2015

University of
Aberystwyth

Alexander Moore

THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE:

ERWIN ROMMEL AND THE
DEUTSCHE AFRIKA KORPS
1941 - 1942
 DISSERTATION
DECLARATION FORM

This dissertation is the result of my own investigations, except where

otherwise stated.

Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes/endnotes giving explicit

references.

A bibliography is included.

Signature:
Alex Moore
………………………………………………………………………………

Name (Printed):
Alexander James Moore
………………………………………………………………………………

Student number:
120074761
………………………………………………………………………………

Date:
28/04/2015
………………………………………………………………………………
 Acknowledgements

Thanks to Professor Martin Alexander for the inspiration to write this dissertation,
Auzee Rosmadee and Jane Nixon for assisting my research and Professor Gerry
Hughes for being my advisor.
 Abstract

An in-depth analysis of the Deutsche Afrika Korps and their British Commonwealth
Opponents, this dissertation explain the core arguments of why the Afrika Korps was
able so successful in the North African Theatre of Operations. It will do this by
analysing the parameters that the Afrika Korps found itself operating in; firstly that
the German force had a superior leader in Erwin Rommel ‘The Desert Fox’
compared to the British Eighth Army that had been weakened by Churchill and the
Imperial General Staff with their decision to shift the focus in the Mediterranean from
North Africa to Greece. Secondly the Afrika Korps was better trained in combined
arms warfare and used better tactics that had been developed over the 1930’s and
perfected in the years of the war which included manoeuvre warfare; bypassing and
isolating enemy strongpoints to engage the more vulnerable supply, communication
and command positions behind the front. This paper also looks at the central role of
logistics in the North African campaign; that the British by methodically building up
their supplies before going on the offensive gave the initiative back to the Afrika
Korps and allowed them to continue their offensives even when their overextended
supply lines should have forced them to halt, by looting and capturing supplies.
 Contents

Introduction Pg. 1 - 6
An account laying out the main arguments and context of what this dissertation is about

Chapters:
I: Commanders and Officers Pg. 7 - 18
Erwin Rommel and his role in the campaign, compared to the other Generals in North Africa

II: Troops, Tactics and Strategy Pg. 19 - 31

The Afrika Korps tactics, strategy and training, contrasted to the British Commonwealth

III: Logistics and Materiel Pg. 32 - 42

An analysis highlighting the role of logistics in the struggles of the Afrika Korps

Conclusion Pg. 43 - 45
Summing up the main points of the dissertation and an explanation of the opinion reached

Appendices Pg. 46 - 52
A section of acronyms and subsidiary information not relevant to the core arguments

Bibliography Pg. 53 - 61
A list of works consulted and cited in this dissertation
 Introduction

During the early hours of the 31st August 1942, it must have appeared to the British
22nd Armoured Brigade that the forward elements of the German 15th Panzer
division, who had been advancing north towards the heights of Alam El Halfa, were
heading into a crushing ambush. The British commander, Brigadier Roberts was in
control of a large force that had been fighting over the course of the North African
campaign including the men of the 5th Royal Tank Regiment, 4th County of London
yeomanry and the 1st tank; who’s M3 Grants were hull down (Appendix A)
in firing
positions dug by bulldozers to protect their vulnerable lower hulls1.

In front of this formidable formation were sited the antitank guns, the 6 pounder
(Appendix A)
(57mm) high velocity cannons of The Rifle Brigade and RHA, all of this
firepower was further supported on the right flank by a battery of 25 pounders from
the 1st RHA and held by Roberts in reserve were the Scots Greys, another armoured
regiment that had been loaned to the Brigadier for the coming battle. The tank men
and infantrymen on the front did not know it yet but this was the prelude to the
decisive Second battle of El Alamein, the turning point of the campaign in North
Africa2.

Within a short time tanks on both sides were burning, tracer fire zipping back and
forth, and with the light failing the German forces retired to regroup and repair. This
respite was short lives as the Royal Air Force dropped bright flares and bombs on
the rallying German troops, forcing them to withdraw and for their commander to shift
to the defensive3.

All of this took place in a period of fierce logistical problems for the German
commander Erwin Rommel, his armoured forces were low on fuel, his artillery was
(Appendix A)
rationing ammo and the RAF was seriously damaging his truck convoys
travelling along the single coastal road to the front from Tripoli and Benghazi. It’s

1
Urban, M (2013) The Tank War, Abacus, London, Page 141 - 142
2
For a more detailed account of the battle of Alam el Halfa from the perspective of the men
of the 5th Royal Tank Regiment please consult Mark Urban’s (2013) ‘The Tank War’,
Abacus, London
3
Schmidt, H (1951) With Rommel In The Desert, Harrap, London, Page 177 – 180

~1~
remarkable that over the course of the North African campaign, Rommel’s small
expeditionary force was able to inflict and receive such damage to and from the
experienced British forces, given their relative inexperience in desert warfare and
difficulties that they were to encounter.4

It is in the spirit of this that this dissertation was written to answer the question of why
the Afrika Korps was able to perform so well given the difficulties they encountered.
It will do this by analysing the role of the commanders and officers, training and
tactics, and finally the logistics of both the British and German forces in North Africa.

Assumptions, arguments and sources of research

The boundaries of any study of the North Africa campaign need to be clearly defined;
therefore this paper will analyse the period prior to the American invasion of French
Algeria in 1942 at the end of the Second Battle of El Alamein, and will concentrate
on the German and British Commonwealth forces. It has also made two assumptions
about the North African campaign that are central to the understanding of this
dissertation:

1. That even with German plans for the occupation of Gibraltar, French North-West
Africa and their adjacent islands; it was within the eastern Mediterranean, if
anywhere, that the war against Britain could have been won.

2. That the initial axis advance would have been limited to the South, i.e. Libya and
Egypt. Any attack through Turkey would have been met with Soviet resistance and
then developed into a full German-Soviet war, before the Germans were ready for
Operation Barbarossa. (Appendix A)5

This will allow the dissertation to ignore the political difficulties involved in
cooperation with Italy, France, Spain and Turkey and to focus instead on the main

4
For a full history of the North African campaign please consult Ronald Lewin’s The Life and
Death of the Afrika Korps (1977), Book Club Associates, London
5
Van Creveld, M (2004) Supplying War, Cambridge University Press, New York, Page 182

~2~
research question, of why the Africa Korp was able to be as successful as it was,
given the difficulties they were to encounter.6

The core arguments this dissertation will make are:

1. That by stripping the British Commonwealth forces in North Africa of vital

manpower and materiel at a time when they could have decisively defeated the
Italian’s in North Africa, Churchill left them in a defensive position unable to repel the
German Expeditionary Force’s initial blitzkrieg offensives. By the time those forces
were made available to the myriad of British commanders in the Mediterranean, the
Afrika Korps had learned valuable lessons which allowed it to survive and succeed.

2. The German system taught troops of all branches how to operate as part of
combined arms battlegroups, this gave the German commanders the tools they
required to overcome the British system of regimental speciality and competition,
especially with regard to infantry-armoured cooperation.

3. The strategic successes by the officers of the Africa Korps and especially Rommel
were reinforced by the élan of the Wehrmacht soldiers that came from their fighting
qualities, early successes and personality of their commanders, something the
numerous British commanders were unable to replicate until the appearance of
Montgomery in 1942.

4. Most important and central to this dissertation is the argument that logistics, during
both the preparation and operations, played a vital and deciding role for both sides in
the North African campaign.7

This dissertation makes use of the account provided by Heinz Werner Schmidt,
(Appendix A)
Rommel’s ADC in his 1951 memoir ‘With Rommel In The Desert’ as a
primary source, which is fantastic alongside the other works I have included as it
provides a first-hand account of the African campaign by an officer who was close to
Rommel and is able to add a new depth and personal details on both officers, troops
6
Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 182
7
Ibid, Page 181 – 201

~3~
and military actions. This work had some changes made since it was published in
South Africa including (as the publisher notes) in style, spelling and grammar but this
has not affected the meaning or usefulness of the source.8

This dissertation has also made great use of Ronald Lewin’s 1977 analysis of the
North African campaign ‘The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps’, Lewin makes
comparisons regarding the similarities between the British Commonwealth and their
German opposites. In the introduction to his work he talks about his experiences as
an artilleryman in the 8th army,9 when I began using his work I was slightly
concerned that it would be biased as a result of his experiences but thankfully it
provided a very informed, scientific almost, account.

He has analysed all the parameters in which the Afrika Korps operated including:

 Quality of training and opponent

 Quality of Germany’s allies
 Equipment
 Supply and logistics
 Leadership – both in the field and in the changing political-military situation set
by both Berlin and Rome.

Van Creveld’s ‘Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton’ is a

meticulously researched study of the impact played by Logistics in warfare, drawing
on a wide variety of primary sources, it examines the rarely explored role of supply:
namely the problems of movement and appropriation, transport and administration.
Can Creveld casts his net far and wide subjecting all the operations he covers to
thorough analysis through the perspective of logistics.

At first glance, trying to explore the field of logistics through a limited number of
specific examples seems a bit ineffective. ‘Supplying War’ tries to use textbook
examples and simplified mathematics to explain real life situations, even Rommel

8
Schmidt, With Rommel In The Desert, Insert 4 (Publishers Note)
9
Lewin, R (1977) The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, Book Club Associates, London,
Page 10

~4~
wouldn’t have tried his dash to the Suez if he had been given the calculations that
are shown in this book; he just didn’t have enough fuel and trucks. This book does
not try to explain the general theory of logistics; there is not a general theory, what it
does show are idealised models that are useful in specific historical and
technological situations.

‘The Tank War’ by Mark Urban is the account of the 5th Tank ‘Regiment’ over the
course of World War Two, from the Fall of France to the final dash to Hamburg in
1945. One often cited soldier in both the book and this dissertation is Sergeant
Wardrop, In November 1941 after narrowly escaping his tank which in the midst of a
battle had been crippled he writes: ‘It wasn’t a very healthy position to be in’ (…) ‘but
it could have been worse; at least it wasn’t raining.’10 Anecdotes like these have
allowed me to analysis the troops fighting the North African campaign through the
human perspective, as well as the cold logic of logistics.

The 5th tanks were on the front line throughout the Second World War. They served
as part of the Desert Rats, before returning to Europe as part of Operation Neptune.
Mark Urban draws on a huge store of new primary sources, from interviews with
surviving soldiers to material from archives; as the book states “It is not just the story
of a battle-hardened unit, but something more extraordinary: the triumph of ordinary
men, against long odds, in the darkest of times’.11

Aiming to tell the story of the Second World War through the eyes of one unit, Mark
Urban decided to study the 5th battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment, by selecting
one small group, and weaving their stories into the evolution of their tanks and of
military strategy, Urban has composed a narrative that presents the familiar story of
the war from a shocking and new perspective. A tank crew’s survival depended
extensively on their machines. We see these machines evolve from cleverly
designed, but hopelessly unreliable British machines at the beginning of the
campaign, through more reliable and mass-produced American models like the M5
‘Honey’ Light Tank that were spacious with petrol engines that had a much longer

10
Lewin, The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, Page 85
11
Urban, The Tank War, Back cover

~5~
range; but which tended to burn like firelighters when hit, to finally the highly evolved
compromises of fire-power, armour and speed like M4 ‘Sherman’ medium tank.

‘Tank War’ is unsparing in its analysis of the performance of the tank crews, and the
gradual onset of battle fatigue is delineated with great care; Wardrop writes: ‘I
discovered that I was having some difficulty in swallowing and in keeping a muscle in
my knee from twitching’.12 In 1944 Wardrop’s account gives a very human answer to
the men of the 5th Tanks reasons for refusing to take the much safer position’s away
from the front: ‘There are a crowd of us, who have been in tanks since we came
here, and at different times we could all have had easy jobs on transport, but not one
has ever taken it. I know why I have not, and I suppose the others think the same. It
is because of (…) all the others who have gone; it is a trust we have left, and if I
stopped now I would never hold my head up again.’13

From Urban’s vivid work, it is possible to conclude that the British system, it’s
individualised nature of the regimental system, was both toxic to the efficient waging
of modern combined arms war, and yet absolutely essential in fostering the vital
bonds that held these people together under fire, in the one of the harshest of
environments possible.

