Assigment No.

5 – LabRev1
Working Conditions for Special Groups of Employees
[1]

G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997. *

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE

COMPANY,  petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
**

GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents.

Labor Law; Dismissals; Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified

from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right
against discrimination afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution.—In the case at bar, petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified
from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
Contrary to peti-tioner’s as sertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account
of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved
principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment
in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

Same; Same; While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should

not be simulated.—Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from
PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as s he was m oved to act the
way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other
words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her
civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for
termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices. Furthermore, it should never be
used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.

Same; Same; The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable

connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of
the employer.—Private respondent, it mus t be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her
dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to complete
the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September
2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down
clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security
of tenure. On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly those
of a regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities which
were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT&T. The primary standard of
determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the
employee in relation to the busines s or trade of the employer.

Same; Same; Policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must
be single and that they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry declared
void in Zialcita, et al. v. Philippine Air Lines.—It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt
here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines, a decision that emanated from the
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Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight
attendants must be single and that they will be automatically s eparated from the service once they
marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code
with regard to discrimination against married women.

Same; Same; While it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements,
terms and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.—Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation
of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind
of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good
morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status,
a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.
Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that
petitioner’s policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations
and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

Same; Same; The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual, impressed
as they are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the comm on good. —
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between
the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so
much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. It goes on to intone that
neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or
convenience of the public. In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage
followed by petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as
an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. That it
must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively
required.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

REGALADO, J.:

Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine

Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT & T) invokes the alleged
concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to
terminate the services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent
Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT & T to terminate
her services was her having contracted marriage during her employment, which is
prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was

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discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer
being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.

Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a

"Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until
April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. 1 Under the
Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment
was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter,
from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991,
private respondent's services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this
time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both
periods.2 After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her
services were terminated.

On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner
company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days.
In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she
indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991. 3

It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the
two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8,
1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch
supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a
memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In
that memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting
married women for employment.4

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was
not aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along
she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. 5 Petitioner nonetheless
remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed
from the company effective January 29, 1992, 6 which she readily contested by
initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of
cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.

At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private

respondent volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation
of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of
her collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of
petitioner7. All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of
the parties and/or their counsel.

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On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a
decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a
regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus
payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly
ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied
upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that
it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company rules.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public

respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled
that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful
discrimination by her employer, PT & T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter
was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be
suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which
should not be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of
the labor arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in
her employment with PT & T.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by

respondent NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil
action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent
NLRC, as well as the denial resolution of the latter.

1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded
with love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction
with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex.
Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of
labor, especially on the matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In
the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within
the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with
preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative
practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention.

The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in
almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective
provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II 8 on the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of
women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section
3 of Article XIII9 (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973
Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including
an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14
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10
of Article XIII   mandates that the State shall protect working women through
provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.

2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more
frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as
Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a
signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 11

Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 12 which explicitly prohibits
discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
promotion, and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955 13 which bans the
"mail-order-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that
cannot guarantee protection to the rights of women workers; Republic Act No.
7192 14 also known as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act," which
affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and
for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military
or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police; Republic Act No. 7322 15 increasing the maternity benefits granted
to women in the private sector; Republic Act No. 7877 16 which outlaws and
punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the education and training
environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, 17 or the "Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995," which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the
deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where
their rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the
Family Code, 18 women's rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced
and expanded.

In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in
Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of
night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities
and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health
and safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a
nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall
be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand,
recognizes a woman's right against discrimination with respect to terms and
conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to
the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of
the marriage of a female employee.

3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional

guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is
required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of
an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial
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evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of
such employee, one's labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property.

On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company

falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass
the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods
and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of
workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. 19 As put in a case,
an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business
judgment, all aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except in cases of
unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. 20

In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified

from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and
the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and
by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed
private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record
discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because
of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT
& T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent
by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the
words of the latter, that "you're fully aware that the company is not accepting
married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you." 21 Again, in the
termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent
was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by
reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was
her violation of the company's policy against marriage ("and even told you that
married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our
company.") 22 Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made
to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only
by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers who would otherwise
be solidarily liable with the corporation. 23

Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT
& T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved
to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a
stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal
company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified
from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it
should not be simulated. 24 It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by
the employee and not on the employer's caprices. 25 Furthermore, it should never
be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. 26
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In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed private
respondent, not because the latter got married but because she concealed that
fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks
dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her
dismissal.

Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it
nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This improbable
reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent
may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other
way around.

Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its
policy against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of
insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her
concealment of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a
trivial matter to which it supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT & T says it
gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the
maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which
obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of
marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee conceals the same
instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of
reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that we
are being regaled with responsible advocacy.

This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of
propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner
glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on
the aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to
conceal her supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which
was the cause of private respondent's secretive conduct now complained of. It is
then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is
the cause of the evil caused.

Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that

she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to
dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly,
private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to
remit some of her collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is
that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital status,
and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor
arbiter would thus consider petitioner's submissions on this supposed dishonesty
as a mere afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive
conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that
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private respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether her failure
to remit the same was through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in
nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent
execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter was
deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of
her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she
was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted
as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be
effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the
plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security
of tenure. 27 On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were
undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods,
as she performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual trade
and business of PT & T. 28 The primary standard of determining regular
employment is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the
employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer. 29

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been
dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. 30 However, as she had undeniably
committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the
compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension
imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or
inference that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if
she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which was
not totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed
from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual
reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding
to her three months suspension.

4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that
adopted by petitioner PT & T. The Labor Code state, in no uncertain terms, as
follows:

Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an

employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of marriage.
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This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 148, 31 better known as the "Women and
Child Labor Law," which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No.
679, 32 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Employment of Women and Children, to
Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes." The forerunner
to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law
on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the employment of women and children in
shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other
places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.

It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita,
et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines,  33 a decision that emanated from the Office of the
President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight
attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated from the
service once they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate
in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married
women. Thus:

Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy or

regulation with the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in
its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to
women employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition
against marriage of women engaged in extraordinary occupations,
like flight attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the
pecularities of their chosen profession.

We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent.

All along, it knew that the controverted policy has already met its
doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148,
otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was
promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or their labor unions
in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain a
momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which
amended paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679,
reveals that it is exactly the same provision reproduced verbatim in
Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May 1,
1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on November 1, 1974.

It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in

the new Labor Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal
and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of
Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of
women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation
require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for
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termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants,
but that is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of
respondent. The standards have not yet been established as set forth
in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any
regulation affecting flight attendants.

It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or

regulations which are as yet to be established, the policy of
respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in
Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full

employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employees. The State shall assure the
rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work . . . .

Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that

termination from employment of flight attendants on account of
marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own
health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid
therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so much
against the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by
reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather
on the consequence of marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed
at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill effects of pregnancy on
flight attendants in the course of their employment. We feel that this
needs no further discussion as it had been adequately explained by
the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.

In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as

far as invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil
Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively, as
bases for its policy of non-marriage. In both instances, respondent
predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for long
periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure
conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering that, in this
modern world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance
from one place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact
that married flight attendants can program their lives to adapt to
prevailing circumstances and events.

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Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in
ordinary occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so.
The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary
occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article
135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the employment of women.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining &

Industrial Corporation  34 considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said
case, respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy
of the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as
separated the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women.
Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an
oral understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married.
Branding the policy of the employer as an example of "discriminatory chauvinism"
tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on
account of their sex, the appellate court struck down said employer policy as
unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148
and the Constitution.

Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer

preference or conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are
categorized as a "sex-plus" discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not
on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict
adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job
discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of
married women, but do not apply to married men, have been held to violate Title VII
of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job
discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of, among other
things, sex. 35

Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just
against married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married
women, but not against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is
unlawful. 36 Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must
remain unmarried could be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or
BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not
on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in
the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an
inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in
one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants,
was regarded as unlawful since the restriction was not related to the job
performance of the flight attendants. 37

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5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the
Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals
and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose
her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible
and inalienable right. 38 Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may
establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient,
the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy. 39 Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that
petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or
common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the
relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely
contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same
should yield to the common good. 40 It goes on to intone that neither capital nor
labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or
convenience of the public. 41 In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy
against marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence,
ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of
the family as the foundation of the nation. 42 That it must be effectively interdicted
here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct
derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and

Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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[2]

G.R. No. 153477. March 6, 2007. *

DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. LOLITA VELASCO, respondent.

Labor Law; Dismissals; Ruling in Filflex cannot be applied in a straight-hand fashion in

cases of pregnancy which is a long-term condition accompanied by an assortment of related
illnesses.—The Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Co. case is not applicable, principally because
the nature and gravity of the illness involved in that case—chronic asthmatic bronchitis—are
different from the conditions that are present in the instant case, which is pregnancy and its related
illnesses. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the condition of asthmatic bronchitis may
be intermittent, in contrast to pregnancy which is a continuing condition accompanied by various
symptoms and related illnesses. Hence, as to the former, if the medical certificate or other proof
proffered by the worker fails to correspond with the dates of absence, then it can be reasonably
concluded that, absent any other proof, such absences are unjustified. This is the ruling
in Filflex which cannot be applied in a straight-hand fashion in cases of pregnancy which is a  long-
term condition accompanied by an assortment of related illnesses.

Same; Same; Court agrees with the Court of Appeals (CA) in concluding that respondent’s
sickness was pregnancy-related and petitioner cannot terminate respondent’s services because in
doing so, petitioner will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to
discharge an employee on account of the latter’s pregnancy.—Petitioner’s contention that the cause
for the dismissal was gross and habitual neglect unrelated to her state of pregnancy is unpersuasive.
The Court agrees with the CA in concluding that respondent’s sickness was pregnancy-related and,
therefore, the petitioner cannot terminate respondent’s services because in doing so, petitioner will,
in effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on
account of the latter’s pregnancy.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and

set aside the Decision1 dated July 23, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 56571 which affirmed the Decision dated May 27, 1999 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and the CA Resolution 2 dated May 7, 2002
which denied the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts of the case, as stated by the CA, are as follows:

Lolita M. Velasco (respondent) started working with Del Monte Philippines

(petitioner) on October 21, 1976 as a seasonal employee and was regularized on
May 1, 1977. Her latest assignment was as Field Laborer.

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On June 16, 1987, respondent was warned in writing due to her absences. On May
4, 1991, respondent, thru a letter, was again warned in writing by petitioner about
her absences without permission and a forfeiture of her vacation leave entitlement
for the year 1990-1991 was imposed against her.

On September 14, 1992, another warning letter was sent to respondent regarding
her absences without permission during the year 1991-1992. Her vacation
entitlement for the said employment year affected was consequently forfeited.

In view of the said alleged absences without permission, on September 17, 1994, a
notice of hearing was sent to respondent notifying her of the charges filed against
her for violating the Absence Without Official Leave rule: that is for excessive
absence without permission on August 15-18, 29-31 and September 1-10, 1994.
The hearing was set on September 23, 1994.

Respondent having failed to appear on September 23, 1994 hearing, another

notice of hearing was sent to her resetting the investigation on September 30,
1994. It was again reset to October 5, 1994.

On January 10, 1995, after hearing, the petitioner terminated the services of
respondent effective January 16, 1994 due to excessive absences without
permission.

Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner
asserting that her dismissal was illegal because she was on the family way
suffering from urinary tract infection, a pregnancy-borne, at the time she committed
the alleged absences. She explained that for her absence from work on August 15,
16, 17 & 18, 1994 she had sent an application for leave to her supervisor, Prima
Ybañez. Thereafter, she went to the company hospital for check-up and was
advised accordingly to rest in quarters for four (4) days or on August 27 to 30,
1994. Still not feeling well, she failed to work on September 1, 1994 and was again
advised two days of rest in quarters on September 2-3, 1994. Unable to recover,
she went to see an outside doctor, Dr. Marilyn Casino, and the latter ordered her to
rest for another five (5) consecutive days, or from September 5 to 9, 1994. She
declared she did not file the adequate leave of absence because a medical
certificate was already sufficient per company policy. On September 10, 1994 she
failed to report to work but sent an application for leave of absence to her
supervisor, Prima Ybañez, which was not anymore accepted. 3

On April 13, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. The
Labor Arbiter held that the respondent was an incorrigible absentee; that she failed
to file leaves of absence; that her absences in 1986 and 1987 were without
permission; that the petitioner gave the respondent several chances to reform

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herself; and that the respondent did not justify her failure to appear during the
scheduled hearings and failed to explain her absences.

