Leibniz: On Virtue and Duty

Alexander Daniels
November 20, 2014

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 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born on 1 July 1646, Leipzig (Germany)1 . During that time, it was a city of

Saxony which was under the rule of the holy Roman empire; its denominational allegiance being Lutheran,

which Leibniz identified as, and continued to throughout his life.2 His father, Friedrich Leubnitz, was a

professor of moral philosophy at the University of Leipzig, and died during Leibniz’s youth. Consequently,

his library was bequeathed to young Leibniz, and this was, most certainly, the beginnings of his explorations.3

Later receiving an M.A. in philosophy, he was well prepared to begin his inspired task to unite his doctrinal

convictions with the modern (in his time) state of philosophy. Throughout this era, the Roman empire was

comprised of several sects of Christianity - each state devoted to the doctrine held by its ruler. Yet his world

was rich and diverse in thought and culture, nourished and maintained by the spirit of ‘mutual toleration’ in

most affairs of science and business4 . One can safely say that Leibniz was indeed a Christian, and therefore

a deist (although he was free or“independent in thought”5 ). In addition, he was a determinist, in the sense

that he believed all things were determined by the (observable and unobservable) universal laws and purpose

of God. Out of his many memorable works, Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics will be the chief source of

inspiration for this discourse. I will examine and explore the consequences of the Leibnizian system of ethics

- especially the notions of virtue and duty. To this end, the following quotation is of primary interest.

Now then, without asking for something that you are unable to know and that can give you no
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light, act according to your duty and your knowledge.

This statement is preceded by a discussion on will, where Leibniz asserted that God created and maintains

the universe in such a way that preserves our freedom in matters of will or volition. He then added that God

created man’s will or soul seeks that which reflects God’s will - all while preserving our ability to choose, i.e.,

“... without at all necessitating our choice, [God] determines it by what appears most desirable.” 7 He equated

the will with the ability to suspend an action or act contrarily. Finally, after raising an objection,“But, you

object, perhaps it has been ordained from all eternity that I will sin”, he retorted, “Find your own answer;

perhaps it has not been.” It is in this context, and immediately after these words, that the principal quotation

is presented.

1 [1] - See Introduction P.9

2 See previous note
3 [1] P.10
4 [1] P. 11-12
5 As his friend, Baron von Boineburg remarked [1] - see P.11
6 SeeDiscourse on Metaphysics §30 for quote and upcoming discussion.
7 All quotations are the words of Leibniz, as it appears in the work given above.

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 To understand the words of Leibniz, we must first examine his metaphysical system of monads. According

to his formulation, each monad - the fundamental unit or being of the universe that is capable of action - 8 is

uniquely determined by an “internal principle”,9 which guides the monad’s behavior; The external universe

cannot influence or govern its behavior. Leibniz describes this property as it “...[having]no windows”10 .

Interestingly, he states that the unique, inherent qualities that distiguish between monads are“perceptions”-

inner representations of the external world - and its “appetitions” - “...its tendencies to pass from one

perception to another.” or “...the consciousness or reflective knowledge of this inner state...”.11 It is from

these notions that we can construct a spirit12 ,which all men(or mankind) possess, endowed with the power

of reflection and rationality13 (which is, of course, accompanied by a material body and therefore includes

sensation.14 ). Leibniz puts a great deal of emphasis on the notion of perception, which not only uniquely

determines our being, but also represents the seat of our action. He later identified the mechanisms by

which our perceptions change as either desire (appétits)15 or the “final causes of good and evil ”16 . These

two mechanisms are reminiscent of “final” and “efficient” causes.

Efficient causes are obtained from observing causal relationships between objects. Although Leibniz

argued that such casual relationships are, in fact, illusions in his Monadology, he does acknowledge their

usefulness in the sciences.17 Final causes are derived from Aristotelian philosophy18 and are defined as the

goal for which an event or object was purposed (Notice that the built-in assumption is that every object

and event was purposed for something). Leibniz provides the beautiful analogy of a craftsman for the need

of both; The craftsman creates an object for a purpose, yet can easily explain the principles or mechanisms

upon which it was built. This is a clear reference to God’s role as creator, and is succinctly stated in the

following introduction to this section of his discourse.