This study will examine how Erwin Rommel was ideally suited to be commander of
the Afrika Korps, his experiences in the Italian campaign of World War One and his
approach to warfare. Then looking at the Afrika Korps; their training in combined
arms warfare, tactics and equipment, and how these helped instil them with a drive
and élan that the Eighth Army was unable to match with its individualised regimental
system. Before finally and centrally looking at the role of supplies in the successes of
the Afrika Korps, looking at how the methodical build up by the British often gave the
initiative away and allowed the Eight Army to be outmanoeuvred by the German
forces.

12
Urban, The Tank War, Page 250
13
Ibid, Page 210

~6~
 Chapter One: The Commanders and officers

Introduction

The Afrika Korps was initially deployed under Hitler’s Directive No. 22 as a

Sperrverband (blocking force)14 in support of the Italian forces in Libya who had been
routed by the British Commonwealth’s Western Desert Force on the 9th December
194015. Hitler handpicked Erwin Rommel to be their commander and he arrived in
Libya on 12th February 1941. He initially commanded the 5th Light Division made up
of the 5th leichte (Light) “Afrika” Panzer Regiment, along with the second regiment of
the 3rd Panzer division and various sub units for water treatment, medical care and
other support functions. In late April and early May of 1941 the 5th light Division were
joined by the 15th Panzer Division from Italy, though this was not until after Rommel
had launched his counter-offensive, re-taken most of Cyrenaica, began the siege of
Tobruk and gone back on the defensive.

Erwin Rommel

Erwin Rommel was a highly decorated officer of the First World War, he’d proved
himself as a small unit commander in the 6th Württemberg Infantry Regiment,
capturing 1,500 men and 43 officers with just 3 riflemen and 2 officers. He earned
the Pour le Mérite (Appendix A) for his exploits on the Italian Front as well as a reputation
for great courage and tactical aptitude16 as part of the Württemberg Mountain
Battalion of the Alpenkorps.(Appendix A)
In World War Two, he would go on to
distinguish himself even further as commander of the 7th ‘Ghost’ Panzer Division
during the invasion of France, so named because of its rapid movements few knew
exactly where the division was. It was however during his command of the German
and Italian forces in the North African Campaign that he was to be established as
one of the most able commanders of the war, and especially of desert warfare, It

14
Lewin, Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, Page 16
15
Playfair, I (2004) The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. III: British Fortunes reach their
Lowest Ebb (September 1941 to September 1942), History of the Second World War, Naval
& Military Press, Uckfield, Page 271
16
Stone, N (2008) World War One: A Short History, Penguin Books, London, Page 146

~7~
was also during the fighting in Cyrenaica that he earned the title of the Desert Fox
from the British Press ‘cunning, ubiquitous, fast-moving’.17

On the 6th February 1941, Rommel was unexpectedly recalled from leave and
instructed at Hitler’s HQ by the Fuhrer himself that he was to proceed to Libya to
take command of a small German expeditionary force that would be arriving shortly.
Operation Sonnenblume (Sunflower) was devised and put in place to stabilise the
routing Italian forces. It strictly laid down that German units be employed as a whole
force under one commander rather than being scattered across a wide front, this
(Appendix A)
gave Rommel an incredible amount of freedom from the OKW , “Hitler
intended for the Afrika Korps to be a stone wall: Rommel made it an avalanche,
moving under laws of its own”18

Though Rommel and his troops were nominally subordinate to their Italian superiors
as Generalleutnant (Lieutenant General) of the Afrika Korps19, Rommel treated his
counterparts with what could only be described as contempt20, potentially as a result
of his World War One experiences on the Italian front.21 During battles he frequently
disregarded their views and orders, and regularly decided not to inform them of his
own operations. Whilst he held the Italian High Command in distain, he did hold
several individual Italian senior officers in very high regard22 and often went out of his
was to commend regimental soldiers for their hard work or courageous actions,
regardless of nationality.23 When it came to tactics and strategic thought he found
Italian doctrine too static, cautious and defensive, and so continued to act as a law to
himself.24

17
Schmidt, With Rommel In The Desert, Page 65
18
Lewin, Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, Page 16
19
Lyman, R (2010) The Longest Siege: Tobruk - The Battle That Saved North Africa,
Macmillan, Oxford, Page 83
20
Liddell Hart, B (1963) The Rommel Papers, Collins, London, Page 262
21
Rommel, E (2013) Infantry Attacks, Pen and Sword Books Ltd, Barnsley, Page 224 - 226
22
Schmidt, With Rommel In The Desert, Page 83
23
Ibid, Page 68
24
Lewin, Life and Death of the Afrika Korps , Page 32

~8~
The Ghost: Rommel’s approach to warfare

What is worthy of study is how Rommel was able to exert an almost hypnotic
influence over not only his own troops but also those of the British Commonwealth
forces in the Eighth army,25 the war in the desert was as much a battle of personality
as of arms. Rommel was an excellent tactical commander, being both versatile and
aggressive. He was adept at using terrain and intelligence to his advantage in
seeking out and exploiting enemy weaknesses.

Rommel set out his approach in Infanterie Greift An (Infantry Attacks), his memoirs
and day to day journal from the First World War, used throughout the Western World
as a resource for tactical infantry movements. General Patton was among the many
that were reported to have read Rommel’s work.26

During fighting at the French town of Bleid early in World War One as a platoon
commander Rommel was faced by a French unit that had set up defences in a
farmhouse at the entrance to the town. He had two options: ‘Should I wait until other
forces came up or storm the entrance of Bleid with my platoon? The latter course of
action seemed proper’.27 He utilised shock troop tactics that emphasised small
team’s moving fast, it was important for these attacks to be launched with the
intention of deceiving the enemy as to the point of the attack while the main body of
the force moved round the flank, followed by a deep penetration and exploitation.

Between the World Wars Rommel served in various positions; including War Ministry
liaison with the Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth) and as commandant of the War Academy
at Wiener Neustadt.28 During the Polish campaign in September 1939 Rommel
served as the head of Hitler’s personal guard; the Führerbegleitbrigade.29 As a
Swabian(Appendix A)
Rommel felt uncomfortable around the traditional Prussian

25
Lyman, The Longest Siege, Page 82 - 83
26
Patton, G.S (1995) War as I knew it, Mariner Books, Boston, Page 166
27
Rommel, Infantry Attacks, Page 9
28
Schmidt, With Rommel In The Desert, Page 85
29
Lewin, Ronald (1998) Rommel As Military Commander, Barnes and Noble, New York,
Page 9

~9~
aristocracy that dominated the German high command30/31, electing instead to serve
as a frontline officer.

Following the Polish Campaign, Rommel asked for his commission to be transferred
to the Regular Army.32 He was given command of 7th Panzer Division, one of the four
light divisions he had seen while with Hitler in Poland that were being built up to full
panzer division strength.33/34 Although Rommel had no training or practical
experience in tank warfare,35 his successes in World War One were based on
surprise and manoeuvre, two elements central to armoured warfare.36

Their speed and mobility had appealed to him, and the decision to give him
command of a Panzer division was soon shown to have been an excellent one.
During the push into France when the German attack stalled along the River Meuse
due to French destroyed bridges, artillery and rifle fire, Rommel brought up his tanks
and light flak units to provide suppressive counter-fire. Several houses upwind were
set afire to improve a smoke screen for his infantry who were sent forward in rubber
boats. Appropriating bridging material from the neighbouring 5 th Panzer Division,
Rommel himself aided his engineers in lashing together the pontoons constructing a
bridge across which the 7th Panzer were able to use to cross the Meuse, moving out
of the Ardennes and into the heart of France. This speed of action was central to
Rommel’s approach to warfare, tactical with a focus on speed and movement.37

The Fighting Fox: Rommel in the North African campaign

Rommel landed in Libya on 12th February 1941 where he immediately took

command of the Afrika Korps that was preparing to land in Tripoli, rather than waiting
for the full force to arrive he began launching offensive operations immediately

30
Lewin, Rommel As Military Commander, Page 1
31
Hoffman, Karl (2004) Erwin Rommel, Brassey's, London, Page 92
32
Ibid, Page 16
33
Schmidt, With Rommel In The Desert, Page 75
34
Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, Page 10 - 13
35
von Luck, H (1989) Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck,
Random House, New York, Page 35
36
Hoffman, Erwin Rommel, Page 114
37
von Luck, Panzer Commander, Page 38

~ 10 ~
sending his reconnaissance forces of the 5th Light Regiment and the 2nd regiment of
the 3rd Panzer Division forward in a probing attack that rapidly developed into a
general offensive that drove the British Commonwealth forces out of Tripolitania, a
region of modern day Libya (Figure 1, Page 12).

To outwit British Intelligence Rommel used some of his supply trucks covered in
tarpaulin to disguise them as Panzers and got his forces to put up large amounts of
dust to make their numbers appear much greater, Heinz Schmidt writes; “Was it
possible that his (Rommel’s) dummy panzers, knocked together out of wood and
canvas, had actually bluffed the enemy’s air reconnaissance into believing that we
intended to launch a major offensive? (...) He exploited the situation to the utmost.
He improvised two attacks – one along the coast towards Benghazi by Italian troops,
the other a German thrust towards Mechili (...) Now it was imperative that the truth
should not be discovered. Rommel’s order was: ‘Panzers to the head of all
formations. Rear vehicles to raise dust, nothing but dust!’ Who in the desert could
distinguish more than the leading vehicles of a column, if in the rear the dust clouds
rose thick and turbulent?”38

In Rommel we have an officer ideally suited to leading the fledgling German desert
expeditionary force and who was central to the success of the Afrika Korps. Rommel
deserves his reputation as one of the greatest commanders of the war.

38
Schmidt, With Rommel In The Desert, Page 27 - 28

~ 11 ~
Figure 1: Showing the initial German attack that rapidly developed39. With the
initiative handed to the German’s it was vital for commanders at every level to have
all the tools they required: the armour available as the spear tip, with the anti-tank
guns and infantry ready to act as a defensive shield if they were counter attacked by
mechanised forces.40

Italo Gariboldi

Italo Gariboldi was originally from Lombardy, Italy. From the end of World War One
and during the interwar years rose in the ranks, holding various staff, regimental and
brigade level commands. In 1935 he fought in the Italian invasion of Abyssinia until
the 1st June 1936 when Eritrea, Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland were joined
together to form the colony of Italian East Africa.

In December 1940, when the British forces launched Operation Compass Italo
Gariboldi was in temporary command of the Italian 10th army as General Mario Berti,
its commander, was on sick leave. Ultimately Gariboldi took full command of the 10th
army after its virtual destruction by the British and General Berti’s replacement was
killed in action. A few months later on March 25th 1941 after a series of shocking
losses for the Italian army at the hands of the Western Desert Force, following an

39
Image showing the German movements during Rommel’s initial advance, Available here:
[Link]
40
Urban, The Tank War, Page 52

~ 12 ~
initial tentative advance by a large force of Italian infantry and light tanks along the
single coastal road that was easily intercepted by the small British Commonwealth
Force,41 which not only halted but succeeded in routing the Italian army in North
Africa. Gariboldi was promoted to Governor-General of Libya, replacing Marshal
Rodolfo Graziani,42 Graziani had believed that all of Tripolitania must be surrendered
except for the main defensive fortifications of Tripoli itself, this was obviously
unacceptable to Rome and the Duce, Mussolini.

Gariboldi’s tenure as commander of the Italian forces in North Africa was to be short
lived as by July 19th 1941 he himself was relieved of command because of his
alleged lack of cooperation with Rommel; Gariboldi was unenthusiastic about a
forward defence of Tripolitania.43 General Ettore Bastico took his place.

