1

III. Lecture Notes: Human Nature

1. Are We Selfish or Moral by Nature? In these notes we will inquire into the matter of how self-interest
2. Thomas Hobbes and morality relate to human nature, that is, to human psychology
2.1 State of Nature and motivation. For this purpose, we will first examine the view
2.2 Social Contract of Hobbes, who is noted as a chief proponent of psychological
3. Psychological Egoism egoism. Then I will review James Rachels’s discussion of
4. Arguments against Psychological Egoism psychological and ethical egoism, as well as his arguments
5. Ethical Egoism against both forms of egoism.

1. Are We Selfish or Moral by Nature?

A distance of two thousand years separates the British philosopher Thomas Hobbes

(1588-1679) from Plato’s Republic, which contains the dialogue between Glaucon and Socrates

involving the Ring of Gyges. And yet we see Hobbes occupied with the very same issues that

had so engrossed Glaucon and Socrates many ages ago on a remote Mediterranean shore. Recall

the thought experiment that Glaucon had proposed in the “Ring of Gyges” (V&V, pp.312~3). In

that passage Glaucon asks us to suppose that we had a ring of invisibility. Since such a ring

gives its bearer complete immunity from fear of getting caught, the ring-bearer would be “like a

god among men”, and would be free to do whatever he or she chooses. Under such

circumstances, Glaucon claims, no sane person would be able to resist the temptation to do

wrong. He argues: “This… is a great proof that no one is just willingly but under compulsion”.

This easily gives rise to the view that morality is not rooted in human nature, but is a set

of conventions imposed on human beings. Glaucon proposes the following theory about the

origin of morality (V&V, p.312). Everyone would like to do wrong without having to suffer the

consequences, but the costs of suffering wrong outweigh the benefits of inflicting wrong.

Therefore, the people decide that they should enter into a contract with one another, where they

exchange guarantees that they will not wrong each other. But anyone strong and clever enough to

wrong others with impunity would never willingly abide by such a contract.
2

Here we have the beginnings of the idea of social contract, which Thomas Hobbes

inherits in the modern period, and develops into a mature theory in his masterpiece Leviathan,

thus laying the foundation of modern political philosophy. What motivates Hobbes’s version of

the social contract is his grim view of human nature. Humans are selfish by nature, i.e., we are

motivated only by self-interested reasons. Society does not originate in mutual goodwill, but in

mutual fear. “I hope nobody will doubt,” says Hobbes, “but that men would much more greedily

be carried by nature, if all fear were removed, to obtain dominion, than to gain society” (V&V,

p.317). It follows that a coercive power must be established to cow humans into submission and

to enforce the rules of morality.

There were near-contemporaries of Hobbes who strongly opposed Hobbes’s view of

human nature. For instance, Joseph Butler (1692-1752) had an optimistic view of human nature.

He believed that human beings are good by nature, that self-love is not bad, and that benevolence

is an innate principle within us. Most importantly, we are moral agents because we possess

conscience. Butler, we might say, inherited Socrates’s view that morality is an intrinsic property

of human nature and essential to the highest welfare of the soul. According to Socrates and

Butler, human nature is a hierarchically ordered whole whose distinct parts may come into

conflict; morality is the state of harmonious balance that is achieved when reason is fully in

control of the will and the passions. It follows from Butler’s view on human nature (and

Socrates’s as well) that moral rules are not simply conventions imposed on us from external

sources and coercive authorities. Morality has its source and authority in the rationality or

conscience of individual human beings.

So who has the correct view of human nature, Hobbes or Butler? Are we incorrigibly

self-interested through and through, or are we so constituted that morality can naturally take root
 3

and flourish within us? For my part, I find that Butler has a more complex and accurate view of

human nature. But Hobbes’s pessimistic view, in various mitigated versions, still has many

adherents in the social contract tradition, and it is also the default assumption about human

nature in modern political philosophy and economics.

2. Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes lived at a time when the physical sciences were making giant strides.