Respondent appealed to the NLRC. On May 29, 1999, the NLRC issued its
Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant decision is hereby VACATED and

a new one entered declaring the dismissal of complainant as ILLEGAL. In
consonance with Art. 279 of the Labor [Code], her reinstatement with full
backwages from the date of her termination from employment to her actual
reinstatement is necessarily decreed.4

The NLRC held that, under the company rules, the employee may make a
subsequent justification of her absenteeism, which she was able to do in the instant
case; that while it is not disputed that the respondent incurred absences exceeding
six (6) days within one employment year – a ground for dismissal under the
company rules – the petitioner actually admitted the fact that the respondent had
been pregnant, hence, negating petitioner’s assertion that the respondent failed to
give any explanation of her absences; that the records bear the admission of
petitioner’s officer of the receipt of the hospital record showing the cause of her
absences ("RIQ advice" or "rest-in-quarters") for August 19-20, 1994 which, in turn,
could already serve as reference in resolving the absences on August 15 to 18; that
the petitioner further admitted that the respondent was under "RIQ advice" on
September 2-3, 1994 and yet insisted in including these dates among respondent’s
16 purported unexplained absences; that it is sufficient notice for the petitioner, "a
plain laborer" with "unsophisticated judgment," to send word to her employer
through a co-worker on August 15 to 16, 1994 that she was frequently vomiting;
that the sheer distance between respondent’s home and her workplace made it
difficult to send formal notice; that respondent even sent her child of tender age to
inform her supervisor about her absence on September 5, 1994 due to stomach
ache, but her child failed to approach the officer because her child felt ashamed, if
not mortified; that respondent’s narration that she had to bear pains during her
absences on September 21 to 27, 1994 is credible; that she dared not venture
through the roads for fear of forest creatures or predators; that the petitioner is
guilty of unlawfully discharging respondent on account of her pregnancy under
Article 137(2) of the Labor Code; and, that petitioner’s reference to the previous
absenteeism of respondent is misplaced because the latter had already been
penalized therefor.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1999.

The petitioner then appealed to the CA. On July 23, 2001, the CA promulgated its
Decision the dispositive portion of which states:

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VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
DISMISSED, the Resolutions, dated May 27, 1999 and September 30, 1999 of the
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. M-003926-98, are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.5

In affirming the NLRC, the CA held that absences due to a justified cause cannot
be a ground for dismissal; that it is undisputed that the respondent was pregnant at
the time she incurred the absences in question; that the certification issued by a
private doctor duly established this fact; that it was no less than petitioner’s
company doctor who advised the respondent to have rest-in-quarters for four days
on account of a pregnancy- related sickness; that it had been duly established that
respondent filed leaves of absence though the last had been refused by the
company supervisor; that the dismissal of an employee due to prolonged absence
with leave by reason of illness duly established by the presentation of a medical
certificate is not justified; that it is undisputed that respondent’s sickness was
pregnancy-related; that under Article 137(2) of the Labor Code, the petitioner
committed a prohibited act in discharging a woman on account of her pregnancy.

On May 7, 2002, the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, the instant Petition raising the following issues:

I.

The court of appeals seriously erred In considering respondent’s Excessive aWOPs

as justified Simply on account of her pregnancy.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT

RESPONDENT’S LATEST STRING OF ABSENCES INCURRED WITHOUT ANY
PRIOR PERMISSION, AND AS ABOVE SHOWN, WITHOUT ANY VALID
JUSTIFICATION, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH HER DAMAGING awop history,
established her gross and habitual neGlect of duties, a just and valid ground for
dismissal.

III.

The court of appeals seriously erred in holding that respondent’s dismissal was in
violation of article 137 (prohibiting an employer to discharge an employee on
account of her pregnancy).

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IV.

The court of appeals seriously erred in awarding full backwages in favor of

respondent notwithstanding petitioner’s evident good faith. 6

The essential question is whether the employment of respondent had been validly
terminated on the ground of excessive absences without permission. Corollary to
this is the question of whether the petitioner discharged the respondent on account
of pregnancy, a prohibited act.

The petitioner posits the following arguments: (a) The evidence proffered by the
respondent, to wit: (1) the Discharge Summary indicating that she had been
admitted to the Phillips Memorial Hospital on August 23, 1994 and discharged on
August 26, 1994, and that she had been advised to "rest in quarters" for four days
from August 27, 1994 to August 30, 1994, and (2) the Medical Certificate issued by
Dr. Marilyn M. Casino stating that respondent had sought consultation on
September 4, 2002 because of spasm in the left iliac region, and was advised to
rest for five days (from September 4, 1994 up to September 8, 1994), due to
urinary tract infection, all in all establish respondent’s sickness only from August 23,
1994 up to August 30, 1994 and from September 4, 1994 up to September 8, 1994.
In other words, respondent was absent without permission on several other days
which were not supported by any other proof of illness, specifically, on August 15,
16, 17, 18, 31, 1994 and September 1, 2, 3, 9, and 10, 1994, and, hence, she is
guilty of ten unjustified absences; (b) Per Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Co. v.
National Labor Relations Commission (Filflex), 7 if the medical certificate fails to
refer to the specific period of the employee’s absence, then such absences,
attributable to chronic asthmatic bronchitis, are not supported by competent proof
and, hence, they are unjustified. By parity of reasoning, in the absence of evidence
indicating any pregnancy-borne illness outside the period stated in respondent’s
medical certificate, such illness ought not to be considered as an acceptable
excuse for respondent’s excessive absences without leave; (c) Respondent’s latest
string of absences, taken together with her long history of absenteeism without
permission, established her gross and habitual neglect of duties, as established by
jurisprudence; (d) The respondent was dismissed not by reason of her pregnancy
but on account of her gross and habitual neglect of duties. In other words, her
pregnancy had no bearing on the decision to terminate her employment; and, (e)
Her state of pregnancy per se could not excuse her from filing prior notice for her
absence.

Petitioner’s arguments are without merit.

First. The Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Co. case is not applicable, principally
because the nature and gravity of the illness involved in that case – chronic

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 Assigment No. 5 – LabRev1
asthmatic bronchitis – are different from the conditions that are present in the
instant case, which is pregnancy and its related illnesses.

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the condition of asthmatic bronchitis
may be intermittent, in contrast to pregnancy which is a continuing condition
accompanied by various symptoms and related illnesses. Hence, as to the former,
if the medical certificate or other proof proffered by the worker fails to correspond
with the dates of absence, then it can be reasonably concluded that, absent any
other proof, such absences are unjustified. This is the ruling in Filflex which cannot
be applied in a straight-hand fashion in cases of pregnancy which is a long-term
condition accompanied by an assortment of related illnesses.

In this case, by the measure of substantial evidence, what is controlling is the

finding of the NLRC and the CA that respondent was pregnant and suffered from
related ailments. It would be unreasonable to isolate such condition strictly to the
dates stated in the Medical Certificate or the Discharge Summary. It can be safely
assumed that the absences that are not covered by, but which nonetheless
approximate, the dates stated in the Discharge Summary and Medical Certificate,
are due to the continuing condition of pregnancy and related illnesses, and, hence,
are justified absences.

As the CA and the NLRC correctly noted, it is not disputed that respondent was
pregnant and that she was suffering from urinary tract infection, and that her
absences were due to such facts. The petitioner admits these facts in its Petition for
Review.8 And, as the CA aptly held, it was no less than the company doctor who
advised the respondent to have "rest-in-quarters" for four days on account of a
pregnancy-related sickness.9

On this note, this Court upholds and adopts the finding of the NLRC, thus:

In this jurisdiction tardiness and absenteeism, like abandonment, are recognized

forms of neglect of duties, the existence of which justify the dismissal of the erring
employee. Respondent’s rule penalizing with discharge any employee who has
incurred six (6) or more absences without permission or subsequent justification is
admittedly within the purview of the foregoing standard.

However, while it is not disputed that complainant incurred absences exceeding six
(6) days as she actually failed to report for work from August 15-18, 23-26, 29-31,
September 1-3, 5-10, 12-17, 21-24, 26-30, and October 1-3, 1994, her being
pregnant at the time these absences were incurred is not questioned and is
even admitted by respondent. It thus puzzles us why respondent asserts
complainant failed to explain satisfactorily her absences on August 15-18, 29-31,
September 1-3 and 5-10, 1994, yet reconsidered the rest of her absences for being
covered with "rest-in-quarters" (RIQ) advice from its hospital personnel when this
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 Assigment No. 5 – LabRev1
advice was unquestionably issued in consideration of the physiological and
emotional changes complainant, a conceiving mother, naturally
developed. Medical and health reports abundantly disclose that during the
first trimester of pregnancy, expectant mothers are plagued with morning
sickness, frequent urination, vomiting and fatigue all of which complainant
was similarly plagued with. Union official IBB Lesna’s observation on
complainant being [sic] apparently not feeling well during the investigation
conducted by respondent on October 5, 1994 even remains in the records of
said proceedings. For respondent to isolate the absences of complainant in
August and mid-September, 1994 from the absences she incurred later in
said month without submitting any evidence that these were due to causes
not in manner associated with her [ ] condition renders its justification of
complainant’s dismissal clearly not convincing under the circumstances.

Despite contrary declaration, the records bear the admission of respondent’s

P/A North Supervisor, PB Ybanez, of her receipt of the hospital record
showing complainant’s RIQ advice for August 19-20, 1994 which could
already serve as respondent’s reference in resolving the latter’s absences on
August 15 to 18, 1994. Respondent further admitted complainant was under
RIQ advice on September 2-3, 1994, yet, insisted in including these dates
among her 16 purported unexplained absences justifying termination of her
employment.10 (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner’s contention that the cause for the dismissal was gross and habitual
neglect unrelated to her state of pregnancy is unpersuasive.

The Court agrees with the CA in concluding that respondent’s sickness was
pregnancy-related and, therefore, the petitioner cannot terminate respondent’s
services because in doing so, petitioner will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code
which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on account of the latter’s
pregnancy.11

Article 137 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 137. Prohibited acts. – It shall be unlawful for any employer:

(1) To deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter
or to discharge any woman employed by him for the purpose of preventing
her from enjoying any of the benefits provided under this Code;

(2) To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, while on

leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy; or

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(3) To discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to
her work for fear that she may again be pregnant. (Emphasis supplied)

Second. The petitioner stresses that many women go through pregnancy and yet
manage to submit prior notices to their employer, especially if "there is no evidence
on record indicating a condition of such gravity as to preclude efforts at notifying
petitioner of her absence from work in series." 12 But it must be emphasized that
under petitioner’s company rules, absences may be subsequently justified. 13 The
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the NLRC and the CA that
the respondent was able to subsequently justify her absences in accordance with
company rules and policy; that the respondent was pregnant at the time she
incurred the absences; that this fact of pregnancy and its related illnesses had been
duly proven through substantial evidence; that the respondent attempted to file
leaves of absence but the petitioner’s supervisor refused to receive them; that she
could not have filed prior leaves due to her continuing condition; and that the
petitioner, in the last analysis, dismissed the respondent on account of her
pregnancy, a prohibited act.

Third. Petitioner’s reliance on the jurisprudential rule that the totality of the
infractions of an employee may be taken into account to justify the dismissal, is
tenuous considering the particular circumstances obtaining in the present case.
Petitioner puts much emphasis on respondent’s "long history" of unauthorized
absences committed several years beforehand. However, petitioner cannot use
these previous infractions to lay down a pattern of absenteeism or habitual
disregard of company rules to justify the dismissal of respondent. The undeniable
fact is that during her complained absences in 1994, respondent was pregnant and
suffered related illnesses. Again, it must be stressed that respondent’s discharge
by reason of absences caused by her pregnancy is covered by the prohibition
under the Labor Code. Since her last string of absences is justifiable and had been
subsequently explained, the petitioner had no legal basis in considering these
absences together with her prior infractions as gross and habitual neglect.