Ettore Bastico

Ettore Bastico was born in Bologna, Italy; He served in the Italian army during World
War One as a lieutenant of the 3rd Bersaglieri Division.44 (Appendix A)
After the war he
remained in the army, being promoted to Generale di brigata (Brigadier) in 1928. As
Brigadier, Bastico was critically analysed by the American Theorist Giulio Douhet,
who examined the six ‘basic theories’ that Bastico put forward and how those related
to the future of an independent Italian air force’s role in a conflict.45

On the 29th May 1932 Bastico was promoted to Major General, and commanded the
1st Blackshirt Division, a Fascist militia unit, during the invasion of Abyssinia. In 1935
he was the commander of the III Corps in Ethiopia and on 10 th February 1936 he
was promoted to Generale di corpo d’armata (lieutenant general).

41
Kennedy, P (1989) The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers: Economic Change And
Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000, Fontana Press, London, Page 441
42
Lyman, The Longest Siege, Page 83
43
Schmidt, With Rommel In The Desert, Page 66 - 67
44
Mitcham, S (2007) Rommel's Desert War: The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps,
Stackpole books, Pennsylvania, Page 20 - 31
45
Douhet, G (2013) The Command of the Air, Office of Air Force History, Washington D.C,
Page 263 – 269

~ 13 ~
Between 1936 and 1937 Eltore Bastico commanded the corpo truppe volonarie
(Italian volunteer corps), in support of the nationalists during the later stages of the
Spanish Civil War. His force fought in the Battle of Santander, a decisive victory for
the Nationalists. In October 1937 Bastico received the rank of General and was
replaced in Spain by Mario Berti, the volunteer corps left Spain in February 1939.

Bastico was then assigned to the 2nd Army before taking command of the newly
motorised 6th army in 1939, stationed in the Po Valley, Italy. During the Second
World War, Bastico was made Governor-General of the Aegean Islands and
promoted to full General on 7th August 1940.

On 19th July 1941 he was named commander over all the Axis forces in North
Africa,46 this was later reduced to just commander of troops in Libya after Rommel
was made commander of the Panzerarmee Afrika, Ugo Cavallero taking command
of all forces further east in North Africa. He was promoted to Marshal on 12nd
August 1942 but the loss of Libya on 2nd February 1943 left him without a command
for the rest of the war.

Claude Auchinleck

Auchinleck served as an officer in the British Army during the First World War;
deployed with his regiment to defend the Suez Canal against Turkish attacks,
earning the Distinguished Service Order for his service,47 finishing the war with the
rank of lieutenant colonel. Following his role during the 1930’s/early 1940’s as
Commander in Chief of the Indian Army, Auchinleck was appointed to the post of
Commander in Chief Middle East Command, succeeding General Archibald Wavell
on 15th July 1941,48 Wavell took up Auchinleck’s former post in India.49

46
Schmidt, With Rommel In The Desert, Page 80
47
Heathcote, T (1999) The British Field Marshalls 1736 – 1997, UK Pen and Sword,
Barnsley, Page 30
48
The London Gazette, 11th July 1941 (Supplement), Retrieved from here:
[Link]
49
The London Gazette, 15th August 1941 (Issue), Retrieved from here:
[Link]

~ 14 ~
In November of 1941 Auchinleck launched Operation: Crusader, an offensive aimed
at relieving Tobruk and driving the Germans back. Despite some setbacks Tobruk
was successfully relieved and Rommel obligated to withdraw back to El Agheila.
Auchinleck however incorrectly believed that Rommel was ‘on the ropes’,50 He writes
in late January 1942 how the Axis forces were “Beginning to feel the strain” and that
British Commonwealth forces were making sure they continued to be “hard
pressed".51 The reality for Rommel and his troops however was that the Afrika Korps
had withdrawn in good order, were able to reorganise and reinforce which allowed
them to strike back at the now dispersed and weakened British Forces, driving them
all the way back to their positions near Tobruk at Gazala52. Alan Brooke, Chief of the
British Imperial General Staff, wrote in his war diaries that the Battle of Gazala was
“Nothing less than bad generalship on the part of Auchinleck”53

It wasn’t just his handling of Operation Crusader and the subsequent German
offensive that many disapproved of, Auchinleck also appointed a number of officers
who were unsuitable to their roles and this ultimately led to his downfall. Among
them his Chief of Staff Major-General Dorman Smith, whom was regarded with
considerable distrust by many of Auchinleck’s senior British commanders. In the
footnote of Brooke’s war diary entry of 30th January 19420 he writes that
"Auchinleck, to my mind, had most of the qualifications to make him one of the finest
of commanders, but unfortunately he lacked the most important of all – the ability to
select the men to serve him."54

Auchinleck took direct command of the British Commonwealth’s Eighth Army on 24 th

June 1942; he had lost confidence in its commander Neil Ritchie. He withdrew his
forces to the more easily defensible El Alamein position and tailored a defence that
took advantage of both the limiting terrain and the troops that he had at his disposal.
He managed to hold the exhausted Italo-German offensive at the First Battle of El
Alamein. As he had a considerable advantage in material and manpower over the

50
Brooke, A (2001) War Diaries: 1939 – 1945, Phoenix Press, Cheshire, Page 225
51
Stewart, A (2010) The Early Battle of the Eighth Army: Crusader to the Alamein Line 1941
- 1942, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, Page 46
52
Heathcote, British Field Marshalls, Page 32
53
Brooke, War Diaries, Page 225
54
Brooke, War Diaries, Page 225

~ 15 ~
weakened German and Italian forces, however Auchinleck then proceeded to
organise a series of counter-offensives that were poorly conceived and coordinated,
which achieved little.55

Like his opponent Rommel, Auchinleck was subjected to constant political

interference, having to deal with a barrage of hectoring telegrams and instruction
from the Prime Minister Winston Churchill, through late 1941 to the summer of 1942.
Churchill constantly pressed for Auchinleck to be on the offensive; even pushing for
a counter attack immediately after the eighth army had all but exhausted itself during
the first battle of El Alamein. By August 1942 Auchinleck had lost the confidence of
both Churchill and Brooke,56/57 and he was replaced by General Alexander as
Commander in Chief Middle East Command58 and by Lieutenant-General Bernard
Montgomery59 as field commander of the Eighth Army.

Bernard Montgomery

Montgomery served during the First World War as a junior officer in the Royal
Warwickshire Regiment where he was shot through the right lung by a sniper. For
which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order, the citation read:
“Conspicuous gallant leading on 13th October, when he turned the enemy out of
their trenches with the bayonet. He was severely wounded”.60 Montgomery ended
the First World War as Chief of Staff for the 47th (2nd London) Division. During the
(Appendix A)
1930’s he served as a battalion commander in Alexandria, On 13th August
1942 He was appointed as field commander of the Eighth Army after William Gott,
the officer originally intended to take over as commander, was killed flying back to
Cairo.61/62

55
Barr, N (2005) Pendulum Of War: Three Battles at El Alamein, Pimlico, New York,
Pages 83 – 184
56
Urban, The Tank War, Page 64
57
Brooke, War Diaries, Page 297
58
Heathcote, British Field Marshalls, Page 33
59
The London Gazette, 22nd July 1941 (Supplement), Retrieved from here:
[Link]
60
The London Gazette, 1 December 1914 (Issue), Retrieved from here:
[Link]
61
Schmidt, With Rommel in the desert, Page 165

~ 16 ~
The effect that Montgomery had on the Eighth Army was remarkable. As previously
stated the war in the desert was as much a battle of personality as of arms, and
Montgomery was able to radically transform the fighting spirit and abilities of his
troops.63 Upon taking command on 13th August 1942, he immediately became a
whirlwind of activity. He created the X corps, an all the armoured formation, which
fought alongside his XIII, the renamed Western Desert Force, and XXX corps. The
only common commander for Montgomery’s infantry and armour corps was himself
as the Eighth Army’s field commander. Correlli Barnett, an English military historian,
wrote that Montgomery’s solution “Was in every way opposite to Auchinleck’s and in
every way wrong, for it carried the existing dangerous separatism still further”.64
Churchill was worried about his decision to promote Montgomery, even going so far
during the Second battle of El Alamein as to rail "Is it really impossible to find a
general who can win a battle?”.65

Montgomery was determined the Army, Navy and Air Force should fight their battles
in a unified, focused manner and all in accordance to a detailed plan. He
immediately reinforced Alam el Halfa, a vital position that dominated the heights just
behind his own lines, correctly assuming this would be the next major objective for
Rommel.

Montgomery visited his troops on the front as often as possible, making himself
known to his men. Although he arrived in the desert wearing a standard British
Commonwealth officer’s cap, he very quickly switched to wearing a black beret that
was offered to him by his driver Jim Fraser on one such inspection tour,66 adding the
badge of the Royal tank Regiment alongside his British General Officer’s badge.
Montgomery nearly equalled Rommel in his cult of personality, showing how
intelligence and morale are important for warfare in the desert.

62
Playfair, (2004) History of the Second World War, Page 367 – 369
63
Ibid, Page 370
64
Barnett, C (1960) The Desert General, Cassell, London, Page 265
65
Vivian, C (2000) The Western Desert of Egypt: An Explorer's Handbook, American
University Press, Cairo p.278
66
Oxton, T (2013) Jim Fraser obituary, available here:
[Link]

~ 17 ~
The next chapter will look at the subjects more relevant to the average British or
Wehrmacht soldier, how they were trained, waged warfare and the tactics employed
in the desert by both sides specifically in relation to armoured warfare and combined
arms. These are very important factors for considering why the Afrika Korps was
able to do so well during the North African campaign.

~ 18 ~
 Chapter Two: Troops, Tactics and Strategy

Introduction

In the previous chapter we spoke of the crucial role that the commanders played in
shaping the nature and style of the North African campaign. We are now going to
analyse how the British forces and their German opponents adopted different
solutions for the tactical and strategic problems posed by the North African theatre of
operations.

Both sides adopted elements of combined arms warfare, an approach to operations

that aimed to give the commanders all the tools required to concentrate combat
forces and achieve mutually complimentary effects greater than that which would
have been possible had they been used separately or sequentially. Combined arms
included close artillery fire, air support and cooperation between tank and infantry
forces.

When the Afrika Korps began its first offensives in March 1941 it met only partially
trained British troops equipped with worn out equipment whose commander,
Auchinleck, under pressure from Churchill was having to constantly contemplate and
launch offensives without having the time to properly plan or analyse previous
mistakes. The British army troops in the early months of the North African were often
squandered before they had the chance to fully acclimatise to the desert
environment in which they were deployed, as the British Official history observed in
its comments on the first battle of El Alamein, “the German soldier always seemed
capable of making one more supreme effort”.67

The Germans on the other hand were deployed to North Africa with a developed
system of combined arms battlegroups, flexible commanders and variable tactics to
concentrate combat power, This was achieved as a result of battle drills and training

67
Lewin, The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, Page 147

~ 19 ~
carried out in the interwar years and the experiences gained prior to their desert
deployment.

The hammer and the anvil: German combined arms operations

The main purpose of the tank is to carry out operational envelopments and turning
movements in the open field; to act at the tactical level, making breakthroughs, which
theoretically would allow the commanders to destroy the enemy in a decisive
Vernichtungsschlacht (battle of annihilation).68 The commanders and Officers of the
Afrika Korps were keen to break the imposed stalemate in North Africa and make a
speedy and far reaching movement allowed for a swift and decisive advancement in
the battle.69 Tanks, and other mechanised forces, were no longer constrained by the
other arms of the German military, at this period in the Second World War artillery
had the ability to be towed by powered vehicles or mounted into armoured and self-
propelled carriages so no longer did tanks have to wait for horse drawn artillery to
redeploy or catch up. As Guderian writes in Achtung-Panzer! “The tank must not
follow the artillery, but the other way round”.70

The combined arms structure of a German Division, having tanks, infantry, artillery
and support units formed together, exists to bring the armour and infantry forces into
action against the enemy with sufficient fire power and shock.

