‘’’’]][]POST-EMPLOYMENT [CASE DIGESTS] reasonably established in an appropriate investigation.

Such employees, too,

are entitled to security of tenure, fair standards of employment and the
I. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT of the em protection of labor laws. Managerial employees, no less than rank-and-file
laborers, are entitled to due process. The captain of a vessel is a confidential
1. PHIL. TRANSMARINE V. CARILLA, 525 SCRA 586 [2007]-Acosta and managerial employee within the meaning of this doctrine. Thus,
DOCTRINE: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that confidential and managerial respondent was illegally dismissed as he was not accorded a fair investigation
employees cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any time, and without cause as as required by law and the ground invoked for his dismissal was not proven.
reasonably established in an appropriate investigation.
2. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY SALES FORCE UNION V. OPLE, 170 SCRA 25
FACTS: Felicisimo Carilla was hired by petitioner Phil. Transmarine Carriers , [1989]-Acosta
in behalf of its principal Anglo-Eastern Shipmanagement, to work as “master” DOCTRINE: So long as a company’s management prerogatives are exercised
on board MV Handy-Cam Azobe for 12 months. in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the
On Nov. 29, 1993, he boarded the vessel in the Ivory Coast. However, on June purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
6, 1994, he was dismissed in India and repatriated in the Phils. special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them.
Carilla filed a case before the LA, alleging that he was illegally dismissed
without notice and without just cause. FACTS: San Miguel Corp. and San Miguel Corporation Sales Force Union
Petitioner alleged that Carilla was incompetent and caused damage to the (PTGWO) had a CBA in force. Its Art. VI, Sec. 1 provides that “the appropriate
cargo while the vessel was in S. Korea. It provided copies of the logbook and bargaining unit shall be entitled to a basic monthly compensation plus
evaluation reports, which allegedly show Carilla’s incompetence. commission based on their respective sales.”
The LA ruled in favor of Carilla; he was illegally dismissed. It said that he had In Sep. 1979, San Miguel introduced a marketing scheme called
a long experience of being a seaman along with recommendations from "Complementary Distribution System" (CDS). Here, wholesalers can purchase
previous employers, which contradicts the allegation of incompetence. beer products directly from it.
Furthermore, petitioner’s documents were not authenticated, which means it The union filed a notice of strike with the Minister of Labor, alleging that San
has no probative value. Miguel committed ULP because the CDS scheme would negate the
The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision. The CA, under Rule 65, also found that “commission” provision in their CBA. According to them, it would reduce their
the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the LA take-home pay and the company would be competing with them.
decision. Labor Minister Blas Ople dismissed the notice of strike on ground that the CDS
Petitioners appealed the decision to the SC, arguing, among others, that they is a valid management prerogative.
should be given wide latitude in terminating managerial employees.
ISSUE: W/N the CDS is a valid management prerogative. (YES)
ISSUE/S: 1) W/ N the documents can be admitted as evidence. (NO)
2) W/N Carilla was illegally dismissed despite being a managerial employee. HELD: So long as a company’s management prerogatives are exercised in
(YES) good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest, and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
HELD: special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them.
1) In Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC, we rejected a typewritten Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according
collation of excerpts from what could be the logbook and found that what to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
should have been submitted as evidence was the logbook itself or even hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work,
authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof, which could have been easily tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working
xeroxed or photocopied, considering the present technology on reproduction regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and
of documents. the discipline, dismissal and recall of work.
Thus, we agree with the LA and the NLRC that these documents, being In this case, the Minister of Labor is correct when he said “nothing in the record
unauthenticated, have no probative value. as to suggest that the unilateral action of the employer in inaugurating the new
2) It is well settled in this jurisdiction that confidential and managerial sales scheme was designed to discourage union organization or diminish its
employees cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any time, and without cause as influence, but rather it is undisputable that the establishment of such scheme
was part of its overall plan to improve efficiency and economy and at the same not benefit from their illegal acts. The dismissed employee, however, is entitled
time gain profit to the highest.” to whatever rights, benefits and privileges [s/he] may have under the
Thus, it is valid. applicable individual or collective bargaining agreement with the employer or
voluntary employer policy or practice or under the Labor Code and other
3. TOYOTA MOTORS PHILS. WORKERS ASSN. V. NLRC, 537 SCRA 171 existing laws.
[2007]-Acosta As in any rule, there are exceptions. One exception where separation pay is
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that when just causes for terminating the given even though an employee is validly dismissed is when the court finds
services of an employee under Art. 282 of the Labor Code exist, the employee justification in applying the principle of social justice well entrenched in the
is not entitled to separation pay. 1987 Constitution.
One exception where separation pay is given even though an employee is In PLDT v. NLRC, the court ruled that severance compensation shall be
validly dismissed is when the court finds justification in applying the principle allowed only when the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconduct
of social justice well entrenched in the 1987 Constitution. It shall be allowed or that which reflects adversely on the employee’s moral character.
only when the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconduct or that In this case, the evidence show that the dismissed workers committed illegal
which reflects adversely on the employee’s moral character. acts, by blocking ingress and egress into the factory, and did not merely
participate in an illegal strike. Therefore, they should not be awarded
FACTS: Toyota Phils. filed an appeal against the DOLE Secretary’s decision, separation pay.
declaring petitioner as the Sole and Exclusive Bargaining Agent of its rank and
file employees. 4. LABADAN V. FOREST HILLS ACADEMY, G.R. 172295, 23 DEC 2008-
Petitioners made proposals for the CBA, but Toyota refused to negotiate Adap
because of such pending appeal. They sent a letter to Toyota, requesting to DOCTRINE:
be absent in order to attend the hearing. Toyota denied the said request.
On Feb. 21, 2001, 135 union officers and employees did not render overtime FACTS: Petitioner Labadan was hired by respondent Forest Hills Mission
work and proceeded to strike in the the DOLE and BLR office in Intramuros. Academy in July 1989 as an elementary school teacher. She was registrar and
The following day there were already more than 200 employees on strike. secondary school teacher for 12 years.
Toyota experienced acute lack of manpower in its manufacturing and She filed a complaint against respondent for illegal dismissal. She alleged in
production lines, and was unable to meet its production goals, resulting in huge her position paper that she was allowed to go on leave; she exceeded her
losses. approved leave period, but such extension allegedly was impliedly approved
It sent individual letters to some 360 employees requiring them to explain by respondent because she received no warning or reprimand and in fact
within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for their obstinate defiance retained in the payroll up to 2002.
of the company’s directive to render overtime work on Feb. 21, 2001, for their Forest Hills on the other hand claimed that petitioner was permitted to go on
failure to report for work on Feb. 22 and 23, 2001, and for their participation in leave for two weeks, but did not return for work after the expiration of the
the concerted actions, which severely disrupted and paralyzed the plant’s period. Despite her undertaking to report "soon", she never did, even until the
operations. end of S.Y. 2001-2002. It thus hired a temporary employee to accomplish the
Petitioner filed a case against Toyota for ULP. Thereafter, Toyota terminated needed reports.
227 employees for violating the company’s code of conduct and Art. 282 of the The LA decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that respondents Forest Hills
Labor Code. Academy and/or Naomi Cabaluna is guilty of illegal dismissal. The NLRC
The CA upheld the dismissal, but granted separation pay. reversed and set aside the LA’s decision, and dismissed petitioner’s complaint.
The CA dismissed the case on the ground of technicalities.
ISSUE: W/N the employees terminated for just causes are entitled to ISSUE: W/N petitioner was illegally dismissed. (NO)
separation pay. (NO)
HELD: While in cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of
HELD: Generally, NO. The general rule is that when just causes for proving that the dismissal is for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must
terminating the services of an employee under Art. 282 of the Labor Code first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal. The records do not
exist, the employee is not entitled to separation pay. The apparent reason show that petitioner was dismissed from the service. They in fact show that
behind the forfeiture of the right to termination pay is that lawbreakers should despite petitioner's absence from July 2001 to March 2002 which, by her own
admission, exceeded her approved leave, she was still considered a member Javier is entitled to security of tenure. For failing to present proof of a valid
of the Forest Hills faculty which retained her in its payroll. cause for his termination, Fly Ace was found to be liable for illegal dismissal of
Petitioner's affidavit and those of her former colleagues, which she attached Javier. The CA annulled the ruling of NLRC. It ruled that Javier is not an
to her Position Paper, merely attested that she was dismissed from her job employee.
without valid cause, but gave no particulars on when and how she was
dismissed. ISSUE: W/N Javier was illegally dismissed. (NO)
There being no substantial proof that petitioner was dismissed, she is not
entitled to separation pay or backwages. HELD: Javier is not an employee of Fly Ace. He simply assumed that he was
an employee of Fly Ace, absent any competent or relevant evidence to support
5. JAVIER V. FLY ACE CORP./ CASTILLO, G.R. 192558, 15 FEB 2012- it. "He performed his contracted work outside the premises of the respondent;
Adap he was not even required to report to work at regular hours; he was not made
DOCTRINE: to register his time in and time out every time he was contracted to work; he
was not subjected to any disciplinary sanction imposed to other employees for
FACTS: Javier alleged that he was an employee of Fly Ace, performing company violations; he was not issued a company I.D.; he was not accorded
various tasks at the respondent’s warehouse, such as cleaning and arranging the same benefits given to other employees; he was not registered with the
the canned items before their delivery to certain locations, except in instances SSS as petitioner's employee; and, he was free to leave, accept and engage
when he would be ordered to accompany the company’s delivery vehicles as in other means of livelihood as there is no exclusivity of his contracted services
pahinante. When he reported to work, the security guard refused to let him with the petitioner, his services being co-terminus with the trip only. All these
enter the premises of the company upon the instruction of Mr. Ong, his lead to the conclusion that petitioner is not an employee of the respondents.
superior. When he saw Mr. Ong, he approached and asked why he was being Therefore, there could be no illegal dismissal.
barred from entering the premises; Ong replied by saying, “Tanungin mo sa
anak mo”. He went home and discussed the matter with his family. He 6. TORREDA V. TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIP., 523 SCRA 133 [2007]-
discovered that Ong had been courting his daughter Annalyn after the two met Adap
at a fiesta celebration in Malabon City; that Annalyn tried to talk to Ong and DOCTRINE:
convince him to spare her father from trouble, but he refused to accede.
Thereafter, Javier was terminated from his employment without notice, and he FACTS: Torreda filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Cristobal and
was neither given the opportunity to refute the cause/s of his dismissal from Toshiba. The LA rendered a decision declaring that Torreda’s dismissal from
work. To support his allegations, Javier presented an affidavit of Bengie employment was unjustified. The series of events indicated that Torreda was
Valenzuela, who alleged that Javier was a stevedore or pahinante of Fly Ace harassed by Sulpuveda because of his exposé of irregularities she had
from Sept. 2007 to Jan. 2008. The said affidavit was subscribed before the LA. committed. The opening of his drawer formed part of her harassment tactics.
Fly Ace on the other hand, averred that it was engaged in the business of Thus, Torreda had all the right to demand an explanation for the forcible
importation and sales of groceries. In Dec. 2007, Javier was contracted by its opening of his computer files and drawer which resulted in the loss of some
employee, Mr. Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw basis at an agreed rate of amount of money. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that respondent Toshiba did
P300 per trip, which was later increased to P325. Mr. Ong contracted Javier not observe the rudiments of due process in terminating Torreda’s
roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month whenever the vehicle of its contracted employment. The result of the investigation on the charges against him came
hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was not available. On April 30, 2008, Fly Ace out on Oct. 2, 1998, or four days before Torreda submitted his written
no longer needed the services of Javier. Denying that he was their employee, explanation to the charges. With this, the LA ruled that respondent company
Fly Ace insisted that there was no illegal dismissal. It submitted a copy of its is guilty of illegal dismissal.
agreement with Milmar Hauling Services and copies of acknowledgment Aggrieved by the decision, respondents appealed the case to the NLRC. They
receipts evidencing payment to Javier for his contracted services bearing the maintained that the sending of an e-mail message containing insulting and
words, "daily manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay)" and the latter's offensive words, and false and malicious statements against his immediate
signatures/initials. superior (Sepulveda), clearly intended to cause dishonor, is not only
The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, on the ground that Javier destructive of the morale of his co-employees and violative of company rules
failed to present proof that he was a regular employee of Fly Ace. The NLRC and regulations; it also constitutes serious misconduct that would justify
ruled in favor of Javier; finding that Javier was a regular employee, it ruled that dismissal from employment. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. The
NLRC ratiocinated that the complainant committed the infraction of accusing without prior permission while he was on leave, not only on Sept. 7, 1998 but
his immediate superior of stealing ₱200 and calling her a robber (through an also on Sept. 10 and 11, 1998; he also pointed out that Sepulveda looked into
e-mail message), without any evidence at all, and forwarding copies to the his personal files in his computer. In fine, by falsely ascribing a crime to
other officers of the company. It declared that this infraction constitutes serious Sepulveda, petitioner was merely retaliating against perceived misdeeds she
misconduct, a just cause for dismissal under Art. 282(a) of the Labor Code, as had committed against him. However, the manner resorted to by petitioner of
amended. It also declared that considering the urgency of the situation, it was redressing the wrong committed by Sepulveda is a criminal act. As the adage
necessary to open the drawer of Torreda: there had been numerous follow- goes, the end cannot justify the means used by petitioner.
ups from separated employees regarding their pending final salary payments,
and from incumbent employees claiming maternity and sickness benefits 7. SUPREME STEEL PIPE CORP. V. BARDAJE, G.R. 170811; APRIL 24,
under the SSS, and processing these applications was part of complainant’s 2007-Alcaraz
responsibilities. Moreover, the opening of the drawer was conducted in the DOCTRINE: Although fighting within company premises may constitute
presence of Oscar Eusebio, Noralyn Florencio and Flor Berdin, who were serious misconduct (possible ground for disciplinary actions), not every fight
employees of the Finance Section, with prior notice to Kobayashi, Vice- within company premises in which an employee is involved automatically
President for Finance. The NLRC further held that disrespect to company warrants dismissal from service.
officials and staff members constitutes serious misconduct, which means a
transgression of some established rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction. FACTS: Petitioner Supreme Steel Pipe Corp. (SSPC), a domestic corporation
Consequently, pursuant to Art. 279 of the Labor Code, the complainant is not primarily engaged in the business of manufacturing steel pipes, employed
entitled to reinstatement to his former position with loss of seniority rights and respondent Rogelio Bardaje as a warehouseman on March 14, 1994. SSPC
privileges, or to payment of any separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, or employees were required to wear a uniform (a yellow t-shirt with a logo and
payment of any backwages and other benefits. the marking "Supreme") while at work.
Respondent reported for work at 6:45 a.m. It was a common practice among
ISSUE: W/N Torreda was illegally dismissed. (NO) warehousemen to wear long-sleeved shirts over their uniforms to serve as
protection from heat and dust while working, respondent had on a green long-
HELD: Torreda is guilty of serious misconduct. There is abundant evidence on sleeved shirt over his uniform. Security guard Christopher Barrios called him
record showing that petitioner committed libel against his immediate superior, in a loud voice, and arrogantly ordered him to remove and turn-over to him
Sepulveda, an act constituting serious misconduct which warrants the (Barrios) the long-sleeved shirt. Insulted and feeling singled-out from the other
dismissal from employment. warehousemen who were also wearing long-sleeved shirts over their uniforms,
Petitioner maliciously and publicly imputed on Sepulveda the crime of robbery respondent replied: " Ano ba ang gusto mo, hubarin ko o magsuntukan na lang
of ₱200. As gleaned from his Complaint which he filed with the General tayo sa labas?" A heated exchange of words ensued, but the brewing scuffle
Administration, he knew that it was Delos Santos who opened his drawer and between the two was averted by a co-employee and was able to keep the
not Sepulveda. Thus, by his own admission, petitioner was well aware that the parties apart. Barrios reported the incident to the SSPC management.
robbery charge against Sepulveda was a concoction, a mere fabrication with The next day, respondent received a Memorandum from petitioner SSPC,
the sole purpose of retaliating against Sepulveda’s previous acts. stating that pending the investigation for his alleged violation of the company
The records show that Sepulveda was impelled to forcibly open petitioner’s rule prohibiting "inciting a fight, harassing, coercing, intimidating and/or
drawer. She needed to retrieve the benefits applications of retirees and threatening co-workers," he was being meted a 30-day preventive suspension.
incumbent employees of respondent-corp., which petitioner had failed to He was also required to submit his Answer/Comment to the incident, to which
process for payment before his leave. The claimants sought to have their he readily complied.
claims approved and released with dispatch. Before opening petitioner’s When respondent reported back to work a month after, he was served with a
drawer, Sepulveda saw to it that she had Kobayashi’s approval. Delos Santos Notice dated Sept. 8, 1999, terminating his employment effective Sept. 23,
opened the drawer of petitioner in the presence of his co-employees in the 1999. "Petitioner SSPC declared that respondent's continued employment
Financial Section. Thereafter, the claims were processed and payments were would pose serious and imminent threat to the lives of his co-workers and to
effected. Thus, Sepulveda acted in good faith. the property of the corporation and its employees.
Petitioner admitted that his charge of robbery/theft against Sepulveda was Alleging that his dismissal from service was illegal, respondent filed a
baseless, but claimed that he fabricated the charge because of his Complaint on against petitioner and its President, Regan Sy.
exasperation and anger at Sepulveda’s repeated acts of opening his drawer Petitioners SSPC and Sy posited that for threatening Barrios and challenging
him to a fight after being "politely advised" to remove the long-sleeved shirt singled out from other warehousemen, who were similarly-clothed while on
and wear the uniform, respondent committed serious misconduct. duty, sufficiently explained why he challenged Barrios to a fight.
The LA rendered judgment and held that Bardaje was illegally dismissed.
8. GURANGO V. BEST CHEMICALS AND PLASTICS, INC., G.R. 174593,
ISSUE: W/N respondent’s misconduct does warrant the imposition of the 25 AUG 2010-Alcaraz
ultimate sanction of dismissal. (NO) DOCTRINE: In termination cases, the employer has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence that the dismissal is for just cause. If the employer fails
HELD: Petition has no merit. LA's conclusion that respondent's misconduct to discharge the burden of proof, the dismissal is deemed illegal.
does not warrant the imposition of the ultimate sanction of dismissal.
Undeniably, the altercation between respondent and Barrios was nipped in the FACTS: Respondent Best Chemicals and Plastics, Inc. (BCPI) is a corporation
bud by the timely intervention of other employees. The momentary work engaged in the manufacture of biaxially oriented polypropylene and related
stoppage did not pose a threat to the safety or peace of mind of the workers. products. Respondent Moon Pyo Hong is the president and CEO of BCPI.
Neither did such disorderly behavior cause substantial prejudice to the Petitioner Alex Gurango and Romeo Albao worked as boiler operator and
business of respondent SSPC. security guard, respectively, in BCPI. In a memorandum dated 2 May 2003,
In this jurisdiction, we have consistently defined misconduct as an improper or BCPI prohibited its employees from bringing personal items to their work area.
wrong conduct, a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, Erring employees would be suspended for six days.
a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, implies wrongful intent According to Gurango, at 4 a.m., he performed his routine check-up inside the
and not mere error of judgment. To be a just cause for termination under Art. production area. He had in his pocket a camera without film. On his way out of
282 of the Labor Code, the misconduct must be serious, that is, it must be of the production area, he saw Albao standing near the bundy clock. Albao pulled
such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. him, grabbed his pocket, and tried to confiscate the camera. Gurango refused
However serious, such misconduct must nevertheless be in connection with to give the camera because there was no reason to surrender it.
the employee's work; the act complained of must be related to the performance Albao held Gurango's arm and punched him on the face. Gurango shouted for
of the employee's duties showing him to be unfit to continue working for the help. Another security guard, Rodenio Pablisarrived. Instead of pacifying
employer. Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for Albao, Pablis joined in punching and kicking Gurango. Albao and Pablis
dismissal: (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the banged Gurango's head against the floor and provoked him to fight back.
employee's duties; and, (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit Gurango's co-worker, Elvin Juanitas , saw what happened and asked Albao
to continue working for the employer. and Pablis to stop hitting Gurango. Albao and Pablis brought Gurango to the
These guideposts were not complied with in the instant case. Although we guardhouse. Officer-in-charge Rommel Cordero locked the guardhouse, then
have recognized that fighting within company premises may constitute serious ordered Albao and Pablis to continue hitting Gurango. Freddie Infuerto arrived
misconduct, we have also held that not every fight within company premises at the guardhouse and asked the security guards to stop hitting Gurango.
in which an employee is involved would automatically warrant dismissal from Gurango agreed to surrender the camera on the condition that the security
service. guards would prepare a document acknowledging receipt of the camera.
Respondent's actuations during the Aug. 19, 1999 incident were not entirely Albao, on the other hand, alleged that he was on duty at the main entrance of
baseless. To begin with, it is certain that the verbal tussle between him and the production area from 7 pm of 4 May 2003 to 7 am of 5 May 2003. At 4:20
Barrios did not start due to the alleged "violent temper and tendency to violate am, Gurango tried to enter the production area bringing a camera. Albao told
company rules and regulations" of respondent; the incident was primarily due Gurango that he could not bring the camera inside the production area.
to Barrios' provoking attitude. Other than the self-serving allegation of Gurango got mad and tried to grab Albao's gun. Albao and Gurango engaged
petitioner SSPC that Barrios "politely advised" respondent to remove his green in a fistfight. Cordero, Pablis, and another security guard, Fredrick Lañada,
long-sleeved shirt and to wear the company-issued uniform, no competent and arrived and stopped the fight.
credible evidence was shown to support the claim. In fact, even the On 5 May 2003, at 8:35 am, Gurango went to Dr. Homer Aguinaldo for
handwritten statements of the three security guards, including that of Barrios examination and treatment. Dr. Aguinaldo issued a medical report and advised
himself, did not dwell on the manner by which petitioner was instructed. On Gurango to rest for three days.
the other hand, petitioner's narrations, as corroborated by the duly notarized In a letter dated 5 May 2003, BCPI asked Gurango to explain in writing why
affidavit of fellow warehouseman Jury Lobitania, revealed how insulting and no disciplinary action should be taken against him and then placed him under
arrogant Barrios was. This, aside from petitioner's feeling that he was being preventive suspension effective 6 May 2003. On 6 May 2003, Gurango wrote
a letter to BCPI narrating what happened. Court has observed that the term fight was considered to be different from the
On 10 May 2003, BCPI wrote a letter to Gurango finding him guilty of engaging term argument. The Court characterized fight as not just a merely verbal
in a fistfight and violating company policy by bringing a camera. tussle, but a physical combat between two opposing parties. Fight was held to
In a letter dated 19 May 2003, BCPI dismissed Gurango effective 20 May be more than just an exchange of words that usually succeeded the
2003. provocation by either party. The gravity of the fight, which was not more than
On 26 May 2003, Gurango filed with the NLRC a complaint against BCPI and a verbal argument between them, was not enough to tarnish or diminish
Hong for illegal dismissal. Northwest's public image.
In his Decision, the LA found BCPI liable for illegal dismissal. He ordered BCPI
to pay Gurango backwages and separation pay. FACTS: Petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. employed respondent Ma.
Concepcion Del Rosario on Dec. 10, 1994 as one of its Manila-based flight
ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s engagement in a fistfight would to warrant his legal attendants. On May 18, 1998, she was assigned at the Business Class Section
dismissal. (NO) of Northwest Flight NW 26 bound for Japan. During the boarding preparations,
Kathleen Gamboa, another flight attendant assigned at the First Class Section
HELD: The petition is meritorious. In termination cases, the employer has the of the same flight, needed to borrow a wine bottle opener from her fellow
burden of proving, by substantial evidence that the dismissal is for just cause. attendants because her wine bottle opener was dull. Vivien Francisco,
If the employer fails to discharge the burden of proof, the dismissal is deemed Gamboa's runner, went to the Business Class Section to borrow a wine bottle
illegal. opener from Del Rosario, but the latter remarked that any flight attendant who
An employee's dismissal due to serious misconduct must be supported by could not bring a wine bottle opener had no business working in the First Class
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence Section. Upon hearing this, Aliza Ann Escaño, another flight attendant, offered
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even her wine bottle opener to Francisco. Apparently, Gamboa overheard Del
if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. Rosario's remarks, and later on verbally confronted her. Their confrontation
In the present case, aside from Albao's statement, BCPI did not present any escalated into a heated argument. Escaño intervened but the two ignored her,
evidence to show that Gurango engaged in a fistfight. Moreover, there is no prompting her to rush outside the aircraft to get Maria Rosario Morales, the
showing that Gurango's actions were performed with wrongful intent. Assistant Base Manager, to pacify them.
The surrounding circumstances show that Gurango did not engage in a On June 19, 1998, Del Rosario was informed of her termination from the
fistfight: service. Northwest stated that based on the results of the investigation, Del
(1) in his 9 May 2003 letter to BCPI, Juanitas corroborated Gurango's version Rosario and Gamboa had engaged in a fight on board the aircraft, even if there
of the facts; had been no actual physical contact between them; and because fighting was
(2) nobody corroborated Albao's version of the facts; strictly prohibited by Northwest, to the point that fighting could entail dismissal
(3) in his medical report, Dr. Aguinaldo found that Gurango suffered physical from the service, even if committed for the first time, Northwest considered her
injuries; dismissal from the service justified and in accordance with the Rules of
(4) Gurango filed with the MCTC a complaint against Albao, Cordero and Conduct for Employees,
Pablis for slight physical injury; Del Rosario subsequently filed her complaint for illegal dismissal against
(5) the LA found Gurango's statement credible and unblemished; Northwest.
(6) the LA found Albao's statement contradictory; In her decision, the LA ruled in favor of Northwest, holding that the dismissal
(7) the LA stated, "I am convinced Albao lied in his statement"; of Del Rosario had been justified and valid upon taking into account that
(8) the NLRC found that Gurango did not start a fight; Northwest had been engaged in the airline business in which a good public
(9) the NLRC found Albao's statement unbelievable and exaggerated; and image had been demanded, and in which flight attendants had been expected
(10) the CA's reversal of the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC is to maintain an image of sweetness and amiability; that fighting among its
baseless. employees even in the form of heated arguments or discussions were very
contradictory to that expected image; and that it could validly dismiss its
9. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. V. DEL ROSARIO, G.R. 157633, 1 SEPT employees like the respondent because it had been entitled to protect its
2014-Alcaraz business interests by putting up an impeccable image to the public.
DOCTRINE: The fight between her and Gamboa should be so serious that it Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA, and ruled in favor of
entailed the termination of her employment even if it was her first offense. The Del Rosario, declaring that the incident between her and Gamboa could not
be considered as synonymous with fighting as the activity prohibited by misconduct really existed.
Northwest's Rules of Conduct. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the incident was the kind of fight
Aggrieved, Northwest elevated the adverse decision to the CA, which prohibited by Northwest's Rules of Conduct, the same could not be considered
sustained the NLRC. It observed that Northwest did not discharge its burden of such seriousness as to warrant Del Rosario's dismissal from the service.
to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting The gravity of the fight, which was not more than a verbal argument between
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC; and the NLRC had them, was not enough to tarnish or diminish Northwest's public image.
correctly held that Del Rosario's conduct did not constitute serious misconduct
because in determining the usual, ordinary and commonly understood 10. NAGUIT V. SAN MIGUEL CORP., G.R. 188839, 22 JUNE 2015-Andal
meaning of the word fighting, the NLRC had resorted to authoritative lexicons DOCTRINE:
that supported its conclusion that the exchange of words between Del Rosario
and Gamboa did not come within the definition of the word fighting. FACTS: Cesar Naguit was employed as a machine operator of San Miguel
Corp. Metal Closure and Lithography Plant, a division of respondent corp.
ISSUE: Was Del Rosario's dismissal from the service valid. (NO) In Sept. 23, 2002, petitioner and Renato Regala, another employee, got
involved in an altercation in respondent corp.'s Canlubang Plant.
HELD: The dismissal was not justified. In his Position Paper, petitioner claimed that Regala went to the said plant to
As provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an distribute anti-union materials that are libelous and defamatory; and as union
employee for a just cause. steward, he confronted Regala. This confrontation developed to a heated
Northwest argues that Del Rosario was dismissed on the grounds of serious exchange of words. Petitioner then elbowed Regala, hitting him in the face,
misconduct and willful disobedience. Misconduct refers to the improper or causing him to lose his balance and fall to the ground.
wrong conduct that transgresses some established and definite rule of action, As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint with respondent corporation's
a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful HR Dept. Respondent corporation then conducted an administrative
intent and not mere error in judgment. But misconduct or improper behavior, investigation giving both parties the opportunity to defend themselves.
to be a just cause for termination of employment, must: (a) be serious; (b) However, petitioner opted to remain silent and did not address the charges
relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) show that the against him.
employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. Petitioner was found guilty of willful injury to another employee within company
In this respect, the fight between Del Rosario and Gamboa should be so premises, which is an infraction of the company's rules and regulations.
serious that it entailed the termination of her employment, even if it was her On Feb. 7, 2003, respondent corporation served upon petitioner a letter
first offense. informing him of the termination of his employment on the basis of the findings
In several rulings where the meaning of fight was decisive, the Court has and recommendation of the investigator. He then filed a complaint for illegal
observed that the term fight was considered to be different from the term dismissal against the former.
argument. In People v. Asto, for instance, the Court characterized fight as not LA--[ruled in favor of respondent corporation] Petitioner's complaint was
just a merely verbal tussle, but a physical combat between two opposing dismissed for lack of merit.
parties. Similarly, in Pilares v. People, fight was held to be more than just an NLRC--[dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the Decision of the LA]
exchange of words that usually succeeded the provocation by either party.
Based on the foregoing, the incident involving Del Rosario and Gamboa could ISSUE: W/N the petitioner had been unlawfully dismissed. (NO)
not be justly considered as akin to the fight contemplated by Northwest. In the
eyes of the NLRC, Del Rosario and Gamboa were arguing, but not fighting. HELD: The Court does not agree with petitioner's argument that the penalty
The understanding of fight as one that required physical combat was absent of dismissal imposed upon him is too harsh and is not commensurate to the
during the incident of May 18, 1998. Moreover, the claim of Morales that Del infraction he has committed, considering that he has been in respondent's
Rosario challenged Gamboa to a brawl (sabunutan) could not be given employ for fifteen years and that this is just his first offense of this nature.
credence by virtue of its being self-serving in favor of Northwest, and of its The settled rule is that fighting within company premises is a valid ground for
being an apparent afterthought on the part of Morales during the investigation the dismissal of an employee. Moreover, the act of assaulting another
of the incident, without Del Rosario having the opportunity to contest Morales' employee is serious misconduct which justifies the termination of employment.
statement. In that context, the investigation then served only as Northwest's Also, the Court agrees with respondent's contention that if petitioner's long
means to establish that the grounds of a valid dismissal based on serious years of service would be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty
of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the On separate occasions thereafter, petitioners sent at least three persons to
meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its talk to and convince private respondent to settle her differences with the
ranks of all undesirables. In addition, where the totality of the evidence was former. Private respondent, however, remained adamant in her refusal to
sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the employees, the law warrants their submit to authority. She received a letter formally informing her that she had a
dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and a habitual month to look for another job as the school had decided to accept her
delinquent. In the present case, all the more should petitioner's years of resignation.
service be taken against him in light of the finding of the lower tribunals that Private respondent then filed a complaint for illegal deduction and
his violation of an established company rule was shown to be willful and such underpayment of salary, overtime pay and service incentive pay.
willfulness was characterized by a wrongful attitude. Moreover, petitioner has On July 19, 1989, she was prevented from entering the school premises in
never shown any feelings of remorse for what he has done, considering that view of her dismissal from the service. Consequently, private respondent
the lower tribunals found no justification on his part in inflicting injury upon a amended her complaint to include illegal dismissal.
co-employee. To make matters worse, petitioner even exhibited a seemingly LA--[decided in favor of private respondent] She was dismissed without a
arrogant attitude in insisting to remain silent and rejecting requests for him to hearing being conducted in order to afford her an opportunity to present her
explain his side despite having been given numerous opportunities to do so. side.
NLRC--[affirmed the LA decision, with modification] At the outset of this
11. CATHEDRAL SCHOOL OF TECHNOLOGY V. NLRC, 251 SCRA 554 opinion, on the rational that while petitioners had valid reasons to terminate
[1992]-Andal the services of private respondent, the dismissal was nonetheless illegal for
DOCTRINE: lack of due process; hence, the award of backwages, separation pay and
attorney's fees.
FACTS: In Feb., 1981, Teresita Vallejera sought admission as an aspirant to
the Congregation of the Religious of Virgin Mary (RVM). She came to live with ISSUE: W/N NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
the sisters of the congregation and received free board and lodging at the payment of said monetary claims where the dismissal is illegal for denial of
house of the nuns. She volunteered to assist as a library aide in the library due process, but there is a finding of a valid ground for termination. (YES)
section of the Cathedral School of Technology, an educational institution run
by the RVM sisters. In return for her work, she was given a monthly allowance HELD: An evaluative review of the records of this case supports a finding of a
of P200. just cause for termination. The reason for which private respondent's services
Private respondent had a change of heart in later years and confessed to the were terminated, (i.e., her unreasonable behavior and unpleasant deportment
sisters that she was no longer interested in becoming a nun. She pleaded, in dealing with the people she closely works with in the course of her
however, to be allowed to continue living with the sisters for she had no other employment) is analogous to the other "just causes" enumerated under the
place to stay in, to which request the sisters acceded and, in exchange Labor Code, as amended.
therefor, she voluntarily continued to assist in the school library. As petitioner school is run by a religious order, it is but expected that good
On Jan. 29, 1988, private respondent formally applied for and was appointed behavior and proper deportment, especially among the ranks of its own
to the position of library aide with a monthly salary of P1,171. It was at around employees, are major considerations in the fulfillment of its mission. Under the
this time, however, that trouble developed. The sisters began receiving circumstances, the sisters cannot be faulted for deciding to terminate private
complaints' from students and employees about private respondent's difficult respondent whose presence "has become more a burden rather than a joy"
personality and sour disposition at work. and had proved to be disruptive of the harmonious atmosphere of the school.
Private respondent was summoned to the Office shortly after the resignation On the matter of illegal dismissal, petitioners do not dispute the findings, and
of the school's Chief Librarian, on account of irreconcilable differences with in effect admit, that private respondent was denied her right to due process.
her, for the purpose of clarifying the matter. As found by the LA, no hearing on the impending dismissal was conducted as
Private respondent resented the observations about her actuations and was would have afforded private respondent an opportunity to explain her side and,
completely unreceptive to the advice given by her superior. She reacted if need be, to defend herself. True, petitioners notified her of the school's
violently to petitioner's remarks and angrily offered to resign, repeatedly decision to terminate her services. But notice alone, without the requisite
saying, "OK, I will resign. I will resign." Thereafter, without waiting to be hearing does not suffice. Therefore, its ruling that private respondent was
dismissed from the meeting, she stormed out of the office in discourteous illegally dismissed was premised solely on the fact of alleged lack of procedural
disregard and callous defiance of authority. due process, without regard to whether or not there was lawful cause for such
dismissal, which latter aspect constitutes the element of substantive due It is true that, exceptionally and as an equitable concession, separation pay
process. may be allowed as a measure of social justice, but only in those instances
It is the contention of petitioners that dismissal for cause, but without due where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
process does not warrant an order for reinstatement or separation pay, as the misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. However, such
case may be for backwages, for these are sanctions that pertain to dismissals exceptional circumstance does not obtain in the present case.
without just cause. On the other hand, arbitrary dismissal for just cause only Verily, an award for payment of separation pay presupposes that the illegally
warrants an award of indemnity for the dismissed employee. dismissed employee would otherwise have been entitled to reinstatement.
It is axiomatic that if just cause for termination of employment actually exists Where, as in this case, there is sufficient basis to dismiss private respondent
and is established by substantial evidence in the course of the proceedings which accordingly is a lawful impediment to her reinstatement, an award for
before the LA, the fact that the employer failed to accord to the discharged separation pay would be a specious inconsistency. Not being entitled to
employee the right of formal notice of the charge or charges against him and reinstatement, private respondent cannot legally be entitled to separation pay.
a right to ventilate his side with respect thereto, and that she was illegally Finally, private respondent is not entitled to recover attorney's fees since the
dismissed for lack of due process, will not operate to eradicate said just cause, instant case clearly does not fall under either the general rule therefore or any
so as to impose on the employer the obligation of reinstating the employees of the exceptions thereto as enunciated in Art. 2208 of the Civil Code.
and otherwise granting him such other concomitant relief as is appropriate in
the premises. 12. CITIBANK, N.A V. NLRC, 544 SCRA [2008]-Andal
It stands to reason that the separation of private respondent from the service DOCTRINE:
is justified as borne out by the circumstances of this case, and is bolstered by
the jurisprudential tenet of long and indisputable standing that —An employer FACTS: Rosita was found by the LA to be an employee of petitioner Citibank
cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who for around 18 years. At the time her employment was terminated for serious
admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties and
and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his gross inefficiency, she was occupying the position of filing clerk.
interests. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither In 1993, as a result of the reorganization, respondent bank declared certain
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. officers and employees, or their positions/functions, redundant. Among these
This being so, there can be no award for backwages, for it must be pointed out affected was complainant Paragas. However, to accommodate the union
that while backwages are granted on the basis of equity for earnings which a officers’ request, complainant’s employment was not terminated, but was
worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal, where private assigned to Records Management Unit of the Quality Assurance Division as
respondent's dismissal is for just cause, as is the case herein, there is no bank statement retriever, a filing clerk job.
factual or legal basis to order payment of backwages; otherwise, private On 11 Dec. 1996, complainant was assigned to undertake the special project
respondent would be unjustify enriching herself at the expense of petitioners. of reorganizing the UAOF from 13 Dec. 1996 to 15 May 1997. As she failed to
Where the employee's dismissal was for a just cause, it would be neither fair complete the project on 30 May 1997, complainant was given another 30 days
nor just to allow the employee to recover something he has not earned or could to complete it. However, by the end of June 1997, her accomplishment was
not have earned. only 30% of the total work to be done.
Neither can there be an award for separation pay. In Cosmopolitan Funeral She was directed to explain in writing why her employment should not be
Homes, Inc. v. Maalat, we reiterated the categorical abandonment of the terminated on the ground of serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross
doctrine that employees dismissed for cause are entitled to separation pay on and habitual neglect of her duties and gross inefficiency. Correspondingly,
the ground of social and compassionate justice. This ruling finds support in complainant was placed under preventive suspension. Complainant submitted
Sec. 7, Bk. VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code which expressly her written explanation on 31 July 1997. Respondent bank notified
states that: “just causes for terminating the services of an employee shall be complainant that her written explanation and those which she ventilated during
those provided in Art. 282 of the Code. The separation from work of an the administrative conference were found self-serving. Consequently, it
employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided terminated her employment on the ground of serious misconduct, willful
in the Code, without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties and gross inefficiency.
privileges he may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining Following the termination of her services, respondent filed a complaint for
agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice. illegal dismissal, praying for reinstatement, backwages, damages and
attorney’s fees. By the aforementioned Decision, the LA dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit, finding that her dismissal on the ground of work
inefficiency was valid FACTS: Petitioner Corazon Sim filed a case for illegal dismissal with the LA.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA, with the modification She alleged that respondent Equitable PCI-Bank hired her as Italian
that respondent should be paid separation pay "as a form of equitable relief" Remittance Marketing Consultant to the Frankfurt Representative Office, and
in view of her length of service with petitioner. then promoted her to a Manager position. However, Remegio David (Senior
Respondent filed a MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION of the Officer, European Head of PCIBank, and Managing Director of PCIB-Europe)
NLRC Resolution. She no longer challenged her dismissal on the ground of informed her through a letter that she was being dismissed due to loss of trust
work inefficiency, but prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay her the and confidence based on alleged mismanagement and misappropriation of
"Provident Fund" benefits under its retirement plan for which she claimed to funds. On the other hand, respondent denied any ER-EE relationship between
be qualified pursuant to petitioner’s "Working Together" Manual, specifically them, and sought the dismissal of the complaint.
the provision on page 12.5 thereof. Claiming that the labor arbiter upheld her LA--The case should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It is the Italian law
dismissal on the ground of merely "work inefficiency" and not for any that should apply, as complainant was hired and assigned in a foreign land,
misconduct on her part, she asserted that she is entitled to 90% of the although by a Phil. Corp.
retirement benefits. NLRC--[affirmed the LA’s Decision, and dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack
ISSUE/S: 1) W/N the dismissal was invalid. (NO) of merit.]
2) W/N she was qualified for retirement benefits. (NO) CA--[dismissed the petition for certiorari due to petitioner's non-filing of a
HELD: Respondent is not entitled to retirement benefits, as she was validly motion for reconsideration with the NLRC; also denied petitioner’s motion for
dismissed for serious misconduct, and not merely for work inefficiency. reconsideration]
After a review of the NLRC finding that respondent did not commit serious Hence, the present recourse under Rule 45 of the ROC.
misconduct, this Court finds otherwise. While the LA did not explicitly rule that
respondent committed serious misconduct, his decision leads to that ISSUE: W/N a prior motion for reconsideration is indispensable for the filing of
conclusion, for the documentary evidence which it cites as basis to prove her a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC with the CA. (YES)
work inefficiency shows, upon close examination, also her commission of
serious misconduct. HELD: Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is
The evaluation of respondent finds corroboration in her admission that "she available only when there is no appeal; or any plain, speedy, and adequate
may have been tactless and insolent in dealing with her superior but it does remedy in the ordinary course of law. A "plain" and "adequate remedy" is a
not allegedly warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal." motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution, the filing of which
Finally, even the NLRC, in its later ruling that respondent was not guilty of is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.
misconduct notwithstanding, was aware that the problem with respondent was This is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself.
not merely her poor work output, but her unreasonable behavior and There exceptions to the said rule:
unpleasant deportment. (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
When an employee, despite repeated warnings from the employer, obstinately jurisdiction;
refuses to curtail a bellicose inclination, such that it erodes the morale of co- (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
employees, the same may be a ground for dismissal for serious misconduct. raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
It is respondent’s obstinate refusal to reform herself which ultimately raised and passed upon in the lower court;
persuades this Court to find that her dismissal on the ground of serious (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
misconduct was valid. and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or
Having been validly dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct, of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
respondent is thus disqualified from receiving her retirement benefits pursuant (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would
to the provision of petitioner’s "Working Together" Manual. be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
13. SIM v. NLRC, 534 SCRA 515 [2007]-Andaya urgency for relief;
DOCTRINE: Mere existence of a basis for believing that a managerial (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
employee has breached the trust of the employer would suffice for his/her granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
dismissal. (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
 process; (3) She admitted to reading a confidential letter addressed to the PET
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no officers/directors, which letter contains the legal opinion of the
opportunity to object; and corporate counsel regarding her case.
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved. (4) As such, she was validly terminated from her employment on the
On the other hand, petitioner failed to qualify her case as among the ground that she willfully breached the trust and confidence reposed in
exceptions. She argued that filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC her by her employer.
would be merely an exercise in futility and useless. Such is not for her to Consequently, the SC held that Tirazona has given PET more than enough
determine. She also contended that the issue is purely a question of law, which reasons to distrust her. The arrogance and hostility she has shown towards
is an exception. However, such are mixed questions of fact and law. Thus, the the company and her stubborn, uncompromising stance in almost all instances
CA did not err in dismissing the petition. justify the company's termination of her employment. Moreover, her reading of
More so, since petitioner failed to show any error on the part of the LA and the what was supposed to be a confidential letter between the counsel and the
NLRC in ruling that she was dismissed for cause. She did not deny that she PET directors, even if it concerns her, only further supports her employer's
had withdrawn 3M lire from the bank's account, but she submitted that she view that she cannot be trusted.
used it for the Radio Pilipinas sa Roma program of the company. However, From this, Tirazona moved for reconsideration. However, the SC denied this,
the said program was already off the air at the time. As a managerial as it did not present any substantial arguments that would warrant a
employee, loss of trust and confidence is a valid ground for her dismissal. The modification of it previous ruling.
mere existence of a basis for believing that a managerial employee has Thereafter, Tirazona filed the instant Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion
breached the trust of the employer would suffice for his/her dismissal. for Reconsideration.
However, the SC noted that there was palpable error in the LA's disposition of
the case with regard to the issue on jurisdiction. It was wrong for the LA to rule ISSUE: W/N a Second Motion for Reconsideration should be granted. (NO)
that "labor relations system in the Philippines has no extra-territorial
jurisdiction." Under Art. 217 of the Labor Code, Sec. 10 of RA 8042 (the HELD: The said Motion is completely unmeritorious. A second motion for
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), and Sec. 62 of the reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, which shall not be allowed, except for
Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 8042, it is clear that extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave shall have
LAs have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from ER-EE first been obtained. In this case, the SC failed to find any such extraordinarily
relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom persuasive reason to allow such motion.
are OFWs. As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just
causes enumerated under Art. 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to
14. TIRAZONA V. PHIL. EDS TECHNO-SERVICE (PET) INC., G.R. 169712, separation pay. Although by way of exception, such grant of separation pay or
20 JAN 2009-Andaya some other financial assistance may be allowed to an employee dismissed for
DOCTRINE: Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice just causes on the basis of equity. Nevertheless, PLDT v. NLRC stated that
only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those
other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character; a instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
contrary rule would have the effect of rewarding, rather than punishing, the serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character; a contrary rule
erring employee for his offense. would have the effect of rewarding, rather than punishing, the erring employee
for his offense.
FACTS: In a previous SC Decision, it was stated that the NLRC and the CA Thus, Tirazona is not entitled to the award of separation pay. To hold otherwise
adapted the ff. facts: would only cause a disturbance of the sound jurisprudence on the matter and
(1) Ma. Wenelita Tirazona was the Administrative Manager of Phil. EDS a perversion of the noble dictates of social justice.
Techno-Service, Inc. (PET). While the SC commiserates with her plight, who has recently manifested that
(2) After PET officers/directors called her attention to her improper she has since been suffering from her poor health condition, it cannot grant
handling of a situation involving a rank-and-file employee, she claimed her plea for the award of financial benefits based solely on this unfortunate
that she was denied due process and demanded P2M indemnity. circumstance. For all its conceded merit, equity is available only in the absence
of law, and not as its replacement. Such is an exceptional extenuating
circumstance that does not favor, nor may be used to reward, the indolent or
the wrongdoer. This Court will not allow a party, in the guise of equity, to benefit separated from service for cause and with due process.
from its own fault. CA--[reversed the NLRC decision and reinstated the LA decision; it, however,
absolved the Capwire president of solidary liability with the company]
15. CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC. V. BALAGOT, 513 SCRA 672 [2007]- Capwire filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this was denied. Thus,
Andaya it filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence recognizes as a valid ground for the dismissal of
an employee the unauthorized use of company time and of company vehicle. ISSUE: W/N respondent Carlos Antonio Balagot was illegally dismissed. (NO)

