Free Exercise Clause and Legal Cases
Free Exercise Clause and Legal Cases
TWO ASPECTS:
1 FREEDOM TO BELIEVE
Set of beliefs that are in the mind of a person.
It is absolute.
2 FREEDOM TO ACT ON YOUR BELIEF
It is not absolute.
The state can restrain someone from acting if the state believes that there is a
public issue, safety or morals that have to be protected.
Whether or not the issuing of the stamps commemorative of the event is unconstitutional
Ruling:
No, it is constitutional. The issuance of stamps does not contemplate religious purposes the
main purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourist to this country.
The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not
contemplated.
Garces v. Estenzo,
Q. The barangay council, through funds obtained by solicitations and donations from residents,
purchased a statue of San Vicente Ferrer and placed it under the care of the hermano [Link]
the occasion of the fiesta, the statue was lent to the church. Subsequently, the parish priest
refused to return the statue. The council passed a number of resolutions towards taking steps to
recover the statue. The validity of these resolutions was challenged on the ground, among
others, of violating the non-establishment clause and the prohibition against the use of public
money for religious purposes. Decide
A. The Court answered this problem thus: That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The
questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious
liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman.
The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money...
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion
nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents.
One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint
had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing
unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and
display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio
fiesta is socio- religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The
fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses
____________________________________________________________________________________
DOCTRINE: state sponsored Bible readings and prayers in public schools have been
invalidated for violation of (1) and (2).
PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA vs HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
Mr. Austria filed a case for illegal dismissal but the church contends that NLRC should not have
the jurisdiction because this involves ecclesiastical affair.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC has the actual jurisdiction of the case?
RULING:
The SC said there was error in the dismissal ruled by the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter should have
jurisdiction of the case because the main issue is not an ecclesiastical affair. The issue pertains to
employer-employee relationship (Church-Mr. Austria), thus, a labor issue or secular issue.
An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church,
or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and
regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such
associations those deemed unworthy of membership
Issue:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution
Ruling:
Q. May the State require a license for the dissemination of religious literature?
A No, the dissemination done as a business operation for profit, no license may be required.
"The constitutional guarantee of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious, profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such
right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that
there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 234 SCRA 630 (1994), the Philippine Bible Society
questioned the validity of the registration provisions of the Value Added Tax Law, Republic Act
7716, as a prior restraint.
The Court said that the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally
applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization. As to
the registration requirement itself, the Court distinguished the earlier American Bible Society
case thus: ... in this case, the fee in B 107, although a fixed amount (PI,000), is not imposed for
the exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration.
The registration requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a
record of tax credits because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays an
input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration
fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right
Difference between American bible case and Tolentino Case
A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386
(1957) which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged in
the sale of general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale of
bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining the free exercise of its right to
propagate.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a
privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of
goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for
revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right
any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to
violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds
derived from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to
those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to increase the price, while
reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the resulting burden on the exercise
of religious freedom is so incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other
economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly.
Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the tax on the sale of vestments
would be to lay an impermissible burden on the right of the preacher to make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by §107 of the NIRC, as amended
by §7 of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of
registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting in §108 of the
NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not liable to pay the VAT does not
excuse it from the payment of this fee because it also sells some copies. At any rate whether the
PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not school children who are members of a religious sector may be expelled from
school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8
RULING:
No. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis.,
[Link] to believe and;
2. freedom to act on one's belief.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare.
In this case, while petitioners' children do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they
do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
When it comes to the exercise of the freedom of religion cases, whenever there is an restraint on
the exercise of religion, the obligation is on the state to prove that there is a valid reason on why
they are restraining such exercise.
The Court remanded the case and ordered the OSG to intervene and required to:
1 to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and
practice;
2 to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious
belief and practice; and
3 to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent's religious freedom.
The SC is clear that when it comes to conduct involving free exercise of religion clause, the
Compelling Interest Test is used.
In this case, there is no compelling state interest established and the state did not prove
that that is the least intrusive means of infringing the particular right.
Whether or not Judge Esidera can be held administratively liable for immoral conduct of giving
birth to a child from a man not her husband.
Ruling:
Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral prescriptions of a
high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular religion.
SECTION 6:
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO vs JUSTO LUKBAN
The Mayor of Manila rounded up all the prostitutes in their city to bring them to Davao.
The SC recognize the importance of the right to liberty of abode. You cannot just compel or
force any person to change his address.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS et al vs HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS
Executive Power:
The marcos’ wanted to bring back the body of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines.