The Court is convinced that the petitioner terminated the services of respondent on
account of her pregnancy which justified her absences and, thus, committed a
prohibited act rendering the dismissal illegal.

In fine, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the CA and the
NLRC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated July
23, 2001 and the Resolution dated May 7, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
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SO ORDERED.

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 Assigment No. 5 – LabRev1
[3]

 G.R. No. 123737. May 28, 1999. *

CARLOS G. LIBRES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, OSMUNDO G. WAGA, JR.,
ANTOINE D. SEVA, PETER [Link], SATURNINO P. MEJORADA and
ISIDRO F. HYNSON, JR., respondents.

Labor Law; Appeals; Resort to judicial review of the decisions of the National Labor

Relations Commission under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not include an inquiry on the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence.—The issues raised in this petition require this Court to
delve into the findings of fact by the public respondent. We have ruled in a litany of cases that resort
to judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is confined only
to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal
rendering them. It does not include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of evidence,
which served as basis for the labor official in determining his conclusion. Findings of fact of
administrative officers are generally given [Link], the Court shall discuss the matter if
only to emphasize that the contentions of petitioner are definitely without merit.

Same; Same; As a rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided, or
except in a criminal case when their application will favor the accused.—Republic Act No. 7877
was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act complained of. It was still being
deliberated upon in Congress when petitioner’s case was decided by the Labor Arbiter. As a rule,
laws shall have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case when
their application will favor the [Link], the Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC report and
the common connotation of sexual harassment as it is generally understood by the public. Faced
with the same predicament, the NLRC had to agree with the Labor Arbiter. In so doing, the NLRC
did not commit any abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Same; Managerial Employees; As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more

exacting work ethics.—Petitioner next trains his gun on the reliance by the NLRC on Villaramaand
claims it was erroneous. We rule otherwise and hold that it was both fitting and appropriate since it
singularly addressed the issue of a managerial employee committing sexual harassment on a
subordinate. The disparity in the periods of filing the complaints in the two (2) cases did not in any
way reduce this case into insignificance. On the contrary, it even invited the attention of the Court to
focus on sexual harassment as a just and valid cause for termination. Whereas petitioner Libres was
only meted a 30-day suspension by the NLRC, Villaramain theother case was penalized with
termination. As Mr. Justice Puno elucidated, “Asa managerial employee, petitioner is bound by
more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher standard of responsibility when he
succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his
subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is
the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from oversexed superiors.” Public
respondent therefore is correct in its observation that the Labor Arbiter was in fact lenient in his
application of the law and jurisprudence for which petitioner must be grateful and not gripe against.

Same; Dismissal; Due Process; The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as

applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to
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 Assigment No. 5 – LabRev1
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.—On the question of due process, we
find that the requirements thereof were sufficiently complied with. Due process as a constitutional
precept does not always and in all situations require a trial type proceeding. Due process is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. It is undeniable that petitioner was given a Notice of Investigation
informing him of the charge of sexual harassment as well as advising him to submit a written
explanation regarding the matter; that he submitted his written explanation to his superior, Isidro F.
Hynson, Jr.; that Hynson, Jr. further allowed him to air his grievance in a private session; and, that
upon release of the suspension order made by the MEC petitioner requested its reconsideration but
was denied. From the foregoing it can be gleaned that petitioner was given more than adequate
opportunity to explain his side and air his grievances.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the decision of public respondent National

Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) sustaining the Labor Arbiter's finding that
petitioner was validly suspended by private respondents, as well as the NLRC
resolution denying petitioner's motion to reconsider its decision.

Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a managerial

position with National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Assistant Manager. On 3 August
1993 he received a Notice of Investigation from Assistant Vice president Isidro F.
Hynson Jr., his immediate superior, requesting him to submit a written explanation
relative to the charge of sexual harassment made by Susan D. Capiral, Hynson's
secretary, allegedly committed by Libres sometime in May 1992, and subsequently
to answer clarificatory questions on the matter. The notice also warned him that
failure to file his written explanation would be construed as a waiver of his right to
be heard. On 14 August 1993 petitioner submitted his written explanation denying
the accusation against him and offering to submit himself for clarificatory
interrogation.

Subsequently, Hynson Jr. conducted an internal investigation to which Libres and

Capiral were invited to ventilate their respective sides of the issue. They readily
responded. Thereafter, Hynson Jr. submitted his report to the Management
Evaluation Committee (MEC).

The MEC, after deliberation concluded that the charges against petitioner
constituted a violation of Item 2, Table V, of the Plant's Rules and Regulations.1 It
opined that "touching a female subordinate's hand and shoulder, caressing her
nape and telling other people that Capiral was the one who hugged and kissed or
that she responded to the sexual advances are unauthorized acts that damaged

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her honor". 2 Referring to the Manual of the Philippine Daily Inquirer in defining
sexual harassment, 3 the MEC finally concluded that petitioner's acts clearly
constituted sexual harassment as charged and recommended petitioner's
suspension for thirty (30) days without pay.

On 5 January 1994 petitioner wrote Melchor Q. Villamor, Vice President for

Manufacturing requesting reconsideration of his suspension, but the same was
denied. On 12 February 1994 the suspension order was finally implemented.

Seeking to reverse his misfortune, Libres filed a complaint for illegal suspension
and unjust discrimination against respondent NSC and its officers, private
respondents herein, before the Labor Arbiter. Citing the failure of the MEC to grant
him audience despite his offer to answer clarificatory questions, petitioner claimed
denial of due process. Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan however ruled that
due process was properly observed and that there was a positive finding of sexual
harassment to justify petitioner's suspension. He pointed out that there was no
substantial inconsistency between the narration of complainant Capiral and
petitioner regarding the incident in the evening of May 1992. The Labor Arbiter
found that aside from a few facts which were controverted by Capiral in her
complaint-affidavit, petitioner's admissions approximated the truth; consequently,
he ruled that the MEC was correct in concluding that sexual harassment had
indeed transpired. The Labor Arbiter observed that petitioner should welcome that
his penalty was only for suspension of thirty (30) days as opposed to termination
imposed in Villarama v. NLRC and Golden Donuts.4

In this recourse petitioner maintains that public respondent grievously erred

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that he committed sexual
harassment justifying his suspension, and in concluding that he was afforded due
process.

Petitioner argues that the issue of sexual harassment was not adequately
considered as he noted that the finding of the NLRC was made without proper
basis in fact and in law. He maintains that the NLRC merely adopted the
conclusions of the Labor Arbiter which in turn were simply derived from the report
of the MEC. Petitioner primarily disputes the failure of the NLRC to apply RA No.
7877, "An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful in the Employment,
Education or Training Environment and for Other Purposes," in determining
whether he actually committed sexual harassment. He asserts that his acts did not
fall within the definition and criteria of sexual harassment as laid down in Sec. 3 of
the law.5 Specifically, he cites public respondent's failure to show that his acts of
fondling the hand and massaging the shoulders of Capiral "discriminated against
her continued employment," "impaired her rights and privileges under the Labor
Code," or "created a hostile, intimidating or offensive environment."6

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Petitioner also contends that public respondent's reliance on Villarama v. NLRC
and Golden Donuts7 was misplaced. He draws attention to victim Divina Gonzaga's
immediate filing of her letter of resignation in the Villarama case as opposed to the
one-year delay of Capiral in filing her complaint against him. He now surmises that
the filing of the case against him was merely an afterthought and not borne out of a
valid complaint, hence, the Villarama case should have no bearing on the instant
case.

As regards his assertion that he was not afforded due process, petitioner would
point to his demand for personal confrontation which was brushed aside by the
MEC. He argues strongly that in rejecting his plea, the MEC clearly denied him an
opportunity to be heard and present his side.

The issues raised in this petition require this Court to delve into the findings of fact
by the public respondent. We have ruled in a litany of cases that resort to judicial
review of the decisions of the NLRC under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is confined
only to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the tribunal rending them. It does not include an inquiry on the correctness
of the evaluation of evidence, which served as basis for the labor official in
determining his conclusion. Findings of fact of administrative officers are generally
given finality.8 Nonetheless, the Court shall discuss the matter if only to emphasize
that the contentions of petitioner are definitely without merit.

Petitioner assails the failure of the NLRC to strictly apply RA No. 7877 to the instant
case. We note however that petitioner never raised the applicability of the law in his
appeal to the NLRC nor in his motion for reconsideration. Issues or arguments
must chiefly be raised before the court or agency concerned so as to allow it to
pass upon and correct its mistakes without the intervention of a higher court.
Having failed to indicate his effort along this line, petitioner cannot now belatedly
raise its application in this petition.

Republic Act No. 7877 was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act
complained of. It was still being deliberated upon in Congress when petitioner's
case was decided by the Labor Arbiter. As a rule, laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case when their application
will favor the accused.9 Hence, the Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC report
and the common connotation of sexual harassment as it is generally as understood
by the public. Faced with the same predicament, the NLRC had to agree with the
Labor Arbiter. In so doing, the NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion in
affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioner next trains his gun on the reliance by the NLRC on Villarama and claims
it was erroneous. We rule otherwise and hold that it was both fitting and appropriate
since it singularly addressed the issue of a managerial employee committing sexual
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harassment on a subordinate. The disparity in the periods of filing the complaints in
the two (2) cases did not in any way reduce this case into insignificance. On the
contrary, it even invited the attention of the Court to focus on sexual harassment as
a just and valid cause for termination. Whereas petitioner Libres was only meted a
30-day suspension by the NLRC, Villarama in the other case was penalized with
termination. As Mr. Justice Puno elucidated, "As a managerial employee, petitioner
is bound by more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher standard of
responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such moral
perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground
for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of
every employer to protect its employees from oversexed superiors." 10 Public
respondent therefore is correct in its observation that the Labor Arbiter was in fact
lenient in his application of the law and jurisprudence for which petitioner must be
grateful and not gripe against.

Petitioner further claims that the delay in instituting the complaint shows that it was
only an afterthought. We disagree. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, it could
be expected since Libres was Capiral's immediate superior. Fear of retaliation and
backlash, not to forget the social humiliation and embarrassment that victims of this
human frailty usually suffer, are all realities that Capiral had to contend with.
Moreover, the delay did not detract from the truth derived from the facts. Petitioner
Libres never questioned the veracity of Capiral's allegations. In fact his narration
even corroborated the latter's assertion in several material points. He only raised
issue on the complaint's protracted filing.

On the question of due process, we find that the requirements thereof were
sufficiently complied with. Due process as a constitutional precept does not always
and in all situations require a trial type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 11 It is undeniable
that petitioner was given a Notice of Investigation informing him of the charge of
sexual harassment as well as advising him to submit a written explanation
regarding the matter; that he submitted his written explanation to his superior, Isidro
F. Hyson Jr.; that Hynson Jr. further allowed him to air his grievance in a private
session; and, that upon release of the suspension order made by the MEC
petitioner requested its reconsideration but was denied. From the foregoing it can
be gleaned that petitioner was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his
side and air his grievances.

The personal confrontation with the MEC officers, which he requested, was not
necessary. The parties had already exhaustively presented their claims and
defenses in different fora. As stated in Howevers Savings and Loan Association
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v. NLRC, litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position
papers, memoranda or oral arguments. 12 Petitioner has been afforded all of the
above means to air his side. Due process was therefore properly observed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, no grave abuse of discretion having

been committed by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in
upholding the suspension of petitioner Carlos G. Libres as justified and in
accordance with due process. Consequently, its decision of 28 August 1995 as well
as its resolution of 31 October 1995 is AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

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Book Four; RA 11999
PDF

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Policy and Definitions
[4]

No. L-26341. November 27, 1968.

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING Co., petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, f or herself and in
behalf of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed PABLO,
respondents.

