Does God exist?

The cosmological argument

 Last time we closed by considering an objection to Aquinas’ assumption
that if a first cause exists, then God exists: the objection was that the first
cause could simply be some event, like the Big Bang, which is not a
plausible candidate to be God.

We then considered one source of dissatisfaction with that reply: namely,

that one could still ask of such a first cause why it occurred. It seems as
though questions like these should have answers — but it is hard, you
might think, to see how we could answer them without appealing to
God.

One can think of our topic today — the cosmological argument — as a

much more precise and sophisticated version of this intuitive line of
thought.
The form of the cosmological argument
we’ll be discussing today is due to
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was a German
philosopher, mathematician, theologian,
and scientist, whose achievements
included the invention of calculus.

His intellect and achievements were

such that they led Diderot, a later “When
French philosopher, to remark that one compares the
talents one has with those
of a Leibniz, one is tempted to
throw away one's books and
go die quietly in the dark of
some forgotten corner.”
Leibniz’s argument is best thought of
as beginning with a question which
he poses at the end of the first
paragraph of our reading for today:

“Why is there any world at all, and why is

it the way that it is?”

Leibniz thought that there must be

some explanation of why there is a
world at all because he endorsed a
certain principle about explanation,
known as the principle of sufficient
reason.
Leibniz thought that there must be some explanation of why there is a
world at all because he endorsed a certain principle about
explanation, known as the principle of sufficient reason.

The basic idea behind the principle is this: Take any feature of the
world. If the world could have failed to be that way, then there must be
some explanation of why the world is that way.

So, for example, we might notice that although the sky is blue, it might
not have been — the sky on earth could have been red, or green, instead
of blue. Given only this, Leibniz concludes that there must be some
reason, or explanation, why the sky is blue: some reason why it is blue
rather than some other color. And this does seem quite plausible.

Suppose that we were walking on campus and came across a metal

sphere on the ground, and you say, ‘I wonder how that got here.’
Suppose that I replied: ‘There’s no explanation for why it is here. It just
is.’ Would there be something odd about my reply?

Some have also thought that the PSR is a presupposition of modern

science. Why might someone think this?
Leibniz thought that there must be some explanation of why there is a
world at all because he endorsed a certain principle about
explanation, known as the principle of sufficient reason.

To state the PSR precisely, we’ll need to introduce three terms which
will also be important for topics we will discuss later in the course:
possible, necessary, and contingent.
 possible necessary contingent

Philosophers use the word ‘possible’ in a very broad sense:

something is possible just in case it could have happened - no
matter how absurd, or bizarre, it is. So, for example, it is possible that
a pink elephant is presently running through south quad, or that a
talking donkey will one day be a professor of philosophy at Notre
Dame.

By contrast, it is not possible, in this sense, that there could be a

three-sided plane closed Euclidean figure with four angles — it isn’t
just that this scenario would be silly or surprising; on reflection, we can
see, on the contrary, that the scenario really does not make sense.
In the same way, we can see that it simply could not be the case that I
have an object in my office which is bright red and bright green all
over. This is what we mean when we say that the scenario is
impossible: it could not have been the case.
 possible necessary contingent

Once you understand what it means for a scenario to be impossible,

you can understand what it means for a situation to be necessary: a
situation is necessary just in case its opposite is impossible; or,
equivalently, just in case it is impossible for that state of affairs not to be
the case.

What are some examples of things that are necessary, in this sense?
 possible necessary contingent

One you understand what possible and necessary mean, you can
understand what it takes for a state of affairs or thing to be contingent.

A state of affairs is contingent just in case (i) it actually is the case, and
(ii) it is not necessary (that is, it is possible that it not be the case).

Can you think of any examples of contingent facts?

Must every contingent fact be possible? Is every possible fact

contingent?
 Using these terms, we can state the Principle of Sufficient Reason as
follows:

The principle of sufficient reason

Every contingent fact has an
explanation.

We have already seen that a strong case can be made that this principle
is true. Now recall Leibniz’s central question:

“Why is there any world at all, and why is

it the way that it is?”

Leibniz thinks that, once we see that the PSR is true, we can show
(1) that this question must have an answer, and (2) that the only
satisfactory answer to this question will imply the existence of God.

Let’s see why he thought that.

 His key premise seems to be that
if nothing existed besides the
sorts of things we find in the
world, there would be no
explanation of why these things
exist.

He illustrates this point by his

example of the geometry books.

And what goes for the geometry

Leibniz thinks that, even we can
books, Leibniz thinks, goes for
explain the existence of each of
the world as a whole. Even if we
the geometry books by the one
can explain every state of the
from which it was copied, we
world in terms of the preceding
can’t explain why these books
state of the world, we lack an
exist at all.
explanation of the fact that there
is a world at all.
When Leibniz says that the existence of “the individual things, or .. the
entire collection and series of things” needs some explanation, which
things is he thinking of?

The example of the geometry books gives us a clue. Is the existence of

some geometry book contingent, or necessary?