The SC said that the right to travel is different from the right to enter to your country.
The right to travel is recognize in the constitution but the right to enter to our country is
different (Right recognized in international law).
The president has the residual powers. It’s the president who is entrusted in executing the laws
of the republic and he is supposed to protect the general welfare of the people.
It is the basis for the president to bar the Marcos’s from entering.
Issue:
Whether the condition imposed by the CA that that he is a resident of the area and that he will
remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with
prior notice to the court and private complainant", A violation of the liberty of abode and right
to travel.
Ruling:
No. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by
petitioner, are not absolute rights.
The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and
function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will
show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the
court in case he does so.
Section 7:
Right of the people to information on matters of public concern
1. Right of the people to information on matters of public concern
- Only pertains on matters of public concern
- There’s no definition of public concern
2. Right to access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to a.
official acts
b. transactions, or
c. decisions
3. Government research data used as basis for policy development
When access is denied, what is the remedy of a person to be able to obtain access to
information?
- REMEDY OF MANDAMUS
- Asking the court to compel a public official to perform a ministerial duty (to
release information)
- TWO REQUISITES:
1. The information sought is of public interest or public concern; and
2. The information sought must not be exempted by law.
- Example:
1. Diplomatic negotiations.
Ex. Ambassadors
2. Public records declared as confidential by law
Ex. Adoption Proceedings in court
3. Presidential Communications
Ex. Cabinet Members
4. Discussions of Justices En Banc
Once the right to information is attaches, does the particular agency need to prepare
summary or brief to provide for the person asking for it?
In this case, the issue is the right to ACCESS to information. When there is a right to access, the
state is not required to prepare summaries or reports. What the right only guaranteed is the
access to official records, documents, and papers.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation
reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference
and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the
right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access to records, documents
and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the
right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is
also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to
minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct
the inspection and copying.
The SC ruled that the ill-gotten wealth is a public concern but not all matters of public interest is
required to be disclosed because the nature of the information sought is a negotiation towards
going to the compromise agreement between the Republic and Marcos’s. The only things that
are required to be divulge are those which are DEFINITE PROPOSITIONS.
Thus on-going meetings or ideas, such as proposals or counter-proposals are not definite
propositions.
But once there is a decided proposal, then, that can be considered a definite proposition.
Sereno vs. Committee on Trade and Related Matters of the NEDA, G.R. No. 175210, February
1, 2016.
Doctrine:
The right of information is not absolute. the right to information does not extend to matters
acknowledged as "privileged information under the separation of powers," which include
"Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings.".
In courts, public records are the whole records, such as court decisions or court orders, are
accessible.
Pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public concern
or interest. So they may be excluded. They are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis
upon which the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests.
In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory
and protective powers of the court, after considering the actual use or purpose for which the
request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties.
Section 8:
-The right of the people to associate or form associations. This recognizes the freedom of the
people to organize themselves or to become members of any group or organizations or
associations and to regulate themselves to adopt the rules that will govern themselves.
-It can only be abridged when there is a valid exercise of police power.
-The right to join associations also includes the right not to join. Because the concern here is
the freedom to associate, thus, you cannot compel someone to join.
-This section does not only cover employees in the private sector. It also includes the
employees in the public sector.
1. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. L-22228,
February 27, 1969.
1 The registration only gives a juridical personality to a labor organization but the right to
exercise freedom of association is not abridged. The right to freedom of association may be
exercised with or without registration.
2. SSS Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989.
DOCTRINE: the intent of the framers of the constitution points to the understanding that the
government employees’ right to organize does not include the right to strike.
RULING:
[Link] the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment.
What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in
the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for
definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines
but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is
not on individuals but on conduct.
Manila Public School Teachers Association vs. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 95445,
August 6, 1991.
DOCTRINE: the intent of the framers of the constitution points to the understanding that the
government employees’ right to organize does not include the right to strike.
Section 9:
HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO vs
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
DOCTRINE:
The predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real property condemned for public
purpose, the party who originally condemned the property recovers control of the land if the
condemning party continues to use the property for public purpose; however, if the
condemning authority ceases to use the property for a public purpose, property reverts to the
owner in fee simple. The government’s taking of private property, and then transferring it to
private persons under the guise of public use or purpose is the despotism found in the immense
power of eminent domain.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda de Castellvi, G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974.
DOCTRINE:
The circumstances that constitute "taking" for purposes of eminent domain are
(1) The expropriator must enter upon the private property;
(2) The entrance must not be for a momentary period, that is, the entrance must be permanent;
(3) The entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) The property must be devoted to public use . or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5) The utilization of the property must be in such a way as to.