FACTS: Petitioner Capitol Wireless, Inc. (Capwire) hired respondent Carlos HELD: Capwire's evidence (i.e. its HRD director's report; Balagot's admission;
Antonio Balagot as collector. His duties required him to work outside of the certification of employment; cash voucher for a company loan from CCI; and
office, so it assigned to him a motorcycle as a service vehicle and shouldered his payslip from CCI; etc.) unmistakably indicate that Balagot had been using
his expenses for gasoline and maintenance. its time to perform service for another company.
One day, the director of Capwire's HR Dept. saw him at the Head Office of His claim that he performed his tasks for CCI only after his office hours with
China Banking Corp., with which the company had no business relations. Capwire does not impress. Since it is presumed, until contradicted, that "the
Thereupon, it was discovered that he had been rendering services to the latter, ordinary course of business has been followed," and "things happened
and that he had been concurrently employed with Contractual Concepts, Inc. according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life," it
(a local manpower company, which assigned him to render messengerial logically follows that he performed his duties with China Bank during office
services to China Bank). hours (i.e from 8am to 5pm). He failed to present any proof to contradict this;
As such, the Capwire HRD director recommended the immediate termination hence, the presumption stands against him.
of his services on the ground of grave misconduct and willful breach of trust Undeniably, his work schedule with the bank conflicts with his work schedule
and confidence. The said department then sent him a memorandum regarding with petitioner. As offices customarily close at 5pm , it would be impossible for
his grave misconduct, and asking him to explain why no disciplinary action him to have rendered his services to the bank only after office hours.
should be taken against him. Furthermore, the minutes of the administrative hearing reflect the observations
In his letter-reply, he admitted the said charge. An administrative hearing was of his superiors that he had shortcomings in the conduct of his duties as
later conducted, where he again admitted to the said charge. collector: failure to submit a detailed report of all collections, incomplete
Thereafter, Capwire informed him that he was found guilty of grave collections, and delayed collections. These detract from his claim that his job
misconduct, resulting in the loss of trust and confidence in him, and that he with CCI did not interfere with his duties at Capwire.
was dismissed. As such, the SC upheld his dismissal. Verily, jurisprudence recognizes as a
Subsequently, Balagot filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Capwire valid ground for the dismissal of an employee the unauthorized use of
and its president before the NLRC. company time and of company vehicle.
LA--The complainant's working in another company, while being an employee
of Capwire, is not a just cause for his dismissal under the Labor Code, 16. CALTEX (PHILS.), INC. V. AGAD, G.R. 162017, 23 APRIL 2010-Angeles
especially when there is no positive showing that he used the company time DOCTRINE: In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer
of one employer in his service to another or that the two employers are in to show that the dismissal is for just cause. When there is no showing of a
competing businesses. Thus, Capwire and Marquez were ordered to jointly clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law
and severally reinstate him, and pay him full backwages and attorney's fees. considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. The quantum of proof which
However, should he opt for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, they are to the employer must discharge is substantial evidence.
give him separation pay.
NLRC--The taking on of a double job is not per se illegal. The only limitation is FACTS: Petitioner Caltex Phils, Inc. employed respondent Hermie Agad as
where one job overlaps with the other in terms of time, and/or poses a clear Depot Superintendent-A on a probationary basis for six months. On 28 Feb.
case of conflict of interest as to the nature of business of complainant's two 1984, he became a regular employee. For the next eleven years, he obtained
employers. The present case is clearly a case of moonlighting and using the various recommendations and held the positions of Depot Superintendent-A,
company's time, money and equipment to render service to another company. Field Engineer, Senior Superintendent, and Bulk Depot Superintendent until
Complainant was guilty of violating company rules and regulations, resulting his dismissal on 8 Aug. 1994.
into the loss of trust and confidence in him. Thus, he was lawfully and rightfully
On 5 July 1993, petitioner E.C. Cavestany, the Regional Manager of Caltex, mentioned that he had been a standby worker at the Depot from 1956 to 1982
issued a Memorandum to Agad directing him to explain the ff. audit review and a piece-worker from 1982 up to 1993, the date he executed the affidavit.
findings: (1) the questionable reimbursement of crating expense; and (2) the It appears then that Delda had established a name for himself and his business
alleged unauthorized withdrawal and sale of 190 pieces of LPG cylinders. with Caltex. Any favorable recommendation from Agad, as the outgoing
On 29 July 1993, Agad sent his reply answering all the charges against him. superintendent, would not provide much impact compared to the reputation he
He stated: (1) that Delda Services constructed the two crates worth P15,500 had built all those years.
as evidenced by an official receipt issued by Delda; and (2) that the withdrawal The testimonies of the two corroborating witnesses, Esperas and Villalino,
of the scrap LPG cylinders formed part of his housekeeping duties as depot cannot be given credence since Agad was not given an opportunity to cross-
superintendent. examine them. Their testimonies are considered as hearsay evidence.
Caltex created an investigating panel chaired by Cavestany to look into the Petitioners did not present any other evidence to show that Agad violated
offenses allegedly committed. On 17 Aug. 1993, the panel held its first formal company policy dealing with crating expenses to be limited to a certain
inquiry. amount. Reasonableness was the only criterion given by the employer.
On 29 April 1994, Caltex placed Agad under preventive suspension. Thus, petitioners were not able to fully substantiate the alleged fictitious
On 26 May 1994 or almost 10 months after the first formal inquiry, the panel reimbursement of the crating expense. Delda’s testimony alone, without any
conducted another hearing. Two other hearings were held on 14 June and 6 corroborating evidence to prove otherwise, is insufficient to overcome the
July 1994. presumption of regularity in the issuance of his own official receipt which he
In a Confidential Memorandum dated 8 Aug. 1994, Cavestany informed Agad gave to Agad.
of his dismissal on the grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and The findings of the CA and NLRC establish the ffl: (1) Agad’s request for
cnfidence, both just causes for termination of employment. Respondents Agad withdrawal of the 190 pieces of LPG cylinders as stated in a Memorandum
and Caltex United Supervisors Assoc. filed a complaint with the LA for illegal dated 12 Feb. 1992 cannot be given credence, since the Memorandum
dismissal against petitioners Caltex and its officers. The LA rendered a pertains to the replacement of the scrap materials due to Boy Bato consisting
decision in favor of Agad. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the of 3K kgs of black iron plates, and not to the subject LPG cylinders; (2) Agad
LA.The CA modified the judgment of the NLRC and ruled in favor of Agad. did not observe Caltex's rules and regulations when he transferred the said
cylinders to Millanes compound without the RMRD form as required under
ISSUE: W/Nt Caltex legally terminated Agad’s employment on just causes. Caltex's Field Accounting Manual; (3) Agad gave specific instructions to
(YES) Millanes to sell the cylinders without bidding to third parties in violation of
company rules; (4)Agad failed to submit the periodic inventory report of the
HELD: An employee’s dismissal due to serious misconduct and loss of trust LPG cylinders to the accounting department; (5) Agad did not remit the
and confidence must be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial proceeds of the sale of the LPG cylinders; and (6) even if considered as scrap
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might materials, the LPG cylinders still had monetary value, which Agad cannot
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally appropriate for himself without Caltex's consent. Considering these findings, it
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. is clear that Agad committed a serious infraction amounting to theft of company
In the present case, petitioners terminated Agad’s employment based on these property. This act is akin to a serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
acts: (1) Agads submission of a fictitious crating expense amounting to employee of the lawful orders of his employer in connection with his work, a
P15,1500; and (2) the unauthorized withdrawal and sale of 190 pieces of 11 just cause for termination of employment recognized under Art. 282(a) of the
kg. LPG cylinders for his personal gain and profit. Labor Code.
The official receipt submitted by Agad serves as the best evidence of payment Further, Agad’s conduct constitutes willful breach of the trust reposed in him,
and is presumed regular on its face absent any showing to the contrary. another just cause for termination of employment recognized under Art. 282(c)
Records show that the reimbursement of the crating expense was approved of the Labor Code. Loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for termination
by Agad’s superior upon presentment of the receipt. At the time, such superior of employment, is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a
did not mention that the amount of the crating expense incurred was position of responsibility, trust and confidence.The employee must be invested
unreasonable. with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, care and
Delda, in his affidavit, disclosed that he was forced to issue the receipt in order protection of the employers property and funds. As a superintendent, Agad
to get a favorable recommendation from the incoming superintendent who occupied a position tasked to perform key and sensitive functions which
would replace Agad in the Depot. However, in the same affidavit, Delda necessarily involved the custody and protection of Caltex’s
properties.Consequently, Agad comes within the purview of the trust and dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. On appeal, the CA reinstated the
confidence rule. decision of the LA
In sum, even if Agad did not commit the alleged charge of fictitious
reimbursement of crating expense, he was found to have acted without ISSUE: W/N Pehid committed gross misconduct. (NO)
authority, a serious infraction amounting to theft of company property, in the
withdrawal and sale of the 190 pieces of LPG cylinders owned by the HELD: The voluntary contribution by the locker personnel amongst
company. Caltex, as the employer, has discharged the burden of proof themselves to a mutual fund for their own personal benefit in times of need is
necessary in terminating the services of Agad, who was ascertained to have not in any way connected with the work of the locker boys and the complainant.
blatantly abused his position and authority. Thus, Agad’s dismissal from If ever there was misappropriation or loss of the said mutual fund, the
employment based on (1) acts tantamount to serious misconduct or willful respondent will not and cannot be in any way “tend or cause to prejudice the
violation of company rules and regulations; and (2) willful breach of trust and club.” Under VGC rule, the dishonesty of an employee to be a valid cause for
confidence as Depot Superintendent was lawful and valid under the dismissal must relate to or involve the misappropriation of malversation of the
circumstances as mandated by Art. 282 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code. club funds, or cause or tend to cause prejudice to VGC.
The substantial evidence on record indicates that the P17,990.00, which was
17. VILLAMOR GOLF CLUB V. PEHID, G.R. 166152, 4 OCT 2005-Angeles accumulated from a portion of the tips given by the golfers from May to Oct.
DOCTRINE: While an employee may be validly dismissed for violation of a 1998 and was allegedly misappropriated by the respondent as the purported
reasonable rule or regulation adopted for the conduct of the company’s custodian thereof, did not belong to VGC but to the forced savings of its locker
business, an act allegedly in breach thereof must clearly and convincingly fall room personnel.
within the express intendment of such order. Company policies and regulations are, unless shown to be grossly oppressive
or contrary to law, generally valid and binding and must be complied with by
FACTS: Rodolfo Pehid was employed by the Villamor Golf Club (VGC) as an the parties, unless finally revised or amended, unilaterally or preferably
attendant in the men’s locker room, and thereafter became the Supervisor-in- through negotiation. However, while an employee may be validly dismissed for
Charge. His subordinates included Juanito Superal, Jr., Patricio Parilla, violation of a reasonable rule or regulation adopted for the conduct of the
Ricardo Mendoza, Cesar Velasquez, Vicente Casabon, Pepito Buenaventura company’s business, an act allegedly in breach thereof must clearly and
and Carlito Modelo. They agreed to establish a common fund from the tips convincingly fall within the express intendment of such order.
they received from the customers, guests and members of the club for their
mutual needs and benefits. Each member was to contribute the amount of 18. COSMOS BOTTLING V. WILSON FERMIN, G.R. 193676 and WILSON
P100 daily, and by Oct. 1998, it had reached the aggregate amount of FERMIN V. COSMOS BOTTLING, G.R. 194303, 20 JUNE 2012-Angeles
P17,990. This agreement, however, was not known to the VGC management. DOCTRINE: For misconduct to be serious and therefore a valid ground for
Upon audit of the Locker Room Section, it was reported that there was an dismissal, it must be: 1) of grave and aggravated character, not merely trivial
undeclared and unrecorded aggregate amount of P17,990 for the fund, and or unimportant; and 2) connected with the work of the employee.
that there was no record that the money had been distributed among those
employed in the locker room. FACTS: Wilson Fermin was a forklift operator at Cosmos. He was accused of
In the meantime, an administrative complaint was filed by Pehid’s stealing the cellphone of his fellow employee.
subordinates charging him with misappropriating the P17,990. Management He was then given a Show Cause Memorandum, requiring him to explain why
ultimately dismissed him for gross misconduct in the performance of his duties the cellphone was found inside his locker. In compliance therewith, he
and for acts of dishonesty that caused prejudice to the club, after his submitted an affidavit the following day, explaining that he only hid the phone
submission of a verified explanation denying the claims filed against him. as a practical joke and had every intention of returning it to Braga.
Pehid filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, ULP, separation pay/retirement After conducting an investigation, COSMOS found Fermin guilty of stealing
benefits, damages and attorney’s fees against petitioners VGC and/or Brig. Braga’s phone in violation of company rules and regulations. Consequently,
Gen. Filamer Artajo (Ret. AFP), Col. Ruben Estepa, Lt. Milagros Aguillon, and on 2 Oct. 2003, the company terminated him from employment after 27 years
the VGC Administrative Board of Inquiry. of service.
The LA ruled in favor of Pehid, declaring that the acts attributed to him were Fermin filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal.
not committed in connection with his work as officer-in-charge of the locker LA--[dismissed the complaint for lack of merit] The act of taking a fellow
room. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA, stating that he was legally employee’s cellphone amounted to gross misconduct.
NLRC--[affirmed the LA decision] memorandum accusing them of gross insubordination, work stoppage and
CA--[reversed the rulings of the LA and the NLRC; awarded him his full other offenses.
retirement benefits] LA--[ruled in favor of Unyon] AER is directed to reinstate the concerned
*It must be noted that in the case at bar, all the lower tribunals were in employees without backwages. The employees were suspended from work
agreement that Fermin’s act of taking Braga’s cellphone amounted to theft. without a valid cause and without due process. There is no doubt that the
hostile attitude of the management to its workers and vice versa started when
ISSUE: the workers began organizing themselves into a union. AER was guilty of
illegal dismissal for refusing to reinstate the 5 employees unless they submit a
HELD: medical certificate that they were fit to work. The concerned employees were
not totally without fault. The concerted slowdown of work that they conducted
19. AER V. PROGRESIBONG UNION SA AER, 15 JULY 2011-Arriola in protesting their illegal suspension was generally illegal and unjustifiable.
DOCTRINE: The in pari delicto doctrine in labor cases provides that when both NLRC--[modified the LA decision; set aside the order of reinstatement] There
parties are in pari delicto it warrants the restoration of the status quo ante and was no illegal dismissal. The employees were validly suspended because they
bringing the parties back to the respective positions before the controversy were found positive for illegal drugs in the drug test conducted by AER.
through the reinstatement of employees. If reinstatement is no longer feasible, Management was just exercising its prerogative in requiring them to submit a
the concerned employees should be given separation pay up to the date set medical fit-to-work certificate before they could be admitted back to work. The
for the return of the complaining employees in lieu of reinstatement. concerned employees had no valid basis in conducting a strike; thus AER had
the right to immediately dismiss them.
FACTS: AER is a company engaged in the automotive engine repair and CA--[agreed with the NLRC on the legality and validity of the suspension]
rebuilding business and other precision and engineering works for more than BOTH parties were guilty of ULP. AER tried to have a runaway shop when it
35 years. Progresibong Unyon ng mga Manggagawa sa AER is the legitimate transferred some of its machinery from the main building to the AER-PSC
labor union of the rank and file employees of the former. Both filed a complaint office located on another street on the pretext that the main building was
against each other before the NLRC. AER accused the Unyon of illegal undergoing renovation. It also prevented its employees, even those who were
concerted activities (illegal strike, illegal walkout, illegal stoppage, and ULP), excluded from its complaint, from going back to work for allegedly staging an
while Unyon accused AER of ULP, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. illegal strike. On the other hand, the concerted work slowdown staged by the
AER’s version of facts concerned employees as a result of their alleged illegal suspension was
18 employees staged a walkout and assembled illegally in the company unjustified.
premises. They occupied it for several hours; thus, disrupting the work of the The Unyon prayed for the payment of full backwages and the reinstatement
other employees and AER’s services to its clients. Subsequently, the of all suspended employees. The CA modified its decision and directed the
management required them to explain in writing why they should not be REINSTATEMENT of the employees immediately WITHOUT BACKWAGES.
disciplined and dismissed. Finding the employees’ explanation unsatisfactory,
AER terminated their services. This prompted them to start a wildcat strike, ISSUE: W/N the CA’s order of reinstatement without backwages was correct.
barricade company premises, and prevent the free ingress and egress of the (YES)
other employees, officers, clients, and visitors and the transportation of
company equipment. HELD: The CA was correct for ordering reinstatement without backwages. The
Unyon’s version of facts Court is in accord with the ruling of the LA and the CA that neither party came
The Unyon filed for certification election before the DOLE after organizing their to court with clean hands. Both were in pari delicto. Since both AER and the
employees union within AER. Resenting what they did, AER forced all of its union are at fault or in pari delicto, they should be restored to their respective
employees to submit their urine samples for drug testing. Those who refused positions prior to the illegal strike and illegal lockout. Nonetheless, if
were threatened with dismissal. The results of the drug test came out, and 5 reinstatement is no longer feasible, the concerned employees should be given
out of those 7 who were found positive were suspended. Meanwhile, Unyon separation pay up to the date set for the return of the complaining employees
found out that AER was moving out machines from the main building; sensing in lieu of reinstatement. With such restoration of the status quo ante it
that management was going to engage in a runaway shop, Unyon tried to necessarily follows that there is no award for backwages on the basis of the
prevent the transfer of machines, which prompted AER to issue a general rule that strikers are not entitled to backwages (with some exceptions
not herein applicable, such as where the employer is guilty of oppression and
union-busting activities and strikers ordered reinstated are denied such 20. BUGHAW V. TREASURE ISLAND, 550 SCRA 307 [2008]-Arriola
reinstatement and therefore are declared entitled to backwages from the date DOCTRINE: Where the dismissal is for just cause, the lack of statutory due
of such denial). More so, is the principle of "no work, no pay" applicable to the process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal or ineffectual.
case at bar, in view of the undisputed finding of illegality of the strike. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
AER’s faults right to procedural due process.
AER's fault is obvious from the fact that a day after the union filed a petition
for certification election before the DOLE, it hit back by requiring all its FACTS: Petitioner Bughaw was employed as production worker by
employees to undergo a compulsory drug test. Although AER argues that the respondent Treasure Island. Respondent received information that many of its
drug test was applied to all its employees, it was silent as to whether the drug employees were using prohibited drugs during working hours and within the
test was a regular company policy and practice in their 35 years in the company premises.
automotive engine repair and rebuilding business. As the Court sees it, it was One of its employees, Loberanes, was caught in flagrante delicto by the police
AER's first ever drug test of its employees immediately implemented after the officers while in possession of shabu. He was arrested and sent to jail. In the
workers manifested their desire to organize themselves into a union. AER course of police investigation, He admitted the commission of the crime. He
engaged in a runaway shop when it began pulling out machines from the main implicated petitioner in the crime by claiming that part of the money used for
AER building to the AER-PSC compound located on another street on the buying the illegal drugs was given by the latter, and the illegal drugs purchased
pretext that the main building was undergoing renovation. Certainly, the were for their consumption for the rest of the month.
striking workers would have no reason to run and enter the AER-PSC Respondent required petitioner to explain within 120 hours why no disciplinary
premises and to cause the return of the machines to the AER building if they action should be imposed against him for his alleged involvement in illegal
were not alarmed that AER was engaging in a runaway shop. AER committed drug activities. He was then placed under a 30-day preventive suspension.
another infraction when it refused to admit back those employees who were Petitioner failed to appear before the respondent's legal counsel on the
not included in its complaint against the union. The penalty of dismissal scheduled hearings to explain his side on the matter. Consequently,
imposed by AER against the striking employees, who, by the way, only staged respondent terminated his employment for using illegal drugs within company
a one day walkout, was too severe. premises during working hours, and for refusal to attend the administrative
Moreover, AER failed to show proof that the drug test conducted on its hearing and to submit a written explanation on the charges hurled against him.
employees was performed by an authorized drug testing center. It did not According to petitioner, when he reported back to work after the expiration of
mention how the tests were conducted and whether the proper procedure was his suspension, he was no longer allowed by respondent to enter the work
employed. The case of Nacague v. Sulpicio Lines is instructive: Sec. 36 of R.A. premises and was told not to report back to work. He thus filed a complaint for
No. 9165 provides that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug illegal dismissal.
testing centers. Moreover, said Sec. also prescribes that drug testing shall LA--[ruled in favor of petitioner] Respondent failed to present substantial
consist of both the screening test and the confirmatory test…Drug testing shall evidence to establish the charge leveled against the petitioner. Apart from
conform with the procedures as prescribed by the DOH. Only drug testing Loberanes's statements on petitioner's alleged illegal drug use, no other
centers accredited by the DOH shall be utilized. Drug testing shall consist of corroborating proof was offered by respondent to justify petitioner's dismissal.
both the screening test and the confirmatory test; the latter to be carried out Further, respondent failed to comply with due process when it immediately
should the screening test turn positive. suspended petitioner and eventually dismissed him from employment.
Unyon’s faults Payment of his unpaid wages, backwages, and separation pay was ordered.
The union and the affected workers were also at fault for resorting to a NLRC--[affirmed LA’s decision] The use of illegal drugs can be a valid ground
concerted work slowdown and walking out of their jobs of protest for their illegal for terminating employment only if it is proven true.
suspension. It was also wrong for them to have forced their way to the CA--[reversed the LA and NLRC decisions on the grounds of patent
AERPSC premises to try to bring out the boring machine. The photos shown misappreciation of evidence and misapplication of law] Petitioner was afforded
by AER are enough proof that the picketing employees prevented the entry the opportunity to explain and defend himself from the accusations against him
and exit of nonparticipating employees and possibly AER's clients. Although when respondents gave him notices of hearing, but he repeatedly ignored
the union's sudden work stoppage lasted a day, it surely caused serious them, opting instead to file an illegal dismissal case against respondent.
disturbance and tension within AER's premises and could have adversely
affected AER's clients and business in general. ISSUE: W/N petitioner was lawfully dismissed. (NO)
HELD: There was just cause for dismissal, but respondent Treasure Island failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer
was liable for non-compliance with the procedural due process. Where the because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer's exercise of his
dismissal is for just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify management prerogative.
the dismissal or render it illegal or ineffectual. However, the employer should
indemnify the employee for the violation of his right to procedural due process. The first-notice requirement was present; however, the second notice was
The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent NOT present. While there is no dispute that respondent fully complied with the
practice of "dismiss now, pay later." first-notice requirement apprising petitioner of the cause of his impending
Under the Labor Code, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an termination and giving him the opportunity to explain his side, we find that it
employee are two-fold: the substantive and the procedural aspects. Not only failed to satisfy the need for a second notice informing petitioner that he was
must the dismissal be for a just or authorized cause, the rudimentary being dismissed from employment.
requirements of due process —notice and hearing — must, likewise, be
observed before an employee may be dismissed. Without the concurrence of 21. PLANTATION BAY RESORT AND SPA V. DUBRICO G.R. 182216, DEC
the two, the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal, for 4, 2009-Arriola
employment is a property right of which one cannot be deprived of without due DOCTRINE: Where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for
process. Hence, the two (2) facets of a valid termination of employment are: termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal
(a) the legality of the act of dismissal, i.e., the dismissal must be under any of dismissal. The burden is on the employer to prove that the termination of
the just causes provided under Art. 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the legality employment was for a valid and legal cause. For an employee's dismissal to
of the manner of dismissal, which means that there must be observance of the be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must
requirements of due process, otherwise known as the two-notice rule. be afforded due process.
The charge of drug abuse inside the company's premises and during working
hours against petitioner constitutes serious misconduct, which is one of the FACTS: Respondents were former employees of petitioner Plantation Bay, of
just causes for termination. Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the which petitioner Belarmino is the Manager. After Plantation Bay issued a series
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, of memoranda and conducted seminars relative to its drug-free workplace
a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not policy, it, in compliance with RA 9165 (CDDA of 2002), conducted surprise
merely an error in judgment. The misconduct to be serious within the meaning random drug tests on its employees.
of the Act must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely The drug tests, said to have been carried out with the assistance of the PNP-
trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless, SOCO were administered on about 122 employees by the Martell Medical
in connection with the work of the employee, constitute just cause for his Trade and Lab Services, a drug testing laboratory. Confirmatory tests were
separation. conducted by the Phil. Drug Screening Laboratory, Inc., a DOH-accredited
A dismissal for just cause under Art. 282 (now 297) implies that the employee laboratory.
concerned has committed, or is guilty of, some violation against the employer, 21 employees, including respondents, were found positive for use of
i.e., the employee has committed some serious misconduct, is guilty of some methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Petitioner required them to submit
fraud against the employer, or he has neglected his duties. Thus, it can be said their explanations on the result of the tests, which explanations were found
that the employee himself initiated the dismissal process. unsatisfactory; hence, it dismissed them.
On another breath, a dismissal for an authorized cause under Art. 283 (now Respondents then filed complaints for illegal dismissal, questioning the
298) does not necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the conduct of the drug tests without the presence of the DOLE Regional Director
employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employer's or his representative.
exercise of his management prerogative, i.e., when the employer opts to install LA--[dismissed respondents’ complaints] In testing positive for the use of
labor saving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or when shabu, they were guilty of serious misconduct; hence, Plantation Bay validly
he undertakes to implement a retrenchment program. terminated their employment. They were afforded due process, having been
If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Art. 282 (now 297), but the issued memoranda as to the mandatory investigation, and given the chance
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be to refute the results of the drug tests by submitting results of recent drug tests.
imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in NLRC--Respondent employees were illegally dismissed; the results of the
effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; and if the dismissal is confirmatory drug tests cannot be given credence, since they were conducted
based on an authorized cause under Art. 283 (now 298), but the employer prior to the conduct by the employer of the drug tests
CA--[affirmed the NLRC decision] He immediately called up to explain the reasons for his failure to submit himself
to the random drug test that day. He also proposed that he would submit to a
ISSUE: W/N respondents were illegally dismissed. (YES) drug test the following day at his own expense.
Caro then received a Show Cause Notice from the corp. through Jaime Dulot,
HELD: Respondents were illegally dismissed. his immediate supervisor, requiring him to explain in writing why he should not
The importance of the confirmatory test is underscored in Plantation Bay's own be charged with "unjustified refusal to submit to random drug testing." The
"Policy and Procedures," in compliance with RA 9165, requiring that a Investigating Panel issued an Investigating Report finding respondent guilty of
confirmatory test must be conducted if an employee is found positive for drugs "unjustified refusal to submit to random drug testing" and recommended a
in the Employee's Prior Screening Test, and that both tests must arrive at the penalty of four working weeks suspension without pay, instead of termination,
same positive result. due to the presence of mitigating circumstances.
Records show that the confirmatory test results were released earlier than The VP for Material Mgt. Dept. recommended that respondent be terminated
those of the drug test, thereby casting doubts on the veracity of the from employment instead of merely being suspended. He argued that even if
confirmatory results. Indeed, how can the presence of shabu be confirmed respondent did not outrightly refuse to take the random drug test, he avoided
when the results of the initial screening were not yet out? the same. He averred that "avoidance" was synonymous with "refusal."
Plantation Bay's arguments that it should not be made liable thereof, and that Caro was subsequently terminated on the same day. He demanded that he
the doubt arising from the time of the conduct of the drug and confirmatory was not accorded due process.
tests was the result of the big volume of printouts being handled by Martell do
not thus lie. It was Plantation Bay's responsibility to ensure that the tests would ISSUE: W/N Caro was illegally terminated.(YES)
be properly administered, the results thereof being the bases in terminating
the employees' services. HELD: Caro was illegally terminated.
As petitioners failed to indubitably prove that respondents were guilty of drug While the adoption and enforcement by Petitioner Corp. of its Anti-Drugs Policy
use in contravention of its drug-free workplace policy amounting to serious is recognized as a valid exercise of its management prerogative as an
misconduct, respondents are deemed to have been illegally dismissed. As to employer, such exercise is not absolute and unbridled. Managerial
the appellate court's deletion of the award of damages, the same is in order; prerogatives are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining
there being no clear showing that the termination of respondents' services was agreements, and the general principles of fair play and justice. In the exercise
actuated by bad faith. of its management prerogative, an employer must therefore ensure that the
policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees must
22. MIRANT PHILS. V. JOSELITO CARO, G.R. 181490, 23 APRIL 2014- always be fair and reasonable and the corresponding penalties, when
Bellosillo prescribed, commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the
DOCTRINE: The [petitioner corp.’s] Anti-Drug Policy is excessive in infraction. The Anti-Drugs Policy of Mirant fell short of these requirements.
terminating an employee for his "unjustified refusal" to subject himself to the Petitioner Corp.’s subject Anti-Drugs Policy fell short of being fair and
random drug test on first offense, without clearly defining what amounts to an reasonable. First, the policy was not clear on what constitutes "unjustified
“unjustified refusal”, and that for the ten-year period that respondent had been refusal" when the subject drug policy prescribed that an employee’s
employed by petitioner corporation, he did not have any record of a violation "unjustified refusal" to submit to a random drug test shall be punishable by the
of its company policies. penalty of termination for the first offense. To be sure, the term "unjustified
refusal" could not possibly cover all forms of "refusal" as the employee’s
FACTS: Caro was hired by Petitioner Corp. as its Logistics Officer. At the time resistance, to be punishable by termination, must be "unjustified." To the mind
of the filing of the complaint, respondent was already a Supervisor at the of the Court, it is on this area where Petitioner Corp. had fallen short of making
Logistics and Purchasing Dept. Petitioner Corp. conducted a random drug test it clear to its employees – as well as to management – as to what types of acts
where Caro was randomly chosen among its employees who would be tested would fall under the purview of "unjustified refusal."
for illegal drug use. The same day, he received a phone call from his wife’s The fact that petitioner corp.’s own Investigating Panel and its VP for
colleague who informed him that a bombing incident occurred near his wife’s Operations differed in their recommendations regarding respondent’s case are
work station in Tel Aviv, Israel, where his wife was then working as a caregiver. first-hand proof that there, indeed, is ambiguity in the interpretation and
He proceeded to the Israeli Embassy to confirm the news on the alleged application of the subject drug policy. The fact that petitioner corporation’s own
bombing incident. On that same day, Caro returned to Petitioner Corp.’s office. personnel had to dissect the intended meaning of "unjustified refusal" is further
proof that it is not clear on what context the term "unjustified refusal" applies secretary, Mary Jane Pastoril in 2000 as secretary, and Norlito Escoto in 2001
to. It is therefore not a surprise that the LA, the NLRC and the CA have as salesman.
perceived the term "unjustified refusal" on different prisms due to the lack of On Feb. 28, 2004, Escoto consummated the sale of a Toyota Town Ace to
parameters as to what comes under its purview. To be sure, the fact that the Teodoro Abejar Aquino for P200K. The latter tried, but failed, to haggle for a
courts and entities involved in this case had to engage in semantics – and lower price. While the purchase price indicated in the original copy of the
come up with different constructions – is yet another glaring proof that the receipt issued to the latter was P200K, it was only P190K in the duplicate copy
subject policy is not clear creating doubt that respondent’s dismissal was a that remained with the company. The receipt was issued by Omela to him after
result of petitioner corporation’s valid exercise of its management prerogative. he gave her P200K in cash, which amount he counted in the presence of
It is not a mere jurisprudential principle, but an enshrined provision of law, that Pastoril.
all doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor. Thus, in Art. 4 of the Labor Code, Pastoril then took out the deed of sale and handed it to him. The deed showed
as amended, "[a]ll doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the that the consideration for the sale to be P190K.
provisions of [the Labor] Code, including its implementing rules and On March 8, 2004, the company terminated the employment of Escoto, Omela
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." In Art. 1702 of the New Civil and Pastoril. On March 10, 2004, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
Code, a similar provision states that "in case of doubt, all labor legislation and against the company and its two top officers.
all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living The NLRC and the CA saw the case differently, but only with respect to
for the laborer." Applying these provisions of law to the circumstances in the Pastoril. They found that Pastoril had no participation in the commission of the
case at bar, it is not fair for this Court to allow an ambiguous policy to prejudice fraud because she merely handed the deed of sale to Aquino, the buyer; in
the rights of an employee against illegal dismissal. To hold otherwise and short, she had no knowledge of the discrepancies in the entries of the
sustain the stance of petitioner corporation would be to adopt an interpretation purchase price in the original receipt issued, the duplicate copy of the receipt
that goes against the very grain of labor protection in this jurisdiction. As retained by the company, and the deed of sale.
correctly stated by the LA, "when a conflicting interest of labor and capital are
weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must ISSUE: W/N Pastoril had no participation in the commission of fraud. (NO)
be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord
the underprivileged worker." HELD: Pastoril’s involvement in the questionable transaction was much more
Second, he penalty of termination imposed by petitioner corp. upon than handing over to Aquino his copy of the deed of sale. The payment of the
respondent fell short of being reasonable. Company policies and regulations purchase price, the issuance of the receipt and the handing of the deed of sale
are generally valid and binding between the employer and the employee, to Aquino were not separate isolated acts. They occurred in one continuous
unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law. Recognizing the logical sequence with the players in close proximity with one another. Under
ambiguity in the subject policy, the CA was more inclined to adopt the these circumstances, to say that Pastoril merely handed over the deed of sale
recommendation of petitioner corporation’s own Investigating Panel over that to Aquino without even looking at the document or knowing what it contained,
of Sliman and the NLRC. and without knowing what was actually happening, can hardly be believed.
To be sure, the unreasonableness of the penalty of termination as imposed in The deed of sale did not appear out of thin air; somebody in the company
this case is further highlighted by a fact admitted by petitioner corp. itself: that prepared this.
for the ten-year period that respondent had been employed by petitioner Pastoril was not an innocent participant in the fraudulent sale of the company’s
corporation, he did not have any record of a violation of its company policies. Toyota Town Ace. She acted in concert with Escoto and Omela in the
transaction that defrauded their employer in the amount of P10K, the
difference in the vehicle’s actual price of P200K paid by the buyer, and the
23. WHITE DIAMOND TRADING CORP. V. NLRC, G.R. 186019, 29 MARCH price entered in the duplicate purchase receipt and in the deed of sale. Pastoril
2010-Bellosillo prepared and issued the deed of sale indicating that the vehicle was sold for
DOCTRINE: P190K, although she knew that the buyer was being charged P200K for the
vehicle. Under these facts, there was a conspiracy where every participant had
FACTS: Petitioner White Diamond Trading Corp. is engaged in buying and made significant contributory acts.
selling second hand motor vehicles; Jerry Uy is its owner and Jessie Uy its Despite the above conclusion, we note that the company itself admits that it
President. The company employed Maria Myrna Omela in 1999 as assistant failed to observe procedural due process in Pastoril’s dismissal, and for this
reason, the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages is trip ticket was issued for that particular delivery. However, even if petitioner
warranted. established that it was company policy to have trip tickets for every delivery of
aggregates, it failed to prove that it was the payload operators like respondent
24. SARGASSO CONSTRUCTION AND DEV’T. CORP. V. NLRC, G.R. Mongcal who had the duty of requiring dump truck drivers to show their trip
164118, 09 FEB 2010-Bellosillo tickets before the trucks could be loaded with aggregates. Petitioner failed to
DOCTRINE: Under Art. 279 of the Labor Code, an illegally dismissed prove that respondent Mongcal was involved at all or agreed with the scheme
employee shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to steal aggregates from petitioner. There was no showing whatsoever, that
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his respondent Mongcal had any knowledge that Aldrin Rasote had the intention
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his of stealing company property.
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an illegally dismissed employee
In addition to full backwages, the Court has also repeatedly ruled that in cases shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
where reinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations, then privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
separation pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement. The Court reiterated benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
that the separation pay, as an alternative to reinstatement, should be compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. In addition to full backwages, the Court has also repeatedly ruled that in cases
where reinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations, then
FACTS: Gorgonio Mongcal was employed as a payloader operator by the separation pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement. The Court reiterated
respondent company. He was required to be ready at any time to load dump that the separation pay, as an alternative to reinstatement, should be
trucks as so requested by truck drivers even at early hours of the morning. equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.
That on June 29, 1995 at around 2:30 o'clock in the morning, a dump truck
driver of the respondent company for truck No. 25, requested complainant to
load his dump truck with construction materials at the crusher site. Mongcal 25. SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NUHWRAIN V.
obliged to do his job; that it was later on discovered that said Aldrin Rasote MAGSALIN, G.R. 164939, 06 JUNE 2011-Cabanas
had diverted the delivery of said materials loaded to another person; that as a DOCTRINE:
result of this incident, Mongcal was dismissed from his job effective 30 June FACTS: Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL
1995. Complainant denies having a hand nor was he involved in the act is a duly registered union and the certified bargaining representative of the
committed by truck driver Aldrin Rasote. rank-and-file employees of Hyatt Regency Manila, a five-star hotel owned and
operated by respondent Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. On January
Mongcal alleged that the corporation filed a criminal complaint for theft against 31, 2001, Hyatt’s General Manager, David C. Pacey, issued a Memorandum
him six (6) months after 29 June 1995, the date of the alleged commission of informing all hotel employees that hotel security have been instructed to
the crime charged and only after coming to know that he had filed a labor case conduct a thorough bag inspection and body frisking in every entrance and
against the company with this office. He further alleged that his dismissal from exit of the hotel. He enjoined employees to comply therewith. Copies of the
work was effected without any valid ground and violative of the rules on due Memorandum were furnished petitioner.
process; that he was not informed of the reasons for his termination from the On February 3, 2001, Angelito Caragdag, a waiter at the hotel’s Cafe Al Fresco
service nor was he given an opportunity to explain his side, and hence, he was restaurant and a director of the union, refused to be frisked by the security
deprived of his means of livelihood without due process of law. personnel. The incident was reported to the hotel’s Human Resources
On the other hand, in their memorandum, the Sargasso Construction aver that Department (HRD), which issued a Memorandum to Caragdag on February 5,
complainant was validly dismissed from his job based on loss of confidence 2001, requiring him to explain in writing within forty-eight (48) hours from notice
due to commission of offense constituting act of dishonesty and flagrant why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. The following day, on
violation of respondent's policy. February 6, 2001, Caragdag again refused to be frisked by the security
personnel. Thus, on February 8, 2001, the HRD issued another Memorandum
ISSUE: WON Mongcal Was Illegally Dismissed. requiring him to explain.
HELD: Yes. It is quite clear that the evidence presented in this case did not On February 14, 2001, the HRD imposed on Caragdag the penalty of
reach the level required to find respondent Mongcal guilty of conspiring to reprimand for the February 3, 2001 incident, which was considered a first
commit theft of company property. Petitioner merely harped on the fact that no offense, and suspended him for three days for the February 6, 2001 incident,
which was considered as a second offense. Both penalties were in accordance exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal
with the hotel’s Code of Discipline. construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be
Subsequently, on February 22, 2001, when Mike Moral, the manager of Hyatt’s disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the
Cafe Al Fresco and Caragdag’s immediate superior, was about to counsel two convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of
staff members, Larry Lacambacal and Allan Alvaro, at the training room, substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Caragdag suddenly opened the door and yelled at the two with an enraged Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they
look. In a disturbing voice he said, "Ang titigas talaga ng ulo n’yo. Sinabi ko na help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following
sa inyo na huwag kayong makikipagusap sa management habang ongoing pa judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of
ang kaso!" (You are very stubborn. I told you not to speak to management justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the
while the case is ongoing!) Moral asked Caragdag what the problem was and procedural rules.
informed him that he was simply talking to his staff. Moral also told Caragdag
that he did not have the right to interrupt and intimidate him during his
counseling session with his staff. 26. RCPI V. NLRC, G.R. 114777, 05 JULY 1996-Cabanas
Still later, on March 2, 2001, Caragdag committed another infraction. At 9:35 DOCTRINE:
a.m. on the said date, Caragdag left his work assignment during official hours FACTS: Villaflores was employed by the RCPI on July 1, 1975. He became
without prior permission from his Department Head. He was required to submit the Internal Auditor, Acting Assistant Vice-President for Finance and
an explanation, but the explanation12 he submitted was found Comptroller, and Assistant Vice-President for Management Services.
unsatisfactory.On March 17, 2001, Moral found Caragdag liable for violating German Bernardo Mattus was hired by RCPI on July 2, 1990 as manager of
OSDA 3.07, i.e., "leaving work assignment during official working hours its Management Information System Department. He was under the division
without prior permission from the department head or immediate superior," and of Villaflores but he was required to report directly to Norberto T. Braga, the
suspended him for three days. Executive Vice-President (EVP) for Corporate Services.
On June 1, 2001, the hotel, through Atty. Juancho A. Baltazar, sent Caragdag On October 29, 1990, Mattus posted a copy of an invitation to a computer
a Notice of Dismissal. seminar on the bulletin board without having sought the permission of
In finding the three separate suspensions of Caragdag valid, the Voluntary Villaflores. When the latter arrived and saw the poster, he asked his secretary,
Arbitrator reasoned that the union officers and members had no right to breach Lydia Henares, to remove it from the bulletin board. Lydia Henares followed
company rules and regulations on security and employee discipline on the Villaflores' order. When Mattus learned of its removal, he took the poster from
basis of certain suspicions against management and an ongoing CBA Lydia Henares and sought out Villaflores.
negotiation standoff. Mattus found Villaflores at work in the computer room. He said, "Ano ba ito,
Petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal, but the Danny?" Villaflores replied, "Hindi puede," at the same time getting a stapler
motion was denied by the CA. Thus, petitioner filed before this Court a petition with the apparent intention of throwing it at Mattus. When a co-employee
for review on certiorari grabbed the stapler from Villaflores, the latter snatched the poster from Mattus,
tore and crumpled it, and threw the pieces at Mattus but missed. Had it not yet
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari been for the timely intervention of the other employees present, the two would
filed before it on the ground that the same is an improper mode of appeal have assaulted each other. As Mattus was leaving the room, Villaflores
shouted invectives such as "bullshit ka," "baboy ka" and "gago ka" at him.
HELD: In the case of Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN- On the same day, Mattus lodged a complaint against Villaflores for: (a) conduct
APL v. Bacungan,26 we repeated the well-settled rule that a decision or award unbecoming of an assistant vice-president of the company; (b) threatening a
of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for review under subordinate with physical injury, and (c) shouting invectives at a subordinate
Rule 43. in the presence of the Management Services staff.
Hence, upon receipt on May 26, 2003 of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Resolution EVP Braga asked Villaflores to explain why no administrative action should be
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, petitioner should have filed taken against him. Villaflores claimed that after he had instructed his secretary
with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, a petition for to remove all the publications posted on the bulletin board, Mattus rushed into
review, not a petition for certiorari. the computer room and shouted at the top of his voice, "Ano ito, Danny?"
Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cogent Mattus, who was bigger than Villaflores, allegedly attempted to attack him but
reason in this case to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules of procedure was prevented by co-employees from doing so. Villaflores admitted having
uttered "shit, baboy" but these were mere expressions of disgust at and by Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora rendered his decision upholding petitioner's
way of objecting to the imminent attack against his person and dignity. position and declared that private respondent's dismissal is anchored on a
After investigation and personally evaluating all the evidence presented by valid and just cause and the latter's contention of denial of due process as
both parties, EVP Braga issued a memorandum dated January 18, 1991 devoid of merit.15
advising Villaflores of the termination of his services effective December 10, Private respondent then appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the
1990 on grounds of gross misconduct unbecoming of a company official in public respondent NLRC where it was assigned to the First Division. The
gross violation of Rules 52, 53 and 55 of the Company Rules and Regulations. NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered herein petitioner
As a consequence, the company had lost trust and confidence in him. to reinstate private respondent with full backwages less one-month pay.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. ISSUE: Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that
(RCPI) illegally terminated the services of its Assistant Vice-President for dismissal was too harsh a penalty.
Management Services, Mario Danilo B. Villaflores, on the grounds of gross HELD: In termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer
misconduct and loss of confidence. to prove that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause.
While an employer enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of
HELD: Consequently, we agree with the public respondents that the policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees,
termination of employment of petitioner Villaflores on account of a minor those directives, however, must always be fair and reasonable, and the
misconduct was illegal because Art. 282 of the Labor Code mentions "serious corresponding penalties, when prescribed, must be commensurate to the
misconduct" as a cause for cessation of employment. Art. 279 of the same offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. In the case at bar, the
Code provides that an illegal dismissal gives rise to payment of full backwages dismissal meted out on private respondent for allegedly sleeping on the job,
and the reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights, of the dismissed under the attendant circumstances, appears to be too harsh a penalty,
employee. Full backwages should be given petitioner Villaflores from the time considering that he was being held liable for first time, after nine (9) long years
his compensation was withheld from him until the finality of this Decision. of unblemished service, for an alleged offense which caused no prejudice to
While there is no clear and convincing evidence that petitioner's employer has the employer, aside from absence of substantiation of the alleged offense. The
lost trust and confidence in him on account of the October 29, 1990 incident, authorities cited by petitioner are also irrelevant for the reason that there is no
it has presented sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the working evidence on the depravity of conduct, willfulness of the disobedience, or
relationship between them has become so strained that reinstatement may conclusiveness of guilt on the part of private respondent. Neither was it shown
well exacerbate what, to the Company, has degenerated into an untenable that private respondents alleged negligence or neglect of duty, if any, was
situation between them. gross and habitual. Thus, reinstatement is just and proper.

27. VH MANUFACTURING V. NLRC, 322 SCRA 417 [2000]-Cabanas 28. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN - CALAMBA V. VILLAS, 399
DOCTRINE: SCRA 550 [26 MARCH 2003]-Carelo
FACTS: Private respondent was employed in petitioner's, business of DOCTRINE: Under the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a
manufacturing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. He served as a quality valid dismissal from employment: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the
control inspector with the principal duty of inspecting LPG cylinders for any causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code (substantive aspect) and (b)
possible defects and earning P155.00 a day. His service with the company the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
was abruptly interrupted on February 14, 1995, when he was served a notice (procedural aspect).7 The procedural aspect requires that the employee be
of termination of his employment. given two written notices before she is terminated consisting of a notice which
His dismissal stemmed from an incident on February 10, 1995 wherein apprises the employee of the particular acts/omissions for which the dismissal
petitioner's company President, Alejandro Dy Juanco, allegedly caught private is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the
respondent sleeping on the job. On that same day, private respondent was employer’s decision to dismiss him.
asked through a written notice from the petitioner's Personnel Department to
explain within twenty-four (24) hours why no disciplinary action should be FACTS: Belen Villas was employed by the petitioner School as high school
taken against him for his violation of Company Rule 15-b9 which provides for teacher in September 1985. On May 15, 1995, she applied for a study leave
a penalty of separation for sleeping during working hours. for six months, from June to December 31, 1995. In a letter dated June 2,
1995, Mrs. Angelina Quiatchon, principal of the high school department, told Voluntary Arbitrator Mayuga who found that respondent was illegally
Villas that her request for study leave was granted for one school year subject dismissed. MR denied. CA affirmed, Hence, this petition.
to the following conditions:
1. The requested study leave takes effect on June 5, 1995 and ends on March ISSUE: WON respondent’s alleged violation of the conditions of the study
31, 1996; grant constituted serious misconduct which justified her termination from
2. The requested study leave involves no remuneration on the part of the petitioner School.
School;
3. The documents that justify the requested study leave should be submitted HELD: No. In the case at bar, the requirements for both substantive and
upon return on April 1, 1996; procedural aspects were not satisfied.
4. Faculty Manual – Section 40 Special Provisions on the Granting of Leave of petitioner School argues that the conduct of respondent breached not only the
Absence should be observed: provisions of the study grant (which was a contractual obligation) but also the
a. Once proven beyond reasonable doubt during the period of the approved Faculty Manual. Respondent was thus guilty of serious misconduct which was
leave of absence that the faculty member shall engage himself in employment a ground for termination.
outside the institution, the administration shall regard the faculty member on Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct. It is the transgression of some
leave as resigned; established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
b. The maximum length of leave of absence that may be applied for by the willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of
faculty member and granted by administration is twelve (12) months. If, at the judgment.9 Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the misconduct, to be a just
lapse of the period, the faculty member fails to return for work, the cause for termination, must be serious. This implies that it must be of such
administration shall regard the faculty member as resigned. grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.
RESPONDENT ALLEGED: that she intended to utilize the first semester of her The alleged infractions of the respondent could hardly be considered serious
study leave to finish her masteral degree at the Philippine Women’s University misconduct:
(PWU). Unfortunately, it did not push through so she took up an Old Testament 1. Her alleged failure to report for work EXACTLY on April 1, 1996 (respondent
course in a school of religion and at the same time utilized her free hours reported on May 15, 1996) is not equivalent to “failure to return for work,” a
selling insurance and cookware to augment her family’s income. However, sanctionable offense under the Faculty Manual. Although we give credence to
during the second semester of her study leave, she studied and passed 12 petitioner’s argument that a private high school teacher still has work at the
units of education subjects at the Golden Gate Colleges in Batangas City. In end of the schoolyear – to assist in the graduation preparations – and in the
response to the letters sent her by petitioner to justify her study leave, she beginning of the school year – to assist in the enrollment – such tasks cannot
submitted a certification from Golden Gate Colleges and a letter explaining be considered a teacher’s main duties, the failure to perform which would be
why she took up an Old Testament course instead of enrolling in her masteral tantamount to dereliction of duty or abandonment.
class during the first semester. 2. With regard to her alleged failure to enroll during the first semester, although
President and Rector of the School, Fr. Ramonclaro G. Mendez, O. P., wrote we agree with the President and Rector, Fr. Mendez, that respondent should
her, stating that her failure to enroll during the first semester was a violation of have first ascertained whether she was still eligible to study at the PWU before
the conditions of the study leave and that the reasons she advanced for failure applying for a study leave,17 such lapse was more of an error in judgment
to enroll during the first semester were not acceptable and thus: rather than an act of serious misconduct. If respondent intended to use her
In the first place, prudence dictates that you should have ascertained first that study leave for other unauthorized purposes, as petitioner would like us to
you are still eligible to study at PWU to finish your masteral degree before believe, she would not have enrolled at the Golden Gate Colleges during the
applying and securing the approval of your leave by the School. In the second second semester. Yet she did, as borne out by the certification18 prepared by
place, you should have informed the School at once that you could not enroll the Registrar of Golden Gate Colleges.
in the first semester so that your leave could have been adjusted for only one- 3. Respondent did not violate the prohibition on engaging in employment
half (1/2) year. Thirdly, your engaging in some part-time business instead of outside the school as specified in her study leave grant and as provided in the
studying in the first semester of your leave is sufficient justification for the Faculty Manual. Section 40 (a) of the Manual. The prohibition against outside
School to consider you as resigned under the Faculty Manual. And lastly, your employment was enacted to prevent the teacher from using the study leave
failure to study in the first semester of your study leave without informing the period for unsanctioned purposes since the School pays the teacher while
School beforehand constitutes deception, to say the least, which is not a good pursuing further studies. That rationale was not violated by respondent for the
example to the other teachers. reason that her part-time activity of selling insurance and cookware could not
have prevented her in any way from studying and, more importantly, she was employee; and even assuming that he is, the ground for loss of confidence is
not being paid by the School while on leave. How did the school expect her without basis as it was not clearly established. Therefore, there was no just
and her family to survive without any income for one whole year? cause for petitioner’s dismissal and thus was unlawful.
Petitioner also failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid
dismissal. Petitioner failed to give respondent the first notice which should 30. PUNZAL V. ESTI TECHNOLOGIES INC., 518 SCRA 66 [2007]-Carelo
have informed the latter of the former’s intention to dismiss her. Petitioner
argues that it complied with this requirement as there were several exchanges DOCTRINE: An aggrieved employee who wants to unburden himself of his
of communication between the School and respondent regarding the cause of disappointments and frustrations in his job or relations with his immediate
her termination. However, we find that these letters did not apprise respondent superior would normally approach said superior directly or otherwise ask some
that her dismissal was being sought by petitioner School as said letters only other officer possibly to mediate and discuss the problem with the end in view
required respondent to submit proof of enrollment. of settling their differences without causing ferocious conflicts. No matter how
much the employee dislikes the employer professionally, and even if he is in a
29. SAMSON V. NLRC, 330 SCRA 460 [2000]-Carelo confrontational disposition, he cannot afford to be disrespectful and dare to
DOCTRINE: For misconduct to warrant dismissal, it must be in connection with talk with an unguarded tongue and/or with a bileful pen.
the employee’s work. In this case, the alleged misconduct was neither in
connection with the employee’s work, as such utterances of petitioner is
expected in informal gatherings; also, such conduct was not even of such FACTS: Petitioner Lorna Dising Punzal (Punzal) had been working for
serious and grave character. respondent ETSI Technologies, Inc. (ETSI) as Department Secretary. Punzal
FACTS: Petitioner Samson received a letter calling the attention of petitioner’s sent an e-mail message to her officemates announcing the holding of a
conduct during a Sales and Marketing Christmas gathering where Samson Halloween Party that was to be held in the office. Her immediate superior,
allegedly made utterances of obscene, insulting and offensive words towards respondent Carmelo Remudaro advised her to first secure the approval of the
the SPS’s Management Committee. Complainant was given two days to SVP, respondent Werner Geisert. When Geisert did not approve of the plan,
explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him and he was Punzal then sent a second e-mail to her officemates that states ―Geisert was
thereafter placed on preventive suspension. Samson replied stating that such so unfair . . . para bang palagi siyang iniisahan sa trabaho. . . Anyway, solohin
utterances were only made in reference to a decision taken by the na lang niya bukas ang office.”
management committee on the Cua Lim Case and not to any specific person. Punzal’s superiors required her to explain her actions which found such as
Petitioner was thereafter informed in a letter that his employment was unacceptable. She was then dismissed from employment due to improper
terminated. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of conduct or act of discourtesy or disrespect and making malicious statements
petitioner illegal. Both parties appealed the decision; petitioner filed a partial concerning company officer. Punzal filed before the National Labor Relations
appeal of the denial of his claim for holiday pay and the cash equivalent of the Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal against ETSI, Geisert,
rice subsidy; respondent company sought the reversal of the labor arbiter’s and Remudaro.
ruling of illegal dismissal. The NLRC found that dismissal was made for just The complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the NLRC found
cause. that while she was indeed guilty of misconduct, the penalty of dismissal was
disproportionate to her infraction. The Court of Appeals held that Punzal’s
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was validly dismissed. dismissal was in order.

HELD: No. Petitioner’s dismissal was brought about by utterances made ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid cause to dismiss Punzal
during a n informal Christmas gathering. Furthermore, petitioner’s outburst
was in reaction to the decision of the management in a certain case and was HELD: A cordial or, at the very least, civil attitude, according due deference to
not intended to malign on the person of the respondent company’s president one’s superiors, is still observed, especially among high-ranking management
and general manager. Respondent company itself did not seem to consider officers. The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipino values of pakikisama
the offense serious to warrant an immediate investigation. It is also provided and paggalang which are not only prevalent among members of a family and
in respondent company’s rules and regulations that for conduct such as that community but within organizations as well, including work sites. An employee
of the petitioner, a first offense would only warrant a “verbal reminder” and not is expected to extend due respect to management, the employer being the
dismissal. Petitioner’s position does not fall within the definition of a managerial “proverbial hen that lays the golden egg,” so to speak. Punzal sent the e-mail
message in reaction to Geisert’s decision which he had all the right to make. in only 80% of the employees winning raffle prizes. Benitez then started
That it has been a tradition in ETSI to celebrate occasions such as Christmas, hurling invectives and foul language while still on stage, mostly directed
birthdays, Halloween, and others does not remove Geisert’s prerogative to
approve or disapprove plans to hold such celebrations in office premises and
at Kurangil.
during company time. Given the reasonableness of Geisert’s decision that Afos and Atienza, who claims to be Benitez’s actual companions in
provoked Punzal to send the second e-mail message, the observations of the the table, added that trouble started when the raffle for the grand prize
Court of Appeals that “the message resounds of subversion and undermines was being conducted. All of a sudden, Benitez, who had not yet won a
the authority and credibility of management” and that petitioner “displayed a prize at that time, stood up and proceeded to the stage, fuming mad and
tendency to act without management’s approval, and even against
management’s will” are well taken.
complaining about the conduct of the raffle.
The company required Benitez to explain in writing why he should
not be disciplined for serious misconduct and willful disobedience of its
31. BENITEZ V. SANTA FE MOVING AND RELOCATION SERVICES, G.R. lawful orders in connection with the incident. Benitez failed to comply
208163, 20 APRIL 2015-Comota and neither did he show remorse for what he did.
DOCTRINE:
In view of the to explain his side, the company issued the
FACTS: Benitez alleged that the company served him a memorandum
memorandum terminating his employment effective on the same day,
advising him not to report for work effective immediately, thereby
for clear violation of "Santa Fe Policy and Procedure under Conduct and
terminating his employment, supposedly on grounds of serious
Behavior as well as Labor Code of the Philippines under Art. 282 -
misconduct or willful disobedience. He allegedly uttered abusive words
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
against respondent Kurangil during the company's christmas party. He
lawful orders of his employer x x x”.
bewailed that he was not given the opportunity to defend himself.
Benitez claimed that during the party, he noticed that the raffle
Benitez contends that he did not commit serious misconduct, insisting
committee members were putting back the names of those who were
that if he indeed became unruly on that day, the company guards should
already drawn, giving them more chances of winning. He appealed to
have restrained him and made a report about it, but there was no such
the committee to put a stop to what they were doing, but they replied
intervention from the guards.
they would not "in the spirit of Christmas”. He denied having verbally
At any rate, they argue, Benitez should not have been dismissed for
abused Kurangil. He presented the affidavits of four co-employees, who
the serious misconduct he allegedly committed since it was not in
was with him at one table, attesting that he did not commit the offense
connection with his work as moving and relocation operator. Moreover,
which led to his dismissal.
for misconduct to be serious, it must be of such a grave and aggravated
Benitez argued that his dismissal constituted an unfair labor practice
character and not merely trivial and unimportant.
as he was a union officer and that it was undertaken to derail the
conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement with the company. He ISSUE: WON petitioner was validly dismissed under the ground of
further argued that the penalty of dismissal is disproportionate to his serious misconduct
alleged offense, considering that it was committed during a casual
gathering and had no connection to his work. HELD: YES. Serious misconduct is a just cause for termination of
The company confirmed Benitez's claim that the incident involved the employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Despite his denial,
conduct of the Christmas raffle. However, they differed on what there is substantial evidence that Benitez maligned the company's
triggered his unruly behavior. It alleged that while the raffle was going managing director and the company itself during their Christmas Party.
on, Benitez climbed up the stage and questioned the management's There was no need for the guards to intervene because Benitez was
decision to allow contractual employees to join the raffle. This resulted restrained by people near the stage and who escorted him outside the
premises where the party was going on as attested to by Kurangil publication of what VECO deemed as a libelous article. Union officers
himself, as well as by Afos and Atienza. received similar notices for them to explain their actions, which they
Benitez's offense constituted a serious misconduct as defined by law. justified as merely an expression of their collective sentiments against
His display of insolent and disrespectful behavior, in utter disregard of the treatment of VECO's management towards them.
the time and place of its occurrence, had very much to do with his work. The Union then filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB against
He set a bad example as a union officer and as a crew leader of a vital VECO, which facilitated a series of conferences that yielded a
division of the company. His actuations during the company's Christmas Memorandum of Agreement signed by the parties.
Party could have had negative repercussions for his employer had he Before the conclusion of the CBA renegotiation, several complaints
been allowed to stay on the job. His standing before those clients who for libel were filed against Mahilum and the other union officers by
witnessed the incident and those who would hear of it would surely be VECO's Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Jaime
diminished, to the detriment of the company. Jose Y. Aboitiz. The administrative hearing against Mahilum resumed
with due notice to the latter, but he protested the same, referring to it as
"moro-moro" or "kangaroo" and insisting that the investigation should
32. VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP, V.
VISAYAN ELECTRIC CO., INC., G.R. 205575, 22 JULY 2015-Comota
follow the grievance machinery procedure under the CBA.
DOCTRINE: Nonetheless, VECO's management carried on with its investigation
FACTS: Before Mahilum was elected as union officer, he was and, on the basis of the findings thereof, issued a notice terminating
transferred from VECO's Public Relations Section to its Administrative Mahilum from employment. In result, the Union filed another Notice of
Services Section without any specific work. When he was elected as Strike with the NCMB against VECO on the grounds of unfair labor
union secretary, he was transferred to the Line Services Department as practice, specifically union busting for the dismissal and/or suspension
its Customer Service Representative. At the time of his election as of its union president and officers, refusal to bargain collectively, as well
union president, VECO management allegedly: (a) terminated active as non-observance of the grievance procedure in their CBA.
union members without going through the grievance machinery To avert any work stoppage that will prejudice VECO's power
procedure prescribed under the CBA; (b) refused to implement the distribution activity, the Secretary of Labor intervened and issued an
profit-sharing scheme provided under the same CBA; (c) took back the Order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
motorbikes issued to active union members; and (d) revised the arbitration.
electricity privilege granted to VECO's employees. Consequently, the strike was enjoined; Mahilum was ordered
Union members marched on the streets of Cebu City to protest reinstated in the payroll; and the parties were directed to refrain from
VECO's refusal to comply with the political and economic provisions committing any act that would exacerbate the situation. NLRC ruled in
of the CBA. Mahilum and other union officers were interviewed by the favor of VECO. Hence, this petition.
media and handed out a document containing their grievances against
VECO. ISSUE: WON Mahilum was illegally dismissed
Mahilum was allegedly demoted as warehouse staff to isolate him and
HELD: NO. Mahilum was terminated for a just and valid cause. VECO
restrict his movements. Other union officers were transferred to
complied with the procedural due process requirements of furnishing
positions that will keep them away from the general union membership.
Mahilum with two written notices before the termination of
Days after, Mahilum was issued a Notice to Explain why he should
employment can be effected. He was apprised of the particular acts for
not be terminated from service due to loss of trust and confidence, as
which his termination was sought; and, after due investigation, he was
well as in violating the Company Code of Discipline, for causing the
given a Notice of Decision informing him of his dismissal from service.
 The derogatory statements issued by Mahilum that were intended to disposed it outside the store. Respondent was also accused of many
incite, not just public condemnation of VECO, there can be no dispute other infractions, as a result of which he was terminated after having
that VECO had lost its trust and confidence in Mahilum and his ability given an unsatisfactory explanation when asked for one.
to perform his tasks with utmost efficiency and loyalty expected of an Arenas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. After due proceedings,
employee entrusted to handle customers and funds. Settled is the rule the LA ruled in his favor, declaring that he had been illegally dismissed.
that an employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision.
guilty of acts inimical to the interests of the employer. A company has CBTL filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
the right to dismiss its employee if only as a measure of self-protection CBTL insisted that Arenas’ infractions amounted to serious misconduct
The fact that Mahilum served the company for a considerable period or willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and breach
of time will not help his cause. The longer an employee stays in the of trust and confidence. To support these allegations, CBTL presented
service of the company, the greater is his responsibility for knowledge Arenas’ letter where he admitted his commission of the imputed
and compliance with the norms of conduct and the code of discipline in violations. CBTL also imputes dishonesty on the part of Arenas for not
the company. The State's responsibility to afford protection to labor, this immediately admitting that he indeed left his bottled iced tea inside the
policy should not be used as an instrument to oppress management and ice bin.
capital. In resolving disputes between labor and capital, fairness and
justice should always prevail. ISSUE: WON Arenas was illegally dismissed

HELD: YES. For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal,

these two elements must concur: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct
must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
33. THE COFFEE BEAN AND TEA LEAF PHILS., INC. V. ARENAS, G.R.
made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he
208908, MARCH 11, 2015-Comota had been engaged to discharge. It is clear that Arenas’ alleged
DOCTRINE: infractions do not amount to such a wrongful and perverse attitude.
FACTS: To ensure the quality of its crew’s services, CBTL regularly Though Arenas may have admitted these wrongdoings, these do not
employs a “mystery guest shopper” who poses as a customer, for the amount to a wanton disregard of CBTL’s company policies. As Arenas
purpose of covertly inspecting the baristas’ job performance. In April mentioned in his written explanation, he was on a scheduled break when
2009, a mystery guest shopper at the Paseo Center Branch submitted a he was caught eating. During that time, the other service crews were the
report stating that Arenas was seen eating non-CBTL products at one in charge of manning the counter. Notably, CBTL’s employee
CBTL’s al fresco dining area while on duty. As a result, the counter handbook imposes only the penalty of written warning for the offense
was left empty without anyone to take and prepare the customers’ of eating non-CBTL products inside the store’s premises.
orders.
On another occasion, Katrina Basallo, the duty manager of CBTL, CBTL also imputes gross and habitual neglect of duty to Arenas for
conducted a routine inspection of the Paseo Center Branch. While coming in late in three separate instances. Gross negligence implies a
inspecting the store’s products, she noticed an iced tea bottle being want or absence of, or failure to exercise even a slight care or diligence,
chilled inside the bin where the ice for the customers’ drinks is stored; or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
thus, she called the attention of the staff on duty. When asked, Arenas consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. There is
muttered, “kaninong iced tea?” and immediately picked the bottle and
habitual neglect if based on the circumstances, there is a repeated failure GTE Directories Corporation (hereafter, simply GTE) is a foreign
to perform one’s duties for a period of time. corporation engaged in the Philippines in the business of publishing
the PLDT (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company) telephone
Arenas’ three counts of tardiness cannot be considered as gross and directories for Metro Manila and several provinces. The practice was for
habitual neglect of duty. The infrequency of his tardiness already its sales representatives to be given work assignments within specific
removes the character of habitualness. These late attendances were also territories by the so-called "draw method." A territory was not fully released
broadly spaced out, negating the complete absence of care on Arenas’ to the salesperson for handling at one time, but assigned in increments or
part in the performance of his duties. Even CBTL admitted in its notice partial releases of account. This practice was observed.
When GTE realized that competition among media for a share of the
to explain that this violation does not merit yet a disciplinary action and advertising revenue had become so keen as to require quick reaction. New
is only an aggravating circumstance to Arenas’ other violations. "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy" was thereafter drawn up. It appears
CBTL also argues that he committed serious misconduct when he lied that the new policy did not sit well with the union. It demanded that it be given
about using the ice bin as cooler for his bottled iced tea. Under CBTL’s 15 days “to raise questions or objections to or to seek reconsideration of the
employee handbook, dishonesty, even at the first instance, warrants the sales and administrative practices issued by the Company. GTE next
formulated a new set of "Sales Administrative Practices, GTE's Sales Manager
penalty of termination from service. sent another Memorandum to "all premise sales personnel. But as before, the
For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, sales representatives did not submit the reports. Instead their union, GTE
(a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the Directories Corporation Employees Union (hereafter, simply the union), sent a
employee’s duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become letter to the Sales Manager. The union filed in behalf of the sales
unfit to continue working for the employer. representatives, a notice of strike grounded on alleged unfair labor practices
of GTE.
However, the facts on record reveal that there was no active In due course, the Bureau of Labor Relations undertook to conciliate the
dishonesty on the part of Arenas. When questioned about who placed dispute. GTE sent still another memorandum to sixteen (16) of its premise
the bottled iced tea inside the ice bin, his immediate reaction was not to sales representatives. GTE gave its sales representatives an ultimatum.
deny his mistake, but to remove the bottle inside the bin and throw it During all this time, conciliation efforts were being exerted by the Bureau of
outside. More importantly, when he was asked to make a written Labor Relations, including attempts to prevent the imposition of sanctions by
GTE on its employees, and the strike itself. When these proved futile, Acting
explanation of his action, he admitted that the bottled iced tea was his. Labor Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. issued an Order assuming jurisdiction
Thus, even if there was an initial reticence on Arenas’ part, his over the dispute. The Acting Secretary opined that the dispute "adversely
subsequent act of owing to his mistake only shows the absence of a affects the national interest. GTE, a "100% foreign owned" company, (was)
deliberate intent to lie or deceive his CBTL superiors. On this score, we being threatened because of the strike;" and "top officers of the union were
conclude that Arenas’ action did not amount to serious misconduct. dismissed during the conciliation process thereby compounding the dispute,"
Reconsideration of this Order was sought by GTE. GTE however reiterated its
previously declared "position that with or without the order now being
questioned, it will accept all striking employees back to work except the
fourteen (14) premise sales representatives who were dismissed for cause
34. GTE DIRECTORIES CORP. V. SANCHEZ, 197 SCRA 452 [1991]-Cruz prior to the strike." By Resolution of then Labor Minister Blas Ople, GTE's
motion for reconsideration was denied. In a clarificatory, Minister Ople
DOCTRINE: reiterated the proposition that "promulgations of company policies and
The formal challenge brought by employee of the reasonableness or the regulations are basic management prerogatives," and that "unless
motives of a company’s policy is not an excuse for the employee not to obey shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law," they are "generally
said policy. binding and valid on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised
or amended unilaterally or preferably, through negotiations or by competent
authorities." Adjudication of the dispute on the merits was made by
FACTS: Order of Minister Ople's successor, Augusto Sanchez. GTE for its part,
argued that the termination of the employment of its fourteen (14) premise sanction of suspension having proved futile, termination of employment was
sales representatives prior to the strike should have been upheld. It also filed the only option left to the employer.
an opposition to the union’s motion for reconsideration. The motions were To repeat, it would be dangerous doctrine indeed to allow employees to refuse
resolved in a "Decision" handed down by Minister Sanchez. Accordingly, he to comply with rules and regulations, policies and procedures laid down by
directed the Bureau of Labor Relations to hear said "other issues raised by the their employer by the simple expedient of formally challenging their
union and to submit its findings and recommendations thereon within 20 days reasonableness or the motives which inspired them, or filing a strike notice
from submission of the case for decision." Again GTE moved for with the Department of Labor and Employment, or, what amounts to the same
reconsideration; again it was rebuffed. The Labor Minister denied thing, to give the employees the power to suspend compliance with company
its motion. The Minister accordingly annulled and set aside his order for the rules or policies by requesting that they be first subject of collective bargaining,
Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct hearings on said issues since he had It would be well nigh impossible under these circumstances for any employer
already resolved them, and affirmed his Order. GTE thereupon instituted to maintain discipline in its establishment. This is, of course, intolerable.
the special civil action of certiorari at bar praying for invalidation, Minister Sanchez decided the dispute in the exercise of the jurisdiction
because rendered with grave abuse of discretion, of the Labor Minister's assumed by his predecessor in accordance with Article 263 (g) of the Labor
orders. Code, providing in part as follows:(g) When in his opinion there exists a labor
GTE had cause to dismiss the fourteen (14) premise sales representatives dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the
who had repeatedly and deliberately, not to say defiantly, refused to national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities,
comply with its directive for submission of individual reports on specified companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks,
matters. hospitals, and export-oriented industries, including those within export
processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment shall assume
ISSUE: jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Whether or not the union's objections to, or request for reconsideration of Commission for compulsory arbitration.
those regulations or policies automatically suspend enforcement thereof and Petition is GRANTED, and as prayed for, the Order dated October 1, 1986 of
excuse the employees' refusal to comply with the same. the public respondent is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

HELD:
In the case at bar, it must thus be conceded that its adoption of a new "Sales 35. EPACIFIC GLOBAL CONTACT CENTER V. CABANSAY, 538 SCRA
Evaluation and Production Policy" was within its management prerogative to 498 [2007]-Cruz
regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment, including the manner, procedure and processes by which DOCTRINE:
particular work activities should be done. Willful disobedience or insubordination necessitates the concurrence of at
When the strike notice was filed by the union, the chain of events which least two requisites: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been
culminated in the termination of the 14 sales persons' employment was already willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the
taking place, the series of defiant refusals by said sales representatives to order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
comply with GTE's requirement to submit individual reports was already in employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
progress. At that time, no less than three (3) of the ultimate six (6) direct orders discharge. On the other hand, loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid ground
of the employer for the submission of the reports had already been for dismissal, must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly
disobeyed. The filing of the strike notice, and the commencement established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
of conciliation activities by the Bureau of Labor Relations did not operate to purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
make GTE's orders illegal or unenforceable so as to excuse continued non- carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.
compliance therewith. It does not follow that just because the employees or
their union are unable to realize or appreciate the desirability of their FACTS:
employers' policies or rules, the latter were laid down to oppress the former Respondent Ma. Lourdes Cabansay (Cabansay) was hired as Senior Traning
and subvert legitimate union activities. Indeed, the overt, direct, deliberate and Manager of ePacific Global Contact Center, Inc. with a monthly salary of
continued defiance and disregard by the employees of the authority of their P38,000.00 on April 18, 2001 and became a regular employee on August 1,
employer left the latter with no alternative except to impose sanctions. The
2001. In March 2002, respondent was tasked to prepare a new training However, on April 11, 2002, the same day she submitted her second
process for the companys Telesales Trainees. explanation, Cabansay received a memorandum from the HR
Department/Office of the President notifying her that she had been terminated
After reviewing the training module prepared by respondent, Mr. Rosendo S. from the service effective immediately for having committed an act of
Ballesteros (Ballesteros), the companys Senior Vice President-Business insubordination resulting in the managements loss of trust and confidence in
Development Group, found that the same did not contain any changes and her. Respondent, thus, filed a case for illegal dismissal.
that they were not ready to present it. He thus instructed respondent through
an electronic mail (e-mail) to postpone the presentation and the ISSUE:
implementation of the new training process. Ballesteros further emphasized Whether or not respondent Cabansay was illegally dismissed.
that the Department needed more time to teach the trainees on how to get
leads, focus on developing their telemarketing skills and acquire proper HELD:
motivation. No. Willful disobedience or insubordination necessitates the concurrence of at
least two requisites: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been
willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the
In response to Ballesteross e-mail instructions, Cabansay wrote: order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
“Ro, the presentation is going to be discussed in detail. As we discussed employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
yesterday i (sic) SPECIFICALLY told you that I WILL DISCUSS the new discharge. On the other hand, loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid ground
training process and explain it to them in detail. Didnt you see the last past for dismissal, must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly
(sic) of the 5-day classroom training, (sic) the last day includes established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
PROSPECTING, thats where the CCA trainees will be taught how to get leads purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
both local and abroad. carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on
The criteria for the evaluation? Its already done by Richie, were going to substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices
distribute the hard copies and discuss it in DETAIL in this afternoons briefing. or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of
This is a very simple presentation and I WILL NOT POSTPONE it today, its the employer. Loss of confidence must not also be indiscriminately used as a
very easy to comprehend and as per YOUR INSTRUCTION we will be shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee was
implementing it next week, so when should we present this to the TLs? arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
Lets not make SIMPLE THINGS COMPLICATED. complained of must be work-related and show that the employee concerned
I will go on with the presentation this afternoon.” is unfit to continue working for the employer.

