finance)
Telecommunications. Eventually under a proper mandate through a specific statute or
cabinet resolution, internal audit in each ministry/department should be established as
an entity directly reporting to the Secretary of the department/ministry, and becoming
exclusively responsible for internal audit activities.
7.3.6 The Commission has examined this issue. It is of the view that if internal audit has to
function independently of both Finance and Accounts, the concept of a Board of Internal
Audit (BIA) consisting of ‘Controller General of Accounts, Controller General of Defence
Accounts, Financial Commissioner (Railways), Member Finance Telecommunication for
“oversight of internal audit in Government of India” and for prescribing standards, even for
an interim period, is not the right solution. In fact, the standards for internal audit should
be prescribed by the C & AG of India, as is the case in the US (the Inspector General Act
of 1978). As has been mentioned earlier, even the IG Act did not establish the Office of
Inspector General in each and every government organization at one go. The Commission
is of the view that an Office of Chief Internal Auditor should be established in select
government Minstries/Departments dealing with major governmental programmes such
as those under the ‘Bharat Nirman’ initiative. Its duties and functions and independence
should be provided under a statute. These Chief Internal Auditors should be directly
responsible to the Secretary of the concerned Ministry/department. As provided in the
IG Act in the US, the statute should also contain provisions regarding ensuring that there
is no duplication of work and maintenance of proper coordination with the C&AG. The
functioning and effectiveness of this new system may be examined and a cost benefit
analysis done after allowing a suitable period of operation. Based on the outcomes of this
examination, such offices may be instituted in other Ministries/departments/organisations.
The personnel for these offices may be inducted from existing accounts officers and given
proper training. However, given the magnitude of the task of internal audit, the norms
for using outside auditors may also be provided. The Commission is also of the view that
132

7.4 Audit Committees in Departments
7.4.1 Presently, Audit Committees have been set up in various Ministries/Departments
to review the action taken on inspection reports and their speedy settlement. They are
normally chaired by the Secretary or the Head of Department and include senior officers of
the concerned Department and Finance. However, the performance of these Committees
has not been satisfactory and they have been generally ineffective.
7.4.2 The Commission is of the view that to effectively coordinate Audit plans in the
department with the internal audit structure on the one hand and external audit on the
other, there should be an Audit Committee in each Ministry/Department. However, in
order to make it independent and effective, its structure needs to be reorganised. Thus, its
Chairperson should be a person of eminence in public life and should be appointed by the
Minister in charge of the Ministry/department. It should have two more members with
expertise in matters of audit and should not be from the government. The Audit Committee
should have an independent status and deal with matters related to both internal and
external audit. All Departments should be duty bound to furnish information as and when
required by this Committee.
7.5 Recommendations
a.

An Office of the Chief Internal Auditor (CIA) should be established in select
Ministries/departments to carry out the functions related to internal audit.
Its independence, duties, functions, mechanism of coordination with the
CAG etc. should be provided by a statute.

b.

CIAs should be directly responsible to the Secretary of the Department.

c.

In the initial stages, personnel may be inducted from existing accounts
cadres. Norms for recruitment and utilizing private sector expertise in select
tasks may also be devised. Capacity building needs for proper functioning
of this Office should be identified in advance.

133


d.

The modalities for ensuring non-duplication of work vis-à-vis the C&AG
should be formalized. This should be aimed at assisting the C&AG in
concentrating on carrying out specialized audit/tasks.

e.

Standards for internal audit should be prescribed by the Office of the
C&AG.

f.

The Accounting functions should be completely separated from Internal
Audit.

g.

The functioning and effectiveness of this new system may be examined
after allowing a suitable period of operation. Based on the results of this
examination, such offices may also be instituted in other Ministries/
departments/organisations.

h.

An Audit Committee should be constituted in each Ministry/Department.
It should consist of a Chairperson and two members to be appointed by the
Minister in charge of that Ministry/Department. The Chairperson should
be a person of eminence in public life. The two members should be from
outside the government. The Audit Committee should look after matters
related to both internal and external audit including implementation of their
recommendations and report annually to the respective Departmentally
related Standing Committee of Parliament.

7.6 Integrated Financial Adviser
7.6.1 The Ministries in the Government of India had an internal financial adviser prior to
1975, who was incharge of their Budget and Accounts. The Internal Financial Adviser was
required to be consulted in all cases of exercise of delegated financial powers. There was also
an ‘Associate’ Financial Adviser based in the Department of Expenditure who was required
to be consulted in matters following outside the delegated field. In 1975, the question
whether the functions of the ‘Associate’ financial adviser and the Internal Financial Adviser
could, with advantage be integrated in a single official forming part of the administrative
Ministry was considered. It was felt that combining the two functions in a single official
would enable him/her to play a more effective and constructive role in the developmental
activities in the Ministry and provide better financial expertise in assisting the Secretary of the
administrative Ministry and other senior officers in the planning, programming, budgeting,
monitoring and evaluation functions of the Ministry. Therefore, a scheme of Integrated
Financial Adviser was drawn up and implemented in 1975 (vide O.M. F.No.10(29)-E.
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Coord/73 dated 6.10.1075). The Integrated Financial Adviser was responsible both to the
administrative Ministry and to the Ministry of Finance.
7.6.2 The entire scheme of the Integrated Financial Adviser was reviewed in 2006 in the
background of India emerging as one of the fastest growing economies of the world and
the last two decades witnessing major reforms in the monetary and fiscal management
of the country. The overarching concept in re-defining the charter for Financial Advisers
was that they are meant to assist in the achievement of objectives/goals of the respective
administrative Ministry with due financial prudence and to ensure that monies allocated
are spent on time to achieve the intended outcomes. It was thought that the more complex
responsibilities envisaged for FAs must be accompanied by corresponding authority and
capacity. Section 2 of the OM of Ministry of Finance dated 1.6.2006 states – “The role
of Financial Adviser is now conceived to be akin to the role of Chief Finance Officer in
a corporate structure with specific responsibilities for ensuring fiscal prudence and sound
financial management.” The duties and responsibilities of the FAs have been enumerated in
the DFPR. Rule 64 of the General Financial Rules designate the Secretary of the Ministry/
Department as the Chief Accounting Authority. The role of the Chief Accounting Authority
as indicated in the GFR is as follows:
• be responsible and accountable for financial management of his Ministry or
department;
• be responsible for the effective, efficient, economical and transparent use of
resources of the Ministry or Department in achieving stated project objectives of
that Ministry or Department, while complying with performance standards;
• be responsible for preparation of expenditures and other statements relating to his
Ministry of Department as required by regulations, guidelines or directives issued
by Ministry of Finance;
• shall ensure that his Ministry of Department maintains full and proper records
of financial transactions and adopts systems and procedures that will at all times
afford internal controls;
• shall ensure his Ministry or Department follows the Government procurement
procedure for execution of works, as well as procurement of services and supplies,
and implements it in a fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective
manners;

135



• shall take effective and appropriate steps to ensure his Ministry or Department:

i.

Budget formulation:

ii.

Outcome Budget

Financial Officer of the Ministry or Department should be to the Secretary of the Ministry/
Department and the role of the FA would be to support the Secretary of the Ministry in
discharging the responsibility for economical, efficient and effective use of resources, effective
internal controls and avoidance of irregular and wasteful expenditure. The Commission
believes that it is important for the Secretaries of the concerned departments as well as the
Finance Ministry to recognize this and to discharge their responsibilities accordingly so that
the concept of dual accountability of the FA to the administrative Ministry as well as to
the Ministry of Finance is dispensed. At the same time it is essential that only officers with
sufficient experience, knowledge and exposure to modern financial management systems are
posted as Financial Advisers so that they are able to effectively discharge the responsibilities
of a Chief Financial Officer.

iii.

Performance Budget

7.6.5 Recommendation:

iv.

FRBM related tasks

v.

Expenditure and cash management

vi.

Project/programme formulation, appraisal, monitoring and evaluation

a.

collects all moneys due to the Governments and

b.

avoids unauthorized, irregular and wasteful expenditure.

7.6.3 The duties and responsibilities of the IFAs have been enumerated in the DFPR. Some
of the tasks for which IFAs would be responsible for are as follows:

vii. Screening of proposals
viii. Leveraging of non-budgetary resources for sectoral development
ix.

b.

Officers with sufficient training and experience in modern financial
management systems should be posted as Financial Advisers in the
Ministries/Departments.

Tax Expenditure

xi.

The role of the Financial Adviser as the Chief Finance Officer of the Ministry
who is responsible and accountable to the Secretary of the Ministry/
Department should be recognized and the trend of dual accountability
should be done away with.

Non-tax receipts

x.

a.

Monitoring of assets and liabilities

xii. Accounts and Audit
xiii. Procurement and contracts
xiv. Financial Management Systems
xv.

Nominee Director on Boards of Public Sector Undertaking

xvi. Use of technology
7.6.4 As a consequence of the OM dated 1.6.2006 and GFR 64, the Commission is of
the view that there can be no room for doubt that the responsibility of FA as the Chief
136

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8.2 The Comptroller and Auditor General of India

8

EXTERNAL AUDIT AND PARLIAMENTARY
CONTROL82

8.1 Importance of External Audit
8.1.1 External audit has a very important role to play in financial management, because
it :
(a)

provides assurance to Parliament/Legislature that public money has been spent
for the purpose for which it was sanctioned by the Parliament/Legislature
and that it has not only been properly spent but has achieved the purpose/
outcome for which it was sanctioned.

(b) is a crucial element of public accountability as it is an independent external
scrutiny. External audit is, therefore, deemed to be a key element in ensuring
proper accountability of the executive both to the Parliament/Legislature
who provide/ sanction resources and to the community including tax payers,
consumers and beneficiaries.
(c)

is a deterrent against careless decision-making and irresponsible attitude
towards public expenditure and project management.

(d) is expected to establish public confidence that public money is being properly
spent.
(e)

is expected to help in achieving full value for money. External audit includes
examination of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public
resources including the evaluation of service quality and measurement of
performance.

(f )

adds value not merely by analysing and reporting what has happened after the
event but also by looking ahead and identifying lessons to be learnt and by
disseminating good practices.