This suggests an answer to our question. When Leibniz says that

“the entire collection and series of things” needs some explanation,
he is talking about the entire series and collection of things whose
existence is not metaphysically necessary - i.e., the collection of
things which exist only contingently.

This gives us a plausible candidate for a premise of Leibniz’s

argument:

The fact that there are

contingent things has an
explanation.
 The fact that there are
contingent things has an
explanation.

Moreover, given that Leibniz endorses the principle of sufficient reason, we can
begin to see how he might argue for this premise.

The principle of sufficient reason

Every contingent fact has an
explanation.

Given the PSR, what assumption would be needed to get us to the

conclusion that the fact that there are contingent things has an
explanation?

The fact that there are

contingent things is
contingent.

Is this assumption plausible? How might one argue for it?

 The fact that there are The principle of sufficient reason
contingent things has an Every contingent fact has an
explanation. explanation.

The fact that there are

contingent things is
contingent.

Is this assumption plausible? How might one argue for it?

Here is one kind of argument. Take some contingent thing, like the chair
you are sitting on. Can you imagine a world just like this one, but without
that chair?

Now pick another contingent thing. Can you subtract that from the world
you just imagined?
But, you might think, we can just go on subtracting contingent objects,
until there are none left. And then we are imagining a scenario in which
there are no contingent things. If that is possible, then the fact that there
are contingent things is itself contingent.
 The fact that there are
The principle of sufficient reason
contingent things is
Every contingent fact has an
contingent.
explanation.

The fact that there are

contingent things has an
explanation.

Now recall again the example of the geometry books. Leibniz’s idea there
seemed to be that, even if the existence of each geometry book in the (infinite)
series could be explained by the one which preceded it, still the existence of
the series as a whole cannot be explained by an geometry books in the series.

This seems plausible. It seems that if we want to explain why there are any
things of a certain kind, this explanation can’t be given in terms of some thing of
that kind.

Suppose that we wanted to explain why rabbits exist in the universe.

Our explanation could not begin like this: “Well, there were these two
rabbits. And then …”
The fact that there are
contingent things is The principle of sufficient reason
contingent. Every contingent fact has an
explanation.

The fact that there are

contingent things has an
explanation.

This line of thought seems to suggest the following:

The fact that there are

contingent things can’t
be explained by any
contingent thing.
 The fact that there are
contingent things is The principle of sufficient reason
contingent. Every contingent fact has an
explanation.

The fact that there are

The fact that there are
contingent things can’t
contingent things has an
be explained by any
explanation.
contingent thing.

The fact that there are

contingent things is
explained by some thing
which is not contingent.

But this gets us very close to Leibniz’s intended conclusion:

The fact that there are
contingent things is The principle of sufficient reason
contingent. Every contingent fact has an
explanation.

The fact that there are

The fact that there are
contingent things can’t
contingent things has an
be explained by any
explanation.
contingent thing.

The fact that there are

contingent things is
explained by some thing
which is not contingent.