His view of human psychology was inspired by Galileo’s mechanistic theories in physics, which

sought to explain all physical phenomena in terms of material bodies in motion. In the same

manner, Hobbes sought to explain human actions in terms of internal and external forces

mechanically influencing the human body. According to Hobbes’s theory of human psychology,

the internal workings of the human mind can be explained in terms of motions. That is, Hobbes

explained our likes and dislikes, mental attitudes for or against, all in terms of motion.

Whenever desires or aversions come into conflict, it is the strongest one that moves us all the

way to action. Thus, Hobbes’s view of human psychology is thoroughly mechanistic.

Hobbes was also a psychological egoist (see §3 for a definition of “psychological

egoism”). According to Hobbes, human beings are always motivated to act for the sake of their

own self-preservation. Everything else, such as love, friendship, learning, etc., we pursue only

for the sake of preserving ourselves. Affection towards one’s family members is to be explained

in terms of one’s “natural lust” (see handout, “Leviathan: Morality as Rational Advantage”, p.3,

bottom of right column). Friendship and goodwill towards others are to be explained in terms

self-love or the fear that people have for their own lives. Thus Hobbes says, “All society

therefore is either for gain, or for glory; that is, not so much for love of our fellows, as for the
4

love of ourselves” (V&V, p.317). He also says, “the original [= origin] of all great an lasting

societies consisted not in the mutual goodwill men had towards each other, but in the mutual fear

they had of each other” (V&V, p.317).

This is not a pleasant picture of human nature. Indeed, Hobbes imagined that in a pre-

social, pre-political stage called the state of nature, the selfish nature of individuals led to a

universal war of everyone against everyone else. Fortunately, human beings are also rational,

and rational self-interest points the way out of this mutually destructive predicament. In short,

the solution to the problem of universal war is the social contract, whereby each person agrees to

limit their self-interest on condition that all others similarly limit theirs. It is through this social

contract that humans enter into society from the state of nature.

Let us now examine how Hobbes describes the state of nature (§2.1), and how the social

contract can be justified by reason and implemented by a coercive power (§2.2).

2.1 State of Nature. The state of nature, according to Hobbes, is the human predicament

in the absence of government and society. The problem with the state of nature is that human

beings cannot achieve their goal of preserving themselves and seeking out the best life for

themselves. They have to live in a constant state of warfare, where there are no winners. Let us

look in closer detail as to how this problem arises in the state of nature.

To begin with, Hobbes believes that human beings are self-interested, rational, and equal

in strength and intelligence. That is:

A. The Nature of Persons

[i] motivated only by self-interest;
[ii] more or less equal in physical and mental abilities;
[iii] rational.

Also, although Hobbes does not explicitly state this, we may also add:
 5

B. External Circumstances
[i] limited resources.

The above schema, A[i]-[iii] and B[i], characterizes the basic setup of the state of nature, from

which it is possible to explain how the universal war of everyone against everyone else arises.

Firstly, since human beings are equal in strength and intelligence, this gives them equal

hope of attaining the goods needed to pursue their self-interest, and hence they compete for the

same goods (given limited resources). Secondly, since there are no property rights and anyone

can take whatever another has, there is deep sense of insecurity; so they try to prevent the attacks

of others by attacking them first. Thirdly, since each person values oneself greatly, one wants

others to esteem him or her just as much, and so takes offense at the disrespect shown by others.

So, competition, diffidence [= insecurity] and desire for glory all arise from the self-

interested and equal nature of persons, and these three factors in turn lead to a war of all against

all. No agriculture, industry, economy, culture or civilization is possible under such unstable

circumstances, and people lead lives that are “poor, nasty, brutish, and short...” (handout,

“Leviathan: Morality as Rational Advantage”, p.3, top of right column).

2.2 Laws of Nature. How then can the people in the state of nature escape this

nightmarish and mutually self-destructive condition of war? This is where A[iii], the rationality

of persons, comes in. Since each person is rationally self-interested, they use reason to discover

laws of nature. These laws of nature are, as Hobbes defines them, “a precept or general rule,

found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life…

and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved” (handout, “Leviathan: Morality

as Rational Advantage”, p.4, bottom half of right column). Below are the first three laws of

nature, which I shall paraphrase and explain:

6

C. Laws of Nature
[i] One should seek peace as far as possible;
[ii] One should agree to give up one’s right to all things, on condition that others
will similarly give up their rights;
[iii] One should perform one’s part in the agreements one makes with others.