138

8.2.1 As stated in the earlier chapters, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India
(CAG) derives his position and authority in relation to the external audit of expenditure
and receipts of both the Union Government and the State Governments from the
Constitution of India. The duties and powers of the CAG are enshrined in Articles 148
to 151 of the Constitution and elaborated under CAG’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions
of Service) Act, 1971. The duties entrusted to the CAG fall broadly under two categories
viz. (i) compilation and keeping of accounts and entitlement work in selected States under
the Articles 149 and 150 of the Constitution and CAG’s DPC Act, 1971, (ii) audit of
public entities under Article 151 of the Constitution of India and CAG’s DPC Act, 1971.
The CAG also audits Government Companies and Corporations in accordance with the
provisions of the Company’s Act read with Section 19 of the CAG’s (DPC) Act, 1971. The
Constitution prescribes exhaustive safeguards for the independent functioning of CAG
like fixed non-renewable term, full access to information, right to table the reports in the
Parliament/ Legislature; power to determine the nature and extent of audit checks and to
decide what should be included in the Audit Reports.
8.2.2 As per the Auditing Standards of the CAG, the purpose of Public Audit is to
safeguard the financial interests of the Union/ States and to promote accountability and
sound financial management practices. As per performance report of IA&AD (2005-06)
the vision is:
“To promote excellence in public sector audit and accounting services towards improving
the quality of governance”.
The mission is:
“To enhance accountability of the executive to the Parliament and State Legislatures by
carrying out audits in the public sector and providing accounting services in the States
in accordance with the Constitution of India and laws as well as best international
practices. Where entrusted, to provide technical guidance and support to local bodies
including Panchayati Raj Institutions to enhance their accountability.”
8.3 Types of Audit
8.3.1 The role of audit in India has been constantly evolving. Initially, in the preIndependence period, audit was an integral organ of the Government keeping track of its

139
Parts of this chapter are extracted from a paper prepared by Mr. I.P. Singh

82

External Audit and Parliamentary Control


expenditure and receipts, checking and exercising control over expenditure incurred by
various Departments in accordance with rules, norms and instructions. In Independent
India, planning and development changed the audit perspective. It was realized that
Regularity (Compliance) Audit and Financial Audit were not enough to evaluate the results
of expenditure out of public funds. Performance Audit, slowly developed as an attempt
to measure the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the Government expenditure. The
following types of audit are undertaken by the CAG:
 Performance Audit
 Regularity (Financial) Audit

(vi) There is a requirement that Audit Reports should be tabled in the Parliament/
Legislature and thereafter these become public documents.
(vii) There are well documented Audit Manuals and audit guidelines for the
Auditors to follow.
(viii) Auditing Standards framed on lines of INTOSAI (International Organization
of Supreme Audit Institutions) guidelines are available.
(xii) There are discussions in the Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament/
Legislature on the important observations contained in the Audit Reports.

 Regularity (Compliance) Audit

8.5 Challenges before the External Audit

 IT Audit

8.5.1 There is no doubt that external audit by the CAG has contributed a great deal in
improving the financial management in the country keeping in view the large number
of Inspection Reports issued, Audit Reports presented to the Parliament/Legislature and
the recoveries made at the instance of audit. In its Reports, Audit raises many important
issues relating inter-alia to weak budgetary controls, deficiencies in revenue collection,
wastage of public resources, inappropriate accounting, poor returns on investments,
diversion of funds, system deficiencies and numerous instances of poor management of
public resources, etc.

8.4 Strengths of External Audit in India
8.4.1 The external audit by the CAG of India has many inherent strengths.
(i)

The CAG has a high status enshrined in the Constitution, upheld by long
traditions of public audit in India. The institution of audit under the CAG
is often regarded as the fourth pillar in the democratic setup and an essential
instrument of financial control and accountability.

(ii) The Constitution of India ensures independence and autonomy of the public
audit.
(iii) The expression ‘Audit’ or scope of the audit has not been defined either in
the Constitution or the CAG’s DPC Act, 1971. The scope of external audit
is, therefore, wide. Audit can respond to changes, reforms, new initiatives,
changing patterns of Government activities, international developments in
the profession and rising expectations of the stakeholders regarding public
accountability.
(iv) The CAG has the power to determine the nature and extent of audit and
related access to records and to relevant information.
(v)

140

The CAG has the inherent right to determine what should be included in the
Audit Reports.

8.5.2 There is, however, a feeling that the impact/effectiveness of external audit could be
further enhanced. Some of the factors and perceptions, which are impeding the effectiveness
of external audit are given below.
(i)

Detailed examination of paras included in the Audit Reports by Public
Accounts Committee is barely about 15-20 against the total number of 1000
to 1500 paras included in the CAG’s reports submitted to the Parliament
every year. The Ministries/Departments take only those audit paras seriously
which come up for discussions in the PAC.

(ii) The Ministeries/Departments are supposed to submit Action Taken Notes
on the paras not discussed. Such Action taken Notes are largely formal rather
than substantive.
(iii) In the State Legislatures, there is a huge pendency of Audit Paras to be
examined by State PACs. Some of the pending paras are 10 to 20 years old.
Delay in examination of matters brought out in the Reports reduces their
relevance.

141



(iv) Thousands of inspection reports containing a huge number of observations are
lying unattended in the State and Union Government Departments. Many of
these paras have revenue implications. There is hardly any accountability for
not taking timely action on audit observations.
(v)

There is a feeling that the CAG’s reports are sometimes not timely because
there is substantial time gap between occurrence of an irregularity and its
reporting by Audit. It reviews programmes after these have run for a few
years. CAG’s audit itself is post facto and by the time, the process of auditing
and reporting is completed, its findings and recommendations may be too
late for corrective action. Many transaction audit comments relate to earlier
years and not to the year of the Audit Report.

(vi) Audit findings are based exclusively on documents and files. Many a times,
the situation on the ground is quite different from what is reflected in the
papers. There is practically no physical verification to supplement or validate
the audit findings.
(vii) There is a feeling that external audit reports tend to be unduly negative and
their focus is on irregularities and faultfinding. Audit does not always recognize
the practical constraints under which the Government/Government Agencies
function.


Audit often does not discriminate between errors arising out of bonafide
intentions/malafide intentions.



Government Agencies are handicapped by unknown/ unforeseen
problems, delays beyond their control and unexpected hurdles. The
auditors on the other hand have the benefit of hindsight. Audit as such
could act as a dampner against new initiatives and risk taking.

(viii) Audit Reports are not always presented in a sufficiently constructive manner,
as they often do not delve into the causes of the problems and how to address
them.


142

Reporting each year a large number of problems which are already
known and which are not being addressed does not add value. Audit
must therefore identify systemic problems.



Findings are at times not focused and are in the nature of scattered
observations. A macro level view of the functioning of a department is
seldom available.



Audit does not give due credit for good performance.

(ix) The relationship between the auditor and auditee is not always harmonious.
Generally interaction is confined mainly to the lower levels.



(x)

Audit is viewed as a system for policing Government Organisations. The
view that audit is a valuable aid to management is normally missing.
There is poor/inadequate response to external audit bordering sometimes
on indifference on the part of Government officials, which seriously
reduces the effectiveness of audit.

Though Audit Committees comprising representatives of audit and
government agencies have been set up to review the departmental action taken
on inspection reports/recommendation, their functioning is not satisfactory.

(xi) There is lack of informed media coverage of CAG’s reports on Union/ State
Governments.


The extent of public interface between the auditors and civil society is
poor. Inspection reports are not in the public domain.

(xii) There is inadequate synergy/coordination between external audit and internal
audit.
(xiii) External audit does not provide audit assurance on the fair presentation of
financial statements of the Government in accordance with stated accounting
principles and policies.
(xiv) There is rarely any audit of grants and loans to NGOs.
The Commission has examined some of these issues in the succeeding paragraphs.

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8.6 Accountability to Parliament

b.

8.6.1 Accountability of the Executive to the Parliament is ensured through various
institutional mechanisms and procedures. The system of Parliamentary financial control
works on the basis of inter-dependent functions discharged by different institutions
like Ministry of Finance, Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), and the
Parliamentary Financial Committees – Committees on Estimates, Public Accounts and
Public Undertakings.

to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure
of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, the audit of which may be
conducted by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India either under the
directions of the President or by a statute of Parliament; and

c.

to consider the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General in cases where
the President may have required him to conduct an audit of any receipts or to
examine the accounts of stores and stocks.

8.6.2 Committee on Public Accounts (PAC)
8.6.2.1 The provisions regarding the constitution and functions of these three Parliamentary
Committees are contained in the ‘Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok
Sabha’. Thus, Rule 308 provides that the Committee on Public Accounts shall examine
the ‘accounts showing the appropriation of sums granted by the House for the expenditure
of the Government of India, the annual finance accounts of the Government of India and
such other accounts laid before the House as the Committee may think fit’. In scrutinizing
the Appropriation Accounts of the Government of India and the Report of the C&AG
thereon, the Committee is enjoined to satisfy itself on the following:

8.6.2.3 Apart from the above, the PAC is also authorized to examine the circumstances
leading to expenditure in excess of moneys granted by the House for any service. However,
the PAC is excluded from examining any subject which has been allotted to the Committee
on Public Undertakings (COPU). The membership of the PAC is limited to 22, with 15
members from the Lok Sabha and 7 from the Rajya Sabha. The PAC has an annual term.
8.6.3 Committee on Estimates
8.6.3.1 Rule 310 provides that a Committee on Estimates is to be constituted for the
‘examination of such of the estimates as may seem fit to the Committee or are specifically
referred to it by the House or the Speaker’. The Committee has the following functions:

a.

that the moneys shown in the accounts as having been disbursed were legally
available for, and applicable to, the service or purpose to which they have
been applied or charged;

a.

to report what economies, improvements in organisation, efficiency or
administrative reform, consistent with the policy underlying the estimates,
may be effected;

b.

that the expenditure conforms to the authority which governs it; and

b.

to suggest alternative policies in order to bring about efficiency and economy
in administration;

c.

that every re-appropriation has been made in accordance with the provisions
made in this behalf under rules framed by competent authority.

c.

to examine whether the money is well laid out within the limits of the policy
implied in the estimates; and

d.

to suggest the form in which the estimates shall be presented to Parliament.