In the case at bar, the reasonableness and lawfulness of Ballesteross order is

Adversely reacting to respondents attitude, Ballesteros sent Cabansay a not in question, so is its relation to the duties of respondent.
memo on April 6, 2002, informing the latter that he found her message to be a
clear act of insubordination, causing him to lose his trust and confidence in her As to the willfulness of her conduct, the same is manifest in her e-mail reply,
as Manager of the Training Department. He then asked respondent to explain which, as it is written, is characterized by abject aggressiveness and
in writing why she should not be terminated as a consequence of her acts. antagonism: the e-mail has a begrudging tone and is replete with capitalized
words eliciting her resolve to indeed contravene the SVPs directive. Thus, she
Meanwhile, no presentation of the training module was made on April 5, 2002 categorically said, This is a very simple presentation and I WILL NOT
because all the participants were informed that the same was postponed POSTPONE it today, its very easy to comprehend and as per YOUR
because Management was not yet ready to present the module. INSTRUCTION we will be implementing it next week, so when should we
present this to the TLs? Lets not make SIMPLE THINGS COMPLICATED. I
Clarifying that this was merely a case of miscommunication and that she had will go on with the presentation this afternoon.
no intention to disregard the order to postpone the implementation of the new
training process, Cabansay submitted two memoranda dated April 8 and 11, Indeed, by refusing to postpone the presentation and implementation of the
2002. new training process, respondent intentionally, knowingly and purposely,
without justifiable excuse, breached the trust and confidence reposed in her
by her employer. To present and discuss a training module, which is deemed S/A No. 3396 did not have sufficient balance to cover the withdrawals at the
by management as still inadequate in its content, will certainly not only waste time they were made.
the time, effort and energy of the participants in the discussion but will also
entail losses on the part of the company. Mauricio was directed to report for work at the Head Office immediately. The
Prudential Bank President issued a Memorandum to Mauricio furnishing him
with a copy of the audit team’s report and directing him to report in writing
36. PRUDENTIAL BANK V. MAURICIO, G.R. 183350, 18 JAN 2012-Cruz within 72 hours from receipt of the memorandum why the bank should not
institute an action against him. The report showed that the bank was exposed
DOCTRINE: to losses amounting to $774,561.58.
For a dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence to be valid, the breach
of trust must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and While the investigation against Mauricio was ongoing, as conducted by a
purposely, without justifiable excuse. Loss of trust and confidence stems from Hearing Committee, the property subject of the Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage
a breach of trust founded on dishonest, deceitful or fraudulent act. This is executed by the Spouses Cruz was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Bank for.
obviously not the case here. Spouses Cruz, however, sought the annulment and/or declaration of nullity of
foreclosure in a complaint or civil case filed with RTC- Makati.
FACTS:
The Bank claimed that it sent the proper demand letters to the Spouses but to
Respondent Mauricio was the Branch Manager of Prudential Bank’s no avail. Thus, it was constrained to foreclose the mortgaged property
Magallanes Branch in Makati City when he was dismissed from employment. extrajudicially for the settlement of the obligations of the Spouses Cruz
including the returned USTWs, checks and drafts. Later, while the
Spouses Marcelo and Corazon Cruz (Spouses Cruz) opened a dollar savings investigation against Mauricio was still ongoing, the Bank filed an Amended
account (FXSD No. 221-6) with an initial cash deposit of US$500.00, in the Answer to implead Mauricio in its counterclaim in the case filed by the Spouses
Bank’s Magallanes Branch. At that time, Mauricio was already its Branch against the former, contending that he conspired and confederated with the
Manager. Spouses Cruz also executed Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage over Spouses Cruz to commit the fraud.
their properties in San Juan in favor of the bank.
The Hearing Committee of the Bank found that there was sufficient evidence
An audit investigation was conducted in the Magallanes Branch. The reports to hold Mauricio guilty of the charges against him. The Board of Directors
of the audit team showed that from March 1991 to August 1991, credits to issued Resolution considering the recommendation of the Hearing Committee
FXSD No. 221-6 consisted mostly of dollar check deposits composed of U.S. and the Board found Antonio S.A. Mauricio to have violated Bank policies and
Treasury Warrants (USTWs), U.S. Postal Money Orders, Travellers Express regulations and committed imprudent acts prejudicial to the interests of the
and Amexco Money Orders. Despite the fact that Spouses Cruz were not the Bank, resulting in monetary loss to the Bank and giving rise to loss of trust and
payees of said instruments and neither of them endorsed the same, Mauricio confidence. The services of Mr. Mauricio was terminated and that his
allowed immediate withdrawals against them. Most of the proceeds of the retirement benefits was forfeited.
encashments were then deposited to a peso savings account, S/A No. 3396,
also in the name of the Spouses Cruz. Mauricio filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
back wages, retirement and provident benefits, vacation and sick leave credits,
The dollar checks were eventually returned by their drawee banks for having and actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees. While the
forged endorsements, alterations to the stated amounts, or being drawn illegal dismissal complaint was pending, the Makati RTC rendered a Decision
against insufficient funds, among other reasons. Allegedly, upon receipt of the in favor of the Spouses Cruz and Mauricio. It was affirmed by the CA and
returned checks at the Magallanes Branch, Mauricio debited FXSD No. 221- Supreme Court.
6, but such debits were made against the uncollected deposits of the Spouses
Cruz. Some of the returned checks and USTWs were lodged to accounts On the other hand, LA rendered a Decision holding that the Bank was justified
receivable because the balance of FXSD No. 221-6 was not sufficient to cover in terminating Mauricio’s employment. The LA ruled that even if Mauricio, as
the returned checks. Simultaneously, cash withdrawals were allowed even if branch manager, was clothed with discretion, he gravely abused it to the
detriment and prejudice of the Bank and that he was afforded procedural due
process before he was dismissed. However, LA ordered the bank to pay The court also holds that MAURICIO was not in anyway prompted by any
Mauricio his 13th month pay and sick leaves earned and reimburse him his malicious motive in approving the encashment and/or withdrawal.
actual contributions to the provident fund, all with legal interest at 12% per
annum from date of the decision until actual payment and/or finality of the The acts and omissions alleged by the Bank in the civil case as basis of its
decision. counterclaim against Mauricio, are the very same acts and omissions which
were used as grounds to terminate his employment. Mauricio cannot be held
Mauricio filed a partial appeal of the LA’s decision with the NLRC, which, to have abused the discretion he was clothed with absent some semblance of
however, affirmed the LA’s decision. On appeal, CA set aside the NLRC parameters. In the absence of such guidelines, the validity of Mauricio’s acts
decision and ruled in favor of Mauricio. Bank filed the instant petition. can be tested by determining whether they were justified under the
circumstances. In exercising his discretion to allow the questioned
ISSUE: withdrawals, Mauricio took into consideration the fact that the Spouses Cruz
have substantial deposit and security, and enjoyed a favorable credit standing
Whether the acts of Mauricio with respect to the accounts of Spouses Cruz with the Bank. No malice can be inferred from Mauricio’s acts who tried to
can be considered as grounds for his termination due to loss of trust and collect from the Spouses Cruz and reported all the transactions to the head
confidence. office; in fact, the Bank never called his attention to any irregularity in the
transactions but even continued to credit the account of the spouses for the
HELD: value of the returned checks. Under the circumstances, Mauricio indeed fully
considered the interest of his employer before approving the questioned
No. transactions.

Civil and labor cases require different quanta of proof – the former requiring For a dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence to be valid, the breach
preponderance of evidence while the latter only calls for substantial evidence. of trust must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and
Despite the dissimilarity, this does not spell closing our eyes to facts purposely, without justifiable excuse. Loss of trust and confidence stems from
conclusively determined in one proceeding when the determination of the very a breach of trust founded on dishonest, deceitful or fraudulent act. This is
same facts are crucial in resolving the issues in another proceeding pursuant obviously not the case here.
to the doctrine of res judicata.
Office Order No. 1596, one of the office orders allegedly violated by Mauricio,
The present labor case is closely related to the civil case that was decided with provides:
finality. In the civil case, the Bank’s counterclaim for actual and exemplary
damages against Mauricio was grounded on his alleged violations of office “Approving officers shall exercise extreme caution in allowing deposit of,
policies when he allowed the encashment and/or withdrawal prior to clearing encashment or withdrawals against foreign and out-of-town checks. Refund to
of numerous USTWs and dollar checks and allegedly tried concealing from the the bank of the amount involved shall be the personal responsibility and
Bank the fact that said instruments were returned. accountability of the officer who authorized the deposit or encashment over
the counter when the check should be returned by the drawee bank for any
The RTC in the civil case ruled: reason whatsoever.”
“Further, this court finds that PRUDENTIAL’s branch manager MAURICIO’s
act of allowing SPOUSES CRUZ to immediately withdraw the instruments is The above company directive is an explicit admission that Mauricio was
well within his functions as a branch manager. A person occupying such clothed with such discretion to enter into the questioned transactions as well
position exercises a certain degree of discretion with respect to the as a forewarning that in case the foreign and out-of-town checks were returned
accommodations extended to certain valued clients such as herein SPOUSES for whatever reason, the approving officer, in this case, Mauricio, shall be
CRUZ. Having been recommended by the legal counsel himself of personally responsible and accountable. “personal responsibility and
PRUDENTIAL and in view of the fact that they have substantial deposit with accountability” could only mean the reimbursement of the value of any
the same bank, it cannot be doubted that SPOUSES CRUZ were valued dishonored check but does not mean termination of the approving officer’s
clients.” employment for breaching the bank’s trust and confidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. RULING:
NO. The offense of willful disobedience requires the concurrence of
37. LORES REALTY ENTERPRISES V. PACIA, G.R. 171189, 09 MARCH two (2) requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful,
2011-Cuevas that is characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order
violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee
DOCTRINE: and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
FACTS: The Supreme Court noted that it finds nothing unlawful in the
In 1998, LREI’s acting general manager, petitioner Sumulong, directive of Sumulong to prepare checks in payment of LREI’s obligations. The
directed Pacia to prepare Check Voucher as partial payment for LREI’s availability or unavailability of sufficient funds to cover the check is immaterial
outstanding obligation to the Bank of the Philippine Islands-Family Bank. Pacia in the physical preparation of the checks. Pacia’s initial reluctance to prepare
did not immediately comply with the instruction. After two repeated directives, the checks, on the other hand, which was seemingly an act of disrespect and
Pacia eventually prepared Check. defiance, was for honest and well intentioned reasons. Protecting LREI and
Sumulong again directed Pacia to prepare another Check Voucher, Sumulong from liability under the Bouncing Checks Law was foremost in her
Pacia once again was slow in obeying the order. Due to the insistence of mind. It was not wrongful or willful. Neither can it be considered an obstinate
Sumulong, however, Pacia eventually prepared the Check. defiance of company authority. The Court takes into consideration that Pacia,
Sumulong issued a memorandum ordering Pacia to explain in writing despite her initial reluctance, eventually did prepare the checks on the same
why she refused to follow a clear and lawful directive. Pacia replied in writing day she was tasked to do it. The Court also finds it difficult to subscribe to LREI
and explained that her initial refusal to prepare the checks was due to the and Sumulongs’ contention that the reason for Pacia’s initial reluctance to
unavailability of funds to cover the amounts and that she only wanted to protect prepare the checks was a mere afterthought considering that "check no.
LREI from liability under the Bouncing Checks Law. 0000737527 under one of the check vouchers she reluctantly prepared,
On November 1998, Pacia received a notice of termination stating, bounced when it was deposited."19 Pacia’s apprehension was justified when
among others, that she was being dismissed because of her willful the check was dishonored. This clearly affirms her assertion that she was just
disobedience and their loss of trust and confidence in her. being cautious and circumspect for the company’s sake. Thus, her actuation
Pacia then filed a Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice due to should not be construed as improper conduct.
Harassment, Constructive Dismissal, Moral and Exemplary Damages against In finding for Pacia, the Court is guided by the time-honored principle that if
LREI and Sumulong. Subsequently, Pacia filed an Amended Complaint to doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the
include the charges of illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries. employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. The rule in
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding that the dismissal of controversies between a laborer and his master distinctly states that doubts
Pacia was for a just and valid cause but ordering payment of what was due reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements
her. and writing, should be resolved in the former's favor.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA’s Decision and found LREI and
Sumulong guilty of illegal dismissal, stating that complainant’s actuation herein 38. PERMEX, INC. V. NLRC, G.R. 125031, 24 JAN 2000-Cuevas
cannot in any manner be construed as an act of insubordination as
Complainant’s initial refusal was good intentioned. The CA found no merit in DOCTRINE: Where a violation of company policy or breach of company rules
the petition and dismissed it and regulations was found to have been tolerated by management, then the
same could not serve as a basis for termination.
RESPONDENT’s CONTENTION: Pacia counters that her initial reluctance to
prepare the checks, which she knew were not sufficiently funded, cannot "be FACTS:
characterized as ‘wrongful or perverse attitude.’" In her view, the directive to Private respondent Emmanuel Filoteo, an employee of Permex, was
prepare the checks at the time it was not sufficiently funded was not a lawful terminated by petitioners allegedly for flagrantly and deliberately violating
order contemplated in Article 282 of the Labor Code. company rules and regulations. More specifically, he was dismissed allegedly
for falsifying his daily time record.
ISSUE: Permex, a company engaged in the business of canning tuna and
· Whether Pacia’s dismissal was justified under the circumstances. sardines, initially hired Emmanuel Filoteo on October 1, 1990, as a mechanic.
Eventually, Filoteo was promoted to water treatment operator, a position he
held until his termination on August 29, 1994. As water treatment operator, even management's own evidence reflected that a certain Felix Pelayo, a co-
Filoteo did not have a fixed working schedule. His hours of work were worker of private respondent, was also allowed to go home that night and like
dependent upon the company's shifting production schedules. private respondent logged in advance 7:00 a.m. as his time-out. This supports
On his shift, Filoteo logged in at the maingate, entering his time-in and Filoteo's claim that it was common practice among night-shift workers to log in
also entered his time-out. This practice of indicating the time out at the moment their usual time-out in advance in the daily time record.
they time in, was customarily done by most workers for convenience and Moreover, as early as Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Victory Employees and
practicality since at the end of their work shift, they were often tired and in a Laborers' Association, 85 Phil. 166 (1949), we ruled that, where a violation of
hurry to catch the available service vehicle for their trip home, so they often company policy or breach of company rules and regulations was found to have
forgot to log out. The company had tolerated the practice. been tolerated by management, then the same could not serve as a basis for
During that shift, they were informed that there would be no butchering termination.
of fish, therefore there is no need for them to operate the boilers. Filoteo then
asked a permission to go home and was granted. He then got his things and 39. DR. PHYLIS RIO V. COLEGIO DE STA ROSA-MAKATI G.R. 189629, 06
dashed off the exit gate in order to catch the service jeep. AUG 2014-Cuevas
The next day, Filoteo received a memorandum asking him to explain
his previous DTR entry. Filoteo was then suspended indefinitely. His DOCTRINE:
explanation was found unsatisfactory. He was dismissed from employment. Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized
The dismissal arose from Filoteo's alleged violation of Article 2 of the company by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
rules and regulations. The offense charged was entering in his DTR that he there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
had worked from 8:45 p.m. of July 31, 1994 to 7:00 a.m. of August 1, 1994, conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
when in fact he had worked only up to 10:00 p.m. affected.
Filoteo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for separation pay,
damages, and attorney's fees with the Labor Arbiter. FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by respondent Colegio De Sta. Rosa-Makati as a
part-time school physician in June 1993. Petitioner was required to report for
ISSUE: work for four (4) hours every week.
Whether or not private respondent was illegally terminated from his In February 2002 or after almost ten (10) years of service, petitioner
employment. received a Contract of Appointment from Sr. Marilyn B. Gustilo (respondent
Gustilo), Directress/Principal, requiring petitioner to report from Monday to
Friday, from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
RULING: Due to the substantial change in the work schedule and decrease in
YES. To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must her salary, petitioner declined the Contract of Appointment.
concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided for in Article In a letter dated 30 July 2002, respondent Gustilo charged petitioner
282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must be afforded an opportunity and Mrs. Neneth Alonzo (Alonzo), the school nurse, of "grave misconduct,
to be heard and defend himself. This means that an employer can terminate dishonesty and/or gross neglect of duty detrimental not only to the school but,
the services of an employee for just and valid causes, which must be principally, to the health and well-being of the pupils based on the Manual of
supported by clear and convincing evidence. It also means that, procedurally, Regulations for Private Schools and Section 94 (a) and (b) and Article 282 (a),
the employee must be given notice, with adequate opportunity to be heard, (b) and (c) of the LaborCode." In the same letter, petitioner and Alonzo were
before he is notified of his actual dismissal for cause. preventively suspended for a period of thirty (30) days, effective 30 July 2002.
The Supreme Court stated that such dismissal was too harsh a penalty for an Petitioner was made to answer for the following: (1) nine (9) students
unintentional infraction, not to mention that it was his first offense committed have medical records for school years during which they were not in the school
without malice, and committed also by others who were not equally penalized. yet, thus could not havebeen the subject of medical examination/evaluation;
Considering the factory practice which management tolerated, the Court are (2) seventy-nine (79) students of several classes/sections during certain
persuaded that Filoteo, in his rush to catch the service vehicle, merely forgot school years were not given any medical/health evaluation/examination; and
to correct his initial time-out entry. Nothing is shown to prove he deliberately (3) failure to conduct medical/health examination on all students of several
falsified his daily time record to deceive the company. The NLRC found that classes of different grade levels for the school year 2001-2002.
 Petitioner denied the charges through a letter to respondent on 2 DOCTRINE:
August 2002. On 9 August 2002 petitioner filed a complaint for constructive FACTS: San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation, Inc. is a domestic
dismissal and illegal suspension against respondents Colegio de Sta. Rosa foundation operating as a college and hospital with a two hundred bed
Makati and Gustilo before the Labor Arbiter. capacity, complemented by four hundred hospital personnel, more or less. It
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner retains approximately seventy medical consultants specializing in various
declaring that the petitioner was illegally dismissed. The NLRC, however, fields of applied medicine and medical research. The Foundation rendered
reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter stating that, according to the NLRC, medical and nursing services to indigents from Pasay City, Las Pias,
"[i]t must be stressed that complainants Rio and Alonzo were tasked with Paraaque, Muntinlupa and Cavite.
responsibilities vital to the health and safety of students. Their apparent lack San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union-Alliance of
of interest, concern and system in performing these tasks could very well earn Filipino Workers (hereinafter referred to as the Union), is the sole and
dismissal from the service even if they had not preempted the school by filing exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees in the
charges prematurely." Foundation.
Rodolfo Calucin, Jr., then Executive Secretary of the Union, had been
employed at the Foundation as a medical clerk for almost twelve years. In a
ISSUE: Letter dated January 14, 1994, the Foundation, through its Personnel Officer
Whether the petitioner is illegally dismissed Teresita D. Doringo, informed him that, per its records, he had incurred five (5)
sets of tardiness for 1993, in addition to the two other sets he had incurred in
RULING: the year 1992, and that such tardiness had affected his efficiency. He was
NO. Based on Article 282 of the Labor Code, in relation to Section 94 of the required to explain, in writing, within seventy-two hours from receipt of the
1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner was legally letter, why his services should not be terminated for gross and habitual neglect
dismissed on the ground of gross inefficiency and incompetence, and of his duties, under Article 282 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
negligence in the keeping of school or student records, or tampering with or Calucin, Jr. expressed surprise over Doringos directive. In his reply, he
falsification of records. claimed that he had already served the maximum suspension of one week,
Gross inefficiency is closely related to gross neglect because both involve from October 11 to 17, 1993, for his past tardiness. He furthered that he had
specific acts of omission resulting in damage to another. Gross neglect of duty not incurred tardiness for the past four months. Moreover, his superior had
or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even given him a performance rating of FAIR, as of October 1993.
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, On July 27, 1994, the Foundation, through then Acting Vice-President for
not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to Health Services Sister Lourdes S. Sabidong, wrote Calucin, Jr. informing the
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. As borne by the latter that his employment had been terminated as of the month of March for
records, petitioner’s actions fall within the purview of the above-definitions. gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code.
Petitioner failed to diligently perform her duties. It was unrefuted that: (1) there On August 26, 1994, then Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
were dates when a medical examination was supposed to have been Secretary Ma. Nieves R. Confesor issued an Order certifying the case to the
conducted and yet the dates fell on weekends; (2) failure to conduct medical NLRC, directing the striking employees to go to work, and directing the
examination on all students for two (2) to five (5) consecutive years; (3) lack of Foundation to accept all employees under the same terms and conditions
medical records on all students; and (4) students having medical records prior prevailing before the strike.
to their enrollment. The Foundation and the Union entered into an agreement on August 30, 1994,
The Supreme Court agreed with the CA further stating that, "even assuming on the following matters: (a) the propriety and legality of the dismissal of
that petit10ner was telling the truth, the fact remains that she had been grossly Calucin, Jr. and the hiring of agency employees shall be submitted to a
inefficient and negligent for failing to provide a proper system of maintaining voluntary arbitrator chosen by the parties in accordance with the CBA; (b) the
and updating the students' medical records over the years of her employment Union shall lift its picket line immediately after the signing of the agreement
with respondent." Indeed, petitioner was grossly inefficient and negligent in and report to work not later than August 31, 1994, except for Calucin, Jr.; (c)
performing her duties. the Foundation would waive any legal action relating to the illegal strike and
the illegal acts committed by the officers and members of the Union.
40. SAN JUAN DE DIOS EDUCATION FOUNDATION EMPLOYEES UNION In a Letter dated August 31, 1994, the Union, through its President, Ma.
V. SAN JUAN DE DIOS AND NLRC, 28 MAY 2005-David Consuelo P. Maquiling, informed the Foundation that the night-shift duty
(10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.) would be reporting back to work. However, she employees of the Hospital refused to acknowledge receipt of the copies of the
requested that those whose duties fell on the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., 8:00 a.m. said Order necessitating the distribution of the same to the striking workers at
to 5:00 p.m., and the 2:00 p.m. to 10 p.m. shifts, be required to return to work the picket line.
on September 1, 1994, considering that they had been in the picket line for the A copy of the Order was served to Consuelo Maquiling at exactly 7:55 p.m. of
past few days. 26 August 1994 but refused to receive officially. However, eight (8) copies of
The Foundation denied the Unions request. The twenty-seven employees who the Order was (sic) distributed by the undersigned to the officers and members
worked the said shifts were not allowed to go back to work. In response to the of the striking workers.
manifestations and motions filed by the Union, the SOLE, on September 14 A copy of the order was also served on the petitioners counsel, Atty. Alfredo
and 21 of 1994, ordered the Foundation to accept the said employees. The Bentulan, but the latter refused to receive the same. This can be gleaned from
Foundation refused. the following notation made by the sheriff:
On October 5, 1994, the SOLE issued an Order directing the Foundation to Served at his office at 11:05 a.m. of 27 August 1994 but his staff refused to
comply with her September 14 and 21, 1994 directives. receive the Order. A copy of the order was left by the undersigned to his staff.
It bears stressing that the sheriffs report is an official statement by him of his
ISSUE: (a) whether or not the petitioners were validly served with copies of acts under the writs and processes issued by the court in obedience to its
the return to work order of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and directive and in conformity with law. In the absence of contrary evidence, a
Employment; (b) whether or not the strike staged by the officers and members presumption exists that a sheriff has regularly performed his official duty. To
of the Union was illegal; (c) whether the petitioner Unions officers were legally controvert the presumption arising therefrom, there must be clear and
dismissed; and, (d) whether or not the respondent Foundation committed an convincing evidence. In this case, the petitioners failed to adduce clear and
unfair labor practice when it terminated the employment of petitioner Calucin, convincing evidence to overcome the presumption. The bare denial by the
Jr. petitioners of receiving copies of the order will not suffice.
The petitioners bare denial is even belied by their admission in their position
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. paper before the NLRC and their motion for reconsideration of the decision of
At the outset, we must stress that only errors of law are generally reviewed by the NLRC, that while the sheriff served copies of the order on them, they
this Court in petitions for review on certiorari of CA decisions. Questions of fact refused to receive the same because they thought it was a fake order. In such
are not entertained. After all, this Court is not a trier of facts and, in labor cases, case, it behooved the petitioners to verify its validity from the Office of the
this doctrine applies with greater force. Factual questions are for labor tribunals Secretary of Labor and Employment. They failed to do so. The petitioners
to resolve. The findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, are cannot, thus, feign ignorance of the said order.
accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. Despite the receipt of an order from then SOLE to return to their respective
Particularly when passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they are jobs, the Union officers and members refused to do so and defied the same.
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not normally be Consequently, then, the strike staged by the Union is a prohibited activity
disturbed. under Article 264 of the Labor Code. Hence, the dismissal of its officers is in
Even then, we have meticulously reviewed the records and find no reversible order. The respondent Foundation was, thus, justified in terminating the
error committed by the Court of Appeals on the merits of the petition. employment of the petitioner Unions officers.
On the first, second, and third issues, the petitioners assert that the respondent On the last issue, the petitioners failed to prove their claim that the respondent
Foundation failed to prove that the petitioners and their counsel were served Foundation committed unfair labor practices and discrimination of its
with copies of the August 26, 1994 Return-to-Work Order issued by the employees. We agree with the following discerning findings and
Secretary of Labor and Employment and that, consequently, they could not encompassing disquisitions of the Court of Appeals on this issue:
have defied the same. Hence, they insist they were illegally dismissed by the However, the records of this case do not show any hint that Calucins [Jr.s]
respondent Foundation. dismissal is due to his trade union activities. On the other hand, per findings of
We do not agree. The return of Sheriff Alfredo C. Antonio irrefragably shows the public respondent, the Foundation was able to support with documents
that copies of the Order were served on the striking employees and the how Calucin [Jr.] declared himself irrelevant in the Foundation through his
petitioners. As gleaned from the Sheriffs Return, viz: tardiness and shallow excuses such as fetching the water, cooking breakfast,
On 26 August 1994, the undersigned served copies of the Order issued in the seeing to it that his kids took breakfast before going to school, preparing
above captioned case to both parties. The Hospital thru Counsel received a packed lunch for himself and even the diversions from the usual route of
copy of the Order on 26 August 1994. On the other hand, the striking jeepneys that he rode in on these days that he was absent are all lame
excuses that amount to lack of interest in his work. His lackluster work attitude 29, 1999; December 1, 2, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 2000; and from February 17,
reached his highest point when he filed for a leave of absence of three months 2000 up to the date of such notification letter. Petitioner was likewise required to
to join his brothers business venture. Furthermore, it is not true that his appear at the investigation and to present his evidence in support of his defense.
attendance improved in 1993 because the records show that in 1993, his However, despite receipt of such notice, petitioner did not participate in the
tardiness worsened to the point that his repeated tardiness went beyond the investigation. Consequently, in a Memorandumdated March 21, 2000, the legal
maximum contemplated in the Foundations Code of Discipline. department recommended petitioner's dismissal from employment due to
For the foregoing reasons, Calucin, Jr.s dismissal is valid. excessive, unauthorized, and unexcused absences, which constitute (i)
The rest of the charges on discrimination amounting to unfair labor practice abandonment of work under the provisions of the Company Code of Employee
acts specifically those affecting the alleged tardiness of Edith Unlao, the meal Discipline (ii) and gross and habitual neglect of duty under Article 282 of the
breaks of the dietary personnel, hazard pay for midwives, the salary of Carmen Labor Code of the Philippines. Through a Notice of Dismissal dated March 28,
Herrera including hiring through agency, the resignation of Cachuela, 2000, petitioner's employment was terminated effective March 29, 2000.
Francisco Rellevo, Nestor Centeno, Nemia Abregoso and Grace Isidro are all Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
dismissed on the ground that the explanation of the Foundation per records of On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the
this case were found to be meritorious. NLRC against respondent assailing the legality of his dismissal. While petitioner
The same holds true as regard the charges of unfair labor practice through did not dispute his absences, he nonetheless averred that the same were incurred
alleged harsh enforcement of the Code of Discipline, affecting Fe Calucin, with the corresponding approved application for leave of absence. He also
Joan Balucos, Edgar Bas, Victor Estuya and the suspension of unmarried claimed that he was denied due process.
pregnant women; including the alleged violation of CBA provisions such as On November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisiondismissing
paying employees through BPI, refusal to activate grievance committee and petitioner's complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter ruled that no evidence
failure to maintain recreational activities. was presented to prove that the absences of petitioner were authorized; that
The Foundation was able to explain and exculpate itself from the charges of petitioner was deprived of due process; and that petitioner's habitual
unfair labor practice and discrimination as shown in their written replies to absenteeism without leave did not violate the company's rules and regulations
these charges which are all in the records of this case. Consequently, all the which justified his termination on the ground of gross and habitual neglect of
charges of unfair labor practice acts are dismissed. duties under Article 282(b) of the Labor Code.
Thus, in the case of Castillo vs. NLRC, et al., L-104319, June 17, 1999, the Proceedings before the NLRC
Supreme Court ruled: Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the legality of his dismissal due
As earlier pointed out, findings of the NLRC are practically conclusive on this to habitual absenteeism. Nonetheless, the NLRC awarded separation pay in favor
Court. It is only when the NLRCs findings are bereft of any substantial support of petitioner citing the case of Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. National Labor
from the records that the Court may step in and proceed to make its own Relations Commission. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision reads:
independent evaluation of the facts. The Court has found none. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED to the extent
that the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the complainant separation pay
41. QUIAMBAO V. MERALCO, G.R. 171023, 18 DEC 2009-David amounting to P126,875.00 (P18,125.00 x 14 yrs./2 = P126,875.00).
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: On July 16, 1986, petitioner was employed as branch teller by 42. ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER V. NAZARIO, G.R. 152166, 20 OCT
respondent Manila Electric Company. He was assigned at respondent's 2010-David
Mandaluyong office and was responsible for the handling and processing of DOCTRINE:
payments made by respondent's customers. FACTS: On June 23, 1995, St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. (petitioner
It appears from his employment records, however, that petitioner has hospital), located at Quezon City, employed respondent as In-House
repeatedly violated the Company Code of Employee Discipline and has Security Guard. In August 1996, Nimaya Electro Corporation installed a
exhibited poor performance in the latter part of his employment. closed-circuit television (CCTV) system in the premises of petitioner
hospital to enhance its security measures and conducted an orientation
ISSUE: W/N sep pay is proper. seminar for the in-house security personnel on the proper way of
monitoring video cameras, subject to certain guidelines.
HELD: YES. On March 10, 2000, a Notice of Investigation was served upon
petitioner for his unauthorized and unexcused absences on November 10, 25, 26,
On December 30, 1996, respondent was on duty from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 and New Maternity Units, as these two units have high incidence of
a.m. of the following day, December 31, 1996. His work consisted mainly crime.
of monitoring the video cameras. In the evening of December 30, 1996, Finding the written explanation of respondent to be unsatisfactory,
Justin Tibon, a foreigner from Majuro, Marshall Island, then attending to petitioner hospital, through Calixton, served on respondent a copy of the
his 3-year-old daughter, Andanie De Brum, who was admitted since Notice of Termination, January 24, 1997, dismissing him on the ground
December 20, 1996 at room 257, cardiovascular unit of petitioner of gross negligence/inefficiency under Section 1, Rule VII of its Code of
hospital, reported to the management of petitioner hospital about the Discipline.
loss of his mint green traveling bag, which was placed inside the cabinet,
containing, among others, two (2) Continental Airlines tickets, two (2) Thus, on March 19, 1997, respondent filed a Complaint for illegal
passports, and some clothes. Acting on the complaint of Tibon, the dismissal against petitioner hospital and its Chairman, Robert Kuan,
Security Department of petitioner hospital conducted an investigation. seeking reinstatement with payment of full backwages from the time of
When the tapes of video camera recorder (VCR) no. 3 covering the his dismissal up to actual reinstatement, without of loss of seniority
subject period were reviewed, it was shown that the VCR was focused rights and other benefits.
on camera no. 2 (Old Maternity Unit), from 2103H to 2215H [or 9:03 p.m. Petitioners countered that they validly dismissed respondent for gross
to 10:15 p.m.] of December 30, 1996, and camera no. 1 (New Maternity negligence and observed due process before terminating his
Unit), from 0025H to 0600H [or 12:25 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.] of December 31, employment.
1996. The cameras failed to record any incident of theft at room 257. On November 11, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners. He stated that a CCTV
On January 6, 1997, petitioner hospital, through Abdul A. Karim, issued monitoring system is designed to focus on many areas in a programmed
a Memorandumto respondent, the CCTV monitoring staff on duty, and sequential manner and should not to be focused only on a specific
directing him to explain in writing, within 24 hours upon receipt thereof, area, unless the situation requires it. He concluded that during
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for violating the respondents duty from December 30 to 31, 1996, he was negligent in
normal rotation/sequencing process of the VCR and, consequently, focusing the cameras at the Old and New Maternity Units only and,
failed to capture the theft of Tibon's traveling bag at room 257. consequently, the theft committed at room 257 was not recorded. He said
that respondents infraction exposed petitioners to the possibility of a
In his letter dated January 6, 1997, respondent explained that on the damage suit that may be filed against them arising from the theft.
subject dates, he was the only personnel on duty as nobody wanted to
assist him. Because of this, he decided to focus the cameras on the Old
On appeal by the respondent, the NLRC issued a Resolution dated it ruled that the ultimate penalty of dismissal was not proper as it was
January 19, 2000, reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It stated not habitual, and that there was no proof of pecuniary injury upon
that petitioners failed to submit proof that there was an existing Standard petitioner hospital. Moreover, it declared that petitioners failed to comply
Operating Procedure (SOP) in the CCTV monitoring system, particularly with the twin notice rule and hearing as what they did was to require
on the focusing procedure. It observed that respondent was not respondent to submit a written explanation, within 24 hours and,
negligent when he focused the cameras on the Old and New Maternity thereafter, he was ordered dismissed, without affording him an
Units, as they were located near the stairways and elevators, which were opportunity to be heard.
frequented by many visitors and, thus, there is the likelihood that
untoward incidents may arise. If at all, it treated the matter as a single or As their motion for reconsideration was denied in the CA's Resolution
isolated act of simple negligence which did not constitute a just cause dated February 12, 2002, petitioners filed this present petition.
for the dismissal of an employee. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads: Petitioners allege that, by not focusing the CCTV cameras on the
different areas of the hospital, respondent committed gross negligence
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
dated November 11, 1998 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new which warrants his dismissal. According to them, there was no need to
one entered ordering respondents-appellees to reinstate prove that the act done was habitual, as the occurrence of the theft
complainant-appellant to his former position without loss
of seniority rights and other benefits, with full backwages exposed them to possible law suit and, additionally, there might be a
from the date of dismissal until actual reinstatement.
repetition of a similar incident in the future if respondent would remain
Should reinstatement be no longer feasible, to further
pay complainant-appellant separation pay equivalent to in their employ.
one (1) month pay for every year of service.

Respondent maintains that he was not negligent in the discharge of his

On February 14, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but duties. He said that there was no actual loss to petitioner hospital as no
the same was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated March 20, 2000.
complaint or legal action was taken against them and that the supposed
complainant, Tibon, did not even report the matter to the police
On September 21, 2001, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for
authorities.
certiorari, affirming the NLRCs finding that while respondent may appear
to be negligent in monitoring the cameras on the subject dates, the same
Contrary to the stance of petitioners, respondent was illegally dismissed
would not constitute sufficient ground to terminate his employment. without just cause and compliance with the notice requirement.
Even assuming that respondents act would constitute gross negligence,
ISSUE: WON PETITIONER SHALL PAY THE SEPARATION PAY OF THE HELD:
RESPONDENT?
46. FELIX V. ENERTECH SYSTEMS INDUSTRIES, INC. AND CA, G.R.
HELD: Petitioners lack of just cause and non-compliance with the procedural 142007, MARCH 28, 2001-Enriquez
requisites in terminating respondents employment renders them guilty of illegal
dismissal. Consequently, respondent is entitled to reinstatement to his former DOCTRINE: It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence,
position without loss of seniority rights and payment of backwages. However, if determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment
such reinstatement proves impracticable, and hardly in the best interest of the for that of the administrative agency. Well-settled is the rule that the findings
parties, perhaps due to the lapse of time since his dismissal, or if he decides not of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the NLRC, are accorded not only respect
to be reinstated, respondent should be awarded separation pay in lieu of but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
reinstatement. Falsification of time cards constitutes serious misconduct and dishonesty or
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court deems that since reinstatement is no fraud, 17 which are just causes for the termination of employment under Art.
282(a) and (c) of the Labor Code.
longer feasible due to the long passage of time, petitioners are required to pay
respondent his separation pay equivalent to one (1) months pay for every year of FACTS:

service. Petitioners are thus ordered to pay respondent his backwages of Respondent Enertech System Industries, Incorporated is engaged in the
manufacture of boilers and tanks. Petitioner Manuel C. Felix worked as a
P250,229.97 and separation pay of P31,365.00, or a total amount of P281,594.97.
welder/fabricator in respondent company. On August 5, 1994, petitioner and
three other employees, were assigned to install a smokestack at the Big J
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 21, 2001 Feedmills in Sta. Monica, Bulacan. During the entire period they were working
and Resolution dated February 12, 2002 of the Court of Appeals, Second Division, at the Big J Feedmills, petitioner and his companions accomplished daily time
in CA-G.R. SP No. 58808, which affirmed the Resolutions dated January 19, 2000 records (DTRs). Petitioner wrote in his DTR that he had worked eight hours a
and March 20, 2000 of the National Labor Relations Commission, Third Division, day on the basis of which his wages were computed.
are AFFIRMED
The work was estimated to be completed within seven days, but it actually took
43. MANSION PRINTING CENTER V. BITARA, G.R. 168120, 15 JAN 2012- the workers until August 17, 1994, or about two weeks, before it was finished.
Delos Reyes On that day, petitioner and his three co-employees were each given notice by
DOCTRINE: respondent, that their act of clocking in at 11:00am and leaving the said site at
FACTS: 2:00pm constitutes Abandonment of Work which is a violation of the Company
ISSUE: Code on Employee Discipline that warrants a penalty of Dismissal, and that
HELD: they were given 24 hours to explain themselves on the said matter. The next
day, August 18, 1994, petitioner and his co-workers were placed under
44. HILTON HEAVY EQUIPMENT V. DY, G.R. 164860, 02 FEB 2010-Delos preventive suspension for seven working days.
Reyes
DOCTRINE: On August 26, 1994, respondent, through its personnel assistant, and in the
FACTS: presence of two union officers, interviewed Johnny F. Legaspi (JFL), who
ISSUE: owned the Big J Feedmills, and his engineer, Juanito Avena. In the interview
HELD: it was revealed that the petitioner and his co-employees were always late and
that they never completed the 8-hour work.
45. MANAROIS V. TEXAN PHILS., INC., G.R. NO. 197011, 28 JAN 2015- These statements were corroborated by the affidavit 4 of petitioner's co-
Delos Reyes employee, Emerson G. Yanos, who stated that petitioner and his co-worker
DOCTRINE: Dante Tunglapan usually arrived for work at the Big J Feedmills between 9:30
FACTS: to 10:00 a.m., stopped working at 12:00 noon, then resumed work at 1:00 p.m.,
ISSUE: continuing until 3:00 p.m. Before going home, they had snacks.
 Edwin V. Galan, respondent, is a former employee of Pzer, Inc. In August
On September 9, 1994, respondent required petitioner to report to the 1982, he was initially hired as a professional sales representative, more
company lawyer on September 13, 1994 for investigation. 6 Then, on October commonly known as a "medical representative." A recipient of several
17, 1994, it issued a memorandum 7 placing petitioner under preventive company awards, respondent was promoted to the position of District Manager
suspension for 30 days. Finally, on November 21, 1994, respondent sent for Mindanao in 1986. He continued to garner more awards for having
petitioner a memorandum terminating his employment on the following exceeded the company's sales targets.
grounds; Dishonesty and Insubordination. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against respondent before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. Sometime in September 1997, Pzer, Inc. issued a memorandum requiring
respondent to explain his unauthorized use of the company's vehicle and his
LA: Petitioner has been illegally dismissed; R, appealed to NLRC questionable expense claims; and to comment on the doubtful liquidation of
his cash advance incurred during his official trip to Indonesia. After respondent
NLRC: Reversed LA decision, petitioner’s complaint lacks merit; P, MR: submitted his explanation, a formal investigation was conducted and
denied, appeal to CA, same with NLRC + 13th month pay, MR: denied. Hence, thereafter, he was preventively suspended.
this petition.
On October 31, 1997, petitioner Maria Angelica B. Lleander sent respondent
ISSUE: a "Notice of Termination" on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
WON the petitioner was illegally dismissed by the respondent company
LA: Respondent was illegally dismissed from service and therefore entitled to
HELD: backwages, 13th month pay, incentives, reimbursements and attorney’s fees.
It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the NLRC: affirmed judgment of LA. The judgment of NLRC became final and
administrative agency. Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi- executory. Upon respondent’s motion, NLRC issued a writ of execution.
judicial agencies, like the NLRC, are accorded not only respect but at times
even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The Meanwhile, petitoners filed with CA for certiorari under rule 65.
findings of fact made therein can only be set aside upon a showing of grave
abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. 16 There is no such showing of grave CA: dismissed the petition for having been filed beyong the 60 day period.
abuse of discretion in this case. For this reason, we find petitioner's dismissal
to be in order. Falsification of time cards constitutes serious misconduct and ISSUE:
dishonesty or fraud, 17 which are just causes for the termination of Whether or nor the CA erred in dismissing the petitioner’s action for
employment under Art. 282(a) and (c) of the Labor Code. certiorari

HELD:
47. PFIZER V. GALAN, G.R. 158460, 24 AUG 2007 -Santos No. The court relied on the ruling in the case of Odango v. National Labor
Relations Commission, this Court held that with respect to labor cases, the
DOCTRINE: appellate court's jurisdiction to review a decision of the NLRC in a petition for
certiorari is conned to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS: Differently put, the extraordinary writ of certiorari issues only for the correction
Petitioner herein challenged the resolution of CA dismissing its petition for of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
certiorari for having been filed beyond the 60 day period. excess of jurisdiction, its sole function being to keep the inferior court, board,
tribunal, or ocer within the bounds of its or his jurisdiction or to prevent it or him
Petitioner Pzer, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of from committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
medicines. It sells its products through its distributors who deliver them to retail jurisdiction.
drugstores nationwide. Maria Angelica B. Lleander, also a petitioner, is the
Human Resource Director of Pfizer, Inc. There are two (2) jurisprudential rules of long-standing in this
jurisdiction.
First, is the hoary rule that factual issues are beyond the scope of certiorari as verification, Ventureslink reported that the fund deviations were upon the
they do not any jurisdictional issue. As held by this Court in Quiambao v. Court instruction of Rivera. On July 16, 2007, Unilever issued a show-cause notice
of Appeals, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, questions of fact are not to Rivera asking her to explain the following charges, to wit: a) Conversion and
generally permitted, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not the Misappropriation of Resources; b) Breach of Fiduciary Trust; c) Policy
respondent tribunal acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Breaches; and d) Integrity Issues.
Responding through an email, dated July 16, 2007, Rivera admitted the fund
Second, is the cardinal principle that factual ndings of the NLRC arming those diversions, but explained that such actions were mere resourceful utilization of
of the Labor Arbiter, when devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness, are budget because of the difficulty of procuring funds from the head office. 5 She
accorded respect if not nality by the Court of Appeals . 9 And where the ndings insisted that the diverted funds were all utilized in the company's promotional
of the Labor Arbiter are armed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, these ventures in her area of coverage. Unilever found Rivera guilty of serious
are deemed binding, nal, and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. 10 It is not breach of the company's Code of Business Principles compelling it to sever
the function of the Supreme Court to inquire into the correctness of the their professional relations. In a letter, dated September 20, 2007, Rivera
evaluation of the evidence which was the basis for the labor ocial's ruling. And asked for reconsideration and requested Unilever to allow her to receive
this Court may not disturb the ndings of facts of those ocials who have gained retirement benefits having served the company for fourteen (14) years already.
expertise in their specialized eld, where such findings have been given the Unilever denied her request, reasoning that the forfeiture of retirement benefits
stamp of approval by the Court of Appeals. was a legal consequence of her dismissal from work.
On October 19, 2007, Rivera filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal and other
This Court, therefore, sustains the findings of fact by the labor agencies and monetary claims against Unilever.
theCourt of Appeals which warrant the dismissal of petitioners' complaint for LA: Dismissed her complaint for lack of merit and denied the claim for
loss of trust and confidence against respondent. retirement benefits but ordered payment of 13th month pay.
NLRC: Partially granted Rivera’s prayer, Unilever violated the twin notice
48. UNILEVER V. RIVERA, G.R. 201701, JUNE 3, 2013-Enriquez requirement. Pay nominal damages, retirement benefits and separation pay.
Unilever, MR: deletes sep. pay, reduced nominal damages to 20,000 but
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any affirmed retirement benefits. Unilever, Appealed to CA.
of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 15 of the Labor Code is not CA: affirmed with modification the NLRC decision, no retirement benefits,
entitled to a separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, the Court has awarded sep. pay as a measure of social justice.
granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of "social
justice" or on "equitable grounds." Issue:
1. WON Rivera should be awarded separation pay despite being
FACTS: dismissed validly from employment
2. WON The Company violated Rivera’s right to procedural due process
Unilever is a company engaged in the production, manufacture, sale, and before terminating her employment
distribution of various food, home and personal care products, while Rivera Held:
was employed as its Area Activation Executive for Area 9 South in the cities of 1. As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the
Cotabato and Davao. She was primarily tasked with managing the sales, just causes enumerated under Article 282 15 of the Labor Code is not entitled
distribution and promotional activities in her area and supervising Ventureslink to a separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted
International, Inc. (Ventureslink), a third party service provider for the separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of "social justice" or
company's activation projects. Unilever enforces a strict policy that every trade on "equitable grounds." In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1)
activity must be accompanied by a Trade Development Program (TDP) and was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character
that the allocated budget for a specific activity must be used for such activity of the employee. The Court wrote in various jurisprudences that "separation
only. pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the
Sometime in 2007, Unilever's internal auditor conducted a random audit and employee's fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor
found out that there were fictitious billings and fabricated receipts supposedly Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no
from Ventureslink amounting to P11,200,000.00. It was also discovered that longer feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just
some funds were diverted from the original intended projects. Upon further cause."
 provide certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules, and to assure
In this case, Rivera was dismissed from work because she intentionally that the same would be complied with
circumvented a strict company policy, manipulated another entity to carry out
her instructions without the company's knowledge and approval, and directed FACTS: On June 29, 2009, Maria Theresa Sanchez was hired as a staff nurse
the diversion of funds, which she even admitted doing under the guise of in the pediatric unit of SLMC. On May 29, 2011, after her shift, she passed
shortening the laborious process of securing funds for promotional activities through the SLMC Centralization Entrance/Exit where she was subjected to
from the head office. These transgressions were serious offenses that the standard inspection procedure. In the course thereof, security guard Jaime
warranted her dismissal from employment and proved that her termination Manzanade discovered in her bag a pouch containing medical supplies.
from work was for a just cause. Hence, she is not entitled to a separation pay.
Sanchez asked if she could return the pouch inside the treatment room, but
2. The Court is not persuaded. In this case, Unilever was not direct and the guard refused and confiscated the pouch instead. She was brought to the
specific in its first notice to Rivera. The words it used were couched in general In-house Security Department (IHSD) where she wrote an incident report and
terms and were in no way informative of the charges against her that may submitted a handwritten letter of apology. In her letter, she admitted she
result in her dismissal from employment. Evidently, there was a violation of her intentionally brought out the items despite knowing it is against SLMC’s rules.
right to statutory due process warranting the payment of indemnity in the form
of nominal damages. Hence, the Court finds no compelling reason to reverse SLMC was apprised of the incident and an investigation was conducted. Asked
the award of nominal damages in her favor. The Court, however, deems it to explain her side, Sanchez submitted an Incident Report Addendum, stating
proper to increase the award of nominal damages from P20,000.00 to that the medical supplies were excess stocks from the medication drawers of
P30,000.00, as initially awarded by the NLRC, in accordance with existing discharged patients which the staff members save as backup in case of
jurisprudence. emergencies. She just failed to return the pouch inside the medication drawer
on the day of the incident.
49. LAKPUE DRUG V. BALGA, G.R. 166379, 20 OCT 2005-Entila
DOCTRINE: Sanchez was preventively suspended until the conclusion of the investigation.
FACTS: A case conference was held, and on July 6, 2011, she was dismissed for
ISSUE: violating SLMC’s Code of Discipline, Sec 1Rule 1 on Acts of Dishonesty.
HELD:
Sanchez filed a case for illegal dismissal, arguing 1) she did not intend to bring
50. PHIL. PLAZA HOLDINGS V. EPISCOPE, G.R. 192826, 27 FEB 2013- the items outside SLMC, 2) she cannot be guilty of pilferage since the items
Entila were neither SLMC nor its employee’s property, and 3) SLMC did not file
DOCTRINE: criminal charges against her.
FACTS:
ISSUE: The labor Arbiter (LA) held that Sanchez was validly dismissed. The NLRC
HELD: reversed the LA, holding that SLMC illegally dismissed Sanchez. The CA
affirmed this decision, hence, this petition by SLMC assailing the NLRC and
51. HORMILLOSA V. COCA-COLA, G.R. 198699, 09 SEPT 2013-Entila CA decision.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE: Was Sanchez illegally dismissed
HELD:
HELD: Sanchez was validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful disregard and
52. ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER V. SANCHEZ, G.R. 212054, 11 MARCH disobedience of the SLMC Code of Discipline. Despite her knowledge of the
2015-Jimenez prohibition under this code, she knowingly brought out the supplies with her.
DOCTRINE: Employers have the right to regulate all aspect of employment. SLMC cannot be faulted in construing the taking of the questioned items as an
This management prerogative, includes the right to prescribe reasonable rules act of dishonesty considering the intent to gain may be reasonably presumed
and regulations necessary or proper for conduct of its business or concern, to from the furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another. It is
immaterial that these supplies were excess stocks because they should have Cruz. Some of the returned checks and USTWs were lodged to accounts
been turned over to the hospital as a matter of policy. receivable because the balance of FXSD No. 221-6 was not sufficient to cover
the returned checks. Simultaneously, cash withdrawals were allowed even if
Employers have the right to regulate all aspect of employment. This S/A No. 3396 did not have sufficient balance to cover the withdrawals at the
management prerogative, includes the right to prescribe reasonable rules and time they were made.
regulations necessary or proper for conduct of its business or concern, to
provide certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules, and to assure Mauricio was directed to report for work at the Head Office immediately. The
that the same would be complied with. Employees, in turn, have the corollary Prudential Bank President issued a Memorandum to Mauricio furnishing him
duty to obey all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer; and with a copy of the audit team’s report and directing him to report in writing
willful or intentional disobedience thereto justifies termination of the contract of within 72 hours from receipt of the memorandum why the bank should not
service and dismissal of employee. Hence, Sanchez’ willful disobedience is institute an action against him. The report showed that the bank was exposed
just cause for her termination. to losses amounting to $774,561.58.

53. PRUDENTIAL BANK V. MAURICIO, G.R. 183350, 18 JAN 2012-Jimenez While the investigation against Mauricio was ongoing, as conducted by a
(*repeated; same as #36) Hearing Committee, the property subject of the Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage
DOCTRINE: For a dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence to be valid, executed by the Spouses Cruz was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Bank for.
the breach of trust must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, Spouses Cruz, however, sought the annulment and/or declaration of nullity of
knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse. Loss of trust and foreclosure in a complaint or civil case filed with RTC- Makati.
confidence stems from a breach of trust founded on dishonest, deceitful or
fraudulent act. The Bank claimed that it sent the proper demand letters to the Spouses but to
no avail. Thus, it was constrained to foreclose the mortgaged property
FACTS: Respondent Mauricio was the Branch Manager of Prudential Bank’s extrajudicially for the settlement of the obligations of the Spouses Cruz
Magallanes Branch in Makati City when he was dismissed from employment. including the returned USTWs, checks and drafts. Later, while the
investigation against Mauricio was still ongoing, the Bank filed an Amended
Spouses Marcelo and Corazon Cruz (Spouses Cruz) opened a dollar savings Answer to implead Mauricio in its counterclaim in the case filed by the Spouses
account (FXSD No. 221-6) with an initial cash deposit of US$500.00, in the against the former, contending that he conspired and confederated with the
Bank’s Magallanes Branch. At that time, Mauricio was already its Branch Spouses Cruz to commit the fraud.
Manager. Spouses Cruz also executed Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage over
their properties in San Juan in favor of the bank. The Hearing Committee of the Bank found that there was sufficient evidence
to hold Mauricio guilty of the charges against him. The Board of Directors
An audit investigation was conducted in the Magallanes Branch. The reports issued Resolution considering the recommendation of the Hearing Committee
of the audit team showed that from March 1991 to August 1991, credits to and the Board found Antonio S.A. Mauricio to have violated Bank policies and
FXSD No. 221-6 consisted mostly of dollar check deposits composed of U.S. regulations and committed imprudent acts prejudicial to the interests of the
Treasury Warrants (USTWs), U.S. Postal Money Orders, Travellers Express Bank, resulting in monetary loss to the Bank and giving rise to loss of trust and
and Amexco Money Orders. Despite the fact that Spouses Cruz were not the confidence. The services of Mr. Mauricio was terminated and that his
payees of said instruments and neither of them endorsed the same, Mauricio retirement benefits was forfeited.
allowed immediate withdrawals against them. Most of the proceeds of the
encashments were then deposited to a peso savings account, S/A No. 3396, Mauricio filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
also in the name of the Spouses Cruz. back wages, retirement and provident benefits, vacation and sick leave credits,
and actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees. While the
The dollar checks were eventually returned by their drawee banks for having illegal dismissal complaint was pending, the Makati RTC rendered a Decision
forged endorsements, alterations to the stated amounts, or being drawn in favor of the Spouses Cruz and Mauricio. It was affirmed by the CA and
against insufficient funds, among other reasons. Allegedly, upon receipt of the Supreme Court.
returned checks at the Magallanes Branch, Mauricio debited FXSD No. 221-
6, but such debits were made against the uncollected deposits of the Spouses On the other hand, LA rendered a Decision holding that the Bank was justified
in terminating Mauricio’s employment. The LA ruled that even if Mauricio, as The acts and omissions alleged by the Bank in the civil case as basis of its
branch manager, was clothed with discretion, he gravely abused it to the counterclaim against Mauricio, are the very same acts and omissions which
detriment and prejudice of the Bank and that he was afforded procedural due were used as grounds to terminate his
process before he was dismissed. However, LA ordered the bank to pay
Mauricio his 13th month pay and sick leaves earned and reimburse him his
actual contributions to the provident fund, all with legal interest at 12% per employment. Mauricio cannot be held to have abused the discretion he was
annum from date of the decision until actual payment and/or finality of the clothed with absent some semblance of parameters. In the absence of such
decision. guidelines, the validity of Mauricio’s acts can be tested by determining whether
they were justified under the circumstances. In exercising his discretion to
Mauricio filed a partial appeal of the LA’s decision with the NLRC, which, allow the questioned withdrawals, Mauricio took into consideration the fact that
however, affirmed the LA’s decision. On appeal, CA set aside the NLRC the Spouses Cruz have substantial deposit and security, and enjoyed a
decision and ruled in favor of Mauricio. Bank filed the instant petition. favorable credit standing with the Bank. No malice can be inferred from
Mauricio’s acts who tried to collect from the Spouses Cruz and reported all the
ISSUE: Whether the acts of Mauricio with respect to the accounts of Spouses transactions to the head office; in fact, the Bank never called his attention to
Cruz can be considered as grounds for his termination due to loss of trust and any irregularity in the transactions but even continued to credit the account of
confidence. the spouses for the value of the returned checks. Under the circumstances,
HELD: Civil and labor cases require different quanta of proof – the former Mauricio indeed fully considered the interest of his employer before approving
requiring preponderance of evidence while the latter only calls for substantial the questioned transactions.
evidence. Despite the dissimilarity, this does not spell closing our eyes to facts
conclusively determined in one proceeding when the determination of the very For a dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence to be valid, the breach
same facts are crucial in resolving the issues in another proceeding pursuant of trust must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and
to the doctrine of res judicata. purposely, without justifiable excuse. Loss of trust and confidence stems from
a breach of trust founded on dishonest, deceitful or fraudulent act. This is
The present labor case is closely related to the civil case that was decided with obviously not the case here.
finality. In the civil case, the Bank’s counterclaim for actual and exemplary
damages against Mauricio was grounded on his alleged violations of office Office Order No. 1596, one of the office orders allegedly violated by Mauricio,
policies when he allowed the encashment and/or withdrawal prior to clearing provides:
of numerous USTWs and dollar checks and allegedly tried concealing from the
Bank the fact that said instruments were returned. “Approving officers shall exercise extreme caution in allowing deposit of,
encashment or withdrawals against foreign and out-of-town checks. Refund to
The RTC in the civil case ruled: the bank of the amount involved shall be the personal responsibility and
accountability of the officer who authorized the deposit or encashment over
“Further, this court finds that PRUDENTIAL’s branch manager MAURICIO’s the counter when the check should be returned by the drawee bank for any
act of allowing SPOUSES CRUZ to immediately withdraw the instruments is reason whatsoever.”
well within his functions as a branch manager. A person occupying such
position exercises a certain degree of discretion with respect to the The above company directive is an explicit admission that Mauricio was
accommodations extended to certain valued clients such as herein SPOUSES clothed with such discretion to enter into the questioned transactions as well
CRUZ. Having been recommended by the legal counsel himself of as a forewarning that in case the foreign and out-of-town checks were returned
PRUDENTIAL and in view of the fact that they have substantial deposit with for whatever reason, the approving officer, in this case, Mauricio, shall be
the same bank, it cannot be doubted that SPOUSES CRUZ were valued personally responsible and accountable. “personal responsibility and
clients.” accountability” could only mean the reimbursement of the value of any
dishonored check but does not mean termination of the approving officer’s
The court also holds that MAURICIO was not in anyway prompted by any employment for breaching the bank’s trust and confidence.
malicious motive in approving the encashment and/or withdrawal.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. the freezers. (a) Discoloration (b) deteriorated condition (c) Fear that it may be
charged against him.

54. MANESE V. JOLLIBEE FOODS, G.R. 17-454, 11 OCT 2012-Jimenez 9. Their team had a meeting on what to do with the chicken – soak and
DOCTRINE: The mere existence of a basis for the loss of trust and confidence clean the rejects in soda water and segregate the valid rejects from the wastes.
justifies the dismissal of the managerial employee because when an employee
accepts a promotion to a managerial position or to an office requiring full trust 10. Julietes was transferred to Jollibee Shell South Luzon Tollway and she
and confidence, such employee gives up some of the rigid guaranties available estimated that 1,140 out of the 4,500 were the rejects.
to ordinary workers.
FACTS: 11. The area manager, Divina Evangelista, visited the Festival branch and
1. Petitions were a team of employees of Jollibee who were tasked to open saw Eufemio Penano cleaning the chickens and told the latter to dispose it but
a new Jollibee branch at Festival Mall. (a) Cecilia – First Assistant Store the former replied that they be allowed to return them to the Commissary. A
Manager; (b) Julietes – Second Assistant Store Manager; and (c) Eufemio – corporate audit was conducted and found that 2,130 pieces of the rejects were
Shift Manager/Assistant Store Manager Trainee declared wastage

2. Julietes requested the Commissionary Warehouse and Distribution 12. Divina then issued a memo requiring petitioners to explain why they
(commissary) for the delivery of wet and frozen goods, to comply with the 30- should not be meted the appropriate penalty for violation of Code of Discipline
day thawing process (Chickenjoy). for (a) extremely serious misconduct (b) gross negligence (c) product
tampering (d) fraud or falsification of company records and insubordination in
3. The opening of the store was postponed 3x, which led to Julietes requesting connection with their findings that 2,130pieces of Chickenjoy rejects were kept
(#2) for the said dates. inside the walk-in freezer, which could cause product contamination and threat
to food safety.
4. The engineering team assured the operations manager (respondent
elizabeth cruz) that the store would open on December 28, 2000. Upon advice 13. Explanations of petitioners:
of the opening team manager, Julietes did not cancel the request for delivery
of products. a. Cecilia Manese

5. The following events took place: (a) December 23 – 450 packs (4,500 a.i. Foul smell and discoloration of the Chickenjoy rejects were due to the
peices) of chickenjoy breakdown of the walk-in facilities prior to the store’s grand opening. During
that time, the store was using temporary power supply, so that it could open
were delivered and placed in the freezer. (b) December 26 – thawed for the during Christmas Day and the Metro Manila Film Festival.
branch opening on the 28th
a.ii. She admitted that she was not able to immediately inform Area Manager
6. Shelf life of chickenjoy is 25 days from being marinated, and should about it.
be served on the 3rd day upon thawing (so the 29th)a. Cannot serve beyond
the 3 days. The remaining chickens are then packed in plastic and placed in a
garbage bag to be stored in a freezer. Then returned to commissary and a.iii. They did their best, but they were not able to save a bulk of the said
disposed of. Chickenjoy due to the holiday season.

