G.R. No.
128523 September 28, 1998
GOVERNMENT SERVICE, INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and ZENAIDA LIWANAG, respondents.
FACTS
Zenaida Liwanag is the surviving spouse of the late Jaime Liwanag. Jaime was 48 years old and had served
the police force continuously for 17 years. At the time of his death, he was [a] Senior Superintendent of the
Philippine National Police.
The late P/Sr. Supt. Jaime Liwanag was admitted at the Medical Center of Manila due to complaints of
Ascites, Poor Appetite. [The] CT Scan showed Cirrhosis with probable Hepatocellular CA, HB 5A3 positive.
Despite medical intervention, Jaime Liwanag succumbed to Upper GI Bleeding, Cirrhosis Secondary to
Hepatitis B; Hepatocellular Carcinoma.
As a consequence, [private respondent] filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) for compensation benefits. The claim was denied for not being an occupational disease under the
law neither was the risk of contracting the ailment of the deceased increased by his employment as a
member of the police force.
On appeal pursuant to Section 5, Rule XVIII of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the . . .
Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the GSIS ruling and ultimately dismissed the appeal for
lack of merit. . . . It is well settled under the Employees' Compensation Law that when the ailment is not the
direct result of the covered employee's employment, like the instant case, and the appellant failed to show
proof that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the covered employee's employment and
working conditions the claim for compensation benefits cannot prosper.
ISSUE
Whether or not private respondent entitled to the death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626
RULING
The Court granted the petition.
At the outset, certain basic postulates governing employees' compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 be
reviewed.
First, said Decree abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Second, for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must
prove either of two (2) things: (a) that the sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under
Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of
contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions.
Third, the claimant must prove this causal relation between the ailment and working conditions by
substantial evidence, since the proceeding is taken before the ECC, an administrative or quasi-
judicial body. Within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-
judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule
that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded.
Finally, in case of doubt in construction and interpretation of social legislation statutes, the liberality
of the law in favor of the working man and woman prevails in light of the Constitution's social justice policy.
On the other side of the coin, however, there is a competing, yet equally vital interest to heed in
passing upon undeserving claims for compensation. It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by
the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly include, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund
is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a
greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for
compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur.
This stems from the development in the law that no longer is the poor employee still arrayed against
the might and power of his rich corporate employer, hence the necessity of affording all kinds of favorable
presumptions to the employee. This reasoning is no longer good policy. It is now the trust fund and not the
employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer
joins the employee in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem the problem
of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. Moreover, the new
system instituted by the new law has discarded, among others, the concept of "presumption of
compensability and aggravation" and substituted one based on social security principles. The new system
is administered by social insurance agencies — the GSIS and the SSS — under the ECC. The purpose of
this innovation was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's
compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.
Applying these principles to the instant case, there is no dispute that Hepatitis B, the disease which
caused the demise of the decedent, is not listed as an occupational disease under Annex "A" of the Rules
on Employees' Compensation. As such, private respondent's burden of evidence before the ECC was to
prove, by substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her deceased husband's illness and his
working conditions. This she failed to do, as will be discussed below.
In the same vein and for the same reasons, respondent court, in reversing the ECC, committed an
error of law by misappreciating the legal standard of what constitutes substantial evidence; and in according
full credence to the proceedings before the PNP Board and thus shifting the burden of evidence to petitioner
to rebut private respondent's claim, when private respondent's evidence was sorely wanting to justify the
award of compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended.
Petition is GRANTED.