8.6.2.2 Apart from the above, the Committee is also empowered
a.

144

to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure
of State corporations, trading and manufacturing schemes, concerns and
projects together with the balance sheets and statements of profit and loss
accounts which the President may have required to be prepared or are prepared
under provisions of the statutory rules regulating the financing of a particular
corporation, trading or manufacturing scheme or concern or project and the
report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General thereon;

Thus, the mandate of this Committee is very wide; it is empowered to examine not only
the form and contents of the estimates, but also their relation to overall efficiency. Further,
it is also mandated to suggest alternative policies. However, although the Committee may
continue the examination of the Estimates from time to time throughout the financial
year and report to the House as its examination proceeds, it has not been made incumbent
on the Committee to examine the entire estimates of any one year. Notwithstanding these
substantial powers, it has been provided that the Demands for Grants may be finally
voted, even when the Committee has made no Report (Rule 312).
145



8.6.3.2 As in the case of the PAC, this Committee has also been excluded from examining
the subjects allotted to the Committee on Public Undertakings. The membership of the
Committee is limited to 30, all from the Lok Sabha and it has an annual term.
8.6.4 Committee on Public Undertakings (COPU)
8.6.4.1 Rule 312A provides for the constitution of a Committee on Public Undertakings
for the ‘examination of the working of the public undertakings’ specified in the Fourth
Schedule to these Rules. This Fourth Schedule contains a list of all Public Undertakings
established by Central Acts. The Committee is empowered to examine the reports and
accounts of the public undertakings specified in the Fourth Schedule; examine the reports,
if any, of the Comptroller and Auditor-General on the public undertakings; examine,
in the context of the autonomy and efficiency of the public undertakings, whether the
affairs of the public undertakings are being managed in accordance with sound business
principles and prudent commercial practices; and exercise such other functions as allotted
to it by the Speaker. However, the Committee is excluded from examining the following:
i.

matters of major Government policy as distinct from business or commercial
functions of the public undertakings;

been mentioned that the “report shall not suggest anything of the nature of
cut motions”);
b.

to examine such Bills pertaining to the concerned Ministries/Departments as
are referred to the Committee by the Chairman, Rajya Sabha or the Speaker,
as the case may be, and make report thereon;

c.

to consider annual reports of Ministries/Departments and make reports
thereon;

d.

to consider national basic long term policy documents presented to the
Houses, if referred to the Committee by the Chairman, Rajya Sabha or the
Speaker, as the case may be, and make reports thereon.

8.6.5.2 However, the Rules also lay down that these Standing Committees shall not consider
the matters of day to day administration of the concerned Ministries/Departments. The
general procedure relating to Demands for Grants to be followed by these Standing
Committees is as follows:
a.

after the general discussion on the Budget in the two Houses is over, the
Houses shall be adjourned for a fixed period;

ii.

matters of day-to-day administration; and

iii.

matters for the consideration of which machinery is established by any special
statute under which a particular public undertaking is established.

b.

the Committees shall consider the Demands for Grants of the concerned
Ministries during the aforesaid period;

The membership of the Committee is limited to 22, with 15 members from the Lok
Sabha and 7 from the Rajya Sabha. The Committee has an annual term.

c.

the Committees shall make their report within the period and shall not ask for
more time;

8.6.5 Departmentally related Standing Committees83

d.

the Demands for Grants shall be considered by the House in the light of the
reports of the Committees; and

e.

there shall be a separate report on the Demands for Grants of each Ministry.

8.6.5.1 To facilitate proper examination of different Demands for Grants leading to more
meaningful discussions in Parliament, the Rules were amended in 1993 to provide for the
constitution and functions of Departmentally related Standing Committees (Rules 331C
to 331N). Each of such Committees consist of not more than 31 members, 21 from Lok
Sabha and 10 from Rajya Sabha. The term of office of these Committees is one year. These
Standing Committees have the following functions:
a.

to consider the Demands for Grants of the concerned Ministries/Departments
and make a report on the same to the Houses. (However, it has specifically

146

8.6.5.3 The Reports of the Committees are generally to be based on broad consensus.
However, a Member of a Standing Committee is allowed to give a note of dissent on the
report of the Committee which has to be presented to the House along with the report.
The Committees are empowered to avail of the expert opinion or the public opinion
to make the report. In the end, the report of a Standing Committee on any matter has
only persuasive value and is to be treated as ‘considered advice’ given by the Committee
(Rule 331N).
147

Sub by L.S. Bn. (II) dated 29-3-1993, para 1921.

83



8.7 Parliamentary Control over Budgetary Policies-lessons from different countries
8.7.1 The issues involved in enhancing Parliamentary control over budgetary policies and
finances need careful consideration. Legislatures in different countries differ substantially
with regard to their control over budgetary processes. These may be categorized in the
following manner:84
i.

ii.

iii.

‘Budget making legislatures’
have the capacity to amend or
reject the budget proposal of
the executive, and the capacity
to formulate and substitute a
budget of their own.
‘Budget
influencing
legislatures’ have the capacity
to amend or reject the budget
proposal of the executive, but
lack the capacity to formulate
and substitute a budget of
their own.
‘Legislatures with little or
no budgetary effect’ lack the
capacity to amend or reject
the budget proposal of the
executive, and to formulate
and substitute a budget of their
own. They confine themselves
to assenting to the budget as it
is placed before them.

8.7.2 For example, the United States
Congress sometimes functions as a
budget making legislature. In certain
years the presidential budget suggestion
is pronounced as ‘dead on arrival’ and
Congress proceeds to independently define
its own budget policy. However, only a

Table 8.1: Does the Legislature Generally Approve the
Budget as Presented by the Government?
(OECD)

With
With

no
minor

changes
changes

only
Australia
x
Austria
x
Canada
x
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
x
France
x
Germany
x
Greece
x
Hungary
Iceland
x
Ireland
x
Italy
x
Japan
x
Korea
x
Mexico
x
The Netherlands
x
New Zealand
x
Norway
x
Poland
x
Portugal
x
Spain
x
Sweden
x
Switzerland
x
Turkey
x
United Kingdom
x
United States
Total
6
17

With
significant
changes

Percent of Total

few other legislatures make such significant changes to budget proposals prepared by the
executive. The position in different legislatures is presented in Table. 8.1.
8.7.3 From the Table, it is evident that most of the legislatures fall in the middle category
of budget influencing legislatures (approving the budget proposed by the Government
with only minor changes). Legislatures which do not exercise any significant influence
on budget policy are basically the Westminster type Parliaments where any successful
amendment to the budget is considered a vote of no confidence that would prompt the
resignation of the Government.85
8.7.4 However, even in the Westminster model changes have been incorporated leading to
substantial presentation of information on the physical framework ahead of the tabling of
the budget thereby generating more parliamentary debate. In fact, it has also been argued
that in spite of limitations on amendment activity, parliamentary control over the budget
can be enhanced substantially. This can be done through establishing systems which lead
to parliamentary consultation on medium term budget policy, thereby diminishing the
need for making amendments to the budget. Secondly, as expenditure related to plans/
programmes take place on a continuous basis, parliament has sufficient opportunities
to indulge in analysis of implementation of these plans/programmes and influencing
subsequent budgetary allocations.

15%

22%

63%

x
x

x

8.7.5 Thus, there are two ways of increasing parliamentary control over the budgetary
process; if the legislature has to involve itself in decisions involving allocations, it will
have to indulge in ex ante scrutiny during the accrual stage of the budgetary process; on
the other hand, if it has to influence the operational efficiency it will have to vigorously
conduct ex post scrutiny on the basis of audit findings after budget implementation. As
mentioned earlier, the US Congress follows an ex ante process while the Westminster
Parliaments follow the ex post process. However, there are countries where both the
functions are blended in a single committee. Thus, in the German Bundestag, the Budget
Committee both approves the annual budget and later considers audit results.86 Different
parliamentary powers to amend the budget are mentioned in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2:87 Parliamentary Powers to Amend the Budget
Rights
Unlimited powers to amend the budget

17

May reduce expenditure, but increase only with

4

permission of government

4

Increases must be balanced with commensurate cuts elsewhere

Source : OECD (2002b); Source : Back from the Sidelines?
Redefining the Contribution of Legislatures to the Budget Cycle by
Joachim Wehner; http://siferesources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/
WBI/37230 Wenherweb.pdf

32

Reductions of existing items only

x
4

Number of countries

13

148

149
84
Source: ‘Back from the Sidelines? Redefining the Contribution of Legislatures to the Budget Cycle’ by Joachim Wehner; (adapted from Norton (1993:
Table 4.1); http://siferesources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/WBI/37230 Wenherweb.pdf

ibid
ibid
ibid

85
86
87



Table 8.2: Parliamentary Powers to Amend the Budget

Contd.

Rights
Rights not specified

Number of countries
15

Total

81

Source: Adapted from PIU (1986 : Table 38A)

8.7.6 Even where committees deliberate over the budget, there are wide variations.
Different committee systems prevalent in the OECD countries are described in
Table 8.3: 88
Table 8.3: What Best Describes the Committee Structure for Dealing with the Budget?
Committee structure

Number of
countries

Percentage
of total

Budget committee decides

19

47.5%

Budget committee decides; non-binding
input from sectoral committees

6

15%

Budget committee decides totals; sectoral
committees decides departmental budgets

7

17.5%

No budget committees; sectoral committees
deal with departmental spending

2

5%

Other

6

15%

Total

40

100%

Source: OECD (2003), httpL//ocde.dyndns.org/

8.7.7 As mentioned earlier, in case of the Indian Parliament, the Departmentally related
Standing Committees are prevented from making any suggestions which could be construed
as a ‘cut motion’. Even in the Australian Senate, while the committees deliberate on the
budget, the Report to the House only mentions issues of concern. Further, in the House
of Representatives, there is no committee stage for the budget.89
8.7.8 The Commission has considered these diverse scenarios and is of the view that the
present system need not be tinkered with. The reforms suggested with regard to budgetary
processes and programme based outcome budget would provide succour to ex-ante
strengthening of the budgetary process. As far as the ex-post processes are concerned,
these are discussed below.