Let me explain these rules. Rule [i] makes sense because one would otherwise have to

live in the condition of universal war, where everyone lives in constant fear and no one can

flourish. Rule [ii] is necessary because in the state of nature nothing counts as wrong, and

therefore one has a right to everything, even another’s body (see handout, “Leviathan: Morality

as Rational Advantage”, p.4, bottom of right column). So people should agree to limit their

rights to the same extent. Rule [iii] is necessary because no one would be willing to enter into an

agreement to limit their rights if people are going to break the agreement whenever they find it

convenient and in their own interest to do so. In short, following Rule [i] is a necessary

condition for self-preservation, Rule [ii] is a necessary condition for following Rule [i], and Rule

[iii] is a necessary condition for following Rule [ii].

But now another problem arises, which is something of a paradox. Each person in the

state of nature arrives at Rules [i]-[iii] through rational self-interest. But the very same rational

self-interest tells each person that it is better for one to disobey Rule [iii] if everyone else is

following it—since one would then have a right to everything while everyone else has agreed to

limit their rights. So how does Hobbes propose a solution to this problem?

The answer: a coercive power is needed, who will punish those who break their part in

agreements. So this coercive power makes it in each person’s rational self-interest to abide by

the agreement to limit their rights, on condition that others will similarly limit theirs.

So, with the establishment of a coercive power, a social contract is possible, and with the

implementation of the social contract, people in the state of nature enter into society.
 7

3. Psychological Egoism

Psychological egoism is a factual thesis about the human psychology, more specifically,

about certain alleged facts about the motivation of human actions. Simply put, it states that

everyone is motivated only by their own self-interest. Our own interest and happiness is the only

thing we are motivated to seek for their own sake, and we seek everything else for the sake of

our own interest and happiness.

Psychological egoism should be distinguished from another type of view, namely, ethical

egoism, which is a normative thesis about what humans should do (as opposed to how humans in

fact are). Ethical egoism states that one ought only to pursue one’s own self-interest.

In short, ethical egoism makes a normative claim about what we should do; psychological

egoism makes a factual claim about what we do do.

– But (you might object) if psychological egoism is taken as a factual claim, it seems

clearly to be false! The psychological egoist claims that we do whatever tends to serve our own

self-interest. However, from time to time we hear about some selfless deed of love or courage,

and there are people who would sacrifice themselves for the sake of others, or for the sake of a

greater cause. How could psychological egoism explain the actions of Florence Nightingale or

Mother Teresa?

– That’s easy, replies the psychological egoist. Consider the following two arguments

(3.1 and 3.2) in support of my ironclad position!

3.1 All of my voluntary actions are prompted by my desires, not someone else’s.
8

So, you believe that Mother Teresa was genuinely altruistic, remarks the psychological egoist

with a patronizing smile. Now, is it not true that all voluntary actions are motivated by desires,

and that we act in order to satisfy these desires? For instance, you search for food in the fridge

because you are hungry, and you do so in order to appease your hunger. Likewise, in the case of

Mother Teresa, her actions were motivated by her desires, and she helped the sick, homeless, and

hungry because she wanted to. Note that these were her desires and not another’s, and she did

what she did in order to satisfy her desires, not another person’s. Therefore, it must be the case

that behind every altruistic desire lies an ulterior motive to satisfy that desire, and every

nonselfish motive can be explained in terms of an ulterior, selfish motive. [See V&V, p.334 for

this argument.]

It is beginning to look as though psychological egoism is not just a possible hypothesis,

but a necessary truth, about human motivation. However, the psychological egoist is not content

to stop at this point. There is a further argument that will clinch psychological egoism against all

opposition.