The fact that there are There is a necessary

contingent things is being which explains the
explained by some existence of contingent
necessary being. things.
1. The fact that there are contingent things Of course, like Aquinas, Leibniz
is contingent. is interested in arguing for the
2. Every contingent fact has an existence of God; so the
explanation. (PSR) representation of the argument
3. The fact that there are contingent
at left is incomplete.
things has an explanation. (1,2)
4. The fact that there are contingent
things can’t be explained by any Let’s expand it in the obvious
contingent thing. way.
5. The fact that there are contingent
things is explained by some thing which
is not contingent. (3,4)
6. The fact that there are contingent
things is explained by some necessary
being. (5)
————————————————
C. There is a necessary being which
explains the existence of contingent
things. (6)
1. The fact that there are contingent things
is contingent.
2. Every contingent fact has an
explanation. (PSR)
3. The fact that there are contingent
things has an explanation. (1,2)
4. The fact that there are contingent
things can’t be explained by any We found reason to doubt the
contingent thing.
5. The fact that there are contingent
idea that, if there is a first cause,
things is explained by some thing which then God exists. Do similar
is not contingent. (3,4) doubts apply to premise (8) of
6. The fact that there are contingent Leibniz’s argument?
things is explained by some necessary
being. (5)
7. There is a necessary being which
explains the existence of contingent
things. (6)
8. If there is a necessary being which
explains the existence of contingent
things, then God exists.
————————————————
C. God exists. (7,8)
1. The fact that there are contingent things
is contingent.
2. Every contingent fact has an Let’s consider a general
explanation. (PSR) objection to the argument:
3. The fact that there are contingent
things has an explanation. (1,2)
4. The fact that there are contingent Leibniz demands that everything get
things can’t be explained by any an explanation. But then why is the
contingent thing. existence of God the one thing that
5. The fact that there are contingent does not need an explanation? Surely
things is explained by some thing which if the existence of contingent things
is not contingent. (3,4) needs some explanation, then so
6. The fact that there are contingent does the existence of God - but no
things is explained by some necessary religious believer can accept the idea
being. (5) that the existence of God would be
7. There is a necessary being which explained by something else!
explains the existence of contingent
things. (6)
8. If there is a necessary being which How should Leibniz, or any
explains the existence of contingent defender of the principle of
things, then God exists. sufficient reason, respond?
————————————————
C. God exists. (7,8)
1. The fact that there are contingent things
is contingent.
2. Every contingent fact has an
explanation. (PSR)
3. The fact that there are contingent
things has an explanation. (1,2)
4. The fact that there are contingent
things can’t be explained by any
contingent thing.
5. The fact that there are contingent
things is explained by some thing which
Is Leibniz’s argument valid?
is not contingent. (3,4)
6. The fact that there are contingent
things is explained by some necessary
being. (5)
7. There is a necessary being which
explains the existence of contingent
things. (6)
8. If there is a necessary being which
explains the existence of contingent
things, then God exists.
————————————————
C. God exists. (7,8)
1. The fact that there are contingent things
is contingent.
2. Every contingent fact has an
explanation. (PSR)
3. The fact that there are contingent If it is valid, then we can turn to
things has an explanation. (1,2)
4. The fact that there are contingent the question of whether it is
things can’t be explained by any sound. And this boils down to
contingent thing. the question of whether all of the
5. The fact that there are contingent four independent premises are
things is explained by some thing which true.
is not contingent. (3,4)
6. The fact that there are contingent
things is explained by some necessary
being. (5)
7. There is a necessary being which
explains the existence of contingent
things. (6)
8. If there is a necessary being which
explains the existence of contingent
things, then God exists.
————————————————
C. God exists. (7,8)
 1. The fact that there are contingent things
is contingent.
2. Every contingent fact has an
explanation. (PSR)
We’ve already discussed 3. The fact that there are contingent
things has an explanation. (1,2)
premises (1), (4), and (8). 4. The fact that there are contingent
things can’t be explained by any
contingent thing.
If we grant that premises (1), 5. The fact that there are contingent
(4), and (8) are true, and that things is explained by some thing which
the argument is valid, then the is not contingent. (3,4)
success of Leibniz’s argument 6. The fact that there are contingent
hinges on premise (2): the things is explained by some necessary
being. (5)
principle of sufficient reason. 7. There is a necessary being which
Let’s turn to two objections to explains the existence of contingent
that premise. things. (6)
8. If there is a necessary being which
explains the existence of contingent
things, then God exists.
————————————————
C. God exists. (7,8)
 The first objection is based on certain interpretations of quantum
mechanics, our best current theory of the physical world.

According to the standard interpretations of quantum mechanics - though

not all interpretations of the theory - the physical world is indeterministic. That
is, what the laws of nature tell us in many cases is not what will happen, but
rather just probabilities of various outcomes.

Imagine, for example, that we have some

uranium, and we are interested in whether some
particular atom will decay in a certain amount of
time.
Quantum mechanics will tell us something like this:
there is a 12.37% chance that the atom will decay
in that amount of time.
Suppose now that the atom does decay, and we ask: why did it decay?

On standard interpretations of quantum mechanics, there is literally no answer

to this question. There was a chance that it would, and a chance that it
wouldn’t, and it just did — end of story. Is that a problem for the PSR?
 A final objection is quite different, and in some ways more worrying.

Let us suppose for purposes of argument that the conclusion of Leibniz’s

argument is true, and hence that the following is true:

God brings about

the existence of
contingent things

This must be either necessary, or contingent. But either path leads to trouble.

necessary contingent
 God brings about
the existence of
contingent things

necessary contingent

then, by the PSR, there

then it is a necessary must be some
truth that there are explanation of God’s
contingent things bringing about the
existence of contingent
things

but then premise (1) of

the original argument is but what could this be?
false
 The right hand side of the dilemma might not
look too bad at first. We might think, for
God brings about
the existence of example, that we can explain God’s creation of
contingent things contingent things in terms of God’s deciding to
create contingent things.

contingent

then, by the PSR, there

must be some
explanation of God’s
bringing about the
existence of contingent
things

but what could this be?

 The right hand side of the dilemma might not
look too bad at first. We might think, for
example, that we can explain God’s creation of
contingent things in terms of God’s deciding to
create contingent things.

But this just gives us a new fact:

God decides to
bring about the
existence of
contingent things

And this fact must be necessary, or contingent.

If it is necessary, then, again, premise (1) of our initial argument is false.

And if it is contingent, then by the PSR it must have some explanation.

But what could this be?
 God decides to
bring about the
existence of
contingent things

And this fact must be necessary, or contingent.

If it is necessary, then, again, premise (1) of our initial argument is false.

And if it is contingent, then by the PSR it must have some explanation.

But what could this be?

The problem for Leibniz’s argument is that we can keep asking this
question. Either we will end up with some necessary fact about God
which explains the existence of contingent things — which would seem
to make the existence of contingent things necessary — or there must
be an unending string of contingent facts about God, each one of which
explains the next.