Journal of Organizational Behavior, J. Organiz. Behav.

36, 313–318 (2015)

Published online 13 October 2014 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/job.1956

The Incubator
“Justice” and “fairness” are not the same thing
BARRY GOLDMAN1* AND RUSSELL CROPANZANO2
1
Department of Management and Organizations, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, U.S.A.
2
Division of Management and Entrepreneurship, Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, U.S.A.

Summary Organizational justice researchers tend to treat as synonyms the terms “justice” and “fairness”. We discuss
different definitional arguments, concluding that these two concepts are distinct. Justice should be defined
as adherence to rules of conduct, whereas fairness should be defined as individuals’ moral evaluations of this
conduct. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords: organizational justice; legal justice; fairness

Historically, organizational justice researchers have focused on individual perceptions of fairness, why these judgments
are important, and the effects of perceiving (in)justice (Cugueró-Escofet & Fortin, in press). This approach has proven
valuable, as justice perceptions have been found to predict such phenomena as work attitudes, job performance, and coun-
terproductive work behaviors (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). Despite these achievements, the signifi-
cant emphasis placed on perceptions has come with a cost that is paid in imprecision. Organizational justice researchers
have tended to use the terms “justice” and “fairness” interchangeably, whereby one is the synonym for the other (for dis-
cussions on this point, see Colquitt & Rodell, in press; Cugueró-Escofet & Rosanas, 2013; Fortin & Fellenz, 2008).
This conceptual strategy may have run its course. Three independent lines of evidence suggest that a distinction
needs to be made between these two ideas—“justice” should refer to whether one adheres to certain rules or
standards, while “fairness” should refer to how one responds to perceptions of these rules (and rule compliance).
In other words, “justice” denotes conduct that is morally required, whereas “fairness” denotes an evaluative
judgment as to whether this conduct is morally praiseworthy. A “just” procedure, for instance, might provide voice,
but voice may or may not be viewed as “fair” depending upon the individual and the situation. As a corollary, there
should be fewer complaints of injustice—the standards for what is required should be more agreed upon in a society
(as they should be based on the edict of a legitimate authority, such as an elected legislature)—than there are com-
plaints of unfairness—because there can be many more reasonable disagreements as to what is morally praisewor-
thy. In this incubator, we will briefly discuss three sets of arguments for separating justice and fairness.

Ancient sources of justice and fairness

While ancient sources do not directly address the distinction between justice and fairness (various conflicting trans-
lations only confuse the issue), they do provide plenty of examples from which the concepts evolved. For example,
the Code of Hammurabi contains a number of passages emphasizing the importance of justice, viz:
Called me by name Hammu-rabi,
the reverent God-fearing prince,
to make justice to appear in the land,
to destroy the evil and the wicked
that the strong might not oppress the weak….

*Correspondence to: Barry Goldman, Department of Management and Organizations, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona,
Tucson, Arizona 85721-0108, U.S.A. E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Received 15 August 2014, Accepted 29 August 2014
314 B. GOLDMAN AND R. CROPANZANO