7. Despite the postponements, the store’s sale targets for Dec. 28 & 29 a.iv. They asked for assistance from other stores, but they could only
were not revised by the operations manager. accommodate a few stocks, as most of their storage areas were filled with their
own stocks.
8. Julietes attempted to return 150 pieces to commissary but the driver
refused to accept them due to ... which led to the chickens being returned to a.v. They did not immediately dispose of the Chickenjoyrejects out of fear of
being reprimanded and it would add to the existing problems of the branch
regarding low sales and profit. HELD (1):
1. An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the
b. Eufemio Penamo appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision
of the court below
b.i. He was not familiar with managerial duties in the kitchen since he had no
proper training, hence, he only followed Cecilia Manase’s instructions. 2. Jollibee did not appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter who ruled
that the dismissal of petitioner Cruz was illegal. They only filed an Opposition
c. Julietes Cruz to Appeal, which prayed for the reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s orders declaring
as illegal the dismissal of Cruz and directing payment of her separation pay.
c.i. Before her transfer, there were only 1,200 rejects
a. The LA’s decision was received on August 28 and they had 10 days
c.ii. Some were greenish because they were the ones delivered when the walk- (September 8) to file an appeal.
in freezers were still on pre-setting temperature and operating on temporary
power. b. Instead of an appeal, they filed this opposition which could have been
treated as an appeal but was filed beyond the 10 days, around October.
14. The management conducted an investigation and sent petitioners
notifying them that they are terminated due to loss of trust and confidence. 3. Failure to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter renders the
decision on the illegal dismissal of Cruz final and executory.
15. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
HELD (2):
16. LA’s Decision: Petitioner’s Argument: The area manager conducted a store audit and had
favorable finding – all departments, including food stock and food safety, was
a. Cecilia Manese & Eufemio Penano: Dismissed fair and satisfactory negated the charge of loss of trust and confidence

b. Julietes Cruz: Illegal Disissal 1. The respective memorandum with a notice of termination given by to
each of the petitioners clearly expressed that their respective acts and
b.i. He was no longer working and was transferred omissions enumerated made respondent company lose its trust and
confidence in petitioners, who were managerial employees; hence, they were
17. NLRC’s Decision: Affirmed LA terminated from employment.

a. Julietes: Actually it was a valid dismissal but management failed to file a 2. The mere existence of a basis for the loss of trust and confidence
timely appeal. justifies the dismissal of the managerial employee because when an employee
accepts a promotion to a managerial position or to an office requiring full trust
18. CA’s Decision: Valid dismissal and confidence, such employee gives up some of the rigid guaranties available
to ordinary workers.
a. The mere existence of a basis for believing that they have breached the
trust of their employer would suffice for their dismissal 3. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required provided there is a
valid reason for the loss of trust and confidence, such as when the employer
ISSUE: (1) WoN CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in passing upon the has a reasonable ground to believe that the managerial employee concerned
legality of Cruz’ dismissal considering the LA decision has become final and is responsible for the purported misconduct and the nature of his participation
executory since there was no timely appeal filed by Jollibee. (2) WoN CA renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position
misappreciated the facts when it affirmed the dismissal on the ground of loss
of trust and confidence (managerial employees) – No, CA did not a. Right of the management to dismiss must be balanced against the
misappreciated the facts. managerial employee’s right to security of tenure which is not one of the
guaranties he gives up.
b. Managerial employees enjoy security of tenure and, although the Petitioner filed an appeal before BPI President Xavier Loinaz, but her appeal
standards for their dismissal are less stringent, the loss of trust and confidence was denied.
must be substantial and founded on clearly established facts sufficient to
warrant the managerial employee’s separation from the company. The aforementioned incidents of fraud resulted in the dismissal of three
officers, including petitioner, one trader; the suspension of two officers and one
4. In this case, the acts listed in the memo were valid bases. trader, and the reprimand of one teller.6

55. DE LEON CRUZ V. BPI, G.R. 173357, 13 FEB 2013-Labampa Thereafter, petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent
DOCTRINE: Hence, respondent was justified in dismissing petitioner on the and its officers with the Arbitral Office of the NLRC.
ground of breach of trust. As long as there is some basis for such loss of The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner cannot be considered a managerial
confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that employee, and that her dismissal on grounds of gross negligence and breach
the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the of trust was unjustified.
nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded of his position, a managerial employee may be On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter,
dismissed. and it entered a new decision dismissing petitioner's Complaint for lack of
FACTS: Petitioner was hired by Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) merit.9
in 1989. Upon the merger of FEBTC with respondent Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) in April 2000, petitioner automatically became an employee of The NLRC stated that the evidence showed that the pre-termination of the
respondent. Petitioner held the position of Assistant Branch Manager of the accounts of the depositors involved and the withdrawal of money from such
BPI Ayala Avenue Branch in Makati City, and she was in charge of the Trading accounts were with the approval of petitioner.
Section. after 13 years of continuous service, respondent terminated petitioner According to the NLRC, the banking industry is such a sensitive one that the
on grounds of gross negligence and breach of trust. Petitioner's dismissal was trust given by a bank's depositors must be protected at all times even by the
brought about by the fraud perpetrated against three depositors, namely, lowest-ranking employee. As petitioner's signature appeared in the documents
Geoffrey L. Uymatiao, Maybel Caluag and Evelyn G. Avila, in respondent's showing her approval of the pre-termination of the accounts of the depositors
Ayala Avenue Branch. involved and the withdrawal of money from their accounts, the NLRC reversed
BPI Vice-President Edwin S. Ragos issued a memorandum3 directing the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ruled that petitioner's dismissal was for a
petitioner to explain within 24 hours the aforementioned unauthorized pre- valid cause.
terminations/withdrawals of US dollar deposits at the BPI Ayala Avenue
Branch. In petitioner's reply,4 she asserted that she followed the bank ISSUE: won there was illegal dismissal
procedure/policy on pre-termination of accounts, opening of transitory HELD: No.
accounts and reactivation of dormant accounts. She explained that upon the Court agrees with the findings of the Court of Appeals and the NLRC that
verifying the authenticity of the signatures of the depositors involved, she petitioner's dismissal was for a valid cause.
approved the withdrawals from certain accounts of these clients. With regard
to the pre-termination of Uymatiao's USD CD, petitioner claimed that the Respondent dismissed petitioner from her employment on grounds of gross
Trader presented to her what she believed was an original and genuine client negligence and breach of trust reposed on her by respondent under Article
copy of the certificate of deposit, the surrender of which caused the issuance 282 (b) and (c) of the Labor Code.
of a new USD CD.
a notice of termination5 was issued informing petitioner of her dismissal Gross negligence connotes want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care
effective July 12, 2002 on grounds of gross negligence and breach of trust for or diligence, or the entire absence of care.18 It evinces a thoughtless disregard
the following acts: (1) allowing the issuance of USD CDs under the bank's of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.19 On the other
safekeeping to an impostor without valid consideration; (2) allowing USD CD hand, the basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is
pre-terminations based on such irregularly released certificates; and (3) that the employees concerned hold a position of trust and confidence.20 It is
allowing withdrawals by third parties from clients' accounts, which resulted in the breach of this trust that results in the employer's loss of confidence in the
prejudice to the bank. employee.21
 petitioner was implicated in an irregularity occurring in the subsidence area of
In this case, respondent avers that petitioner held the position of Assistant respondents mine site at Pacdal, Tuba, Benguet. Petitioners co-worker Danilo
Manager in its Ayala Avenue Branch. However, petitioner contends that her R. Lupega (Lupega), a Subsidence Checker at the mine site who was himself
position was only Cash II Officer. under administrative investigation for what came to be known as the
subsidence area anomaly, executed an affidavit.
The test of “supervisory” or “managerial status” depends on whether a person The incidents alleged in Lupegas affidavit supposedly took place when
possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer and whether such petitioner was still a Contract Claims Assistant at respondents Legal
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the use of Department. An investigation was promptly launched by respondents officers
independent judgment. by conducting several fact-finding meetings for the purpose.Petitioner
attended the meetings but claimed that he was neither asked if he needed the
Petitioner holds a managerial status since she is tasked to act in the interest assistance of counsel nor allowed to properly present his side.
of her employer as she exercises independent judgment when she approves Petitioner thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
pre-termination of USD CDs or the withdrawal of deposits. In fact, petitioner respondent, represented by Agustin, with claims for annual vacation leave pay
admitted the exercise of independent judgment when she explained that as for 2001 and 2002. Respondent, admitting that it dismissed petitioner,
regards the pre-termination of the USD CDs of Uymatiao and Caluag, the contended that the decision was preceded by regular and proper proceedings,
transactions were approved on the basis of her independent judgment that the all attended by petitioner; that petitioner had agreed to submit his case for
signatures in all the documents presented to her by the traders matched, as decision; that it lost almost P9,000,000 from the subsidence area anomaly;
shown in her reply25 dated April 23, 2002 to respondent's memorandum and that Crispin Y. Tabogader, Jr. (Tabogader), Subsidence Area Head,
asking her to explain the unauthorized preterminations/withdrawals of U.S. Robert L. Montes, Draw Control Superintendent, and Eduardo R. Garcia, Jr.,
dollar deposits in the BPI Ayala Avenue Branch. Mine Engineering and Draw Control Department Manager, had all been
In that regard, petitioner was remiss in the performance of her duty to approve dismissed for their involvement in the anomaly.
the pre-termination of certificates of deposits by legitimate depositors or their The Labor Arbiter found that respondent failed to prove by substantial
duly-authorized representatives, resulting in prejudice to the bank, which evidence the alleged fraud committed by petitioner, explaining that the
reimbursed the monetary loss suffered by the affected clients. Hence, telephone conversations between petitioner and Didith Caballero of ANSECA
respondent was justified in dismissing petitioner on the ground of breach of would not suffice to lay the basis for respondents loss of trust and confidence
trust. As long as there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when in petitioner.
the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned On the charge of gross negligence, the Labor Arbiter held that no negligence
is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation was present as respondent itself admitted that petitioner reported the
therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his underloading to Tabogader, who was then in charge of the subsidence area
position, a managerial employee may be dismissed. where the alleged anomaly was happening.

56. ABEL V. PHILEX MINING CORP., G.R. 178976, 31 JULY 2009-Labampa On respondents appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
DOCTRINE: The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and by Decision dated January 31, 2005,[10] finding that petitioner was guilty of
confidence is that the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust gross and habitual neglect of duty as he continually reported ANSECAs
and confidence. The second requisite is that there must be an act that would backfilling operations as okay per his inspection notwithstanding the gross
justify the loss of trust and confidence.[28] Loss of trust and confidence, to be underloading; and that he did not act on Lupegas report concerning certain
a valid cause for dismissal, must be based on a willful breach of trust and irregularities.
founded on clearly established facts. The basis for the dismissal must be
clearly and convincingly established but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of Abel is valid
necessary. HELD: The law mandates that the burden of proving the validity of the
FACTS: petitioner was first hired by respondent in January, 1988. He was termination of employment rests with the employer. Failure to discharge this
eventually assigned to respondents Legal Department as a Contract Claims evidentiary burden would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified
Assistant, a position he occupied for five years prior to his transfer to the Mine and, therefore, illegal. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and
Engineering and Draw Control Department wherein he was appointed Unit conclusions of employers do not provide legal justification for dismissing
Head in early 2002. employees. In case of doubt, such cases should be resolved in favor of labor
pursuant to the social justice policy of labor laws and the Constitution. working at respondents mine site attested to the truth of any of his statements.
The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is Standing alone, Lupegas account of the subsidence area anomaly could
that the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and hardly be considered substantial evidence.And while there is no concrete
confidence. Verily, the Court must first determine if petitioner holds such a showing of any ill motive on the part of Lupega to falsely accuse petitioner,
position. that Lupega himself was under investigation when he implicated petitioner in
There are two classes of positions of trust.[22] The first class consists of the subsidence area anomaly makes his uncorroborated version suspect.
managerial employees. They are defined as those vested with the powers or
prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, 57. VALENZUELA V. CALTEX PHILS., INC., G.R. 169965-66, 15 DEC 2010-
lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively Labampa
recommend such managerial actions.[23] The second class consists of DOCTRINE: Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, gross and
cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc.. They are defined as those who, habitual neglect by the employee of his duties is a sufficient and legal ground
in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle to terminate employment. Jurisprudence provides that serious misconduct
significant amounts of money or property.[24] and habitual neglect of duties are among the just causes for terminating an
In this case, petitioner was a Contract Claims Assistant at respondents Legal employee. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones
Department at the time he allegedly committed the acts which led to its loss of duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a
trust and confidence. It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee period of time, depending upon the circumstances.
performs.[25] It was part of petitioners responsibilities to monitor the FACTS: Petitioner was hired by respondent Caltex Philippines, Inc. sometime
performance of respondents contractors in relation to the scope of work in March 1965 as Laborer and assigned in the Lube Oil Section of its Pandacan
contracted out to them Terminal in Manila. After three years, he was designated as Machine Operator
The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is A. petitioner requested that he be transferred to respondents main office.
that the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and Since the position available then was that of a messenger, he accepted the
confidence. Verily, the Court must first determine if petitioner holds such a same. One year later, petitioner was given a new assignment as Aviation
position. Attendant of respondents Manila Aviation Service.[5]
There are two classes of positions of trust.[22] The first class consists of After twenty-two (22) years at the Manila Aviation Service, petitioner was
managerial employees. They are defined as those vested with the powers or moved to respondents Lapu-Lapu Terminal in Lapu-Lapu City. The transfer
prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, was part of the penalty for the charge of not servicing an aircrafts fuel needs,
lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively which petitioner denied. Reluctantly, petitioner acceded to the transfer.[6]
recommend such managerial actions.[23] The second class consists of Petitioner was initially designated as Gauger but he also handled Bulk
cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc.. They are defined as those who, Receiving, Tank Truck Loading and Bunkering. In 1996, the Warehouseman
in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle retired and the functions of the warehouseman were given to petitioner.[7] As
significant amounts of money or property.[24] warehouseman, petitioners duties included, among others, the maintenance
In this case, petitioner was a Contract Claims Assistant at respondents Legal of stock cards for storehouse materials and supplies, the conduct of physical
Department at the time he allegedly committed the acts which led to its loss of inventory of the companys merchandise stocks and monitoring the movement
trust and confidence. It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee of said stocks.
performs.[25] It was part of petitioners responsibilities to monitor the
performance of respondents contractors in relation to the scope of work a spot operational audit was conducted on the Lapu-Lapu City District Office,
contracted out to them and several irregularities in the handling of respondents merchandise were
The second requisite is that there must be an act that would justify the loss of discovered. Petitioner was required to explain within forty-eight (48) hours
trust and confidence.[28] Loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid cause for such shortage and the other irregularities discovered during the spot audit. He
dismissal, must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly was further informed[10] that an administrative investigation will be conducted
established facts. The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly on the matter and because of the nature of his offense and his position in the
established but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary.[29] Company, he was preventively suspended to prevent further losses and/or
Respondents evidence against petitioner fails to meet this standard. Its lone possible tampering of the documents and other evidence.
witness, Lupega, did not support his affidavit and testimony during the Specifically, respondent found petitioner liable for (1) Gross and Habitual
company investigation with any piece of evidence at all. No other employee neglect of duties and responsibilities as warehouse clerk, (2) Not performing
month-end inventory duties, (3) Not investigating the shortages of stocks FACTS: Petitioner Jerry Mapili, as bus conductor while on duty was caught by
under his custody and (4) Commission of Fraud.[13] PRBLI's field inspector extending a free ride to a lady passenger who boarded
Aggrieved by the respondents decision to terminate his employment, petitioner at Barangay Magtaking, Labrador, Pangasinan. Consequently, petitioner was
filed a complaint[14] for illegal dismissal with the NLRC Regional Arbitration preventively suspended and was directed to appear in an administrative
Branch No. VII in Cebu City. investigation. Thereafter, a formal hearing was conducted during which
Labor Arbiter Ernesto F. Carreon rendered a Decision[17] declaring the claim petitioner was given an opportunity to present and explain his side.
for illegal dismissal unmeritorious. On appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC set aside Consequently, through a memorandum that petitioner was terminated from
the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared that petitioner was illegally employment for committing a serious irregularity by extending a free ride to a
dimissed. passenger in violation of company rules. Petitioner filed with the NLRC a
Complaint for illegal dismissal against PRBLI, Nisce, and Ricardo Paras
ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly ruled that petitioner was validly dismissed. (Paras), PRBLI's General Manager.Petitioner alleged that his employment
was terminated without cause and due process. He argued that the infraction
HELD: There is no compelling reason in this case for us to reverse the ruling was only trivial. He argued that his two previous violations of the same
of the CA sustaining the finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioners dismissal company regulation cannot be considered in the imposition of the penalty of
was effected with just cause. The findings of the Labor Arbiter are supported dismissal since those previous infractions were not too serious and are not
by more than substantial evidence and even petitioners admissions during the sufficient to merit the penalty of dismissal.Respondents argued that petitioner's
administrative hearings. As the CA correctly held, admissions during the investigation that he indeed offered a free ride out of
Evidence overwhelmingly shows that petitioner Valenzuela was indeed guilty gratitude to the wife of his co-employee and that it was his third offense,
of habitual and gross neglect of his duties. It was not the first time that there justified his termination considering that his position is imbued with trust and
occurred a shortage of the merchandise stocks but apparently petitioner confidence. The Labor Arbiter ordered that the Mapili be reinstated to his
Valenzuela did nothing about it and, instead, manipulated documents and former position. Upon appeal, NLRC held that petitioner’s dismissal was for
records, i.e., stock cards, to create the illusion that all merchandise stocks just cause and petitioner’s past record of similar infractions do not merit the
were accounted for, when in fact a lot of these merchandise were already compassion of law.
missing from petitioner Companys Lapu-Lapu terminal. ISSUE: W/N past similar infractions for which an employee has already
suffered the corresponding penalty can be used as justification for the
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, gross and habitual neglect employee’s dismissal from service. (YES)
by the employee of his duties is a sufficient and legal ground to terminate HELD: Petitioner's position is imbued with trust and confidence because it
employment. Jurisprudence provides that serious misconduct and habitual involves handling of money and failure to collect the proper fare from the riding
neglect of duties are among the just causes for terminating an employee. public constitutes a grave offense which justifies his dismissal. Moreover,
Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. petitioner's series of irregularities when put together may constitute serious
Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of misconduct. As petitioner's employment record shows, this is not the first
time, depending upon the circumstances. time that petitioner refused to collect fares from passengers. In fact, this is
Further, Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, also provides fraud or already the third instance that he failed to collect fares from the riding public.
willful breach by employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer as a Although petitioner already suffered the corresponding penalties for his past
just cause for termination. It is always a serious issue for the employer when misconduct, those infractions are still relevant and may be considered in
an employee performs acts which diminish or break the trust and confidence assessing his liability for his present infraction. THese are relevant in
reposed in him. The Labor Code, as amended, although sympathetic to the assessing private respondent's liability for the present violation for the purpose
working class, is aware of this scenario and in pursuit of fairness, included of determining the appropriate penalty. To sustain private respondent's
fraud or willful breach of trust as a just cause for termination of employment. argument that the past violation should not be considered is to disregard the
warnings previously issued to him.
58. MAPILI V. PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., G.R. 172506, 27 JULY 2011-
Libo-on 59. CENTURY IRON WORKS, INC. V. BANAS, G.R. 184116, 19 JUNE 2013-
DOCTRINE: While a penalty may no longer be imposed on offenses for which Libo-on
the employee has already been punished, those infractions are still relevant DOCTRINE:
and may be used as justification for an employee’s dismissal.
Loss of confidence applies to: (1) employees occupying positions of trust and of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Fraud and willful
confidence, the managerial employees; and (2) employees who are routinely neglect of duties imply bad faith of the employee in failing to perform his job,
charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property which to the detriment of the employer and the latter’s business. Habitual neglect, on
may include rank-and-file employees. the other hand, implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of
FACTS: Bañas worked as an inventory comptroller. Century Iron received time, depending upon the circumstances.
letters of complaint from its gas suppliers regarding alleged massive shortage Evidence on record shows that Bañas committed numerous infractions during
of empty gas cylinders In the investigation that Century Iron conducted in his stay in Century iron such as failing to check the right quantity of materials
response to the letters, it found that Bañas failed to make a report of the subject of his inventory, undertaking undertime, incurring an absence without
missing cylinders. Century Iron required Bañas to explain within forty-eight asking for prior leave, failing to implement proper warehousing and
(48) hours from receipt of its letter why no disciplinary action should be taken housekeeping procedures, failing to ensure sufficient supplies of oxygen-
against him for loss of trust and confidence and for gross and habitual neglect acetylene gases during business hours, failing to secure prior permission
of duty, Century Iron issued a Memorandum requiring Bañas to attend a before going on leave. such numerous infractions are sufficient to hold him
hearing regarding the missing cylinders. Century Iron terminated Bañas’ grossly and habitually negligent. His repeated negligence is not tolerable. The
services on grounds of loss of trust and confidence, and habitual and gross totality of infractions or the number of violations he committed during his
neglect of duty. Bañas alleged that he merely worked as an inventory clerk employment merits his dismissal.
who is not responsible for the lost cylinders. He pointed out that his tasks were
limited to conducting periodic and yearly inventories, and submitting his 60. PHIL. TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. V. CARILLA, 525 SCRA 586
findings to the personnel officer. Therefore, he cannot be terminated on the [2007]-Libo-on
ground of loss of confidence. Petitioners asserted that Bañas was a (*repeated; same as #1)
supervisory employee who was responsible for the lost cylinders. They DOCTRINE: In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer
maintained that Bañas committed numerous infractions during his tenure to show that the dismissal of the employee is for just cause and failure to do
amounting to gross and habitual neglect of duty. These included absences so would mean that the dismissal is not justified.
without leave, unauthorized undertime, failure to implement proper standard It is well settled in this jurisdiction that confidential and managerial employees
warehousing and housekeeping procedure, negligence in making inventories cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any time, and without cause as reasonably
of materials, and failure to ensure sufficient supplies of oxygen-acetylene established in an appropriate investigation.The captain of a vessel is a
gases. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Banas was illegally dismissed. Upon confidential and managerial employee within the meaning of this doctrine.
appeal, NLRC affirmed LA’s ruling and ruled that Banas was only an inventory FACTS: Felicisimo Carilla was hired by petitioner, a manning agent, in behalf
clerk. The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower tribunals that Banas was an of its principal, Anglo-Eastern Shipmanagement Ltd., to work as Master on
inventory clerk but was afforded due process. board MV Handy-Cam Azobe for twelve months. On November 29, 1993,
ISSUE/S: W/N loss of confidence is a ground for terminating a rank-and- respondent boarded the vessel. On June 6, 1994,respondent was dismissed
file employee who is not routinely charged with the care and custody of and repatriated to the Philippines. respondent filed with the Philippine
the employer’s money or property. (NO) Overseas and Employment Agency (POEA) a complaint for illegal dismissal
W/N Bañas was grossly and habitually neglectful of his duties. (YES) and alleged that he was dismissed without notice and hearing and without any
HELD: 1Bañas did not occupy a position of trust and confidence nor was he valid reason. Petitioner contended that respondent's termination was for
routinely in charge with the care and custody of Century Iron’s money or cause; he failed to take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of the vessel
property, his termination on the ground of loss of confidence was misplaced. and its cargo causing petitioner to incur a huge amount of damages on cargo
Loss of confidence applies to: (1) employees occupying positions of trust and claims and vessel repairs.Furthermore, the fact that respondent was warned
confidence, the managerial employees; and (2) employees who are routinely of his lapses, he had not shown any improvement which forced petitioner to
charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property which dismiss and replace him with a competent one. Thus, respondent's
may include rank-and-file employees. incompetence is therefore penalized with dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
2Article 282 of the Labor Code provides that one of the just causes for rendered decision in favor of Carilla and ruled that his dismissal is illegal and
terminating an employment is the employee’s gross and habitual neglect of his ordered the petitioner to pay the unexpired portion of the contract. Upon
duties. This cause includes gross inefficiency, negligence and carelessness. appeal, NLRC dismissed the appeal.
Gross negligence connotes want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care ISSUE: W/N Carilla was illegally dismissed. (YES)
or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard
HELD: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that confidential and managerial explanation. Only when Tirazona again failed to comply with the same did PET
employees cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any time, and without cause as terminate her employment.
reasonably established in an appropriate investigation. Such employees, too,
are entitled to security of tenure, fair standards of employment and the 62. EATS-CETERA FOOD SERVICES V. LETRAN, G.R. 179507, 02 OCT
protection of labor laws.Managerial employees, no less than rank-and-file 2009-Marcilla
laborers, are entitled to due process.The captain of a vessel is a confidential DOCTRINE: A cashier is a highly sensitive position which requires absolute
and managerial employee within the meaning of this doctrine. dismissal is not trust and honesty on the part of the employee. The rule, therefore, is that if
justified. A dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the there is sufficient evidence to show that the employee occupying a position of
charges leveled against him by his employer.The determination of the trust and confidence is guilty of a breach of trust, or that his employer has
existence and sufficiency of a just cause must be exercised with fairness and ample reason to distrust him, the labor tribunal cannot justly deny the employer
in good faith and after observing due process. petitioner's documents were not the authority to dismiss such employee.
authenticated and, hence, were self-serving and unreliable. It appears from FACTS: Espanadero works as a cashier in Eats-cetera Food Services Outlet.
the Logs of Events During Capt. Carilla Command that it is merely a On November 20, 2002, when she reported for duty, Espadero discovered that
typewritten enumeration of several alleged incidents of damages to the her time card was already punched in. After asking around, she found out that
cargoes and to the vessel, but it does not state the source and who prepared a certain Joselito Cahayagan was the one who punched in her time card.
the same. There is no way of verifying the truth of these entries, and if they Espadero, however, failed to report the incident to her supervisor, Clarissa
were actually recorded in the vessel logbook on the dates the alleged incidents Reduca (Reduca). This prompted Reduca to report the incident to the
took place. Thus, respondent was illegally dismissed as he was not accorded personnel manager, Greta dela Hostria. Espadero contended that she was
a fair investigation as required by law and the ground invoked for his dismissal dismissed outright without being given ample opportunity to explain her side.
was not proven. The LA decided in favor of Espanadero which was reversed by the NLRC.
Upon appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed LA’s decision. Thus, the case at bar.
61. Tirazona V. CA, 548 SCRA 560 [2008]-Marcilla
DOCTRINE: The well-entrenched policy is that no worker shall be dismissed ISSUE: W/N Espanadero was afforded her right to due process before being
except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process. It dismissed. (YES)
is an established principle that loss of confidence must be premised on the fact W/N her infraction was serious enough to warrant dismissal. (YES)
that the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence.
FACTS: Tirazona, a managerial employee who was holding a position of trust HELD: 1Reduca’s affidavit avers that Espadero was notified by the personnel
and confidence in the company, was admonished by the latter for her improper manager and was asked to explain her side within 72 hours. As there was no
handling of a situation involving a rank and file employee. Claiming she was duplicate copy, the only copy of the notice to explain remained with Espadero.
denied due process, she demanded P2M as indemnity from PET and its While it may be highly suspicious for a personnel manager not to keep a copy
officers/directors. She also admitted having read a confidential letter for the of such an important document, Reducas averment that the only copy of the
PET directors containing a legal opinion of respondent’s counsel regarding the notice to explain was handed to Espadero herself was never denied nor
status of her employment. She was terminated on the ground that she willfully controverted by the latter. Wittingly or not, the averment is deemed to have
breached the trust and confidence reposed in her by her employer. been admitted by Espadero. This being so, petitioners may be said to have
ISSUE: W/N Tirazona was legally dismissed. (YES) sufficiently complied with the first notice requirement, i.e., that the employee
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the dismissal was valid because of the must first be given a notice to explain her side. 2Petitioners cannot be faulted
arrogance and hostility she has shown towards the company. Her stubborn for losing their trust in Espadero. As an employee occupying a job which
uncompromising stance in almost all instances justify the company’s requires utmost fidelity to her employers, she failed to report to her immediate
termination of her employment. The Court held that there is no violation of due supervisor the tampering of her time card. Whether her failure was deliberate
process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a or due to sheer negligence, and whether Espadero was or was not in cahoots
chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the with a co-worker, the fact remains that the tampering was not promptly
denial of the opportunity to be heard. Tirazona in this case has been afforded reported and could, very likely, not have been known by petitioners, or, at least,
a number of opportunities to defend her actions. Even when Tirazona failed to could have been discovered at a much later period, if it had not been reported
attend the scheduled hearing, PET still informed Tirazona about what by Espaderos supervisor to the personnel manager. Petitioners, therefore,
happened therein and gave her the chance to submit a supplemental written cannot be blamed for losing their trust in Espadero.
 adduced additional evidence to convincingly show that Gran's employment
63. DELA CRUZ V. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, G.R. 180465, 31 JULY 2009- was validly and legally terminated. The burden devolves not only upon the
Marcilla foreign-based employer but also on the employment or recruitment agency for
DOCTRINE: Acts by employees which are inimical to the employer’s interest the latter is not only an agent of the former, but is also solidarily liable with the
are deemed willful breach of the trust and confidence reposed in them. foreign principal for any claims or liabilities arising from the dismissal of the
FACTS: Raymund Sales, a salesman of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc (Coca- worker.
Cola), figured an accident while driving a vehicle he was not authorized to use. FACTS: EDI is a recruitment agency and along with ESI, another recruitment
Sales was hospitalized and was observed that he was under the influence of agency, processed the documentation and deployment of private respondent
liquor at the time of the accident and was included in the police blotter. Gran to work for OAB in Saudia Arabia as a Computer Specialist. The initial
Respondent Coca-Cola discovered that Sales’ co-employees secured a police salary was $600 a month but Gran signed for $850.
report and medical certificate which omitted the fact that Sales was under the After working for 5 months. Gran’s employment was terminated for lack of
influence of alcohol. Coca-Cola required Sales’ Supervisors John Espina, Raul requirements and signed a declaration that released OAB from any financial
M. Lacuata (Lacuata), and Eric dela Cruz (dela Cruz), to explain why no obligation. When Gran got back to the Philippines, he filed a complaint against
disciplinary action be taken against them. Espina denied the fact that he ESI/ED and OAB.
altered the documents. Petitioner Dela Cruz said that he just asked for a copy LA ruled against Gran was declared validly dismissed. He appealed but failed
of the police report one Melvin Asuncion. And lastly, Petitioner Lacuata said to furnish EDI with a copy of his Appeal Memorandum. The NLRC ruled in
that he has no participation in the alleged alteration because he only picked- Gran’s favor, for he was not given notice. EDI appealed to the CA. The CA
up the medical certificate from the Hospital. Further investigation shows that ruled that EDI failed to prove the grounds for termination nor was the twin
they conspired to alter the medical certificate and the police report. After such notice requirement followed. .
finding they were dismissed from employment. Espina, Lacuata and dela Cruz ISSUE/S: W/N EDI needed to be furnished a notice of appeal memorandum.
filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal with the contention that the W/N Gran was validly dismissed.
alleged altering of documents is work related and is a willful breach of HELD: 1. No. Failure of appellant to furnish a copy of the appeal to the adverse
confidence. party is not fatal to the appeal.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Espina’s complaint for lack of merit. Dela Cruz Failure to furnish the adverse party with a copy of the appeal is treated only as
was found to be illegally dismissed. Lacuata was found to be at fault for doing a formal lapse, and excusable neglect, and not a jurisdictional defect.
nothing to stop Espina from obtaining false police and medical reports. The While Gran's failure to furnish EDI with a copy of the Appeal Memorandum is
respondent Coca-Cola was ordered to reinstate dela Cruz and pay both excusable, the abject failure of the NLRC to order Gran to furnish EDI with the
petitioners dela Cruz and Lacuata their respective back wages, 13th month Appeal Memorandum constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
pay and separation pay. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission 2) He was not validly dismissed.
(NLRC) affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision but deleted the award of moral Petitioner claims that private respondent Gran was validly dismissed for just
damages in favor of dela Cruz. Its motion for reconsideration having been cause, due to incompetence and insubordination or disobedience.
denied, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals However, other than the termination letter, no other evidence was presented
(CA). The CA set aside the NLRC decision and held that petitioners Lacuata to show how and why Gran was considered incompetent, insubordinate, or
and dela Cruz were validly dismissed. disobedient. Petitioner EDI had clearly failed to overcome the burden of
ISSUE: W/N Lacuata and dela Cruz were validly dismissed on the grounds of proving that Gran was validly dismissed. For willful disobedience to be a valid
altering the medical certificate and police report of Sales. (YES) cause for dismissal, the following twin elements must concur: (1) the
HELD: By obtaining an altered police report and medical certificate, Dela Cruz employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by
et al. deliberately attempted to cover up the fact that Sales was under the a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been
influence of liquor at the time the accident took place. In so doing, they reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the
committed acts inimical to respondent’s interests. They thus committed a duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
work-related willful breach of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
EDI failed to discharge the burden of proving Gran's insubordination or willful
64. EDI- STAFFBUILDERS IN’L V. NLRC, 537 SCRA 409 [2007]-Marquez disobedience
DOCTRINE: Even though EDI and/or ESI were merely the local employment
or recruitment agencies and not the foreign employer, they should have
65. SALVALOZA V. NLRC, G.R. 182086, 24 NOV 2010-Marquez exceeding six months to prevent losses due to lack of work or job orders from
DOCTRINE: abroad, and that the lay-off affected both union and non-union members. It
FACTS: justified its failure to recall the 38 laid-off employees after the lapse of six
ISSUE: months because of the subsequent cancellations of job orders made by its
HELD: foreign principals, a fact which was communicated to the petitioners and the
other complainants who were all offered severance pay. Twenty-two (22) of
66. TORREDA V. TOSHIBA INFO EQUIP., G.R. 165960 [2007]-Marquez the 38 complainants accepted the separation pay. The petitioners herein did
DOCTRINE: not.
FACTS:
ISSUE: The cases then involving those who accepted the separation pay were pro
HELD: tanto dismissed with prejudice.

67. SEBUGUERO V. NLRC, 248 SCRA 532 [1995]-Mendoza, E. LA: VALID LAY-OFF
DOCTRINE:
NLRC: VALID LAY-OFF
Under the aforequoted Article 283 of the Labor Code, there are three basic
requisites for a valid retrenchment: ISSUE: WON THERE WAS VALID LAY OFF OR RETRENCHMENT?

the retrenchment is necessary to prevent losses and such losses are proven HELD:

written notice to the employees and to the Department of Labor and YES. The Labor Code, however, speaks of a permanent retrenchment as
Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment opposed to a temporary lay-off as is the case here. There is no specific
provision of law which treats of a temporary retrenchment or lay-off and
payment of separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least 1/2 month provides for the requisites in effecting it or a period or duration therefor. These
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. employees cannot forever be temporarily laid-off. To remedy this situation or
fill the hiatus, Article 286 may be applied but only by analogy to set a specific
FACTS: period that employees may remain temporarily laid-off or in floating status.[13]
Six months is the period set by law that the operation of a business or
The petitioners were among the thirty-eight (38) regular employees of private undertaking may be suspended thereby suspending the employment of the
respondent GTI Sportswear Corporation (hereinafter GTI), a corporation employees concerned. The, temporary lay-off wherein the employees likewise
engaged in the manufacture and export of ready-to-wear garments, who were cease to work should also not last longer than six months. After six months,
given "temporary lay--off" notices by the latter on 22 January 1991 due to the employees should either be recalled to work or permanently retrenched
alleged lack of work and heavy losses caused by the cancellation of orders following the requirements of the law, and that failing to comply with this would
from abroad and by the garments embargo of 1990. be tantamount to dismissing the employees and the employer would thus be
liable for such dismissal.
Believing that their "temporary lay-off" was a ploy to dismiss them, resorted to
because of their union activities and was in violation of their right to security of Under the aforequoted Article 283 of the Labor Code, there are three basic
tenure since there was no valid ground therefor, the 38 laid-off employees filed requisites for a valid retrenchment:
with the Labor Arbiter's office in the National Capital Region complaints for
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages under Wage the retrenchment is necessary to prevent losses and such losses are proven
Orders Nos. 01 and 02, and non-payment of overtime pay and 13th month
pay.[4] written notice to the employees and to the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment
Private respondent GTI denied the claim of illegal dismissal and asserted that
it was its prerogative to lay-off its employees temporarily for a period not
payment of separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least 1/2 month retrenchment be done to prevent losses. The DOLE is the agency that will
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. determine whether the planned retrenchment is justified and adequately
supported by facts.[24]
As for the first requisite, whether or not an employer would imminently suffer :
serious or substantial losses for economic reasons is essentially a question of
fact for the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to determine.[14] Here, both the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC found that the private respondent was suffering and
would continue to suffer serious losses, thereby justifying the retrenchment of 68. CULILI V. EASTERN TELECOM, G.R. 165381, 09 FEB 2011-Mendoza,
some of its employees, including the petitioners. We are not prepared to E.
disregard this finding of fact. It is settled that findings of quasi-judicial agencies
which have acquired expertise in the matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are DOCTRINE: There is redundancy when the service capability of the workforce
accorded by this Court not only with respect but with finality if they are is greater than what is reasonably required to meet the demands of the
supported by substantial evidence.[15] The latter means that amount of business enterprise. A position becomes redundant when it is rendered
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify superfluous by any number of factors such as over-hiring of workers, decrease
a conclusion.[16] In the instant case, no claim was made by any of the parties in volume of business, or dropping a particular product line or service activity
that such a finding was not supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.
the petitioners did not appeal the finding of the Labor Arbiter that their
temporary lay-off to prevent losses was amply justified. They cannot now
question this finding that there is a valid ground to lay-off or retrench them. FACTS:

The requirement of notice to both the employees concerned and the Respondent Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) is a
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is mandatory and must be
written and given at least one month before the intended date of retrenchment. telecommunications company engaged mainly in the business of establishing
In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners were given notice of the commercial telecommunications systems and leasing of international datalines
temporary lay-off. There is, however, no evidence that any written notice to
permanently retrench them was given at least one month prior to the date of or circuits that pass through the international gateway facility (IGF).[7] The other
the intended retrenchment. The NLRC found that GTI conveyed to the
respondents are ETPIs officers: Salvador Hizon, President and Chief
petitioners the impossibility of recalling them due to the continued
unavailability of work.[17] But what the law requires is a written notice to the Executive Officer; Emiliano Jurado, Chairman of the Board; Virgilio Garcia,
employees concerned and that requirement is mandatory .[18] The notice
must also be given at least one month in advance of the intended date of Vice President; and Stella Garcia, Assistant Vice President.
retrenchment to enable the employees to look for other means of employment
and therefore to ease the impact of the loss of their jobs and the corresponding
income.[19] That they were already on temporary lay--off at the time notice Petitioner Nelson A. Culili (Culili) was employed by ETPI as a Technician in its
should have been given to them is not an excuse to forego the one-month
written notice because by this time, their lay-off is to become permanent and Field Operations Department on January 27, 1981. On December 12, 1996,
they were definitely losing their employment. Culili was promoted to Senior Technician in the Customer Premises
There is also nothing in the records to prove that a written notice was ever Equipment Management Unit of the Service Quality Department and his basic
given to the DOLE as required by law. GTI's position paper,[20] offer of
exhibits,[21] Comment to the Petition,[22] and Memorandum[23] in this case salary was increased.[8]
do not mention of any such written notice. The law requires two notices one
to the employee/s concerned and another to the DOLE not just one. The
notice to the DOLE is essential because the right to retrench is not an absolute As a telecommunications company and an authorized IGF operator, ETPI was
prerogative of an employer but is subject to the requirement of law that
required, under Republic Act. No. 7925 and Executive Order No. 109, to
establish landlines in Metro Manila and certain provinces.[9] However, due to
interconnection problems with the Philippine Long Distance Telephone After the successful implementation of the first phase of the Right-Sizing
Company (PLDT), poor subscription and cancellation of subscriptions, and Program, ETPI, on March 1, 1999 proceeded with the second phase which
other business difficulties, ETPI was forced to halt its roll out of one hundred necessitated the abolition, transfer and merger of a number of ETPIs
twenty-nine thousand (129,000) landlines already allocated to a number of its departments.[16]
employees.[10]
Among the departments abolished was the Service Quality Department. The
In 1998, due to business troubles and losses, ETPI was compelled to functions of the Customer Premises Equipment Management Unit, Culilis unit,
implement a Right-Sizing Program which consisted of two phases: the first were absorbed by the Business and Consumer Accounts Department. The
phase involved the reduction of ETPIs workforce to only those employees that abolition of the Service Quality Department rendered the specialized functions
were necessary and which ETPI could sustain; the second phase entailed a of a Senior Technician unnecessary. As a result, Culilis position was abolished
company-wide reorganization which would result in the transfer, merger, due to redundancy and his functions were absorbed by Andre Andrada,
absorption or abolition of certain departments of ETPI.[11] another employee already with the Business and Consumer Accounts
Department.[17]
As part of the first phase, ETPI, on December 10, 1998, offered to its
employees who had rendered at least fifteen years of service, the Special On March 5, 1999, Culili discovered that his name was omitted in ETPIs New
Retirement Program, which consisted of the option to voluntarily retire at an Table of Organization. Culili, along with three of his co-employees who were
earlier age and a retirement package equivalent to two and a half (2) months similarly situated, wrote their union president to protest such omission. [18]
salary for every year of service.[12] This offer was initially rejected by the
Eastern Telecommunications Employees Union (ETEU), ETPIs duly In a letter dated March 8, 1999, ETPI, through its Assistant Vice President
recognized bargaining agent, which threatened to stage a strike. ETPI Stella Garcia, informed Culili of his termination from employment effective April
explained to ETEU the exact details of the Right-Sizing Program and the 8, 1999.
Special Retirement Program and after consultations with ETEUs members, Culili alleged that neither he nor the Department of Labor and Employment
ETEU agreed to the implementation of both programs.[13] Thus, on February (DOLE) were formally notified of his termination. Culili claimed that he only
8, 1999, ETPI re-offered the Special Retirement Program and the found out about it sometime in March 1999 when Vice President Virgilio Garcia
corresponding retirement package to the one hundred two (102) employees handed him a copy of the March 8, 1999 letter, after he was barred from
who qualified for the program.[14] Of all the employees who qualified to avail of entering ETPIs premises by its armed security personnel when he tried to
the program, only Culili rejected the offer.[15] report for work.[21] Culili believed that ETPI had already decided to dismiss him
even prior to the March 8, 1999 letter as evidenced by the December 7, 1998 ETPI tendered to Culili his final pay check of Eight Hundred Fifty-Nine
version of that letter. Moreover, Culili asserted that ETPI had contracted out Thousand Thirty-Three and 99/100 Pesos (P859,033.99) consisting of his
the services he used to perform to a labor-only contractor which not only basic salary, leaves, 13th month pay and separation pay.[25] ETPI claimed that
proved that his functions had not become unnecessary, but which also violated Culili refused to accept his termination and continued to report for work.[26]
their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and the Labor Code. Aside from ETPI denied hiring outside contractors to perform Culilis work and denied
these, Culili also alleged that he was discriminated against when ETPI offered offering added incentives to its employees to induce them to retire early. ETPI
some of his co-employees an additional benefit in the form of motorcycles to also explained that the December 7, 1998 letter was never given to Culili in an
induce them to avail of the Special Retirement Program, while he was not. [22] official capacity. ETPI claimed that it really needed to reduce its workforce at
that time and that it had to prepare several letters in advance in the event that
ETPI denied singling Culili out for termination. ETPI claimed that while it is true none of the employees avail of the Special Retirement Program. However,
that they offered the Special Retirement Package to reduce their workforce to ETPI decided to wait for a favorable response from its employees regarding
a sustainable level, this was only the first phase of the Right-Sizing Program the Special Retirement Program instead of terminating them
to which ETEU agreed. The second phase intended to simplify and streamline LA: The Labor Arbiter held that a reading of the termination letter shows
that the ground ETPI was actually invoking was retrenchment and not
the functions of the departments and employees of ETPI. The abolition of redundancy, but ETPI stuck to redundancy because it was easier to
Culilis department - the Service Quality Department - and the absorption of its prove than retrenchment. He also did not believe that Culilis functions
were as limited as ETPI made it appear to be, and held that ETPI failed to
functions by the Business and Consumer Accounts Department were in line present any reasonable criteria to justify the declaration of Culilis
position as redundant. On the issue of unfair labor practice, the Labor
with the programs goals as the Business and Consumer Accounts Department
Arbiter agreed that the contracting out of Culilis functions to non-union
was more economical and versatile and it was flexible enough to handle the members violated Culilis rights as a union member

limited functions of the Service Quality Department. ETPI averred that since CA: The Court of Appeals found that Culilis position was validly
abolished due to redundancy. The Court of Appeals said that ETPI had
Culili did not avail of the Special Retirement Program and his position was
been very candid with its employees in implementing its Right-Sizing
subsequently declared redundant, it had no choice but to terminate Culili. [23] Program, and that it was highly unlikely that ETPI would effect a
company-wide reorganization simply for the purpose of getting rid of
Culili, however, continued to report for work. ETPI said that because there was Culili. The Court of Appeals also held that ETPI cannot be held guilty of
no more work for Culili, it was constrained to serve a final notice of unfair labor practice as mere contracting out of services being
performed by union members does not per se amount to unfair labor
termination[24] to Culili, which Culili ignored. ETPI alleged that Culili informed practice unless it interferes with the employees right to self-organization.
The Court of Appeals further held that ETPIs officers cannot be held
his superiors that he would agree to his termination if ETPI would give him liable absent a showing of bad faith or malice. However, the Court of
certain special work tools in addition to the benefits he was already offered. Appeals found that ETPI failed to observe the standards of due process
as required by our laws when it failed to properly notify both Culili and
ETPI claimed that Culilis counter-offer was unacceptable as the work tools the DOLE of Culilis termination.
Culili wanted were worth almost a million pesos. Thus, on March 26, 1999,
ISSUE: won the dismissal is valid? on the viability of the newly created positions, job description and the approval

HELD: by the management of the restructuring.[41]