The key elements of the offensive are:

1. Surprise and speed
2. Superiority in force
3. Employment of armour71/72

68
Frieser, K and Greenwood, J (2005) The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the
West, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Page 6
69
Guderian, H (1999) Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare, Cassell, London,
Page 168
70
Ibid, Page 169
71
Atkinson, R (2003) An Army At Dawn, Abacus, St Ives, Page 102
72
Military Intelligence Division (1943) Handbook on German Military Forces, Available here:
[Link]

~ 20 ~
Once launched, the attack had to drive straight on to its objective regardless of
opposition. Coordination between the combined arms was an absolute requisite to
the success of these shock tactics. This became truer over the course of the North
African campaign as the British forces developed more effective antitank weapons
and adopted deeper defences, limiting the self-sufficiency of the German
mechanised forces73 especially during the battles for El Alamein. Germany
attempted to counter this by increasing the mobility and armour protection of their
mechanised forces, and having a portion of their direct and indirect heavy support
weapons on self-propelling carriages.74

An attack on a narrow section of front must have armament in sufficient quantities to

enable a widening of the penetration while maintaining the speed of advance and
protection of the flanks of the penetrating forces; however the Germans realised that
even the largest concentrations of forces were not always sufficient for overwhelming
superiority along the entire front. They would therefore select a point of Schwerpunkt
(main effort) for the breakthrough, at which they massed the bulk of their heavy
weapons and reserves. The other frontline sectors were engaged by weaker,
diversionary forces to distract the enemy from the main objectives.75

When selecting the main point, the Germans considered weaknesses in the enemy’s
defensive position, suitability of the terrain for a breakthrough and exploitation: with
consideration for tanks and combined arms battle groups, approach routes; and
possibilities for supporting fire, especially artillery. If any of the diversionary attacks
meet with unexpected success then the Germans had drawn up plans to allow them
to shift forces to that sector, alongside ensuring sufficient reserves under a strong
unified command.

Most of the German successes in the build up to the Second Battle of El Alamein
were achieved with armoured and mechanised formations76. The original German
blitzkrieg tactics were based on the belief in the irresistible power of tank formations

73
Schmidt, With Rommel in the desert, Page 147 - 148
74
Military Intelligence, Handbook on German Forces
75
Ibid
76
Schmidt, With Rommel in the desert, Page 187

~ 21 ~
working independently supported by aerial dive-bombers. By the time of El Alamein
the offensive tactics were less bold than they had been in the September of 1939 but
the fundamental theories behind them had changed remarkably little. 77

Armoured tactics stressed tank-mechanised infantry cooperation; each requiring the

support of the other as unlimited Luftwaffe support was not guaranteed to be at the
Afrika Korps command in North Africa. This cooperation failed during the battle of
Alam el Halfa78 and the wider First Battle of El Alamein in 1942, the limited number
of tanks and artillery provided to the Afrika Korps meant that the punch wasn’t
sufficient to break through decisively which led to much greater losses as reserves
were drip fed in and British reserves were deployed to counter attack. Rommel writes
in one of his letters “A kind of apathy took hold of us as we issued orders for all
positions to be held on instruction from the highest authority. I forced myself to this
action”,79 this push by Hitler which forced the Afrika Korps to penetrate through the
British lines cost the Germans five hundred tanks, leaving Rommel in a perilous
position of having just twelve operational by 4th November 1942.80

The main brunt of the major German attacks was borne by the Panzer corps, a
combined arms mixed group of tanks, mechanised forces and artillery. Where
Infantry divisions were employed singularly they were limited to local attacks on a
minor scale or mopping up in the rear of the Panzer corps. Unsurprisingly during the
North African campaign the Germans were unable to contemplate a full-scale attack
by Infantry formations on fixed defences. German tactics were to outflank or encircle
the main area of the enemy defences with tank formations and to have the infantry
roll up the defences from the rear.

The three main tactics and methods of exploitation used by the Afrika Korps and the
Wehrmacht are:

77
Military Intelligence, Handbook on German Forces
78
Liddell Hart, B.H (1970) A History of the Second World War, Cassell, Oxford, Page 369 –
376
79
Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, Page 320 - 4
80
Schmidt, With Rommel in the desert, Page 177

~ 22 ~
 1) Flankenangriff: Flank attack

The most effective attack, it moves in against the enemy’s flanks; the right or left side
of the enemy. The flank attack develops either through a turning movement or from
flank marches. It attempts to surprise the enemy and permit him no time for
countermeasures. Since mobility and surprise are required, the flank attack is most
successful when launched from a long distance as it hinders enemy observation and
reconnaissance; however the troop movements needed for this type of attack can be
executed up close but only with favourable terrain or at night where the movements
would be hidden from the enemy. Attacks on both flanks were only achievable when
the German forces were considered superior.81 North Africa provided ideal
circumstances as terrain was not a limiting factor for the manoeuvres, for example
the Battle of Gazala (Figure 2, Page 24)

2) Einkreisung und Flugelangriff: Encirclement and Wing Attack

Encirclement is a decisive form of attack, but usually more difficult than a flank attack
or an envelopment, especially in the desert. In encirclement the enemy is bypassed,
the objective being to manoeuvre him out of position. This is a risky tactic as it
requires extreme mobility and deception by the mechanised forces involved. The
wing attack is directed at either one or both of the enemy’s wings, these are units in
an enemy army that are distinct to the ‘centre’ of the formation. This has a better
chance of success than simply striking in a central frontal attack, since only part of
the enemy’s firepower is correctly faced and only one flank of the attacking forces
are exposed to enemy fire. If the attack is successful it will give the opportunity for a
flank attack or an envelopment of the enemy positions.82

81
Military Intelligence, Handbook on German Forces
82
Ibid

~ 23 ~
Figure 2: The battle of Gazala, showing a flank attack by the Afrika Korps on the
British forces at the Gazala line, notice the turning movement around Bir Hacheim.83

3) Einbruch und Durchbruch: Penetration and Breakthrough

Penetration and breakthrough are not separate forms of attack; they are the
exploitation of a successful attack, on the enemy’s front, wing or flank. Successive
effective attacks can destroy the enemy’s position and broaden the penetration; the
deeper into the enemies rear supply and command positions the attack can be
driven. Strong reserves are then deployed to throw back enemy counterattacks
against the flanks of the penetration.84

German Wehrmacht soldiers were trained to exploit a penetration to the maximum

so it could develop into a complete breakthrough before an effective hostile counter
attack could be launched. The deeper the attack into the rear echelons of the enemy,
the more effective it was in preventing the enemies closing his front again by

83
Map showing the German and British Commonwealth during the Battle of Gazala.
Available here: [Link]
84
Military Intelligence, Handbook on German Forces

~ 24 ~
withdrawal.85 The follow up forces can then roll up the front along the newly created
flanks and reduce individual strongpoints by encirclement and isolation.

The main objective of a penetration and breakthrough was to overcome the enemy’s
artillery and command positions, as these were normally at the rear of the enemy
lines; this was usually assigned to the tank and mechanised forces.86

How Churchill dropped the ball: The Western Desert Force and Greece

The German system of the combined arms Divisions gave German commanders all
the tools they required to achieve their objectives and overcome any obstacles in
their way.

In contrast the British system of corps couldn’t be much more different. On January
1st 1941, the Western Desert Force was renamed the XIII Corps. Following its
decisive routing of the Italian army in Sidi Barrani (Figure 3, Page 27), during which
so many Italians were captured that Anthony Eden, parodying Churchill, gave a
speech saying “Never has so much been surrendered by so many, to so few”.87

By February 1941 as the remaining Italian forces were withdrawing from the
pursuing British 7th armoured division and Australian 6th Infantry Division the XIII
corps headquarters was deactivated, its role taken over by Headquarters Cyrenaica,
a static command aimed at reflecting the Allied defensive posture in the Western
Desert. Middle East Command became obligated to concentrate on the Greek
campaign and forces were transferred there from the XIII corps.88

The role of the Greek campaign in the subsequent successes of the Afrika Korps is a
matter of contention by Military Historians. Max Hastings in ‘All Hell Let Loose’
writes how the imminent arrival of the Afrika Korps, overstretched British supply lines

85
Urban, The Tank War, Page 50
86
Military Intelligence, Handbook on German Forces
87
World War Two Timelines: 12th February 1941, [Link], Michigan, Available here:
[Link]
88
Dimbleby, J (2012) Destiny in the Desert: The Road to El Alamein – The battle that turned
the tide, Profile Books, London/, Page 108

~ 25 ~
and worn out men and machinery alongside a heavily draining Abyssinian campaign
meant that it was unlikely the British would have had the strength anyway to
complete the conquest of North Africa.89

This is the opposite to the view put forward by Liddell Hart in his ‘A History Of The
Second World War’ who writes that the Greek campaign was incredibly damaging
to the British in North Africa, pointing to the appalling quality of the remaining British
mechanised forces and huge numbers of captured Italian tanks that were pressed
into service all contributing to a dramatically weaker response to initial German
attacks in March 1941.90

Antony Beevor strikes the middle ground in ‘The Second World War’ arguing that
although the diversion to Greece could not have come at a worse time, Britain in the
early years of World War Two had a tendency to overstretch itself anyway and so the
role of the Greek campaign in and of itself was actually minimal, because Churchill
and the British more generally were unable to ruthlessly prioritise their war aims and
that the opportunity to win the war in North Africa were lost as soon as forces were
withdrawn for Greece and Rommel arrived.91

The XIII Corp which was left in an incredible tenuous position as a result of
Churchill’s decision to shift the strategic focus at a time when it should have been
fixed on finishing the remaining Italian forces in Cyrenaica,92 John Kennedy wrote
“One thing seemed quite certain to us, that if the battles were to be fought from
London, a mess would be made of them”.93/94

Rommel and the Afrika Korps got incredibly lucky and were able to successful exploit
the situation of the XIII corps when they launched their first attacks from Tripoli.95

89
Hastings, M (2012) All Hell Let Loose: The World At War 1939 – 1945, Harper Press,
London, Page 111
90
Liddell Hart, A History of the Second World War, Page 217
91
Beevor, A (2012) The Second World War, Phoenix Paperbacks, London, Page 175
92
Urban, The Tank War, Page 62
93
Dimbleby, Destiny in the Desert, Page 98
94
Weinberg, G (2005) A World At Arms: A Global History Of World War Two, Cambridge
University Press, New York, Page 187
95
Beevor, The Second World War, Page 175

~ 26 ~
Troopers and Privates: Separatism and organisation in the XIII Corp

Within the XIII Corp there was a sense of separatism between the infantry and the
armoured forces,96 often unjustly this mutual suspicion would only intensify over the
North African campaign.97 During the interwar years there were heated debates
among military theorists about the role of the tank in a future war, Fuller and Liddell
Hart were two central theorists when it came to shaping British and German thinking,
the key theorist of Blitzkrieg, Heinz Guderian, was deeply influenced by their
theories.98

Figure 3: The advances on Sidi Barrani, with three warships providing close
support.99

96
Kippenberger, H (1961) Infantry Brigadier, Oxford University Press, London, Page 169
97
Lewin, The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, Page 41
98
Trythall, A (1977) “Boney” Fuller: Soldier, Strategist, and Writer, Rutgers University Press,
New Jersey, Page 211
99
Map showing the advance of the British Commonwealth force during Operation: Compass
Available here:
[Link]

~ 27 ~
 The Key Elements of armoured warfare according to Fuller and Liddell Hart were:

1. Cooperation of tank’s and close air support

2. Using tanks to attack command and logistics,
3. Independence of tanks from infantry
4. Indirect approaches and manoeuvre warfare100

There was also a sense of separatism within the armoured forces itself. As a result
of decisions taken in the inter-war years two very distinct military cultures were being
forced to coexist: the Cavalry troopers and the Tank Corp privates.101