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be
an actual physical taking or appropriation. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and
necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its
value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor
material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect
changes hands.
DOCTRINE:
(1) "Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover
the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking
agency. While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn property in the
exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation is
predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal proceedings.
(2 )AS A GENERAL RULE just compensation must be reckoned from the time of taking or filing
of the complaint whichever came first.
special exception: Inverse condemnation if the taking took place without the knowledge or
consent of the owner, or through stealth. just compensation should be reckoned from the time
the property owners initiated inverse condemnation proceedings not withstanding that the
taking of the properties occurred earlier.
the valuation of the property should be based on the value at the time of its taking
Just compensation is “the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who
desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.”
It should be noted that the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the
property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the
property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when
the loss resulted.
G.R. No. 166429 December 19, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON
Q. May entry into the property be made before just compensation?
A. yes, however, where the expropriation is public works, R.A. 8974 requires prior full
payment.
Q. The contract for the construction of the NAIA International Airport was nullified for being
contrary to law and public policy but after the construction of the building had almost been
completed. What remedy does the contractor have?
A. Since the state is taking over the property, the contractor is entitled to just compensation.
Under RA 8974 the government must make a direct payment (not just a deposit under Rule 67)
of the proffered value of tibte property before it can enter and exercise proprietary rights.
Republic v. Judge Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, December 19,2005.
Q. Rules of Court require deposit of 15% of the value of the property before an expropriator can
enter. Can Congress amend this?
A. R.A. 8974, however, creates an exception in expropriation cases involving public works and
requires full payment before entry in public works projects. In answering the question whether
Congress may amend Rules of Court, the Court said that since expropriation involves both
procedural and substantive matters, the substantive aspect is always subject to legislation.
Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, February 1, 2006.
HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN vs CITY OF MANDALUYONG
Issue:
Whether or not a local government unit may exercise power of eminent domain by mere
issuance of resolution
Ruling:
No, the local government unit shall not exercise power of eminent domain by mere issuance of
resolution units
It is true that such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public
entities and public utilities, provided that the following requisites has been complied:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III
of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, it is clear that City of Mandaluyong exercised the power of eminent domain
over the property of petitioner Suguitan by means of resolution, it is in contravention of the first
requisite which requires an enactment of an ordinance.
ELIZABETH MANALASTAS and BEA CASTILLO
Issue:
Ruling:
No, the formula for determination of just compensation to owners of the property does not
include the factor for inflation rate.
The value of the property is reckoned from the time of the taking. In computing just
compensation, an additional interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the time of taking up to
the satisfaction of the state (full payment). Also, award of exemplary damages imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good. Also, attorney’s fees are awarded.
Section 10:
Impairment of Contract
- There is a change or modification of the terms and conditions of the contract which results
to weaken the position of one party or diminish the rights or obligations of any parties.
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC vs THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DOCTRINE:
Q. Petitioner contends that the cancellation of its timber license constitutes an impairment of the
obligation of its contract. Decide.
A. "Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
VENANCIO LIM, SR vs THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
Exercise of Quasi-judicial power: Not covered by Sec 10 or non impairment clause.
a. his gross monthly income does not exceed P1,500.00 (now not more than double the
monthly minimum wage) and
b. he should not own property with an assessed value of not more than P18,000.00 (now not
more than P300k market value).
If not met, there should not be an outright denial of the grant of application, hence, the
court should perform the indigency test under Sec. 21 of Rule 3.
RE: LETTER DATED APRIL 18, 2011 OF CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA
RUEDA-COSTA REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF
SHERIFF'S EXPENSES
Sheriff’s expenses are not those fees which exempts the indigent clients of the PAO. The PAO
officers and employees to be the one to serve the pleadings and orders.
Sec 12
- Only applies to the part of criminal procedures before filing a criminal case. Whether
it is a criminal proceeding which initiated by virtue of preliminary investigation or
criminal proceeding initiated straight to court because for ex. The accused arrested
was caught in flagrante delicto or inquest proceeding.
- Only applicable during custodial investigations. Custodial investigation is a period
of time right before a case is officially filed.
- There are some criminal cases. When you file a criminal case, it is expected that
the evidence are complete. (ex. In Prosecutor’s Office-Affidavits, documentary
evidence)
- Custodial investigation is a point of time when the evidence is gathered going
to the filing of criminal case.
The Rationale of Section 12– the right of a person to counsel is only begins
during the start of criminal proceedings.