As can be seen from this example, the purpose of justice is to protect the weak from the strong and the means to do
that is through retribution, which is a frequent theme throughout this Code. Moreover, lest our modern conceptions
of social justice affect our interpretation of Hammurabi’s Code, it should be noted that equality has no place in the
Code, nor in other civilizations of the Fertile Crescent. The Code has scaled punishments so that the status of the
offender and victim (free man, slave) may be accounted for (e.g., “If a man put out the eye of a free man, they shall
put out his eye. If he breaks the bone of a [free] many, they shall break his bone. If he puts out the eye of a serf or
breaks the bone of a serf, he shall pay one mina of silver.”). Moreover, the Code is inviolable, even going so far as to
threatening dire consequences (revolts, famine, sudden death, the destruction of the city, etc.) to Hammurabi’s
successors who disregard its provisions (Johnston, 2011). These sorts of dictates may strike the modern reader as
“unfair”, though they would have constituted a type of early “justice”.
By contrast, the Old Testament,1 according to Rabbinic tradition, has commands that were divided into two cat-
egories, chok (a decree of God, akin to an ordinance, for which there is no known reason) and mishpat (a justice-
based rule based on logic and reason) (Dershowitz, 2000). Much of the Old Testament involves an expansion of
the concept of mishpat. For example, in Genesis (18: 16–33), we see Abraham argue with God over the fate of
Sodom and Gomorrah—the first recorded example of a human challenging God to be just. Indeed, throughout much
of the Old Testament, we see the Hebrew prophets debate with God (e.g., Saul and the judgment against the
Amalekitess in 1 Samuel 15: 9–2) not infrequently with success. In this process, we see the development of a system
of “natural law” (derived from the nature of humans and their Creator) as opposed to previously existing “positive
law” (in formal codes of conduct enacted by a King, legislature, or similar authority). In essence, we see the
developmental process of a new moral code grounded in different philosophical assumptions. An example that is
sometimes lost on the casual reader: The substantive law is somewhat harsh (e.g., an eye for an eye, generous allo-
cation of death for what modern sensibilities would view as trivial offenses) but the procedural law (how the accused
is adjudged guilty) is burdensome to the accuser (e.g., multiple witnesses, protections against double jeopardy, and
severe punishment for false witnesses) (Dershowitz, 2000).
The understanding of the law, including “justice” and “fairness”, continued to evolve during the archaic period of
Classical Greece. Interestingly, the Iliad may have one of the first early examples of a distinction between justice and
fairness. Early in the work, we encounter an argument between Agamemnon and Achilles. When King Agamemnon
takes Briseis, Achilles’ prize girl wrested from battle with the Trojans, Achilles objects: “And now my prize you
threaten in person to strip from me, for whom I labored much…Never…do I have a prize that is equal to your prize.
Always the greater part of the painful fighting is the work of my hands; but when the time come to distribute the
booty yours is far the greater reward, and I with some small things yet dear to me go back to my ships when I
am weary with fighting”. What we see is a dispute not over what is morally required (our definition of “justice”)—
Achilles knows that Agamemnon as king is entitled to his choice of prizes—but over what is morally praiseworthy
(our definition of “fairness”). Yet, as is typical of the Iliad, justice (dike in the Iliad) is not the chief virtue in it; arête
(virtue or excellence) is. Consistent with their understanding of virtue, when justice is an issue among the actors it is
resolved by warrior-like qualities. Thus, Achilles, resolves his dispute with King Agamemnon by withdrawing his
troops from battle (Johnston, 2011).
Within the New Testament and the Koran, justice is taught through exemplars of ideal behavior by Jesus
(or Mohammed). Although the teachings and parables may require some explanation, readers are provided with
models of behavior from which moral lessons can be inferred. To illustrate this development, Goldman (in press)
considers the Parable of the Vineyard Owner. In this story, a vineyard owner hires laborers at four different times
during the day—morning, 12:00, 3:00, and 5:00. At the end of the day, all four groups were paid the same amount.
Those worked longer protested, but the owner replied: “I am not being unfair to you, friend. Didn’t you agree to
work for a denarius? … I want to give the one who was hired last the same as I gave you. … Or are you envious
because I am generous?” (Matthew 20: 1–16). Notice that the vineyard owner has adhered to at least one formal rule
of distributive justice (equality), but the laborers hired early in the day do not find it fair.

We use the terms “Old Testament” as synonymous with the “Jewish Bible,” without intending any theological implications.
1

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 36, 313–318 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/job
 ORGANIZATIONAL-JUSTICE LEGAL-JUSTICE 315