Over the course of the 1930’s Britain had begun integrating some of its cavalry
regiments into its armoured regiments, phasing horses out in favour of machines;
there was a lot of animosity between these two groups, until the mid-1930’s the
former Royal Tank Corp had maintained a monopoly over the crewing and
employment of armoured fighting vehicles, in the same way as the Royal Engineers
or Royal Artillery held precedent over where to build a bridge or the best solution for
an artillery barrage.102

It wasn’t just in the Interwar organisation that changes were made; the terminology
used by the new Royal Armoured Corp was also radically different and not wholly
adopted, soldiers of the old Tank Corp for example continued using their old
terminology: calling their men ‘private’ instead of ‘trooper’, the armoured forces being
organised into ‘companies’ rather than ‘squadrons’ referring to ‘sections’ rather than
‘troops’. The language that the soldiers rejected was that of the cavalry, and though
the terminology used would slowly change it brought into question ideas of military
identity, many soldiers of the old tank battalions felt demoted “from a high and mighty

100
Steele, B (2005) Military Reengineering Between the World Wars, Rand Corporation,
Page 12, Available here:
[Link]
101
Bond, B (1982) British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, Page 10
102
Urban, The Tank War, Page 16

~ 28 ~
corps to a regiment’, adding ‘we didn’t like the cavalry. “Donkey bashers”, we called
them.”103

This struggle between horse and mechanisation showed itself at the commissioned
officer ranks by debates surrounding the use of the tank on the battlefield, at the
non-commissioned ranks there was a jeering contempt for the newly mechanised
cavalrymen, an engineer in the 5th tank regiment comments “The general view was
that they (The Cavalry) might know how to groom a horse, but were clueless as to
the maintenance of such a complex piece of machinery.”104/105

The retention of cavalry ideas, of dash and bravado, would have enormous
consequences when units of the New Royal Armoured Corp went into combat
against the Afrika Korps, “I got the impression, somehow or other, that the cavalry
(…) couldn’t forget that they didn’t have horses and would go charging in’.106 The
cavalrymen, in the eyes of this private, were unable to relinquish their preconceived
ideas about warfare, that charging forward through the enemy was the way to go.
This would be confirmed by some British armoured units such as the yeomanry
regiments of the 22nd Armoured Regiment as they made a disastrous desert debut in
November 1941.107

Pat Hobart, a British tank major, gives an account of an attack where he assaulted
an enemy fort using basic tank formations with old cavalry tactics, he writes “formed
up in line and advanced at full speed on the fort in what I imagined to be the best
traditions of the arme blanche [i.e. the cavalry] … in we went with every gun and
machine gun firing. My orders to the squadron were to drive straight through the
perimeter, doing as much destruction as possible, out the other side, and then return
again”.108 In reality it was vital to be able to operate efficiently and effectively, halting
to ensure an accurate first shot.109

103
Urban, The Tank War, Page 18
104
Ibid, 16 - 19
105
Ibid, Page 35
106
Ibid, Page 19
107
Ibid, Page 139
108
Ibid, Page 36
109
Ibid, Page 139

~ 29 ~
If this was the case it does go some way to answering the question of why the Afrika
Korps was able to be so effective, however if it was an inherent feature of the military
system then how effective was Montgomery in bringing about real change to the
Eighth Army at El Alamein?

The Monty reforms: Montgomery’s impact on the men of the Eighth Army

As previously stated, when appointed Field commander of the Eighth Army,110

Montgomery resisted pressure from Churchill for a quick offensive and worked to
build up the army’s strength after the First Battle of El Alamein.111

Morale was low when Montgomery took over; soldiers and officers were expecting to
withdraw when Rommel again attacked their positions112, even though Auchinleck
had no plans to withdraw from the strong defensive position he held at El Alamein.113
At Montgomery’s first meeting with his officers in the desert he told them “I have
cancelled the plan for withdrawal. If we’re attacked then there will be no retreat. If we
cannot stay here alive, then we will stay here dead”.114/115

To try and improve the morale and élan of the soldiers on the front, especially those
involved in operations, Montgomery arranged for cigarettes to be distributed and
went to great lengths to visit the front to observe and encourage his units.116 It was
important for the British commander to reinforce the morale of his troops, as Heinz
Schmidt writes Montgomery did this by “reminding them that they were receiving
steady reinforcements in men and materials. His troops knew it: he told them so”.117

110
The London Gazette, 13th October 1942 (Supplement), Retrieved from here:
[Link]
111
Schmidt, With Rommel in the desert, Page 165
112
Urban, The Tank War, Page 137 - 138
113
Caddick-Adams, P (2001) Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives. Preface Publishing,
London Page 461
114
Urban, The Tank War, Page 137 – 138
115
Moorehead, A (1967) Montgomery: A biography, Hamilton, Connecticut, Page 118 - 127
116
Oxton, Jim Fraser Obituary
117
Schmidt, With Rommel in the desert, Page 173

~ 30 ~
Montgomery led the reorganisation of the corps at his disposal, creating a pursuit
formation; the X corps (an all armoured formation). This was entirely the wrong
solution to the issues facing the Eighth Army and only exasperated further the
already prevalent feelings of separation between the infantry and the armoured
branches.118 The only common commander in the Eighth Army’s corps was
Montgomery himself, and this allowed them to work in a unified, focused manner
according to his detailed plans.119

Under the command of Montgomery the Eighth Army structure placed an emphasis
on coordinating army, naval and aerial combined arms operations, which
Montgomery went someway to improving by moving his field headquarters to Burg al
Arab, a position that was close to the air force command headquarters.120

The Eighth army’s strategic ideas were the polar opposite to those of the Afrika Korp
and Rommel. Instead of manoeuvre and exploitation Montgomery believed strongly
in a defensive methodical build-up of British Commonwealth forces;121 training the
troops at his command and resisting calls for a hasty counter attacks that would
jeopardise the strategy in place for an offensive on his own terms in late October
1942,122 planning for which had begun shortly before he took his command.123

While the commanders and troops of the Afrika Korps were important, especially in a
campaign of this scale. If they weren’t fed, ran out of ammo or if any other way
deprived of the material they needed; they wouldn’t have been able to fight.124 This
next chapter will look then at the centrally important role of logistics and supply in the
success of the Afrika Korps.

118
Barnett, C, The Desert General, Page 265
119
Nigel, H (2004) Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press,
London, Montgomery, Bernard Law, Available here:
[Link]
120
Playfair, History of the Second World War, Page 370
121
Lewin, The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, Page 153
122
Schmidt, With Rommel in the desert, Page 171
123
Playfair, History of the Second World War, Page 388
124
Urban, The Tank War, Page 139

~ 31 ~
 Chapter Three: Logistics and Materiel

Introduction

Having looked at the commanders in the North African arena we now look at the role
of logistics in the success of the Afrika Korps. How the British handed the initiative
back to the Germans by methodically building up large stock piles of materiel before
launching offensives.

Logistics is the planning and carrying out of movement and maintenance of military
forces,125 at its most basic level it includes the:

1. Storage, distribution, maintenance and disposition of materiel

2. Transport of personnel
3. Acquisition or construction of facilities for the storage and distribution of
materiel
4. Acquisition and distribution of medical and service support126/127

In the North African campaign, the first stage for the distribution of supplies for both
the British Commonwealth and German forces was by ships to the ports of Benghazi
and Tripoli for the Afrika Korps and the ports of Alexandria and Cairo for the British
Commonwealth. From these ports the second stage held a number of options for the
two sides; they could move it by train, truck, pack animals or coastal ships. All of
these options had advantages and disadvantages during the North African
campaign.

Germany: The Logistics of the Afrika Korps

The logistics of the mechanised Afrika Korps raised two important questions:

125
von Clausewitz, C (1993) On War, Everyman’s Library, London, Page 394
126
Ibid, Page 400
127
NATO Standardisation Agency (2008) AAP-6 2009, NATO Glossary of Terms and
Definitions, Page 2-L-5, Available here: [Link]

~ 32 ~
 1. How would the army be supplied with fuel, spares and replacement vehicles?
2. How would they move large mechanised formations, and especially the ones
that are road-bound?128

Logistics were an integral part of operational planning for the Afrika Korp. The initial
plans had to be prepared quickly to stabilise the Italian forces; the main concern was
to provide transport of materiel for the German troops by rail to Italian ports and by
Italian or German ships to Benghazi and Tripoli in North Africa. This initial stage of
the operation fell under the remit of a special branch of the military; ‘the Branch for
Transportation to Africa’, which operated under the command of the German military
attaché in Rome.

When the supply ships arrived in the North African ports they were then under the
remit of the supply and administration officers of the Afrika Korps who were
responsible for the further transportation of the supplies and personal to their
respective units, this role was later changed to the chief supply and administration
officer of Panzergruppe Afrika (later Panzer Army Afrika).

Initially, all bulk commodities, including troops, were transported by sea. When the
shipping losses mounted, officers and men began being transported by plane.
However over the course of the campaign in North Africa various situational changes
necessitated alterations in the supply and distribution for the Afrika Korps.

In order to more fully understand the logistical situation as it developed, this

dissertation will analyse the campaign for the German forces over the period from
the arrival of the Afrika Korps to its eventual reversal at the Second Battle of El
Alamein, before then contrasting that to the British Commonwealth forces during the
North African campaign.

128
Guderian, Achtung-Panzer!, Page 207

~ 33 ~
Deployment: February-May 1941

The transportation of troops and supplies across the Mediterranean functioned

without interruption. The convoys reached Tripoli regularly and almost without
losses. Immediately after its capture, Benghazi was used as a port of debarkation;
though given it was well within the reach of the Royal Air Force it came under
frequent bombing raids, and the amount of supply it was able to handle suffered
accordingly, the capacity of 700 – 800 tons/month was rarely reached; for example
OKH reports note how in early May the port was entirely blocked to convoy traffic.129

At the request of the German command, Italian submarines were used to transport
fuel for the advanced elements of the Afrika Korps; distributing their cargo at Derna.
Coastal shipping along the North African coast was also organised with small ships
and sailing boats with outboard motors. The shortages that were involved during this
period often were very small; Baum writes about a unit that required a few tons of
anti-tank ammunition on 6th May 1941,130 though small these shortfalls in supply
were none the less vital for the developing Afrika Korps.

With the arrival of the 15th Panzer division, together with the Italian forces already in
North Africa, there were now seven divisions that required supply, this put the whole
supply chain under immense strain and jeopardised its reliability. Tripoli was the
main harbour for the German and Italian forces during these early months of the
campaign, it had an ideal capacity of 45,000 tons/month; the Axis forces in North
Africa at the time required 70,000 tons/month.

Even the bilateral Germanic-French deal to allow 20,000 tons/month through Vichy-
French Bizerta would have left a supply deficit of 5,000 tons/month,131 as it was
though by the end of Summer 1941 no loads would have passed through this port,132

129
Van Creveld, Supplying War (Note 32), Page 299
130
Baum, W and Weichold, E (1973) Der Krieg der Assenmächte im Mittelmeer-Raum: die
"Strategie" der Diktatoren, Göttingen, Göttingen University Press, Page 62 - 64
131
Atkinson, An Army At Dawn, Page 95
132
Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 185 – 186

~ 34 ~
The Vichy French were alarmed by the British invasion of Syria and the Germans
also regretted the deal; for reasons of their own.133

The Italian difficulties over these months were even worse, for their 225,000 troops
they only had 7,000 trucks.134

Interdiction: June-December 1941

The May offensive was a clear tactical victory for the Afrika Korps, catching the
British Commonwealth forces off-guard Rommel drove them back to Sollum over the
Egyptian border and invested himself in the siege of Tobruk. It was however a
strategic blunder, Rommel failed to deliver a decisive victory, while also adding 700
miles to the already overextended supply lines of the German and Italian forces.135
This led to June being a crisis month for the Afrika Korps; even though they received
125,000 tons/month Rommel and his troops were still forced to live hand to mouth ‘in
great danger every day’.136 This was further highlighted in the account provided by a
Senior German Officer to the foreign ministry on the 15th June 1941.137

As predicted by the German High Command the added distance made it incredibly
difficult for Rommel’s rear support services to move materiel from the harbours to the
forward elements of the Afrika Korps; the result being that while supplies built up on
the wharves and in the harbours, shortages began to arise in the front line areas.

