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Use SELinux "db_table: { truncate }" to check if permission is granted to
TRUNCATE. Update example SELinux policy to grant needed permission for
TRUNCATE. Add new regression test to demonstrate a positive and negative
cases. Test will only be run if the loaded SELinux policy has the
"db_table: { truncate }" permission. Makes use of recent commit which added
object TRUNCATE hook. Patch by Yuli Khodorkovskiy with minor
editorialization by me. Not back-patched because the object TRUNCATE hook
was not.
Author: Yuli Khodorkovskiy
Reviewed-by: Joe Conway
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAFL5wJcomybj1Xdw7qWmPJRpGuFukKgNrDb6uVBaCMgYS9dkaA%40mail.gmail.com
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As of Fedora 30, it seems that the system-provided macros for setting
up user privileges in SELinux policies don't grant the ability to read
/etc/passwd, as they formerly did. This restriction breaks psql
(which tries to use getpwuid() to obtain the user name it's running
under) and thereby the contrib/sepgsql regression test. Add explicit
specifications that we need the right to read /etc/passwd.
Mike Palmiotto, per a report from me. Back-patch to all supported
branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/[email protected]
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The regression tests for sepgsql were broken by changes in the
base distro as-shipped policies. Specifically, definition of
unconfined_t in the system default policy was changed to bypass
multi-category rules, which the regression test depended on.
Fix that by defining a custom privileged domain
(sepgsql_regtest_superuser_t) and using it instead of system's
unconfined_t domain. The new sepgsql_regtest_superuser_t domain
performs almost like the current unconfined_t, but restricted by
multi-category policy as the traditional unconfined_t was.
The custom policy module is a self defined domain, and so should not
be affected by related future system policy changes. However, it still
uses the unconfined_u:unconfined_r pair for selinux-user and role.
Those definitions have not been changed for several years and seem
less risky to rely on than the unconfined_t domain. Additionally, if
we define custom user/role, they would need to be manually defined
at the operating system level, adding more complexity to an already
non-standard and complex regression test.
Back-patch to 9.3. The regression tests will need more work before
working correctly on 9.2. Starting with 9.2, sepgsql has had dependencies
on libselinux versions that are only available on newer distros with
the changed set of policies (e.g. RHEL 7.x). On 9.1 sepgsql works
fine with the older distros with original policy set (e.g. RHEL 6.x),
and on which the existing regression tests work fine. We might want
eventually change 9.1 sepgsql regression tests to be more independent
from the underlying OS policies, however more work will be needed to
make that happen and it is not clear that it is worth the effort.
Kohei KaiGai with review by Adam Brightwell and me, commentary by
Stephen, Alvaro, Tom, Robert, and others.
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To do this, we add an additional object access hook type,
OAT_FUNCTION_EXECUTE.
KaiGai Kohei
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KaiGai Kohei, with comment and doc wordsmithing by me
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The main change here is to call security_compute_create_name_raw()
rather than security_compute_create_raw(). This ups the minimum
requirement for libselinux from 2.0.99 to 2.1.10, but it looks
like most distributions will have picked that up before 9.3 is out.
KaiGai Kohei
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This is intended as infrastructure to allow sepgsql to cooperate with
connection pooling software, by allowing the effective security label
to be set for each new connection.
KaiGai Kohei, reviewed by Yeb Havinga.
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KaiGai Kohei, with some changes by me.
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KaiGai Kohei
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This is still pretty rough - among other things, the documentation
needs work, and the messages need a visit from the style police -
but this gets the basic framework in place.
KaiGai Kohei
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