Workmen's Compensation Act; When compensation may be granted; Injuries sustained off the
premise; When "assault" may be considered as an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act; Resume' of governing principles.—In resumé:
1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise out of
and in the course of employment.
2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is weak and
the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the
question is whether the accident is work-connected.
3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must first be shown to exist
between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of employment, it
is presumed to have arisen out of the employment.
4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the
injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may be, and
while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his place of
work, is not of the employment.
6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premise, but while in
close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and egress. The reason for
extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises injuries is that there is a causal
connection between the work and the hazard.
7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be
the subject-matter of a dispute leading the assault.
The question as to where the line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the employer
cannot continue has been held to be usually one of fact.

Same; Where employment extends.—Employment includes not only the actual doing of the
work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the
place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or
implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises,  or
over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the
employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as
though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance.
In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in
point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule,
'employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's
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premises where the work is to be done; "but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include
adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or
implied consent of the employer" (Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles, 72 L. ed. 507, Feb. 20, 1928).

Same; Assault by third persons; Case at bar.—The ruling in Kelty v. Travellers Insurance

Company, 391 SW 2d 558, is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where Pablo was
killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related
to the employee's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises." That portion
of the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering
the IDECO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses if extensively in
pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or
contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely
because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place
safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one
of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures
over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting
in his death.

APPEAL from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred
to as the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) affirming
the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay
to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the minors
Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the
widow P89 as reimbursement for burial expenses and P300 as attorney's fees, and
to pay to the Commission the amount of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.

At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was
employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot
to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a
private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not
heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and
still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's
death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another
employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going
home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were
four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential
house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the
record.

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According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death
occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the
employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's
death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and
intendment of that "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific", 1 phrase The two
components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in the course of
employment."2 The two components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and
"in the course of employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be
independently satisfied;3 however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept
of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word,
"work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent
application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude
clearly work-connected injuries.4 The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or
cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the
course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident
takes place.5

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the

course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at
a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties
or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. 6

The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming
rule," simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee
injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits
of workmen's compensation acts."7 This rule, however, admits of four well-
recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his
work on the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or
about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary
means of ingress and egress; (3) where the employee is charged, while on his way
to or from his place of employment or at his home, or during his employment, with
some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the
employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation
to and from the place of employment.8

We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the

second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but
while using a customary means of ingress and egress.

This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber
Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9 There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while
proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a
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ditch fronting the main gate of the employer's factory, as a result of which he died
the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which caused the
employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. This Court
ruled in favor of the claimant thus:

The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the
petitioner intimated that "we do not of course mean to imply that an
employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or from
work. That depends on the nature of his employment." Considering the facts
found by the Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was not
under any shift routine; that his assignment covered the entire working hours
of the factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the morning;
that it takes at least thirty minutes before the machine operates at full speed
or load; that the spot where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or
sidewalk of its premises), is immediately proximate to his place of work, the
accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his
employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig
vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in
the Comments on the Workmen's Compensation Commission Act by
Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for injury
received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a
path or way owned by his employer and commonly used by the latter's
laborers.

In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which

concerned injuries sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at
9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon
"after he stepped out of the company gate, and while standing about 2-½ meters
from it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside
the compound and intersected the highway, waiting for a ride home, he was
bumped by a jeepney, as a result of which he sustained" injuries. In holding that
these injuries were "not produced by an accident "arising out of and in the course of
employment," " this Court reasoned thus:

The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or

coming from his work depends upon whether or not it is "work-connected."
As Chief Justice Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the
employee is travelling to or from work on a public highway does not
necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d
543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to say that the employee would not
have been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since the same
can usually be said of the general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial
Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in effect, insures the employee
against losses arising from the perils of his work. In other words, the
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Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such,
must have a causative connection with something, not merely in common
with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant recovery
for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a very
special danger, some particular risk which the employer could have caused
or allowed to exist. Hence,

It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases

have involved normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk
adjacent to the premises and therefore identified with the premises in
the sense that the employer should have removed the ice. (Emphasis
ours.)

It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130
(June 30, 1956), we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an
employee who, as he was running to his place of work to avoid the rain,
slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate and near the
same. The ditch was, however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to
its proximity to the gate, the employer should have taken measures to
remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the
occurrence of the accident.

In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is

no particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the
employee and either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the
decision appealed from, the record does not show that the company "had
taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the employees," neither
does the record show either that the accident occurred at the usual waiting
place of the employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe.

Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it
is not amiss to pay deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise
area of law here involved, we can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and
State precedents.

From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation

Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following observations:

Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way
home from work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial
upheavals.

The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and
not "out of" the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street
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risks, whether the employee was walking or driving, and all other similar
questions deal with the risk of injury or "out of" the employment. "In the
course of" deals mainly with the element of time and space, or "time, place
and circumstances."

Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within
one hundred feet of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads,
the question of "in the course of" the employment is flatly raised.

Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to
include these injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the
moment his foot or person reaches the employer's premises, whether he
arrives early or late. These states find something sacred about the
employment premises and define "premises" very broadly, not only to
include premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased, hired,
supplied or used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the
employer. Adjacent private premises are protected by many states, and a
few protect the employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets.
Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island, all its streets are
protected premises.

There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for
a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for
a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's
premises. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that it will
not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence,
a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his employer's
brick-making premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short
crossing over the track), and killed by a train, was held to be in the course of
his employment when hit by an oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day
would have begun. So long as causal relation to the employment is
discernible, no federal question arises.

The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he
crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-
premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are
compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle
owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's
street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all
hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for the
employer, i.e., travelling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's
time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the
employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed
salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his
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place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally
justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances.

Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:

The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an
employee is generally considered to be in the course of his employment
while coming to or going from his work, when, though off the actual
premises of his employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is proceeding
diligently at an appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural,
practical, customary, convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress
either on land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property
with the express or implied consent of the employer.

On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition:

The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an
award in case of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all
mankind, or to which the public at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they
do not as a general rule cover injuries received while going to or from work
on public streets, where the employee has not reached, or has left the
employer's premises. The question whether an injury arises out of and in the
course of the employment, however, is one dependent upon the facts of
each case, and in some cases, where an injury occured while the employee
was going to or from work, but was in the street in front of the employer's
premises, it has been held compensable.

Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the
injury was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment,
where the employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately in front of
the employer's place of business, while on her way to report for duty, and
just before entering by the only entrance to her place of employment. The
court here recognized the general rule that, if an employee is injured while
going to or from his work to his house, or to or from some point not visited
for the discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or while in the use
of a public highway, he does not come within the protection of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, but stated that there is an exception to this
rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual time when the
workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases,
but includes a reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he is
at or near his place of employment. The court reasoned that in the case at
bar, although the employee had not entered the employer's place of
business, and the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was
in front of the employer's place of business was a necessary adjunct, used
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in connection with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited
degree and purpose a part of the employer's premises.

In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the
injury was held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an
employee, about five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty,
was struck by an automobile owned and driven by another employee, within
a short distance from the employer's plant, which was located at the dead
end of a street maintained by the employer from its plant to the intersection
with another street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere
except to the employer's plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use
it in going to and from their work. The court stated that where the conditions
under the control of an industrial plant are such that the employee has no
option but to pursue a given course with reference to such conditions and
environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the
employer in his contract with such employee, and that when he, for the
purpose of entering his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone
controlled by his employer and is pursuing a course with reference to which
he has no option, he is then not only within the conditions and environments
of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course of his employment; and
that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions and
environments, there is a direct causal connection between his employment
and his injury, and the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for
which compensation has been provided by the Workmen's Compensation
Law.

99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:

It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that,
in the absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual
circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by
an employee while going to or from his work is not compensable. Such
injury, or accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts as
not arising out of his employment, and as not being, or not occurring, in the
course thereof.

However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is

subject to qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the nature,
circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment, the
circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the injury.

Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests 11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for
extending the scope of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries:

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We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-
premises injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on
public streets and highways. The extension of the course of employment to
off-premises injuries is not based upon the principle which would justify a
distinction upon the narrow ground of private and public property; it is not
sound to say that while an employee is on public highway he is always there
as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of any right
conferred by his contract to employment; nor is it a complete answer to say
that while he is on his employer's premises his presence there is by contract
right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not
one is a covered employee should not be resolved by the application of the
law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by law of trespass, licensee,
invitee or otherwise.

A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of

employment beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to
the necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment. These
risks may or may not be on the premises of the employer and for this reason
there is no justification to distinguish between extended risks on public
highways and private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a
difference. Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or
private is obviously of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not
conclusive.

Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions:

We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule:

it is not nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or
surrounding areas with the premises; it is simply that, when a court has
satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising out of" or causal connection
between the conditions under which claimant must approach and leave the
premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of
employment extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's
Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211)

We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault.

An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an

"accident" within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since
the word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be
casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible." 12

In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected,
compensation was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged
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in hauling the ship's cable and in coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed
of one of the passengers. This passenger, upon being asked, declared his
ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and
proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with
Nava, and then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this
point, the passenger's brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death
was adjudged compensable.

In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck which

Mandaguit was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction. The
latter turned around and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes
later when it stopped to take on passengers. The driver then disembarked from the
bus to wash his hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him there and
knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant of compensation upon the finding that
the death arose out of and in the course of employment.

In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of
another employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his labor
union; while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to intercede
for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended
employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable because "the
injury sustained by the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of his
employment since the evidence is clear that the fight which resulted in the killing of
the deceased had its origin or cause in the fact that he was placed in the job
previously occupied by the assailant."

In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the
assailant.

In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver who, while

driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by
the Commission. However, the question of whether the assault arose out of the
employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court.

In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was

raised. While the employee-driver was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and
sat directly behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which the passenger
and the driver never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger shot the driver
to death and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause of the
assault, although there were intimations that the incident arose from a personal
grudge. The majority decision17 ruled the death compensable. The bases: (1) Once
it is proved that the employee died in the course of the employment, the legal
presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, is that the
claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law" (sec. 43), in other
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words, that the incident arose out of the workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to
rights to compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and his dependents.
(3) The Commissioner's declaration on the work-connection might be binding on
the Court. (4) There are employments which increase the risk of assault on the
person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm sustained by
the assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the increased risk to
assault supplies the link or connection between the injury and the employment.
Among the jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs having to
do with keeping the peace or guarding property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping
or carrying of money which subject to the employee to the risk of assault because
of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the employee to
direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of
a bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor.

It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of
its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind
of employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving
dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer's property, that of carrying
or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or irresponsible
members of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or indiscriminate
contact with the public, such as the job of a street car conductor or taxi-driver; 18 (2)
jobs where the employee is placed in a dangerous environment; 19 and (3) jobs of
employees whose work takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the
employment itself may be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault as
where a supervisor is assaulted by workmen he has fired, or where the argument
was over the performance of work or possession of tools or the like, or where the
violence was due to labor disputes.20

In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to

have arisen out of the employment because it occurred in the course of
employment. This Court relied on the presumption of law that in any proceeding for
the enforcement of a claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of
the Act.21 According to this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New
York." Concerning the corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to
say:

In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory

presumption in favor of coverage has figured in unexplained-accident cases.
The Massachusetts statute provides:

In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed,
or is physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in
the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim
comes within the provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the
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injury has been given, and that the injury or death was not occasioned
by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or
another.

This provision was largely copied from the New York section on
presumptions, except that the New York act creates the presumption in all
cases, not merely those involving an employee's death or inability to testify.

The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to

mean that the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima
facie case, as long as death or injury is shown to have occurred. The New
York and Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted these statutes,
however. It seems to be necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link
with the employment before the presumption can attach. Otherwise, the
claimant widow would have merely to say, "My husband, who was one of
your employee, has died, and I therefore claim death benefits," whereupon
the affirmative burden would devolve upon the employer to prove that there
was no connection between the death and the environment.

It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-

connection will give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to
rule out cases in which claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in
the course of employment nor that it arose out of it, as where he contracted
a disease but has no evidence to show where he got it. If there is evidence
that the injury occurred in the course of employment, the presumption will
usually supply the "arising-out-of-employment" factor." Larson's Workmen
Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124.