Legal scholarship
Legal scholars use the terms “justice” and “fairness” differently than organizational scientists (Goldman, in press).
Although organizational justice scholars tend to assume the two terms are the same, this is not generally the case
with legal scholars who view them as distinct. In legal settings, “justice” is a broader concept than “fairness”.
Dworkin (1986; p. 374) illustrated the differences between the terms as follows: “We recognize different political
virtues, which may compete with one another, in deciding which interpretation of the equal protection or due process
clause [of the U.S. Constitution], for example, would make them better in political morality. Justice is one of these
virtues: an interpretation of equal protection is better…if it comes closer to realizing what justice actually requires.
But fairness is another: an interpretation is also better…if it reflects convictions that are dominant or at least popular
in the community as a whole than if it expresses convictions unpopular or rejected there”.
In other words, justice refers to whether a decision-maker adheres to whatever is stated in the law (in this case,
within the equal protection clause), while fairness is how people react to the law. Thus, the perceiver(s) of fairness
judge it by its moral integrity; that is, by its perceived consistency with their understanding of justice. Whereas,
perceivers of justice judge it by a number of factors (e.g., equality, efficiency, practicality, and dominant in the
community) that may or may not also include moral integrity. A corollary of this is that assessments of fairness
are more subject to variability within a population.
We can see this illustrated in the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision (Schuette vs. Bamn, 572 U. S. ____ (2014))
where the Court held in a 7–1 decision that voters refused to address the substantive issue of whether how the issue
of racial preferences is resolved. It framed the issue in terms of whether an amendment to the Constitution of the
State of Michigan, approved and enacted by its voters, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In relevant part, the Court stated: “By approving [the voter-
approved amendment] to their State Constitution, the Michigan voters exercised their privilege to enact laws as a
basic exercise of their democratic power. In the federal system States ‘respond, through the enactment of positive
law, to the initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times.’ Bond, 564 U.S., at—
(slip op. at 9). Michigan voters used the initiative system to bypass public officials who were deemed not responsive
to the concerns of a majority of the voters….” (slip op. at 15). In a dissent, Justice Sotomayer disagreed with this
deference to voters in the community arguing that protection of minorities requires disregarding the will of the
majority given the history of racial discrimination in the country.
This dissent raises the question as to what is the place of equality in our conceptualization of justice and fairness? Our
view is that equality has a place in helping to define a just social system. Hume first suggested that an axiom of justice is
that it involves an implicit agreement among relative equals (Hume, 2007). This theme was expanded by Rawls (Rawls
& Kelly, 2001). He attempted to understand distributive justice (the socially just distribution of goods in a society). He
outlines two principles of justice that were concerned with equality relating to commercial opportunities, economic
opportunities, and rights to hold public offices (“equality of opportunity”). Aristotle (primarily in Book V of his
Nicomachean Ethics) would have been aghast at this view of equality because he viewed unequal capabilities of people
as proof of their unequal worth. To treat people of unequal worth, the same would have been illogical.
Consequently, events will sometimes be “just” but “unfair” or “fair” but “unjust”. The purposes of workplace fairness
and legal justice are largely distinct. Justice describes normative standards and how these are implemented; fairness
describes reactions to those standards. This difference is important, especially in practical settings. For instance,
speaking broadly, the study of organizational justice by organizational scholars to date has been concerned with ways
to foster cooperation (or, conversely, ways to decrease conflict) in groups or organizations, particularly as they relate to
group identification or interpersonal relationships (Tyler, 2006). To do this, it tends to focus on perceptions by individ-
ual workers (Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005). Potentially, one could design organizations so that they promote stronger
fairness perceptions among employees (Cugueró-Escofet & Rosanas, 2013). For example, if employees receive perfor-
mance appraisals according to established criteria, but one employee complains to management about his appraisal and
manages to get it favorably modified, this may be viewed by the other employees as unfair (although, it is not necessarily
unjust since the criteria are agreed upon and applicable to everyone the same)

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 36, 313–318 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/job
316 B. GOLDMAN AND R. CROPANZANO

While this would seem to be generally worthwhile, it does raise a concern. Individual perceptions of fairness can
be egocentric, impacted by the so-called “self-serving bias”. For example, Tyler (1984) reported that favorability
of outcomes received and fairness judgments were found to be distinguishable but not totally independent
(r = .39) (see also, Tyler, 2006). By extension, one way to improve fairness perceptions would be to “give people
what they want”, (or, what they “deserve”) even if doing so is inconsistent with legal justice, or if it works against
business necessity by creating an environment that is chaotic and unpredictable. In this example, legal justice
provides a caution and some recommendations.
As noted briefly earlier, and at the risk of some simplification, legal justice focuses on conforming to the rules
whatever those rules may be (fair or unfair, despised or loved). It invokes the principle that we should treat people
according to their rights, but it does not determine any requirements or conditions of the moral quality of those rights
(Sadurski, 1985). Assessments of legal justice generally involve consistency with legal rules (Hart, 1961); they con-
firm that a general rule is properly applied to a particular case. Judgments about organizational justice have, as their
object, the content of those rules or procedures or interactions; they confirm that the burdens or benefits of these are
distributed justly (or fairly). Hence, legal justice is more “standardized”, at least when it works well. It provides a
common set of standards by which all should be treated.
Among legal scholars, justice—understood as the law—is viewed as the basis for societal and organizational
legitimacy (cf., Dworkin, 1986). There is much to recommend this view. For example, a predictable and consistent
legal framework is one that includes respect for property rights and facilitates the development of modern organiza-
tions. Nevertheless, this perspective is incomplete, and organizational justice researchers would seem to offer much
promise to legal scholars in that their research offers empirical verification of the conditions for, and consequences
of, legitimacy. For example, extensive research by Tyler (2006) suggests that people are more likely to voluntarily
obey a law, when they believe that it has been established through a fair process. Failing that, the law is viewed as
illegitimate and disobedience becomes more common. While criminals are less likely to trust the law than are
non-offenders, when they accept its legitimacy, they tend to obey it. For example, in a survey of 141 active criminal
offenders in Chicago, gun offenders (just like non-criminals) are more likely to comply with the law when they
believe in (a) the legitimacy of legal actors, but especially the police, and (b) that the substance of the law is consis-
tent with their own moral schedules (Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2012).