In the case at bar, ETPI was upfront with its employees about its plan to
YES. it is valid
implement a Right-Sizing Program. Even in the face of initial opposition from
There is redundancy when the service capability of the workforce is greater
and rejection of the said program by ETEU, ETPI patiently negotiated with
than what is reasonably required to meet the demands of the business
ETEUs officers to make them understand ETPIs business dilemma and its
enterprise. A position becomes redundant when it is rendered superfluous by
need to reduce its workforce and streamline its organization. This evidently
any number of factors such as over-hiring of workers, decrease in volume of
rules out bad faith on the part of ETPI.
business, or dropping a particular product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.[36]
In deciding which positions to retain and which to abolish, ETPI chose on the
basis of efficiency, economy, versatility and flexibility. It needed to reduce its
This Court has been consistent in holding that the determination of whether or
workforce to a sustainable level while maintaining functions necessary to keep
not an employees services are still needed or sustainable properly belongs to
it operating. The records show that ETPI had sufficiently established not only
the employer.Provided there is no violation of law or a showing that the
its need to reduce its workforce and streamline its organization, but also the
employer was prompted by an arbitrary or malicious act, the soundness or
existence of redundancy in the position of a Senior Technician. ETPI explained
wisdom of this exercise of business judgment is not subject to the discretionary
how it failed to meet its business targets and the factors that caused this, and
review of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.[37]
how this necessitated it to reduce its workforce and streamline its organization.
ETPI also submitted its old and new tables of organization and sufficiently
However, an employer cannot simply declare that it has become overmanned
described how limited the functions of the abolished position of a Senior
and dismiss its employees without producing adequate proof to sustain its
Technician were and how it decided on whom to absorb these functions.
claim of redundancy.[38]Among the requisites of a valid redundancy program
are: (1) the good faith of the employer in abolishing the redundant position;
69. GENERAL MILLING CORP. V. VIAJAR, G.R. 181738, 30 JAN 2013-
and (2) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be Mendoza, E.
declared redundant,[39] such as but not limited to: preferred status, efficiency,
DOCTRINE:
and seniority.[40]
it is imperative that the employer must comply with the requirements for
a valid implementation of the companys redundancy program, to wit: (a)
This Court also held that the following evidence may be proffered to the employer must serve a written notice to the affected employees and
the DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date of
substantiate redundancy: the new staffing pattern, feasibility studies/ proposal retrenchment; (b) the employer must pay the employees a separation pay
equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher; (c) the employer must abolish the termination, the respondent was receiving the salary rate of P19,651.41
redundant positions in good faith; and (d) the employer must set fair and per month.12?r?l1
reasonable criteria in ascertaining which positions are redundant and For its part, the petitioner insisted that Viajars dismissal was due to the
may be abolished redundancy of her position. GMC reasoned out that it was forced to
terminate the services of the respondent because of the economic
FACTS: setbacks the company was suffering which affected the companys
profitability, and the continuing rise of its operating and interest
GMC is a domestic corporation with principal office in Makati City and a expenditures. Redundancy was part of the petitioners concrete and
manufacturing plant in Lapu-Lapu City. actual cost reduction measures. GMC also presented the required
In October 2003, GMC terminated the services of thirteen (13) employees "Establishment Termination Report" which it filed before the Department
for redundancy, including herein respondent, Violeta Viajar (Viajar). GMC of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on October 28, 2003, involving thirteen
alleged that it has been gradually downsizing its Vismin (Visayas- (13) of its employees, including Viajar. Subsequently, GMC issued to the
Mindanao) Operations in Cebu where a sizeable number of positions respondent two (2) checks respectively amounting to P440,253.02 and
became redundant over a period of time.6?r?l1 P21,211.35 as her separation pay
On December 2, 2003, Viajar filed a Complaint7 for Illegal Dismissal with
damages against GMC, its Human Resource Department (HRD) Manager, LA:Decision of the Labor Arbiter declaring the validity of complainants
Johnny T. Almocera (Almocera), and Purchasing Manager, Joel Paulino termination due to redundancy is hereby AFFIRMED
before the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. VII, NLRC, Cebu City.
In her Position Paper,8 Viajar alleged that she was employed by GMC on NLRC: NLRC affirmed the findings of the LA that Viajars dismissal was
August 6, 1979 as Invoicing Clerk. Through the years, the respondent legal considering that GMC complied with the requirements provided for
held various positions in the company until she became Purchasing under Article 283 of the Labor Code
Staff.
On October 30, 2003, Viajar received a Letter-Memorandum dated ISSUE: won the employee was validly dismissed due to redundancy?
October 27, 2003 from GMC, through Almocera, informing her that her
services were no longer needed, effective November 30, 2003 because HELD:
her position as Purchasing Staff at the Purchasing Group, Cebu
Operations was deemed redundant. Immediately thereafter, the In the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA when it held that the
respondent consulted her immediate superior at that time, Thaddeus petitioner failed to present substantial proof to support GMCs general
Oyas, who told her that he too was shocked upon learning about it. 9?r?l1 allegations of redundancy. As shown from the records, the petitioner
When Viajar reported for work on October 31, 2003, almost a month simply presented as its evidence of good faith and compliance with the
before the effectivity of her severance from the company, the guard on law the notification letter to respondent Viajar; 39 the "Establishment
duty barred her from entering GMCs premises. She was also denied Termination Report" it submitted to the DOLE Office;40 the two (2) checks
access to her office computer and was restricted from punching her daily issued in the respondents name amounting to P440,253.02 and
time record in the bundy clock.10?r?l1 P21,211.35;41 and the list of terminated employees as of June 6, 2006. 42
On November 7, 2003, Viajar was invited to the HRD Cebu Office where We agree with the CA that these are not enough proof for the valid
she was asked to sign certain documents, which turned out to be an termination of Viajars employment on the ground of redundancy.
"Application for Retirement and Benefits." The respondent refused to The letter-memorandum which contains general allegations is not
sign and sought clarification because she did not apply for retirement enough to convince this Court that Viajars termination of employment
and instead asserted that her services were terminated for alleged due to redundancy was warranted under the circumstances. There is no
redundancy. Almocera told her that her signature on the Application for showing that GMC made an evaluation of the existing positions and their
Retirement and Benefits was needed to process her separation pay. The effect to the company. Neither did GMC exert efforts to present tangible
respondent also claimed that between the period of July 4, 2003 and proof that it was experiencing business slow down or over hiring. The
October 13, 2003, GMC hired fifteen (15) new employees which aroused "Establishment Termination Report" it submitted to the DOLE Office did
her suspicion that her dismissal was not necessary. 11 At the time of her not account for anything to justify declaring the positions redundant. The
Court notes that the list of terminated employees presented by GMC was
a list taken as of June 6, 2006 or almost three years after the respondent the cause. For retirement, Article 287 of the Labor Code gives leeway to
was illegally dismissed and almost a year after the LA promulgated its the parties to stipulate above a floor of benefits.
decision. While the petitioner had been harping that it was on a xxx
"reduction mode" of its employees, it has not presented any evidence The line between voluntary and involuntary retirement is thin but it is one
(such as new staffing pattern, feasibility studies or proposal, viability of which this Court has drawn. Voluntary retirement cuts employment ties
newly created positions, job description and the approval of the leaving no residual employer liability; involuntary retirement amounts to
management of the restructuring,43 audited financial documents like a discharge, rendering the employer liable for termination without cause.
balance sheets, annual income tax returns and others) 44 which could The employees intent is the focal point of analysis. In determining such
readily show that the companys declaration of redundant positions was intent, the fairness of the process governing the retirement decision, the
justified. Such proofs, if presented, would suffice to show the good faith payment of stipulated benefits, and the absence of badges of
on the part of the employer or that this business prerogative was not intimidation or coercion are relevant parameters.48 (Emphasis supplied
whimsically exercised in terminating respondents employment on the and citations omitted)
ground of redundancy. Unfortunately, these are wanting in the instant Clearly, the instant case is not about retirement since the term has its
case. The petitioner only advanced a self-serving general claim that it peculiar meaning and is governed by Article 287 of the Labor Code.
was experiencing business reverses and that there was a need to reduce Rather, this is a case of termination due to redundancy under Article 283
its manpower complement. of the Labor Code. Thus, the demand of GMC for the respondent to sign
On the other hand, the respondent presented proof that the petitioner an "Application for Retirement and Benefits" is really suspect.
had been hiring new employees while it was firing the old ones, 45
negating the claim of redundancy. It must, however, be pointed out that
in termination cases, like the one before us, the burden of proving that 70. BUSINESSDAY V. NLRC, 221 SCRA 9-Mendoza, S.
the dismissal of the employees was for a valid and authorized cause DOCTRINE: In termination of employee the employer may not in the
rests on the employer. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to show by guise of exercising management prerogatives, pay separation benefits
substantial evidence that the termination of the employment of the unequally.
respondent was validly made and failure to discharge that duty would
mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.46?r?l1 FACTS:
Furthermore, the Court cannot overlook the fact that Viajar was Businessday was engaged in the manufacture and sale of computer
prohibited from entering the company premises even before the forms. Due to financial reverses, its creditors, the DBP and the Assets
effectivity date of termination; and was compelled to sign an Privatization Trust, took possession of its assets, including a
"Application for Retirement and Benefits." These acts exhibit the manufacturing plant in Marilao, Bulacan.
petitioners bad faith since it cannot be denied that the respondent was
still entitled to report for work until November 30, 2003. The demand for As a retrenchment measure, some plant employees, including the private
her to sign the "Application for Retirement and Benefits" also respondents, were laid off after prior notice and were paid separation pay
contravenes the fact that she was terminated due to redundancy. Indeed, equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of service. Upon receipt
there is a difference between voluntary retirement of an employee and of their separation pay, the private respondents signed individual
forced termination due to authorized causes. releases and quitclaims in favor of BSSI.
In Quevedo v. Benguet Electric Cooperative, Incorporated, 47 this Court
explained the difference between retirement and termination due to BSSI retained some employees in an attempt to rehabilitate its business
redundancy, to wit:cralawlibrary as a trading company. However, barely two and half months later, these
While termination of employment and retirement from service are remaining employees were likewise discharged because the company
common modes of ending employment, they are mutually exclusive, with decided to cease business operations altogether. Unlike the private
varying juridical bases and resulting benefits. Retirement from service is respondents, the batch employees received separation pay equivalent to
contractual (i.e. based on the bilateral agreement of the employer and a full month’s salary for every year of service plus mid-year bonus.
employee), while termination of employment is statutory (i.e. governed
by the Labor Code and other related laws as to its grounds, benefits and Protesting against the discrimination in the payment of their separation
procedure). The benefits resulting from termination vary, depending on benefits, the 27 private respondents filed 3 separate complaints against
the BSSI and Raul Locsin (president / manager). These case were later dependents inside said facility. When the said contract expired on 02
consolidated. May 1988, petitioner Galace, owner and general manager of SMJS,
"opted not to renew the existing contract nor bid on the new contract,"
At the conciliation proceeding, petitioners denied that there was due to financial difficulties, he having suffered a net loss the prior year.
unlawful discrimination in the payment of separation benefits to the As a consequence, the services of the complainants were terminated. By
employees. They argued that the first batch of employees was paid that time, however, the 23 had already filed a complaint for non-
“retrenchment” benefits mandated by law, while the remaining compliance with the minimum wage law from 1980 onwards, plus non-
employess were granted highter “separation” benefits because their payment of the 13th month pay, legal holiday pay, overtime pay, service
termination was on account of the closure of the business. incentive leave pay and separation pay. In their position paper,
complainants claimed that they were drivers (except for Edna Farin and
ISSUE: Brainly Aglibot who worked as dispatchers, and Abner Martinez who was
WON the BSSI is liable to pay separation pay differentials and mid-year a mechanic-dispatcher) and all of them were receiving their pay based
bonus to the first batch of laid employees. on commission basis, which was below the statutory minimum wage.
They further alleged, among others, that their work entitled them to
HELD: overtime pay, legal holiday pay and severance pay, which were not paid
Yes. BSSI is liable to pay separation pay differentials to the employees. to them.
However, mid-year bonus is deleted and set aside.
Petitioners on the other hand rejected any liability for the money claims.
Petitioner’s right to terminate employees on account of retrenchment to In refutation of the complainants’ claims, they submitted a position
prevent losses or closure of business operations, is recognized by law, paper.
but it may not pay separation benefits unequally for such discrimination
breeds resentment and ill-will among those who have been treated less The arbiter ruled that insofar as the claims for holiday pay, 13th month
generously than others. Clearly, there was impermissible discrimination pay and service incentive pay were concerned, under the Rules
against the private respondents in the payment of their separation Implementing PD 851, the complainants were not entitled to such
benefits. The law requires employer to extend equal treatment to its benefits, being workers on a purely commission basis. With respect to
employees. It may not, in the guise of exercising management the alleged underpayment of minimum wage, the arbiter held that "since
prerogatives, grant greater benefits to some and less to others. the complainants-drivers control(led) their own collections and time, . . .
Management prerogatives are not absolute prerogatives but are subject there could be no basis to determine minimum wage in relation to their
to legal limits, collective bargaining agreements, or general principles of commissions . . . . Moreover, a perusal of the Complaint . . . shows a clear
fair play and justice. admission of payment of the latter on commission basis at the rate of
14.4% of their collections. . . . (T)he failure of the complainants-drivers to
state in their Complaint and pleadings the amount of their alleged
71. SAN MIGUEL JEEPNEY V. NLRC, 265 SCRA 35 [1996]-Mendoza, S. underpayment only reflects that complainants themselves were unsure
DOCTRINE: if they were underpaid or not. Hence this Arbiter finds no basis to grant
The mere fact that they were paid on commission basis does not affect the same." (The foregoing findings by the arbiter were subsequently
or change their status as regular employees. The test for determining cited with approval by the respondent NLRC.)
whether an employee is regular or casual has nothing to do with the
manner of computing or paying an employee's wages or compensation. He likewise held that the non-renewal of the contract with the US Naval
Base is a closure or cessation of operations NOT due to serious
FACTS: business losses under Art. 283 of the Labor Code, and that being the
The 23 complainants were formerly working (as drivers, dispatchers and case, the drivers became entitled to one-half (1/2) month pay for every
mechanic) with petitioner San Miguel Jeepney Service (SMJS), with year of service. All other claims, such as for overtime pay and the like,
services ranging from two to eight years. Petitioner SMJS had a contract were dismissed for lack of both legal basis and evidence to support the
with the U.S. Naval Base Facility located in San Miguel, San Antonio, same. However, the arbiter ordered payment of P1,000.00 to each of the
Zambales, to provide transportation services to personnel and
complainants-drivers by way of financial assistance, considering their WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed Resolution
length of service. of public respondent NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED. The separation pay of
the private respondents equivalent to one-half month pay for every year
On appeal, the respondent Commission modified the arbiter's ruling, of service shall be computed at the then prevailing minimum daily wage
holding that "all the complainants are regular employees in the of P53.00.
contemplation of Article 281 (now Art. 280) of the Labor Code, which SO ORDERED.
provides that employment 'shall be deemed regular when the employee
performs activities which are usually necessary and desirable in the 72. NAVOTAS SHIPYARD CORP. V. MONTALLANA, G.R. 190053, 24
usual business or trade . . . ' "; respondent Commission thus ruled that MARCH 2014-Mendoza, S.
the complainants are entitled to separation pay of one-half month for DOCTRINE:
every year of service, by virtue of the non-renewal of the transportation To place the case in perspective, we first examine the applicable law in
contract with the naval base. However, finding that the complainants did view of the disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents
not ask for financial assistance, the NLRC deleted the award of P1,000.00 in that respect. According to the CA, the "[p]etitioners anchor their
for the each of the complainants. arguments mainly on Article 283 of the Labor Code,stating that private
respondents resorted to retrenchment and permanent closure of
ISSUE: business, while private respondents maintain that what is applicable is
The respondent NLRC acted in grave abuse of its discretion in awarding Article 286 . . . as the closure of business was merely temporary.”
separation pay in favor of respondents, such award not being warranted
by the facts and the law. FACTS:
The respondents alleged that on October 20, 2003, the company's
HELD: employees (about 100) were called to a meeting where Villaflor told them:
The Court held that there was no serious business losses. "Magsasara na ako ng negosyo, babayaran ko na lang kayo ng
separation pay dahil wala na akong pangsweldo sa inyo. Marami akong
Having said that, we return to the instant case and, at the risk of mga utang sa krudo, yelo, at iba pa." Since then, they were not allowed
being repetitive, reiterate that in this case there was no question about to report for work but Villaflor's promise to give them separation pay
the existence of employer-employee relationship between petitioners never materialized despite their persistent demands and follow-ups.
and private respondents. Art. 280 therefore can be properly applied to ScaHDT
the present case, to confirm the regular-employee status of the private
respondents. The petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that due to the "seasonal lack
Prescinding from the foregoing, as such regular employees, of fish caught and uncollected receivables[,]" the company suffered
private respondents are entitled to security of tenure and their services financial reverses. It was thus constrained to temporarily cease
may be terminated only for causes provided by law. Likewise, they are operations. They projected that the company could resume operations
also to be accorded the benefits provided under the Labor Code, before the end of six months or on April 22, 2004. It reported the
including inter alia separation pay for loss of employment resulting from temporary shutdown to the Department of Labor and Employment,
retrenchment to prevent losses or closure/cessation of operation not National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) and filed an Establishment
due to serious business losses. The Solicitor General in his Comment Termination Report.
suggested that, being regular employees, they are likewise entitled to the Labor Arbiter (LA) Geobel A. Bartolabac dismissed the complaint
protection of minimum wage statutes. 19Hence, the separation pay due for lack of merit, but awarded the respondents 13th month pay and
them may be computed on the basis of the minimum wage prevailing at service incentive leave pay for the year 2003 in the aggregate amount of
the time their services were terminated by petitioners. We P62,534.00. LA Bartolabac ruled that the respondents could not have
agree.Executive Order No. 178 fixed the minimum wage for non- been illegally dismissed. He declared that the "Notice of Temporary
agricultural workers working outside Metro Manila at P53.00 a day Closure filed before the DOLE belies complainants' unsubstantiated
effective October 1, 1987. Thus, we utilize this figure as the basis for allegation that they were informed in a meeting on 20 October 2003 . . .
computing private respondents' separation pay. that [their] services were terminated." He considered the temporary
shutdown as a suspension of the employment relationship between the Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the company's
parties. employees were illegally dismissed; rather, they lost their employment
because the company ceased operations after failing to recover from
The respondents appealed the LA's ruling. They argued before their financial reverses. The CA itself recognized what happened to the
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) that since they were company when it observed: "The temporary shutdown has ripened into
not given work assignments for more than six months, they should have a closure or cessation of operations. In this situation[,] private
been considered constructively dismissed and granted backwages as respondents are definitely entitled to the corresponding benefits of
well as separation pay. The NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit separation." 22 Even the respondents had an inkling of the company's
and affirmed LA Bartolabac's decision in toto. It also denied the fate when they claimed before the LA that on October 20, 2003, they were
respondents' subsequent motion for reconsideration. The respondents called, together with all the other employees of the company, by Villaflor;
sought relief from the CA by way of a petition for certiorari, charging the the latter allegedly told them that he would be closing the company, but
NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of their would give them their separation pay. He also disclosed to them the
complaint. reason — he could no longer pay their salaries due to the company's
Before the CA, the respondents maintained that the company's unsettled financial obligations on fuel and ice and other indebtedness.
closure was intended to be permanent, as evidenced by Villaflor's 23 aTCAcI
statement during the meeting on October 20, 2003 that he was closing The respondents' verbal account of what happened during the
the company and that they would be given separation pay. In such a meeting, particularly the company's imminent closure, to our mind,
case, they argued that they should have been given individual notices confirmed the company's dire situation. The temporary shutdown, it
thirty days before the intended closure; in the absence of this notice, appears, was a last ditch effort on the part of Villaflor to make the
they should be considered illegally dismissed. company's operations viable but, as it turned out, the effort proved futile.
The CA found merit in the respondents' submission that the The shutdown became permanent as the CA itself acknowledged. The
company's shutdown was not temporary, but permanent. While it CA misappreciated the facts when it opined that the respondents were
acknowledged that initially, the shutdown was only temporary, it "has illegally dismissed because they were not reinstated by the petitioners
ripened into a closure or cessation of operations" 10 after it exceeded after the lapse of the company's temporary shutdown. It lost sight of the
the six months allowable period under Article 286 of the Labor Code in fact that the company did not resume operations anymore, a situation
the manner this Court declared in Mayon Hotel & Restaurant v. Adana. the CA itself recognized. The respondents, therefore, had no more jobs
11 It thus became a dismissal, it pointed out that, by operation of law, to go back to; hence, their non-reinstatement.
when the petitioners failed to reinstate the respondents after the lapse of In these lights, the CA was not only incorrect from the point of
six months. It noted that "during the proceedings [before] the LA law; it likewise disregarded, or at the very least, grossly misappreciated
covering a period in excess of six months, there is no showing on record the evidence on record — that the petitioner was in distress and had
that notices to return to work were given to the petitioners or that temporarily suspended its operations, and duly reflected these
operations have resumed." 12 EIDaAH circumstances to the DOLE. From this perspective, there was no grave
The CA declared that the NLRC committed grave abuse of abuse of discretion to justify the CA's reversal of the NLRC's findings
discretion in upholding LA Bartolabac's ruling that no illegal dismissal and conclusions.
took place as the LA disregarded the obtaining facts and the applicable
provisions of law. It set aside the challenged NLRC decision and granted 73. NORTH DAVAO MINING CORP. V. NLRC, G.R. 112546, 13 MARCH
the respondents' claims for service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, 1996-Meneses
separation pay and backwages.
ISSUE: DOCTRINE: Where the closure was due to business losses the Labor
WON the respondents illegally dismissed and entitled to the CA award Code does not impose any obligation upon the employer to pay separation
benefits, for obvious reasons. Art. 283 of the Labor Code does not obligate an
HELD: employer to pay separation benefits when the closure is due to losses.
FACTS: On May 31, 1992, petitioner North Davao completely ceased of separation pay. The fact that North Davao at the point of its forced closure
operations due to serious business reverses. When it ceased operations, its voluntarily paid any separation benefits at all — although not required by law
remaining employees were separated and given the equivalent of 12.5 days' — and 12.5-days' worth at that, should have elicited admiration instead of
pay for every year of service, computed on their basic monthly pay, in addition condemnation. But to require it to continue being generous when it is no longer
to the commutation to cash of their unused vacation and sick leaves. However, in a position to do so would certainly be unduly oppressive, unfair and most
it appears that, during the life of the petitioner corporation, from the beginning revolting to the conscience.
of its operations in 1981 until its closure in 1992, it had been giving separation
pay equivalent to thirty (30) days' pay for every year of service. Moreover, 74. ANABE V. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION (ASIAKONSTRUKT), G.R. 183233,
inasmuch as the region where North Davao operated was plagued by 23 DEC 2009-Meneses
insurgency and other peace and order problems, the employees had to collect
their salaries at a bank some 58 kilometers from their workplace, this DOCTRINE: To effect a valid retrenchment, the following elements must be
arrangement lasted from 1981 to 1990. present: (1) the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent
Subsequently, a complaint was filed with respondent labor arbiter by business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but
respondent Wilfredo Guillema and 271 other separated employees for: (1) substantial, serious, and real, or only if expected, are reasonably imminent as
additional separation pay of 17.5 days for every year of service; (2) back perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer; (2) the employer
wages equivalent to two days a month; (3) transportation allowance; (4) hazard serves written notice both to the employee/s concerned and the Department
pay; (5) housing allowance; (6) food allowance; (7) post-employment medical of Labor and Employment at least a month before the intended date of
clearance; and (8) future medical allowance. The LA rendered a decision retrenchment; (3) the employer pays the retrenched employee separation pay
ordering North Davao to pay respondents separation pay, back wages and in an amount prescribed by the Code; (4) the employer exercises its
transportation allowance. On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the decision prerogative to retrench in good faith; and (5) the employer uses fair and
in toto. The petitioner alleges that The NLRC acted with grave abuse of reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be retrenched or retained.
discretion in affirming without legal basis the award of additional separation
pay to private respondents who were separated due to serious business FACTS: Virgilio G. Anabe (petitioner) was hired by respondent Asian
losses on the part of the petitioner. Construction (Asiakonstrukt) as radio technician/operator on April 15, 1993.
By notice dated September 8, 1999, he was advised that his services would
ISSUE: WON an employer whose business operations ceased due to serious be, as he was in fact, terminated effective October 8, 1999 on the ground of
business losses or financial reverses is obliged to pay separation pay to its retrenchment. Petitioner thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and illegal
employees separated by reason of such closure. deduction and
payment of overtime pay, premium pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave
HELD: NO. A portion of Art. 283 governs the grant of separation benefits "in pay, and 13th month pay. Asiakonstrukt, attributing petitioner's retrenchment
case of closures or cessation of operation" of business establishments "NOT to sudden business reversal in the construction industry, averred, however,
due to serious business losses or financial reverses . . .". Where, however, the that petitioner's money claims have been offset against his outstanding
closure was due to business losses — as in the instant case, in which the accountabilities. In its decision, the LA finding that Asiakonstrukt
aggregate losses amounted to over P20 billion — the Labor Code does not failed to submit financial statements to prove losses, ruled that petitioner was
impose any obligation upon the employer to pay separation benefits, for not validly dismissed. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
obvious reasons. There is no need to belabor this point. In the case before us, (NLRC), taking into consideration the certified true copies of the Audited
the basis for the claim of the additional separation benefit of 17.5 days is Financial Statements from 1998 to 2000 submitted by Asiakonstrukt, modified
alleged discrimination, i.e., unequal treatment of employees, which is the Labor Arbiter's Decision by holding that petitioner was not illegally
proscribed as an unfair labor practice by Art. 248 (e) of said Code. Under the dismissed. On appeal, held that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
facts and circumstances of the present case, the grant of a lesser amount of part of the NLRC when it considered the financial statements as they "already
separation pay to private respondent was done, not by reason of form part of the records on appeal. Petitioner maintains that he was illegally
discrimination, but rather, out of sheer financial bankruptcy — a fact that is not dismissed as Asiakonstrukt failed to prove that it was suffering business losses
controlled by management prerogatives. Stated differently, the total cessation to warrant a valid retrenchment of its employees; and Asiakonstrukt belatedly
of operation due to mind-boggling losses was a supervening fact that submitted financial statements were not shown to be newly found evidence
prevented the company from continuing to grant the more generous amount
and unavailable during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter to thus cast their union activities and was in violation of their right to security of tenure since
doubts as to their veracity. there was no valid ground therefore, the 38 laid-off employees filed with the
Labor Arbiter's office in the National Capital Region complaints for illegal
ISSUE: WON there was a valid dismissal due to retrenchment dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages under Wage Orders
Nos. 01 and 02, and non-payment of overtime pay and 13th month pay. Private
HELD: NO. Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated by the respondent GTI denied the claim of illegal dismissal and asserted that it was
employer through no fault of and without prejudice to the employees. It is its prerogative to lay-off its employees temporarily for a period not exceeding
resorted to during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or six months to prevent losses due to lack of work or job orders from abroad,
seasonal fluctuations or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of and that the lay-off affected both union and non-union members. It justified its
materials, conversion of the plant for a new production program or the failure to recall the 38 laid-off employees after the lapse of six months because
introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery or of automation. It is of the subsequent cancellation of job order made by its foreign principals, a
a management prerogative resorted to, to avoid or minimize business losses, fact which was communicated to the petitioners and the other complainants
and is recognized by Article 283 of the Labor Code. To effect a valid who were all offered severance pay. Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the
retrenchment, the following elements must be present: (1) the retrenchment is petitioners, ruling that there was constructive dismissal. In its challenged
reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already decision, the NLRC concurred with the findings of the Labor Arbiter that there
incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, and real, or only was a valid lay-off of the petitioners due to lack of work, but disagreed with the
if expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith latter's ruling granting back wages after 22 July 1991. Petitioners contend,
by the employer; (2) the employer serves written notice both to the employee/s among others, that the NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
concerned and the Department of Labor and Employment at least a month grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was a valid and legal
before the intended date of retrenchment; (3) the employer pays the reduction of business and in sustaining the theory of redundancy in justifying
retrenched employee separation pay in an amount prescribed by the Code; (4) the dismissal of the petitioners.
the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench in good faith; and (5) the
employer uses fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid dismissal due to retrenchment
retrenched or retained. The losses must be supported by sufficient and
convincing evidence, the normal method of discharging which is the HELD: YES, the retrenchment was not illegal but only defective. Under
submission of financial statements duly audited by independent external the Article 283 of the Labor Code, there are three basic requisites for a valid
auditors. In the present case, Asiakonstrukt failed to submit its audited retrenchment: (1) the retrenchment is necessary to prevent losses and such
􀀼nancial losses are Proven; (2) written notice to the employees and to the Department
statements within the two years that the case was pending before the Labor of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of
Arbiter. It submitted them only after it received the adverse judgment of the retrenchment; and (3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one month pay
Labor Arbiter. or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. As for
the first requisite, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that the private
75. SEBUGUERO V. NLRC, 248 SCRA 533 [1995]-Meneses respondent was suffering and would continue to suffer serious losses, thereby
DOCTRINE: The requirement of notice to both the employees concerned and justifying the retrenchment of some of its employees, including the petitioners.
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is mandatory and must be As to the requirement of notice to both the employees concerned and the
written and given at least one month before the intended date of retrenchment. Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), such is mandatory and must
be written and given at least one month before the intended date of
FACTS: The petitioners were among the thirty-eight (38) regular employees of retrenchment. In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners were given
private respondent GTI Sportswear Corporation, a corporation engaged in the notice of the temporary lay-off. There is, however, no evidence that any written
manufacture and export of ready-to-wear garments, who were given notice to permanently retrench them was given at least one month prior to the
"temporary lay-off" notices by the latter on 22 January 1991 due to alleged lack date of the intended retrenchment. The NLRC found that GTI conveyed to the
of work and heavy losses caused by the cancellation of orders from abroad petitioners the impossibility of recalling them due to the continued
and by the garments embargo of 1990. Believing that their "temporary lay-off" unavailability of work. But what the law requires is a written notice to the
was a ploy to dismiss them, resorted to because of employees concerned and that requirement is mandatory and to be given one
month before the date of retrenchment. That they were already on temporary
lay-off at the time notice should have been given to them is not an excuse to offer services to the client companies with Dr. Clemente as its head and the
forego the one-month written notice because by this time, their lay-off is to notice of closure was a mere ploy for his ouster in view of his refusal to retire
become permanent and they were definitely losing their employment. With despite Dr. Clemente's previous prodding for him to do so, sought his
respect to the payment of separation pay, the NLRC found that GTI offered to reinstatement but it was unheeded. Thus, he filed a complaint for illegal
give the petitioners their separation pay but that the latter rejected such offer dismissal. The LA held that the abolition of the ISU was a valid and lawful
which was accepted only by 22 out of the 38 original complainants in this case. exercise of management prerogatives and there was convincing evidence to
As to when this offer was made was not, however, proven. But with or without show that ISU was being operated at a loss. On appeal by Dr. Meris, the
this offer of separation pay, our conclusion would remain the same: that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) modified the Labor Arbiter's
retrenchment of the petitioners is defective in the face of our finding that the decision. It held that in the exercise of Capitol's management prerogatives, it
required notices to both the petitioners and the DOLE were not given. had the right to close the ISU even if it was not suffering business losses in
The lack of written notice to the petitioners and to the DOLE does not, light of Article 283 of the Labor Code and jurisprudence. The CA, on the other
however, make the petitioners' retrenchment illegal such that they are entitled hand, held that Dr. Meris was illegally dismissed.
to the payment of backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as
they contend. Their retrenchment, for not having been effected with the ISSUE: WON Dr. Meris was validly dismissed
required notices, is merely defective. In those cases where we found the
retrenchment to be illegal and ordered the employees' reinstatement and the HELD: NO. The right to close the operation of an establishment or undertaking
payment of backwages, the validity of the cause for retrenchment, that is the is explicitly recognized under the Labor Code as one of the authorized causes
existence of imminent or actual serious or substantial losses, was not proven. in terminating employment of workers, the only limitation being that the closure
But here, such a cause is present as found by both the Labor Arbiter and the must not be for the purpose of circumventing the provisions on termination of
NLRC. There is only a violation by GTI of the procedure prescribed in Article employment embodied in the Labor Code. The phrase "closures or cessation
283 of the Labor Code in effecting the retrenchment of the petitioners. of operations of establishment or undertaking" in Art. 283 of the Labor Code
includes a partial or total closure or cessation. And the phrase "closures or
76. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER V. MERIS, 470 SCRA 125 [2005]- cessation . . . not due to serious business losses or
Meneses financial reverses" recognizes the right of the employer to close or cease his
business operations or undertaking even if he is not suffering from serious
DOCTRINE: The right to close the operation of an establishment or business losses or financial reverses, as long as he pays his employees their
undertaking is explicitly recognized under the Labor Code as one of the termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length of service. As
authorized causes in terminating employment of workers, the only limitation long as the company's exercise of the same is in good faith to advance its
being that the closure must not be for the purpose of circumventing the interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of
provisions on termination of employment embodied in the Labor Code; employees under the law or a valid agreement, such exercise will be upheld.
As long as the company's exercise of the same is in good faith to advance its In the case at bar, Capitol failed to sufficiently prove its good faith in closing
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the ISU. From the letter of Dr. Clemente to Dr. Meris, it is gathered that the
employees under the law or a valid agreement, such exercise will be upheld. abolition of the ISU was due to the "almost extinct demand for direct medical
FACTS: On January 16, 1974, petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc. (Capitol) service by the private and semi-government corporations in providing health
hired Dr. Cesar Meris (Dr. Meris) one of its stockholders, as in charge of its care for their employees;" and that such extinct demand was brought about by
Industrial Service Unit (ISU). Until the closure of the ISU on April 30, 1992, Dr. "the existing trend of industrial companies allocating their health care
Meris performed dual functions of providing medical services to Capitol's more requirements to Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) or thru a tripartite
than 500 employees and health workers as well as to employees and workers arrangement with medical insurance carriers and designated hospitals." The
of companies having retainer contracts with it. On March 31, 1992, Dr. Meris records of the case, however, fail to impress that there was indeed extinct
received from Capitol's president and chairman of the board, Dr. Thelma demand for the medical services rendered by the ISU. If there was extinct
Navarette-Clemente (Dr. Clemente), a notice advising him of the demand for the ISU medical services as what Capitol and Dr. Clemente purport
management's decision to close or abolish the ISU and the consequent to convey, why the number of client companies of the ISU increased from 11
termination of his services as Chief thereof, effective April 30, 1992. Dr. Meris, to 18 from 1986 to 1991, as well as the number of patients from both industrial
doubting the reason behind the management's decision to close the ISU and corporations and Capitol employees, they did not explain.
believing that the ISU was not in fact abolished as it continued to operate and
 The existence of business losses is not required to justify the closure ISSUE: Whether or not the deletion the award to petitioners of additional
or cessation of establishment or undertaking as a ground to terminate separation benefits equivalent to 4 days of work for every year of service.
employment of employees. Even if the ISU were not incurring losses, its
abolition or closure could be justified on other grounds like that proffered by HELD: NO. While serious business losses generally exempt the employer
Capitol — extinct demand. Capitol failed, however, to present sufficient and from paying separation benefits, it must be pointed that the exemption only
convincing evidence to support such claim of extinct demand. In fact, the pertains to the obligation of the employer under Article 297 of the Labor Code.
employees of Capitol submitted a petition dated April 21, 1992 addressed to This is because of the law’s express parameter that mandates payment of
Dr. Clemente opposing the abolition of the ISU. The closure of ISU then separation benefits “in case of closures or cessation of operations of
surfaces to be contrary to the provisions of the Labor Code on termination of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
employment. The termination of the services of Dr. Meris not having been reverses.”
premised on a just or authorized cause, he is entitled to either reinstatement However, when the obligation to pay separation pay is not sourced
or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and to backwages. from law, but from contract, such as an existing CBA between the employer
and its employees, an examination of the latter’s provisions becomes
77. BENSON INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP V. BENSON necessary in order to determine the governing the parameters for the said
INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. 200746, 06 AUG 2014-Mesa obligation. When the parties agree as to the grant of such separation benefits
irrespective of the employer’s financial position, then the obligatory force of
DOCTRINE: When the obligation to pay separation pay is not sourced from that contract prevails and its terms should be carried out to its full effect. When
law, but from contract, such as an existing CBA between the employer and its it is clear and unambiguous and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
employees, an examination of the latter’s provisions becomes necessary in public order or public policy, it becomes the law between the parties and
order to determine the governing the parameters for the said obligation. compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
In the case at hand, it was not shown that the CBA was forged
FACTS: Respondent Benson Industries sent its employees, including between the parties contrary to law, etc. Hence, the parties to the CBA must
petitioners, a notice informing them of their intended termination from be presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable developments.
employment, to be effected on the ground of closure and/or cessation of Moreover, it is only in absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances that
business operations. In consequence, the majority of Benson’s employees equity demands assistance for the debtor company.
resigned and accepted Benson’s payment of separation pay computed at 15
days for every year of service, as per the parties‟ Memorandum of Agreement. 78. PEÑAFRANCIA TOURS AND TRAVEL TRANSPORT, INC. V.
Nevertheless, petitioners proffered a claim a claim for the payment of SARMIENTO, G.R. 17897, 20 OCT 2010-Mesa
additional separation pay at the rate of four days for every year of service on
the basis of the existing CBA executed by and between the Union and Benson DOCTRINE: RE SALE OF COMPANY DONE IN BAD FAITH WILL NOT FREE
which states that “[Benson] shall pay toany employee/laborer who is EMPLOYER FROM LIABILITY TO EMPLOYEE
terminated from the service without any fault attributable to him, a „Separation
Pay‟ equivalent to not less than nineteen (19) days‟ pay for every year of FACTS: Bus drivers Respondents ABC and DEF were told by their employer
service based upon the latest rate of pay of the employee/laborer concerned. Petitioner XYZ that the company is now sold to RST. Respondents were given
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of the petitioners but held that separation pay and other benefits. Later, respondents learned that it was still
respondent was indeed in a state of insolvency which justified its closure XYZ operating the company. Respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal.
and/or cessation of business operations. On appeal, the VA‟s ruling was The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case. NLRC reversed. CA affirmed NLRC
reversed Decision. XYZ filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court
and deleted the award of additional separation benefits equivalent to 4 days of
work for every year of service. It held that despite the express provision in the ISSUE: Was there illegal dismissal
CBA stating that Benson should pay its employees who were terminated HELD: Yes, there was illegal dismissal. The alleged sale or transfer of
without their fault separation benefits equivalent to at least 19 days‟ pay for ownership was done in bad faith. The sale or disposition must be motivated by
every year of service, Benson cannot be compelled to do so considering its good faith as a condition for exemption from liability.]Thus, where the change
current financial status. of ownership is done in bad faith, or is used to defeat the rights of labor, the
successor-employer is deemed to have absorbed the employees and is held DOCTRINE: Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable
liable for the transgressions of his or her predecessor. with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement
The verbatim ruling of the SC follows: or contract of employment.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Closure of business is the reversal of fortune of the employer whereby there FACTS: Petitioner Sevillana was contracted to work, as a driver by I.T. for its
is a complete cessation of business operations and/or an actual locking-up of foreign accredited principal, Samir Maddah in Saudi Arabia. He argues
the doors of the establishment, usually due to financial losses. Closure of however, that only 1/3 of his salary was received. After working 12 months, he
business, as an authorized cause for termination of employment, aims to said that he was repatriated without any valid and justifiable reason. He filed a
prevent further financial drain upon an employer who can no longer pay his complaint with the POEA for underpayment of salaries and illegal dismissal
employees since business has already stopped. Closure or cessation of against I.T., and Samir Maddah. The company arguedthat his blood pressure
operation of the establishment is an authorized cause for terminating an was considered critical and when his blood pressure did not stabilize and
employee, as provided in Article 283 of the Labor Code, to wit: began affecting his work as driver due to frequent headaches and dizziness,
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The he was repatriated to avoid further injury and complication. I.T. claimed that
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the after he had received all the benefits accorded to an employee consisting of
installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent full salaries and separation pay, he refused to be repatriated and instead
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or decided to run away and since then, his whereabouts were unknown and I.T.
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the only heard about him when he reported to their office in the Philippines and
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the later on filed thecomplaint. The POEA Adjudication Office, held the private
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the respondents herein jointly and severally liable to the petitioner. The NLRC
intended date thereof. x x x. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in reversed this saying that I.T. is a recruitment agency and is not the employer
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking itself and at most it is an agent of the employer.
not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay
shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one-half (1/2) month pay ISSUE: Whether or not Sevillana was illegally dismissed
for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered one (1) whole year. HELD: The SC held that there was illegal dismissal, I.T. cannot be considered
On this ground, petitioner terminated the employment of respondents. as an agent of its foreign principal. The NLRC disregard the rule regarding the
However, what petitioner apparently made was a transfer of ownership. It is solidary liability of the local employment agency with its foreign principal in
true that, as invoked by petitioner, in Manlimos, et al. v. NLRC, et al., we held overseas employment contracts. Private employment agencies are held jointly
that a change of ownership in a business concern is not proscribed by law. and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the
Lest petitioner forget, however, we also held therein that the sale or disposition recruitment agreement or contract of employment. The solidary liability
must be motivated by good faith as a condition for exemption from liability. imposed is to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient
Thus, where the charge of ownership is done in bad faith, or is used to defeat payment of what is due him. Also the Labor Code puts the burden of proving
the rights of labor, the successor-employer is deemed to have absorbed the that the dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause on the employer. For a
employees and is held liable for the transgressions of his or her predecessor. dismissal to be valid it must be for a valid cause and there must be due
But, in this case, there is no successor-employer because there was no actual process. The record shows that neither of the 2 conditions was shown to have
change of ownership. We sustain the uniform factual finding of both the NLRC been complied with. All I.T. did was to really on its claim that petitioner was
and the CA that no actual sale transpired and, as such, there is no closure or repatriated by its foreign principal. Under Section 8, Rule 1, Book, VI of the
cessation of business that can serve as an authorized cause for the dismissal Rules and Regulations Implementation the Labor Code, for a disease to be a
of respondents. valid ground for dismissal, the continued employment of the employee is
prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or the health of his co-employees.
And there must be a certification by a competent public health authority that
79. SEVILLANA V. INT’L. CORP., 356 SCRA 451 [16 April 2001]-Mesa thedisease is of such nature or at such a state that it cannot be cured within a
period of 6 months, even with proper medical treatment.
80. ROMEO VILLARUEL V. YEO HAN GUAN, G.R. 169191, 1 JUNE 2011- deserve a place in the workplace and it is the management’s prerogative to
Murallos terminate the employment.

Doctrine: A person who is not dismissed or terminated from his employment Facts: Ynson was the National Sales Manager for Automotive of Wuerth
is not entitled to separation pay. Philippines, Inc. And as NSM, he was required to travel a lot to supervise,
make a schedule of activities, and submit such to Ricanor, the Chief Executive
Facts: Villaruel alleged that he was employed as a machine operator in Officer of the petitioner company. In an e-mail sent to Ricanor, which stated
Ribonette Manufacturing Company owned and managed by Yeo. Over a the copy of Ynson’s sales targets, the latter also indicated his intends to be on
period of almost two decades, the company has changed its name four times. leave. But, subsequently, Ynson was not able to follow the coverage plan
But during the employment of Villaruel, it remained as Yuhans Enterprises, stated as he already failed to report to work due to stroke. The latter’s doctors
and despite the numerous changes, Villaruel remained in its employ. Villaruel issued certification of what has happened to Ynson. Afterwards, Ynson
narrated that he got sick and subsequently confined, and when he decided to informed the head of the company that he could return to work. Such
come back to work he was no longer allowed to come back due to his illness. information was forwarded to Ricanor. But the latter sent a letter directing him
But he claimed that he asked for a lighter kind of work, but it was also denied. to appear for investigation for the following violations: (1) absences without
Thus, as his last resort, he asked for separation pay. Yeo averred that they leave, and (2) abandonment of work. But Ynson deflected such and claimed
asked Villaruel to work, still, but it was the latter who never showed up and that that his therapy sessions could not be disrupted. So, Ricanor sent two more
they were even surprised to receive an instant case asking for recovery pay. letters resetting such investigation, and this time including (3) gross
inefficiency as an additional ground for possible suspension. Ynson reiterated
When the case was elevated to the Labor Arbiter, the LA rendered judgment the same reasons, and even asked Ricanor if he would be the one to come to
in favor of Villaruel. Thus, Yeo filed an appeal with the NLRC, but to no avail Davao and conduct the investigation there. Ricanor was not having it, so he
as it upheld the LA’s decision. When Yeo filed for a MR, it was also denied. informed Ynson that the management is terminating his employment upon
Thus, Yeo brought the matter to the CA, which partially granted its appeal. receipt of such letter on the three grounds reiterated.
Then, Villaruel filed a MR but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
Thus, Ynson filed a complaint against the petitioner company for illegal
Issue: W/N petitioner was entitled to separation pay. dismissal and non-payment of allowances, with claim for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees to the NLRC. When it was elevated to the Court
Held: NO. The Supreme Court stated that the law states that an employer shall of Appeals, the appellate court found that petitioner company had the right to
not terminate the services of the employee unless there is a certification by a terminate Ynson. Thus, this petition.
competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such
a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of 6 months even with proper Issue: W/N Wuerth Philippines, Inc., may terminate Ynson’s employment.
medical treatment.
Held: YES. The Supreme Court stated that Article 284 of the Labor Code
In this case, Yeo did not terminate Villaruel’s employment, as it was Villaruel provides that an employer may terminate the services of an employee who has
who initiated the severance of his employment. It is evident from the various been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued
pleadings filed that he never intended to return to his employment on the employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health, as well as to the
ground that his health is failing. Added to that, since Villaruel was not health of his co-employees. In this case, Ynson would have been capable of
dismissed, nor terminated, he is not entitled to separation pay under the returning to work. However, despite notices sent by the petitioner company,
provisions of the Labor Code. Ynson refused to report for the investigations set by the petitioner. Even
considering the directive of respondent’s doctor to continue with his present
81. WUERTH PHILS., INC. V. YNSON, G.R. 175932, 15 FEB 2012-Murallos regimen for at least another month and a half, it could be safely deduced that
the rehabilitation period already ended. Thus, his unexplained absences in the
Doctrine: Employers are allowed wide latitude of discretion in terminating the proceedings is construed a waiver of his right to be present in order to adduce
employment of managerial personnel. The mere existence of a basis for evidence that would have justified his continued absence from work.
believing that such employee has breached the trust and confidence of his
employer would suffice for his dismissal. An irresponsible employee does not
As a general rule, employers are allowed wide latitude of discretion in Held: NO. The Supreme Court pointed out that there exists no retirement plan,
terminating the employment of managerial personnel. The mere existence of collective bargaining agreement, or any equivalent contract between the
a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust and parties which set out the terms and conditions for the retirement of the
confidence of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. An irresponsible employees, with only the sole exception of the Philam Life Plan which
employee does not deserve a place in the workplace and it is the premiums had already been paid by the bank. Added to that, neither was there
management’s prerogative to terminate the employment. any established company policy of giving early retirement packages to the
Bank’s aging employees. The giving of benefits should have been done over
82. PADILLO V. RURAL BANK OF NABUNTURAN, INC., G.R. 199338, 21 a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and
JAN 2013-Murallos deliberate.

Doctrine: In the absence of any applicable contract, collective bargaining The absence of any applicable contract or any evolved company policy
agreement, or any evolved company policy, any employee could not claim disqualifies Padillo from such retirement benefits. As although he was able to
retirement benefits if they have not reached the age of retirement set by the comply with the 5 year tenure requirement—as he served for 29 years—he,
law, which is 60 years old. however, fell short with respect to the 60 year age requirement, given that he
was only 55 when he retired. Therefore, without prejudice to the proceeds due
Facts: The late Padillo was employed by the petitioner bank as its SA under the Philam Life Plan, petitioners’ claim for the retirement benefits must
Bookkeeper. Due to its liquidity problems, the Bank took out be denied.
retirement/insurance plans with Philam life for all its employees in anticipation
of its possible closure and the concomitant severance of its personnel.
Subsequently, Oropeza bough majority shares of stock of the petitioner bank, 83. FIRST GENERAL MARKETING CORP. V. NLRC, G.R. 97835, 14 JUNE
and took over its management which brought about its gradual rehabilitation. 1993-Onate
Decades later, Padillo suffered a mild stroke due to hypertension which
consequently impaired his ability to effectively pursue his work. Padillo wrote Doctrine: Jose Uy signed the agreement as President and General Manager
a letter addressed to Oropeza expressing his intention to avail of an early of both Paramount Gloves Phils. Inc. and FGMC. Therefore, he is estopped
retirement package, but it was unheeded. Padillo was then separated from from disclaiming any liability under it.
employment due to his poor and failing health as reflected in a Certification Facts: Jose Uy owned and controlled three (3) garment companies, namely
issued by the petitioner bank. Not having received his “claimed” retirement Paramount Gloves Phils., Inc., State Garment Company, and First General
benefits, Padillo filed with the NLRC a complaint for the recovery of unpaid Marketing Corporation (FGMC). In March, 1988, the Paramount and FGMC
retirement benefits, and asserted that the petitioner bank had adopted a policy were merged to enable Uy to meet the rising volume of purchase orders and
of granting its aging employees early retirement packages, pointing out that export demands.
one of his co-employees was accorded such benefits even when she retired On March 16 1988, Uy and ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor
at 53. Organizations) entered into an agreement wherein the workers of Paramount
will be absorbed by FGMC. Private respondents, who were regular cutters in
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Padillo’s complaint and it found Padillo Paramount, were assigned as “temporary trimmers” in FGMC’s finishing
disqualified to receive any benefits as he was only 55 years old when he section. They were also asked by Uy to signed probationary contracts and that
resigned. The law specifically provides for an optional retirement age of 60 and they will be excluded from the new company’s bargaining unit.
compulsory retirement age of 65. Dissatisfied with the LA’s ruling, the matter Private respondents were discharged without notice. They filed a complaint for
was elevated to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and illegal dismissal against FGMC and Uy.
ordered the petitioner bank to pay a separation pay on top of the Philam life LA: dismissed the complaint on the ground that the complainants knew that
benefit. But the petitioner bank raised the matter to the CA, which set aside their hiring was seasonal in character, hence, it could not ripen into permanent
the NLRC’s ruling and upheld the LA’s decision. Thus, this petition. or regular employment.
NLRC: reversed the LA; The merger agreement compelled FGMC and Uy to
Issue: W/N Padillo may recover retirement benefits. respect the permanent status of the complainants and that hey could not be
dismissed without just cause.
Issue: Whether or not private respondents were illegally dismissed the interest of the new management. Thus, the filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal.
Held: YES. The agreement between Jose Uy and ANGLO dated March 16, LA: Petitioners were illegally dismissed; The transfer of ownership partook of
1988 clearly stated that the company and the union agree that the workers of a cessation of business operation not due to business reverses under Article
Tri-Star whose names are attached and all workers of PARAMOUNT GLOVES 283 of the Labor Code and pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Mobil
PHILS., INC. will be covered and will fall under regular employees of FIRST Employees Association vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the
GENERAL MARKETING and members of the union under ANGLO. All of the following requisites must be complied with before the dismissal of employees
benefits to be received by the workers from their respective companies shall may be effected: (1) service of a written notice to the employees and to the
continue and the benefits derived from the CBA of FIRST GENERAL Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) at least one month before the
MARKETING shall be given and enjoyed by the covered workers. intended date thereof; (2) the cessation of or withdrawal from business
Jose Uy signed the agreement as President and General Manager of both operations must be bona fide in character; and (3) payment to the employees
Paramount Gloves Phils. Inc. and FGMC. Therefore, he is estopped from of termination pay amounting to at least one-half month pay for each year of
disclaiming any liability under it. The probationary employment contracts which service or one month pay whichever is higher. The first and third requisites
the private respondents were made to sign on May 23, 1988, a week after the were present however there was no "cessation of operations which would lead
execution of the merger agreement on March 16, 1988, violated the terms of to the dismissal of the employees."
the merger agreement and the employees' right to security of tenure. NLRC: reversed LA’s decision; The change of ownership in this case was
made in good faith since there was no evidence on record that "the former
owners conspired with the new owners to insulate the former management of
84. MANLIMOS V. NLRC, G.R. 113337, 02 MARCH 1995-Onate any liability to its workers."
Doctrine: - Where such transfer of ownership is in good faith, the transferee
is under no legal duty to absorb the transferor's employees as there is no law Issue: Whether or not the complainants were validly dismissed
compelling such absorption. The most that the transferee may do, for reasons
of public policy and social justice, is to give preference to the qualified Held: Yes. The change in ownership of the management was done bona Cde
separated employees in the filling of vacancies in the facilities of the purchaser. and the petitioners did not for any moment before the Cling of their complaints
raise any doubt on the motive for the change. On the contrary, upon being
Facts: The petitioners were among the regular employees of the Super informed thereof and of their eventual termination from employment, they
Mahogany Plywood Corporation, a domestic corporation organized in 1988 freely and voluntarily accepted their separation pay and other beneCts and
and based in Butuan City. They had been hired as patchers, taper-graders, individually executed the Release or Waiver which they acknowledged before
and receivers-dryers. On 1 September 1991, a new owner/management group no less than a hearing officer of the DOLE.
headed by Alfredo Roxas acquired complete ownership of the corporation. The Where such transfer of ownership is in good faith, the transferee is under no
petitioners were advised of such change of ownership; however, the legal duty to absorb the transferor's employees as there is no law compelling
petitioners continued to work for the new owner and were considered such absorption. The most that the transferee may do, for reasons of public
terminated, with their conformity, only as of December 1991 when they policy and social justice, is to give preference to the qualified separated
received their separation pay, 13th month pay, and all other benefits due them employees in the filling of vacancies in the facilities of the purchaser.
computed as of the said month. Each of them then executed on 17 December Since the petitioners were effectively separated from work due to a bona Cde
1991 a Release and Waiver which they acknowledged before Atty. Nolasco change of ownership and they were accordingly paid their separation pay,
Discipulo, Hearing Officer of the Butuan City District Office of the Department which they freely and voluntarily accepted, the private respondent corporation
of Labor and Employment (DOLE). was under no obligation to employ them; it may, however, give them
The new owner caused the publication of a notice for the hiring of workers, preference in the hiring. The private respondent in fact hired, but on
indicating therein who of the separated employees could be accepted on probationary basis, all the petitioners, except Rosario Cuarto. The non-hiring
probationary basis. The petitioners then filed their applications for of Cuarto was legally permissible.
employment. Two (2) of the employees hired were terminated for their alleged The hiring of employees on a probationary basis is an exclusive management
absence without leave and were considered to have abandoned their work. prerogative. The employer has the right or privilege to choose who will be hired
The rest were dismissed because they allegedly committed acts prejudicial to and who will be denied employment. It is within the exercise of this right that
the employers may set or fix a probationary period within which it may test and prepare his reports and that he brought to the office his own air-conditioning
observe the employee's conduct before hiring him permanently. unit saying that it is common practices for housewives to have "their presence
felt" in the offices of their husbands and for executives to bring their own
85. JRS BUSINESS CORP. V. NLRC, G.R. 108891, 17 JULY 1995-Onate appliances to their office.
Doctrine: Petitioner, having violated the maximum 30-day preventive Also presented as an issue was petitioner's directive to private respondent of
suspension under Section 4, Rule XIV, Book of the Omnibus Rules October 12, 1988 to go on leave without pay to pave the way for the
Implementing the Labor Code, must indemnify private respondent in the investigation of the charges against him. Petitioner having violated the
amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). maximum 30-day preventive suspension under Section 4, Rule XIV, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, a sanction is imposed on
Facts: Petitioner employed private respondent on April 7, 1980. Subsequently, him in consonance with our ruling in Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation
private respondent was promoted as Station Manager of petitioner's Davao v. National Labor Relations Commission, 187 SCRA 694 (1990). Petitioner
branch office. In September 1988, Fernando T. dela Cerna, petitioner's must indemnify private respondent in the amount of One Thousand Pesos
Internal Auditor, conducted an audit of its Davao office. The audit revealed a (P1,000.00).
shortage totalling P145,564.33 arising from undeposited cash sales and
unexplained cash shortages from charge sales. Milady J. Munoz, petitioner's 86. CADIZ V. CA, 474 SCRA 232 [2005]-Pilar
Treasurer, called private respondent's attention to the cash shortage. He was DOCTRINE: There is no demand that the notices of dismissal themselves be
directed to explain in writing within 72 hours from receipt of the notice why he couched in the form and language of judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. What
should not be relieved from his position. is required is that the employer conduct a formal investigation process, with
Four days later or on September 27, 1988, private respondent was informed notices duly served on the employees informing them of the fact of
by Ernesto A. Gonzales, petitioner's Personnel Manager, of the appointment investigation, and subsequently, if warranted, a separate notice of dismissal.
of Fernando T. dela Cerna as officer-in-charge of the Davao office. He was Through the formal investigatory process, the employee must be accorded the
further instructed to report to dela Cerna for his new duties pending petitioner's right to present his/her side, which must be considered and weighed by the
Knal decision regarding the result of the audit report On October 12, 1988, employer. The employee must be sufficiently apprised of the nature of the
private respondent was directed by Ernesto A. Gonzales to go on leave without charge against him/her, so as to be able to intelligently defend against the
pay effective October 15, 1988 until further notice, in view of the on-going charges.
investigation.
On November 17, 1988, private respondent and his wife received separate FACTS:Petitioners Romeo Cadiz, Carlito Bongkingki and Prisco Gloria IV
demand letters for the immediate restitution of the amount of P145,564.33. On were employed as signature verifier, bookkeeper, and foreign currency
February 6, 1988, considering his indefinite forced leave without pay as a denomination clerk/bookkeeper-reliever, respectively, in the main office
constructive dismissal, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner branch of Philippine Commercial International Bank (respondent bank).
with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. IX of Davao City for illegal dismissal,
reinstatement with back wages, vacation and sick leave pay, moral and The anomalies in question arose when Rosalina B. Alqueza filed a complaint
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. with PCIB for the alleged non-receipt of a $600.00 demand draft drawn against
LA: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit; it which was purchased by her husband from Hongkong and Shanghai
NLRC: set aside LA’s decision and ruled that private respondent was illegally Banking Corporation. Upon verification, it was uncovered that the demand
dismissed draft was deposited with FCDU Savings Account, an account under the name
of Sonia Alfiscar. Further investigation revealed that the demand draft,
Issue: Whether or not private respondent Robert Nacario was illegally together with four (4) other checks, was made to appear as only one deposit
dismissed for US$1,232.00. The Branch Manager, Ismael R. Sandig, then presided over
a series of meetings, wherein Cadiz, Bongkingki and Gloria allegedly verbally
Held: Yes. The Court affirmed the ruling of the NLRC in finding that the admitted their participation in a scheme to divert funds intended for other
charges levelled against private respondent to be without basis and accepted accounts using the Savings Account of Alfiscar. Subsequently, Cadiz allegedly
his explanation thereof as satisfactory. It took note of the long and dedicated paid Alqueza the peso equivalent of US$600, but insisted that the
service of private respondent to the company. It belittled the charges that corresponding receipt be issued in Alfiscars name instead.
private respondent allowed his wife to go to the branch office to help him
The internal auditors of the bank determined that petitioner Cadiz had reserved the required procedural due process for their termination was strictly complied
the savings account in the name of Sonia Alfiscar. The account was opened with.
on 27 November 1987 and closed on 23 June 1988. Twenty-five (25) deposit All given, we affirm the conclusion that petitioners were dismissed for just
slips involving the account were posted by Bongkingki while sixteen (16) cause. Loss of trust and confidence is one of the just causes for termination
deposit slips were posted by Gloria. A verification of the deposit slips yielded by employer under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The breach of trust must be
findings of miscoded checks, forged signatures, non-validation of deposit slips willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely,
by the tellers, wrongful deposit of second-endorsed checks into foreign without justifiable excuse. Ideally, loss of confidence applies only to cases
currency deposit accounts, the deposit slips which do not bear the required involving employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those
approval of bank officers, and withdrawals made either on the day of deposit situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody
or the following banking day. In view of such findings, show-cause memoranda of the employers money or property. Utmost trust and confidence are deemed
were served on petitioners, requiring them to explain within seventy-two (72) to have been reposed on petitioners by virtue of the nature of their work.
hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against them in connection
with the results of the special audit examination. Petitioners submitted their
written explanations. Not satisfied with their explanations, respondent bank 87. DELES V. NLRC, 327 SCRA 541 [2000]-Pilar
dismissed petitioners from employment for violation of Article III Section 1 B-2 DOCTRINE: Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment
and Article III Section 1-C of the Code of Discipline. is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust
and confidence. This situation holds where an employee or official of the
Petitioners lodged a complaint before the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal on company is entrusted with responsibility involving delicate matters, such as the
18 September 1989. Labor Arbiter Ernesto S. Dinopol adjudged that custody, handling, or care and protection of the employers property. In the
petitioners were illegally dismissed and ordered their reinstatement and case of company personnel occupying such positions of responsibility, the
payment of backwages. This conclusion was based on the notices of Court has repeatedly held that loss of trust and confidence justifies termination.
dismissal, which, to the mind of the labor arbiter, was couched in general terms
and without explaining how the rules were violated. The labor arbiter also FACTS: Respondent company operates a pipeline system which transports
attributed petitioners acts in fraudulently coding several deposit slips as 1511 petroleum products from the refineries by Caltex Inc. and Shell Inc. in
as mere procedural inadequacies, with the fault attributable to respondent Batangas to terminal receiving facilities in Metro Manila. Petitioner was
bank for its laxity. employed by respondent company as shift supervisor. He was assigned at its
joint terminal facility in Pandacan, Manila, where he was the highest ranking
ISSUE: Whether or not he termination was proper officer at the terminal during his shift. His primary task was to oversee the
entire pipeline operation in the terminal.
HELD: respondent bank complied with the two-notice rule prescribed in Article
277(b) of the Labor Code. Petitioners were given all avenues to present their One night, petitioner was the shift supervisor on duty while Eduardo Yumul
side and disprove the allegations of respondent bank. An informal meeting was and Leonardo Espejon were the assigned shift operator and gauger,
held between the branch manager of MOB, the three petitioners and Mr. respectively. During this shift, there was a scheduled delivery for Shell through
Gener, the Vice-President of the PCIB Employees Union. As per report, respondent companys pipeline of about 3,000 barrels of kerosene (KE) to be
petitioners admitted having used Alfiscars account to divert funds intended for followed by a delivery of aviation turbine fuel (AV). Forthwith, petitioner
other accounts. A special audit investigation was conducted to determine the instructed his chief operator (Yumul) to effect a batch change from the
extent of the fraudulent transactions. Based on the results of the investigation, kerosene tank to the aviation fuel tank when the joint terminal facility turbine
respondent bank sent show-cause memoranda to petitioners, asking them to meter registers 2,944 barrels of kerosene delivered. Apparently, Yumul failed
explain their lapses, under pain of disciplinary action. The memoranda, which to execute correctly petitioners order. Instead of effecting the batch change at
constitute the first notice, specified the various questionable acts committed the prescribed reading of 2,944 barrels, Yumul caused the batch change when
by petitioners. Afterwards, petitioners submitted their respective replies to the the reading already reached 3,341 barrels. Thus, about 397 barrels of the
memoranda. This very well complies with the requirement for hearing, by succeeding batch of aviation turbine fuel went to the kerosene batch thereby
which petitioners were afforded the opportunity to defend themselves. The downgrading the former.
second notice came in the form of the termination memoranda, informing
petitioners of their dismissal from service. From the foregoing, it is clear that
When informed of the incident, respondent company required petitioner to In view of these newly unearthed violations, respondent company again asked
explain why he should not be charged administratively for neglect of duty in petitioner to explain why he should not be administratively sanctioned for: (1)
view of his failure: (a) to witness the actual batch change cutting of S83- tampering with an operating equipment (MOV#10), and; (2) tampering with the
KE/S84-AV; (b) to see to it that a batch change checklist was prepared and installation of a safety device of gravitometer. Consequently, petitioner was
followed, and; (c) to see to it that a batch change report was prepared. placed under preventive suspension effective June 24, 1993, pending the
Concomitantly, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension pending outcome of the probe on the latest charges against him. Meanwhile, on July
the outcome of the investigation. 24, 1993, petitioner was reinstated in the payroll.

Accordingly, private respondent Flaviano Santos, respondent companys After conducting formal investigation, respondent company terminated the
assistant vice president, informed petitioner that he was found to have violated employment of petitioner.
the section on Neglect of Duty of respondent companys Code of Discipline and
for this violation he was meted the penalty of three (3) months suspension. ISSUE: Whether ot not the Termination was proper

Believing that suspension for three months was too harsh, petitioner sought HELD: In the case at bar, petitioner, is tasked to perform key functions; he is
reconsideration of the penalty imposed. Subsequently, he filed a complaint bound by an exacting work ethic. He should have realized that his position
before the NLRC, questioning the legality of his suspension. requires the full trust and confidence of his employer in every exercise of
managerial discretion insofar as the conduct of his employers business is
While petitioner was under suspension, respondent company received reports concerned. However, as found a quo, he committed acts which betrayed the
that petitioner allowed the entry of two "bar girls" at the terminal at an unholy trust and confidence reposed on him by tampering with very sensitive
hour (4:00 A.M.) on February 23, 1993. This belied petitioners previous claim equipment at the joint terminal facility. In doing so, he exposed the terminal
that the two female visitors are his relatives. Thus, respondent company complex and the residents in adjacent communities to the danger of a major
required petitioner to explain in writing why he should not be held liable for: (1) disaster that may be caused by tank explosions and conflagration. Verily, he
neglect of duty as he allowed unauthorized persons in a restricted area, and; committed acts inimical to the interest of his employer which is mandated by
(2) dishonesty as he misrepresented to management that the two women are law to observe extraordinary diligence in its operations to ensure the safety of
his relatives. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to submit his written explanation. the public. Indeed, we are constrained to conclude that petitioners admitted
Nonetheless, respondent company conducted a formal inquiry on the matter infraction as well his past violation of safety regulations is more than sufficient
which was attended by petitioner. ground for respondent company to terminate the employment of petitioner.

During the aforesaid proceeding, it was discovered that petitioner tampered As regards the procedural aspect of petitioners dismissal, it appears clear to
with the automatic shutdown feature of Gravitometer No. 5 at the terminal on us that petitioner was given ample opportunity to present his side and to
March 19, 1993. Likewise, respondent company learned that petitioner opened defend himself against the charges against him. Respondent company sent
the terminals motor operated valve (MOV # 10) between 6:00 A.M. and 6:35 petitioner a letter dated June 2, 1993, requiring him to answer the charges
A.M. on said date which caused the gravitation of the contents of Shell hurled against him. He participated in the formal investigation conducted by
kerosene tank to aviation fuel tank. respondent company on July 23 and August 3, 1993. After the investigation
(The abovementioned gravitometer is equipped with a safety feature which was concluded, petitioner was notified of his dismissal. Under these attendant
triggers the automatic closure of the joint terminal facility pressure control valve circumstances, we find no basis for public respondents ruling that respondent
which in turn cause a shutdown of the pipeline operations. It prevents the entry company breached legal procedure prior to termination. Consequently, the
of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or a product mixture containing LPG, through award of indemnity for non-observance of due process is bereft of legal basis
the motor operated valve and onwards to the other product tanks such as and must be deleted.
gasoline, kerosene, jet fuel and diesel fuel. Hence, by disabling the automatic
shutdown feature of said gravitometer, LPG could pass through the line to the
gasoline tank undetected, and since the gasoline tank is not designed to 88. MCMER CORP. V. NLRC, G.R. 193421, 04 JUNE 2014-Pilar
accommodate LPG, the possibility of an explosion is enhanced.) DOCTRINE: The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person
in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his position
under the circumstances. It is an act amounting to dismissal but made to
appear as if it were not. Constructive dismissal is, therefore, a dismissal in On August 6, 2007, private respondent Feliciano C. Libunao, Jr. filed a
disguise. As such, the law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of complaint for unfair labor practices, constructive illegal dismissal, nonpayment
employees in order to protect their rights and interests from the coercive acts of 13th month pay and separation pay, moral and exemplary damages, as well
of the employer. In fact, the employee who is constructively dismissed may be as attorney’s fees, against petitioners McMer Corporation, Inc., Roque, and
allowed to keep on coming to work. Alvestir.

FACTS: Private respondent was employed by petitioner McMer Corporation, On August 18, 2007, a conciliary meeting was held inside petitioners’ premises
Inc. as Legal Assistant and was eventually promoted as Head of Legal to discuss the possibility of an amicable settlement. In the end, however,
Department, and concurrently, as Officer-in-Charge of petitioner McMer' s private respondent was informed verbally by petitioner Alvestir that on account
Legal and Administrative Department. of strained relationship brought about by the institution of a labor case against
petitioners, the latter is inclined to dismiss him from office. Private respondent
According to private respondent, for quite some time, he and petitioners, was, likewise, offered a separation pay in the sum of ₱55,000.00.
specifically Macario D. Roque, Jr. (Roque) and Cecilia R. Alvestir (Alvestir),
McMer’s General Manager and President, respectively, have been on a cold The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no constructive dismissal in the instant
war brought often by the disagreement in the design and implementation of case since it is very apparent that complainant voluntarily stopped reporting
company policies and procedures. However, the subsisting rift between him for work on perceived danger from harm by Mr. Roque. However, it is more of
and petitioners heightened when McMer started verbally and maliciously a figment of his imagination and not supported by any concrete evidence or
imputing against the officers of the Logistics Department certain unfounded established facts.
score of inefficient performance of duty.

At around noon on July 20, 2007, petitioner Roque gave an immediate ISSUE: Whether or not the termination was proper
summon upon private respondent to proceed to his office to discuss
administrative matters, including but not limited to the alleged absence and HELD: There was constructive dismissal.
tardiness of private respondent. Private respondent, sensing some unusual
development in the attitude of petitioner Roque, instead of responding to the It bears stressing that Guiao has actual knowledge of facts derived from her
summon, went to petitioner Alvestir’s office, and informed her of petitioner personal observation of what transpired on July 20, 2007, an excerpt: 3. In the
Roque’s disposition and his fear of a perceived danger to his person. He then course of our discussion we were interrupted by Feliciano Libunao, Jr. as he
requested for petitioner Alvestir to go to petitioner Roque’s office instead, of transmitted some words to the President for the latter to inform the owner of
which petitioner Alvestir conceded. Moments later, petitioner Roque, at the the company, Mr. Macario D. Roque, Jr. that he cannot proceed on the latter’s
height of anger, confronted private respondent and commanded him to summon to proceed to his office understandably on account of existing fear
proceed to his office. At this juncture, private respondent was too scared to that they would come to a possible severe disagreement.
confront Roque as the latter may inflict physical harm on him. 4. Ms. Alvestir then moved to the office of the owner in compliance to the given
request, but after few seconds, Mr. Macario Roque followed by Ms. Alvestir
As a consequence of the foregoing, private respondent elected to discontinue proceeded to the aforesaid office where I remained sitting and where Feliciano
work that afternoon and immediately proceeded to the Valenzuela Police Libunao, Jr. holds his office.
Headquarters to report on the incident in the police blotter. Private respondent 5. His face apparently fuming with anger associated with clear provocation,
did not report for work from July 21, 2007 up to July 30, 2007. Because of this, Mr. Roque accosted Mr. Libunao and shouted at him to immediately proceed
petitioner McMer, through petitioner Alvestir, issued a Memorandum directing to his office.
private respondent to explain within five (5) days why no disciplinary action 6. On the intervention of Ms. Alvestir, his younger brother, Mr. Macario Roque
should be imposed upon him for being in absence without official leave was forced to return to his office with that standing order for Mr.Libunao to
(AWOL). follow him, while Mr. Libunao was caught in the state of shock, public
humiliation and embarrassment in the presence of employees and applicants.
In response, private respondent sent a letter explaining the reason why he 7. Understandably to avoid a possible collision with Mr. Roque, who is known
refused to report for work during the aforesaid period. within the company yard as a violent person especially during the height of
uncontrolled anger, Mr. Libunao decided to immediately leave the office almost five (5) years until his alleged termination in August 2001. According to
without seeing anymore Mr. Roque. him, he reported daily to Gulf Pacific, waiting for his new assignment, but he
was not given any because there was no position available for him. His last
As may gleaned from the records, what transpired on July 20, 2007 was not visit to Gulf Pacifics office was in February 2002, but still no assignment was
merely an isolated outburst on the part of petitioner Roque. The latter’s given to him. In their position paper, Gulf Pacific and private respondent Angel
behaviour towards his employees shows a clear insensibility rendering the Quizon (Quizon), the owner and manager of the agency, denied Gregorios
working condition of private respondent unbearable.1âwphi1 Private allegations and countered that he had been relieved several times from his
respondent had reason to dawdle and refuse to comply with the summon of assignments for various reasons or had been on Absence Without Leave
petitioner Roque out of severe fear that he will be physically harmed. In fact, (AWOL). They further maintained that Gregorio was not illegally dismissed, but
the same was clearly manifested by his immediate reaction to the situation by was only placed on floating status due to his failure to comply with the
going to the Valenzuela Police to report the incident. Memorandum dated August 2, 2001, requiring him to complete the
requirements for his 201 file. In his rejoinder, Gregorio stated that he did not
Moreover, after a judicious scrutiny of the records, we find that private go on AWOL, since he was permitted to go on leave by his operations
respondent has exhibited a strong opposition to some company practices manager. At the end of the proceeding, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
resulting in a severe marginal distance between him and petitioners Roque Gregorio. Gulf pacific appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the LA, and
and Alvestir at the workplace. This, together with the harassment and the Court of Appeals likewise upholding the reversal. Thus, petitioner files the
intimidation displayed by petitioner Roque to his employees, became so instant case.
unbearable for private respondent to continue his employment with petitioner
McMer. The fact that none of the employees complained or brought this to the ISSUE:
attention of the appropriate authority does not validate petitioners’ actions. For Whether or not the CA erred in holding that Gregorio was not illegally
private respondent, retaining the employment despite his despair was a matter dismissed.
of principle. Private respondent reasoned that it was difficult for him to look for
another employment, considering that at the time he filed his Position Paper, HELD:
he was already 58 years old. His eventual decision to leave petitioners due to The petition has partial merit. In termination cases, the burden of proving just
the agonizing situation at the workplace cannot, therefore, be discounted. cause for dismissing an employee is on the employer. It was contended in the
petition that Gulf Pacific and Quizon failed to discharge this burden when they
The NLRC and the CA, therefore, correctly appreciated the foregoing events claimed that Gregorio’s employment was severed for his failure to renew his
as badges of constructive dismissal, since private respondent could not have security guard license, for his alleged inefficiency at work, and for his
given up a job he has engaged in for eight years unless it has become so submission of a spurious security guard license.
unbearable for him to stay therein. Indeed, private respondent felt compelled
to give up his employment. On this note, contrary to the posture of Gregorio, we hold that a security guard
has the personal responsibility to obtain his license .Notwithstanding the
practice of some security agencies to procure the licenses of their security
89. SALVALOZA V. NLRC, G.R. 182086, 24 NOV 2010-Pinugu guards for a fee, it remains the personal obligation of a security guard to
(*repeated; same as #65) ensure that he or she has a valid and subsisting license to be qualified and
DOCTRINE: available for an assignment. Thus, when Gregorio was given the
FACTS: Memorandum dated August 2, 2001, directing him to complete his 201 file
Gregorio filed a complaint against Gulf Pacific for illegal dismissal with claim requirements, it meant that he had to submit each and every document to show
for underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, his qualifications to work as a security guard, most important of which is his
premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13th month security guard license. Thus, his excuse that he was not informed that he
pay, damages, and attorneys fees before the National Labor Relations already had an expired license and had to renew the same cannot be
Commission (NLRC). In his position paper, Gregorio alleged that he was sustained. He should have known when his license was to expire.
employed by Gulf Pacific as a security guard, working from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00
p.m., Mondays to Sundays, receiving a monthly salary of P4,000.00. He stated However with regard to the issue of dismissal. There is constructive dismissal
that he was assigned to several establishments, working continuously for if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer
becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it would foreclose on floating status for a period not exceeding six months was justified in view
any choice except to forego continued employment. It exists when there is of her threatened resignation from her position and BGCCs request for her
cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, replacement.
unreasonable, or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a During the pendency of the case, however, Reyes eventually served the DOLE
diminution in pay. Of the three instances when Gregorio was temporarily "off- and Leynes with a notice terminating the latters services, on the ground of
detailed," we find that the last two already ripened into constructive dismissal. redundancy or lack of a posting commensurate to her position at the Project.
While the Court acknowledge that Gregorio’s service record shows that his
performance as a security guard was below par, we join the LA in his finding ISSUE:
that Gulf Pacific never issued any memo citing him for the alleged repeated 1. Whether or not placing an employee on floating status is tantamount
errors, inefficiency, and poor performance while on duty, and instead to constructive dismissal.
continued to assign him to various posts. This amounts to condonation by Gulf 2. Was the complaint for illegal dismissal proper?
Pacific of whatever infractions Gregorio may have committed. 3. Was the dismissal valid on the ground of redundancy?