150

8.8 Public Accounts Committee and CAG
8.8.1 The Audit Reports of the CAG upon their presentation to the Parliament/ Legislature
stand referred suo-moto to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) for all matters except
the Reports on the commercial undertakings, which stand referred to the Committee on
Public Undertakings (COPU) of the Parliament/ Legislature.
8.8.2 The Reports of the CAG on the Union Government referred to the PAC contain
about 1000-1500 paragraphs and performance audit reports every year. Out of these,
the PAC has been selecting for detailed examination about 25-30 paragraphs, but has
been able to discuss, with the concened Ministries/Departments, only between 10 and
15 paragraphs out of those selected for detailed examination. This is despite the fact that
successive PACs have tried their best to discuss as many paragraphs as possible.
8.8.3 Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha at a seminar organized by CAG’s office on 22nd July
2005, made some suggestions in this regard.
“Many PACs including the PAC of the Parliament have setup working groups and
sub-committees to deal with audit paras that cannot be considered in detail by the full
committee. Ways must be found to strengthen the working of these sub-committees or
working groups. The sub-committees should be empowered to deal with subjects referred
to them by the main committee in a conclusive manner after approval of the Chairman
of PAC and allowed to record evidence of the executive. Their recommendations should
be approved by Chairman and endorsed by other members by circulation.”
8.8.4 He also suggested for consideration whether sub-committees particularly those of the
PAC could be constituted department-wise for major departments like Defence, Railways
at the Centre or the PWD in the States. He further suggested for consideration the need
for a separate committee for Direct Taxes, Indirect Taxes and Non-tax Revenues as the
Receipt Audit Reports of the CAG have direct revenue implications for the Government.
It may also be debated whether formation of working groups or sub-committees on these
lines to examine the paragraphs finally is possible within the existing strength of PAC and
COPU.

151
Source: Good Governance, Parliamentary Oversight & Financial Accountability; Rick Stapenhurst, World Bank Institute;
Source: The Role of Parliament in the Budget Process; Warren Krafchik and Joachim Wehner

88
89


8.8.5 In order to strengthen parliamentary control over the executive it is necessary to
devise a system which envisages that PAC examines all the reports submitted by the CAG
and submits its recommendations to the Legislature within a stipulated time limit. It has
already been observed that this is possible only if the volume of CAG’s Audit reports is
reduced and their quality and content improved.
8.8.6 The Commission is of the view that in order to further strengthen the Parliamentary
oversight mechanism, as many audit paras as possible may be examined by Parliamentary
Committees. The PAC and COPU may like to decide in the beginning of the year itself,
which paras would be examined by them and which by their sub-committees (to be
constituted for the purpose). They may consider assigning other paras for examination to
the respective Departmentally related Standing Committees. The objective would be to
complete the examination of all paras within one year. In exceptional cases, Chairman,
PAC or COPU may authorize keeping a para alive for more than one year. Thus, the
PAC and COPU and their sub-committees and the Departmentally related Standing
Committees (and their sub-committees) would be able to complete the examination of all
paras within a year. If still there are pendencies, it is for the consideration of the PAC and
COPU to refer such paras to the Departmental Audit Committees (recommended vide
paragraph 7.5 of this Report).
a.

152

In order to further strengthen the Parliamentary oversight mechanism,
as many audit paras as possible need to be examined by Parliamentary
Committees. To facilitate this, the PAC and COPU may decide in the
beginning of the year itself, which paras would be examined by them and
which by their sub-committees (to be constituted for the purpose). They
may consider assigning other paras to the respective Departmentally
related Standing Committees. The objective would be to complete the
examination of all paras within one year. In exceptional cases, Chairman,
PAC/COPU may authorize keeping a para alive for more than one
year. If still some paras are pending, it is for the consideration of the
PAC and COPU to refer these to the Departmental Audit Committees
(recommended vide paragraph 7.5 of this Report).


8.9 Relationship between Audit and the Government/Government Agencies
8.9.1 Due to the very nature of its role as watchdog, independent audit is sometimes
perceived by government agencies and auditees as a mere fault finding exercise. This
perception has, on occasions, led to lack of adequate cooperation by the auditees which
results in tardy repsonse to audit observations. In such cases, external audit does not have
the desired impact.
8.9.2 There is need for better understanding and synergy between government agencies
and audit so that there is proper accountability and timely oversight and consequently
better audit impact. The information provided by the external audit is useful only if the
executive acts upon it. How to encourage a more collaborative approach to public audit is
the real challenge. This calls for a more positive approach by both auditors and auditees.
8.9.3 Another area of concern is that audit is often perceived by the auditees as
discouragement to innovate, change and reform. This is because departments associate
risk taking or innovations with the increased possibility of something going wrong leading
to financial loss and consequently their censure by the audit. Because of this apprehension
officers prefer to play it safe and continue with the traditional time tested methods of
functioning even when need for innovations or reforms is obvious because unlike audit,
they do not have the benefit of hindsight. Therefore, before indicting an officer for an
innovation or reform which may have caused a financial loss, the audit should carefully
examine whether the department had taken adequate steps to identify the risks and
planned suitably before carrying out the reforms/innovations. If this had been done and
no malafide is indicated then audit should not be hasty to draw adverse conclusions.
8.9.4 There is a need for deepening and enhancing the level of interaction between audit
and the executive at senior levels. They should discuss important issues, recommendations
and what needs to be done arising out of audit. Audit should not remain isolated; While
independence of audit is crucial to objectivity, it should not mean isolation. There should
be increasing coordination with the executive. There should be a quarterly communication
from the Accountant General to each Administrative Secretary informing the latter of
significant points and systems deficiencies noticed during audit inspections. Additionally
there should be quarterly meetings relating to pending inspection reports, audit observations
153



and clearance during the quarter and various issues of common interest including audit
recommendations for improvements. Audit should consider their views with an open
mind and appreciate their constraints. A concern has been that the public audit reporting
is unduly negative. While it is true that audit has a major role in ensuring accountability,
this does not mean a negative or only faultfinding approach.
8.9.5 The Commission is of the view that there is paramount need to sensitize the executive
towards the role and findings of audit so that the two sides realize that they are not working
at cross purposes but for the same objective of delivery of the programmes in a manner
which leads to achievement of objectives, outcomes and also promotes accountability.
Further, the Auditing Standards require Auditors to be careful to avoid offering implied
criticism in cases where although the original anticipations have not been realized, there
are no strong indications, significant or substantive of inefficiency or waste on the part of
the administrative authorities.
8.9.6 Audit organizations in all the developed countries have been moving towards
positivism while still maintaining their key role. Everybody is sensitive to criticism but
amenable to reason and logic and ready to take corrective action. Rather than focus
exclusively on irregularities, external audit should conduct studies and evaluation of systems
e.g. accounting, financial management, internal control, risk management, contracting,
procurement, etc. and offer constructive suggestions for strengthening Government
operations and reforms oriented towards best practices. Audit should look at itself as an
agency for change and improvement rather than primarily detection of irregularities.
a.

b.

154

There is need for better understanding and synergy between the audit
and auditees for enhanced public accountability and consequently better
audit impact.
There should be balanced reporting by the audit. Audit reports should
not focus on criticism alone but contain a fair assessment or evaluation,
which would mean that good performance is also acknowledged.

c.

There is need for increasing interaction as well as coordination between
the executive and the audit, including at senior levels. These should
include regular and meaningful meetings where important issues could be
discussed and conclusions reached on what needs to be done arising out of
the recommendations made by the audit. There should also be quarterly
communication from the Accountant General to Administrative Secretaries
informing them about significant points and areas of improvement noted
by Audit during their inspections.

8.10 Timeliness of Audit
8.10.1 External Audit often reviews programmes after these have run for a few years.
CAG’s audit itself is post facto and by the time, the process of auditing and reporting is
completed, its findings and recommendations may be late for corrective action.
8.10.2 Concurrent Audit
8.10.2.1 While performance audit is mainly a posteriori exercise, there is no bar to
conduct performance audit of programmes concurrently, or at the initial stages of the
implementation of the programmes, in cases where the risk and materiality are perceived as
being significant. Concurrent performance audit of long-term on-going schemes should be
undertaken at appropriate intervals. Accountants General are expected to be aware of issues
where concurrent performance audit or audit at the initial stages of the programme may be
desirable. The strategic plan should contain a list of recently introduced programmes and
selection of subjects for audit in their initial stage should be made in the light of expected
value addition.
8.10.3 Major Policy Shift Issues
8.10.3.1 Accountants General and the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) should be alive
to major shifts in the policies and programmes of the entity and the consequential new
public sector programmes and select critical cutting-edge subjects for performance audit
in the context of policy changes. Performance audit of such sunrise issues are likely to
contribute value to the implementation of the policy shifts. The performance audit of
155



such subjects could be undertaken singly or in generic form when they are at the early
stage of their implementation. Some examples of such subjects are sale of assets, private
finance initiative, public-private sector partnership, introduction of structural changes,
major changes in industrial or export-import policy, etc.
8.10.3.2 With e-governance and Internet, apart from adjusting to the momentous speed
of communications, Government is gearing up to generate responses to various issues and
communications at a pace much faster than before. This will require audit to also review
its procedures to reduce/ compress the time lag between the occurrence of an event and
its reporting.
8.10.3.3 External audit has to spend considerable time on the audit of transactions because
internal audit arrangements in the State Government and in many Union Government
Departments are either weak or non-existent. Transaction audit is basically the job of
internal auditors. External audit is supposed to do only sample checking. If internal
audit is strengthened, CAG’s audit will save considerable time spent on extensive audit
of transactions (The Commission has suggested strengthening of internal audit in
Chapter 7.
8.10.4 Recommendations:
a.

External audit needs to be more timely in inspecting and reporting so
that their reports can be used for timely corrective action. All audits for
the year under review should be completed by 30th of September of the
following year. To start with, all Audit Reports may be finalized by 31st
December and this date may be gradually advanced.

b.

c.

Government agencies also need to be more prompt in responding to
audit observations and ensure that the remedial and corrective action
not only settles the irregularities reported but also addresses the systemic
deficiencies.