The German and Italian convoy routes which had hitherto been safe were being
interdicted at an alarmingly increasing rate by British Commonwealth aerial and
naval forces operating from Malta, especially British surface and submarine vessels
of the Royal Naval Force K who interfered with the transportation of German troops
and supplies, in July 1941 19% of all supplies, by weight, were sunk to contrast that

133
Jäckel, E (1966) Frankreich in Hitlers Europa: die deutsche Frankreichpolitik im Zweiten
Weltkrieg , Deutsche Verlags-Ansalt, Stuttgart, Page 171 - 179
134
Rochat, G (1975) ‘Mussolini Chef de Guerre’, Revue d’historie de la deuxiëme guerre
mondiale, Page 62 – 64, in Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 299
135
Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 186
136
Ibid, Page 186 - 187
137
Chef OKW to foreign minister, 15 June 1941, DGFP, D, xii, No. 633 in Van Creveld,
Supplying War, Page 299

~ 35 ~
to the following months; in August, 9% , September 25%, October 23%,138 in addition
to the losses suffered by the convoys; in the ports themselves over these months the
situation worsened with Benghazi being heavily bombed in September; causing
ships to have to be diverted to Tripoli which extended the lines of communication
from 250 to 1,000 miles. This caused relations to be incredibly strained between all
the headquarters involved,139 Rommel himself accused the Commando Supremo of
inefficiency and demanded that the entire supply system be taken over by the
Wehrmacht instead.140

A fact that was missed by all the parties in these arguments was that despite all the
troubles encountered the Italians still managed to put an average of 72,000 tons
across the Mediterranean for the Germans, which was more than Rommel required,
for each of these months.

The Afrika Korps difficulties in supply therefore stemmed less from a lack of supply
from Europe and more from the impossibly long lengths of Rommel’s lines of
communication, e.g. it took nearly 10% of the total fuel landed to transport the other
90% up to the front lines, nearly 30 – 50% of all the fuel landed in North Africa was
wasted between the port of Tripoli and the front;141 Obliged as the trucks were to
cover the 1,000 miles of desert each way. To add to this the 35% of supply vehicles
that were constantly out of repair, under these conditions it is no surprise that the
logistical supply services broke down. Almost 85% of the German trucks were
actually captured British or American trucks, which meant finding spare or
replacement parts was extremely difficult.142

At various stages to try and help relieve this blockade between ports and the front
aircraft were employed to move troops and materiel, while coastal naval barges were
used to transport tanks and spare parts; though the main port of Bardia was denied
at various stages to the German forces by RAF bombing raids. In December 1941,

138
Gabriele, loc. cit., Page 292 in Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 299
139
Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 189
140
DAK / Ia to ObdH /Genst.d.H/[Link], No 48/41 [Link], 25 July 1941, GMR / 7 –
78/324/6279246-47 in Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 299
141
Gabrielle, loc. cit., Page 292 in Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 189
142
Lewin, Rommel As Military Commander, Page 149

~ 36 ~
the Italian navy, in a supreme effort to resupply their German allies, dispatched four
battleships, three light cruisers and twenty destroyers to escort a convoy to Libya,
owing to the limited capacity of the ports that meant only four ships could be
escorted this was incredibly costly; 100,000 tons of warship were escorting only
20,000 ton of supply, the cost in fuel was incredibly prohibitive, this scale of
operation was only possible once more in January 1942.

Withdrawal from Egypt: January-June 1942

After the general retreat by Axis forces at the end of December 1941 and the loss of
Benghazi, Mussolini again pressed for the Germans to open negotiations with Vichy
French to make use of Bizerta, but these led to nothing, and it was doubtful that
Bizerta would have actually been any assistance to the Germans logistical supply
problems anyway.

Over this time there was more transportation of materiel by large aircraft after
German superiority in the air was gained by the Luftwaffe under Kesselring and the
suppression of Malta’s forces; Transportation of supplies therefore proceeded
smoothly and with few losses, even though only 39,000 tons got across the
Mediterranean. It is clear that the improvements in the situation of the Afrika Korps
were not from any sort of increased safety of the sea routes. Rather it resulted from:

1. The discovery of 13,000 tons of Italian fuel stored near Tripoli143

2. Rommel’s withdrawal from El Agheila which reduced his lines of
communication to a more manageable 460 miles.144

The arrival on 6th January 1942 of the second ‘battleship convoy’ with six vessels
carrying supplies eased the supply situation even further, though supplies reaching
Africa during this time rarely exceeded 50,000 tons, the new year found the

143
KTB / DAK / [Link], 30 December 1941, 3 January 1942, GMR / T-314 / 000035-37 in
Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 301
144
Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 192

~ 37 ~
Panzerarmee Afrika and especially the Afrika Korps feeling like they were in a much
better state.145

The withdrawal from Egypt played an enormous part in the ability for the supply
services to get the materiel from Benghazi and Tripoli up to the soldiers of the Afrika
Korps.

The year of miracles: July – November 1942

1941 saw Hitler at the zenith of his power; Nazi Germany dominated the whole of
Western Europe and was preparing to extend its power over the Balkans. One year
on and the situation had changed dramatically, even though the territory under
Hitler’s control had grown enormously, shadows were beginning to grow around the
Third Reich. December 1941 saw the United States officially joined the war against
Hitler, and the Soviet Union finally succeeded in holding and then repelling Germany
for the first time since the beginning of the war.146

As a result of Rommel’s withdrawal, January 1942 saw the German Field Marshal in
control of a large but secure and defensible area; the shorter distance had improved
his supply situation and the burden of maintaining a logistics network over hundreds
of miles of desert now rested back with the British Commonwealth.147

The arrival of the second air fleet had done much to ease the burden in the central
Mediterranean; but the logistical network to the front for the Afrika Korps would have
been much more secure if a rail network was set up to the frontline. 148 Rommel had
requested 8,000 trucks for the forth coming offensive he had planned; this was out of

145
KTB / DAK / [Link], 14, 20, 24 January, 1942, GMR / T-314 / 16 / 000042 In Van
Creveld, Supplying War, Page 301
146
Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 192
147
Ibid, Page 193
148
Der dtsch. Gen. b. H.Q. d. Ital. Wehrmacht to OKH /Genst.d.H / [Link], No 5001 / 41
[Link], 7 December 1941, GMR / T-78 / 324 / 6279063-6. in Van Creveld, Supplying War,
Page 301

~ 38 ~
the question, since all of the armoured forces in Russia could only muster 14,000
Lorries between them149

The British Commonwealth: The Logistics of the Eighth Army

In contrast to the Germans the British Commonwealth had begun to make

preparations for a campaign in North Africa as early as 1940. A force was formed at
Mersa Matruh, a small village; known only to Greek fishers and middlemen who
handled the export trade.150 Mersa Matruh was to become the terminus of a railway
and road network from Alexandria and in 1940 it became a base and a fortress,151
When the Italians began their first offensive into Egypt. General Archibald Wavell,
the British Commander, held fast in Tobruk and deprived the Italians the only good
seaport east of Benghazi - 340 miles west of Tobruk.152 Holding onto this port would
weaken Wavell’s counter attacking force in Egypt by two divisions,153 and it
increased the length of the Italian lines of communication.154 It was not until much
later when Rommel had reduced Tobruk that he would have sufficient force to
continue his advances toward Alexandria155

The British Commonwealth forces were much more methodical in their planning.
Their concepts revolved around ensuring a sufficient build-up of supplies prior to
commencing an operation. Multiple means were used for moving supplies and
materiel to the front; most movements were done by truck, however the British did
make use of railways where they were available, especially in Egypt from the main
ports of Alexandria and Cairo to areas as far forward as possible. Even though

149
OKH / Genst.d.H / [Link].1 / I to [Link], ‘Ferngespräch Qu. Rom…von 18.1.1941’, ibid,
6279240-41 in Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 301
150
Barnett, C, Desert General, Page 25
151
Ibid, Desert General, Page 25
152
Fuller, J (1956) "From the Seven Days Battle, 1862, to the Battle of Leyte Gulf, 1944," A
Military History of the Modern World, Funk & Wagnalls, New York, Page 479
153
Ibid, Page 479-80
154
Lyman, The Longest Siege: Tobruk, Page 119 - 233
155
Fuller, From the Seven Days Battle, 1862, to the Battle of Leyte Gulf, 1944 Page 480

~ 39 ~
tactically inferior initially156, the British Commonwealth strength eventually became
their ability to wear down the Axis by a mixture of overwhelming superiority in
material and an ability to maintain and move large supplies of ammunition and fuel.

Auchinleck, in preparing for Operation Crusader in 1941, organised the construction

of large supply dumps, extended the railway from Alexandria further westward
(Figure 4, Page 41), and a pipeline for fuel was laid along 150 miles:157 Nearly
30,000 tons of munitions, fuel and supplies were stored in these depots before the
Operation began.158 This contrasts sharply with the impression Rommel gave of a
haphazard approach to his supply problems.159 This may be due to the fact that in
the desert he was not in sole command of the supply organisation and there was
constant inter-service feuding with both the Italians and within the Wehrmacht itself,
this was aggravated by the vastly different equipment used by the two allies. 160

Rommel makes many references to the large amounts of loot and supplies captured
following the defeat of British Commonwealth units throughout the desert. In some
cases such as Benghazi and Tobruk, the build-up was so extensive it couldn’t be
destroyed; allowing the Germans to be both sustained and to continue their
offensives. Surprisingly Rommel’s forces sent any provisions that were surplus to
their requirements back to Germany, especially bully beef which was considered a
luxury.161/162

Julia Millen, an Australian military Historian, opposes this view citing examples of
dumps as large as six miles square being established and camouflaged in the desert
and that in his haste to destroy the enemy, Rommel overlooked these that would
have been invaluable to his forces.163

156
Dimbleby, Destiny in the Desert, Page 45
157
Douglas-Home, C (1973) Rommel, Saturday Review Press, New York, Page 111
158
Young, D (1978) Rommel: The Desert Fox, Harper & Row, New York, Page 8
159
Fuller, From the Seven Days Battle, 1862, to the Battle of Leyte Gulf, 1944 Page 480
160
Home, Rommel, Page 111-12
161
Schmidt, With Rommel In The Desert, Page 150
162
Lewin, Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, Page 137
163
Millen, J (1997) Salute to service: A history of the Royal New Zealand Corps of Transport
and its predecessors, 1860-1996, Victoria University Press, Victoria, Page 216

~ 40 ~
Aerial methods of supply did not appear to play a significant role in supporting British
Commonwealth forces in the theatre; their forces rely primarily on sea and land lines
of communication throughout the campaign in North Africa. In reality, an efficient air
transport service had yet to be established by the Royal Air Force.164 Logistics
played a large part in the success of the Afrika Korps even if Rommel was less
inclined to actively tackle it as the British Commonwealth were, his troops very rarely
complain about the situation especially after the capture of Tobruk; armies in pursuit
understandably have a more positive morale added to the fact that the Panzerarmee
Afrika, considered itself an elite fighting force in the Wehrmacht.

Figure 4: Operation: Crusader showing the extent of the Alexandria railway, on the
extreme right of this image.165

164
Caviggia, J (1990) British and German Logistics Support During The World War Two
North African Campaign, Page 16, Available here:
[Link]
165
Map showing the plan for Operation: Crusader, showing the railway and coastal road
Available here: [Link]

~ 41 ~
This Dissertation has looked at the commanders of the forces; the role that Rommel
had in creating a cult of personality that worked to instil his soldiers with a sense of
élan and drive that the British in North Africa were unable to replicate until
Montgomery took command of the Eighth Army, the troops themselves; how the
German troops were trained in combined arms warfare that gave them the edge of
over the British system of regimental competition and speciality before finally looking
at all of these within the logistical situation that each side found themselves in and
how that is central to understanding the ebbing and flowing nature of the desert war
and how the methodical build-up of depots by the British gave the initiative back to
the Germans and allowed them to outmanoeuvre and continue to press their
offensives by capturing and looting supply’s from their opponents.