90. NIPPON HOUSING PHIL. INC. V. MAIAH LEYNES, G.R. 177816, 03 HELD:
AUG 2011-Pinugu
DOCTRINE: 1. No. Acting on Leynes letter protesting against the hiring of her
FACTS: replacement and reiterating her lack of intention to resign from her position,
Maiah Leynes was hired as Property Manager for respondent NHPI’s building the record, moreover, shows that NHPI simply placed her on floating status
maintenance business. She handled the project for their only client, Bay until such time that another project could be secured for her. The rule is settled,
Gardens Condominium Corporation (BGCC). She was also responsible for the however, that "off- detailing" is not equivalent to dismissal, so long as such
hiring and deployment of manpower, salary and position determination as well status does not continue beyond a reasonable time and that it is only when
as the assignment of the schedules and responsibilities of employees. Leynes such a "floating status" lasts for more than six months that the employee
had a misunderstanding with Engr. Cantuba, the Building Engineer assigned may be considered to have been constructively dismissed.
at the Project, regarding the extension of the latters working hours. NHPIs
Vice President went on to issue a memorandum, attributing the incident to In constructive dismissal cases, the employer is, concededly, charged with
simple personal differences and directing Leynes to allow Engr. Cantuba to the burden of proving that its conduct and action or the transfer of an employee
report back for work. are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity.
Disappointed with the foregoing management decision, Leynes submitted to
NHPIs President, a letter asking for an emergency leave of absence for the Article 286 of the Labor Code has been applied to other industries when, as a
supposed purpose of coordinating with her lawyer regarding her resignation consequence of the bona fide suspension of the operation of a business
letter. While NHPI offered the Property Manager position to Engr. Carlos Jose or undertaking, an employer is constrained to put employees on floating
as a consequence of Leynes’ signification of her intention to resign, it also status for a period not exceeding six months.
appears that Leynes sent another letter to NHPI on the same day, expressing
her intention to return to work on and to call off her planned resignation upon 2. No. A complaint for illegal dismissal filed prior to the lapse of said
the advice of her lawyer. Leynes was constrained to send out a written protest six-month and/or the actual dismissal of the employee is generally considered
regarding the verbal information she supposedly received from Reyes (NHPI’s as prematurely filed.
HRD Head) that a substitute has already been hired for her position. Leynes
was further served by petitioner with a letter and memorandum relieving her 3. Yes. With no other client aside from BGCC for the building
from her position and directing her to report to NHPIs main office while she management side of its business, we find that NHPI was acting well within its
was on floating status. Aggrieved, Leynes lost no time in filing against NHPI a prerogatives when it eventually terminated Leynes services on the ground of
complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, benefits, damages and redundancy. One of the recognized authorized causes for the termination of
attorney’s fees docketed before the NLRC. She claimed that her being relieved employment, redundancy exists when the service capability of the workforce
from her position without just cause and replacement by one Carlos Jose is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the business
amounted to an illegal dismissal from employment. NHPI and its officers enterprise.
asserted that the management exercise of the prerogative to put an employee
 suspend operations is a prerogative of management, which the State does not
91. NASIPIT LUMBER CO. V. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF usually interfere with as no business or undertaking is required to continue
WORKINGMEN (NOWM), G.R. 146225, 11/25/2004-Pinugu operating at a loss simply because it has to maintain its workers in
DOCTRINE: employment. Such an act would be tantamount to a taking of property without
FACTS: due process of law.
Petitioner Nasipit Lumber Company (Nasipit) and its affiliate, petitioner However, the burden of proving, with sufficient and convincing evidence, that
Philippine Wallboard Corporation (Wallboard), employed, among others, thirty such closure or suspension is bona fide falls upon the employer. Otherwise,
(30) individual workers at the Nasipit Processing Plant. These workers were such ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming
members of the respondent, the National Organization of Workingmen employers who might be merely feigning business losses or reverses in their
(NOWM), which belonged to the Western Agusan Workers Union (WAWU- business ventures to ease out employees.
ALU-TUCP) which, in turn, was the certified bargaining unit in the said plant. In the present case, the petitioners failed to prove with convincing evidence a
The NOWM demanded for the balance of the health bonus of its members for bona fide suspension of their operations in 1994, 1995 and even in January
the year 1994, 13th month-pay, and the remaining backlog payables amounting 1996 due to acute economic losses in their operations.|||
to P1,800.000.00. Although no agreement was arrived at by the conferees, the First. The only evidence adduced by the petitioners that they sustained huge
petitioners granted financial assistance to their rank-and-file employees, losses-in their operations for 1994 and 1995 were the xerox copies of unsigned
security guards and company staff. Thereafter, the General Membership of and unverified Comparative Statements of Income and Expenses for the Years
WAWU-ALU-TUCP, approved and issued Resolution No. 02-96 in which it was Ended December 31, 1994 and 1995 filed with the BIR only on April 15, 1996.
stated that except for the rank-and-file workers assigned to the St. Christopher The petitioners failed to submit any other documents to support the said
Hospital, the thirty (30) members of respondent NOWM would not report for Comparative Statements. Thus, such statements are barren of probative
work. Thereafter, respondents NOWM and its thirty (30) members filed a weight.
complaint against the petitioners for illegal cessation of business operations, Second. Despite their alleged huge losses in 1994 and 1995, the petitioners
non-payment of separation pay, underpayment of salary and salary arrears for continued employing the respondents, although each of them received a
one (1) year before the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The monthly salary of only P600.00.
respondents claimed that the petitioners terminated their employment on the Third. The petitioners' claim that they were ready to resume operations in
allegation that the latter's operations were suspended. The labor arbiter January 1996 were it not for the respondent union's issuance of Resolution
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on his finding that the petitioners had No. 02-96 belies their contention that they sustained huge losses in their
to suspend their operations because of the respondent employees' refusal to operations in 1994 and 1995. There is no evidence on record that the
report for work. The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC which petitioners ever gave notice to their employees of the suspension of their
rendered a Decision setting aside the decision of the labor arbiter and operations, and, thereafter, that they were ready to resume such operation in
awarding separation pay to the thirty members of the respondent union. The January 1996.
NLRC ruled that, contrary to the findings of the labor arbiter, the respondents Fourth. The CA declared that the petitioners even gave the following benefits
were dismissed because of their failure to report for work after the petitioners to their employees on February 9, 1996; financial assistance of P300.00 for
refused to accede to their just demands for monetary benefits. The NLRC also the rank-and-file employees; P400.00 for the security guards; P500.00 for
found that the respondents had every reason not to report for work, the middle managerial employees; and P750.00 for the company staff. The
petioner points out, that Resolution No. 02-96 was a mere offshoot of the petitioners admitted these findings of the appellate court.
respondents' refusal to pay the complainant's salaries which at the time the
Resolution was passed amounted to about p1.8 Million Pesos. The CA 92. G.J.T. REBUILDERS MACHINE SHOP V. AMBOS, G.R. 174184, 28 JAN
affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence the instant petition. 2015-Margret

ISSUE: DOCTRINE:G.J.T. Rebuilders must pay respondents their separation pay for
Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed by the petitioners. failure to prove its alleged serious business losses Article 283 of the Labor
Code allows an employer to dismiss an employee due to the cessation of
HELD: operation or closure of its establishment or undertaking, thus:
Yes. Closure or suspension of operations for economic reasons is recognized
as a valid exercise of management prerogative. The determination to cease or
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. – The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to In contrast with the Labor Arbiter’s finding, the National Labor Relations
the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to Commission found G.J.T. Rebuilders to have suffered serious business
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the losses. Because of the fire that destroyed the building where G.J.T.
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of Rebuilders was renting space, the demand for its services allegedly declined
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on as “no same customer would dare to entrust machine works to be done for
the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one them in a machine shop lying in a ruined and condemned building.” The
(1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to National Labor Relations Commission then concluded that the fire “proximately
installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected caused” G.J.T. Rebuilders’ serious business losses, with its financial
thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one statement for the fiscal year 1997 showing a net loss of P316,210.00.
(1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in In the Decision dated January 25, 2001, the National Labor Relations
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or Commission vacated and set aside Labor Arbiter Leda’s Decision and
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. Since the Commission found that
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one- G.J.T. Rebuilders ceased operations due to serious business losses, it held
half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A that G.J.T. Rebuilders and the Trillana spouses need not pay Ricardo, Russell,
fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. and Benjamin separation pay.

The Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations Commission’s

FACTS:G.J.T. Rebuilders rented space in the Far East Asia (FEA) Building in Decision, agreeing with Labor Arbiter Leda that G.J.T. Rebuilders failed to
Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City, which served as the site of its machine prove its alleged serious business losses. The Court of Appeals conceded
shop. On September 8, 1996, a fire partially destroyed the FEA Building. Due that G.J.T. Rebuilders had to close the machine shop for reasons connected
to the damage sustained by the building, its owner notified its tenants to vacate with the fire that partially destroyed the building where it was renting space.
their rented units by the end of September 1996 “to avoid any unforeseen Nevertheless, G.J.T. Rebuilders continued its business for more than one year
accidents which may arise due to the damage.” after the fire. Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, G.J.T. Rebuilders did
Despite the building owner’s notice to vacate, G.J.T. Rebuilders continued its not suffer from serious business losses but closed the machine shop to prevent
business in the condemned building. When the building owner finally refused losses.
to accommodate it, G.J.T. Rebuilders left its rented space and closed the
machine shop on December 15, 1997. It then filed an Affidavit of Closure In their Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners maintain that G.J.T.
before the Department of Labor and Employment on February 16, 1998 and a Rebuilders suffered serious business losses as evidenced by its financial
sworn application to retire its business operations before the Mandaluyong statement covering the years 1996 and 1997. Petitioners admit that the
City Treasurer’s Office on February 25, 1998. financial statement was belatedly subscribed under oath.30 Nevertheless, “the
credibility or veracity of the entries”31 in the financial statement was not
Having lost their employment without receiving separation pay, Ricardo, affected since the Bureau of Internal Revenue received the same
Russell, and Benjamin filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor unsubscribed financial statement when G.J.T. Rebuilders allegedly filed its
Arbiter. They prayed for payment of allowance, separation pay, and attorney’s income tax return on April 15, 1998.32
fees. Considering that petitioners sufficiently proved G.J.T. Rebuilders’ serious
business losses, petitioners argue that respondents are not entitled to
In their defense, G.J.T. Rebuilders and the Trillana spouses argued that G.J.T. separation pay.
Rebuilders suffered serious business losses and financial reverses, forcing it
to close its machine shop. Therefore, Ricardo, Russell, and Benjamin were As for respondents, they contend that G.J.T. Rebuilders failed to prove its
not entitled to separation pay. alleged serious business losses. They argue that the financial statement
Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda (Labor Arbiter Leda) decided the Complaint, showing a net loss for the year 1997 was not credible, having been belatedly
finding no convincing proof of G.J.T. Rebuilders’ alleged serious business subscribed under oath by the Certified Public Accountant who prepared it. With
losses. no credible proof of G.J.T. Rebuilders’ supposed serious business losses,
respondents argue that petitioners must pay them separation pay under Article
283 of the Labor Code. We uphold G.J.T. Rebuilders’ decision to close its establishment as a valid
exercise of its management prerogative. G.J.T. Rebuilders closed its machine
shop, believing that its “former customers . . . seriously doubted [its] capacity
ISSUE:whether petitioners sufficiently proved that G.J.T. Rebuilders suffered . . . to perform the same quality [of service]”56 after the fire had partially
from serious business losses. damaged the building where it was renting space.

Nevertheless, we find that G.J.T. Rebuilders failed to sufficiently prove its

HELD:This petition should be denied. G.J.T. Rebuilders must pay respondents alleged serious business losses.
their separation pay for failure to prove its alleged serious business losses
Article 283 of the Labor Code allows an employer to dismiss an employee due 93. MAYA FARMS EMPLOYEES ORG. V. NLRC, G.R. 106256, 28 DEC
to the cessation of operation or closure of its establishment or undertaking 1994-Margret
The decision to close one’s business is a management prerogative that courts
cannot interfere with. Employers can “lawfully close shop at anytime,” even DOCTRINE:
for reasons of their own. “Just as no law forces anyone to go into business, FACTS:Private respondents Maya Farms, Inc. and Maya Realty and Livestock
no law can compel anybody to continue in it.” Corporation belong to the Liberty Mills group of companies whose
undertakings include the operation of a meat processing plant which produces
However, despite this management prerogative, employers closing their ham, bacon, cold cuts, sausages and other meat and poultry products.
businesses must pay the affected workers separation pay equivalent to one- Petitioners, on the other hand, are the exclusive bargaining agents of the
month pay or to at least one-half-month pay for every year of service, employees of Maya Farms, Inc. and the Maya Realty and Livestock
whichever is higher. The reason is that an employee dismissed, even for an Corporation.
authorized cause, loses his or her means of livelihood.red
Private respondents announced the adoption of an early retirement program
The only time employers are not compelled to pay separation pay is when they as a cost-cutting measure considering that their business operations suffered
closed their establishments or undertaking due to serious business losses or major setbacks over the years. The program was voluntary and could be
financial reverses. availed of only by employees with at least eight (8) years of service.1 Dialogues
were thereafter conducted to give the parties an opportunity to discuss the
Serious business losses are substantial losses, not de minimis. “Losses” details of the program. Accordingly, the program was amended to reduce the
means that the business must have operated at a loss for a period of time for minimum requirement of eight (8) years of service to only five (5) years.
the employer “to [have] perceived objectively and in good faith” 44 that the However, the response to the program was nil. There were only a few takers.
business’ financial standing is unlikely to improve in the future. To avert further losses, private respondents were constrained to look into the
companies' organizational set-up in order to streamline operations.
The burden of proving serious business losses is with the employer. The Consequently, the early retirement program was converted into a special
employer must show losses on the basis of financial statements covering a redundancy program intended to reduce the work force to an optimum number
sufficient period of time. The period covered must be sufficient for the National so as to make operations more viable.
Labor Relations Commission and this court to appreciate the nature and In December 1991, a total of sixty-nine (69) employees from the two
vagaries of the business. companies availed of the special redundancy program. On January 17, 1992,
the two companies sent letters to sixty-six (66) employees informing them that
their respective positions had been declared redundant. The notices likewise
Aside from the obligation to pay separation pay, employers must comply with stated that their services would be terminated effective thirty (30) days from
the notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Employers must receipt thereof. Separation benefits, including the conversion of all earned
serve a written notice on the affected employees and on the Department of leave credits and other benefits due under existing CBAs were thereafter paid
Labor and Employment at least one month before the intended date of closure. to those affected. On January 24, 1992, a notice of strike was filed by the
Failure to comply with this requirement renders the employer liable for nominal petitioners which accused private respondents, among others, of unfair labor
damages. practice, violation of CBA and discrimination. Conciliation proceedings were
held by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) but the parties employee who was employed on the latest date must be the first one to go.
failed to arrive at a settlement. On February 6, 1992, the two companies filed The provision speaks of termination in the line of work. This contemplates a
a petition with the Secretary of Labor and Employment asking the latter to situation where employees occupying the same position in the company are
assume jurisdiction over the case and/or certify the same for compulsory to be affected by the retrenchment program. Since there ought to be a
arbitration. Thus, on February 12, 1992, the then Acting Labor Secretary (now reduction in the number of personnel in such positions, the length of service of
Secretary) Nieves Confesor certified the case to herein public respondent for each employees is the determining factor, such that the employee who has a
compulsory arbitration. On March 4, 1992, the parties were called to a hearing longer period of employment will be retained.
to identify the issues involved in the case. Thereafter, they were ordered to In the case under consideration, specifically with respect to Maya Farms,
submit their respective position papers. several positions were affected by the special involuntary redundancy
In their position paper, petitioners averred that in the dismissal of sixty-six (66) program. These are packers, egg sorters/stockers, drivers. In the case of
union officers and members on the ground of redundancy, private respondents packers, prior to the involuntary redundancy program,
circumvented the provisions in their CBA, more particularly, Section 2, Article twenty-one employees occupied the position of packers. Out of this number,
III thereof. Said provision reads: only 5 were retained. In this group of employees, the earliest date of
Sec. 2. LIFO RULE. — In all cases of lay-off or retrenchment resulting in employment was October 27, 1969, and the latest packer was employed in
termination of employment in the line of work, the 1989.
Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) Rule must always be strictly observed.
Finally, contrary to petitioners' contention, there is nothing on record to show
Petitioners also alleged that the companies' claim that they were in economic that the 30-day notice of termination to the workers was disregarded and that
crisis was fabricated because in 1990, a net income of over 83 million pesos the same substituted with separation pay by private respondents. As found by
was realized by Liberty Flour Mills Group of Companies. 2 Furthermore, with public respondent, written notices of separation were sent to the employees
the termination of the sixty-six (66) employees pursuant to the special on January 17, 1992. The notices expressly stated that the termination of
redundancy program, the remaining work force, especially the drivers, became employment was to take effect one month from receipt thereof. Therefore, the
overworked and overburdened so much so that they found themselves doing allegation that separation pay was given in lieu of the 30-day notice required
overtime work and reporting for duty even during rest days. by law is baseless.

ISSUE:WON there was violation of the LIFO rule HENCE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent, the instant petition is hereby
HELD:There was no violation of the LIFO rule. DISMISSED.

The NLRC correctly held that private respondents did not violate the LIFO rule 94. MENDOZA V. NLRC, G.R. 94294, 22 MARCH 1991-Margret
under Section 2, Article III of the CBA which provides:
Sec. 2. LIFO RULE. In all cases of lay-off or retrenchment resulting in DOCTRINE:
termination of employment in the line of work, the Last-in-First-Out (LIFO) Rule
must always be strictly observed. FACTS: Petitioner was a regular employee (salesman) of private respondent
San Miguel Corporation (SMC), Magnolia Division, assigned to its Baguio
It is not disputed that the LIFO rule applies to termination of employment in the Sales Office. On June 2, 1988, petitioner submitted to private respondent
line of work. Verily, what is contemplated in the LIFO rule is that when there Conrad B. Yumang III, then Regional Sales Supervisor, an accident report that
are two or more employees occupying the same position in the company reads as follows: "This is to inform you about the accident that happened last
affected by the retrenchment program, the last one employed will necessarily May 31, 1988 at around nine thirty to ten thirty in the evening along Holy Ghost
be the first to go. in Imelda Village, Baguio City. I left the sales office at about 7:05 in the evening
after submitting my remittances on the said date, I was constrained to return
Moreover, the reason why there was no violation of the LIFO rule was amply to Lina's Mini-Mart along Marcos Highway to collect my uncollected cash sales
explained by public respondent in this wise: for the purpose that no short remittance will be reflected on my report due to
. . . . The LIFO rule under the CBA is explicit. It is ordained that in cases of month ending. Mr. Nick Villabona came along with me. While waiting for the
retrenchment resulting in termination of employment in line of work, the owner of the said outlet, Mr. Nick Villabona recalled that there is a missing
freezer, who at that time is conducting a physical freezer inventory. I suggested company vehicle; and (3) damage to company vehicle which was a total
that we have to look for it. We were informed that Mr. Roberto Tan of Bollian's wreck. As a matter of fact, Mr. and Mrs. Pablo Cognoden, the owner of the
brought the freezer at the vicinity of Imelda Village. And then, while we were house the kitchen of which was hit by the delivery truck driven by petitioner
maneuvering a right turn curve, suddenly two men crossed the road coming sought from SMC the amount of P50,000.00 for actual damages.
from the left side. To avoid hitting them, I slowed down and moved the truck a Due process contemplates freedom from arbitrariness. What it
little to the left. Not knowing that the road was softened by the constant heavy requires is fairness or justice; the substance rather than the form being
downpour of rain. All of a sudden, the left shoulder gave way and the truck with paramount. When a party has been given the opportunity to be heard, then
Plate No. SMC 408 slowly slipped down and turned-turtle in its left side. Hitting he was afforded due process. Petitioner also assails the severity of the
first the separate kitchen located infront of the house which was badly penalty imposed upon him alleging that he should have merited a
damaged and then landed at the left portion of the house. Because of the suspension only considering his past performance.
incident, we were too confused and shocked that we proceeded first to the Unfortunately petitioner does not appear to be a first offender. Aside
house of Mr. Nick Villabona to inform his wife. Not knowing what to do, while from the infractions he was found to have committed, it appears that
Nick Villabona was experiencing pain due to the incident, we decided to go to petitioner falsified the truth when he made a false report about the incident
SLM Hospital for medical check-up and treatment. From there I called-up the to private respondent SMC to cover up for his misdeeds. Moreover on
police station to report the accident that happened. For your information." previous occasions, petitioner committed violations of company rules and
When private respondent Yumang made his own inquiries pursuant regulations concerning pricing as a salesman of the company in a way that
to superior instructions to conduct a formal investigation, he found out that is detrimental to his employer. On one occasion, he failed to remit
the police traffic report shows that the date and time of the accident was on collections, so that in 1986 he was suspended for thirty days. Thus, the
June 1, 1988 at 1:00 o'clock in the early morning thereof not at 7:00 o'clock totality of the infractions that petitioner has committed justifies the penalty of
in the evening of May 31, 1988 as per petitioner's report. Hence, respondent dismissal.
Yumang conducted a formal investigation on June 16, 1988 to determine the The Court, therefore, finds that the public respondent NLRC did not
truth about the accident. commit a grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of labor arbiter
In a memorandum dated July 5, 1988, petitioner was relieved by and upholding the dismissal of petitioner. Hence, the petition is DISMISSED,
private respondent SMC of the duties and responsibilities as tetra salesman without pronouncement as to costs.
of the Baguio Sales Office. On August 15, 1988, petitioner was served a 95. VILLENO V. NLRC, G.R. 108153, 26 DEC 1995-Raterta
letter of termination. Consequently on August 23, 1988, petitioner filed a DOCTRINE:
complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter and ruled in favor to Among the basic duties of an employee are to conduct himself properly
petitioner. and to yield obedience to lawful orders of his employer. It is in this regard
Private respondent SMC appealed said decision to public that serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The appeal was lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
opposed by petitioner.On May 28, 1990, public respondent NLRC work is a just cause for his termination. This is explicitly provided under
promulgated a resolution dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of merit. Art. 282, par. (a), of the Labor Code. The misconduct must be related to
the performance of his duties and of such grave character rendering him
unfit to continue working for the employer.
ISSUE:The honorable commission commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction FACTS:Juan P. Villeno was employed on 29 December 1961 as
electrician in one of the vessels of private respondent Sulpicio Lines, Inc.
Twenty-seven (27) years later he was separated from the service
HELD:The rules laid down by the company for the investigation of an
employee before his termination need not be observed to the letter. It is M/V Sulpicio Container XI after leaving the port of Cebu for Manila was
enough that there was due notice and a hearing before a judgment or forced to return due to the death of the purser on board. Upon reaching
resolution thereof is made. port, the crew members were instructed not to leave the vessel as it
At such investigation private respondent SMC found that petitioner would pursue its voyage immediately after turning over the body to the
violated the company's policy on employees conduct on three counts, proper authorities. The ship's cook however was granted permission
namely (1) driving under the influence of liquor; (2) unauthorized use of upon his request to leave the vessel to buy additional foodstuff for their
provisions. The petitioner on the other hand, without seeking HELD: Yes, Among the basic duties of an employee are to conduct
permission, left the vessel purportedly to settle a marital problem. Before himself properly and to yield obedience to lawful orders of his employer.
leaving he disconnected the ship's steering line cable so that the vessel It is in this regard that serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
could not leave port without him. His explanation was that he wanted to employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
prevent pranksters from toying around with the steering wheel as what connection with his work is a just cause for his termination. This is
had happened in the past.||| explicitly provided under Art. 282, par. (a), of the Labor Code. The
misconduct must be related to the performance of his duties and of such
According to petitioner, when he returned to the port thirty (30) minutes grave character rendering him unfit to continue working for the
later, the ship was only a few inches away from the wharf but was employer. As regards willful disobedience, we stated in San Miguel
prevented by a representative of respondent corporation from boarding Corporation v. Ubaldo 3 that at least two (2) requisites must concur: (1)
the vessel. It turned out that the vessel had hired another electrician to the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional,
reconnect the steering line cable. The consequence of petitioner's the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse
actuation was that the departure of the vessel was further delayed. attitude;" and, (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
Petioner filed against private respondents a complaint for illegal made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he
dismissal had been engaged to discharge.

Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was indeed guilty of misconduct but Consequently, we sustain the NLRC in holding that petitioner was guilty
found the penalty of dismissal harsh considering that there was no of serious misconduct and willful disobedience —
evidence showing that petitioner intended to sabotage the voyage of the . . . Granted that his act was without malice or willful intent to cause
vessel. Besides, for the duration of his long years of service, it was his damage, this does not excuse him for putting his personal interests over
first offense. that of his employers in the sense that he . . . unnecessarily disrupt(ed)
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) held that the and prejudice(d) the normal operations of respondent to attend to
circumstances that petitioner had been employed by respondent personal matters. No amount of good faith or lack of intention to cause
corporation for a long period of time and that it was his first offense were damage can diminish the degree of responsibility of complainant for his
not by themselves sufficient to warrant mitigation of the consequences actuations . . . . 4
of his serious misconduct. What were material were the facts that he By disconnecting the steering line cable before disembarking, petitioner
disembarked from the vessel despite explicit instruction to the contrary, must have deluded himself into believing that he was the master in
and he disconnected the steering line cable so that the vessel could not command of the vessel and that during his absence the vessel should
leave, which in the context of respondent corporation's business could be immobile. His lack of concern for his empemployer's interests or for
not be tolerated. his responsibility towards his employer.
Petitioner argues that although his reason for disconnecting the steering
line cable was personal yet it was highly commendable since he was
concerned with family unity. In addition, the disconnection was done to
protect the vessel from pranksters who in the past would play with the 96. ACEBEDO OPTICAL V. NLRC, 527 SCRA 655 [2007]-Raterta
steering wheel. By terminating his services respondent corporation thus DOCTRINE:
set to naught his twenty-seven (27) years of service, completely ignoring One must marshal the obligatory quantum of evidence needed to
the fact that it was his first offense. He claims that the delay he caused substantiate an ending of legitimacy or validity in the termination of
to the vessel was almost nil considering that it took him only thirty (30) employment
minutes to return as compared to the delay that the voyage had already
incurred FACTS: Petitioners engaged the services of private respondent as a
packaging clerk responsible for the following tasks:
ISSUE: whether petitioner's act of disconnecting the steering line cable 1. Receives (sic) product from supplier and sort them out;
and disembarking from the vessel without permission constitute serious 2. Record incoming and outgoing deliveries to stock ledger and stock
misconduct and willful disobedience justifying his dismissal card;
3. Received (sic) requisition from branch retail outlets;
4. Select products from storage and place them inside the box, label the the appellate court, petitioners' failure to adduce in evidence a copy of
boxes and prepare the corresponding delivery receipts; the contravened company policy was fatal to their cause. Absent proof
5. Make physical count at regular intervals and reconciles physical count of evidence of such document embodying the 􏰀outed rule, the appellate
with book records; court, along with the labor arbiter and the NLRC, was unable to make a
6. Other assignments as and when required by supervisor from time to categorical ending on the issue of whether or not the private
time. respondent's accumulated absences and/or tardiness were, indeed, in
Initially, the private respondent's employment status was probationary. violation of petitioner company's rules and regulations. Further, as to the
Six months later, or on 1 March 1992, however, she was regularized. allegation of chronic absenteeism and/or tardiness for the period of 1991
But before her employment status was made permanent, private to 1995, the appellate court likewise held that the non-presentation of the
respondent was given a Memorandum by Miguel Acebedo III, Operations Daily Time Records (DTRs) for said period was a grave error. It held that
Manager of petitioner corporation. the numerous memoranda issued to private respondent were mere self-
serving evidence and made the following observations —
On 22 April 1994, a three-day suspension from work was imposed on Petitioners' stance is even incongruent with the evidence on record.
private respondent on the ground of her being tardy twenty-six times Thus, the Private Respondent was employed, (sic) on a probationary
within the period of January to March 1994. The suspension notice was basis or status . . . [she] incurred tardiness in the accumulated time of
served on her via a Memorandum dated the same day. It was averred one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes for the month of August, 1991, and
that private respondent incurred twenty-six counts of tardiness within yet, the Private Respondent was promoted and made a permanent
the above-specified months which number far exceeded the maximum employee on March 1, 1992.
allowable limit per month of only four times.||| [A]fter her one (1) hour and thirty — four (34) minute tardiness in
28 February 1995, private respondent was served a fourth Memorandum. September 1991, nothing on record reveals that she had been tardy for
For having incurred twenty-one counts of tardiness for the months of the year 1992. The "Memorandum" reminding the Private Respondent
[unreadable] to December 1994, the latter was meted another about her tardiness did not establish that Private Respondent again
suspension, this time for seven days, or four days longer than the first.||| incurred any tardiness. It is noted that Private Respondent was not tardy
in the year 1993. Although she was tardy during the period from January
On 22 May 1995, private respondent filed an application for an indefinite to March 1994, however, she was ordered suspended on May 10 to 12,
leave of absence and it was not approved considering the nature of the 1994. Thereafter, Private Respondent did not report late for the rest of
leave. the year as the next "Memorandum" of the Petitioner Corporation was
On 29 August 1995, private respondent was suspended for the third time, issued on February 28, 1995, informing Private Respondent of her
this time for thirteen days. The reason given for the imposition of such suspension on March 6, 9, 14, 16, 21, 23 and 27, 1995. Based on the
penalty was the employee's failure "to meet the company policy on "Memorandum" of the Petitioners, the Private Respondent was tardy for
tardiness. seventeen (17) times for the quarter from April to June, 1995. However,
On 12 November 1996, private respondent did not report for work the "Memorandum" of the Petitioners did not indicate the dates and
allegedly due to the demolition of the place that her family was renting. precise times when the Private Respondent was tardy. Without the "Daily
On 2 December 1996, private respondent again absented herself from Time Records" of the Respondent during the period envisaged in the
work this time because her child was allegedly hospitalized. Memoranda of the Petitioners, it cannot be ascertained whether Private
Six days later, or on 8 December 1996, the Head of the Personnel Respondent's tardiness was habitual and incorrigible.
Department of petitioner corporation issued a Notice of Termination Anent the fid􏰀nding by the NLRC that herein petitioners' appeal was 􏰀led
against private respondent out of time, the Court of Appeals clari􏰀fid that Sec. 224 of the Labor Code
requires that both party and counsel must be served their respective
ISSUE: Whether or not employee had been dismissed for just cause copies of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In the instant case, herein
petitioners received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision only on 5
HELD: No, petitioners failed to marshal the obligatory quantum of March 1999. They then 􏰀led an appeal, 15 March 1999. Therefore, it
evidence needed to substantiate an ending of legitimacy or validity in the cannot be said that their recourse to the NLRC was filed out of time.
termination of employment of private respondent, the reason for which
was supposedly her repeated de􏰀ance of company policy. According to
97. CITIBANK NA V. GATCHALIAN, 240 SCRA 212 [1995]-Raterta the APBCI applicants were fictitious and denied participation in the
DOCTRINE: fraudulent use of
LABOR LAW; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; the credit cards.
DISMISSAL; GROUND; GROSS NEGLIGENCE, DEFINED. — 7.Petitioner bank dismissed Llonillo. However, pursuant to the collective
bargaining
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to agreement and after presentation of evidence, Voluntary Arbitrator
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of rendered a
care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences decision ordering the reinstatement of respondent Llonillo without
without exerting any effort to avoid them. FACTS: 1.Respondent
||| payment of
Llonillo, together with Teresita Supnad, her co-employee and Florence backwages.
Verendia, an employee of Asian-Pacific Broadcasting Company, Inc.
(APBCI), were ISSUE: Whether or not the reinstatement of respondent Llonillo is
implicated in a scheme to defraud petitioner bank. proper.
2.Petitioner bank received 31 applications from alleged APBCI
employees for the HELD: NO. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to
issuance of Citibank credit cards, known as Mastercard. The exercise slight care or
applications were diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless
approved and the corresponding new and unsigned cards were issued disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
after verifying She admitted that the first time she was asked by Verendia to pick up
the applications by a Citibank employee from Verendia, as secretary of one of the newly
the approved and unsigned credit cards, she immediately acceded. Yet, at
Geneneral Manager of APBCI. that time, she had not personally met nor previously seen Verendia. She
3.Petitioner bank’s policy is for new and unsigned credit cards to be said that Verendia described herself over the phone and that was how
released only to she was able to indentify her when they first met. Thus, on the basis of a
cardholders concerned or their duly authorized representatives. mere description over the telephone, respondent Llonillo delivered the
4.However, a Citibank employee may himself take delivery of new and credit cards to Verendia. Respondent Llonillo’s negligence was also
unsigned credit shown when she gave the credit cards to a messenger when she had not
cards after accomplishing a Card Pull-Out Request Form wherein the seen before but who merely represented to her that he was the
employee messenger sent, and without asking to sign a receipt evidencing the
assumes the responsibility of delivering the same to the cardholder. acceptance.
5.Supnad and Verendia took delivery of 19 credit cards issued in the It was also ruled that her negligence is both gross and habitual. It was
name of the proved that she
alleged APBCI credit applicants. On the other hand, on 5 separate picked up the newly approved credit cards on 5 separate occasions and
occasions, delivered the same to Verendia and the latter’s messenger. Certainly,
respondent Llonillo personally picked up the newly approved and these repetitive acts and omissions bespeak of habituality.
unsigned credit The longer an employee stays in the service of the company, the greater
cards issued to 7 alleged APBCI employees and delivered them to is his responsibility for knowledge and compliance with the norms of
Verendia. conduct and the code of discipline of the company. Hence, respondent’s
6.When the bank discovered that the credit card applicants were 22 years of service would not, by itself, mitigate her negligence,
fictitious, Llonillo was especially in view of the substantial loss incurred by petitioner bank.
made to explain. She alleged that she wanted to help the bank deliver
“fast,
competent, and problem-free service to clients” and disclaimed any 98. MOYA V. FIRST SOLID RUBBER, G.R. 184011, 18 SEPT 2013-
knowledge that Religioso
DOCTRINE: Opposing the story of Moya, the company countered that Moya, who
was exercising supervision and control over the employees as a department
Moya's dismissal is based on one of the grounds under Art. 282 of the Labor head, failed to exercise the diligence required of him to see to it that the
Code which is willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his machine operator, Melandro Autor, properly operated the machine. This act is
employer. Also, he is outside the protective mantle of the principle of social considered as a gross and habitual neglect of duty which caused actual losses
justice as his act of concealing the truth from the company is clear disloyalty to the company.
to the company which has long employed him.
During the initial investigation, Moya, in his Explanation Letter 12
FACTS: dated 15 October 2004, insisted that the cause of the damage of five (5) tires
was due to premature hauling of the tires below curing time. Unsatisfied with
Moya, the petitioner, filed before the NLRC-National Capital Region a the explanation, the company sent Moya a Letter 13 dated 26 October 2004
complaint for illegal dismissal against First Solid Rubber Industries, Inc. (First stating that he failed to explain what really transpired in the undercuring of
Solid) and its President Edward Lee Sumulong. In his complaint-affidavit, tires. The company informed Moya that the damage was caused by the
Moya alleged that, Sometime in May 1993, he was hired by the company First operator's unlawful setting of the timer from manual to automatic without
Solid, a business engaged in manufacturing of tires and rubbers, as a machine Moya's permission. To make the matter worse, Moya failed to disclose the real
operator; Through years of dedication to his job, he was promoted as head of situation that the operator was at fault.
the Tire Curing Department of the company; That, On October 15, 2004, he Moya was given twenty-four (24) hours to defend himself and explain
reported an incident about an undercuring of tires within his department which the matter. In response, Moya admitted in a letter his mistake of not disclosing
led to the damage of five tires; The company conducted an investigation of the the true incident and explained that he found it more considerate to just let the
incident and he was later required to explain; In his explanation, he stated that operator be suspended and be fined for the damage committed. He denied
the damage was caused by machine failure and the incident was without any any willful intention to conceal the truth or cover up the mistake of his
fault of the operator; Despite his explanation of what transpired, he was employee. Finally, he asked for the company's forgiveness for the fault he had
terminated by the company through a letter dated November 9, 2004. committed.
Petitioner, in his affidavit, prayed that payment of backwages, Procedural due process, through issuance of twin notices, was also
separation pay, moral damages and exemplary damages be adjudged in his complied with by the company. Moya was informed of the charges against him
favor due to the illegal dismissal he suffered from the company. through a memorandum indicating his violation and was given an opportunity
Moya, through his Reply, added that his termination fell short of any to answer or rebut the charges. After giving his explanation through several
of the just causes of serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties letters to the company, a notice was sent informing him of the management's
and willful breach of trust. He pointed out that the company failed to prove that decision of his dismissal and termination from services on 9 November 2004
his act fell within the purview of improper or wrong misconduct, and that a based on serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duty and willful
single act of negligence as compared to eleven (11) years of service of good breach of trust reposed upon him by the company.
record with the company will not justify his dismissal. |||
First Solid, in its Position Paper, Reply and Memorandum, admitted ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not Moya was illegally dismissed.
that Moya was a former employee of the company and was holding the position 2.) Whether or not his termination fell short of any of the just causes
of Officer-in-Charge of the Tire Curing Department until his valid dismissal. of serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and willful
However, it denied that it illegally dismissed Moya and maintained that his breach of trust.
severance from the company was due to a valid exercise of management
prerogative. The company insisted on its right to validly dismiss an employee HELD:
in good faith if it has a reasonable ground to believe that its employee is
responsible of misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders That there is a valid ground for the dismissal of Moya based on breach and
him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. loss of trust and confidence is no longer at issue.Petitioner is not entitled to
separation pay. Payment of separation pay cannot be justified by his length of
service.
 Indeed, as found below, Moya's length of service should be taken against him.
It must be stressed that Moya was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. He The pronouncement in Reno Foods, Inc. v. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
was holding a supervisory rank being an Officer-in-Charge of the Tire Curing Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan 45 is instructive on the matter:
Department. The position, naturally one of trust, required of him abiding
honesty as compared to ordinary rank-and-file employees. When he made a . . . Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can
false report attributing the damage of five tires to machine failure, he breached simply be stacked against the employer. After all, an
the trust and confidence reposed upon him by the company. employer-employee relationship is symbiotic where both
parties benefit from mutual loyalty and dedicated service.
In a number of cases, the Court put emphasis on the right of an employer to If an employer had treated his employee well, has
exercise its management prerogative in dealing with its company's affairs accorded him fairness and adequate compensation as
including its right to dismiss its erring employees. We recognized the right of determined by law, it is only fair to expect a long-time
the employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as the freedom to employee to return such fairness with at least some
prescribe work assignments, working methods, processes to be followed, respect and honesty. Thus, it may be said that
regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off betrayal by a long-time employee is more insulting
and discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers. It is a general principle of and odious for a fair employer. 46 (Emphasis supplied)
labor law to discourage interference with an employer's judgment in the |||

conduct of his business. As already noted, even as the law is solicitous of the
welfare of the employees, it also recognizes employer's exercise of |
management prerogatives. As long as the company's exercise of judgment is 99. LEONARDO V. NLRC, 333 SCRA 589 [2000]-
in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or DOCTRINE:
circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements,
such exercise will be upheld. ABANDONMENT; A COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IS
INCONSISTENT WITH A CHARGE OF ABANDONMENT. — Neither can we
Following the ruling in The Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. Gacayan, the say that FUERTE's actions are indicative of abandonment. To constitute such
employers have a right to impose a penalty of dismissal on employees by a ground for dismissal, there must be (1) failure to report for work or absence
reason of loss of trust and confidence. More so, in the case of supervisors or without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention, as manifested by
personnel occupying positions of responsibility, does loss of trust justify some overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship. We have
termination. Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment accordingly held that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, as in this
is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust case, is inconsistent with a charge of abandonment.|||
and confidence. This situation holds where a person is entrusted with FACTS:
confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and
protection of the employer's property. But, in order to constitute a just cause Petitioner Aurelio Fuerte was originally employed by private respondent
for dismissal, the act complained of must be "work-related" such as would Reynaldo's Marketing Corporation on August 11, 1981 as a muffler specialist.
show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer. He was transferred to the company's Sucat plant due to his failure to meet his
sales quota, and for that reason, his supervisor's allowance was withdrawn.
The foregoing as viewpoint, the right of First Solid to handle its own affairs in
managing its business must be respected. The clear consequence is the He protested his transfer by filing a complaint for illegal termination. On his
denial of the grant of separation pay in favor of Moya. part, petitioner Danilo Leonardo alleged that on April 22, 1991, private
respondent was likewise approached by the personnel manager of the
Moya's dismissal is based on one of the grounds under Art. 282 of the Labor
company who informed him that his services were no longer needed. He, too,
Code which is willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer. Also, he is outside the protective mantle of the principle of social filed a complaint for illegal termination. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment
justice as his act of concealing the truth from the company is clear disloyalty in favor of petitioners ordering private respondent to reinstate complainant
to the company which has long employed him. Aurelio Fuerte to the position he was holding before the demotion, and to
reinstate likewise complainant Danilo Leonardo to his former position, or in lieu
thereof, they be reinstated through payroll reinstatement without any of them
losing their seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of allowance and to ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint for illegal dismissal is consistent with a
their other benefits. On appeal, Private respondent contends that it never charge of abandonment.
terminated petitioners' services. In FUERTE's case, private respondent claims
that the latter was demoted pursuant to a company policy intended to foster HELD:
competition among its employees. Under this scheme, private respondent's
employees are required to comply with a monthly sales quota. Should a Neither can we say that FUERTE's actions are indicative of abandonment. To
supervisor such as FUERTE fail to meet his quota for a certain number of constitute such a ground for dismissal, there must be (1) failure to report for
consecutive months, he will be demoted, whereupon his supervisor's work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention,
allowance will be withdrawn and be given to the individual who takes his place. as manifested by some overt acts, to sever the employer-employee
relationship. We have accordingly held that the filing of a complaint for illegal
When the employee concerned succeeds in meeting the quota again, he is re-
dismissal, as in this case, is inconsistent with a charge of
appointed supervisor and his allowance is restored. abandonment.|||Given that FUERTE may not be deemed to have abandoned
his job, and neither was he constructively dismissed by private respondent,
the Commission did not err in ordering his reinstatement but without
With regard to LEONARDO, private respondent likewise insists that it never backwages. In a case where the employee's failure to work was occasioned
severed the former's employment. On the contrary, the company claims that it neither by his abandonment nor by a termination, the burden of economic loss
was LEONARDO who abandoned his post following an investigation wherein is not rightfully shifted to the employer; each party must bear his own loss.
he was asked to explain an incident of alleged "sideline" work which occurred
on April 22, 1991. It would appear that late in the evening of the day in
question, the driver of a red Corolla arrived at the shop looking for 100. CATHEDRAL SCHOOL OF TECHNOLOGY V. NLRC, 251 SCRA 554
[1992]-Resurreccion
LEONARDO. The driver said that, as prearranged, he was to pick up
(*repeated; same as #11)
LEONARDO who would perform a private service on the vehicle. When reports
of the "sideline" work reached management, it confronted LEONARDO and DOCTRINE:
asked for an explanation. According to private respondent, LEONARDO gave • However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to
contradictory excuses, eventually claiming that the unauthorized service was extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his
for an aunt. When pressed to present his aunt, it was then that LEONARDO dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed. The dismissal of an
stopped reporting for work, filing his complaint for illegal dismissal some ten employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due process.
Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be
months after his alleged termination. cdll
imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an
Insofar as the action taken against FUERTE is concerned, private investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment.
Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the
respondent's justification is well-illustrated in the record. He was unable to
private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of this award
meet his quota for five months in 1991, from July to November of that year. depends on the fact of each case and the gravity of the omission committed
Yet he insists that it could not possibly be so. He argues that he must have by the employer.
met his quota considering that he received his supervisor's allowance for the
period aforesaid. The Commission, however, negated this view, finding the FACTS:
alleged inconsistency to be adequately explained in the record. The • February, 1981 - Teresita Vallejera sought admission as an aspirant to the
Congregation of the Religious of Virgin Mary (RVM), upon the
respondent National Labor Relations Commission modified the aforesaid
recommendation of Archbishop Patrick Cronin.
decision by dismissing the complaint of Danilo Leonardo for lack of merit; and • In order to observe the life of a religious, she came to live with the sisters of
deleted the monetary award as well as the award of moral damages and the congregation and received free board and lodging at the house of the nuns.
attorney's fees in favor of the complainants. Hence, the present petition. • During the period of her aspirancy and in return for her accommodations, she
volunteered to assist as a library aide in the library section of the petitioner
|||
school, an educational institution run by the RVM sisters. In return for her work • She requested that she be furnished a copy of the termination paper but she
as such, she was given a monthly allowance of P200.00. was told that the letter of June 15, 1989 served that purpose.
• Teresita had a change of heart in later years and confessed to the sisters • Petitioner denied all the allegations.
that she was no longer interested in becoming a nun. LABOR ARBITER’S RULING
• She pleaded, however, to be allowed to continue living with the sisters for • Favored private respondent, holding that she was illegally dismissed for lack
she had no other place to stay in, to which request the sisters acceded and, in of due process, in that she was summarily dismissed without a hearing being
exchange therefor, she voluntarily continued to assist in the school library. conducted in order to afford her an opportunity to present her side.
• January 29, 1988 - private respondent was appointed to the position of library • Private respondent was not entitled to reinstatement with backwages, but the
aide with a monthly salary of P1,171.00. payment of separation pa consisting of two months salary in the sum of
• The sisters began receiving complaints' from students and employees about P3,916.00 and underpayment in the sum of P2,961.00
private respondent's difficult personality and sour disposition at work. NLRC’S RULING
• June 2, 1989, private respondent was summoned to the Office of the • Affirmed the labor arbiter's decision, with modifications
Directress by herein petitioner, shortly after the resignation of the school's • While petitioners had valid reasons to terminate the services of private
Chief Librarian, Heraclea Nebria, on account of irreconcilable differences with respondent, the dismissal was nonetheless illegal for lack of due process,
said respondent, for the purpose of clarifying the matter. hence the award of backwages, separation pay and attorney's fees.
• Petitioner also informed private respondent of the negative reports received
by her office regarding the latter's frictional working relationship with co- ISSUE:
workers and students and reminded private respondent about the proper Whether private respondent was validly terminated – YES
attitude and behavior that should be observed Whether or not there was just cause as to the termination – YES
• Private respondent resented the observations about her actuations and was Whether or not there was illegal dismissal. NO
completely unreceptive to the advice given by her superior.
• She reacted violently to petitioner's remarks and angrily offered to resign, HELD:
repeatedly saying, "OK, I will resign. I will resign." Thereafter, without waiting · The reason for which private respondent's services were terminated,
to be dismissed from the meeting, she stormed out of the office in discourteous namely, her unreasonable behavior and unpleasant deportment in dealing with
disregard and callous defiance of authority. the people she closely works with in the course of her employment, is
• Petitioners sent at least three persons to talk to and convince Teresita to analogous to the other "just causes" enumerated under Art. 282 of the Labor
settle her differences with the former. Code.
• She, however, remained adamant in her refusal to submit to authority. · Petitioners' averments on private respondent's disagreeable character
• June 15, 1989 - Sister Apolinaria sent a letter formally informing private — "quarrelsome, bossy, unreasonable and very difficult to deal with" — are
respondent that she had a month from said date or until July 15, 1989 to look supported by the various testimonies of several co-employees and students of
for another job as the school had decided to accept her resignation. the school.
• Teresita filed a complaint for illegal deduction and underpayment of salary, · Her overbearing personality caused the chief librarian to resign.
overtime pay and service incentive pay. · Furthermore, the complaints about her objectionable behavior were
• July 19, 1989 - She was prevented from entering the school premises by one confirmed by her reproachable actuations during her meeting with the
Sister Virginia Villamino in view of her dismissal from the service petitioner directress on June 2, 1989, when private respondent, upon being
• Private respondent amended her complaint to include illegal dismissal. advised of the need to improve her working relations with others,
ALLEGATIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT obstreperously reacted and unceremoniously walked out on her superior, and
• She was forced by petitioner school directress to tender her resignation but arrogantly refused to subsequently clear up matters or to apologize therefor.
she refused. She was informed that her services would be terminated effective · To make matters worse, she ignored the persons sent by petitioners
July 15, 1989 through the letter dated June 15, 1989. on separate occasions to intervene in an effort to bring the matter to a peaceful
• Insists that she continued to report for work, but on July 17, 1989 and resolution. The conduct she exhibited on that occasion smacks of sheer
thereafter she could not find her daily time record, so she just requested a disrespect and defiance of authority and assumes the proportion of serious
fellow employee to sign a piece of paper to show that she reported for work. misconduct or insubordination, any of which constitutes just cause for
• Was barred from entering the school due to the fact that she had already dismissal from employment.
been dismissed.
· As petitioner school is run by a religious order, it is but expected that · It stands to reason that the separation of private respondent from the
good behavior and proper deportment, especially among the ranks of its own service is justified as borne out by the circumstances of this case, and is
employees, are major considerations in the fulfillment of its mission. bolstered by the jurisprudential tenet of long and indisputable standing that —
· Under the circumstances, the sisters cannot be faulted for deciding to An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of
terminate private respondent whose presence "has become more a burden a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards
rather than a joy" and had proved. to be disruptive of the harmonious his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently
atmosphere of the school. inimical to his interests. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer,
· Moreover, there is no dispute as to the existence of such just cause authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. 23
for petitioners have presented sufficient evidence attesting to private · This being so, there can be no award for backwages, for it must be
respondent's unsavory character. On the other hand, no evidence was offered pointed out that while backwages are granted on the basis of equity for
by private respondent to controvert the charges and statements of petitioners earnings which a worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal,
and their witnesses, beyond a general denial that the same were "imaginal where private respondent's dismissal is for just cause, as is the case herein,
(sic) and "fanciful" along with unsubstantiated allegations that her dismissal there is no factual or legal basis to order payment of backwages;
was allegedly due to her union activities · Neither can there be an award for separation pay. In Cosmopolitan
· It is the contention of petitioners that dismissal for cause but without Funeral Homes, Inc. vs. Maalat, et al., 27 we reiterated the categorical
due process does not warrant an order for reinstatement or separation pay, as abandonment of the doctrine that employees dismissed for cause are entitled
the case may be nor of backwages, for these are sanctions that pertain to to separation pay on the ground of social and compassionate justice.
dismissals without just cause. On the other hand arbitrary dismissal for just Sec. 7. That just causes for terminating the services of an employee shall be
cause only warrants an award of indemnity for the dismissed employee. those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The separation from work of an
· We grant our imprimatur to this submission of petitioners, just as we employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided
view with disfavor public respondent's intransigence on the matter in this and in the Code, without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and
other cases despite our pronouncements thereon. privileges he may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining
· Rubberworld (Phils.) Inc. et. al. vs. National Labor Relations agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice.
Commission, et al., supra
· It is now axiomatic that if just cause for termination of employment 101. HEAVYLIFT MANILA, INC. V. CA, 473 SCRA 541 [2005]-Resurreccion
actually exists and is established by substantial evidence in the course of the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the fact that the employer failed, prior to DOCTRINE:
such termination, to accord to the discharged employee the right of formal • An employee who cannot get along with his co-employees is
notice of the charge or charges against him and a right to ventilate his side detrimental to the company for he can upset and strain the working
with respect thereto, will not operate to eradicate said just cause so as to environment.
impose on the employer the obligation of reinstating the employees and • Without the necessary teamwork and synergy, the organization
otherwise granting him such other concomitant relief as is appropriate in the cannot function well. Thus, management has the prerogative to take the
premises. necessary action to correct the situation and protect its organization.
· Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., • When personal differences between employees and management
· However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for affect the work environment, the peace of the company is affected. Thus,
failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before an employees attitude problem is a valid ground for his termination.
causing his dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed. The dismissal • It is a situation analogous to loss of trust and confidence that
of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due process. must be duly proved by the employer. Similarly, compliance with the twin
Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be requirement of notice and hearing must also be proven by the employer.
imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an
investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment. FACTS:
Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the • February 23, 1999, Heavylift, a maritime agency, thru a letter,
private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of this award informed respondent Ma. Dottie Galay, Heavylift Insurance and
depends on the fact of each case and the gravity of the omission committed Provisions Assistant, of her low performance rating and the negative
by the employer. feedback from her team members regarding her work attitude.
• Also notified her that she was being relieved of her other twin requirement of notice and hearing must also be proven by the
functions except the development of the new Access program. employer.
• August 16, 1999 - Galay was terminated for alleged loss of · However, we are not convinced that in the present case,
confidence. petitioners have shown sufficiently clear and convincing evidence to
• She filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal justify Galays termination. Though they are correct in saying that in
and nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay against this case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, still there
petitioners. must be substantial evidence to support the termination on the
• PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATIONS ground of attitude.[19]
• Galay had an attitude problem and did not get along with her co- · The mere mention of negative feedback from her team members,
employees for which she was constantly warned to improve. and the letter dated February 23, 1999, are not proof of her attitude
• Galay’s attitude resulted to the decline in the company’s problem. Likewise, her failure to refute petitioners allegations of her
efficiency and productivity. negative attitude does not amount to admission. Technical rules of
• LABOR ARBITER’S RULING procedure are not binding in labor cases.[20] Besides, the burden of
• Galay was illegally terminated for petitioners failure to prove that proof is not on the employee but on the employer who must
she violated any company regulation, and for failure to give the proper affirmatively show adequate evidence that the dismissal was for
notice as required by law. justifiable cause.
• NLRC RULING · Neither does the February 23, 1999 letter constitute the required
• Denied the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of notice. The letter did not inform her of the specific acts complained
the Labor Arbiter.[7] A motion for reconsideration was subsequently of and their corresponding penalty.
filed but which was likewise denied. · The law requires the employer to give the worker to be dismissed
• COURT OF APPEAL’S RULING two written notices before terminating his employment, namely, (1) a
• Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of justifying notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or
circumstances, and because the attached board resolution was issued omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent
after the petition was filed.[10] notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to
dismiss him.[22] Additionally, the letter never gave respondent Galay
ISSUE: an opportunity to explain herself, hence denying her due process.
· Whether or not attitude problem is a valid ground for the Apropos the award of service incentive pay and 13 th month pay, we find
termination of an employee that they were properly prayed for by Galay.