3.2 When we get what we want, we often get pleasure—my pleasure, not another’s.

The truth of the above statement suggests that what we really aim at, when we act upon our

desires, is to attain the pleasures deriving from the satisfaction of our desires. Conversely, when

we find out that the object of our desire will bring us only pain, our desire for it naturally tends to

disappear. So it seems plausible to think that the ultimate end of all purposive action is the

pursuit of our own pleasure, self-satisfaction and happiness.

But you may ask about Mother Teresa: didn’t she forsake her own happiness?

Our psychological egoist responds: suppose that Mother Teresa had chosen not to go to

Calcutta to devote her life to succoring the poor and tending to the sick. Would she have felt
 9

truly content? Not very likely. She would have felt no peace of mind, her decision would not

have won her own approval, and her self-esteem would have suffered. She had consecrated her

entire life for the sake of others, because she would not have been truly happy otherwise. This

shows that whatever we voluntarily do, we do ultimately for the sake of our own happiness. [See

V&V, p.335 for this argument.]

4. Arguments against Psychological Egoism

Here I will outline James Rachels’s arguments against psychological egoism—i.e.,

against the two arguments (3.1 and 3.2) that I have explained in §3.

 Against Argument 3.1:

(a) Argument 3.1 assumes that all voluntary actions are prompted by the agent’s wants
or desires. But this assumption is false with regard to:
(i) Actions which we perform not because we want to, but because they are
necessary means to ends that we do want.
- e.g., visiting a dentist to get rid of your toothache.
(ii) Actions which we perform not because we want to, but because we have an
obligation to perform them.
- e.g., keeping a difficult promise not because you want to, but because
you believe it is right to keep promises.
(b) But suppose we grant, for the sake of argument, that all voluntary actions are
motivated by the agent’s desires. Still, the fact that the agent is acting from her own
desire does not make that desire selfish or unselfish. Rather, it is the object of her
desire that makes the desire selfish or unselfish. (Rachels’s rhetorical question: Isn’t
the unselfish person precisely the one who wants to help others?)

 Against Argument 3.2:

(a) Argument 3.2 notes that even the unselfish person often derives pleasure or self-
satisfaction from doing unselfish deeds. But so what? Isn’t that what we would
expect from an unselfish person? The unselfish person is precisely the one who
derives pleasure from helping others, unlike the selfish person who does not derive
such pleasure.
10

(b) Moreover, even if we assume that the unselfish agent derives pleasure from helping
others, this does not mean that she is aiming at her own pleasure. The sense of self-
satisfaction or pleasure we get from fulfilling our desires is a by-product of attaining
the objects of our desires. This means that deriving satisfaction or pleasure from
helping others requires an antecedent and independent desire to help others. So the
agent cannot simply want her own pleasure only (as the psychological egoist argues),
but must independently and genuinely want to help others.

Besides attacking the two arguments (3.1 and 3.2) in favor of psychological egoism,

Rachels makes note of three commonplace confusions made by psychological egoists. By

pointing out these confusions, Rachels claims to show that (a) not all actions are selfish, (b) not

all actions are performed for self-interested reasons, and (c) self-interest can be compatible with

altruism. The confusions are as follows:

(a) Confusion of selfishness with self-interest.

 A selfish action ignores the interests of other people, in situations where it is wrong to
ignore them.
(For instance, suppose that your dear aunt Thelma is lonely and sick and she would be
immensely happy to see you. But you stay indoors and watch a basketball game instead.)
 A self-interested action is not necessarily “selfish” in the above sense.
(For instance, suppose that you abstain from beer because it’s time you got rid of your
increasingly noticeable beer belly. This action is in your self-interest but it is not selfish.)
(b) The false dichotomy that every action is performed either from self-interest or from altruism.
 There are plenty of actions that are neither in your self-interest nor in the interests of
others. Actions prompted by addiction, jealousy, anger, etc., fall neither under self-
interest nor altruism.
(For instance, someone who continues to smoke cigarettes after learning that it is bad for
health is not acting in one’s self-interest. Also, someone who commits a crime of passion
—say, because she saw her dear husband having an affair with another woman—does
something neither in her own best interest nor in her husband’s.)
(c) The false assumption that self-interest is incompatible with genuine concern for others.
 There is no necessary inconsistency between pursuing one’s own self-interest and
promoting the interests of others. True, conflicts do sometimes arise between these two
goals of conduct. But very often our own interests are intertwined with the interests of
others, such as our family and friends. And sometimes we even help strangers from
disinterested (impartial) motives, and not because our own interests are at stake.
 11

5. Ethical Egoism

Ethical egoism is a normative position which claims that one should always do what is in

one’s own best interest. It is important to note that there is no logical connection between

psychological egoism and ethical egoism: one can be an ethical egoist without being a

psychological egoist, and vice versa.