~ 42 ~
 Conclusion

The Afrika Korps was able to survive its initial deployment and successfully push
back the more experienced but weakened British force, who had been stripped as a
result of Churchill, and the Imperial General Staff, deciding to shift the focus from
North Africa to Greece; vital manpower and materiel were unavailable to Wavell at a
point when the Western Desert Force could have decisively driven the Italians out of
North Africa and defeated the small German expeditionary force. By the time Britain
had fully committed to defending Egypt the Afrika Korps had learned the valuable
lessons it required to succeed in North Africa.

The Second and Third battles of El Alamein would prove to be a decisive victory for
the Allies, though Rommel and his men did not lose hope and enacted a masterful
withdrawal. Churchill would say of the battle “Before Alamein we never had a victory.
After Alamein we never had a defeat.”166 While this statement was not entirely true
and many Allied soldiers would continue to pay the ultimate price to defeat the Axis,
this was certainly a crucial victory.167

The German arrangement of their Order of Battle into combined arms battle groups
gave officers the tools they needed to surprise and out manoeuvre, apply superior
force at the main point of the attack and to more efficiently deploy their mechanised
reserves. The Afrika Korps was both effective on the offensive as a result of this
system and able to absorb huge amounts of damage when on the defensive,
alongside the combined arms system they were easily and quickly able to reform
and reorganise after Operation Crusader. The British with their regimental speciality,
competition and traditional areas of responsibility had a system that left the infantry
and armour corps unable to cooperate together as a single unit. Montgomery was
right not to try and force these two cultures together and instead he took personal
command of the two separate army corps.

166
Churchill, W, The Hinge of Fate in Shapiro, F (2006) The Yale Book of Quotations, Yale
University Press, Connecticut, Page 603
167
Atkinson, An Army At Dawn, Page 540

~ 43 ~
Logistics proved to be much more important in the North African campaign than in
any other theatre of action.168 Every need of the soldiers had to be transferred from
Germany, to ports in Italy before being shipped to the two main harbours of Tripoli
and Benghazi and then transported up to the frontline. The lengths of the supply line
were a deciding factor in the successes of both sides; the methodical build up by the
British gave the initiative back to the Germans and allowed the Afrika Korps, by
capturing supplies, to advance much further than should have been possible with
their overextended supply lines.169

Rommel was able to exert an almost hypnotic influence on both his own troops and
those of his enemy.170 His cult of personality was further reinforced by the élan of the
Afrika Korps who saw themselves as an elite unit in the Wehrmacht, especially after
their early successes, alongside the combined arms system they were easily and
quickly able to reform and reorganise after Operation Crusader; something that
British commanders in the Mediterranean, like Auchinleck, were unable to match
before late 1942 when Montgomery took command of the Eighth Army.

Of the British Commonwealth units who fought in North Africa prior to the Second
Battle of El Alamein the 5th tank regiment and other armoured forces would go on to
fight in Europe through Italy and then on Operation Overlord and Operation Plunder;
through France and Germany. After the defeat of the Germans at the Third Battle of
El Alamein, the Australian contingent would be withdrawn by a nervous Australian
government to fight in the Pacific against the Japanese and the British 70th division
would go onto fight deep behind Japanese lines in Burma as part of the famous
Chindits. These are other stories and areas for research that can be covered in
another paper.171

For the Germans however there would be little extra glory garnered after the Second
Battle of El Alamein, following Rommel’s successes and despite opposition from
Hitler, his masterfully executed withdrawal, many Germans would still be captured or

168
Dimbleby, Destiny in the Desert, Page 75
169
Van Creveld, Supplying War, Page 181 – 201
170
Lyman, The Longest Siege, Page 82 – 83
171
Ibid, Page 291

~ 44 ~
killed, of one company made up of 386 men at the time of the Second Battle of El
Alamein in November 1941, only 13 men would remain 18 months later;172 a quarter
of a million men would lay down their arms, six hundred and sixty-three would
escape to fight on in Europe.173

The battlefields of North Africa were largely forgotten after the final defeat of the
Afrika Korps and the capture Tunisia and Libya in 1943, handed back to nature and
ignored for years. In the 1950’s and 60’s much of the detritus was removed but large
quantities still remain near the surface of the desert including mines and unexploded
ordinance, scores of people die every year as a result of the battles fought years
earlier between 1940 – 1943.

The Sun continues to beat down on the combatants of all the nations who were
never able to leave North Africa and whose bodies will continue to bear witness to
the battles waged over the decades since the end of The North African
campaign.174/175 As Ronald Lewin writes “The last phase in the life of the Afrika
Korps had been entirely worthy of its astonishing début. When all was over its
famous sign, the palm tree, could have been fittingly surrounded by a wreath of
laurels.’176

Unfortunately for the men of the Afrika Korps even with their successes; there would
be no laurels in Africa.

172
Lyman, The Longest Siege, Page 291
173
Schmidt, With Rommel In The Desert, Page 240
174
Urban, The Tank War, Page 80
175
Lyman, The Longest Siege, Page 291 - 292
176
Lewin, The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, Page 197

~ 45 ~
 Appendix A

 Hull down - A position in which the main, lower body of a vehicle is protected

from incoming firepower, for example a prepared dug position.

 Turret down – A position but where the turret and hull are hidden from

incoming enemy fire but without hindering the commander’s view of the

surrounding area177.

 Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) – The RHA dates from 1793 and are part of the

Royal Artillery of the British Army, Horses had been phased out of deployment

over the course of the 1930’s.

 Desert Air Force (DAF) – (Also known as Air Headquarters Western Desert,

Air Headquarters Libya, the Western Desert Air Force, and the First Tactical

Air Force) initially created from no. 204 Group under Middle East Command in

1941, by the time of the Second Battle of El Alamein, the DAF fielded 29

squadrons.178/179

 Operation Barbarossa - The German invasion of the Soviet Union during

World War II that was launched on the 22nd June 1941, 3 months after the

Afrika Korps arrived in North Africa, ‘Hitler’s fateful decision to invade Russia

in June 1941 changed the entire dimension of the North African conflict.’180

 Aide-de-camp (ADC) – A military officer who serves as an assistant to a

senior officer. Heinz Schmidt served as Rommel’s aide-de-camp from March

1940 to November 1941 he was at his commander’s side during the battles of

El Agheila, Abedabia and Tobruk.

177
Urban, The Tank War, Page 44
178
Playfair, I (2004) The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume IV: The Destruction of the
Axis Forces in Africa, History of the Second World War, Naval and Military Press, Uckfield,
Appendix 8 (a)
179
Dear, The Oxford Companion to World War II, Page 992
180
Kennedy, The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers, Page 442
~ 46 ~
  Pour le Mérite – The former state of Prussia’s highest award, presented for

extraordinary personal achievement, this was conferred without distinction to

all ranks regardless of social standing.

 Alpenkorps (Alpine Corps) - A mountain formation of division size formed

during World War I, It was considered by the Allies to be one of the best in the

German Army.

 Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) – the OKW had nominal oversight

over the German army, navy and air force during World War Two.

 Swabian – Rommel was born in the town of Heidenheim, Swabia. This is a

culturally, historically and linguistically unique region located within south

West Germany.

 Prussian –The term ‘Prussian’ is used in this paper to mean the professional,

aggressive, militaristic and conservative landed aristocrats who dominated the

German officer corps and high command during the early 20th century.

 Bersaglieri (English - Marksmen) – A highly mobile light infantry corps of the

Italian army recognisable by their wide brimmed hat with large black feather.

During the First World War, 210,000 soldiers fought as Bersaglieri, 32,000

would be killed with another 50,000 wounded (among them future Italian

dictator Benito Mussolini). A contingent would fight alongside Wavell in the

Sinai and Palestine, 1917.181

 Commander in Chief (CiC) – The commander in chief is the officer in

supreme command of the forces within a particular theatre of operation, CiC

Mediterranean’s role was to control British land forces in the region to defend

181
Wavell, A (1933) The Palestine Campaigns, In Sheppard, E (1968) A Short History of the
British Army (4th Edition), Constable, London, Page 90 - 91
~ 47 ~
 British interests such as the Suez Canal.182 The first person to hold this post

was General Wavell in 1939.183

 Alexandria - Alexandria was the destination of choice for soldiers on leave

who were seeking freedom from parental or uxorial supervision, as a battalion

commander Montgomery insisted on inspections, by medical officers, of the

prostitutes in Alexandria to ensure they were free of venereal diseases, this

was carried out in the face of prudishness from senior officers because

Montgomery believed that his men required ‘horizontal refreshment’.184

182
Playfair, I (2004) The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. II: The Germans come to the
help of their Ally (1941). History of the Second World War, Naval & Military Press, Uckfield,
Page 31
183
The London Gazette, 1st August 1939 (Issue), Retrieved from here:
[Link]
184
Urban, The Tank War, Page 60
~ 48 ~
 Appendix B

German Forces Order of Battle by November 1942 185/186

Afrika Korps

5th Light Division (Later 21st Panzer Division):

5th Panzer Regiment, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 104th Motorised Infantry

Regiment (also known as 104th Panzer Grenadier Regt/104th Rifle Regiment), 155th

Armoured Artillery Regiment, 200th Anti-Tank Battalion, 39th Anti – Tank Battalion,

200th Motorised Signals Battalion, 200th Armoured Engineer Battalion, 605th Anti-

Tank Battalion, 2nd Machine-Gun Battalion, 8th Machine-Gun Battalion

15th Panzer Division:

8th Panzer Regiment, 115th Infantry Regiment, 33rd Armoured Artillery Regiment, 33rd

Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion, 33rd Anti-Tank Battalion, 15th Motorised

Infantry Battalion, 33rd Armoured Supply Battalion, 200th Motor Rifle Regiment

90th Light Division:

155th Infantry Regiment, 361st Afrika Regiment, 288th Sonderverband (Special Unit),

580th Reconnaissance Battalion

Corps Units:

1st Battalion, 18th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, 576th Anti-Tank Regiment, 1st Battalion, 33rd

Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Logistical Units

185
Lyman, The Longest Siege, Page 295
186
Joslen, H (2003) Orders of battle : Second World War 1939 - 1945, Naval and Military
Press, Uckfield, Pages 566 - 573
~ 49 ~
 Italian Forces Order of Battle by November 1942 187/188

21st Corps

Bologna Division

Brescia Division

Pavia Division

Sacona Division

Trento Division

Böttcher Artillery Group

Manoeuvre Group

Ariete Armoured Division:

132nd Armoured Regiment, 8th Bersaglieri Regiment, 132nd Artillery Regiment

Trieste Armoured Division:

65th and 66th Infantry Regiments, 9th Bersaglieri Regiment189

187
Lyman, The Longest Siege, Page 296
188
Joslen, Orders of battle, Pages 566 - 573
189
Lyman, The Longest Siege, Page 296
~ 50 ~
 British Forces Order of Battle by November 1942190/191

8th Army

X Corps

1st Armoured Division:

2nd Armoured Brigade, 7th Motor Brigade, Hammerforce (Attached from 8th Armoured

Division)

10th Armoured Division:

8th Armoured Brigade, 24th Armoured Brigade (Attached from 8th Armoured Division),

133rd Infantry Brigade (Attached from 44th Infantry Division)

8th Armoured Division

XIII Corps

50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division:

1st Greek Infantry Brigade, 151st Infantry Brigade, 69th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Free

French Brigade

44th (Home Counties) Infantry Division:

131st Infantry Brigade, 132nd (Kent) Infantry Brigade, 133rd (Lorried) Infantry Brigade

7th Armoured Division:

4th Light Armoured Brigade, 22nd Armoured Brigade, 1st Free French Brigade Group

190
Lyman, The Longest Siege, Page 293 - 295
191
Joslen, Orders of battle, Pages 566 - 573

~ 51 ~
 XXX Corps

9th Australian Division:

Australian 24th, 26th and 20th Brigades

51st (Highland) Infantry Division:

152nd, 153rd and 154th Infantry Brigades

2nd New Zealand Division:

New Zealand 5th and 6th Infantry Brigades, 9th Armoured Brigade

South African 1st Infantry Division:

South African 1st, 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades

4th Indian Division:

5th, 7th and 161st Indian Infantry Brigades

Corps Reserve:

23rd Armoured Brigade192

192
Joslen, Orders of battle, Pages 566 - 573
~ 52 ~
 Bibliography
(Includes consulted works)
Figures

 Figure 1 Illustration showing the German movements during Rommel’s initial

advances, Available here: [Link]

 Figure 2 Map showing the German and British Commonwealth forces during

the Battle of Gazala, Available here: [Link]

content/uploads/2012/08/[Link]

 Figure 3 Map showing the advance of the British Commonwealth force during

Operation Compass, Available here:

[Link]

[Link]

 Figure 4 Map showing the plan for Operation Crusader, Available here:

[Link]

Articles

 Caviggia, J (1990) British and German Logistics Support During The World

War Two North African Campaign, Available here:

[Link]

 Citino, R (2012) Rommel's Afrika Korps, MHQ Magazine, Available here:

[Link]

 Darwin, J (1980) Imperialism In Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial

Policy Between The Wars, The Historical Journal vol. 23 no 3 (September

1980), page 657 – 679, Available here: [Link]/stable/2638996

~ 53 ~
 Görlitz, W (2014) der Wüstenfuchs; Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel; the

Desert Fox, Available here:

[Link]

 Hatton, J (2001) Logistics and the Desert Fox, Available here:

[Link]

 Military Intelligence Division (1943) Handbook on German Military Forces,

Available here: [Link]

[Link]

 NATO Standardisation Agency, NATO rank comparison chart, Available

here: [Link]

 NATO Standardisation Agency (2008) AAP-6 2009, NATO Glossary of

Terms and Definitions, Available here:

[Link]

 Nigel, H (2004) Montgomery, Bernard Law, Oxford Dictionary of National

Biography, Oxford University Press, London, Available here:

[Link]

 Oxton, T (2013) Jim Fraser obituary, Available here:

[Link]

 Said, E (1978) Orientalism, Routledge, London, Available here:

[Link]

/said-introduction_and_chapter_1_of_orientalism.pdf

 Steele, B (2005) Military Reengineering Between the World Wars, Rand

Corporation, Available here:

[Link]

.pdf

~ 54 ~
 Schreiber, P (1998) Rommel’s Desert War: The Impact of Logistics on

Operational Art, Joint Military Operations Department, Newport, Available

here: ://[Link]/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/[Link]

 The London Gazette, 1 December 1914 (Issue), Retrieved from here:

[Link]

 The London Gazette, 1st August 1939 (Issue), Retrieved from here:

[Link]

 The London Gazette, 11th July 1941 (Supplement), Retrieved from here:

[Link]

 The London Gazette, 22nd July 1941 (Supplement), Retrieved from here:

[Link]

 The London Gazette, 15th August 1941 (Issue), Retrieved from here:

[Link]

 The London Gazette, 13th October 1942 (Supplement), Retrieved from here:

[Link]

 Thomas M (2010) European Crisis, Colonial Crisis? Signs of Fracture in the

French Empire from Munich to the Outbreak of War, The International History

Review, 32:3, 39 – 413, Retrieved from here:

[Link]

 World War Two : 12th February 1941, Michigan, Available here:

[Link]

[Link]

 Toppe, A (1991) Desert Warfare: German experiences in World War Two,

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Kansas, Available here:

[Link]

~ 55 ~
Books

 Arnold-Forster, M (1973) The World at War, Collins, London

 Arthur, M (2004) Forgotten Voices of the Second World War, Smart, London

 Atkinson, R (2003) An Army At Dawn, Abacus, St Ives

 Badoglio, P (1976) Italy in the Second World War, Greenwood Press,

Connecticut

 Barnett, C (1960) The Desert Generals, Cassell, London

 Barr, N (2005) Pendulum Of War: Three Battles at El Alamein, Pimlico, New

York

 Battistelli, P (2006) Rommel's Afrika Korps - Tobruk to El Alamein, Osprey

Publishing, Oxford

 Baum, W and Weichold, E (1973) Der Krieg der Assenmächte im

Mittelmeer-Raum: die "Strategie" der Diktatoren, Göttingen, Göttingen
University Press
 Beasley, J (2010) I Was There When It Happened, Xlibris, Indiana
 Beele, P (2009) Death by Design: British Tank Development in the Second
World War, History Press, Stroud
 Beevor, A (2012) The Second World War, Phoenix Paperbacks, London

 Bond, B (1982) British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars,

Clarendon Press, Oxford

 Brooke, A (2001) War Diaries: 1939 – 1945, Phoenix Press, Cheshire

 Bryant, A (1957) The Turn of the Tide, (Alanbrooke Diaries, 1939 – 1945),

Collins, London

 Buckingham, W (2009) Tobruk: The Great Siege, History Press, Stroud

 Bungay, S (2002) Alamein, Aurum Press, London

~ 56 ~
 Caddick-Adams, P (2001) Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives, Preface

publishing, London

 Carver, M (2002) Dilemmas of the Desert War: The Libyan Campaign 1940 –

1942, History Press, Stroud

 Chamberlain, P (1971) Afrika Korps: German military operations in the

Western Desert: 1941–42, Almark Publishing, London

 Connell, J (1959 ) Auchinleck, Cassell, London

 Connell, J (1964) Wavell - Soldier and Scholar, Cassell, London

 Cooper, M (1990). The German Army 1933–1945. Scarborough House.

Chelsea,

 Churchill, W (1943) The End of the Beginning, Cassell, London

 Churchill, W (1949) Volume 2 – Their Finest Hour, Cassell, London

 Churchill, W (1951) Volume 4 - The Hinge of Fate, Cassell, London

 Davies, T (1980) The Surrey and Sussex Yeomanry in the Second World

War, Ditchling Press, Sussex

 Dimbleby, J (2012) Destiny in the Desert: The Road to El Alamein – The

battle that turned the tide, Profile Books, London

 Douglas-Home, C (1973) Rommel, Saturday Review Press, New York

 Douhet, G (2013) The Command of the Air, Office of Air Force History,

Washington D.C

 Erwan, B (1976) The Corps d’Elite: The Afrika Korps, Wingate, London

 Freedman, L (1994) War, Oxford University Press, New York

 Frieser, K and Greenwood, J (2005) The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940

Campaign in the West, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis

~ 57 ~
 Fuller, J (1956) "From the Seven Days Battle, 1862, to the Battle of Leyte

Gulf, 1944," A Military History of the Modern World, Funk & Wagnalls, New

York

 Guderian, H (1999) Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare,

Cassell, London

 Harding, D et al (1980) Weapons, Macmillan, London

 Hastings, M (2012) All Hell Let Loose: The World At War 1939 – 1945,

Harper Press, London

 Heathcote, T (1999) The British Field Marshalls 1736 – 1997, UK Pen and

Sword, Barnsley

 Hibber, J (2008) Mussolini: The Rise and Fall of Il Duce, Palgrave Macmillan,

Basingstoke

 Hoffman, Karl (2004) Erwin Rommel, Brassey's, London

 Jäckel, E (1966) Frankreich in Hitlers Europa: die deutsche Frankreichpolitik

im Zweiten Weltkrieg , Deutsche Verlags-Ansalt, Stuttgart

 Joslen, H (2003) Orders of battle : Second World War 1939 - 1945, Naval
and Military Press, Uckfield

 Kennedy, P (1989) The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers: Economic

Change And Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000, Fontana Press, London

 Kitchen, M (2009) Rommel’s Desert War, Cambridge University Press, New

York

 Kippenberger, H (1961) Infantry Brigadier, Oxford University Press, London

 Latimer, J (2002) Alamein, John Murray, London

~ 58 ~
 Lewin, R (1977) The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, Book Club

Associates, London

 Lewin, R (1998) Rommel As Military Commander, Barnes and Noble, New

York

 Liddell Hart, B.H (1970) A History of the Second World War, Cassell, Oxford

 Liddell Hart, B.H (1963) The Rommel Papers, Collins, London

 Lyman, R (2010) The Longest Siege: Tobruk - The Battle That Saved North

Africa, Macmillan, Oxford

 Macksey, K (1968) Afrika Korps, Ballantine, New York

 Mack Smith, D (1981) Mussolini, Paladin, Colorado

 Millen, J (1997) Salute to service: A history of the Royal New Zealand Corps

of Transport and its predecessors, 1860-1996, Victoria University Press,

Victoria

 Mitcham, S (2007) Rommel's Desert War: The Life and Death of the Afrika

Korps, Stackpole books, Pennsylvania

 Moorehead, A (1967) Montgomery: A biography, Hamilton, Connecticut

 Moorehead, A (2009) The Desert War: The Classic Trilogy on the North

American Campaign 1940 – 1943, Aurum Press, London

 Patton, G.S (1995) War as I knew it, Mariner Books, Boston

 Playfair, I (2004) The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. II: The Germans
come to the help of their Ally (1941), History of the Second World War, Naval

& Military Press, Uckfield

 Playfair, I (2004) The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. III: British

Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb (September 1941 to September 1942),

History of the Second World War, Naval & Military Press, Uckfield

~ 59 ~
 Playfair, I (2004) The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume IV: The
Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa. History of the Second World War,

Naval and Military Press, Uckfield

 Phillips, L (1962 ) Alamein, Heinemann, Portsmouth

 Pitt, B (1982) The Crucible of War: Year of Alamein 1942, Jonathan Cape,

London

 Rommel, E (2013) Infantry Attacks, Pen and Sword Books Ltd, Barnsley

 Sadler, J (2010) The Story of the Battle in the Words of the Soldiers,

Amberley, Gloucestershire

 Schmidt, H (1951) With Rommel In The Desert, Harrap, London

 Somerville, C (1999) Our War: How the British Commonwealth Fought the

Second World War, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London

 Shapiro, F (2006) The Yale Book of Quotations, Yale University Press,

Connecticut

 Strawson, J (1969) The Battle for North Africa, Batsford, London

 Stewart, A (2010) The Early Battle of the Eighth Army: Crusader to the

Alamein Line 1941 - 1942, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania

 Stone, N (2008) World War One: A Short History, Penguin Books, London

 Trythall, A (1977) “Boney” Fuller: Soldier, Strategist, and Writer, Rutgers

University Press, New Jersey

 Urban, M (2013) The Tank War, Abacus, London

 Underwood, J (1998) Military Geology in War and Peace, The Geological

Society of America, Boulder, Colorado

 Underhill, W (1957) The Royal Leicestershire Regiment, Anthony Rowe,

Eastbourne

~ 60 ~
 Van Creveld, M (2004) Supplying War, Cambridge University Press, New

York

 Von Bülow, K (1938) Wehrgeologie, Quelle and Mayer Publishing House,

Leipzig

 Von Clausewitz, C (1993) On War, Everyman’s Library, London

 Von Luck, H (1989) Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von

Luck, Random House, New York

 Von Mellenthin, F (2008) Panzer Battles, 1939 – 1945: A Study of the

Employment of Armour in the Second World War, Spellmount, London

 Verney, G (1957) The Desert Rats – The 7th Armoured Division in World War

Two, Hutchinson, London

 Walzer, M (2006) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical

Illustrations , Basic Books, New York

 Weinberg, G (2005) A World At Arms: A Global History Of World War Two,

Cambridge University Press, New York

 Wilson, E (2003) Press on regardless: The story of the Fifth Royal Tank

Regiment in World War Two, Spellmount, London

 Whiting, C (2007) The Poor Bloody Infantry,1939 - 1945, Spellmount, London

 Young, D (1978) Rommel: The Desert Fox, Harper & Row, New York

 Ziegler, P (1986) Mountbatten, Fontana Press, London

~ 61 ~