8 The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason §1

9 See The Monadology §11
10 The Monadology §7
11 The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason §2, 4
12 It is tempting to think that monads are merely spirits, which is not true. Please see the later development of final and

efficient causes and [1] P.31

13 §5
14 See The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason §4 for Leibniz’s brief treatment of the senses
15 The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason §3
16 Also §4
17 Also,Discourse on Metaphysics §22
18 See footnote in [1] P.18

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 Reconciliation of the two methods of explanation, the one using final causes, and the other

efficient causes, thus satisfying both those who explain nature mechanically and those who have

recourse to incorporeal natures.19

The statement above also recounts one of Leibniz’s main goals - to reconcile two mutually exclusive modes

of explanation and thought and combine them through his metaphysical development. In light of this, I

reinterpret a monad as the material final cause of a series or set of phenomena. Notice that the notion of

efficient causes hides in this ‘series of phenomena’ or “change in perceptions”, for these changes are observable

and subject to a more scientific analysis.20

It is with this knowledge that we can extract the full meaning out of Leibniz’s reply “Find your own

answer..”, for it is a charge directed to his readers that rests upon this interplay between God’s deterministic

universe (of efficient causes), and the unfolding of the internal, i.e. the purpose and nature of our existence

embedded within our identity or being - which was also instantiated by God. It is then immediately apparent

that according to Leibniz, moral identity is not predetermined (In the sense that our volition is not a relevant

factor in the final development of events)- consistent with the biblical origins of sin. Therefore, echoing the

primary statement under scrutiny, we can conclude that in a Leibnizian universe, there are truths lying

outside the realm of our capacity (God’s final cause), which need not concern us, and truths contained in

our being(A blend of final cause with reasoning, that includes an awareness of the mechanistic causes) which

are intimately connected with our actions and identity.

I shall now briefly examine Leibniz’s ethical system as it relates to (our) action. Leibniz postulated that

for every possible action, there is an associated moral quality, i.e. right or obligation.21 If we have the right

to perform an action, equivalently, we have the freedom to do so - given by an explicit law. For, according to

an Aristotelian view, that which is not “expressly permitted” by law is forbidden. Or, in other words, there

has to be a good or, as Leibniz would say, “sufficient reason” why we should have the freedom to act in a

prescribed manner.22 Otherwise, we are obligated to act, i.e., by not doing we are necessarily committing

a sin or moral wrong. This constraint is imposed by logic and can be seen as the “logical criteria” for the

attribute of moral uprightness. As Hobbes aptly remarked, “Where liberty ends, obligation begins”.23 I

must add, however, that Leibniz’s conception of obligation does not solely rely on objective reasoning. In

fact, it is contingent upon the (subjective) idea that the individual desires happiness, which (it perceives)
19 See footnote 12
20 This means that both perspectives are built into the smallest and most fundamental unit of his theory, which is not at all
unreasonable and makes perfect sense (I just had a “eureka-moment”)!
21 For the present discussion, please see [2] Ch.7 (Virtue and Duty) P.64-72
22 See Grua’s suggestion in [2] P. 68
23 De cive, II.10 or See P.68 in [2]

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can only be obtained through one and only method. (which is yet to be defined).24 Therefore, the ideal

moral state of mankind is known, not only through reason, but also by one’s nature to seek happiness.To

further elucidate this point, let us consider the words of Leibniz.

Since a right is a power, and an obligation a necessity, imposed upon the man who wishes to be

just, it will have force also for the man who wants to be ‘saved’. The wise man already knows,

and the fool will learn by his misfortune, that the prudent man cannot do things which conflict

with piety, justice and honesty, things which are morally wrong and ought not to be done; and,

by contrast, that it is to everyone’s greatest benefit to seek virtue and praise, and to develop

righteousness above all.25

God’s judgment associates ‘good’ with happiness, for who could be happy with a life full of ‘misfor-

tunes’ ?26 This immediately clarifies the concept of good (once more); it must be defined by God and

therefore follows from Christian values and teachings. Leibniz emphasizes the important point, which might

be buried by legalism, that these values coincide with what is best for us. In this way, God is not simply a

dictator; he carefully considers the well-being of his creation. We can now conclude that God provides the

‘sufficent reason’ for moral uprightness. Once this reason is understood through either a series of misfortunes

or an understanding of God’s ways, the force of logic shows us the most direct route to our happiness.I rein-

troduce the term duty and recall the words of Leibniz: “...act according to your duty and your knowledge.”