It is also important to note—as Rachels points out (V&V, p.338)—that ethical egoism is

self-effacing, which just means that an ethical egoist cannot recommend his position to others.

He cannot recommend that everyone pursue their own self-interest at the expense of other

people’s interests. A society where everyone promotes their own interests without respecting the

rights of others will be unstable and is likely to collapse. Hence an ethical egoist prefers to live

in a society where everyone except himself abides by the moral norms and conventional rules of

society. He must encourage others to be conscientious or altruistic, while he himself secretly

pursues courses of action that serve only his own self-interest. For instance, the ethical egoist

can encourage others to pay taxes so that he can reap the benefits of national security, health

care, etc. But he himself will cheat on his taxes, because that will maximally serve his own

interests.

A popular philosophical argument against ethical egoism (an argument that Rachels

himself does not endorse) seeks to prove that ethical egoism is a logically inconsistent position.

This argument assumes that the concept of “rightness” can be analyzed as follows:

(U) An action is right only if the same kind of action is right for anyone in the same sort of situation.

This imposes the requirement that one be consistent in one’s evaluation of actions, whether one’s

own or those of other people. But the ethical egoist, for instance, would claim:

(a) It is right for everyone else not to cheat on their taxes.

(b) It is right for me not to cheat on my taxes.
12

And thus the ethical egoist makes an inconsistent exception in his evaluation of actions, an

exception in his own case. This (it is claimed) shows that ethical egoism is a logically

inconsistent position.

But the above analysis (U) of the concept of “rightness” employs a special model of

rationality—i.e., that for an ethical principle to be rationally consistent, it should be

universalizable (= universally applicable) to everyone.3 The gist of Rachels’s response to the

argument in the previous paragraph is that when we employ a different model of rationality

(often called instrumental rationality or means-end reasoning), ethical egoism turns out to be a

logically consistent position.4 We can give a different analysis of “rightness” in terms of means-

end reasoning, as follows:

(M-E) An action is right only if it is the appropriate means to attaining a given end or goal.

According to this analysis, the ethical egoist’s reasoning comes out as follows:

(a) My goal is to maximally serve my own interests.

(b) Cheating on my taxes, while telling others to pay theirs, maximally serve my own interests.

Since (b) is the appropriate step to take in achieving the goal stated in (a), ethical egoism is

logically consistent in accordance with the analysis of “rightness” given in (M-E). So, Rachels

would argue, there is no logical inconsistency in the ethical egoist’s advocating universal

altruism to others, while he himself thinks it right to pursue his own personal advantage.

In that case, how can we argue against ethical egoism? How can we show the ethical

egoist that it is wrong to hurt others and right to help others? Rachels maintains that the only

reason we can provide for not hurting others is that others will be hurt, and the only reason we

can provide for helping others is that others will be helped (V&V, p.340). This seems viciously

circular: isn’t Rachels assuming the very thing that he needs to show the ethical egoist? No,

according to Rachels. He argues that it is a “fundamental requirement of rational action” that

 13

“the existence of reasons for action always depend on the prior existence of certain attitudes in

the agent” (V&V, p.340). Perhaps, if psychological egoism is true and we are only capable of

having selfish attitudes, then the point that others will be hurt or helped by our actions will make

no intrinsic appeal to us. But this is not so, since sympathy is an essential ingredient of human

psychological makeup (excluding psychopaths). Promoting the interests of others and refraining

from injuring their interests provide reasons for our own actions that we find convincing in their

own right and valuable for their own sakes.