We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs.
Gunderman & Sons:22

The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the

burden of showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were
sustained in the course of his employment. "It is not the law that mere proof
of an accident, without other evidence, creates the presumption under
section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Law, c. 67) that
the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the
contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must
be some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries
did arise out of and in the course of the employment." Proof of the accident
will give rise to the statutory presumption only where some connection
appears between the accident and the employment.

Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:

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The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of
employment," was opened with the suggestion that, while "course" and
"arising" were put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay
between the two factors should be observed in the various categories
discussed.

A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice,
have not been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent
merged into a single concept of work-connection. One is almost tempted to
formulate a sort of quantum theory of work-connection: that a certain
minimum quantum of work-connection must be shown, and if the "course"
quantity is very small, but the "arising" quantity is large, the quantum will add
up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the "arising" quantity is
very small but the "course" quantity is relatively large.

But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum
quantum will not be met.

As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor,
one may cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed off the
employment premises, outside business hours, when an employee going to
or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly traceable to the
employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the employment
premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the premises. Here,
by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since
the employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet
the unmistakable character of the causal relation of the injury to the
employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the "course"
factor. Another example of the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line
of cases dealing with injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in
hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases that,
although the "course" factor is on the borderline when the employee is
sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to the
conditions of employment — as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a straw
falls into the bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the mattress above, or the
employee is trapped in a burning hotel — will boost the case over the line to
success; while a weak causal connection, as where the salesman merely
slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak "course" factor due to the absence
of any direct service performed for the employer at the time, will under
present decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too small to
support an award. It was also shown that when the "course" element is
strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range
of compensable sources of injury is broader than when the employee,
although living on the premises is not on call.
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A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a
borderline course-of-employment activity like seeking personal comfort or
going to and from work falls short of compensability if the method adopted is
unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no such restriction applies to
the direct performance of the work.

As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a

weak "arising" element; one may recall the "positional" cases discussed in
section 10, as well as the unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases.
Here the course of employment test is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt:
the employee is in the midst of performing the active duties of his job. But
the causal connection is very weak, since the source of the injury — whether
a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or death, or a
mistaken assault by a stranger — is not distinctly associated with
employment conditions as such, and is tied to the employment only by the
argument that the injury would not have occurred to this employee but for
the obligation of the employment which placed him in the position to be hurt.
Yet, since the "course" element is so strong, awards are becoming
increasingly common on these facts.

Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful

yardstick for measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding
compensation coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by the
above standards, is weak both on course of employment and on causal
connection, one can conclude that the court is capable of giving the act a
broad construction. Thus, an award was made in Puffin v. General Electric,
where the course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element
was weak (setting fire to own sweater while smoking). Both factors were
likewise very weak in O'Leary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course
of employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a rescue of a
stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where
decedent was prohibited from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of
employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in the morning) and the
causal factor was also weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award was made in
New York.

But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of
course and arising factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum
is not found. In Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an
employee who while combing her hair preparatory to going to lunch
negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here we see thinness on all fronts:
as to course of employment time factor, we have a lunch period; as to the
course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance;
and as to the causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each
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weakness standing alone — lunch period, care of appearance, negligence
— would not be fatal; there are many awards in which one or another of
these is present. But when all are present, while an award is not impossible
and could be defended on a point by point basis, it cannot be relied upon in
most jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer. Larson's Workmen's Compensation
Law 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to 452.100.

In resume:

1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident

which arise out of and in the course of employment.

2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one
factor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not
where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the
accident is work-connected.

3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to

come within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a
preliminary link must first be shown to exist between the injury and the
employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of employment, it is
presumed to have arisen out of the employment.

4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor
is present if the injury takes place within the period of employment, at a
place where the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is
engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes
from his place of work, is not of the employment.

6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's

premises, but while in close proximity thereto and while using a customary
means of ingress and egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course
of employment" to off-premises injuries is that there is a causal connection
between the work and the hazard.

7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the

Workmen's Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of
assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to
the assault.

From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar,
having in mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity,
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that the particular facts and circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and
that in any perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the line should be drawn
beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be
usually one of fact.

We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo
was killed. In granting compensation, the Commission said that "the road where the
deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led
straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it
belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership
of the road were open to question, there was no doubt that its private character was
obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose of its own business to such
an extent as to make it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so
that the "shooting of the deceased may be considered to have taken place on the
premises, and therefore within the employment;" and that "while respondent
allowed its name to be used in connection with the private road for the ingress and
egress of the employees it did not apparently take the necessary precaution to
make it safe for its employees by employing security guards."

But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the
Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not originate from his work
as to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the
road. The decision of the Regional Office does not state that the road belongs to
the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was
dismissed from work and while walking along the IDECO road about twenty (20)
meters from the gate." In its "motion for reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO
emphasized that "the place where the incident happened was a public road, not
less than twenty (20) meters away from the main gate of the compound, and
therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the place of work." Again,
the ownership of the road was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged
outright that the "road where the incident took place, although of private ownership,
does not belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that shows
IDECO owns the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have
been no question that the assault arose "in the course of employment." 23 But if it did
indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and place its main gate
at the other end of the road where it meets the public highway.

But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was
using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road
leads directly to its main gate. 24 Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed
from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a
legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and
properly be charged with security control of the road. The IDECO owed its
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employees a safe passage to its premises. In compliance with such duty, the
IDECO should have seen to it not only that road was properly paved and did not
have holes or ditches, but should also have instituted measures for the proper
policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty
meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone's throw
therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises.
Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just finished overtime
work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal from work,
the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that
the place where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his
place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the
zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof." Our
principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment.
We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment,
even though the said assault is unexplained.

American jurisprudence supports this view.

In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:

Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to
and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee to be
injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer,
to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of
another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the
employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of
employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was
engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the
employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and
in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached.
Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the
employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises where the work
is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include
adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress
with the express or implied consent of the employer.

The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and
twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and
space necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The
IDECO employees used the private road with its consent, express or implied.
Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's
premises. It follows that Pablo's death was in the course of employment.

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26
In Carter vs. Lanzetta,  it was held that "such statutes envision extension of
coverage to employees from the time they reach the employer's premises until they
depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period when this might be
accomplished within a reasonable interval;" and that "under exceptional
circumstances, a continuance of the course of employment may be extended by
allowing the employee a reasonable time not only to enter or leave the premises
but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto."

The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it
would appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine
Sales,27 it was held that, where the employee, while returning to work at the end of
the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the
employer's premises and one other located thereon, and the general public used
the street only in connection with those premises, and the employer actually stored
boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was within the precincts of employment. In that
case there were even two business establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it
is exclusively the IDECO premises which appear to be at the end of the private
road.

We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the obligation

of the employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of
'safe passage' to an employee to the point where he can reach the proper arrival or
departure from his work seems without question."

We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:29

The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by
an employee while using the public streets and highways in going to or
returning from the place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of
the rule being that in most instances such an injury is suffered as a
consequence of risk and hazards to which all members of the travelling
public are subject rather than risk and hazards having to do with and
originating in the work or business of the employer....

Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called

"access" cases. In these cases a workman who has been injured at a plane
intended by the employer for use as a means of ingress or egress to and
from the actual place of the employee's work has been held to be in the
course of his employment. The courts have said that these access areas are
so closely related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part
of the employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities dealing
with this exception to the general rule.

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The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one
which we think is controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n
v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the
employee was employed by Hartburg Lumber Company, which company
operated and owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber
town, consisting solely of the employer's facilities. A railroad track ran
through the town and a part of the lumber company's facilities was situated
on either side of the right-of-way. A public road ran parallel to the railroad
tracks which led to the various buildings on the property of the lumber
company. This crossing was used by any member of the public desiring to
go to any part of the lumber company facilities. On the day in question the
decedent quit work at noon, went home for lunch and while returning to the
lumber company plant for the purpose of resuming his employment, was
struck and killed by a train at the crossing in question. The insurance
company contended (as it does here) that the decedent's death did not
originate in the work or business of his employer and that at the time of his
fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business
of his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion, reviewed the
authorities from other states and especially Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326,
130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion that the injury and death
under such circumstances were compensable under the Texas Act. The
court held that the railroad crossing bore so intimate a relation to the lumber
company's premises that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a part
of the premises. The Court pointed out that the lumber company had rights
in and to the crossing which was used in connection with the lumber
company's business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In
announcing the "access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said:

Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or

business of his employer when he received the injury causing his
death? He was upon the crossing provided as the means of access to
his work solely because he was an employee. He encountered the
dangers incident to use of the crossing in order that he might perform
the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting
himself to such dangers he could not do what was required of him in
the conduct of the lumber company's business. He had reached a
place provided and used only as an adjunct to that business, and was
injured from a risk created by the conditions under which the business
was carried on. To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the
affairs or business of the lumber company would be to give a strict
interpretation to this remedial statute, which should be liberally
construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote
justice.

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xxx      xxx      xxx

In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d

674, wr. ref., this court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In
that case the employee was killed while crossing the railroad track near his
place of employment. In discussing the question of the situs of the injury
Justice Looney said:

Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not
only conduced his safety and convenience, but contributed to the
promptness and efficiency with which he was enabled to discharge
the duties owing his employer; hence the reason and necessity for his
presence upon the railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading
over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do
with, originated in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that,
the injury received at the time, place and under the circumstances,
necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or business of the
employer.

Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W.

2d 327, err. ref., this court had occasion to follow the "access" doctrine. In
that case Chief Justice Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Bountiful Brisk Company, et al. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154,
48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as follows:

An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in
passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the
employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied
consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the
employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and
relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises,
the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as
much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in
his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the
employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered
upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be
done is reached.

The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road
where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an
"access area" "so clearly related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated
as a part of the employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a
relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO
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premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively
in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by
virtue of easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road
as a means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this
reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees.
Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of
these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper
security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the
injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.

As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself
killed before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the
statement that before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be shown that
there is a causal connection between the employment and the hazard which
resulted in the injury.30 The following more modern view was expressed in Lewis
Wood Preserving Company vs. Jones:31

While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must
be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries
to arise out of and in the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121]; Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have
been somewhat more liberal, saying that, "to be compensable, injuries do
not have to arise from something peculiar to the employment." Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444.
"Where the duties of an employee entail his presence (at a place and a time)
the claim for an injury there occurring is not to be barred because it results
from a risk common to all others ... unless it is also common to the general
public without regard to such conditions, and independently of place,
employment, or pursuit." New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga.
App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39
Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co.,
79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.

But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held
liable in view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed,
because of its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO's premises.
Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and there automatically arises
the presumption — invoked in Rivera — that the injury by assault arose out of the
employment, i. e., there is a causal relation between the assault and the
employment.

We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from
overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring
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Pablo's death within the scope of the course factor. But it may logically be asked:
Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after
and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but
quote that portion of the decision in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which
answered a question arising from an ingenious hypothetical question put forth by
the defendant therein:

We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old
saw, "that which is not before us we do not decide." Instead, we prefer to
utilize the considerably older law: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof"
(Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this admonition: no statute is static; it
must remain constantly viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery
in a proper case should not be suppressed because of a conjectural posture
which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of
then existing law.

Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to

afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for
which it was enacted.32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablo's
death. The Commission did not err in granting compensation.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

Page 50 of 82
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[5]

G.R. No. 128524. April 20, 1999. *

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE, respondents.

Labor Law; Employees’ Compensation; Employees’ Compensation Commission; Guidelines

of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits: (a) that the employee must be at the place
where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official
functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing
an order for the employer.—As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees’ Compensation
Commission case, although he was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer to be
at the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the peacekeeping
nature of the matter he was attending to at the time that he was attacked and shot to death, that is,
bringing his son to the police station to answer for a crime, a basic duty which any policeman is
expected and ought to perform.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Civil Service Law; The 24-hour duty doctrine

should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer
but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police
service in character.—Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with
respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his
work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre’s widow should be denied the
claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met
his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature
proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence
of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act
attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or directive of
a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2
Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to
render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved
vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a
situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was
refusing to render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-
hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation
of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit
them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine
should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer
but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police
service in character.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

ROMERO, J

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May a moonlighting policeman's death be considered compensable? This is the
crux of the controversy now at bar.