HELD: 102. CITIBANK NA V. NLRC, 544 SCRA [2008]-Resurreccion

· Was there just cause in the termination of Galay?
· An employee who cannot get along with his co-employees is DOCTRINE:
detrimental to the company for he can upset and strain the working When an employee, despite repeated warnings from the employer,
environment. obstinately refuses to curtail a bellicose inclination such that it erodes
· Without the necessary teamwork and synergy, the organization the morale of co-employees, the same may be a ground for dismissal for
cannot function well. Thus, management has the prerogative to take serious misconduct.
the necessary action to correct the situation and protect its
organization.
· When personal differences between employees and management FACTS:
affect the work environment, the peace of the company is affected. · August 1979, Paragas joined respondent Citibank with various
Thus, an employees attitude problem is a valid ground for his positions until 1992
termination. · 1993- Petitioner declared certain officers and employees, or their
· It is a situation analogous to loss of trust and confidence that positions/functions, redundant and among these affected was
must be duly proved by the employer. Similarly, compliance with the complainant Paragas.
· However, to accommodate the union officers’ request, complainant’s · Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, finding that
employment was not terminated but was assigned to Records her dismissal on the ground of work inefficiency was valid.
Management Unit of the Quality Assurance Division as bank statement · NLRC RULING
retriever, a filing clerk job described by complainant as "non-brainer · Affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter with the modification that
job." respondent should be paid separation pay "as a form of equitable relief"
· July 1994 - Paragas was assigned to file Universal Account Opening in view of her length of service with petitioner.
Forms (UAOF) in file boxes and retrieving such UAOFs from the file · Respondent filed a MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION of
boxes upon internal customers’ request from time to time. the NLRC Resolution. She no longer challenged her dismissal on the
· She was also assigned to process or develop microfilms. However, ground of work inefficiency, but prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay
on 20 February 1995, she complained that the processing of microfilms her the "Provident Fund" benefits under its retirement plan for which she
was proving to be harmful to her health. Thus, the job was reassigned to claimed to be qualified pursuant to petitioner’s "Working Together"
another clerk. Accordingly, beginning 21 February 1995, complainant’s Manual,
job in the bank was to file and retrieve UAOFs. · Respondent, claiming that the labor arbiter upheld her dismissal on
· 11 December 1996, complainant was assigned to undertake the the ground of merely "work inefficiency" and not for any misconduct on
special project of reorganizing the UAOF’s from 13 December 1996 to 15 her part, asserted that she is entitled to 90% of the retirement benefits.
May 1997. · Finding that respondent’s dismissal was "for causes other than
· 10 January 1997, AVP Narciso Ferrera issued a Memo to complainant misconduct," the NLRC, by the above-mentioned October 24, 2001
calling her attention on various mistakes and errors done in his tenure Resolution granted respondent’s motion for partial reconsideration. 5
· 2 April 1997, Paragas received another memo from AVP Ferrera Petitioner moved to reconsider this Resolution, but the same was denied
called her attention (a) to the same nine (9) cases misfiled UAOF’s in by the NLRC.
Annex 16, (b) to three (3) other cases of misfiled UAOFs (c) her persistent · COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING
failure to submit weekly report on the progress of her work under the Dismissed petitioner’s petition for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the
Special Project, and (d) that despite the lapse of three (3) months, she challenged NLRC Resolution.
was still in letter D (or UAOFs covering clients whose surnames begin
with letter D). ISSUE:
· As she failed to complete the project on 30 May 1997, complainant Whether or not petitioner’s evidence support respondent’s misconduct
was given another 30 days to complete it. However, by the end of June
1997, her accomplishment was only 30% of the total work to be done. HELD:
· On 25 July 1997, AVP Ferrera directed Paragas to explain in writing · While the labor arbiter did not explicitly rule that respondent
why her employment should not be terminated on the ground of serious committed serious misconduct, his decision leads to that conclusion, for
misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of her the documentary evidence which it cites as basis to prove her work
duties and gross inefficiency. inefficiency shows, upon close examination, also her commission of
· Complainant was placed under Preventive suspension. Complainant serious misconduct.
submitted her written explanation on 31 July 1997. · In support of its ruling that respondent’s dismissal was valid, the
· On 29 August 1997, an administrative conference took place with labor arbiter relied on the performance appraisals of respondent from
the complainant, her counsel and the Union President in attendance. July to December 1994, from January to June 1995, and from July to
· Finally, on 4 September 1997, the respondent bank thru AVP Ferrera December 1996, all of which were submitted by petitioner’s Assistant
notified complainant that her written explanation and those which she Vice-President, Narciso M. Ferrera. The labor arbiter noted that Ferrera’s
ventilated during the administrative conference held on 29 August 1997 evaluation of respondent was not lacking in objectivity.
were found self-serving, and consequently, terminating her employment · These performance appraisals, however, did not merely show that
on the ground of serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and respondent was not able to meet performance targets. More relevantly,
habitual neglect of duties and gross inefficiency. they also consistently noted significant behavioral and attitudinal
· Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for problems in respondent. In particular, respondent was found to be very
reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorney’s fees. argumentative;15 she had difficulty working with others;16 she was hard
· LABOR ARBITER’S RULING
to deal with;17 and she never ceased being the subject of complaints from other "just causes" enumerated under the Labor Code. (Emphasis
co-workers.18 supplied)
· Moreover, beyond the documents referred to in the labor arbiter’s · It bears noting that petitioner cited Cathedral School of Technology
decision, there are other pieces of evidence on record which further in its Comment/Reply to Complainant-Appellant’s Appeal Memorandum
establish that respondent was validly dismissed not only for work precisely to show that its dismissal of complainant on the ground of
inefficiency but for serious misconduct. The Court sees no reason why "gross inefficiency and unreasonable behavior" (emphasis supplied)
these should not be accorded credibility along with those cited by the was correctly upheld by the labor arbiter.26
labor arbiter When an employee, despite repeated warnings from the employer,
· The assessment of respondent’s performance by Randy Uson, obstinately refuses to curtail a bellicose inclination such that it erodes
another superior of respondent, was given weight by the labor arbiter the morale of co-employees, the same may be a ground for dismissal for
who noted that Uson was "described as [a] very professional and fair serious misconduct.
person by complainant [herein-respondent] herself."19 Significantly,
Uson later commented on respondent’s behavior as follows: 103. MENDOZA V. HMS CREDIT CORP., G.R. 187232, 17 APRIL 2013-
"Less tangible but none the less real, are the common concerns raised Resurreccion
by her peers and supervisor, on the stress and tension created when
Rose is around. The conscious effort to ‘get out of her way’ and avoid DOCTRINE:
conflict, hinders productivity and efficiency and has adversely affected Resignation the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a position
the morale of the entire unit. x x x"20 (Emphasis and underscoring or office is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where
supplied) he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
· For the appraisal period from June to December 1995, respondent’s exigency of the service, and he has then no other choice but to
performance appraisal report stated that her attitude towards her work, disassociate himself from employment. The intent to relinquish must
the bank, and superiors needed reformation.21 The report for January to concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence, the acts of the
June 1996 made the same observation,22 indicating that there was no employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in
improvement on her part. determining whether he in fact intended to terminate his employment. In
· The performance appraisal report of respondent for the period of illegal dismissal cases, fundamental is the rule that when an employer
January to June 1997, besides stating that she was still "hard to deal interposes the defense of resignation, on him necessarily rests the
with," described her as "belligerent," one who had "a negative presence burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned.
which affects the morale of the entire unit," and who "pick[ed] fights with
peers and other employees even without provocation."23 FACTS:
· The evaluation of respondent cited above finds corroboration in her • 1 August 1999 - Petitioner was the Chief Accountant of
admission that "she may have been tactless and insolent in dealing with respondent Corporation
her superior but it does not allegedly warrant the supreme penalty of • During her employment, she simultaneously serviced three other
dismissal."24 respondent companies, all part of the Honda Motor Sports Group,
· Finally, even the NLRC, its later ruling that respondent was not guilty namely, Honda Motor Sports Corporation, Beta Motor Trading
of misconduct notwithstanding, was aware that the problem with Incorporated (Beta Motor) and Jianshe Cycle Worl.
respondent was not merely her poor work output, but her unreasonable • Luisa B. Diego was the Managing Director of HMS Credit, while
behavior and unpleasant deportment. Thus, as its Resolution of October respondent Felipe R. Diego was the company officer to whom Mendoza
24, 2000 drew to a close, it stated that petitioner was "correct" in invoking directly reported.
Cathedral School of Technology v. NLRC,25 specifically the following • 11 April 2002 - Mendoza avers that after she submitted to Luisa
portion of this Court’s decision therein: the audited financial statements of Honda Motors, Beta Motor, and
An evaluative review of the records of this case nonetheless supports a Jianshe, Felipe summoned Mendoza to advise her of her termination
finding of a just cause for termination. The reason for which private from service.6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
respondent’s services were terminated, namely, her unreasonable • She claims that she was even told to leave the premises without
behavior and unpleasant deportment in dealing with the people she being given the opportunity to collect her personal
closely works with in the course of her employment, is analogous to the belongings.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
• When she went back to the office building, the stationed security · With respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence
guard stopped her and notified her of the instruction of Felipe and Luisa as ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged
to prohibit her from entering the premises. events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and
• Later that month, she returned to the office to pick up her accusations by the employer will not be sufficient
personal mail and to settle her food bills at the canteen, but the guard on · As regards managerial employee, the mere existence of a basis for
duty told her that respondents had issued a memorandum barring her believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer
from entering the building.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary would suffice for his dismissal.
• Respondents maintain that Mendoza was hired on the basis of · Hence, in the case of managerial employees, proof beyond
her qualification as a CPA which turned out to be a misrepresentation.11 reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is some
• They likewise contend that not only did she fail to disclose basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has
knowledge of the resignations of two HMS Group officers, Art Labasan reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is
(Labasan) and Jojit de la Cruz (de la Cruz), and their subsequent transfer responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his
to a competitor company, but she also had a hand in pirating them. participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence
• 12 April 2002, confronted her about these matters. demanded by his position.35 (Emphasis supplied)
• Mendoza allegedly told them that if they had lost their trust in her, · Further, in the case of termination by the employer, it is not enough
it would be best for them to part ways.12 Accordingly, they purportedly that there exists a just cause therefor, as procedural due process
asked her to propose an amount representing her entitlement to dictates compliance with the two-notice rule in effecting a dismissal: (a)
separation benefits. Before she left that night, they allegedly handed her the employer must inform the employee of the specific acts or omissions
P30,000 as payment for the external auditor she had contracted to for which the dismissal is sought, and (b) the employer must inform the
examine the books of the HMS Group employee of the decision to terminate employment after affording the
• Mendoza filed with the NLRC) Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and latter the opportunity to be heard.
Non-payment of Salaries/Wages, 13th Month Pay and Mid-Year Bonus. L · On the other hand, if the termination of employment is by the
• LABOR ARBITER’S RULING employee, the resignation must show the concurrence of the intent to
• Rendered a Decision ruling that Mendoza had been illegally relinquish and the overt act of relinquishment,
dismissed, and that the dismissal had been effected in violation of due · In this case, the NLRC and the CA were in agreement that although
process requirements. Mendoza committed acts that amounted to breach of trust, the
• Held respondents jointly and severally liable for the payment of termination of her employment was not on that basis. 39 Instead, both
separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and tribunals held that the parties parted amicably, with Mendoza evincing
attorney's fees for P1,025,081.82. her voluntary intention to resign and respondents' proposed settlement
• NLRC RULING to pay her separation benefits.40 This Court does not agree with these
• Rendered a Decision reversing the ruling of the Labor Arbiter findings in their entirety.
declaring that Mendoza had not been summarily dismissed · Whether Mendoza was a Chief Accountant of HMS Credit, as stated
• CA RULING in her appointment letter,41 or a Finance Officer of all the corporations
• Affirmed the NLRC under the HMS Group, as claimed by respondents,42 what is certain is
• There was no dismissal, as the parties had entered into a that she was a managerial employee.
compromise agreement whereby respondents offered to pay Mendoza · In securing this position, she fraudulently misrepresented her
separation benefits in exchange for her voluntary resignation.28 professional qualifications by stating in her Personal Information Sheet
that she was a CPA. Based on the records, she never controverted this
ISSUE: imputation of dishonesty or, at the very least, provided any explanation
Whether or not there was dismissal therefor.
· Thus, this deceitful action alone was sufficient basis for
HELD: respondents' loss of confidence in her as a managerial employee.
· In instances in which the termination of employment by the employer · In addition, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual
is based on breach of trust, a distinction must be made between rank- findings of the NLRC and the CA as regards the existence of other
and-file employees and managerial employees, thus: circumstances that demonstrated Mendoza's breach of trust.
· In sum, the commission finds that Mendoza was not illegally 105. GENERAL MILLING CORP. V. VIAJAR, G.R. 181783, 30 JAN 2013-
dismissed. Respondents could have validly dismissed her for just cause Romano (*repeated; same as #69)
because she had forfeited her employment by having incurred breach of
trust that they had reposed in her. 106. QUEVEDO V. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOP., INC., 599 SCRA 438
· She had concealed from them the fact that she was going to visit a [2009]-Romano
rival motorcycle dealership in Tarlac, called Honda Mar, on the afternoon DOCTRINE:
of April 5, 2002, in the company of its owner; the notice she had given FACTS:
was that, on the morning of that date, she would get her child's report ISSUE:
card from her school. HELD:
· She also failed to disclose to them the fact that she saw in that store
Labasan and De la Cruz, and respondents' mechanics, Gatus and Mejis, 107. BECTON DICKINSON PHILS. V. NLRC, 475 SCRA 125 [2005]-
who cleaned and painted the same. And she gave the appearance of Santiago
giving aid and support to respondents' competitor, to the prejudice of DOCTRINE:
their business standing and goodwill. FACTS:
· These were acts of disloyalty for which [they] would have been ISSUE:
justified in terminating her service on the ground of loss of confidence. HELD:
· Mendoza was nevertheless dismissed from service in violation of
procedural due process, as respondents failed to observe the two-notice 108. GOODRICH MANUFACTURING V. ATIVO, G.R. 188002, 01 FEB 2010-
requirement. Instead, respondents insisted that she voluntarily resigned, Santiago
which argument the NLRC and the CA sustained. This Court is not DOCTRINE:
persuaded. FACTS:
· Respondents were unable to discharge their burden to prove the ISSUE:
contemporaneous existence of an intention on the part of Mendoza to HELD:
resign and an overt act of resignation.
· Aside from their self-serving allegation that she had offered to resign 109. SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC, INC. AND SKIPPERS MARITIME, INC.,
after they had expressed their loss of trust in her, there is nothing in the LTD V. DOZA, G.R. 175558, 08 FEB 2012-Santiago
records to show that she voluntarily resigned from her position in their DOCTRINE:
company. In this regard, it is worthy to underscore the established rule FACTS:
that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with ISSUE:
resignation or abandonment.44chanroblesvirtualawlibrary HELD:
Moreover, the conclusion of the NLRC and the CA that Mendoza
voluntarily resigned in consideration of respondents' supposed payment 110. CHUA-QUA V. CLAVE, 189 SCRA 117 [1990]-Santos, Camil
of a settlement is bereft of any basis. The lower tribunals merely DOCTRINE: The marriage of a classroom teacher to her student who is a
surmised that the parties forged a compromise agreement despite minor is not a sufficient basis for terminating the teacher’s services.
respondents' own admission that they never decided thereon. 45 In fact, FACTS: Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational
the records are clear that none of the parties claimed the existence of institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner had been employed therein as a teacher
any settlement in exchange for her resignation since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the
sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy of the
104. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES V. GUCABAN, 654 SCRA 18 [2011]- school to extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted
Romano such instructions in school by petitioner. In the course thereof, the couple fell
DOCTRINE: in love and they got married in a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City.
FACTS: Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16)
ISSUE: years old, consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs.
HELD: Concepcion Ong. Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of
their religion in a church wedding at Bacolod City.
Tay Tung High school, private respondent, filed with the sub-regional office of Now, on the merits, private respondent submits that petitioner's actuations as
the Department of Labor at Bacolod City an application for clearance to a teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust
terminate the employment of petitioner on the following ground: "For abusive and confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to
and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her terminate her services. It argues that as a school teacher who exercises
continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus,
the high moral values, of the school." petitioner had moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not
Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay. abuse such authority and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it charged
Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal petitioner with having allegedly violated the Code of Ethics for teachers.
hearing, rendered an "Award" in in favor of private respondent granting the On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate
clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner. her services as there is nothing wrong with a teacher falling in love with her
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission petitioner claimed pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with him. She argued
denial of due process for not having been furnished copies of the aforesaid that she was dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua.
affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter. She further contended that there was ISSUE: whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the
nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her
dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into lawful wedlock with her student constitute immorality and/or grave misconduct
student. HELD: Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are
National Labor Relations Commission constrained to review the factual conclusions arrived at by public The findings
unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and ordered petitioner's of fact must be supported by substantial evidence otherwise, this Court is not
reinstatement with backwages and held that “even if we have to strain our bound thereby.
sense of moral values to accommodate the conclusion of the Arbiter, we could We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion.
not deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and a boy talking Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of in arriving at his
inside a room after classes with lights on and with the door open.” decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit, leaving many question
The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain
reversed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The times of the day during off school hours when appellant and her student were
petitioner was, however, awarded six (6) months salary as financial assistance found together in one of the classrooms of the school. But the records of the
petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the case present a ready answer: appellant was giving remedial instruction to her
Philippines., which reversed the appealed decision and Private respondent student and the school was the most convenient place to serve the purpose.
was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete absence of specific immoral
seniority rights and other privileges and with full back wages from the time she acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another, and very
was not allowed to work until the date of her actual reinstatement. important at that, the alleged acts complained of invariably happened from
However, public respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration of herein September to December, 1975, but the disciplinary action imposed by
private respondent reconsidered and modified the aforesaid decision, this time appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more, the affidavits
giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate were executed only in August, 1976 and from all indications, were prepared
the services of petitioner as classroom teacher but giving her separation pay by appellee or its counsel are clearly the product of after-thought.
equivalent to her six (6) months salary. With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral
Hence this petition for certiorari. acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school
Sc held that petitioner’s right to due process was not violated as she claims it teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that
to be. There is no denial of due process where a party was afforded an petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two
opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues are eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels,
resolved based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own
is recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and
insisted on a hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she did universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The
not do so, obviously because she was convinced that the case involves a deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern
question of law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed by her cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
in the proceedings before the Ministry of Labor.
In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from
an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
finding that the dismissal is unjustified. submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her
dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the (a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is
relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably committed when:
and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the (1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment,
parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said
reinstatement. individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or
privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
111. DR. RICO JACUTIN V. PEOPLE, G.R. 140604, 06 MARCH 2002- segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate,
Santos, Camil deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
said employee.
DOCTRINE: Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he
held when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in
FACTS: In an accusatory Information petitioner, City Health Officer Rico her desire to gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her plight, her
Jacutin of Cagayan de Oro City, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with father being a boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for her in his
the crime of Sexual Harassment. office, he asked her about accepting a job in a family planning research project.
That the accused, a public officer, being then the City Health Officer of It all started from there
Cagayan de Oro City with committing the offense in relation to his official While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city
functions and taking advantage of his position, did there and then, willfully, personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation
unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit, request sexual favors from Ms. Juliet from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office
Q. Yee, a young 22 year-old woman, single and fresh graduate in Bachelor of could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have
Science in Nursing who was seeking employment in the office of the accused, conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate
namely: by demanding from Ms. Yee that she should, expose her body and Juliets employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue
allow her private parts to be mashed and stimulated by the accused, which liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the
sexual favor was made as a condition for the employment of Ms. Yee in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan
Family Program of the Office of the accused, thus constituting sexual were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioners secretary, Iryn Lago
harassment. Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo, a city health nurse, all
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, finding of whom were said to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by
the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment under petitioner.
Republic Act No. 7877. The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered by petitioner,
In the instant recourse, Petitioner contend that he cannot be convicted of the i.e., that he was at a meeting of the Committee on Awards; the court a quo
crime of sexual harassment in view of the inapplicability of Republic Act No. said:
7877 to the case at bar. Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual
ISSUE: Petitioner contend that he cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive
harassment in view of the inapplicability of Republic Act No. 7877 to the case upon, the tribunal,[6] no cogent reasons having been sufficiently shown to now
at bar. hold otherwise.
HELD: NO. The contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary
Republic Act 7877 provides: damages by the Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable levels.
SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined- Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant but are awarded only
Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an to enable an injured party obtain some means that would help obviate the
employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, sufferings sustained on account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, must not appear to be the result of passion or undue prejudice, and it must
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be proportional to the
wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be recompensed for her mental Likewise, Rayala assails the OPs interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA
anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological counseling expert, has found 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the defense of absence of malice is
Juliet to be emotionally and psychologically disturbed and suffering from post unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is considered an offense
trauma stress following her unpleasant experience with petitioner. The Court against a particular person, not against society as a whole. Thus, he claims
finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral damages. In that intent is an essential element of the offense because the law requires as
addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00 exemplary damages to serve a conditio sine qua non that a sexual favor be first sought by the offender in
as a deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious order to achieve certain specific results. Sexual harassment is committed with
actions. the perpetrators deliberate intent to commit the offense.
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877.
112. DOMINGO V. RAYALA, G.R. 155831, 18 FEB 2016-Santos, Camil He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or
requirement do not constitute sexual harassment as contemplated by the law.
DOCTRINE: Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced superiority He alleges that the rule-making power granted to the employer in Section 4(a)
which is enough to dampen an employees spirit and her capacity for of RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to
advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life. It is true the employer the power to promulgate rules which would provide other or
that Section 3 of RA 7877 defining sexual harassment, calls for a demand, additional forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its own definition of
request or requirement of a sexual favor. It is not necessary that the demand, sexual harassment.[
request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or ISSUES: 1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of (2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
the offender. HELD: It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case
FACTS: Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter at were unanimous in upholding the findings of the Committee and the OP. They
the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before differed only on the appropriate imposable penalty. That Rayala committed the
Secretary Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment is, therefore, the
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the
incidences of sexual harassment complained of. Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and
to be immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the
harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and courts.The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind
Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and us.These findings are now conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly,
Employment. Rayala himself admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to him.
Secretary Laguesma found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that
recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal
which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months. and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,Rayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling the others.[43] This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
on what constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section
harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand, request, or 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined
re-employment, or continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in “Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an
discrimination against the employee. employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence
favor, demand, or request from petitioner in exchange for her continued or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed to environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from
him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingos perception the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
of malice in his alleged acts a product of her own imagination that led her to submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
file the sexual harassment complaint. (a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is
committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, Facts:
re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or May 2001, SSCW hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW's Director of
privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate. Sometime in 2003,
segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW
deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect learned of the petitioner's pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao),
said employee; SSCW's Directress, advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1,
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under 2003. In response, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not
existing labor laws; or resign from her employment just because she got pregnant without the benefit
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive of marriage.
environment for the employee. On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect writing why she should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual
of the unlawful act of sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to serious
Section 6, authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for damages misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic school.
and other affirmative relief. Even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the In a letter 7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her pregnancy
standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable. out of wedlock does not amount to serious misconduct or conduct unbecoming
It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a of an employee. She averred that she is unaware of any school policy stating
sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement that being pregnant out of wedlock is considered as a serious misconduct and,
of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may thus, a ground for dismissal. Further, the petitioner requested a copy of
be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and SSCW's policy and guidelines so that she may better respond to the charge
squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and against her.
tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money On June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that, pending the
allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making promulgation of a "Support Staff Handbook," SSCW follows the 1992 Manual
statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 MRPS) on the causes for termination
resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual of employments; that Section 94 (e) of the 1992 MRPS cites "disgraceful or
favor.Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand, immoral conduct" as a ground for dismissal in addition to the just causes for
request or requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or termination of employment provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondents acts result SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual relations, even if
in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee. between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry, is
That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which
Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating are grounds for the termination of employment under the 1992 MRPS and the
Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an Labor Code. That SSCW, as a Catholic institution of learning, has the right to
officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and uphold the teaching of the Catholic Church and expect its employees to abide
requested transfer to another unit. by the same.
Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
113. SANTOS LEUS V. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE WESTGROVE, Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City against SSCW and
G.R. 187226, 28 JAN 2015-Enriquez Sr. Quiambao (respondents).
LA: The LA found that there was a valid ground for the petitioner's dismissal;
DOCTRINE: that her pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a "disgraceful and immoral
The fact of the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not conduct." The LA pointed out that, as an employee of a Catholic educational
enough to characterize the petitioner's conduct as disgraceful or immoral. institution, the petitioner is expected to live up to the Catholic values taught by
There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual SSCW to its students.
relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered NLRC: The NLRC held that the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock is a
disgraceful or immoral. "disgraceful or immoral conduct" within the contemplation of Section 94 (e) of
the 1992 MRPS and, thus, SSCW had a valid reason to terminate her "immoral conduct . . . [was] magnified as serious misconduct not only by her
employment. getting pregnant as a result thereof before and without marriage, but more than
CA: The CA further held that the petitioner's dismissal was a valid exercise of that, also by the fact that Brent is an institution of the Episcopal Church in the
SSCW's management prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on erring Philippines operating both a hospital and college where [Cadiz] was employed
employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations. The CA upheld the
NLRC's conclusion that the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock is CA: However, dismissed her petition outright due to technical defects in the
considered as a "disgraceful and immoral conduct" and, thus, a ground for petition: (1) incomplete statement of material dates (2) failure to attach registry
dismissal. receipts; and (3) failure to indicate the place of issue of counsel's PTR and IBP
official receipts. It further ruled that committed NO grave abuse of discretion
Issue: amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction holding [Cadiz's] dismissal from
WON the petitioner’s dismissal from employment was valid employment valid

Held: Cadiz contends, among others, that getting pregnant outside of wedlock is not
In resolving the foregoing question, the Court will assess the matter from a grossly immoral, especially when both partners do not have any legal
strictly neutral and secular point of view — the relationship between SSCW as impediment to marry. Cadiz surmises that the reason for her suspension was
employer and the petitioner as an employee, the causes provided for by law not because of her relationship with her then boyfriend but because of the
in the termination of such relationship, and the evidence on record. The Court resulting pregnancy
finds no substantial evidence to support the aforementioned conclusion arrived
at by the labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock, ISSUE:
without more, is not enough to characterize the petitioner's conduct as Whether or not the impregnation outside of wedlock is a valif ground for
disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial evidence to establish that the termination of employment of Cadiz
pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are
indeed considered disgraceful or immoral. HELD:
No.
114. CADIZ V. BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES, G.R. 187417, 15 Following the ruling in the case of Leus v. St. Scholastica's College Westgrove
MARCH 2016-Santos, Claire and/or Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB.
The Court ruled that the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or
DOCTRINE: immoral involves a two-step process:
first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
FACTS: conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à- vis the
Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital and prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral
Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her indefinite suspension from employment and respectable.
in 2006. The cause of suspension was Cadiz's Unprofessionalism and
Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. It appears that Cadiz In this case, the surrounding facts leading to Cadiz's dismissal are
became pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent imposed the suspension until such straightforward — she was employed as a human resources officer in an
time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with law. educational and medical institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines;
she and her boyfriend at that time were both single; they engaged in premarital
Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for Unfair Labor sexual relations, which resulted into pregnancy. The labor tribunals
Practice, Constructive Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and Damages with characterized these as constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct. They also
prayer for Reinstatement. sweepingly concluded that as Human Resource Officer, Cadiz should have
been the epitome of proper conduct and her indiscretion "surely scandalized
LA: suspension amounted to a constructive dismissal; nevertheless, the LA the Brent community."
ruled that Cadiz was not illegally dismissed as there was just cause for her
dismissal, that is, she engaged in premarital sexual relations with her boyfriend Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act
resulting in a pregnancy out of wedlock. 6 The LA further stated that her should be gauged — it is public and secular, not religious. Whether a conduct
is considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in accordance with the
prevailing norms of conduct, which, as stated in Leus case, refer to those FACTS:
conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions An administrative complaint for sexual harassment under R.A. 7877 and
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. The fact violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Code of Professional
that a particular act does not conform to the traditional moral views of a Responsibility was led by complainant, Chief of the Legal Technical Staff of
certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify such act the Court of Tax Appeals, against respondent Judge Ernesto Acosta, presiding
as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular judge of the same court. Complainant alleged that the respondent judge
standards. More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish sexually harassed her six times on different occasions. In his comment, the
that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered respondent judge denied complainant's allegation. The case was referred to
disgraceful or immoral. the investigating justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation. In her report, the investigating justice held that a mere
The totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify the conclusion casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and does not fall
that Cadiz committed acts of immorality. Similar to Leus, Cadiz and her within the purview of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877. She found that
boyfriend were both single and had no legal impediment to marry at the time the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of the
she committed the alleged immoral conduct. In fact, they eventually married. respondent judge in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a 'beso-beso'
the labor tribunals' respective conclusion that Cadiz's "indiscretion" fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated
"scandalized the Brent community" is speculative, at most, and there is no by malice or ill motive. Hence, she recommended that the administrative
proof adduced by Brent to support such sweeping conclusion. Even Brent complaint be dismissed and, accordingly, the respondent judge be exonerated
admitted that it came to know of Cadiz's "situation" only when her pregnancy therefrom.
became manifest. Brent also conceded that "[a]t the time [Cadiz] and Carl R.
Cadiz were just carrying on their boyfriend- girlfriend relationship, there was ISSUE:
no knowledge or evidence by [Brent] that they were engaged also in premarital Whether or not respondent is guilty of sexual harassment
sex." This only goes to show that Cadiz did not flaunt her premarital relations HELD:
with her boyfriend and it was not carried on under scandalous or disgraceful The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the investigating justice. The
circumstances. As declared in Leus, "there is no law which penalizes an Court had reviewed carefully the records of the case and found no convincing
unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the evidence to sustain complainant's charges. What the Court perceived to have
consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons; that neither does been committed by respondent judge were casual gestures of friendship and
such situation contravene[s] any fundamental state policy enshrined in the camaraderie, nothing more, nothing less. In kissing complainant, the Court
Constitution." The fact that Brent is a sectarian institution does not found no indication that respondent judge was motivated by malice or lewd
automatically subject Cadiz to its religious standard of morality absent an design. Complainant misunderstood respondent judge's actuations and
express statement in its manual of personnel policy and regulations, construed them as work related sexual harassment under R.A. 7877.
prescribing such religious standard as gauge as these regulations create the However, from the records on hand, there was no showing that the respondent
obligation on both the employee and the employer to abide by the same. judge demanded, requested or required any sexual favor from complainant in
exchange for "favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or
Brent, likewise, cannot resort to the Manual of Regulation For Private Schools privileges" specied under Section 3 of R.A. 7877. Nor did he, by his actuations,
because the Court already stressed in Leus that "premarital sexual relations violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or the Code of Professional
between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, Responsibility. Thus, the Court exonerated the respondent judge from the
and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely charges against him. He was, however, advised to be more circumspect in his
public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or deportment
immoral conduct under Section 94 (e) of the 1992 MRPS.
116. TOLEDO V. TOLEDO, 544 SCRA 27-Vendivil
115. ATTY. SUSAN AQUINO V. HON ERNESTO ACOSTA, PRESIDING DOCTRINE:
JUDGE OF CTA, A.M. NO. CTA-01-1, 02 APRIL 2002-Santos, Claire FACTS:
ISSUE:
DOCTRINE: HELD:
117. MALAYANG SAMAHAN SA M. GREENFIELD, 326 SCRA 428-Vendivil Bergante and Inguillo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
DOCTRINE: Labor Arbiter. The LA ruled that there was no illegal dismissal. Initially,
FACTS: the NLRC reversed the LA ruling on ground that there was no due
ISSUE: process. However, on motion for reconsideration, they reversed their
HELD: own decision and adopted the LA ruling.

118. ALABANG COUNTRY V. NLRC, 545 SCRA 351 [2006]-Vendivil ISSUE: W.O.N Bergante and Inguillo were denied due process.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: HELD:
ISSUE:
HELD: Yes.

119. INGUILLO V. FIRST PHIL. SCALES, G.R. 165407, 05 JUNE 2009- Union security is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends
Acosta closed shop, union shop, maintenance of membership or any other form
of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire
DOCTRINE: In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. There
the Union Security Clause, the employer needs only to determine and is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the
prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is union within a certain period as a condition for their continued
requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when
CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union's decision employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the
to expel the employee from the union or company. agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union
membership as a condition for continued employment until they are
The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is
his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor terminated. A closed-shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an
union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement x x x. Dismissals enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his
must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed in employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any
dismissing an employee because it affects not only his position but also or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is,
his means of livelihood. becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in
good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the
FACTS: employees in interest are a part.

First Philippine Scales, Inc. (FPSI) is a domestic corporation engaged in In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the Union
manufacturing weighing scales. It had an existing CBA with First Security Clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that:
Philippine Scales Industries Labor Union (FPSILU) with provisions for (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for
Union Security. the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there
is sufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel the
Bergante and Inguillo were employees of FPSI and officers in FPSILU. employee from the union or company.
However, they transferred to Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa
[NLM-KATIPUNAN], a rival union of FPSILU. FPSILU alleged that However, for denial of due process, as in the case of Agabon v. National
Bergante and Inguillo misused FPSILU funds. Labor Relations Commission,where the dismissal is for a cause
recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence, the absence of the statutory
FPSILU asked FPSI to enforcement the Union Security clause. FPSI due process should not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal, or
terminated Bergante and Inguillo for violation of the union security ineffectual. Accordingly, for violating Bergante and Inguillo's statutory
clause and due to acts detrimental to FPSI.
rights, respondents should indemnify them the amount of P30,000.00 case for illegal constructive dismissal. In its position paper, respondent denied
each as nominal damages. that it dismissed petitioner from the service, it claiming that while it was still in
the process of investigating the January 21, 2000 incident, it offered petitioner
The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of another assignment which he declined, saying pahinga muna ako [I will in the
his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor meantime take a rest].
union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement x x x. Dismissals
must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed in The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners suspension for more than nine months
dismissing an employee because it affects not only his position but also had ripened into constructive termination.
his means of livelihood.
NLRC found that petitioner was indeed constructively dismissed. The CA
120. PIDO V. NLRC, 516 SCRA 68 [2007]-Adap upheld the decision of the NLRC.

DOCTRINE: ISSUE: WON Petitioner was constructively dismissed?

FACTS: Pido was hired by Cherubim Security and General Services as a HELD: YES. When a security guard is placed on a floating status, he does
security guard. He was assigned at the Ayala Museum, but was later not receive any salary or financial benefit provided by law. Due to the
transferred on December 1, 1995 to the Tower and Exchange Plaza of Ayala grim economic consequences to the employee, the employer should
Center where he worked as a computer operator at the Console Room, bear the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the
responsible for observing occurrences that transpire inside elevators and other employee temporarily out of work can be assigned. This, respondent
areas in buildings which are recorded by surveillance cameras and relayed to failed to discharge. It is gathered that respondent intended to put
monitors. Like the other guards deployed by respondent at the Ayala Center, petitioner under preventive suspension for an indefinite period of time
petitioner was under the operational control and supervision of the Ayala pending the investigation of the complaint against him. The allowable
Security Force (ASF) of the Ayala Group of Companies. period of suspension in such a case is not six months but only 30 days.
Respondent did not inform petitioner that it was extending its
Petitione Pido had an altercation with Richard Alcantara (Alcantara) of investigation, nor did it pay him his wages and other benefits after the
the ASF, arising from a statement of Alcantara that petitioners security license lapse of the 30-day period of suspension. Neither did respondent issue
for his .38 caliber revolver service firearm and duty detail order had already an order lifting petitioners suspension, or any official assignment,
expired. On even date, Alcantara filed a complaint for Gross Misconduct, memorandum or detail order for him to assume his post or another post.
claiming that when he directed petitioner to present his security license, Respondent merely chose to dawdle with the investigation, in absolute
petitioner angrily and on top of his voice questioned his authority. And disregard of petitioners welfare.
Alcantara recommended that petitioner be relieved from his post, and that
immediate disciplinary action against him be taken.
At the time petitioner filed the complaint for illegal suspension and/or
Petitioner reported for work at the Ayala Center but he was not allowed to stay constructive dismissal on October 23, 2000, petitioner had already been
in the premises, a Recall Order having been issued by respondent through its placed under preventive suspension for nine months. To date, there is
Operations Manager. Petitioner thus filed an information report wherein he no showing or information that, if at all, respondent still intends to
narrated that Alcantara confronted him on January 21, 2000 about his right to conclude its investigation.
carry a firearm and afterwards tried to grab it from its holster, resulting in a
heated argument between them. This Court thus rules that petitioners prolonged suspension, owing to
respondents neglect to conclude the investigation, had ripened to
Petitioner was later to claim that he was suspended by respondent constructive dismissal.
following his argument with Alcantara.

As more than nine months had elapsed since the investigation was conducted
by respondent with no categorical findings thereon made, petitioner filed a II. PROCEDURE TO TERMINATE EMPLOYMENT
 Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes rendered judgment dismissing
1. KING OF KINGS TRANSPORT, INC., CLAIRE DELA FUENTE, and respondent's Complaint for lack of merit. 6
MELISSA LIM vs. SANTIAGO O. MAMAC, G.R. 166208, 29 JUNE 2007 Hence, we have this petition.
ISSUE: WON KKTI did not comply with the requirements of procedural due
DOCTRINE: process before dismissing the services of the complainant/private
A verbal appraisal of the charges against an employee does not comply with respondent.|||
the first notice requirement. Regardless of respondent's written explanation, a HELD:
hearing was still necessary in order for him to clarify and present evidence in Yes, there was non-compliance with the Due process requirement. Due
support of his defense. process under the Labor Code involves two aspects: first, substantive — the
FACTS: valid and authorized causes of termination of employment under the Labor
Petitioner KKTI is a corporation engaged in public transportation and managed Code; and second, procedural — the manner of dismissal. 12 In the present
by Claire Dela Fuente and Melissa Lim. case, the CA affirmed the findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC that the
Respondent Mamac was hired as bus conductor of Don Mariano Transit termination of employment of respondent was based on a "just cause." This
Corporation (DMTC) on April 29, 1999. The DMTC employees including ruling is not at issue in this case. The question to be determined is whether the
respondent formed the Damayan ng mga Manggagawa, Tsuper at Conductor- procedural requirements were complied with.
Transport Workers Union and registered it with the Department of Labor and Art. 277 of the Labor Code provides the manner of termination of
Employment. Pending the holding of a certification election in DMTC, petitioner employment, thus:
KKTI was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission which Art. 277. Miscellaneous Provisions. — . . .
acquired new buses. Many DMTC employees were subsequently transferred (b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to
to KKTI and excluded from the election. security of tenure and their right to be protected against
The KKTI employees later organized the Kaisahan ng mga Kawani sa King of dismissal except for a just and authorized cause without
Kings (KKKK) which was registered with DOLE. Respondent was elected prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of
KKKK president. this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose
Respondent was required to accomplish a "Conductor's Trip Report" and employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
submit it to the company after each trip. Upon audit of the October 28, 2001 containing a statement of the causes for termination and
Conductor's Report of respondent, KKTI noted an irregularity. It discovered shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to
that respondent declared several sold tickets as returned tickets causing KKTI defend himself with the assistance of his representative if
to lose an income of eight hundred and ninety pesos. While no irregularity he so desires in accordance with company rules and
report was prepared on the October 28, 2001 incident, KKTI nevertheless regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the
asked respondent to explain the discrepancy. In his letter, 3 respondent said Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken
that the erroneous declaration in his October 28, 2001 Trip Report was by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the
unintentional. He explained that during that day's trip, the windshield of the bus worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by
assigned to them was smashed; and they had to cut short the trip in order to filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National
immediately report the matter to the police. As a result of the incident, he got Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that
confused in making the trip report. the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest
Respondent received a letter 4 terminating his employment effective on the employer.
November 29, 2001. The dismissal letter alleged that the October 28, 2001 Accordingly, the implementing rule of the aforesaid provision states:
irregularity was an act of fraud against the company. KKTI also cited as basis SEC. 2. Standards of due process; requirements of
for respondent's dismissal the other offenses he allegedly committed since notice. — In all cases of termination of employment, the
1999. following standards of due process shall be substantially
Respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, observed:
nonpayment of 13th-month pay, service incentive leave, and separation pay. I. For termination of employment based on just
He denied committing any infraction and alleged that his dismissal was causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:
intended to bust union activities. Moreover, he claimed that his dismissal was (a) A written notice served on the employee
effected without due process. specifying the ground or grounds for termination,
 and giving said employee reasonable opportunity considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of
within which to explain his side. their employment. DCSETa
(b) A hearing or conference during which In the instant case, KKTI admits that it had failed to provide respondent with a
the employee concerned, with the assistance of "charge sheet." 16 However, it maintains that it had substantially complied with
counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to the rules, claiming that "respondent would not have issued a written
respond to the charge, present his evidence, or explanation had he not been informed of the charges against him." 17
rebut the evidence presented against him. We are not convinced.
(c) A written notice of termination served on First, respondent was not issued a written notice charging him of committing
the employee, indicating that upon due an infraction. The law is clear on the matter. A verbal appraisal of the charges
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds against an employee does not comply with the first notice requirement.
have been established to justify his termination. 13 Second, even assuming that petitioner KKTI was able to furnish respondent
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall an Irregularity Report notifying him of his offense, such would not comply with
be served on the employee's last known address. 14 the requirements of the law. We observe from the irregularity reports against
ETHIDa respondent for his other offenses that such contained merely a general
To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of description of the charges against him. The reports did not even state a
employees: company rule or policy that the employee had allegedly violated. Likewise,
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the there is no mention of any of the grounds for termination of employment under
specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that Art. 282 of the Labor Code. Thus, KKTI's "standard" charge sheet is not
the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation sufficient notice to the employee.
within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Third, no hearing was conducted. Regardless of respondent's written
Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the explanation, a hearing was still necessary in order for him to clarify and present
employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. 15 This evidence in support of his defense. Moreover, respondent made the letter
should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt merely to explain the circumstances relating to the irregularity in his October
of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation 28, 2001 Conductor's Trip Report. He was unaware that a dismissal
against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and proceeding was already being effected. Thus, he was surprised to receive the
decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in November 26, 2001 termination letter indicating as grounds, not only his
order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and October 28, 2001 infraction, but also his previous infractions.
defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and
circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. 2. MAGRO PLACEMENT VS. HERNANDEZ
A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should DOCTRINE: For termination of employment based on just causes as defined
specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which in Article 282 of the Code:
among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct (a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds
a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within
to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present which to explain his side;
evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented (b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to
employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this against him; and
conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come (c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon
to an amicable settlement. due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers justify his termination.
shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all
circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been FACTS: November 1999, Cresenciano E. Hernandez, then an Aircon
Electrical Technician of Toyota Pasong Tamo, Inc., filed with Magro Placement
an application for employment abroad as Auto Electrician or Air-Conditioning in the K.S.A. nor his Philippine agent Magro Placement and respondent
Technician. requested that he be sent back to the Philippines as early as possible.

He went through a battery of interviews and trade tests and he successfully He requested for immediate repatriation and on March 2000, respondent was
passed all of it. And so the guy got hired as Auto Electrician of Al Yamama repatriated to the Philippines. When he sought financial assistance from
Est. in Jeddah, K.S.A. petitioner Magro, the latter offered the sum of P2,000.00 only. This prompted
respondent to file as complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner before
. On January 16, 2000, respondent left for Jeddah and worked at the Al the NLRC.
Yamama as an electrician.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the respondent's complaint
After 10 days, his employer took his passport and brought him to Orbi (the for lack of merit. It was held that there was no illegal dismissal and that
Jeddan mother recruitment company of petitioner herein Margo). His respondent was ill-equipped to work as an Auto Electrician for American cars,
employer told the agency that respondent did not know his job as electrician. per his revelation and admission, and that respondent himself asked to be
Respondent explained that since he used to repair Japanese cars only, he repatriated, without any complaint against his foreign employer or agency.
needed time to adjust to American cars. Respondent further stated that he was
willing to continue his job. Respondent was quickly subjected to a trade test ISSUE: WON he was accorded with procedural due process before he
using an American car, and he failed. was separated from work

In a Statement respondent narrated his day-to-day experience that: he could HELD: No.
not perform his job well because the cars being repaired at Al Yamama were
American cars and he had experience with Japanese cars only. In the present case, petitioner argues that the purpose of the written notice
requirement was achieved when respondent issued the three statements
Al Yamama had no tester for checking car components. He understood a few where he was given the chance to air his side before his termination.
Arabic words only and could not communicate with his employer because the
latter could hardly understand English. The accommodation had no aircon or The Court disagrees with the contention. Al Yamama failed to satisfy the two-
electric fan and there were plenty of mosquitoes. Respondent's food allowance notice requirement. Without prior notice or explanation, Al Yamama took
was only 10 riyals every two days and during lunch the employer bought the respondent's passport and simply brought him to petitioner's foreign principal,
food. He did not sign any employment contract in Saudi Arabia; he only signed Orbit, and told the latter that respondent did not know his job as electrician.
an employment contract in the Philippines. An electrical job is not easy, even Respondent heard his employer's complaint against him at that instance only.
experts need a repair manual and wiring diagrams which Al Yamama did not
have. From these facts, it is clear that respondent's dismissal was effected without
the notice required by law. Article 277 of the Labor Code explicitly provides:
So in view thereof, respondent was no longer willing to continue his job with
his employer and he was willing to work with other employers. He was allowed (b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their
to find a new job, but he was not qualified to work in Budget Rent-A-Car right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause
Company & Nissan. and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this
Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to
And so, duly witnessed by the Secretary of Orbit and noted by our Assistant be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for
Labor Attache and our Consul General in Jeddah, K.S.A., respondent issued termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to
another Statement, stating that: he was recruited for Al Yamama as Auto defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in
Electrician, but he was not qualified since he had no experience as Auto accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to
Electrician. That he was allowed to go for a trade test but failed. And that he guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
was allowed to find a new job, but he was not qualified to work in Budget Rent-
A-Car Company & Nissan. However he had no complaints against his agent Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, provides:
 clients. As such, she was directed to explain herself, and to appear in an
Section 2. Standards of due process: requirements of notice. In all cases of administrative investigation.
termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be Her counsel replied through a letter, and demanded for a bill of particulars
substantially observed: regarding the charges against her. Citibank's counsel, in turn, replied that it
only wanted to give her the opportunity to explain her side, and not turn the
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article situation into a full blown trial.
282 of the Code: Meanwhile, Genuino did not appear in the administrative investigation. Her
lawyers instead wrote a letter to Citibank's counsel, and asked "what bank
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds clients' funds were diverted from the bank and invested in other companies,
for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within the specific amounts involved, the manner by which and the date when such
which to explain his side; diversions were purportedly affected." In reply, the latter noted her failure to
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the appear in the investigation, and gave her time to submit her written
assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to explanation. However, she failed to do this.
respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented Citibank then informed her that the investigation found her to have used the
against him; and facilities of her family corporation (Global Pacific) to personally and actively
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon participate in the diversion of bank clients' funds to products of other
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to companies that yielded interests higher than what Citibank products offered,
justify his termination. and that she realized substantial financial gains. Such were in violation of the
existing company policy and the Corporation Code. Consequently, her
employment was terminated on the grounds of (1) serious misconduct, (2)
CA ruling was affirmed with modification ordering petitioner Magro Placement willful breach of the trust reposed upon her, and (3) commission of a crime
and General Services to pay respondent Cresenciano E. Hernandez the against the bank.
amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for failure to comply fully with the Thereafter, Genuino filed before the LA a Complaint against Citibank for illegal
notice requirement as part of due process, in addition to payment of suspension and illegal dismissal, with damages and prayer for temporary
respondent's one half month salary in the sum of US$185.00 or its peso restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
equivalent. LA--The dismissal of the complainant was without just cause and in violation
of her right to due process. Respondent CITIBANK, N.A., and any and all
persons acting on its behalf or by or under their authority are ordered to
reinstate her, with backwages, as well as moral and exemplary damages and
3. GENUINO V. NLRC, 539 SCRA 342 [2007]-Andaya attorney's fees.
DOCTRINE: To constitute as just cause for dismissal, loss of confidence NLRC--The dismissal of the complainant is valid and legal on the ground of
should relate to acts inimical to the interests of the employer, and the act/s serious misconduct and breach of trust and confidence.
complained of should have arisen from the performance of the employee's CA--[dismissed the petitions of both parties]. In their motions for
duties. reconsideration, Citibank was ordered to pay Genuino P5K as indemnity for
FACTS: Marilou Genuino was employed by Citibank as Treasury Sales non-observance of due process
Division Head, with the rank of Asst. VP. She received a monthly Hence, this petition.
compensation of P60,487.96, exclusive of benefits and privileges. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal is for a just cause and in accordance with due
However, the latter sent her a letter, wherein she was charged with "knowledge process. (NO)
and/or involvement" in transactions "which were irregular or even fraudulent", HELD: The dismissal was for just cause, but lacked due process.
and informed her that she was under preventive suspension. In a string of cases, it was held that that the requirement of twin notices must
She then wrote to it, and asked for the bases of the charges against her. To be met. The IRR of the Labor Code provides that any employer seeking to
this, its Country Senior HR Officer Victorino Vargas sent her a letter, which dismiss a worker shall furnish the latter with a written notice stating the
stated that the bank advised her in a previous letter that there were ongoing particular acts or omissions constituting the grounds for dismissal. Its purpose
investigations showing her involvement in or knowledge of some irregular is to sufficiently apprise the latter of the acts complained of and to enable
transactions between Global Pacific and/or Citibank and the listed bank him/her to prepare his/her defense.
In this case, the letters sent by Citibank to Genuino did not identify the found out the following day that only the proceeds from the Tanay Room had
particular acts or omissions that she allegedly committed. While it gave her an been remitted to the accounting department. There were also unauthorized
opportunity to deny the truth of the allegations in writing and to participate in charges of food on the account of Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio, one of the
the administrative investigation, the fact remains that the charges were too participants. To resolve the issue, Valle Verde conducted an investigation; the
general to enable her to intelligently and adequately prepare her defense. employees who were assigned in the two function rooms were summoned and
Thus, her dismissal could not be in accordance with due process. made to explain, in writing, what had transpired. Valle Verde sent a
Nevertheless, her dismissal was justified. Art. 282 (c) of the Labor Code memorandum to Esguerra requiring her to show cause as to why no
provides that an employer may terminate an employment for fraud or willful disciplinary action should be taken against her for the non-remittance of the
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her employer or Ballroom's sales. Esguerra was placed under preventive suspension with pay,
duly authorized representative. To constitute as just cause for dismissal, such pending investigation. Esguerra denied having committed any
should relate to acts inimical to the interests of the employer, and the act/s misappropriation. She explained that it had been her daughter (who was
complained of should have arisen from the performance of the employee's assigned as a food checker) who lost the money. To settle the matter,
duties. Esguerra paid the unaccounted amount as soon as her daughter informed her
As Asst. VP of Citibank's Treasury Dept., she was tasked to solicit investments about it. Esguerra also explained the unauthorized charging of food on Judge
as well as peso and dollar deposits for, and keep them in, the bank, and to sell Bonifacio's account. She alleged that Judge Bonifacio took pity on her and told
and/or push for the sale of its financial products. She held a position of trust her to take home some food and to charge it on his account. Valle Verde
and confidence. There is no way she could deny any knowledge of the bank's issued a memorandum terminating Esguerra’s employment.
policies nor her understanding of these policies as reflected in the survey done
by the bank. She could not likewise feign ignorance of the businesses of LA: Esguerra’s complaint for illegal dismissal lacked merit, but ordered
Citibank, and of Global and Torrance. respondent to pay Esguerra 13th month pay in the amount of P2,016.66, rice
All the pieces of evidence compel the SC to conclude that she did not have subsidy in the amount of P1,100.00, and ten percent (10%) attorney's fees
her employer's interest. Citibank then had valid grounds to dismiss her on the
ground of loss of confidence. However, because of its failure to observe due NLRC: affirmed LA’s decision
process, it must pay nominal damages to her in the amount of P30K.
CA: NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that
Esguerra was validly dismissed from employment for loss of trust and
5. Esguerra v. Valle Verde Country Club -- Arriola confidence, and her length of service cannot be counted in her favor.
GR No. 173012, June 13, 2012
P: Brion, J ISSUE W/N Esguerra was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence alleging that she was only a regular employee and did not occupy
Doctrine: To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an a supervisory position vested with trust and confidence.
employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a
written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said HELD
employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written There was valid notice and hearing
notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds A memorandum was sent to Esguerra informing her of the charges against
have been established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss the her, and clearly directed her to show cause, in writing, why no disciplinary
employee. action should be imposed against her. Esguerra’s allegation that the notice
was insufficient since it failed to contain any intention to terminate her is
FACTS incorrect.
Valle Verde hired Esguerra as Head Food Checker. In 1999, she was
promoted to Cost Control Supervisor. The Couples for Christ held a seminar To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an
at the country club. Esguerra was tasked to oversee the seminar held in the employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a written notice
two function rooms — the Ballroom and the Tanay Room. The arrangement specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a
was that the food shall be served in the form of pre-paid buffet, while the drinks reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice
shall be paid in a "pay as you order" basis. The Valle Verde Management
indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have Petitioners also claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin
been established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee. requirements of notice and hearing. Private respondent, on the other hand,
maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work.
Contrary to Esguerra's allegation, the law does not require that an intention to Issue: WON petitioners were illegally dismissed.
terminate one's employment should be included in the first notice. It is enough Held:
that employees are properly apprised of the charges brought against them so Accordingly, petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause. They had abandoned
they can properly prepare their defenses; it is only during the second notice their employment and were already working for another employer.
that the intention to terminate one's employment should be explicitly stated. To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and
valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity
The existence of an actual, formal "trial-type" hearing, although preferred, is to be heard and to defend himself.
not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee's right to be heard. Esguerra Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to
was able to present her defenses; and only upon proper consideration of it did resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for
Valle Verde send the second memorandum terminating her employment. termination of employment by the employer.
Since Valle Verde complied with the two-notice requirement, no procedural After establishing that the terminations were for a just and valid cause, we now
defect exists in Esguerra's termination. determine if the procedures for dismissal were observed.
The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Book VI, Rule I, Section
Esguerra occupied a position of trust and confidence 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code:
There are two (2) classes of positions of trust — the first class consists of Standards of due process: requirements of notice. – In all cases of termination
managerial employees, or those vested with the power to lay down of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially
management policies; and the second class consists of cashiers, auditors, observed:
property custodians or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282
functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. of the Code:
1. A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
Esguerra held the position of Cost Control Supervisor and had the duty to remit grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable
to the accounting department the cash sales proceeds from every transaction opportunity within which to explain his side;
she was assigned to. This is not a routine task that a regular employee may 1. A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with
perform; it is related to the handling of business expenditures or finances. For the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given
this reason, Esguerra occupies a position of trust and confidence — a position opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the
enumerated in the second class of positions of trust. Any breach of the trust evidence presented against him; and
imposed upon her can be a valid cause for dismissal. (c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to
We cannot favorably consider Esguerra's explanation about the unauthorized justify his termination.
charging on Judge Bonifacio's account. It is highly unethical for an employee In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee’s
to bring home food intended to be sold to customers. At any rate, her last known address.
explanation is self-serving and cannot be believed; the numerous written Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282,
testimonies of the other co-workers never even mentioned it. the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
8. Agabon vs NLRC GR 158693 employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a
Facts: hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the
employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30
cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
dismissed for abandonment of work. Thus, Petitioners then filed a complaint From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the
for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an
authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284,
and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized Petitioner’s explanation was considered not satisfactory, because she was
cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or given notice of the termination of her employment. Petitioner filed a complaint
authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for for illegal dismissal against Univet Agricultural Products, Inc.
just or authorized cause but due process was not observed.
The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal The Labor Arbiter found petitioner guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct,
should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned warranting dismissal from the service.
their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not
follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the On appeal the NLRC, while finding petitioner liable to disciplinary action,
last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside thought that the penalty imposed by the company was too severe. Accordingly,
there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid it set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the petitioner
excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the reinstated and paid backwages for one year of P84,164.72 (P7,014.56 x 12)
employee’s last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non- and attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the award or P8,416.47.
compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
Petition denied. CA affirmed with modifications. ISSUE:

I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DISMISSED WITHOUT DUE

10. Bernardo vs. NLRC PROCESS OF LAW

DOCTRINE: II. WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS VALID GROUND TO DISMISS

No formal hearing was necessary considering that petitioner admitted PETITIONER
responsibility for the unauthorized insertion. It was sufficient that she was
informed of the findings of management on the basis of its decision to dismiss HELD:
her.
I.No. Petitioner claims that without giving her the right to be heard, private
FACTS: respondents found her guilty of violating company rules for having inserted in
Petitioner Marilyn Bernardo was employed at the Univet Agricultural Products, the approved requisition request an order for an executive swivel chair and for
Inc. Starting as general clerk, she rose in 1980 to the position of administrative other violations of company rules allegedly committed in the past. With respect
clerk, which she held until March 18, 1989 when she was dismissed for to the first ground (inserting an additional item in the approved request for
dishonesty. purchase), we hold that no formal hearing was necessary considering that
petitioner admitted responsibility for the unauthorized insertion. It was
The Manufacturing Department of the Univet Agricultural asked for two filing sufficient that she was informed of the findings of management and the basis
cabinets. Accordingly, petitioner prepared the Capital Appropriations Request of its decision to dismiss her.
(CAR) for the purchase of two filing cabinets. The request was signed by Dr.
Salvador P. Cajilog, department head, and later approved by five other officers II. We agree with the finding that the insertion of an additional item in the
of Univet Agricultural. Before the CAR was transmitted to the purchasing request for purchase, after this had been approved, was a violation of company
department for the procurement of the office equipment, it was discovered that rule but it was not of such gravity as to warrant petitioners outright dismissal.
petitioner had included in the order the acquisition of one executive swivel On the other hand, considering the offense committed, an award of backwages
chair. and order of reinstatement cannot be justified. Considering, however, that the
insertion of the additional order did not cause damage to the company in the
A memorandum was issued to petitioner, requiring her to explain within 48 sense that the cost of the chair, even if purchased, would not make the total
hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her. Petitioners claim amount to be expended exceed the amount of budget, and that in all probability
that the insertion was with the knowledge of the department head, Dr. Salvador petitioner was simply motivated by a desire to curry favor with the head of her
P. Cajilog. She further explained that she wanted to surprise him since it was department rather than gain materially, we agree with the NLRC that outright
for his use that the swivel chair was to be purchased. dismissal would be out of proportion to the gravity of her offense. The question
is what penalty is reasonable under the circumstances. Petitioner, while not In cases of illegal dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove that there
deserving of outright dismissal as a penalty is not entitled to reinstatement was a valid ground for dismissal. Mere allegation of reduction of costs without
either. Considering that petitioner has been in the service for twelve years and any proof to substantiate the same cannot be given credence by the Court. As
that her performance was rated excellent and superior, she is, in our opinion, the respondents failed to rebut petitioners' evidence, the irresistible conclusion
entitled to separation pay at the rate of one-half months pay for every year of is that the dismissal in question was illegal. As held by this Court, if the contract
service, based on her salary at the time of dismissal from February 14, 1977 is for a fixed term and the employee is dismissed without just cause, he is
to March 18, 1989. entitled to the payment of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion
of the employment contract. The prayer of petitioners for reinstatement cannot
14. [G.R. No. 127673. March 13, 2000.] RICARDO S. MEDENILLA, et al., be granted.
petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, RENAN V. SANTOS,
PACIFICO U. CERVANTES, LOIS OLARTE, respondents. PURISIMA, J:
16.) Philippine Airlines v. NLRC
Doctrine: Fixed-term employment is valid provided that its purpose is not to
circumvent security of tenure. DOCTRINE: The power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from
Facts: "any labor dispute.” The term "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or
matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or
Petitioners, employees of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) were terminated representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
when the bank was placed under liquidation by the Monetary Board. They were arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or
rehired on the same day of their termination and signed employment contracts not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.
valid only for the period of liquidation. The Liquidator reserved the right to There is no labor dispute when there has yet been no complaint for illegal
terminate their services. During that period, petitioners were dismissed dismissal filed with the labor arbiter.
allegedly for the purpose of reducing costs and expenses in the liquidation of
closed banks in order to protect the interest of the depositors, creditors and FACTS: Ferdinand Pineda and Godofredo Cabling, flight stewards of PAL,
stockholders. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The were dismissed by the latter from the service for their alleged involvement in
Labor Arbiter rendered judgment finding petitioners to have been illegally the currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Aggrieved by said dismissal, they went
dismissed. Their reinstatement was ordered without loss of seniority rights with directly to the NLRC and filed a petition for injunction with the object of making
full backwages. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor PAL withhold its orders of dismissal and reinstate them to work. The NLRC
Arbiter. Motion for reconsideration having been denied, they resorted to this granted their petition. Displeased, PAL challenged the NLRC through a motion
recourse. for reconsideration questioning its jurisdiction to issue an injunction or
restraining order since this may be issued only under Article 218 of the Labor
Issue: Code if the case involves or arises from labor disputes.