It is not only obvious that the set of obligations (duty) are implied to be known, but also, with the above

discussion, how one may obtain such knowledge.I now direct the discussion to the concept of virtue.

Virtue is a habit or disposition, which becomes second nature, of acting easily in the manner

prescribed by reason; or, more briefly, it is a tendency of volition in the direction of happiness. 27

The term ‘habit’, which is - more or less - a repeated act, and disposition or tendency, are tied together

by an underlying variable - time. A habit or tendency can only be known after a sufficient amount of time

has passed, although that doesn’t stop us from making judgments as soon as we observe an act; moreover, it

is the next proposition (“...which becomes second nature...”) , which adds another dimension to this analysis.

Notice that a habit, by some process, becomes natural, i.e., characteristic of the actor. The difference between

nature and habit resides only in the quality of an action; ‘nature’ involves an a priori degree of certainty
24 [2]P.70
25 [2] P.70
26 See previous
27 [2] P.64

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that results from one’s internal constitution, while ‘habit’ is a posteriori in the sense that it is derived from

observable patterns of behavior. While observing a set of actions an agent performs, we find, however, that

‘habit’ and ‘nature’ are virtually indistinguishable, even if we observe the pattern of behavior for a long

time! This feature allows us to make these two concepts - these two causes - equivalent. By doing so, both

an explanation based upon the nature of the agent (final cause) and another based upon empirical evidence

(efficient cause) would constitute a ‘sufficient reason’ for its action. This, in my opinion, is the foundation

of a probabilistic (technically, frequentist) formulation. Probability allows the sovereignty of science and

will (especially God’s will) to coexist, for it inherently assumes the natural limitations to our knowledge, all

while making valid claims - upon which a science may be built.

He continues, “...of acting easily in the manner prescribed by reason.” This act, dictated by reason, is

nothing other than an obligation, as described earlier; yet, there is more. Why should performing one’s

obligation be done with ease? To answer this question completely, we must consider Leibniz’s formulation

of duty, which stands in direct contrast with the work of other philosophers, namely Kant. Kant described

duty as being solely derived from reason, which stood in direct opposition to one’s appétits, while Leibniz’s

previous description of duty (Leibniz preceded Kant) included “natural inclinations” and, in fact, coincides

with a brand of moral perfection that follows from both desire and obligation. We can now fully appreciate

this ease; for it follows from Leibnizian duty. The inherent unity between desire and obligation is the

signature of Leibniz’s reconciliatory efforts given for the Judaeo-Christian and stoic conception of virtue.28

The stoic tradition held that the purest form of happiness could only be derived from the exercise of virtue,

which is reflected by Leibniz (“virtue is its own reward”29 ). Leibniz limits this reward to something that

must necessarily be less than the “highest good”, to accommodate the ‘infinite good’ of eternal life offered by

Judaeo-Christian teachings. He did this by asserting that, as stated earlier, God “...appeals to our desires”

(God is apparently interested in our happiness30 ). What, then, can be said of our will? Do we simply strive

to achieve happiness in accordance with God’s will? There is in fact more to it than just the reasoning of a

‘brute’ - a series of reactions to the act or anticipation of God’s judgment; Leibniz agreed.

In a previous section, will was defined as the ability to suspend an action or act contrarily. But, why

would we want to do so if our happiness coincides with God’s will? This is where Leibniz’s varieties of will

become relevant. The “primitive antecedent will ” is the type of will that our last discussion anticipated -

tending to do what it perceives as good and only that. The “meditative will ”, however, might choose an
28 [2] P.72
29 [2]P.65
30 See Theodicy§91 for the upcoming discussion

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action that involves what is normally considered to be “evil”, as long as the “...good exceeds the evil”.31 It

is important to observe that in a Leibnizian universe, both evil and good serve to accomplish God’s will.