The records 1 disclose that private respondent Felonila Alegre's deceased husband,

SPO2 Florencio A.. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National
Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On that fateful day of December 6,
1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of
Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk
Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him
regarding his tour of duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even
directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two
which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer.1âwphi1.nêt

On account of her husband's death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for
death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the
GSIS, however, denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre's
death, he was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected.
Subsequent appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) proved
futile as said body, in a decision dated May 9, 1996, merely affirmed the ruling of
the GSIS.

Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when
on February 28, 1997, the appellate court reversed 2 the ECC's decision and ruled
that SPO2 Alegre's death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable.
Citing Nitura v. Employees' Compensation Commission 3 and Employees'
Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, 4 the appellate court explained the
conclusion arrived at thus:

[T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a "workplace" cannot

always be literally applied to a person in active duty status, as if he
were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factor or
a clerk in a particular fixed office.

It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace officer, his work

place is not confined to the police precinct or station but to any place
where his services, as a lawman, to maintain place and security, are
required.

At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the

northeastern part of the Imelda Commercial Complex where the
police assistance center is located. There can be no dispute therefore
that he met his death literally in his place of work.

Page 52 of 82
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It is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers
aboard, when he was accosted by another police officer. This would
lend some semblance of viability to the argument that he was not in
the performance of official duty at the time.

However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks the fact

that policemen, by the nature of their functions, are deemed to be on
around-the-clock duty.

Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its

position that SPO2 Alegre's death lacks the requisite element of compensability
which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-
connected.

We grant the petition.

As stated at the outset, the sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether the
death of SPO2 Alegre is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and
regulations.

Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, it is provided that "for
the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be
the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place

where his work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official

functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee

must have been executing an order for the employer. 5

Actually, jurisprudence is rather scant with respect to the above rules' application in
the case of police officers. Nevertheless, owing to the similarity of functions, that is,
to keep peace and order, and the risks assumed, the Court has treated police
officers similar to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with regard to
the compensability of their deaths. Thus, echoing Hinoguin v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 6 a case involving a soldier who was accidentally fired
at by a fellow soldier, we held in Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court
of Appeals, 7 that "members of the national police are by the nature of their
functions technically on duty 24 hours a day" because "policemen are subject to
call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to
assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community."
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Upon examination of the Court of Appeals' reasoning, we believe that the appellate
court committed reversible error in applying the precepts enunciated in the cited
cases. While we agree that policemen, like soldiers, are at the beck and call of
public duty as peace officers and technically on duty round-the-clock, the same
does not justify the grant of compensation benefits for the death of SPO2 Alegre
based on the facts disclosed by the records. For clarity, a review of the cases
relevant to the matter at hand is in order.

In Hinoguin, the deceased Philippine Army soldier, Sgt. Limec Hinoguin, together
with two other members of his detachment, sought and were orally granted
permission by the commanding officer of their company to leave their station in
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. As they
were returning to their headquarters, one of his companions, not knowing that his
M-16 rifle was on "semi-automatic" mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot
Sgt. Hinoguin who then died as a result thereof. Ruling for the grant of death
compensation benefits, this Court held:

The concept of a "workplace" referred to in Ground 1, for instance,

cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as
if he were a machine operator or a worker in assembly line in a
factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must
go where his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva
Vizcaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being
approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public
transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had
permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it
appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful
permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a
place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We
note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which,
notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave.
Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with
which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements
happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with
which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might
encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered
NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by
them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not
believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding
the death a compensable one.

Then came the case of Nitura, likewise involving a member of the Philippine Army,
Pfc. Regino S. Natura, who was assigned at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del
Norte. At the time he met his death, he was instructed by his battalion commander
Page 54 of 82
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to check on several personnel of his command post who were then attending a
dance party in Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. But on his way back to the camp,
he passed, crossed and fell from hanging wooden bridge which accident caused
his death. Reversing the ECC which earlier denied death benefits to the
deceased's widow, the Court ruled:

A soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the case at bar,

Pfc. Nitura's station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del
Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with the
permission of his superior officer having been directed to go to
Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City: In carrying out said directive, he
had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As
held in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a place where soldiers have
secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally
speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their
commanding officer.

As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official

function at the time of the incident, it has been held that a soldier on
active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day of official duty status
and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He
is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times,
seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation
leave status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty
unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that
status or condition temporarily by going on approved vacation leave.

The more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its
decision is Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals. This time,
the claim for death compensation benefits was made in behalf of a deceased police
officer, P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran, who, at the time of his death, was a member of the
Mandaluyong Police Station but assigned to the Pasig Provincial Jail. Findings
showed that the deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for
interview because the latter was involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of
the said station, the deceased was approached by another policeman and shot him
to death. Both the GSIS and the ECC denied the claim by the deceased's widow on
the ground that Sgt. Alvaran was plainly acting as a father to his son and that he
was in a place where he was not required to be. The Court of Appeals reversed
said denial which decision was affirmed by this Court, declaring that:

But for clarity's sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold
that members of the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the
nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except
when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call at
Page 55 of 82
 Assigment No. 5 – LabRev1
anytime and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed
citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the
community.

xxx xxx xxx

We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation

under P.D. No. 626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the
same manner as soldiers.

While it is true that, "geographically" speaking, P/Sgt Alvaran was not

actually at his assigned post at the Pasig Provincial Jail when he was
attacked and killed, it could not also be denied that in bringing his son
— as a suspect in a case — to the police station for questioning to
shed light on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as father
but as a peace officer.

From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that the Court did not justify its grant of
death benefits merely on account of the rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case
may be, are virtually working round-the-clock. Note that the Court likewise
attempted in each case to find a reasonable nexus between the absence of the
deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident that led to his death.

In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was
assigned and the place where he was accidentally shot was the permission duly
given to him and his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight pass.
According to the Court, "a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission
cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to
go by their commanding officer" and hence, the deceased is to be considered as
still in the performance of his official functions.

The same thing can be sad of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his
station on permission and directive by his superior officer to check on several
personnel of his command who were then attending a dance party.

As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees' Compensation Commission case, although

he was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the
Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the
peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the time that he was
attacked and shot to death, that is, bringing his son to the police station to answer
for a crime, a basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform.

Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect
to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place
Page 56 of 82
 Assigment No. 5 – LabRev1
where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been
performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to
understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow should be denied the claims otherwise
due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his
death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in
nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior
officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases
of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the
policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or directive of a
superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding
that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may
be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a
round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change
the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he
was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was
refusing to render one pointing out that he had already complied with the duty
detail. 8 At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and
soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them
within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all
situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty
doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing
the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of
duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.1âwphi1.nêt

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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[6]

G.R. No. 90204. May 11, 1990. *

MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION

COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
respondents.

Employees’ Compensation Commission; Government Service Insurance

System; Benefits; Septicemia post partum is admittedly not listed as an occupational disease;
Oania Belarmino’s death from that ailment is compensable because an employment accident and
the conditions of her employment contributed to its development.—The illness, septicemia post
partum, which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an occupational
disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition,
her death from that ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of
her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs.
Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent
abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic
consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which
caused the development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was
the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her
demise.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to compensation extends to disability due to disease

supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury.—Thus in
Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled: “x x x. Verily, the right to compensation
extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a
compensable injury (82 Am. Jur. 132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the
course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of
the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s
own negligence or misconduct (I Larson Workmen’s Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]). Simply
stated, all the medical consequences and sequels that flow from the primary injury are compensable.
(Ibid.)”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Mrs. Belarmino’s fall was the primary injury that arose in

the course of her employment as a classroom teacher.—Mrs. Belarmino’s fall was the primary
injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical
consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby,
her septicemia post partum, and death, are compensable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Argument that the cause of decedent’s post partum septicemia was

the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent’s delivery of her child at home
unmeritorious.—There is no merit in the public respondents’ argument that the cause of the
decedent’s post partum septicemia “was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the
decedent’s delivery of her child at home” for the incident in school could not have caused
septicemia post partum, x x x if the necessary precautions to avoid infection during or after labor
were (not) taken.”

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Fact that septicemia post partum is a disease of childbirth and
premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the classroom
overlooked.—The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a
disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did not accidentally
fall in the classroom.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Employees’ Compensation

Commission.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady school
teacher which the public respondents disallowed on the ground that the cause of
death was not work-connected.

Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a
classroom teacher of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at
the Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had
been a classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for eleven (11) years. Her
husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher.

On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as
a classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy,
accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she complained
of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she continued to suffer
from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but,
heedless of the advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she
continued to report to the school because there was much work to do. On January
25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her accident, she went into labor and prematurely
delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo).

Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever
and headache. She was brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on
February 11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found that she was suffering from septicemia
post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from the
hospital after five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered but she died
three (3) days later. The cause of death was septicemia post partum. She was 33
years old, survived by her husband and four (4) children, the oldest of whom was
11 years old and the youngest, her newborn infant (p. 9, Rollo).

On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On
February 14, 1984, it was denied by the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) which held that 'septicemia post partum the cause of death, is not an
occupational disease, and neither was there any showing that aforesaid ailment
was contracted by reason of her employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned
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could not have precipitated the death of the wife but rather the result of the infection
of her lacerated wounds as a result of her delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo).

On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued

Resolution No. 3913 dated July 8, 1988 holding:

We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this

appeal. Postpartum septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the
puerperium resulting from the entrance into the blood of bacteria
usually streptococci and their toxins which cause dissolution of the
blood, degenerative changes in the organs and the symptoms of
intoxication. The cause of this condition in the instant case was the
infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of
her child which took place at home. The alleged accident in school
could not have been the cause of septicemia, which in this case is
clearly caused by factors not inherent in employment or in the working
conditions of the deceased. (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

Hence, this petition for review.

After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the
comments of the public respondents, we are persuaded that the public
respondents' peremptory denial of the petitioner's claim constitutes a grave abuse
of discretion.

Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation

enumerates the grounds for compensability of injury resulting in disability or death
of an employee, as follows:

Sec. 1. Grounds — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of
an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place

where his work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official

functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee

must have been executing an order for the employer.

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be

compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational
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disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set
therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975

and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these
Rules.

The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino,
is admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a
classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that
ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her
employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor
caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall
precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the
premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall
on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the
development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore
was the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of
events, leading to her demise.

. . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not

implying however, as might be inferred from the word itself, the
nearest in point of time or relation, but rather, [is] the efficient cause,
which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It must be that
which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere
preexisting condition upon which the effective cause operates, and
must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage without
the intervention of an independent cause. (Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil. 166,171.)

The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment
of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181.)

Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled:

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. . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to
disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting
from a compensable injury (82 Am. Jur. 132). Where the primary
injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every
natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of
the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening
cause attributable to complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I
Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]). Simply stated,
all the medical consequences and sequels that flow from the primary
injury are compensable. (Ibid.)

Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her
employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing
from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her
septicemia post partum and death, are compensable.

There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the
decedent's post partum septicemia "was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting
from the decedent's delivery of her child at home" for the incident in school could
not have caused septicemia post partum, . . . the necessary precautions to avoid
infection during or after labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo).

The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a
disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did
not accidentally fall in the classroom.

It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital
operating room instead of in the unsterile environment of her humble home, and if
she had been attended by specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would
not have suffered lacerations of the vagina and she probably would not have
contracted the fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained longer than five (5)
days in the hospital to complete the treatment of the infection, she probably would
not have died. But who is to blame for her inability to afford a hospital delivery and
the services of trained doctors and nurses? The court may take judicial notice of
the meager salaries that the Government pays its public school teachers. Forced to
live on the margin of poverty, they are unable to afford expensive hospital care, nor
the services of trained doctors and nurses when they or members of their families
are in. Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering her baby at home
instead of in a hospital.

The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely
blameless for her poverty. Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to
free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a
decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973
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Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for the lowly and
underpaid public school teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until Government
adopts measures to ameliorate their economic condition and provides them with
adequate medical care or the means to afford it. "Compassion for the poor is an
imperative of every humane society" (PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671,
673). By their denial of the petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death of
his wife, the public respondents ignored this imperative of Government, and
thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees

Compensation Commission and the Government Service Insurance System are
ordered to pay death benefits to the petitioner and/or the dependents of the late
Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully
paid, plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award, and costs of
suit.