8.11 Inadequate Response to Audit
8.11.1 One of the reasons for Audit not having the desired impact is the inadequate
response of government agencies. It has been observed that often they do not send replies
to draft paras intended for inclusion in Audit Reports or furnish Explanatory Notes
on paragraphs finally included in CAG’s Reports. A primary reason for this inadequate
response to audit is that there are no significant consequences for non-compliance with
financial rules, regulations and procedures laid down by the Government.
8.11.2 In respect of the audit reports of CAG, on the recommendation of the PAC the
Government of India has prescribed that Ministries/Departments must furnish replies to
the draft paragraphs which are forwarded to the Secretaries of the Ministries/Departments
demi-officially within 6 weeks. Yet it has been observed that Ministries/Departments often
do not furnish their responses to the draft paragraphs within the prescribed time frame.
Similar delays have been observed in case of Action Taken Notes on paragraphs included
in the reports of CAG. A review of outstanding ATNs on paragraphs included in the
Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Union Government (Civil,
Other Autonomous Bodies and Scientific Departments) as of October 2007 has disclosed
that the Ministries/Departments had not submitted remedial ATNs on 169 paragraphs.
This is shown in Fig. 8.190

IT should be used increasingly and effectively for data collection and
analysis.

156

157
Report No. CA 1 of 2008

90


Fig. 8.1 : Summarised Position of Outstanding Action Taken Notes
(ATNs; Source: Report No. CA1 of 2008; CAG)

Financial Management in State Governments

9

The Commission has not examined the States’ budgets in detail, but it feels that the
weaknesses highlighted earlier and the core principles stated would apply to the financial
management systems in the States. Some of the issues which need to be addressed by the
State Governments are briefly analysed below.

9.1 Integrated Financial Advisers

8.11.4 The Commission feels that the pending paras could be monitored by having a
database in each Ministry/ Department of the pending audit paras. The number of audit
paras pending in respect of an officer with reasons and adequacy of response to audit should
be an input while appraising an officer. This will ensure better response and responsibility
for taking appropriate action. Also for persistent default in submitting replies to the audit
paras a procedure should be laid down for action against concerned officers.
a.

158

The pending audit paras should be monitored by having a database
on them in each Ministry/Department. In case of persistent default in
submitting replies to the audit paras a procedure should be laid down for
action against the concerned officer.

9.1.1 The extent of delegation of financial powers to Departments varies from State to
State. It has generally been observed that since this delegation is quite limited, most of the
financial proposals get referred to the Finance Department. Some States have created the
mechanism of Financial Advisers in some major Departments, but their powers are also
rather inadequate. The same compulsion that made the Union Government implement the
scheme of Integrated Financial Adviser for assisting administrative ministries in planning,
programming and budgeting should now be the reason for State Governments to introduce
the system of FA in various departments where FAs would be the representatives of the
Finance Department.91 This should be coupled with greater delegation of financial powers to
the Departments. But all these need to be preceded by capacity building of the Departments
in financial administration.
9.2 Multi-year Budgeting
9.2.1 Along with the introduction of the FA system, multi-year budgeting would help
in bringing about better fiscal discipline and financial management. The present system
of budgeting in the States for a year at a time suffers from a number of weaknesses. The
most important is that full financial implications of projects, which are to be implemented
over a number of years, are not brought out fully. A government decision may entail only
a nominal expenditure in year one, but may call for sizable expenditure in the following
years. With one year budgeting system, the full implications of incomplete work are not
realized. It is, therefore, necessary that State Governments shift to multi-year budgeting
and give the estimates of revenue and expenditure for a period of four years in addition
to the year which the budget pertains. This should be done on a roll-on basis. This will
enable better estimation of the fund requirements of on-going schemes, programmes and
projects. It will also ensure realistic budgeting.
Madhav Godbole (2003), Public Accountability and Transparency, Orient Longman, p.231

91

159

Financial Management in State Government


9.2.2 States like Karnataka have implemented the Medium Term Fiscal Plan (MTFP) since
2001-02, a rolling document prepared annually. The MTFP is a medium-term statement
of the governments, medium-term fiscal objectives and also provides projection of key
fiscal variables for the current year and three subsequent years. Each MTFP also reports
performance against targets. The MTFP serves two purposes. First, it helps to put annual
budget formulation within the medium-term context. Second, it serves as a communication
channel to the people, of government’s fiscal intentions and strategy. Many other states
have followed this practice. This needs to be followed by all States. Karnataka was the first
state in India to enact a Fiscal Responsibility Act 2003 (FRA), which became the most
influential factor in budget making. FRA indicates the fiscal management principles that
will guide the state government. These are steps in the right direction.
9.3 Realistic Estimates and Proper Assumptions while Preparing Budget
9.3.1 There is need to have economic assumptions which are prudent and realistic in order
to formulate budget estimates which are accurate and not overly optimistic. At the end of
every financial year, the gap between the estimates and the actuals should be analysed so
that the underlying economic assumptions could be suitably calibrated for the future.

9.5 Skewed Expenditure Pattern
9.5.1 As in the case of Union government, the expenditure pattern of the State Governments
is also highly skewed with the bulk of expenditure taking place in the last quarter and
particularly in the month of March. Government of India has tried to overcome this
problem by introducing the Monthly Expenditure Plan (MEP). A similar system should
be adopted by the States.
9.6 Internal Control
9.6.1 The weaknesses of the internal audit system have been brought out by the CAG
through various Reports:
Andhra Pradesh – Health, Medical and Family Welfare Department – [CAG’s
Report (Civil) for the year ending 31st March 2005 on Government of Andhra
Pradesh]
1.

The internal audit in the department was inadequate. The Department
did not have any manual on internal audit nor did they prescribe the
duties and responsibilities of the internal auditors

2.

No training was imparted to the staff in internal audit methodology and
techniques as of August 2005.

3.

Only two AAOs were in position against the sanctioned strength of
three (without any supporting staff) to cover the entire State with more
than 100 subordinate offices and 1703 DDOs and other grant receiving
institutions. No supervision was made by the Accounts Officer. This
indicated that little importance was given to internal audit.

9.4 Avoiding Ad hoc Announcements Token Provisions
9.4.1 As stated earlier in the case of Government of India, in States also, in spite of detailed
instructions and guidelines in budget manuals, projects and schemes are announced on an
ad-hoc basis during visits of high-level functionaries. Such announcements of large sums
seriously distort plan allocations and disturb the faithful implementation of schemes already
approved under the budget. This could also lead to announcements not being followed by
formal approvals thereby resulting in discontent among people and financial indiscipline.
The proper method would be to include projects that may be considered absolutely essential
at the time of preparing the annual plans and budgets. The practice of announcing projects
and schemes on an ad-hoc basis needs to be abandoned.
9.4.2 A related practice is to make token provisions in the budget. This is resorted to facilitate
announcement of a large number of projects. This can result in spreading limited resources
thinly over a large number of projects and starvation of projects already under execution.
Cost and time over-runs are consequences of this practice. It is therefore necessary that
norms for sanction of projects should be rigidly adhered to.

160

Goa – Police Department – (CAG’s Audit Report on Government of Goa for the
year ended 31st March 2005)
Internal Audit Arrangements
The Finance Department specified (August 1996) that in Departments where the
post of Accounts Officer/ Senior Accounts Officer exists, the duty of carrying out
the internal inspection of the establishment/ Drawing and Disbursement Officers
would devolve on the Accounts Officer. It was, however, observed that neither was
the internal audit of any unit conducted (2000-2005) nor was a separate internal
audit wing within the Department set up.
161


Jharkhand – Rural Development Department – [CAG’s Audit Report
(Civil and Commercial) on the Government of Jharkhand for the year ended
31st March 2005]
The Department did not have an internal audit wing. The internal audit wing of
the Finance Department was responsible for internal audit of Rural Development
Department. It was noticed that Finance Department also had not conducted internal
audit of any of the test-checked units.
9.6.2 The above observations of the C&AG on the functioning of internal audit in some
of the Departments of the Union and State Governments, PSUs and PRIs indicate that
there are serious deficiencies in the existing internal audit system. The current internal
audit arrangements are inadequate and ineffective. It is not even being conducted in some
departments. Internal audit guidelines are outdated and there are no internal audit manuals
in many cases, particularly in States. There is an acknowledged problem of under-resourcing
of the internal audit service. There is shortage of manpower and often lack of qualified
and professional staff, the capacity of staff is inadequate, and supervision is weak. There
is lack of response to internal audit reports by auditee units. A large number of internal
audit reports and observations remain pending. No effective action is taken to rectify the
deficiencies. Because of lack of action on internal audit observations, the irregularities and
deficiencies pointed out persist.
9.6.3 It is therefore necessary to develop a strategic view of internal audit to move beyond
the financial regularity and compliance audit to exert a wider role. In the light of this
strategic view, the scope and role of internal audit needs to be redefined. The organization
structure of the internal audit should be recast with the internal audit directly reporting to
the head of the organization followed up by proper staffing and capacity building of internal
audit units. The Commission has suggested constitution of audit committees in respect of
Government of India. The same could be considered by the State Governments.
9.7 External Audit
9.7.1 The Public Accounts Committees in some States have a practice of examining all
paragraphs and performance audit reports included in the CAG’s Audit Reports, while others
have adopted a more selective approach. In the former case, due to the volume of work
involved, the Reports of the CAG are sometimes not discussed for years together, often upto
10-15 years and the arrears keep mounting. The approach of discussing all the paragraphs
in the order of the year of their presentation often results in examination of matters as old
as 10-20 years many of which may have lost their relevance due to the lapse of time. In
162

Financial Management in State Government

other State Legislatures, where selective approach is adopted, the status on effectiveness is
similar to the one in the case of the Central PAC/ COPU discussed above.
9.7.2 The CAG had constituted a High Powered Committee under the Chairmanship of
Shri S.L. Shakdher, former Chief Election Commissioner in August 1992 to review the
status of Audit Reports pending examination by the State Legislatures. The Committee
submitted its report in March 1993. Some of the recommendations were:
 A selective approach may be adopted by the PACs/ COPUs in all States in regard
to taking oral evidence and having detailed discussions with witnesses as at
Centre.
 The PACs and COPUs in all States may accord priority to the consideration of
the latest Audit Report, selecting matters for detailed discussions in such a manner
that they can complete scrutiny of that Report within one year.
 As regards the clearance of arrears, the PACs/ COPUs may simultaneously take up
the outstanding past Audit Reports for selective scrutiny in a phased programme,
so that the arrears would be cleared within a period of say two to three years.
9.7.3 The implementation of the aforesaid recommendations did result in some improvements
but a large number of paras are still pending. As per the status paper of the CAG on the
detailed examination of Audit Reports by the State PACs/COPUs, 14,715 paras/reviews
were pending for discussion as on 31st March 2006 and some of the paras date back to
1983-84. This would indicate that the examination of CAG paras included in the Reports
is still in heavy arrears in almost all States.
9.7.4 To overcome the situation, the Legislative Committees may like to adopt a time
frame within which they would complete examination of audit reports also and submit
their reports to the Legislature. The State Governments may also specify a time frame for
the Departments for necessary follow up action on the recommendations of Audit and
forwarding of the ATNs for vetting to the Accountant General before their final submission
to the State PAC/ COPU. It is also necessary to ensure that all Departments adhere to the
prescribed time limits.