When Section 12 is violated, any admission or confessions are inadmissible in court. (Par
3)
- ONLY ADMISSION AND CONFESSIONS ARE INADMISSIBLE.
TWO SITUATIONS IN SECTION 12:
InMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court said that the
following constitutional requirements must be observed in custodial investigations:
(1) The person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and unequivocal terms that he
has a right to remain silent.
(2) After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be used against
him in court.
(3) He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer
and to have the lawyer with him during the interrogation. He does not have to ask for a lawyer.
The investigators should tell him that he has the right to counsel at that point.
(4) He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a lawyer but also that if
he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
(5) Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the
moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease until
an attorney is present.
(6) If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the trial to have been
observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used
against him.
ISSUE: The lawyer from the PAO who signed the extrajudicial confession of Mahinay
During the trial, the counsel himself was examined in the open court. He was able to explain
sufficiently what happens or circumstances surrounding the execution of the extrajudicial
confession. It was made to the court that the confession of Mr Mahinay was an implications of
the signing and executing that confession was made clear to him. Thus, The Court upheld the
validity of extrajudicial confession.
As compare to the case of Obrero, aside from being a police officer of the lawyer, based on the
transcrip of record, the SC noted that the Attorney/Police Officer did not clearly explain to the
accused his right.
The court really wants is for the lawyer, even the interrogator, need to explain clearly to the
person being interrogated what are his rights and the meaning of those.
In this case, the lawyer is from PAO and that he clearly explains the rights of the accused
Whether or not the admission of Dela Cruz for the crime of rape to his daughter is admissible as
evidence
Ruling:
Yes, admission of the crime of Dela Cruz is admissible as evidence to prove his guilt
The court ruled that there is no higher evidence of guilt than the voluntary testimony of the
accused himself. Such admission is evidence of the highest order, since it is supported by the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess
to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.
In this case, two separate letters for forgiveness and admission of Dela Cruz is a clear and
convincing evidence of his guilt.
There was an extrajudicial confession presented in court and the lawyer signed it is lawyer but
also a police commander.
The SC said that the independent counsel required by Art. III, Section 12(1) cannot be a
special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police
whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
- Basically, there is a conflict of interest because police were the investigator and
police was also given as a lawyer to sign the confession.
In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of
the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted
accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. To allow such
a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial
investigation.
the court differentiates the meaning of confession and admission. It held that confession is an
acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime
charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent
to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other
words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of
some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which
tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit
examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in
the above rule.
Only admission or confession during custodial investigation is inadmissible under Sec. 12,
Article 3. But other evidence gathered during custodial investigation is admissible.
In this case, the seized drugs can be used as evidence in court. Also, there is no statement or
extrajudicial confession was released
- Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.
The sworn statement of the police officer accused of the crime executed before the prosecutor
during preliminary investigation is admissible because Sec 12 applies to custodial investigation,
not to preliminary investigation.
Section 13:
What is bail?
Bail is a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the
attendance of the accused at his trial. It usually takes the form of a deposit of money or its
equivalent of such attendance and which deposit is forfeited upon failure to appear.
General Rule: Whenever there is a criminal case against any person or any accused, then, he
should be detained during the pendency of the hearing.
Exception: But The law allows a provisional liberty to the accused until finality of criminal
proceeding.
Ex.
Murder with Rape. Penalty to be imposed: Reclusion Perpetua
The accused will file or apply for bail.
Then the judge will set a hearing.
The prosecution need to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of not granting
the bail.
Ruling:
No, granting bail after arraignment is unconstitutional, bail should be granted before
arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.
Ruling:
the court ruled that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to
bail.
Yap Case and Camara case
The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused during trial. It is not meant as
a punishment or cover possible civil liability that may be imposed to the accused.
In this case, the crime charged is plunder and the penalty is RP. . It is a matter of discretion.
The new standard imposes by the SC for extradition proceeding that it must be shown that
there is a clear and convincing evidence. It is the POTENTIAL EXTRADITEE who must
present clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk.
Clear and convincing evidence is somewhere between the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases and the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases
RICARDO DE LA CAMARA vs HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE
“the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused’s presence at trial, and declared that
‘bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is “excessive
Ruling:
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party (PCGG). The defect cannot be
cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation. Invalid information is no
information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by Vergara and Bernadas were admissible.
RULING:
No. In order for the extrajudicial confession to be valid it should be voluntarily given, and
now, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the extrajudicial confession was
voluntarily given.
In the case at bar, and the record shows that the interrogation was made incommunicado,
wherein Vergara and Bernadas where each interrogated, surrounded by the policemen.