WON the petitioners where illegally dismissed by respondent bank NLRC RULING: It denied PAL’s motion for reconsideration and upheld its
jurisdic
Held: tion to issue the mandatory injunctive writ ordering PAL to withhold the
enforcement of the orders of dismissal and reinstate Pineda and Cabling.
Fixed-term employment is valid provided that its purpose is not to circumvent
security of tenure. Such is manifest in the case at bar. 1. The fixed period of ISSUE: Can the NLRC, even without a complaint for illegal dismissal filed
employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, without before the labor arbiter, entertain an action for injunction and issue such writ?
any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the
employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or: 2. It HELD: NO. Generally, injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. Relative to this, the power of the
on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute.” The term
exercised by the former on the latter. "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and
conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and memorandum apprising her of temporary lay-off allegedly due to continuous
conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in brownouts. When petitioner resumed her normal work, her immediate
the proximate relation of employers and employees." The term "controversy" supervisor accosted her why she was keeping her folding umbrella in a bag
is likewise defined as "a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of marked Pliva, which was exclusively used in packaging Pliva products being
law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dispute." A manufactured by respondent Company for a foreign client. In the course of the
"justiciable controversy" is "one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a administrative investigation, petitioner was placed under preventive
legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and suspension. When the investigation was completed, respondent Company
not a mere theoretical question or issue." From the foregoing definitions, it is terminated the services of petitioner, for violating the Company Code of
therefore an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute Discipline, specifically the provision on dishonesty. Petitioner filed a complaint
between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, for illegal temporary lay-off and illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed
there is no labor dispute between PAL and respondents Pineda and Cabling the petitioner’s complaint and ruled that there was sufficient cause for the
as there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor dismissal. Upon appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision but not on the ground of
arbiter by them against the PAL. The petition for injunction directly filed before dishonesty but fors unauthorized possession of company property.
the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal dismissal. This is clear from the
allegations in the petition which prays for their reinstatement; award of full ISSUE:
backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees. As such, the 1. Whether or not the temporary layoff of Gloria dela Cruz
petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has the original and was valid (NO)
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all 2. Whether or not the dismissal of Gloria dela Cruz was valid
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural. (NO)

18.) Dela Cruz v NLRC (1997)

HELD:
DOCTRINE: 1. NO. A lay-off, used interchangeably with retrenchment, is a
● A lay-off, used interchangeably with retrenchment, is a recognized prerogative of management. It is the termination
recognized prerogative of management. It is the termination of employment resorted to by the employer, through no fault
of employment resorted to by the employer, through no fault of nor with prejudice to the employees, during periods of
of nor with prejudice to the employees, during periods of business recession, industrial depression, seasonal
business recession, industrial depression, seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders,
fluctuations, or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new
shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production program, or the introduction of new methods or
production program, or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery, or of automation. The requisites of
more efficient machinery, or of automation. a valid retrenchment are covered by Article 283 of the Labor
● The term trust and confidence is restricted to managerial class Code. hen a lay-off is temporary, the employment status of
of employees. the employee is not deemed terminated, but merely
suspended. Article 286 of the Labor Code provides, in part,
FACTS: that the bona fide suspension of the operation of the business
or undertaking for a period not exceeding six months does not
Petitioner Gloria de la Cruz was assigned at the Production terminate employment. The standard then by which to judge
Department in the respondent company where she was in charge of printing the validity of the exercise of this aspect of management
the product codes, labels and foils of the company products. In a management prerogative is good faith. The Court held that at the program
meeting, the employees were informed that due to heavy volume of work, was but a camouflage of the true reason or intention of the
availment of vacation leaves was being temporarily suspended and sick leaves company to eventually rid petitioner from the service. Indeed,
could be availed of only if the sickness or injury occurred within company if there was need to temporarily lay-off to save on costs due
premises. Despite the above directive, petitioner went on sick leave. When to the brownouts, this Court cannot understand why, first, the
petitioner reported to work, she was barred from entering and was handed a private respondents disallowed, due to heavy volume of work,
 the availment of vacation and sick leaves unless the sickness 24. Nueva Ecija Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NEECO I) Employees
or injury occurred inside company premises; and second, only Association, v. NLRC [G.R. No. 116066, January 24, 2000]
the petitioner out of more than 100 employees was laid-off. DOCTRINE:
These alone showed beyond cavil that the so-called cost- FACTS: Petitioners were permanent employees of respondent NEECO I.
saving program was nothing but a sham and contrived as a They were members of the NEECO I Employees Association. TheBoard of
belated defense. Directors adopted Policy No. 3-33, which set the guidelines for NEECO I’s
retirement benefits. All regular employees were ordered to accomplish Form
2. NO. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid 87, which were applications for either reinstatement, resignation, or separation
cause for dismissing an employee from his employment rests from service. Also, certain union officers were promoted to supervisory rank.
upon the employer, and the latters failure to do so results in a These events caused apprehension in the labor organization and deemed as
finding that the dismissal is unjustified. This rule is designed harassment threatening union members and circumventing employees’
to give flesh and blood to the guaranty of security of tenure security of tenure. The union held a snap election of officers. Petitioner union
granted the employees by the Constitution and the Labor passed a resolution withdrawing the applications for retirement of all its
Code. In this case, the private respondents could only rely on members. Petitioners Marin, Fajardo and Carilio were compulsory retired and
the perceived conflicting explanations of the petitioner as to received their separation pay under protest. Javate was terminated for
how she came into possession of the Pliva bag. The error in allegedly misappropriating funds and dishonesty. Petitioners and Javate filed
choice can by no means be deemed dishonesty nor as breach a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on
of trust and confidence. settled that an employer may December 21, 1992 declaring NEECO I guilty of illegal dismissal. Private
terminate the services of an employee due to loss of trust and respondents elevated the case to the NLRC. They filed their appeal on
confidence. However, the loss must be based not on ordinary December 28, and posted a surety bond on January 5, 1993. Petitioners were
breach by the latter of the trust reposed in him by the former, reinstated by NEECO I pending appeal. Javate withdrew his complaint and
but, in the language of Article 283[c] of the Labor Code, on opted to receive his retirement benefits.
willful breach. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally,
knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as ISSUE:
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, 1. Whether or not the appeal was perfected within the 10 day reglementary
heedlessly or inadvertently. Elsewise stated, it must rest on period.
substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, 2. Whether or not NLRC should have deleted en too moral and exemplary
whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would
damages.
eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. It should be
genuine and not simulated; nor should it appear as a mere
afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith or a HELD:
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or 1. Yes. Petitioners contend that the appeal should have been completed with
unjustified. It has never been intended to afford an occasion the filing of the supersedeas bond by January 4, 1993. However, in a number
for abuse because of its subjective nature. There must, of cases, the Court has relaxed the rule to resolve controversieson the merits
therefore, be an actual breach of duty committed by the when there are special circumstances, such as when there was a substantial
employee which must be established by substantial evidence.
compliance with the rule, so that on balance, technical considerations could
The possession and use of the Pliva bag cannot be
considered as an act of dishonesty. it was then error for the give way to equity and justice. Private respondent filed their appeal within the
Labor Arbiter to consider it as such and to make it a basis for reglementary period. The bonding company issued the bond on January 4, but
loss of trust and confidence. Besides, it was not shown that it was forwarded to the NLRC only on the following day, January 5. Since it
the petitioner was a managerial employee of the private was the holiday season, The Court found it equitable to eases the rules and
respondents, the term trust and confidence being restricted to consider there was substantial compliance. Although as to the bond,
said class of employees respondent in its resolution of November 7, 1991 deleted the phrase “exclusive
of moral and exemplarydamages as well as attorneys fees” in determining the
amount of thebond, it provided a safeguard against the imposition of excessive illegal dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the
bonds as the Commission was given the power to reduce the amount of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The private respondents filed a Petition for
bond in meritorious cases and upon motion of the appellant. Certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the
2. No. To warrant an award of moral damages, it must be shown that the part of NLRC. The Court of Appeals found merit in the petition and
dismissal of the employee was attended to by bad faith, or constituted an act reinstated th
oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs e Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this appeal.
or public policy. As there was ULP, it was proper to impose moral and Issue: Whether or not Lynvil observed the procedural due process in the
exemplary damages; however the damages awarded by the laborarbiter were dismissa
excessive. l the respondents.

30. Lynvil Fishing vs Ariola Ruling: Having found that respondents are regular employees who may
Lynvil Fishing vs. Ariola, GR No. 181974 be, however dismissed for cause as we have so found in this case, there
February 1, 2012 is a need to look i
Ponente: Perez, J., nto the procedural requirement of due process in Section 2, Rule XXIII,
Facts: Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. (Lynvil) is a company engaged Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
in deep-sea fishing,operating along the shores of Palawan and other It isrequired that the employer furnish the employee with two written
outlying islands of t notices:
he Philippines. Lynvil received a report from Romanito Clarido, one of its (1) a written notice
employees, that he witnessed that while on board the company vessel served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for terminatio
Analyn VIII, n, and giving to said
Lynvil employees, namely: Andres G. Ariola (Ariola), employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; and
Jessie D. Alcovendas (Alcovendas), Chief Mate; Jimmy B. Calinao (2) a written notice of
(Calinao), Chief Engineer;Ismael G. Nubla (Nubla), cook; Elorde Bañez termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
(Bañez), oiler; and Leopoldo D. Sebullen (Sebullen),bodegero, conspired consideration of all
with one another and stole eight (8) tubs of “pampano” and “tangigue” the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
fish and delivered them to another vessel, to the prejudice of Lynvil. The termination.
said employees were engaged on a per trip basis or “por viaje” which From the records, there was only one written notice which required
terminates at the end of each trip. By reason of the report and respondents to explain within five (5) days why they should not be
after initial investigation, Lynvil’s General Manager terminated their dismissed from the service.
employment. Alco vendas was the only
Aggrieved, the employees filed with the Arbitration Branch of the one who signed the receipt of the notice. The others, as claimed by
National Labor Relations Comm ission - NationalCapital Region a Lynvil, refused to sign. The other employees argue that no notice was
complaint for illegal dismissal with claims of backwa ges, salary given to them. Despite the inconsistencies, what is clear is that no final
differential written notice or notices of termination were sent to the employees. The
reinstatement, service incentive leave, holiday pay and its premium and twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the elements of [due]
13th month pay. process in cases of employee s dismissal. The requirement of notice is
Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes found merit in complainants’ intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer s intent to
charge of dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal. Upon theother hand,
the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to · The loss of his employment prompted petitioner to file a complaint
answer his employer s charges against him and accordingly, to defend on December 3, 1991 with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
himself there from before dismissal is effected. layoff, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of
salary and overtime pay.
Obviously, the second written notice, as indispensable as the first, is
· LABOR ARBITER’S RULING
intended to ensure · Found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and to pay
the observance of due process. Applying the rule to the facts at hand, petitioner full backwages for Php 74, 740. 00 from the time of his
we grant a monetary award of P50,000.00 as nominal damages, this, dismissal until reinstatement based on his monthly salara of Php 4,
pursuant to the fresh ruling of this Court in Culili v. Eastern 040/month at the time of his termination but limited to 3 years.
Communication Philippines, Inc. · Also ordered the reinstatement of Serrano to his former position as
Due to the failure of Lynvil to follow the procedural requ security section head
· Private respondent failed to establish that it had retrenched its
irement of two-notice rule, nominal damages are due to respondents
security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business;
despite their dismissal for just cause. · private respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner; that
private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting
employees whose employment would be terminated
· Private respondent had not shown that petitioner and other
employees in the security section were so inefficient so as to justify their
replacement by a security agency, or that "cost-saving devices [such as]
32. *SERRANO V NLRC (ABANDONED RULING, BUT WAS MENTIONED secret video cameras (to monitor and prevent shoplifting) and secret
IN THE CASE LIST. OVERTURNED BY AGABON V NLRC, DIGESTED code tags on the merchandise" could not have been employed; instead,
BELOW) · Private respondent employed a safety and security supervisor with
duties and functions similar to those of petitioner.
DOCTRINE: · NLRC Ruling:
· The violation by the employer of the notice requirement in termination · Reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered petitioner to
for just or authorized causes was not a denial of due process that will be given separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of
nullify the termination. service, unpaid salary, and proportionate 13th month pay.
· However, the dismissal is ineffectual and the employer must pay full · Phase-out of private respondents security section and the hiring of
backwages from the time of termination until it is judicially declared that an independent security agency constituted an exercise by private
the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. respondent of
· legitimate business decision whose wisdom we do not intend to
inquire into and for which we cannot substitute our judgment
FACTS: · distinction made by the Labor Arbiter between "retrenchment" and
· Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store the employment of "cost-saving devices" under Art. 283 of the Labor
as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of Code was insignificant because the company official who wrote the
merchandise. dismissal letter apparently used the term "retrenchment" in its "plain and
· Initially hired on October 4, 1984 on contractual basis, petitioner ordinary sense: to layoff or remove from ones job, regardless of the
eventually became a regular employee on April 4, 1985. In 1988, he reason therefor";
became head of the Security Checkers Section of private respondent. that the rule of "reasonable criteria" in the selection of the employees to
· 1991 - as a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to be retrenched did not apply because all positions in the security section
phase out its entire security section and engage the services of an had been abolished; and that the appointment of a safety and security
independent security agency. For this reason, it wrote Serrano a notice supervisor referred to by petitioner to prove bad faith on private
of his termination as Security Section Head, to be effective on October respondents part was of no moment because the position had long been
11, 1991. in existence and was separate from petitioners position as head of the
Security Checkers Section.
 · Petitioner was given a notice of termination on October 11, 1991.
ISSUE: · On the same day, his services were terminated. He was thus denied
Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the his right to be given written notice before the termination of his
private respondent to replace its current security section a valid ground employment, and the question is the appropriate sanction for the
for the dismissal of the employees classed under the latter? - violation of petitioners right.
· As this Court said: "It is now settled that where the dismissal of one
HELD: employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to be but
Petitioner Laid Off for Cause he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the
· De Ocampo v. National Labor Relations Commission,[8] this Court twin requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, the dismissal
upheld the termination of employment of three mechanics in a shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance
transportation company and their replacement by a company rendering with the requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process." [19]
maintenance and repair services. It held: · The rule reversed a long standing policy theretofore followed that
In contracting the services of Gemac Machineries, as part of the even though the dismissal is based on a just cause or the termination of
companys cost-saving program, the services rendered by the mechanics employment is for an authorized cause, the dismissal or termination is
became redundant and superfluous, and therefore properly terminable. illegal if effected without notice to the employee. The shift in doctrine
The company merely exercised its business judgment or management took place in 1989 in Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC.[20] In announcing the
prerogative. And in the absence of any proof that the management change, this Court said:[21]
abused its discretion or acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the · Validity of Petitioners Layoff Not Affected by Lack of Notice
court will not interfere with the exercise of such prerogative.[9] · We agree with our esteemed colleagues, Justices Puno and
· Indeed, as we pointed out in another case, the "[management of a Panganiban, that we should rethink the sanction of fine for an employers
company] cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and disregard of the notice requirement.
attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its operation. · We do not agree, however, that disregard of this requirement by an
To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be employer renders the dismissal or termination of employment null and
performed by its personnel or contracted to outside agencies . . . [While void.
there] should be mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid · Such a stance is actually a reversion to the discredited pre-Wenphi
to what management decides."[11] Consequently, absent proof that lrule of ordering an employee to be reinstated and paid backwages when
management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not it is shown that he has not been given notice and hearing although his
interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer.[12] dismissal or layoff is later found to be for a just or authorized cause.
· We have only the bare assertion of petitioner that, in abolishing the · Such rule was abandoned in Wenphil because it is really unjust to
security section, private respondents real purpose was to avoid payment require an employer to keep in his service one who is guilty
to the security checkers of the wage increases provided in the collective · The need is for a rule which, while recognizing the employees right
bargaining agreement approved in 1990.] Such an assertion is not a to notice before he is dismissed or laid off, at the same time
sufficient basis for concluding that the termination of petitioners acknowledges the right of the employer to dismiss for any of the just
employment was not a bona fide decision of management to obtain causes enumerated in Art. 282 or to terminate employment for any of the
reasonable return from its investment, which is a right guaranteed to authorized causes mentioned in Arts. 283-284.
employers under the Constitution.[14] · If the Wenphil rule imposing a fine on an employer who is found to
· Accordingly, we hold that the termination of petitioners services have dismissed an employee for cause without prior notice is deemed
was for an authorized cause, i.e., redundancy. Hence, pursuant to Art. ineffective in deterring employer violations of the notice requirement, the
283 of the Labor Code, petitioner should be given separation pay at the remedy is not to declare the dismissal void if there are just or valid
rate of one month pay for every year of service. grounds for such dismissal or if the termination is for an authorized
· Sanctions for Violations of the Notice Requirement cause.
· Art. 283 also provides that to terminate the employment of an · That would be to uphold the right of the employee but deny the right
employee for any of the authorized causes the employer must serve "a of the employer to dismiss for cause.
written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and · Rather, the remedy is to order the payment to the employee of full
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof." backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that the
dismissal was for a just cause. But, otherwise, his dismissal must be · Where the termination of employment was for a just cause, no notice
upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is because his dismissal is was required to be given to the employee.
ineffectual. · It was only on September 4, 1981 that notice was required to be
· For the same reason, if an employee is laid off for any of the causes given even where the dismissal or termination of an employee was for
in Arts. 283-284, i.e., installation of a labor-saving device, but the cause. This was made in the rules issued by the then Minister of Labor
employer did not give him and the DOLE a 30-day written notice of and Employment to implement B.P. Blg. 130 which amended the Labor
termination in advance, then the termination of his employment should Code.
be considered ineffectual and he should be paid backwages. · And it was still much later when the notice requirement was
· However, the termination of his employment should not be embodied in the law with the amendment of Art. 277(b) by R.A. No. 6715
considered void but he should simply be paid separation pay as provided on March 2, 1989. It cannot be that the former regime denied due process
in Art. 283 in addition to backwages. to the employee. Otherwise, there should now likewise be a rule that, in
· Violation of Notice Requirement Not a Denial of Due Process case an employee leaves his job without cause and without prior notice
· The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a to his employer, his act should be void instead of simply making him
limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of liable for damages.
private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor · The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 cannot
Code. be considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the
· The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take the life, employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of
liberty, or property of the individual. his own cause. This is also the case in termination of employment for a
· The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise just cause under Art. 282
of this power is consistent with what are considered civilized methods. · Justice Puno disputes this. He says that "statistics in the DOLE will
· The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the prove that many cases have been won by employees before the
Due Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought grievance committees manned by impartial judges of the company." The
to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination grievance machinery is, however, different because it is established by
of employment under Art. 283. agreement of the employer and the employees and composed of
· Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the adversary representatives from both sides.
system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day written notice before an · But here we are dealing with dismissals and layoffs by employers
employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on alone, without the intervention of any grievance machinery. Accordingly
any charge against him, for there is none. in Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation,[32] although a professor
· The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the eventual was dismissed without a hearing by his university, his dismissal for
loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to determine whether having made homosexual advances on a student was sustained, it
economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his employment. appearing that in the NLRC, the employee was fully heard in his defense.
· Even in cases of dismissal under Art. 282, the purpose for the · Lack of Notice Only Makes Termination Ineffectual
requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with Due Process · Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process.
Clause of the Constitution. · Some are simply part of a procedure to be followed before a right
· The time for notice and hearing is at the trial stage. Then that is the granted to a party can be exercised.
time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due · The consequence of the failure either of the employer or the
process. employee to live up to this precept is to make him liable in damages, not
· Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice requirement to render his act (dismissal or resignation, as the case may be) void. The
before he dismisses an employee does not foreclose the right of the measure of damages is the amount of wages the employee should have
latter to question the legality of his dismissal. received were it not for the termination of his employment without prior
· The Termination Pay Law was held not to be a substantive law but notice. If warranted, nominal and moral damages may also be awarded.
a regulatory measure, the purpose of which was to give the employer the · The employers failure to comply with the notice requirement does
opportunity to find a replacement or substitute, and the employee the not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a
equal opportunity to look for another job or source of employment. procedure for the termination of employment which makes the
termination of employment merely ineffectual.
· Indeed, under the Labor Code, only the absence of a just cause for · LABOR ARBITER’S RULING:
the termination of employment can make the dismissal of an employee · Declare the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay
illegal. This is clear from Art. 279 which provides: the monetary claims.
Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall · NLRC RULING:
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or · Reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed abandoned their work, and were not entitled to backwages and
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority separation pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of were also denied for lack of evidence.
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent · COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to · Dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had
the time of his actual reinstatement.[37] abandoned their employment but ordered the payment of money claims.
· Thus, only if the termination of employment is not for any of the · Petitioners dismissal was for a just cause for they had abandoned
causes provided by law is it illegal and, therefore, the employee should their employment and were already working for another employer.
be reinstated and paid backwages. ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONERS
Given the nature of the violation, therefore, the appropriate sanction for · They were dismissed because the private respondent refused to
the failure to give notice is the payment of backwages for the period give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a pakyaw basis
when the employee is considered not to have been effectively dismissed when they reported for duty on February 23, 1999.
or his employment terminated. The sanction is not the payment alone of · They did not agree on this arrangement because it would mean
nominal damages as Justice Vitug contends. losing benefits as Social Security System (SSS) members. Petitioners
also claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin
32-A AGABON V. NLRC requirements of notice and hearing.
DOCTRINE: ALLEGATIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
· Here, we believe that in cases involving dismissals for cause but · Petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work.
without observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the · Private respondent sent two letters to the last known addresses of
better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by the petitioners advising them to report for work.
holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on · Private respondents manager even talked to petitioner Virgilio
the employer. Agabon by telephone sometime in June 1999 to tell him about the new
· The dismissed employee, although not given any notice and hearing, assignment at Pacific Plaza Towers involving 40,000 square meters of
was not entitled to reinstatement and backwages because the dismissal cornice installation work.
was for grave misconduct and insubordination, a just ground for Petitioners did not report for work because they had subcontracted to
ttermination under Article 282. perform installation work for another company. Petitioners also
· The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to demanded for an increase in their wage to P280.00 per day. When this
dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the was not granted, petitioners stopped reporting for work and filed the
dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an illegal dismissal case.
indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil or
Belated Due Process Rule ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s dismissal was illegal
FACTS: Whether or not the procedure illegal dismissal was observed
· Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of
selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. HELD:
· It employed petitioners as gypsum board and cornice installers on · Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for
January 2, 1992[2] until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for termination by the employer:
abandonment of work. · (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
· Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment the lawful orders of his employer or the latters representative in
of money claims connection with the employees work;
· (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with
· (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given
him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the
· (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the evidence presented against him; and
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his (c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that
duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
foregoing. established to justify his termination.
· Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an · Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions
employee to resume his employment.[14] It is a form of neglect of duty, attributable to the employee while dismissals based on authorized
hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer.[15] causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow the employer
· For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be to terminate employees.
present: · A termination for an authorized cause requires payment of
· (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable separation pay. When the termination of employment is declared illegal,
reason; and reinstatement and full backwages are mandated under Article 279. If
· (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal was unjust,
the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt separation pay may be granted.
acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more · From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived:
intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code,
shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.[16] for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under
· Petitioners were frequently absent having subcontracted for an Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without
installation work for another company. Subcontracting for another just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal
company clearly showed the intention to sever the employer-employee is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and
relationship with private respondent. (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not
· January 1996, they did not report for work because they were observed.
working for another company. · The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The
· Private respondent at that time warned petitioners that they would dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the
be dismissed if this happened again. petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company.
· Petitioners disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear intention · Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements
to sever their employer-employee relationship. The record of an and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses
employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore.
should be meted out to him.[17] · Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse
· Sandoval Shipyard v. Clave, because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the
· An employee who deliberately absented from work without leave or employees last known address.[21] Thus, it should be held liable for non-
permission from his employer, for the purpose of looking for a job compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
elsewhere, is considered to have abandoned his job. · A review and re-examination of the relevant legal principles is
· The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Book VI, Rule appropriate and timely to clarify the various rulings on employment
I, Section 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code: termination in the light of Serrano v. National Labor Relations
Standards of due process: requirements of notice. In all cases of Commission.
termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall · Wenphil Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
be substantially observed: · We reversed this long-standing rule and held that the dismissed
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in employee, although not given any notice and hearing, was not entitled to
Article 282 of the Code: reinstatement and backwages because the dismissal was for grave
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or misconduct and insubordination, a just ground for termination under
grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable Article 282.
opportunity within which to explain his side;
· The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to · By doing so, this Court would be able to achieve a fair result by
dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the dispensing justice not just to employees, but to employers as well.
dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an · The unfairness of declaring illegal or ineffectual dismissals for valid
indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil or or authorized causes but not complying with statutory due process may
Belated Due Process Rule have far-reaching consequences.
· In Serrano We held that the violation by the employer of the notice · This would encourage frivolous suits, where even the most notorious
requirement in termination for just or authorized causes was not a denial violators of company policy are rewarded by invoking due process.
of due process that will nullify the termination. · This also creates absurd situations where there is a just or
· However, the dismissal is ineffectual and the employer must pay full authorized cause for dismissal but a procedural infirmity invalidates the
backwages from the time of termination until it is judicially declared that termination.
the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. · Invalidating the dismissal would not serve public interest. It could
· The rationale for the re-examination of the Wenphil doctrine in also discourage investments that can generate employment in the local
Serrano was the significant number of cases involving dismissals economy.
without requisite notices. We concluded that the imposition of penalty · The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not
by way of damages for violation of the notice requirement was not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this
serving as a deterrent. Hence, we now required payment of full Court to the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the
backwages from the time of dismissal until the time the Court finds the employer when it is in the right, as in this case.[32] Certainly, an employer
dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. should not be compelled to pay employees for work not actually
· Serrano was confronting the practice of employers to dismiss now performed and in fact abandoned.
and pay later by imposing full backwages. · An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282
· We believe, however, that the ruling in Serrano did not consider the should not be protected by the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution.
full meaning of Article 279 of the Labor Code Social justice, as the term suggests, should be used only to correct an
· This means that the termination is illegal only if it is not for any of injustice.
the justified or authorized causes provided by law. Payment of · As the eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel observed, social justice must
backwages and other benefits, including reinstatement, is justified only be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
if the employee was unjustly dismissed. among diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
· The fact that the Serrano ruling can cause unfairness and injustice equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
which elicited strong dissent has prompted us to revisit the doctrine. social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
· Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and
has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the
employment termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the greatest number.[34]
manner of dismissal. · This is not to say that the Court was wrong when it ruled the way it
· Constitutional due process protects the individual from the did in Wenphil, Serrano and related cases. Social justice is not based on
government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or rigid formulas set in stone. It has to allow for changing times and
administrative proceedings; while circumstances.
· Statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing · Justice in every case should only be for the deserving party.
Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just · It should not be presumed that every case of illegal dismissal would
cause after notice and hearing automatically be decided in favor of labor, as management has rights
· Here, we believe that in cases involving dismissals for cause but that should be fully respected and enforced by this Court.
without observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the · As interdependent and indispensable partners in nation-building,
better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by labor and management need each other to foster productivity and
holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on economic growth; hence, the need to weigh and balance the rights and
the employer. welfare of both the employee and employer.
· Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in
Wenphil.
· Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the written and oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment
lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the
it illegal, or ineffectual. Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to prevent
However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed
of his statutory rights, period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the
parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure brought to bear upon
43. PINES CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER vs. NLRC the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or
DOCTRINE: where it satisfactorily appears that the employer or employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being
FACTS: exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the
Private respondents Dangwa Bentrez, Roland Picart, Apollo Ribaya, Sr., law would be made to apply to purposes other than those expressly stated by
Ruperta Ribaya, Virginia Boado, Cecilia Emocling, Jane Bentrez, Leila its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt
Dominguez, Rose Ann Bermudez and Lucia Chan were all employed as to lead to absurd and unintended consequences.
teachers on probationary basis by petitioner Pines City Educational Center,
represented in this proceedings by its President, Eugenio Baltao. Insofar as the private respondents who knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon
On April 10, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal fixed periods of employment are concerned, their services were lawfully
before the Labor Arbiter, alleging that their dismissals were without cause and terminated by reason of the expiration of the periods of their respective
in violation of due process. Except for private respondent Leila Dominguez contracts. Thus, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
who worked with petitioners for one semester, all other private respondents the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering the reinstatement and payment of
were employed for one to two years. They were never informed in writing by full backwages and other benefits and privileges.
petitioners regarding the standards or criteria of evaluation so as to enable The NLRC cannot claim not knowing the ruling in the Brent case because in
them to meet the requirements for appointment as regular employees. They its questioned resolution, it is stated that one of the cases invoked by
were merely notified in writing by petitioners, through its chancellor, Dra. Nimia petitioners in their appeal is said case. This notwithstanding, it disregarded
R. Concepcion, of the termination of their respective services as on March 31, Our ruling therein without any reason at all and expressed the erroneous view
1989, on account of their below-par performance as teachers that:
Petitioners contended that private respondents' separation from employment, The agreement of the parties fixing a definite date for the termination of the
apart from their poor performance, was due to the expiration of the periods employment relations is contrary to the specific provision of Article 280. being
stipulated in their respective contracts. the duration of their employment contrary to law, the agreement cannot be legitimized.
contracts was for one semester, or beginning November, 1988 to March 1989. Stare decisis et no quieta movere. Once a case has been decided one way,
They argued further that they cannot be compelled to enter into new contracts then another case, involving exactly the same point at issue, should be
with private respondents. They concluded that the separation of private decided in the same manner. Public respondent had no choice on the matter.
respondents from the service was justified. Heavily relying in the case of Brent It could not have ruled in any other way. This Tribunal having spoken in the
School vs. Zamora Brent case, its duty was to obey. Let it be warned that to defy its decisions is
LA and NLRC ruled in favor of the private respondents ordering reinstament to court contempt.
with backwages
Complainants appealed. 95. Juan P. Villeno vs NLRC

ISSUE: Facts:
WON NLRC erred in its decision by maliciously disregarding the rules of law.
HELD: Juan P. Villeno was employed on 29 December 1961 as electrician in one
of the vessels of private respondent Sulpicio Lines, Inc. Twenty-seven
The decision is Modified. (27) years later he was separated from the service
Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already
observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his M/V Sulpicio Container XI after leaving the port of Cebu for Manila was
tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all forced to return due to the death of the purser on board. Upon reaching
port, the crew members were instructed not to leave the vessel as it ISSUE: whether petitioner's act of disconnecting the steering line cable
would pursue its voyage immediately after turning over the body to the and disembarking from the vessel without permission constitute serious
proper authorities. The ship's cook however was granted permission misconduct and willful disobedience justifying his dismissal
upon his request to leave the vessel to buy additional foodstuff for their
provisions. The petitioner on the other hand, without seeking Ruling:
permission, left the vessel purportedly to settle a marital problem. Before
leaving he disconnected the ship's steering line cable so that the vessel Yes, Among the basic duties of an employee are to conduct himself
could not leave port without him. His explanation was that he wanted to properly and to yield obedience to lawful orders of his employer. It is in
prevent pranksters from toying around with the steering wheel as what this regard that serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
had happened in the past.||| employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work is a just cause for his termination. This is
According to petitioner, when he returned to the port thirty (30) minutes explicitly provided under Art. 282, par. (a), of the Labor Code. The
later, the ship was only a few inches away from the wharf but was misconduct must be related to the performance of his duties and of such
prevented by a representative of respondent corporation from boarding grave character rendering him unfit to continue working for the
the vessel. It turned out that the vessel had hired another electrician to employer. As regards willful disobedience, we stated in San Miguel
reconnect the steering line cable. The consequence of petitioner's Corporation v. Ubaldo 3 that at least two (2) requisites must concur: (1)
actuation was that the departure of the vessel was further delayed. the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional,
Petioner filed against private respondents a complaint for illegal the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse
dismissal attitude;" and, (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he
Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was indeed guilty of misconduct but had been engaged to discharge.
found the penalty of dismissal harsh considering that there was no
evidence showing that petitioner intended to sabotage the voyage of the Consequently, we sustain the NLRC in holding that petitioner was guilty
vessel. Besides, for the duration of his long years of service, it was his of serious misconduct and willful disobedience —
first offense. . . . Granted that his act was without malice or willful intent to cause
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) held that the damage, this does not excuse him for putting his personal interests over
circumstances that petitioner had been employed by respondent that of his employers in the sense that he . . . unnecessarily disrupt(ed)
corporation for a long period of time and that it was his first offense were and prejudice(d) the normal operations of respondent to attend to
not by themselves sufficient to warrant mitigation of the consequences personal matters. No amount of good faith or lack of intention to cause
of his serious misconduct. What were material were the facts that he damage can diminish the degree of responsibility of complainant for his
disembarked from the vessel despite explicit instruction to the contrary, actuations . . . . 4
and he disconnected the steering line cable so that the vessel could not By disconnecting the steering line cable before disembarking, petitioner
leave, which in the context of respondent corporation's business could must have deluded himself into believing that he was the master in
not be tolerated. command of the vessel and that during his absence the vessel should
Petitioner argues that although his reason for disconnecting the steering be immobile. His lack of concern for his employer's interests or for his
line cable was personal yet it was highly commendable since he was responsibility towards his employer.
concerned with family unity. In addition, the disconnection was done to
protect the vessel from pranksters who in the past would play with the
steering wheel. By terminating his services respondent corporation thus 96.ACEBEDO Optical vs. NLRC
set to naught his twenty-seven (27) years of service, completely ignoring
the fact that it was his first offense. He claims that the delay he caused Petitioners engaged the services of private respondent as a packaging
to the vessel was almost nil considering that it took him only thirty (30) clerk responsible for the following tasks:
minutes to return as compared to the delay that the voyage had already 1. Receives (sic) product from supplier and sort them out;
incurred.||| (Villeno v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 2. Record incoming and outgoing deliveries to stock ledger and stock
108153, [December 26, 1995], 321 PHIL 880-889) card;
3. Received (sic) requisition from branch retail outlets; was supposedly her repeated de􏰀ance of company policy. According to
4. Select products from storage and place them inside the box, label the the appellate court, petitioners' failure to adduce in evidence a copy of
boxes and prepare the corresponding delivery receipts; the contravened company policy was fatal to their cause. Absent proof
5. Make physical count at regular intervals and reconciles physical count of evidence of such document embodying the 􏰀outed rule, the appellate
with book records; court, along with the labor arbiter and the NLRC, was unable to make a
6. Other assignments as and when required by supervisor from time to categorical 􏰀nding on the issue of whether or not the private
time. respondent's accumulated absences and/or tardiness were, indeed, in
Initially, the private respondent's employment status was probationary. violation of petitioner company's rules and regulations. Further, as to the
Six months later, or on 1 March 1992, however, she was regularized. allegation of chronic absenteeism and/or tardiness for the period of 1991
But before her employment status was made permanent, private to 1995, the appellate court likewise held that the non-presentation of the
respondent was given a Memorandum by Miguel Acebedo III, Operations Daily Time Records (DTRs) for said period was a grave error. It held that
Manager of petitioner corporation. the numerous memoranda issued to private respondent were mere self-
serving evidence and made the following observations —
On 22 April 1994, a three-day suspension from work was imposed on Petitioners' stance is even incongruent with the evidence on record.
private respondent on the ground of her being tardy twenty-six times Thus, the Private Respondent was employed, (sic) on a probationary
within the period of January to March 1994. The suspension notice was basis or status . . . [she] incurred tardiness in the accumulated time of
served on her via a Memorandum dated the same day. It was averred one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes for the month of August, 1991, and
that private respondent incurred twenty-six counts of tardiness within yet, the Private Respondent was promoted and made a permanent
the above-specified months which number far exceeded the maximum employee on March 1, 1992.
allowable limit per month of only four times.||| [A]fter her one (1) hour and thirty — four (34) minute tardiness in
28 February 1995, private respondent was served a fourth Memorandum. September 1991, nothing on record reveals that she had been tardy for
For having incurred twenty-one counts of tardiness for the months of the year 1992. The "Memorandum" reminding the Private Respondent
[unreadable] to December 1994, the latter was meted another about her tardiness did not establish that Private Respondent again
suspension, this time for seven days, or four days longer than the first.||| incurred any tardiness. It is noted that Private Respondent was not tardy
in the year 1993. Although she was tardy during the period from January
On 22 May 1995, private respondent filed an application for an indefinite to March 1994, however, she was ordered suspended on May 10 to 12,
leave of absence and it was not approved considering the nature of the 1994. Thereafter, Private Respondent did not report late for the rest of
leave. the year as the next "Memorandum" of the Petitioner Corporation was
On 29 August 1995, private respondent was suspended for the third time, issued on February 28, 1995, informing Private Respondent of her
this time for thirteen days. The reason given for the imposition of such suspension on March 6, 9, 14, 16, 21, 23 and 27, 1995. Based on the
penalty was the employee's failure "to meet the company policy on "Memorandum" of the Petitioners, the Private Respondent was tardy for
tardiness. seventeen (17) times for the quarter from April to June, 1995. However,
On 12 November 1996, private respondent did not report for work the "Memorandum" of the Petitioners did not indicate the dates and
allegedly due to the demolition of the place that her family was renting. precise times when the Private Respondent was tardy. Without the "Daily
On 2 December 1996, private respondent again absented herself from Time Records" of the Respondent during the period envisaged in the
work this time because her child was allegedly hospitalized. Memoranda of the Petitioners, it cannot be ascertained whether Private
Six days later, or on 8 December 1996, the Head of the Personnel Respondent's tardiness was habitual and incorrigible.
Department of petitioner corporation issued a Notice of Termination Anent the fid􏰀nding by the NLRC that herein petitioners' appeal was 􏰀led
against private respondent. out of time, the Court of Appeals clari􏰀fid that Sec. 224 of the Labor Code
requires that both party and counsel must be served their respective
ISSUE: Whether or not employee had been dismissed for just cause copies of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In the instant case, herein
petitioners received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision only on 5
No, petitioners failed to marshal the obligatory quantum of evidence March 1999. They then 􏰀led an appeal, 15 March 1999. Therefore, it
needed to substantiate a ending of legitimacy or validity in the cannot be said that their recourse to the NLRC was filed out of time.
termination of employment of private respondent, the reason for which
97.CITIBANK VS GATCHALIAN agreement and after presentation of evidence, Voluntary Arbitrator
rendered a
FACTS decision ordering the reinstatement of respondent Llonillo without
1.Respondent Llonillo, together with Teresita Supnad, her co-employee payment of
and Florence backwages.
Verendia, an employee of Asian-Pacific Broadcasting Company, Inc. ISSUE:
(APBCI), were Whether or not the reinstatement of respondent Llonillo is proper.
implicated in a scheme to defraud petitioner bank. RULING:
2.Petitioner bank received 31 applications from alleged APBCI NO. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise
employees for the slight care or
issuance of Citibank credit cards, known as Mastercard. The diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless
applications were disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
approved and the corresponding new and unsigned cards were issued She admitted that the first time she was asked by Verendia to pick up
after verifying one of the newly
the applications by a Citibank employee from Verendia, as secretary of approved and unsigned credit cards, she immediately acceded. Yet, at
the that time, she had not personally met nor previously seen Verendia. She
Geneneral Manager of APBCI. said that Verendia described herself over the phone and that was how
3.Petitioner bank’s policy is for new and unsigned credit cards to be she was able to indentify her when they first met. Thus, on the basis of a
released only to mere description over the telephone, respondent Llonillo delivered the
cardholders concerned or their duly authorized representatives. credit cards to Verendia. Respondent Llonillo’s negligence was also
4.However, a Citibank employee may himself take delivery of new and shown when she gave the credit cards to a messenger when she had not
unsigned credit seen before but who merely represented to her that he was the
cards after accomplishing a Card Pull-Out Request Form wherein the messenger sent, and without asking to sign a receipt evidencing the
employee acceptance.
assumes the responsibility of delivering the same to the cardholder. It was also ruled that her negligence is both gross and habitual. It was
5.Supnad and Verendia took delivery of 19 credit cards issued in the proved that she
name of the picked up the newly approved credit cards on 5 separate occasions and
alleged APBCI credit applicants. On the other hand, on 5 separate delivered the same to Verendia and the latter’s messenger. Certainly,
occasions, these repetitive acts and omissions bespeak of habituality.
respondent Llonillo personally picked up the newly approved and The longer an employee stays in the service of the company, the greater
unsigned credit is his responsibility for knowledge and compliance with the norms of
cards issued to 7 alleged APBCI employees and delivered them to conduct and the code of discipline of the company. Hence, respondent’s
Verendia. 22 years of service would not, by itself, mitigate her negligence,
6.When the bank discovered that the credit card applicants were especially in view of the substantial loss incurred by petitioner bank.
fictitious, Llonillo was
made to explain. She alleged that she wanted to help the bank deliver Procedure to Terminate Employment
“fast, 30. Lynvil Fishing Enterprises vs Ariola
competent, and problem-free service to clients” and disclaimed any Facts:
knowledge that engaged in deep-sea fishing,... Lynvil received a report from Romanito
the APBCI applicants were fictitious and denied participation in the Clarido, one of its employees, that on 31 July 1998, he witnessed that
fraudulent use of while on board the company vessel Analyn VIII, Lynvil employees,
the credit cards. namely: Andres G. Ariola (Ariola), the captain; Jessie D. Alcovendas
7.Petitioner bank dismissed Llonillo. However, pursuant to the collective (Alcovendas), Chief Mate; Jimmy B. Calinao (Calinao), Chief Engineer;
bargaining Ismael G. Nubla (Nubla), cook; Elorde Bañez (Bañez), oiler; and Leopoldo
D. Sebullen (Sebullen), bodegero, conspired with one another and stole
eight (8) tubs of "pampano" and "tangigue"... fish and delivered them to FACTS: Benitez alleged that the company served him a memorandum
another vessel, to the prejudice of Lynvil... said employees were advising him not to report for work effective immediately, thereby
engaged on a per trip basis or "por viaje" which terminates at the end of terminating his employment, supposedly on grounds of serious
each trip misconduct or willful disobedience. He allegedly uttered abusive words
Issues: against respondent Kurangil during the company's christmas party. He
Lynvil contends that it cannot be guilty of illegal dismissal because the bewailed that he was not given the opportunity to defend himself.
private respondents were employed under a fixed-term contract which Benitez claimed that during the party, he noticed that the raffle
expired at the end of the voyage. committee members were putting back the names of those who were
It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of already drawn, giving them more chances of winning. He appealed to the
employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, committee to put a stop to what they were doing, but they replied they
without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear would not "in the spirit of Christmas”. He denied having verbally abused
upon the employee... and absent any other circumstances vitiating his Kurangil. He presented the affidavits of four co-employees, who was with
consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and him at one table, attesting that he did not commit the offense which led
employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no to his dismissal.
moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Benitez argued that his dismissal constituted an unfair labor practice
Contrarily, the private respondents contend that they became regular as he was a union officer and that it was undertaken to derail the
employees by reason of their continuous hiring and performance of conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement with the company. He
tasks necessary and desirable in the usual trade and business of Lynvil further argued that the penalty of dismissal is disproportionate to his
alleged offense, considering that it was committed during a casual
Ruling: gathering and had no connection to his work.
Jurisprudence, laid two conditions for the validity of a fixed-contract The company confirmed Benitez's claim that the incident involved the
agreement between the employer and employee... fixed period of conduct of the Christmas raffle. However, they differed on what triggered
employment... was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties his unruly behavior. It alleged that while the raffle was going on, Benitez
without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear climbed up the stage and questioned the management's decision to
upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his allow contractual employees to join the raffle. This resulted in only 80%
consent;... it satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee of the employees winning raffle prizes. Benitez then started hurling
dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral invectives and foul language while still on stage, mostly directed at
dominance exercised by the former or the latter. Kurangil.
In the context, however, of the facts that: (1) the respondents were doing Afos and Atienza, who claims to be Benitez’s actual companions in the
tasks necessarily to Lynvil's fishing business with positions ranging table, added that trouble started when the raffle for the grand prize was
from captain of the vessel to bodegero; (2) after the end of a trip, they being conducted. All of a sudden, Benitez, who had not yet won a prize
will again be hired... for another trip with new contracts; and (3) this at that time, stood up and proceeded to the stage, fuming mad and
arrangement continued for more than ten years, the clear intention is to complaining about the conduct of the raffle.
go around the security of tenure of the respondents as regular The company required Benitez to explain in writing why he should not
employees. be disciplined for serious misconduct and willful disobedience of its
Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of lawful orders in connection with the incident. Benitez failed to comply
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be and neither did he show remorse for what he did.
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is In view of the to explain his side, the company issued the memorandum
employed and his employment shall continue while such... activity terminating his employment effective on the same day, for clear violation
exists. of "Santa Fe Policy and Procedure under Conduct and Behavior as well
as Labor Code of the Philippines under Art. 282 - Serious misconduct or
ROQUE B. BENITEZ AND SANTA FE LABOR UNION-FEDERATION OF willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer
FREE WORKERS v. SANTA FE MOVING/VEDIT KURANGIL x x x”.
G.R. No. 208163, 20 April 2015
 Benitez contends that he did not commit serious misconduct, insisting FACTS: Before Mahilum was elected as union officer, he was transferred
that if he indeed became unruly on that day, the company guards should from VECO's Public Relations Section to its Administrative Services
have restrained him and made a report about it, but there was no such Section without any specific work. When he was elected as union
intervention from the guards. secretary, he was transferred to the Line Services Department as its
At any rate, they argue, Benitez should not have been dismissed for Customer Service Representative. At the time of his election as union
the serious misconduct he allegedly committed since it was not in president, VECO management allegedly: (a) terminated active union
connection with his work as moving and relocation operator. Moreover, members without going through the grievance machinery procedure
for misconduct to be serious, it must be of such a grave and aggravated prescribed under the CBA; (b) refused to implement the profit-sharing
character and not merely trivial and unimportant. scheme provided under the same CBA; (c) took back the motorbikes
issued to active union members; and (d) revised the electricity privilege
ISSUE: WON petitioner was validly dismissed under the ground of granted to VECO's employees.
serious misconduct Union members marched on the streets of Cebu City to protest VECO's
refusal to comply with the political and economic provisions of the CBA.
RULING: YES. Serious misconduct is a just cause for termination of Mahilum and other union officers were interviewed by the media and
employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Despite his denial, handed out a document containing their grievances against VECO.
there is substantial evidence that Benitez maligned the company's Mahilum was allegedly demoted as warehouse staff to isolate him and
managing director and the company itself during their Christmas Party. restrict his movements. Other union officers were transferred to
There was no need for the guards to intervene because Benitez was positions that will keep them away from the general union membership.
restrained by people near the stage and who escorted him outside the Days after, Mahilum was issued a Notice to Explain why he should not
premises where the party was going on as attested to by Kurangil be terminated from service due to loss of trust and confidence, as well
himself, as well as by Afos and Atienza. as in violating the Company Code of Discipline, for causing the
Benitez's offense constituted a serious misconduct as defined by law. publication of what VECO deemed as a libelous article. Union officers
His display of insolent and disrespectful behavior, in utter disregard of received similar notices for them to explain their actions, which they
the time and place of its occurrence, had very much to do with his work. justified as merely an expression of their collective sentiments against
He set a bad example as a union officer and as a crew leader of a vital the treatment of VECO's management towards them.
division of the company. His actuations during the company's Christmas The Union then filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB against VECO,
Party could have had negative repercussions for his employer had he which facilitated a series of conferences that yielded a Memorandum of
been allowed to stay on the job. His standing before those clients who Agreement signed by the parties.
witnessed the incident and those who would hear of it would surely be Before the conclusion of the CBA renegotiation, several complaints for
diminished, to the detriment of the company. libel were filed against Mahilum and the other union officers by VECO's
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Jaime Jose Y.
Aboitiz. The administrative hearing against Mahilum resumed with due
notice to the latter, but he protested the same, referring to it as "moro-
moro" or "kangaroo" and insisting that the investigation should follow
the grievance machinery procedure under the CBA.
Nonetheless, VECO's management carried on with its investigation
and, on the basis of the findings thereof, issued a notice terminating
Mahilum from employment. In result, the Union filed another Notice of
Strike with the NCMB against VECO on the grounds of unfair labor
practice, specifically union busting for the dismissal and/or suspension
of its union president and officers, refusal to bargain collectively, as well
VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP and as non-observance of the grievance procedure in their CBA.
CASMERO MAHILUM vs. VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. (VECO) To avert any work stoppage that will prejudice VECO's power
G.R. No. 205575 22 July 2015 distribution activity, the Secretary of Labor intervened and issued an
Order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory FACTS: To ensure the quality of its crew’s services, CBTL regularly
arbitration. employs a “mystery guest shopper” who poses as a customer, for the
Consequently, the strike was enjoined; Mahilum was ordered purpose of covertly inspecting the baristas’ job performance. In April
reinstated in the payroll; and the parties were directed to refrain from 2009, a mystery guest shopper at the Paseo Center Branch submitted a
committing any act that would exacerbate the situation. NLRC ruled in report stating that Arenas was seen eating non-CBTL products at CBTL’s
favor of VECO. Hence, this petition. al fresco dining area while on duty. As a result, the counter was left
empty without anyone to take and prepare the customers’ orders.
ISSUE: WON Mahilum was illegally dismissed On another occasion, Katrina Basallo, the duty manager of CBTL,
conducted a routine inspection of the Paseo Center Branch. While
RULING: NO. Mahilum was terminated for a just and valid cause. VECO inspecting the store’s products, she noticed an iced tea bottle being
complied with the procedural due process requirements of furnishing chilled inside the bin where the ice for the customers’ drinks is stored;
Mahilum with two written notices before the termination of employment thus, she called the attention of the staff on duty. When asked, Arenas
can be effected. He was apprised of the particular acts for which his muttered, “kaninong iced tea?” and immediately picked the bottle and
termination was sought; and, after due investigation, he was given a disposed it outside the store. Respondent was also accused of many
Notice of Decision informing him of his dismissal from service. other infractions, as a result of which he was terminated after having
The derogatory statements issued by Mahilum that were intended to given an unsatisfactory explanation when asked for one.
incite, not just public condemnation of VECO, there can be no dispute Arenas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. After due proceedings,
that VECO had lost its trust and confidence in Mahilum and his ability to the LA ruled in his favor, declaring that he had been illegally dismissed.
perform his tasks with utmost efficiency and loyalty expected of an On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision.
employee entrusted to handle customers and funds. Settled is the rule CBTL filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. CBTL
that an employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is insisted that Arenas’ infractions amounted to serious misconduct or
guilty of acts inimical to the interests of the employer. A company has willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and breach of
the right to dismiss its employee if only as a measure of self-protection trust and confidence. To support these allegations, CBTL presented
The fact that Mahilum served the company for a considerable period of Arenas’ letter where he admitted his commission of the imputed
time will not help his cause. The longer an employee stays in the service violations. CBTL also imputes dishonesty on the part of Arenas for not
of the company, the greater is his responsibility for knowledge and immediately admitting that he indeed left his bottled iced tea inside the
compliance with the norms of conduct and the code of discipline in the ice bin.
company. The State's responsibility to afford protection to labor, this
policy should not be used as an instrument to oppress management and ISSUE: WON Arenas was illegally dismissed
capital. In resolving disputes between labor and capital, fairness and
justice should always prevail. RULING: YES. For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal,
these two elements must concur: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct
must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he
had been engaged to discharge. It is clear that Arenas’ alleged
infractions do not amount to such a wrongful and perverse attitude.
Though Arenas may have admitted these wrongdoings, these do not
amount to a wanton disregard of CBTL’s company policies. As Arenas
mentioned in his written explanation, he was on a scheduled break when
he was caught eating. During that time, the other service crews were the
one in charge of manning the counter. Notably, CBTL’s employee
CBTL (yep) AND WALDEN CHU v. ROLLY P. ARENAS handbook imposes only the penalty of written warning for the offense of
G.R. No. 208908, 11 March 2015 eating non-CBTL products inside the store’s premises.
 CBTL also imputes gross and habitual neglect of duty to Arenas for
coming in late in three separate instances. Gross negligence implies a
want or absence of, or failure to exercise even a slight care or diligence,
or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. There is
habitual neglect if based on the circumstances, there is a repeated failure
to perform one’s duties for a period of time.
Arenas’ three counts of tardiness cannot be considered as gross and
habitual neglect of duty. The infrequency of his tardiness already
removes the character of habitualness. These late attendances were also
broadly spaced out, negating the complete absence of care on Arenas’
part in the performance of his duties. Even CBTL admitted in its notice
to explain that this violation does not merit yet a disciplinary action and
is only an aggravating circumstance to Arenas’ other violations.
CBTL also argues that he committed serious misconduct when he lied
about using the ice bin as cooler for his bottled iced tea. Under CBTL’s
employee handbook, dishonesty, even at the first instance, warrants the
penalty of termination from service.
For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal,
(a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the
employee’s duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become
unfit to continue working for the employer.
However, the facts on record reveal that there was no active dishonesty
on the part of Arenas. When questioned about who placed the bottled
iced tea inside the ice bin, his immediate reaction was not to deny his
mistake, but to remove the bottle inside the bin and throw it outside.
More importantly, when he was asked to make a written explanation of
his action, he admitted that the bottled iced tea was his.
Thus, even if there was an initial reticence on Arenas’ part, his
subsequent act of owing to his mistake only shows the absence of a
deliberate intent to lie or deceive his CBTL superiors. On this score, we
conclude that Arenas’ action did not amount to serious misconduct.
G.R. No. 164939 June 6, 2011

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASAH-

NUWHRAIN), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN and
HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 172303

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASAH-

NUWHRAIN), Petitioner,
vs.
HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

Facts: Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-

APL is a duly registered union and the certified bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees of Hyatt Regency Manila,
a five-star hotel owned and operated by respondent Hotel Enterprises of
the Philippines, Inc. On January 31, 2001, Hyatt’s General Manager,
David C. Pacey, issued a Memorandum informing all hotel employees
that hotel security have been instructed to conduct a thorough bag
inspection and body frisking in every entrance and exit of the hotel. He
enjoined employees to comply therewith. Copies of the Memorandum
were furnished petitioner.
On February 3, 2001, Angelito Caragdag, a waiter at the hotel’s Cafe Al
Fresco restaurant and a director of the union, refused to be frisked by
the security personnel. The incident was reported to the hotel’s Human
Resources Department (HRD), which issued a Memorandum to Caragdag
on February 5, 2001, requiring him to explain in writing within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him. The following day, on February 6, 2001, Caragdag again
refused to be frisked by the security personnel. Thus, on February 8,
2001, the HRD issued another Memorandum requiring him to explain.
On February 14, 2001, the HRD imposed on Caragdag the penalty of
reprimand for the February 3, 2001 incident, which was considered a first
offense, and suspended him for three days for the February 6, 2001
incident, which was considered as a second offense. Both penalties were
in accordance with the hotel’s Code of Discipline.
Subsequently, on February 22, 2001, when Mike Moral, the manager of the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose.
Hyatt’s Cafe Al Fresco and Caragdag’s immediate superior, was about to Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may
counsel two staff members, Larry Lacambacal and Allan Alvaro, at the not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures
training room, Caragdag suddenly opened the door and yelled at the two the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
with an enraged look. In a disturbing voice he said, "Ang titigas talaga speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper
ng ulo n’yo. Sinabi ko na sa inyo na huwag kayong makikipagusap sa litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital system
management habang ongoing pa ang kaso!" (You are very stubborn. I of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and
told you not to speak to management while the case is ongoing!) Moral in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well
asked Caragdag what the problem was and informed him that he was served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural
simply talking to his staff. Moral also told Caragdag that he did not have rules.
the right to interrupt and intimidate him during his counseling session
with his staff.
Still later, on March 2, 2001, Caragdag committed another infraction. At Becton Dickinson Phils vs NLRC
9:35 a.m. on the said date, Caragdag left his work assignment during
official hours without prior permission from his Department Head. He
was required to submit an explanation, but the explanation12 he Case Doctrine: The decision to terminate must not be based
submitted was found unsatisfactory.On March 17, 2001, Moral found on salary.
Caragdag liable for violating OSDA 3.07, i.e., "leaving work assignment
during official working hours without prior permission from the FACTS:
department head or immediate superior," and suspended him for three Petitioner is a domestic corp. engaged in the business
days.
On June 1, 2001, the hotel, through Atty. Juancho A. Baltazar, sent relating to health care products needed by hospitals,
Caragdag a Notice of Dismissal. doctors, laboratories, and pharmaceutical companies. The
In finding the three separate suspensions of Caragdag valid, the company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Becton Dickinson
Voluntary Arbitrator reasoned that the union officers and members had Worldwide, Inc., U.S.A. with operations in the Asia Pacific
no right to breach company rules and regulations on security and Region under the charge of Becton Dickinson Asia Pacific.
employee discipline on the basis of certain suspicions against
management and an ongoing CBA negotiation standoff. Joaquin was formerly the Country Manager of Becton, Phils.
Petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal, but Becton, Phils. had two (2) main divisions, namely: (a) the
the motion was denied by the CA. Thus, petitioner filed before this Court Medical Division; and (b) the Diagnostics Division. Esmaquel
a petition for review on certiorari started his stint with Becton, Phils. as Director of Sales and
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition for Marketing of the Diagnostics Division. For his commendable
certiorari filed before it on the ground that the same is an improper mode
of appeal performance as Sales and Marketing Director, respondent
Held: In the case of Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN- received numerous citations and awards. For purposes of
APL v. Bacungan,26 we repeated the well-settled rule that a decision or selling its products, Becton, Phils had organized two (2)
award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for divisions, namely, the Sales Division and the Marketing
review under Rule 43. Division, and designated respondent as the Director of
Hence, upon receipt on May 26, 2003 of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s
Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, petitioner Sales. Pursuant to its established policies and guidelines for
should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary terminating employees, Becton, Phils. Retrenched nine (9)
period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari. employees, giving them separation benefits. Becton Asia
Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no announced the appointment of petitioner Wilfredo Joaquin,
cogent reason in this case to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules a former Filipino citizen who later acquired American
of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in
citizenship, as the new Country Manager of Becton, Phils.
Being a stranger to the company’s operations, a swell as to must not be based on salary. There is no clear proof that
the customers of Becton, Phils., Joaquin sought respondent’s services are in excess of the Company’s
respondents assistance to address serious problems of the reasonable demands and requirements; and that there is no
company, and to orient him in the mechanics of the other alternative available to the Company except to dismiss
company’s sales and marketing efforts in the Philippines. respondent. The superfluity of position has not been
Barely two (2) months from Joaquins assumption of his established. There has been no previous over hiring of
position as Country Manager, Becton, Phils. served upon employees. On the contrary, the Company had already
respondent a notice of termination of employment effective terminated nine (9) employees. There is no proof of
August 10, 2001, on the ground that his position has been decreased volume of business.
declared redundant. Respondent asked Joaquin if he had
taken into consideration in declaring redundant his position,
the guidelines/rules for termination of employment as
directed by Becton, Asias President, namely: (a) to retain the
best employee; (b) consider the performance of the
employee for the last three (3) years; and (c) refrain from
taking decision based on individual salary. This
notwithstanding, he was terminated and required to sign a
Release and Quitclaim, otherwise, his separation pay and
retirement benefits will be withheld. Respondent found no
other alternative but to give in, and reluctantly signed the
document. Respondent then filed a case for illegal dismissal.
The LA declared that there was illegal dismissal.
Skippers United Pacific vs Nathaniel Doza
ISSUE: Whether or not the termination was valid
Case Doctrine: For a worker’s dismissal to be considered
RULING: valid, it must comply with both procedural and substantive
due process. The legality of the manner of dismissal
Esmaquel’s termination was not for an authorized cause. constitutes procedural due process, while the legality of the
1) The record supports the finding that the Company and act of dismissal constitutes substantive due process.
Joaquin disregarded totally the Company’s guidelines in
declaring respondent’s position redundant. The principal FACTS:
reason why respondent’s position was declared redundant Petitioner deployed, respondents to work on board the vessel MV
is the fact that he was the highest paid employee with a Wisdom Star. Respondents claimed that Skippers failed to remit
monthly salary of P197,525.00. The Company’s main their respective allotments for almost five months, To date,
purpose in terminating [respondent] was to cut down however, Skippers only failed to remit the home allotment for the
expenses and it did so by dismissing him in, camouflaging month of December 1998. Respondents were unceremoniously
its malice by using the ground of redundancy. Thus was discharged from MV Wisdom Stars and immediately repatriated.
violated the Company rule that the decision to terminate Upon arrival in the Philippines, Respondents filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter who dismissed herein their contracts, then Respondents should have submitted their
action for lack of merit. Respondents’ filed an appeal to the NLRC written resignations.
who dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s decision. The respondents appealed to the CA and
granted the respondents petition and reversed the decisions of
the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Goodrich Manufacturing vs. NLRC
Whether the Dismissal of the respondents is valid
HELD: Case Doctrine: The Court has given effect to quitclaims
No, For a worker’s dismissal to be considered valid, it must executed by employees if the employer is able to prove the
comply with both procedural and substantive due process. The following requisites, to wit: (1) the employee executes a deed
legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes procedural due of quitclaim voluntarily; (2) there is no fraud or deceit on the
process, while the legality of the act of dismissal constitutes part of any of the parties; (3) the consideration of the
substantive due process. Procedural due process in dismissal quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (4) the contract is
cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first recognized by law.
notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second notice FACTS:
informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. On account of lingering financial constraints, Goodrich gave
Before the issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a all its employees the option to voluntarily resign from the
hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an company. Several employees, including respondents,
opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing decided to avail of the voluntary resignation option.
be conducted. Substantive due process, on the other hand, Respondents were paid their separation pay and executed
requires that dismissal by the employer be made under a just or their respective waivers and quitclaims. The following day,
authorized cause under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code. In some of Goodrich’s former employees, including herein
this case, there was no written notice furnished to Respondents respondents, filed complaints against Goodrich for illegal
regarding the cause of their dismissal. Cosmoship furnished a dismissal with prayer for payment of their full monetary
written notice (telex) to Skippers, the local manning agency, benefits before the NLRC. Despite several conferences, no
claiming that Respondents were repatriated because the latter amicable settlement was reached by the parties. Labor
voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts. This telex was given rendered a Decision declaring that there was no illegal
credibility and weight by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding dismissal but held that petitioners were still liable to the
that there was pre-termination of the employment contract “akin respondents for their unpaid emergency cost of living
to resignation” and no illegal dismissal. However, as correctly allowance (ECOLA), 13th month pay, and service incentive
ruled by the CA, the telex message is “a biased and self-serving leave (SIL) pay.
document that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial
evidence.” If, indeed, Respondents voluntarily pre-terminated ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents may still receive the deficiency
amounts due them considering the release, waiver and
quitclaim signed by them.
RULING:
The Court has given effect to quitclaims executed by
employees if the employer is able to prove the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the employee executes a deed of
quitclaim voluntarily; (2) there is no fraud or deceit on the
part of any of the parties; (3) the consideration of the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (4) the contract is
not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
In a comment, respondents themselves admitted that they
were not coerced to sign the quitclaims. They, however,
maintain that two (2) reasons moved them to sign the said
documents: first, they believed Goodrich was terminating its
business on account of financial hardship; and second, they
thought petitioners will pay them the full amount of their
compensation.
The Court is not persuaded. First, the contents of the
quitclaim documents that have been signed by the
respondents are simple, clear and unequivocal.Second,
respondents claim that they were deceived because
petitioners did not really terminate their business since Mr.
Chua Goy had set up another company with the same line of
business as Goodrich. Such contention, however, was not
proven during the hearing before the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC. And third, the considerations received by the
respondents from Goodrich do not appear to be grossly
inadequate vis-à-vis what they should receive in full because
the amount computed by the Labor Arbiter was even lesser.