163

CONCLUSION
In this Report on Financial Management, the Commission has examined the issue of
reforms in the public financial management system as a part of the overall governance
reform. Efforts aimed at improving the efficiency, responsiveness and accountability of
Government organizations have to be complemented by reforms in financial management
system in order to deliver the desired outcome. In accordance with its terms of reference,
the Commission has largely emphasized the expenditure size of public finance in India
with particular attention to proper maintenance of accounts, smooth flow of funds and
strengthening of internal and external audit mechanisms.
Maintaining financial discipline and prudence while simultaneously ensuring prompt and
efficient utilization of resources to achieve the goals of different government agencies has
to be the underlying theme for all government agencies. Towards this end, accountability
needs to shift from compliance with procedures to a much greater focus on results and
outcomes. Tools of modern of financial management like information technology and
financial information system need to be used to improve accountability combined with
accurate budgeting and realistic economic assumptions.
In order to reform the financial management system in India, the Commission has
suggested adoption of medium term plan/budget framework and alignment of plan,
budget and accounts, in order to bring greater synergies between the annual budgets
and the five year development plan. A paradigm shift from the traditional bottom up
approach to budgeting to a top down technique focusing on broader resource allocations
as well as on outcomes rather than processes has also been recommended. This has to be
combined with greater operational autonomy to government agencies and decentralization
of administrative and financial powers to them in order to improve their efficiency.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
1. (Para 4.5.8) Unrealistic Budget Estimates
a.

The assumptions made while formulating estimates must be realistic. At
the end of each year the reasons for the gap between the ‘estimates’ and
‘actuals’ must be ascertained and efforts made to minimize them. These
assumptions should also be subject to audit.

b.

The method of formulation of the annual budget by getting details
from different organizations/units/agencies and fitting them into a predetermined aggregate amount leads to unrealistic budget estimates. This
method should be given up along with the method of budgeting on the basis
of ‘analysis of trends’. This should be replaced by a ‘top-down’ method by
indicating aggregate limits to expenditure to each organization/agency.

c.

Internal capacity for making realistic estimates needs to be developed.

2. (Para 4.6.5) Delay in Implementation of Projects
a.

Projects and schemes should be included in the budget only after detailed
consideration. The norms for formulating the budget should be strictly
adhered to in order to avoid making token provisions and spreading
resources thinly over a large number of projects/schemes.

Any financial management system, howsoever sound, will not be able to deliver the
desired outcomes unless there are strong internal and external oversight mechanisms. The
Commission has therefore recommended measures for strengthening of both internal and
external audit mechanisms.

164

165



3. (Para 4.7.8) Skewed Expenditure Pattern – Rush of Expenditure towards the end
of the Financial Year

7. (Para 4.13.4) Irrational ‘Plan – Non Plan’ Distinction leads to Inefficiency in resource
Utilization

a.

The Modified Cash Management System should be strictly adhered.
This System should be extended to all Demands for Grants as soon as
possible.

4. (Para 4.8.26) Inadequate Adherance to the Multi-year Perspective and Missing Line
of Sight between Plan and Budget
a.

In order to bring about clarity, transparency and consolidation, the
ways and means for implementing an ‘alignment’ project, similar to that
in the UK, may also be examined by the High Powered Committee so
constituted.

5. (Para 4.11.2) Adhoc Project Announcements
a.

The practice of announcing projects and schemes on an ad-hoc basis in
budgets and on important National Days, and during visits of dignitaries
functionaries to States needs to be stopped. Projects/schemes which are
considered absolutely essential may be considered in the annual plans or
at the time of mid-term appraisal.

6. (Para 4.12.6) Emphasis on Meeting Budgetary Financial Targets rather than on
Outputs and Outcomes
a.

166

Outcome budgeting is a complex process and a number of steps are involved
before it can be attempted with any degree of usefulness. A beginning
may be made with proper preparation and training in case of the Flagship
Schemes and certain national priorities.

The Plan versus non-Plan distinction needs to be done away with.

8. (Para 5.2.12) Flow of Funds relating to Centrally Sponsored Schemes
a.

A High Powered Committee may be constituted to examine and recommend
on the need and ways for having medium-term expenditure limits for
Ministries/Departments through the Five Year Plans and linking them to
annual budgets with carry forward facility.

b.

a.

The Controller General of Accounts, in consultation with the C&AG, should
lay down the principles for implementing the system of flow of sanctions/
approvals from the Union Ministries/Departments to implementing
agencies in the States to facilitate release of fund at the time of payment.
After taking into account the available technology and infrastructure
for electronic flow of information and funds, especially under the NeGP,
and putting in place a new Chart of Accounts, the scheme should be

9. (Para 5.3.6) Development of Financial Information System,
a.

A robust financial information system, on the lines of SIAFI of Brazil,
needs to be created in the government in a time bound manner. This system
should also make accessible to the public, real time data on government
expenditure at all levels.

10. (Para 5.4.3) Capacity Building
a.

The capacity of individuals and institutions in government needs to be
improved in order to implement reforms in financial management. To
facilitate this, a proper programme of training needs to be devised and

167



11. (Para 6.3) Accrual System of Accounting

b.

CIAs should be directly responsible to the Secretary of the Department.

a.

A Task Force should be set up to examine the costs and benefits of
introducing the accrual system of accounting. This Task Force should
also examine its applicability in case of the Appropriation Accounts and
Finance Accounts.

c.

In the initial stages, personnel may be inducted from existing accounts
cadres. Norms for recruitment and utilizing private sector expertise in select
tasks may also be devised. Capacity building needs for proper functioning
of this Office should be identified in advance.

b.

Initially, a few departments/organizations may be identified where tangible
benefits could be shown to be derived within 2-3 years by implementing
the accrual system of accounting, especially departmental ‘commercial
undertakings’.

d.

The modalities for ensuring non-duplication of work vis-à-vis the C&AG
should be formalized. This should be aimed at assisting the C&AG in
concentrating on carrying out specialized audit/tasks.

e.

Standards for internal audit should be prescribed by the Office of the
C&AG.

f.

The Accounting functions should be completely separated from Internal
Audit.

c.

The result of this initial implementation may be studied by a committee
of experts which would recommend on its further implementation in all
departments/organisations at the Union/State level along with exclusions,
if any. This may proceed in a phased manner.

d.

Prior to its implementation, training and capacity building needs of the
accounting personnel and all stake holders in the decision making process
would have to be addressed and a meticulous schedule worked out in line
with the road map of implementation.

g.

The functioning and effectiveness of this new system may be examined
after allowing a suitable period of operation. Based on the results of this
examination, such offices may also be instituted in other Ministries/
departments/organisations.

e.

Before the new system is adopted, alignment of the plan, budget and
accounts, as recommended in this Report elsewhere, needs to be achieved
and a viable financial information system needs to be put in place.

h.

An Audit Committee should be constituted in each Ministry/Department.
It should consist of a Chairperson and two members to be appointed by the
Minister in charge of that Ministry/Department. The Chairperson should
be a person of eminence in public life. The two members should be from
outside the government. The Audit Committee should look after matters
related to both internal and external audit including implementation of their
recommendations and report annually to the respective Departmentally
related Standing Committee of Parliament.

12. (Para 7.5) Internal Audit
a.

168

An Office of the Chief Internal Auditor (CIA) should be established in select
Ministries/departments to carry out the functions related to internal audit.
Its independence, duties, functions, mechanism of coordination with the
CAG etc. should be provided by a statute.

169



13. (Para 7.6.5) Integrated Financial Adviser
a.

b.

The role of the Financial Adviser as the Chief Finance Officer of the Ministry
who is responsible and accountable to the Secretary of the Ministry/
Department should be recognized and the trend of dual accountability
should be done away with.

b.

There should be balanced reporting by the audit. Audit reports should
not focus on criticism alone but contain a fair assessment or evaluation,
which would mean that good performance is also acknowledged.

c.

There is need for increasing interaction as well as coordination between
the executive and the audit, including at senior levels. These should
include regular and meaningful meetings where important issues could be
discussed and conclusions reached on what needs to be done arising out of
the recommendations made by the audit. There should also be quarterly
communication from the Accountant General to Administrative Secretaries
informing them about significant points and areas of improvement noted
by Audit during their inspections.

Officers with sufficient training and experience in modern financial
management systems should be posted as Financial Advisers in the
Ministries/Departments.

14. (Para 8.8.7) Accountability to Parliament

16. (Para 8.10.4) Timeliness of Audit
a.

In order to further strengthen the Parliamentary oversight mechanism,
as many audit paras as possible need to be examined by Parliamentary
Committees. To facilitate this, the PAC and COPU may decide in the
beginning of the year itself, which paras would be examined by them and
which by their sub-committees (to be constituted for the purpose). They
may consider assigning other paras to the respective Departmentally related
Standing Committees. The objective would be to complete the examination
of all paras within one year. In exceptional cases, Chairman, PAC/COPU
may authorize keeping a para alive for more than one year. If still some
paras are pending, it is for the consideration of the PAC and COPU to
refer these to the Departmental Audit Committees (recommended vide
paragraph 7.5 of this Report).

15. (Para 8.9.7) Relationship between Audit and the Government/Government
Agencies
a.

170

There is need for better understanding and synergy between the audit
and auditees for enhanced public accountability and consequently better
audit impact.

a.

External audit needs to be more timely in inspecting and reporting so
that their reports can be used for timely corrective action. All audits for
the year under review should be completed by 30th of September of the
following year. To start with, all Audit Reports may be finalized by 31st
December and this date may be gradually advanced.

b.

IT should be used increasingly and effectively for data collection and
analysis.

c.

