Paper 2026/1531
Toward a Secure Fixed-Point Implementation of the Falcon Signature Scheme
Abstract
Falcon was selected by NIST in 2022 for standardization as a post-quantum digital signature scheme. Among all standardized signature schemes, Falcon achieves the smallest signature size. Its main drawback, however, is its reliance on floating-point arithmetic, which plays a critical role in the security analysis. This reliance poses significant challenges for practical implementations: some platforms lack floating-point units, floating-point division is not constant time on many processors, and protecting floating-point computations against side-channel attacks using masking techniques is particularly difficult on embedded devices. To address portability issues, Pornin (ePrint 2019/893) proposed an implementation of \falcon that emulates floating-point arithmetic using integer operations. While it enables deployment on a wider range of platforms, this approach incurs a substantial performance penalty compared to the native floating-point implementation. This work studies the theory and practice of implementing Falcon's signing procedure in fixed-point arithmetic. This requires a specific analysis of the boundedness and precision of intermediate variables. 1. Our boundedness analysis revolves around a key fact: almost every intermediate variable arising during key expansion and signing is bounded by a function of four quantities that can be computed at key generation time. Our modified key generation enforces thresholds on these quantities through a light rejection step that rejects less than 50% of initial Falcon keys. This then yields sharp, unconditional bounds on all fixed-point variables. Establishing these bounds is highly nontrivial, and relies on Gaussian concentration arguments as well as on symplectic pairs, a generalization of symplecticity. 2. Our precision analysis remains, for now, partly empirical. Following a Rényi divergence argument, our main theorem proves the security of fixed-point Falcon conditioned on error bounds of certain intermediate values. These error bounds are derived empirically based on extensive experiments. We provide a C fixed-point implementation. It is approximately a factor of two slower than the original floating-point \falcon implementation, but achieves a speedup of an order of magnitude compared to emulated floating-point implementations.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2026
- Keywords
- FalconFN-DSAlattice implementationsfixed-point arithmetic
- Contact author(s)
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daniel de-almeida-braga @ irisa fr
pierre-alain fouque @ irisa fr
bachir lachguel @ pqshield com
thomas prest @ pqshield com - History
- 2026-07-30: approved
- 2026-07-26: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/1531
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1531,
author = {Daniel De Almeida Braga and Pierre-Alain Fouque and Bachir Lachguel and Thomas Prest},
title = {Toward a Secure Fixed-Point Implementation of the Falcon Signature Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1531},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1531}
}