Measurement considerations
Early researchers in organizational justice may have inadvertently contributed to the use of justice and fairness
as synonyms. When creating psychological measurement instruments researchers generally prefer to have multiple
items. These are designed (hopefully) as indicators to a latent variable and in so doing reduce random error (i.e., to
increase reliability). In creating early measures, these multi-item scales sometimes included items that referred to
both “justice” and “fairness”. For example, Earley and Lind (1987) employed a two-item measure of procedural
justice that contained both the words fair and just. Later research clarified this distinction, classifying justice mea-
sures as “indirect” and “direct” (Colquitt & Shaw, 2005). Accordingly, indirect measures queried respondents
regarding actual events in their environments, such as whether pay was divided equitably. Direct measures queried
respondents as to how they evaluated such events. For example, the influential measure constructed by validated by
Colquitt (2001) is an indirect measure.
Conceptually, indirect and direct measures should be casually related. That is, adherence to rules of justice should
promote fairness perceptions. Ambrose and Schminke (2009) found evidence for this causal model. More generally,
the indirect and direct measures do not show the same pattern of relationships with other variables (Colquitt et al.,
2001), suggesting that they are taping distinct constructs. Based on these considerations, Colquitt and Rodell
(in press) draw an important distinction that is quite similar to that already made in the legal literature. “[J]ustice
as the perceived adherence to rules that reflect appropriateness in decision contexts …. [f]airness … is defined as
a global perception of appropriateness” (p. 5).

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 36, 313–318 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/job
 ORGANIZATIONAL-JUSTICE LEGAL-JUSTICE 317

Business ethics and justice

One important concern for business ethics is to help organizational decision-makers build and maintain ethical work-
places. Some have argued that this task would be more straightforward if we were to treat fairness as a consequence
of justice (Colquitt & Rodell, in press). In this vein, Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas (2013) “use justice to refer to the
ex-ante provisions of a system and the way the system is used. … In contrast, fairness refers to the perceptions of the
ex-post consequences” (p. 25).
To illustrate why this distinction is important for promoting workplace ethics, consider the work of Fortin and
Fellenz (2008). For Fortin and Fellenz, equating justice and fairness poses an ethical risk. Powerful but unscrupulous
managers may have the ability to alter or otherwise shape employee fairness judgments, perhaps by lying or
distorting the evidence. They may do so, even if the work environment is exploitive or harmful to employee
well-being. If such managerial shaping activities were successful, then an unjust manager could be perceived to
be fair. More to the point, if justice and fairness are the same things, then shaping behavior on the part of manage-
ment has produced at least a sort of justice. If the employee perceived fairness, then she has been treated justly
because justice and fairness are synonyms. Notice that this is not the outcome that most observers would wish
for. To build ethical workplaces, managers need to take into account justice, as characteristic of the environment,
as well as fairness. Distinguishing just workplaces from fair ones provides independent standards of good conduct.
This can encourage positive changes toward more ethical treatment.
In this vein, Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas (2013) argue for incorporating justice into the design of Management
Control Systems (MCS). Specifically, they distinguish between formal justice, the specific policies and guidelines,
and informal justice, the way the MCS is implemented. Crossing these two types of justice produces different levels
of fairness, and this, in turn, may push the MCS to evolve. Because justice is a cause of fairness, rather than another
name for fairness, the emphasis is placed on designing more ethical control systems. If a system was viewed as just
simply because employees thought it was fair, then the emphasis could switch to impression management and
persuasion. At the extreme, this might even involve disinformation. This is an important area for future inquiry.

Conclusion

Three lines of evidence, each independent from the other, argue for distinguishing between justice and fairness.
Legally they refer to different ideas. Psychometrically, they do not appear to be the same construct. Ethically, the
equation of these two different ideas may slow progress toward better workplaces. With this in mind, we argue that
justice and fairness refer to related—but distinct—concepts (Colquitt & Rodell, in press; Cugueró-Escofet &
Rosanas, 2013). With respect to workplace justice, it should refer to events in the work environment that are morally
required and involve normative standards. In particular, whether rules of appropriate conduct are followed and
obeyed. Fairness should refer to a subjective assessment or evaluation of these events and whether the events as
implemented are morally praiseworthy. An initial implication of these suggestions is that research is needed involv-
ing construct validation of these concepts to ensure that they involve distinctions that are meaningful in the work-
place. However, as noted earlier, evidence has accumulated suggesting that it is.

Author biographies

Dr. Barry Goldman is an Associate Professor of Management at the University of Arizona, investigating conflict
management and legal issues in management. Prior to earning his PhD, he practised law. He is a former Division

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 36, 313–318 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/job
318 B. GOLDMAN AND R. CROPANZANO

Chair of the Conflict Management Division of the Academy of Management and a former Managing Editor of the
Mary Law Review.
Dr. Russell Cropanzana is a Professor of Management at the University of Colorado, engaging in research on
organizational justice and workplace emotion. He is a fellow in the Academy of Management, the Society for
Industrial/Organizational Psychology, the Southern Management Association, and the Association for Psychological
Science.

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Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 36, 313–318 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/job