Government agencies also need to be more prompt in responding to
audit observations and ensure that the remedial and corrective action
not only settles the irregularities reported but also addresses the systemic
deficiencies.

17. (Para 8.11.5) Inadequate Response to Audit
a.

The pending audit paras should be monitored by having a database
on them in each Ministry/Department. In case of persistent default in
submitting replies to the audit paras a procedure should be laid down for
action against the concerned officer.

171


Speech of Chairman, ARC

Annexure-I(1)

Speech of the Chairman, ARC
National Workshop on
at National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi
23rd July, 2008
The mandate of the Commission is vast. So far the Commission has submitted 8 reports
on a range of vital issues. But now the Commission has to address itself to the key issue of
how to administer and run the government structure. It has to suggest measures to achieve
an efficient and accountable administration for the country. The difficulties inherent in
the political economy of reforms cannot, of course, be underestimated. The country has
tackled this path well. But a harder climb lies ahead. Given the same political will which
has brought about the beginning of the effort and the widening support, the task shall be
achievable.
Let me start by introducing you to the larger picture that the Administrative Reforms
Commission is seeking to bring about through its various reports. In fact the most important
trilogy of three reports that Commission shall now be bringing out shall be on:
1. Civil services reforms: personnel refurbishment
2. Structure of the Government
3. Financial management systems
The Commission would like to introduce a system of greater autonomy coupled with more
accountability. For the purpose, it is proposing to recommend a system of executive agencies
to be the implementation arm of the Government in its Report on Civil Service Reforms
and separation of policy making and implementation of the policies. To bring this about
we are suggesting the following steps.
Firstly-There should be broad separation of policy making from implementation
responsibilities. The ministries should do only policy making. Implementation bodies
need to be restructured as Executive Agencies (as done in the UK, Australia, New Zealand,
Japan, Sweden, Singapore) by giving them greater operational autonomy and flexibility while
172

Annexure-I(1) (Contd.)

making them accountable for what they do. For accountability purposes, the Executive
Agencies have to sign annual performance agreements with the departmental ministers,
describing the performance targets to be achieved. The Executive Agencies would become
directly accountable to the departmental Minister through performance targets that are
defined in advance and used as a benchmark for measuring end-of–the–period performance.
In return for such ex ante specification of accountability, the Executive Agencies should
be given necessary financial autonomy. The heads of the Executive Agencies should be from
the Senior Executive Service.
We are also proposing to recommend that government servants would be assigned to a
domain early in their career, and with the years of experience in the domain shall acquire
domain specialization. As suggested by the Surinder Nath Committee there shall be a
specific domain dealing with “Public Finance and Financial Management”. Officers shall
therefore, once assigned to this domain have specialized knowledge in dealing with financial
issues. There shall therefore be no dearth of officers having specialization in the fields of
finance to assist the heads of the executive agencies in performing their functions. Once this
responsibility has been given to the Heads of the executive agencies it shall be imperative
that the requisite amount of financial freedom should be given to him to allow him to
achieve the goals that have been set. To enable him to achieve this, a new scheme of financial
management and accountability shall have to be spelt out to provide him an enabling
environment which is not centralized and is more responsive to his immediate requirements.
The present system of line based budgeting, cumbersome processes of reappropriation &
demand for supplementaries, all done in a centralized system have to be, to my mind, done
away with. In the modern system being envisaged for the future, the authority must have
the financial autonomy; and this authority is to be exercised with consistency and efficiency
to achieve a system where the goals are achieved and results are visible to all. The authority
shall itself be vigilant about the processes and outcomes. An effective system of internal audit
shall ensure that the financial propriety is being followed. I have some reservations about
the role external audit plays in assisting in the financial management of the organization.
External audits are not conducted in the contemporaneous time frame and at times there is
a lag of many a years in finalizing the audit objections. This does not aid the organizational
head in keeping the financial processes under control. The role of internal audit has to be
well developed in maintaining the financial discipline in organisations that shall be given
more autonomy. The system that we hope to put in place has worked well in the case of
Deptt of Space and Department of Atomic Energy where financial delegation has been
done and an effective internal system of checks and balances has been introduced.
173




The next serious concern that the Commission seeks to address itself is the need to
introduce accrual accounting. When we are managing our personal accounts we are
adopting the system of dual accounting, maintaining a balance sheet of asset & liabilities;
then why do we differ in approach when dealing with public money and public property.
It has come to my notice that when there are time and cost over-runs there are at times
difficulties in gathering from the records the total amount of funds that have been paid to
the government agencies who are implementing the projects. Reconciliation of accounts
and payments is not done for many a years when dealing with repairs and refurbishment
of capital assets by government agencies. As the assets created do not find a mention in
the books of the govt, many are languishing on account of poor maintenance. All these
problems are compounded and the net result is that we do not have a fair idea of the cost
of service that we are providing, we are not in a position to intelligently determine when
and at what cost future capital investments are to be made. The opportunity cost of the
funds deployed in a project are not known, so the returns on the investments can also not
be determined. These are just some of the examples that come to my mind. I am sure this
gathering has a better idea of the problems and drawbacks we face when restricted by cash
accounting. Cash accounting has worked well in controlling expenditure. However now the
Commission seeks to move the administration to a level where it shall be accountable for its
performance. When we are to introduce greater autonomy with greater accountability then
we need to have intelligent financial decisions and multiyear budgeting. Lapsing budgets
at the year end have created problems in delivering the goals that have been set out. The
quarter-wise and at times month-wise restriction on spending have brought about spending
discipline but has affected the achievement of the targets. We must grow out of the system
of the Finance Ministry monitoring our spending pattern and move to a system where the
spending decisions are based on conscious decisions. Such decisions have a bearing on the
transgenerational equity. The accrual accounting system is complex and this gathering shall
have to help the Commission determine the road map for implementation of the accrual
accounting system.

reforms. India has to now sooner rather than later embark upon strengthening its financial
management system.

The Indian reform process should be seen to be part of a larger global process. Our policies
and practices have to be adapted to the realities of the international economy. On the
philosophical plane, our reforms should be in keeping with the paradigm shift which we are
witnessing round the world. On studying the international experiences we realized that if
Government were to survive in this competitive environment, they need to make a transition
to a more disciplined and rigorous system of financial management. Other countries felt the
pressure of globalization earlier than India did and they responded by adopting financial
174


Some of the other issues that come to mind are the need to ensure effective utilisation of
funds that are transferred from the Centre to the States; the problems that are encountered
in the implementation and in the release of funds of the Centrally sponsored schemes, and
the Non plan Schemes and the steps that can be taken to remove such impediments.

In this millennium the international economy has become more integrated and more
complex and difficult. No country can afford to be island unto itself. There is, no need to fear
the impact of globalization if we structure our policies right, for globalization does indeed
accentuate the benefits of good policies even as it raises the cost of bad ones. We have to
have confidence in ourselves – confidence born out of an appreciation of our potential, and
a will to fashion our policies to realize that potential, we shall do so without loss of time.
It must be appreciated that the funds available with the govt. have an opportunity cost of
not being available to the corporate and global economy. When dealing with the policies
of expending such funds one now must be clearer about the outcomes sought and work
towards delivering them efficiently within the government framework.
To bring about the changes, and also to provide a financial accountability and accounting
framework, we need a legislation. In Australia, for example, the Financial and Accountability
Act of 1997 provides such a framework. Under the Australian Act, the chief executives of
the Agencies are given greater flexibility and autonomy in their financial management; they
are also required to promote efficient, effective and ethical use of public resources. We do
need such a legislation. In addition, this legislation could include some of the requirements
for the budget process as recommended in the Report under discussion today.
Some of the other issues that have been raised at many an economic fora in the past
are the need to do away with the artificial distinction between the Plan and Non-Plan
expenditure, a more realistic differentiation of the Revenue and Capital expenditure, and
the need for doing away differentiation of charged and voted expenditure in the Budget.
I would like to call upon this gathering to debate whether resolving such issues will result
in better budgeting.

Also it is high time we flag the issues that result in the failure or the poor quality of
implementation of our policies; these can be in the nature of subsidies not reaching the
175





poor, projects having a time and cost over-run. etc. All these result in outcome targets not
being met. I feel that at the time of conceptualising and planning the programmes and
projects, a strong financial management system should give a correct assessment of the
risks that are associated. This entails recognising factors that may result in the programme
failing or not meeting the objective for which it is being set out.

necessary foundation for the emergence of a strong and viable financial system which
will conform to best international practices and make its distinctive contribution to the
furtherance of our national objectives of growth, equity and justice.

I have noticed that at times there is mindless splintering of Plan Schemes. We lament
the low impact of such schemes on the outcome desired. Do such steps detract from the
achievement of the main objective. Should not the Financial Management system have a
role to play in consolidating the programmes and working to make them more viable to
achieve the goal for which they were set out.
Our financial system has served us reasonably well so far. It is capable of doing better. The
Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘reforms’ as making or becoming “better by removal
or abandonment of imperfections, faults or errors”. This is what the Report of NIPFP has
proposed – correcting the imperfections, faults and efforts of the past in the hope that our
financial management system will enhance the progress of the economy and that credit
would be, in Schumpeter’s memorable phrase, “phenomenon of development”.

I am sure that a sound financial management system with the correct practices of planning,
budgeting and accounting shall provide the desired framework for a result oriented delivery
system in the government. In a democratic and federal polity like ours, it is necessary for
reforms to have broad consensus. Such a consensus shall emerge. The states which were
initially somewhat hesitant about the reform programme are now embracing it with
enthusiasm. There has also been a broadening across the political spectrum for support of
the reform effort. This augurs well for the future.
Our motto shall be the same as the oath taken by the Council Members in the ancient
city of Athens:
“ We will strive increasingly to quicken the public sense of public duty; that thus….we
will transmit this city not only not less, but greater, better, and more beautiful than it
was transmitted to us.”