This means that evil is only, once again, a result of our limited perception. In God’s point of view, evil and

good are not polar opposites, but two necessary principles by which our lives are governed. Lastly, the “final

and decisive will ” considers all possible good and evil that may result from the action, which is of course

inaccessible to us and can therefore only be exercised by God. Echoing the principal quote once again, this is

what underlies Leibniz statement that tells us not to be concerned with what we cannot know - especially the

full and complete conception of the cause of an action. He does tell us, however, to use what we do know - to

use either our “meditative will” or “primitive will”. There is one interesting interpretation that may follow

from the above discussion; If good only concerns the well-being of the agent of limited ability, then good

becomes an inherently subjective notion. What also follows is that God’s judgment necessarily involves ‘evil’,

since it is often not always in favor of the agent’s immediate well-being. Although our previous discussion

on God’s judgment demonstrated this, it is a fine point that is worthy of a cocktail-party-treatment. At any

rate, ‘the will’ can now be appreciated to be sufficiently complex, yet balanced - ordered, yet spontaneous;

it is with this will that we act.32

An important aspect of this will is it’s strength, which we often refer to when admitting to our neighbors

that we didn’t have the willpower to carry out our New Year’s resolution. This highlights the notion that the

strength of the will is “proportional to virtue”33 , which usually means that an undesirable action (from the

persepective of the actor or agent) is the result of a weak will. Strangely, although the idea of ‘strength of

will’ is also implicitly expressed in this usage of the term ‘ease’, Leibniz’s theory of volition does not allow for

this weakness.34 In fact, he simply attributes these ‘contrary acts’ not to reason, but to the “final causes” (of

good and evil) which are secretly at work, while maintaining that the actor willed it to be so (with the same

degree of strength).35 Therefore, instead of weakness or strength (which cannot be measured), consistency

becomes the measure of the degree of virtue present (within an actor).

Recalling the words “...a tendency of volition”, I revisit the idea of probabilities. If virtue is measured

by the consistency of action, then it can be seen as a ‘probabilistic measure’. Probability not only gives us

a method to measure virtue, but also allows for occasional faults or unexpected phenomena - which is not a

feature of the mechanistic model or view of the world. You might ask, “Why is this mathematical system
31 See previous note
32 Leibniz often used the term “spontaneous” interchangeably with freedom (to act) in his treatment, The Principles of Nature
and of Grace, Based on Reason
33 See [2] P.69
34 See [2] P.65
35 See previous note

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relevant to intellectual thought?”. My answer: all of mathematical and scientific thought, along with any

endeavor of men (including art and history), has, as its foundation, the basis of popular conceptions of that

time and place. In other words, there is no such thing as science divorced from the subjective beliefs of its

creators. With this in mind, the consequence of Leibniz’s reconciliatory approach is substantial in more than

just one subject matter - which I think he was well aware of.

I have raised and answered several questions that were appropriately posed for discourse: According to

Leibniz’s formulation, what exactly is this duty or knowledge that he speaks of? How do we come to know

it? And, why should we act accordingly to its precepts? Implications of his views have also been mentioned

in passing. Leibniz’s motivations for his views remained clear as we waded thorough his formulations; he

was consistent and loyal to his beliefs. His work highlighted the importance of a non-scientific or non-

deterministic cause of being - which begun to fall out of favor (at least among the scientists of that day).

Although many great minds have seen these works as an attempt that never attained the solidity he strove
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to give it, (Kant, for example) it remains as a hopeful tribute. His words - first quoted - are truly words

of wisdom. Although it may at first appear to oppose scientific pursuits, in context, it is clear that it serves

only to put determinism in its proper role - outside of our volition where, I think many would agree, it

belongs. Its effect is a renewed emphasis on our freedom or power to choose, renewed faith in the wisdom

and divine plan of God, and a newfound understanding and appreciation for our identity (even our moral

identity).

36 See [2] P.72

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References

[1] Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Discourse on Metaphysics and other Writings. .Ed. Loptson, Peter: Broad-

view Press, 2012.

[2] Hostler, John. Leibniz’s moral philosophy. (1975).