SO ORDERED.

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[7]

G.R. No. 58445. April 27, 1989. *

ZAIDA G. RARO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-
Sciences), respondents.

Labor Law; Labor Standards; Disability Benefits; State Insurance Fund; A claimant for

disability benefits must prove that his illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting
the same was increased by his working conditions.—–The law, as it now stands requires the
claimant to prove a positive thing—–that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not
available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement
that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed.

Same; Same Same; Same; Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by

specific working conditions, it cannot be concluded that it was the employment which increased the
risk of contracting the disease.—–In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No.
46684, April 27, 1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin
which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a
particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e.g. chemical fumes, nuclear
radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the
risk of contracting the disease.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a

source of confusion among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing
the employees' compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of the principles
of 94 presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the defunct
Workmen's Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the present
compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees'
compensation decisions.

The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of
"proof of increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it
cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational
disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions. The one espoused by
the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection
because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that
working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand,
the respondents state that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the
disease is not compensable because the law says so.

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The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by
the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office
on March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and
recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves
every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a
Mining Recorder in the Bureau.

The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from
brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power
had been lost.

A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly
denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the
Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.

The following issues are raised in this petition:

1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted

during employment is compensable under the present compensation
laws.

2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely

inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is
not listed as occupational disease. (p. 17, Rollo)

The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science
cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a
disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment
appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly
paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It
makes the difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar
employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of
a rural area.

It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of
occupational diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as
compensable, namely —

Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment

xxx xxx xxx xxx

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 Assigment No. 5 – LabRev1
16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products
lymphatic and blood forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity
and sinuses and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood
mills.

17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic
workers.

(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)

The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the

Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated
for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as
strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl,
USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for
specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as
increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others
is proof.

The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.

Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines
defines "sickness" as follows:

ART. 167. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Title unless the

context indicates otherwise:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational

disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is by working conditions. For this purpose, the
Co on is empowered to determine and approve occupational and
work- related illnesses that may be considered compensable sable
based on hazards of employment. (PD 1368, May 1, 1978).

Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly
defines who are entitled. It provides:

SECTION 1.

xxx xxx xxx

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(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational
disease under Annex A of these rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting
the disease is increase by the working conditions. (Emphasis
supplied)

The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the
illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available,
therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal
requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent
proof cannot be presumed .

In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27,

1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin
which strikes; people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be
shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e.
g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that
it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease .

To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of

decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision
of the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the
distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and the present scheme.

On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel

scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the
concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a
system based on social security principles. The present system is also
administered by social insurance agencies — the Government Service Insurance
System and Social Security System — under the Employees' Compensation
Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the
employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to
receive reparation for work- connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, et al., GR No. 65680, May 11, 1988).

Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer,
we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by

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employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can
prove entitlement.

In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the

validity of the new law by explaining the present system as follows:

We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against

the constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It
must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions
of this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now
questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari.

The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has
granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it
no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights.

xxx xxx xxx

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the

contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees.
The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation.
No employer opposes his claim There is no notice of injury nor
requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with
a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then
determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and
medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The
payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low.
The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular
monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance
companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or
set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does not have to
defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of
workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles
claims from a fired under its exclusive control. The employer does not
intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the
past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered
claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid
benefits.

Page 68 of 82
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Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for
compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and
controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an
employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through
the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new

law. There is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.

The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a

matter that should be addressed to the President and Congress, not
to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's compensation
program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial
procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present
scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present
law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate
on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of
working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to
improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. (at pp. 4, 5, and 6)

The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to

an understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that
the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate
employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is
fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are
paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its
employees in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the
problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by
employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and integrity
of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The
employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove
a positive proposition, that the risk of contracting the is increased by working
conditions.

The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which
distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.

Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered

employers throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and
regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are
paid from this trust fund. At the time the amount of contributions was being fixed,
actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers
Page 69 of 82
 Assigment No. 5 – LabRev1
who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the
stability of the said fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when
due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law.

We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to
be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State
Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered
by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to winch
the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever
covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased
contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are
now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial
studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject
with such far reaching implications.

We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually
evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way,
more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of
covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress
either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit payments,
or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the
powers of this Court to accomplish.

For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned,
this decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with
conclusions different from those stated above.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the

public respondents is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 70 of 82
 Assigment No. 5 – LabRev1
[8]
No. L-18438. March 30, 1963.
CONRADO PAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
and ISABELA JAPONES, in behalf of her minor children RODOLFO, ROLANDO and
JAIME, all surnamed BARAWID, respondents.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission; Jurisdiction over hazardous industries, like business
for transportation of goods.—While the mere act of buying and selling palay is in itself not
hazardous, yet when carrying out such business the use of motor vehicles essential and
indispensable to transport the goods especially where the place of purchase was very far from the
place of sale so that to a driver, like the deceased, risk on the road was great, it becomes a hazardous
enterprise and the Workmen’s Compensation Commission was correct in assuming jurisdiction of
the case.

Same; Death arising out of and in the course of employment.—Where the deceased driver,
paid on commission basis, left the truck assigned to him and went to the other side of the river for
the purpose of advising the other truck driver to have all the palay bought loaded early because he
was in a hurry to go back, and he (deceased), outside of his regular duties, even helped the other
driver in the work of loading and unloading the palay at the bank of the river to be ferried to the
other side where his truck was parked, but said driver against the advice of the other truck driver
rode on the third banca which capsized and sunk and said deceased was drowned, it  is held that said
deceased driver’s death arose out of and in the course of employment.

Same; Prescription; Action not barred where there is knowledge of the accident by the
employer and voluntary compensation payments were made to the widow.—Where even if notice of
injury was filed beyond the 3 months period fixed by law, but there is knowledge of the accident by
the employer, his agent or representative, and voluntary compensation payments were made lo the
widow, the proceeding is held valid and the action is not barred by the statute of limitations.
Same; Compensability of claim; Notorious negligence, meaning of; Not present in case at bar.
—Notorious negligence signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own safety. The
disregard of a warning, where the deceased did not act with full knowledge of the existence of a
danger that ordinary prudence would counsel him to avoid, constituted merely a miscalculation, and
cannot be a valid reason to deny his widow the right to be compensated.
REVIEW of a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

PAREDES, J.:

On October 30, 1957, the heirs of Marciano Barawid, presented with the
Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 3, a complaint for compensation. A
Motion to Dismiss the complaint was presented on January 28, 1958, on three
grounds, to wit —

1. The allegations do not constitute a cause of action;

Page 71 of 82
 Assigment No. 5 – LabRev1
2. Lack of jurisdiction; it appearing that the capital of Paez is very much less
than P10,000.00 and that his business of buying and selling palay is not
hazardous nor deleterious to employees; and

3. The claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

On March 10, 1958, Hearing Officer Juan M. Gerardo, issued an Order, the
dispositive portion of which states —

Without prejudice to the right of the claimant to file suit against the
respondent under Employer's Liability Act (Act No. 1874) before the Courts
as directed by sec. 42, of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the instant
claim is hereby declared DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction of the Regional
Office to take cognizance of the same.

Complainant Isabela Japones, presented a Petition for Review of the above Order.
Associate Commissioner Jose Sanchez, on January 9, 1959, remanded the case
for such action as is consistent with the Order, making the following observations
—

... The Hearing Officer is correct in his finding that the respondent regularly
used a truck owned by him in his business of buying palay. But this is
precisely the reason for the logical conclusion that, although the business of
buying palay is not in the enumeration contained in Section 42 of the Act,
which is not exclusive, said business should nevertheless be considered
"hazardous or deleterious" as this phrase is meant to be understood in the
Act..

Moreover, the Hearing Officer found that the respondent used his truck for
transporting not only the palay he purchased but also that of other persons
engaged in the same or similar business as his; and that in all these
instances he charged freight for such transportation. Respondent must
therefore, be deemed engaged in the business of transporting goods which
causes him to fall under sub-paragraph 1, of Section 42 of the Act..

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the respondent comes within the
coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, either in his
business of buying palay, or in his enterprise of transporting goods; hence,
the Regional Office No. 3, Manila, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
claim for compensation filed against him by the claimant.

and remanding the case for further investigation and/or hearing on the merits. The
Hearing Officer received evidence, and rendered the same decision, dismissing the

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 Assigment No. 5 – LabRev1
case, which was again reversed by the Associate Commissioner who ordered Paez
—

1. To pay the claimants, thru this Commission, the sum of THREE

THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE and 71/100 (P3,455.71)
PESOS as Death benefits;

2. To reimburse the claimant, thru this Commission, the sum of P150.00 for
burial expenses;

3. To pay the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE and 18/100

(P259.18) PESOS as attorney's fees pursuant to Section 6, Rule 26, of the
Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and Article 2208 (8) of
the new Civil Code; and

4. To pay the Commission the sum of P35.00 as fees pursuant to Section 35

of the Act.

After the denial of a motion for reconsideration, the case was brought to this court,
for review.

Paez and his wife were on and sometime before 1953, engaged in the business of
buying palay for the King Tong Seng Ricemill of Victoria, Tarlac, with the latter
supplying the capital of P1,000.00 to P2,000.00. In August, 1953, Paez had been
buying palay in Isabela. For such purpose, he employed agents, two truck drivers
and two truck helpers, all of whom were paid on commission basis. In bringing the
palay purchased by his agents to Nueva Ecija or Tarlac, the same had to be ferried
in bancas across the Magat River in Aurora, Isabela, towards the other bank, which
is Cabatuan; from Cabatuan side to Guimba, the palay were hauled by truck which
was regularly driven by Valentin Lagman. Respondent's truck driver on the Aurora
side was Primitivo Apolonio, who also collected all the palay on said side — hauled
them to the river bank (Aurora side), where he engaged boatmen to ferry the palay
to the Cabatuan side and where Lagman would take them and bring them to
Guimba or Victoria, as the case may be. On August 1, 1953, because his child
became seriously ill, Lagman engaged the services of Marciano Barawid to
substitute him in undertaking the trip to Isabela, with the understanding that he
(Barawid), was to receive his (Lagman's) pay during the latter's absence. On
August 2, 1953, Barawid drove respondent's truck up to the Cabatuan side of the
Magat River to await for the palay that were to be ferried from the Aurora side. On
the same date, instead of awaiting the palay on the Cabatuan side, Barawid
crossed the Magat River and joined Apolonio on the Aurora side in hauling the
palay. After having collected all the palay on the Aurora side, Apolonio and Barawid
reached the river's bank at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, and both helped in
loading three (3) bancas. Apolonio advised Barawid not to ride the third banca
Page 73 of 82
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because same was already fully loaded, but to take another to Guimba, as he had
to drive a new truck of his brother-in-law. While in the midst of the Magat River, the
banca capsized and sunk, and Barawid was drowned.

The petitioner submits the following issues for determination, to wit —

a) the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission over the

case;

b) whether the death arose out of and in the course of employment;

c) prescription of action; and

d) whether the deceased was guilty of notorious negligence.

The Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428. as amended provides —

SEC. 42. Law applicable to small industries.— All claims for compensation

by reason of an accident in an enterprise, industry, or business carried on or
in a trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the
purpose of gain, whose capital amounts to less than ten thousand pesos and
is not hazardous or deleterious to employees, shall be governed by the
provisions of Act Numbered Eighteen hundred and seventy-four and its
amendments: Provided, however, That the following enterprises or
establishments shall be among those considered hazardous or deleterious
to employees:

(1) Any business for the transportation of persons or goods, or both; ....