A. '^Generally, the Supreme Court has no supervisory authority over military courts.
the SC does not review decisions of military commissions but of ,the Court of Military Appeals
in cases appealed to the latter by military commissions. Therefore, the issue of denial of the
right to present evidence should first be passed upon by military authorities
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel.
In the case at bar, the challenged provision contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. A person disqualified to
run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed
in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto mayor,
which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the
term of the sentence
The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused—it is not applicable where the evidence presented is not equally weighty, such as
where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was denied of his constitutional right to present evidence
Ruling:
Yes, while the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary
implication, it means that the accused should be allowed reasonable freedom to present his
defense if the courts are to give form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail
to accord an accused reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by
the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of due process.
In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his signatures in the
disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule
that as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
In order to be able to discharge his burden, he must be afforded reasonable opportunity to
present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the
signatures he is questioning by no less than the country’s premier investigative force – the NBI.
Thus, the denial to petitioner’s request for reinvestigation constitutes a violation of due process.
the court has the following duties when the defendant appears without a counsel:
(1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being
arraigned;
(2) after giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the
aid of an attorney;
(3) if he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him; and
(4) if the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant
him a reasonable time therefor.
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
4. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant), and circumstances.
In the case at bar, Yambot and Versoza were scheduled to present evidence, however since
some of subpoenas were not served, witnesses were not able to present in the court. Yambot
and Versoza must be afforded amplest opportunity to defend themselves before rendition of
judgment
FELICISIMO JARA, REYMUNDO VERGARA and ROBERTO BERNADAS
In order for the extrajudicial confession to be valid it should be voluntarily given, and now, the
prosecution has the burden of proving that the extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given.
Section 15:
CARLOS T. GO, SR vs LUIS T. RAMOS
objective of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether the confinement or detention is
valid or lawful. If it is valid, the writ cannot be issued.
Section 16:
MANUEL Q. CABALLERO and LELITA A. CABALLERO
vs HON. FEDERICO B. ALFONSO, JR
the guarantee of the right to "a speedy disposition of cases," which the Constitution expressly
provides, recognizes the truism that “ justice delayed can mean justice denied.”
In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain
factors may be considered and balanced against each other.
These are
length of delay,
reason for the delay,
assertion of the right or failure to assert it,
and prejudice caused by the delay.
JEJOMAR C. BINAY vs HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Section 17:
THE UNITED STATES vs BALDOMERO NAVARRO, ET AL
the taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self- incrimination
FRANCISCO BELTRAN vs Hon. FELIX SAMSON
writing is something more than moving the body, or hand, or fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act; it requires the application of intelligence and attention; writing means for the
petitioner here to furnish, through a testimonial act, evidence against himself.
1. Transactional Immunity - is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant the witness can
no longer be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
Section 19:
A. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must
be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community,"
‘punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
Section 20:
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO vs.
THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ
BP 22 does not transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
BP 22 was enacted in order to punish the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonoured upon its presentation for payment and it is not the non-payment of an
obligation. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by
the imposition of penal sanctions
Section 21:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs ELISEA YLAGAN
a person in criminal prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following
conditions:
The constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense
charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the
same act or set of acts.
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts
which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
A. The defense of second jeopardy is not proper because the presentation of evidence of
complete self-defense amounted to SL withdrawal of his original plea. Audi since no new plea
was entered, there was no first jeopardy. People v. Balisican, August 31,1966
There is simply no double jeopardy when subsequent information charges another and different
offense although arising from the same at or set of facts. Prosecution for the same act is not
prohibited. The essential elements of Sec 3(g) is different and not included in Sec 3(e). For
double jeopardy to exist, the elements of one offense should ideally encompass or include those
of the other. What the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to the identity of elements in the
two offenses.
A. The two charges against petitioner arose from Article 365 of the Penal Code. The doctrine
that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365. The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection
under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused's prior acquittal of "slight
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the
Court explained: "Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions." Ivler v.
Judge San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010.
Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible,
which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense", the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if
indicted for the new offense
In the case at bar, the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the
injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy.
Because a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and
distinct offense"
Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible,
which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense", the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if
indicted for the new offense
In the case at bar, If the X-ray examination disclosed the existence of a fracture when the second
examination was made, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made.
There was, therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen
since the filing of the original action, which would justify application of the rule of double
jeopardy.
In the case at bar, it is clear that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and
cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double
jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due
process.
ANTONIO LEJANO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
As a general rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused
under double jeopardy.
However, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are
exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its
discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases,
the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.