The way the economy is now linked to international economic pressures, it is also necessary
that the country takes steps to insulate itself and contain inflationary pressures. The
old fashioned virtues of fiscal prudence and monetary restraint have thus not lost their
contemporary relevance. It must be appreciated that there is indeed no substitute for sound
and internally consistent macro management, covering aspects such as fiscal, monetary and
exchange rate policies and an adequate institutional and legal framework which help in the
efficient intermediation and control.
The system is always capable of improvement in productivity, efficiency and in the ultimate
analysis of profitability, which again helps to increase the inherent strength of institutions
and delivery systems. The process of reform in the social sector that we are now engaged in
cannot succeed unless the financial system itself is strong and efficient so that it can help
to support higher investment levels and accentuate growth and help to create a productive
and competitive economy. Structural and financial reforms are thus mutually reinforcing
and sustain each other.
No reform can indeed be painless. We have to appreciate that the quest for competitive
efficiency will take its toll of the weak and the inefficient. These pains, however, are a
176

177


Participants

Annexure-I(2)

Workshop on
Strengthening Financial Management System in India


16.

Shri S.C. Jain

ED(CF) IOC

17.

Shri Ajay Garg

Joint Secretary (Fin/Plg)

23 July, 2008

18.

Ms. Benita Sharma

Gender Specialist

National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi

19.

Dr. P. Umanath

Deputy Secretary (Budget), Finance Deptt. Govt. of
Tamil Nadu

20.

Shri B.C. Mohapatra

Joint Secretary, Finance Deptt., Govt. of Orissa

Designation

21.

Shri Sunil Soni

Principal Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra

1.

Shri Vinod Rai Comptroller and Auditor-General of India

22.

Shri Deepak Sengupta

Jt. Director-Plg., Govt. of Delhi

2.

Dr. Renuka Viswanathan Secretary (C&PG), Cabinet Secretariat

23.

Shri L.N. Meena

Jt. Director – Planning, Govt. of NCT, Delhi

3.

Shri V.N. Kaila Controller General of Accounts

24.

Shri Santosh Kumar

Director (Fin.), Min. of Health & Family Welfare

4.

Shri Rakesh Jain

DG (AEC), Office of CAG of India

25.

Shri Ravindra Dhongde

Director of Accounts & Treasuries, Mumbai

5.

Shri R.S. Negi

AAO, Finance (Budget), Deptt., Delhi Government

26.

Shri B.L. Pathak

Joint Director (Plg. Deptt), Govt. of NCT of Delhi

6.

Shri I.P. Singh

Former Dy.CAG of India

27.

Shri D.K. Malhotra Under Secy., Finance, Govt. of NCT of Delhi

7.

Shri Ashok Das

Principal Secretary (Finance), Govt. of M.P.

28.

Shri B.S. Rawat

8.

Shri Subhash Garg

Principal Secretary (Finance), Govt. of Rajasthan

Dy. Director, Planning Deptt., Govt. of NCT of
Delhi

9.

Ms. Ananya Ray

Joint Secretary & FA, Ministry of Water Resources,
New Delhi

29.

Ms. Parneet Suri

Spl. Secy., Finance, Govt. of Punjab

30.

Shri S.N. Shukla COA, Govt. of NCT of Delhi

List of Participants
Sl.No. Name

10.

Shri B.B. Pandit

D.G.(Audit), Office of CAG

31.

Shri S.P. Singh

Dy. Director Finance

11.

Shri Sandeep Saxena

Dy.CGA, Office of CGA

32.

Dr. B.K. Sharma

12.

Shri V. Bhaskar

Joint Secretary, 13th Finance Commission

Director (Planning) Govt. of Delhi, Delhi
Secretariat

13.

Shri R. Sridharan

Joint Secretary (SP) & Adviser (FR), Planning
Commission

33.

Dr. Ram Mohan

Advisor (Finance), Railway Board

34.

Dr. I.Y.R. Krishna Rao

Pr. Secretary (Finance), Govt. of Andhra Pradesh

14.

Secretary (B&R), Govt. of Karnataka

15.
178

Shri Ajay Seth
Shri K.P. Krishnan

Joint Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs,
Govt. of India
179


Recommendations made by Group

Annexure-I(3)

Recommendations made by Groups
Group 1: Reforms in Budgetary System – Central
• Budget process: It is essential that accounts and other information required should
be made available in time and should be reliable.
• Plan and Non-plan divide: The plan and non-plan distinction should be
removed
• Capital and Revenue Expenditure: To begin with disclosure relating to revenue
grants that are aimed at creating capital assets be made without changing the
existing revenue and capital accounting system
• Multi-year Budgeting – Advance Expenditure Ceilings:
• Three year perspective budgeting with first year approval, next two year are
indicative – rolling framework
• carry over provision
• Annual ceilings of the ministries fixed within the three year perspective budget
with scheme wise flexibility
• Performance Orientation in budgeting:
• Programme based budgeting with performance indicators
• Institutional support: Departmental financial Management Committee to be
convened by the FA and chaired by the Secretary
Group-II: Institutional Reforms for Strengthening Financial Reforms
I. Role of Integrated Financial Advisor in Financial Management
• Role of IFA laid out in the Charter issued by Ministry of Finance should be
reconciled with the provisions of GFR 64 and reflected in a legislation defining
the role of CAO and CFO and the relationship between the two.

180

• The detailed framework within which FAs should function should be laid down
in terms of his professional competence, skills and support systems.


• The role of the FA as bridge between the spending department and the Ministry
of Finance should be defined in the proposed statute.
• Accountability for programme implementation should be incorporated in the
canons of financial propriety as well as in the proposed statute.
• In the Ministry of Finance there should be a separate wing called Financial
Management Wing which should be headed by a Controller General of Financial
Management drawn from a pool of specialists in the field of financial management
and accounting.
• Supporting staff and all officers in the Financial Management wing should be
recruited from among professionals having the requisite qualifications.
II. Internal Audit and Internal Control
• To strengthen the oversight function within the Ministries/Departments, there
should be an independent and professionally competent internal audit and
investigation set-up. It should be directly responsible to the Chief Accounting
Authority of the department.
• For this purpose, the Inspector General Model of US should be adopted. This
model should be given a statutory backing.
• In each department there should be an Audit Committee headed by the Chief
Accounting Authority including some independent members to lay down the
scope of internal audit, to consider its Reports and to monitor its effectiveness
and competence.
• Internal Audit should be equipped with the requisite power and competence to
investigate cases of frauds etc. (forensic audit). Such powers should be provided
in the proposed statute.
• Chief Accounting Authority should lay down along with the budget, a positive
statement containing assurance on existence and functioning of internal controls
in his department.

181


Recommendations made by Group


III. Accrual Accounting for Better Accountability
• GASAB should be the nodal agency for preparing the standards and formats for
accrual accounting.
• Accrual accounting should be taken up in project mode and implemented in a
specific timeframe. Further, incentives for introduction of accrual accounting
should be given by the Ministry of Finance to the State Governments in the form
of grants.
• A steering committee should be set up under the chairmanship of the Finance
Minister for implementation of the accrual accounting project.
IV. Parliamentary Financial Control
• PAC should be coterminous with the term of the Parliament. On-fifth of the PAC
members may retire every year to involve more members.
• Financial limits for savings and excess expenditure should be periodically
reviewed.
• The Standing Committee attached to each department while discussing the
demands for grant may also discuss the internal control framework of each Ministry
as well as outstanding audit paras.
• CAG DPC Act needs an amendment, particularly in relation to powers of CAG
to secure documents, information and clarifications as well as access of audit in
regard to audit of grants.
• FRBM may be amended suitably to incorporate provisions relating to control
over savings/ excess expenditure and avoidable supplementary grants and costing
and concept of programme budgeting.
Group 3: Strengthening financial management at State level
Flow of centrally sponsored schemes
• One size fits all approach will not work
182


• State should be involved in the Scheme formulation
• There should be enough flexibility for State specific variation
• There can be a MOU to regulate flow of funds.
• If there is delay on part of state Government to release the funds, additional
contribution by way of interest may have to be made.
• An alternative can be to release the funds directly to executing agencies, but make
a non cash credit in favour of State Government.
• State Government in turn releases it share in cash and also makes a non cash release
corresponding to the central share.
• All releases from GOI should be posted on a common website.
IFMIS
• The standard software for all states will not work.
• Instead GOI should help in putting together a common framework incorporating
best practices from different states.
• The protocol for inter-state communication and standards for financial transactions
having all India implications should be prescribed by GOI.
• States should be encouraged to develop to their own IFMIS based on the common
framework.
• This can be an area for funding by GOI/Finance Commission.
Expenditure tracking at local bodies
• Expenditure tracking should include all funds of the local bodies including their
own resources.
• The major lacuna found in proper expenditure tracking/auditing is nonmaintenance of Accounts and non closing of Accounts on time by local bodies.
183


List of Reports Submitted by the
Second Administrative Reforms Commission up to April 2009


• This can be out sourced to Chartered Accountants and Accounts maintained and
closed on time to facilitate proper auditing.
• Outcome/performance auditing should also be taken to see how well the funds
are spent.

1.

First Report:

Right to Information: Master Key to Good Governance

2. Second Report:

Unlocking Human Capital: Entitlements and Governance –
A Case Study

• Distinction between revenue and capital should remain

3.

Third Report:

Crisis Management: From Despair to Hope

• Grants to another level of Government for asset creation should be accounted as
Capital expenditure at the level where the assets are created.

4.

Fourth Report:

Ethics in Governance

5.

Fifth Report:

Public Order – Justice for All . . . Peace for All

6.

Sixth Report:

Local Governance – An Inspiring Journey into the Future

7.

Seventh Report:

Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution – Friction to Fusion

8.

Eighth Report:

Combatting Terrorism – Protecting by Righteousness

9.

Ninth Report:

Social Capital – A Shared Destiny

Programme based expenditure classification

• Distinction between Plan and Non-Plan should be removed. It should
be development expenditure and expenditure on statutory and sovereign
functions.
• Further classification may be for
– Programme activities
– Administrative Cost
– Overheads

10. Tenth Report:

Refurbishing of Personnel Administration – Scaling New Heights

– Financing cost

11. Eleventh Report:

Promoting e-Governance – The SMART Way Forward

12. Twelfth Report:

Citizen Centric Administration – The Heart of Governance

• Performance parameters should be a part of the Budget
Multi Year Budgeting

13. Thirteenth Report: Organisational Structure of Government of India

• There can be multi year planning of resources and expenditure
• This exercise should feed into the Annual Budget
• Multi year budgeting and carry over of funds from one year to another may not
be practical.

184

185

Second ARC(14th report)- strenghthening financial management systems

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