The regular use of motor vehicles, was indispensable and essential in carrying on
petitioner's business, and necessarily placed his business under the category of
hazardous enterprises. Without the use of motor vehicles, it would be extremely
difficult for petitioner to conduct such business. The provision of law above cited is
not exclusive, for it clearly provides that the enterprises or establishments
enumerated therein are among those that are considered hazardous or deleterious
to the employees. True it is, that the mere act of buying and selling palay is in itself
not hazardous, but when the one engaged in the business used motor vehicles to
transport the goods, especially when, as in the instant case, the place of purchase
was very far from the place of sale (Isabela to Tarlac), that business became
inherently hazardous and dangerous. To a driver, like the deceased Barawid, risk
on the road was great, resulting from hold-ups and outlaws, falling into ravines,
vehicular accidents of all sorts, collisions, tire blowouts, etc. There seem to be no
serious discussion that the regular use of motor vehicles by the claimant's own

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employees makes the business hazardous (Haddad v. Commercial Motor Truck
Co., 146 La. 897, 84 So. 197, [1920]).

The respondent Court found that petitioner was in a sense engaged in the
transportation of goods (palay), by charging freight from other persons who loaded
their palay in his trucks, thereby definitely classifying the business of the petitioner
as hazardous. It was shown that for buying palay for the ricemill, the petitioner was
paid a commission of P.20 for every cavan of palay purchased, aside from the
freight he charged for transporting palay from Isabela to Nueva Ecija or Tarlac at
P1.50 per cavan. This being the case, We need not stretch our imagination far, to
visualize that petitioner was engaged more in the transportation of palay than the
buy-and-sell thereof. The trial court was, therefore, correct in assuming jurisdiction
of the case.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioner contends that the respondent WCC erred in finding that the death of
Barawid arose out of and in the course of employment. In justifying its findings in
this respect, respondent court said —

... And so, each case must be analyzed and decided according to its own
peculiar facts and careful consideration given to the nature and incidents
entailed by the employment..

Here, as elsewhere stated, the deceased Marciano Barawid left the

International truck assigned to him and went to the other side of the Magat
River (Aurora side) for the purpose of advising the other truck driver,
Primitivo Apolonio, to have all the palay bought by the respondent's agent
loaded early because he was in a hurry to go back to Guimba. In fact,
Barawid joined Apolonio in the work of loading and unloading the palay at
the bank of the river to be ferried towards the Cabatuan side where the
International truck was parked. The activities performed by Barawid, we
believe, were incidental to his duties not only as driver but as purchaser of
the respondent who was engaged in the business of buying and selling
palay. It is reasonable to expect an employee, as in the case of Barawid to
help a co-employee in the performance of his duties. And even granting,
only for the sake of argument, that the acts performed by the deceased were
not strictly within the bounds of his duties, still he was, in the fullest sense of
the term, in the course of the employment. For the performance of those
acts — helping the other employee of the respondent load and unload palay
— would inure to the benefit of the respondent in the pursuit of his business.
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As Arthur Larsen, an eminent authority on the subject of Workmen's
Compensation Laws, has put it:

An act outside an employee's regular duties which is undertaken in

good faith to advance the employer's interests, whether or not the
employee's own assigned work is hereby furthered, is within the
course of employment.(Larsen's Workmen's Compensation Text, Vol.
7, p. P338)

"Simply stated, 'if the act is one for the benefit of the employer or for the mutual
benefit of both, an injury arising out of it will usually be compensable."'(Schneider's
Workmen's Compensation Text, Vol. 7, p. 338.) There is little to be added to the
above observations, except to state that they are based upon the evidence and law
on the subject.

The third proposition dwells on the non-dismissal of the claim for having been filed
out of time. The record shows that the petitioner had knowledge of the death of
Barawid, and he himself made immediate arrangements for the removal of the body
from the place of the accident (Cabatuan) to his home town, Guimba; and that the
petitioner also gave respondent Isabela Japones, the amount of P150.00 for burial
and other expenses and another P150.00 for family subsistence. Knowledge of the
accident by the employer, his agent or representative, is sufficient notice (section
27, of Act. No. 3428, as amended); so that, even if the notice of injury was filed
beyond the 3 months period fixed by law, the proceeding is still valid. The fact that
the petitioner also made voluntary compensation payments to the widow, rendered
it no longer necessary to file the claim for compensation within the time prescribed
by law, as provided for in section 24 of the same Act. The present action is not,
therefore, barred by the statute of limitations.

It is finally contended that the respondent WCC erred in not finding that the
accident was caused through the notorious negligence of the deceased (Sec. 4, of
Act No. 3428). Petitioner's answer to the complaint for compensation, does not
allege notorious negligence in his defense. That defense should be proven by the
party invoking it. Notorious negligence is something more than mere or simple
negligence, or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee
to disregard his own personal safety. In the case at bar, there is no showing at all
that deceased Barawid had deliberately disregarded his safety; no intention was
attributed to him to end his life or that he wantonly courted death. The deceased
wanted to return home as it was getting late, and even helped in the loading and
unloading of the palay to the banca and truck, to finish the work that day. It is
claimed that the deceased wanted to return home, because he was to drive the
new truck of his brother-in-law, and he was in such a hurry that he unheeded the
suggestion of his companion not to embark any more, as it was dark and the banca
was fully loaded. Conceding this to be true, for the purpose of argument, (Barawid
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can no longer contradict it, his lips having been sealed by death), still the disregard
of the warning, can not be considered as a notorious negligence. Disobedience to
rules, orders and/or prohibition, does not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if
no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life. And if in the case at bar,
there was any negligence at all, the same can not be considered notorious or
evident. The deceased did not act with the full knowledge of the existence of a
danger that ordinary prudence would counsel him to avoid such a case. That a
banca loaded with palay and 3 persons, at night time, would sink if one person
more was added to its weight, constituted merely a miscalculation on the part of
such person, if he thought it would be safe for him to embark, the alleged
overloading notwithstanding Barawid's promptness in accomplishing his duties, to
enable him to attend his personal interest thereafter, cannot be a valid reason to
deny him the right to be compensated.

IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, and the decision appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

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[9]

G.R. No. 94167. January 21, 1991. *

MABUHAY SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. AND SKIPPERS MARITIME CO., LTD.,

petitioners, vs. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST
DIVISION) AND CECILIA SENTINA, respondents.
Labor Standards; Death Benefits; When the death of a seaman resulted from a deliberate or
willful act on his own life, and it is directly attributable to the seaman, such death is not
compensable.—The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not
automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which led to the death as well as the
provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the employer and seaman must be taken
into consideration, in consonance with the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. There are limitations to the liability to pay death benefits. When the death of the
seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his own life, and it is directly attributable to the
seaman, such death is not compensable. No doubt a case of suicide is covered by this provision.

Same; Same; Same; The death of a seaman, who, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck,

inflicted injury to another, so that in his defense, the latter fought back, and in the process killed the
seaman, is not compensable.—By the same token, when as in this case the seaman, in a state of
intoxication, ran amuck, or committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on
the latter, so that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman, the
circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his
own life directly attributable to him. First he challenged everyone to a fight with an axe. Thereafter,
he returned to the messhall, picked up and broke a cup and hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered
injury. Thus provoked, the oiler fought back. The death of seaman Sentina is attributable to his
unlawful aggression and thus is not compensable.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The employer is exempted from liability for burial expenses for a seaman who
commits suicide. How about in a case of one who ran amuck or who in a state of
intoxication provoked a fight as a result of which he was killed? Is the employer
similarly exempt from liability? This is the issue in this case.

Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th Engineer by petitioner Mabuhay Shipping

Services, Inc. (MSSI) for and in behalf of co-petitioner, Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd.
to work aboard the M/V Harmony I for a period of one year. He reported for duty
aboard said vessel on July 13, 1987.

On January 16, 1988 at about 3 p.m., while the vessel was docked alongside
Drapetona Pier, Piraeus, Greece, Sentina arrived aboard the ship from shore leave
visibly drunk. He went to the messhall and took a fire axe and challenged those
eating therein. He was pacified by his shipmates who led him to his cabin.
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However, later he went out of his cabin and proceeded to the messhall. He became
violent. He smashed and threw a cup towards the head of an oiler Emmanuel Ero,
who was then eating. Ero touched his head and noticed blood. This infuriated Ero
which led to a fight between the two. After the shipmates broke the fight, Sentina
was taken to the hospital where he passed away on January 17, 1988. 1 Ero was
arrested by the Greek authorities and was jailed in Piraeus.

On October 26, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners with
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for payment of death
benefits, burial expenses, unpaid salaries on board and overtime pay with damages
docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 88-10-896. After submission of the answer and
position papers of the parties a decision was rendered by the POEA on July 11,
1989, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

ordering Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. and Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to
pay complainant Cecilia S. Sentina the sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P230,000.00) representing the deceased's death
benefit and burial compensation, the sum of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY US
DOLLARS (US$350.00) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment
representing unpaid shipboard pay and fixed overtime pay plus ten percent
(10%) of the total judgment award by way of and as attorney's fees.

All other claims are ordered dismissed

SO ORDERED.2

A motion for reconsideration and/or appeal was filed by petitioners which the
respondent First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
disposed of in a resolution dated March 31, 1990 dismissing the appeal and
affirming the appealed decision.3

A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was denied by said public
respondent in a resolution dated June 29, 1990.

Hence, the herein petition for certiorari wherein the following grounds are invoked:

The Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding that "The payment
of Death Compensation Benefit only requires that the seaman dies during
the term of the contract, and no other."

That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding that even if the
subject seaman's death resulted from the fight he himself created, such
nonetheless does not constitute a "deliberate or wilfull act on his own life."
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That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding, that the death
of the late 4/Engr Romulo Sentina is compensable. 4

The petition is impressed with merit.

Part II, Section C, No. 6 of the POEA Standard Format for Filipino seamen
employed in ocean going vessels states that —

No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity,

disability or death resulting from a deliberate or willful act on his own life by
the seaman, provided however that the employer can prove that such injury,
incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seamen.

The same provision of the standard format also provides —

In case of death of the seaman during the term of his contract, the employer
shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of

x x x           x x x          x x x

b. P210,000.00 for other officers including radio operators and master

electrician. (Memo Circular No. 5 effective March 1, 1986)

In interpreting the aforequoted provision in its decision, the POEA held that
payment of death compensation benefits only requires that the seaman should die
during the term of the contract and no other. It further held that the saving provision
relied upon by petitioners refers only to suicide where the seaman deliberately and
intentionally took his own life.5

Public respondent in affirming the said POEA decision made the following
disquisition

It is not difficult for us to understand the intent of the aforequoted "Part II,
Section C, No. 6 of the POEA Standard Format" that to avoid death
compensation, two conditions must be met:

a) the subject death much have resulted "from a deliberate or willful act on
his own life by the seaman;" and

b) such death "directly attributable to the seaman" must have been proven
by the "employer."

Thus, even if arguendo, the appellants may successfully prove that the

subject seaman's death resulted from the fight he himself created, such,
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nonetheless does not constitute a "deliberate or willful act on his own life."
On this ground alone, the instant appeal would already fail. 6

The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not
automatically give rise to compensation.1âwphi1 The circumstances which led to
the death as well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of
the employer and seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. There are limitations
to the liability to pay death benefits.

When the death of the seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his own
life, and it is directly attributable to the seaman, such death is not compensable. No
doubt a case of suicide is covered by this provision.

By the same token, when as in this case the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran
amuck, or committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the
latter, so that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the
seaman, the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a
deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. First he
challenged everyone to a fight with an axe. Thereafter, he returned to the messhall
picked up and broke a cup and hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered injury. Thus
provoked, the oiler fought back The death of seaman Sentina is attributable to his
unlawful aggression and thus is not compensable.

Even under Article 172 of the Labor Code, the compensation for workers covered
by the Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund are subject to the
limitations on liability.

Art. 172. Limitations of liability. — The State Insurance Fund shall be liable

for the compensation to the employee or his dependents except when the
disability or death was occasioned by the employee's intoxication, willful
intent to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence, or otherwise
provided under this Title.

Private respondent pointed out that petitioner MSSI endorsed the claim for
compensation of private respondents. Said petitioner admits this fact but asserts
that it was not favorably acted upon by its principal, petitioner Skippers Maritime
Co., Inc. because of the circumstances that led to the death of Sentina.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the POEA

dated July 11, 1989 and the resolutions of public respondent dated May 31, 1990
and June 29, 1990 affirming the same are hereby set aside and another judgment
is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint.

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SO ORDERED.

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