1. [ G.R. No.

119347, March 17, 1999 ] EULALIA RUSSELL, RUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO

TAUTHO, SUSANA T. REALES, APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS,
GREGORIO TAUTHO, DEODITA T. JUDILLA, AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO,
WILLIAM TAUTHO, AND MARILYN PERALES, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE
A. VESTIL (incapable of pecuniary estimation; real action)

Facts. A parcel of land is co-owned. Later, some co-owners (co-heirs) partitioned the
property through a deed of extrajudicial settlement to the exclusion of other co-owners
(other co-heirs). A suit to declare the deed of extrajudicial settlement as void was filed
in the RTC. The case was sought to be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as
the assessed value of the subject land is only PhpP5,000.00 which under section 33 (3)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela.

Issue. Rule on the motion.

Resolution.

The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.

In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill,[12] we had the occasion to rule that:

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific

performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage, or annulment of judgment; also
actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance
and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a counterpart of specific
performance.

While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation
(i.e. REAL ACTIONS), the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC,
METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does exceed
P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds
P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have
jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).

However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document
denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS
ORAL PARTITION."
 The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the
document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late
spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to
the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property,
this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of
the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

N.B. It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve the
issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees therefor. In this
jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading.
The caption of the complaint below was denominated as one for "specific performance and
damages." The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or
ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties
enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the
case below was actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real
property.

In the case of Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena,[14] this Court held that a real action is
one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in section 2(a) of
Rule 4 (now Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a real action is an
action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.

It has also been held that where a complaint is entitled as one for specific
performance but nonetheless prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel
of land, its primary objective and nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself
and, thus, is deemed a real action. In such a case, the action must be filed in the proper
court where the property is located:

In this Court, the appellant insists that her action is one for specific performance, and,
therefore, personal and transitory in nature.

This very issue was considered and decided by this Court in the case of Manuel B. Ruiz vs.
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. et al., L-18692, promulgated 31 January 1963. There the Court, by
unanimous vote of all the Justices, held as follows:

`This contention has no merit. Although appellant's complaint is entitled to be one for
specific performance, yet the fact that he asked that a deed of sale of a parcel of land
situated in Quezon City be issued in his favor and that a transfer certificate of title
covering said parcel of land be issued to him shows that the primary objective and
nature of the action is to recover the parcel of land itself because to execute in
favor of appellant the conveyance requested there is need to make a finding that
he is the owner of the land which in the last analysis resolves itself into an issue
of ownership. Hence, the action must be commenced in the province where the property is
situated pursuant to Section 3, Rule 5, of the Rules of Court, which provides that actions
affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property shall be commenced and tried in
the province where the property or any part thereof lies."[15]
It is clear from the foregoing that while respondents claim that their amended complaint
before the RTC is denominated as one for the declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale
and for specific performance, the averments in their amended complaint and the character
of the reliefs sought therein reveal that the action primarily involves title to or possession
of real property. An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's
cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal
rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title
is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property itself." [25]

The ultimate relief sought by respondents is for the recovery of the property through the
enforcement of its sale in their favor by the late spouses Ramiro. Their other causes of
action for the cancellation of the original title and the issuance of a new one in their
name, as well as 'for injunction and damages, are merely incidental to the recovery of the
property.[26] Before any of the other reliefs respondents prayed for in their complaint can
be granted, the issue of who between them and petitioners has the valid title to the lot
must first be determined.[27]

2. [ G.R. No. 136109, August 01, 2002 ]

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS (incapable of pecuniary estimation; sum of money)

Facts. A case for breach of contract of lease was filed in the RTC. The lessee filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the case is for collection of
unpaid rentals in the sum of Php84,000.00 which properly belongs to the first level
courts.

Issue. Rule on the motion.

Resolution. Pertinent portion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7691, provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;

xxxxxxxxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Corollary thereto, Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:

xxxxxxxxx

2. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the

jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in
cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.

x x x x x x x x x.

In Russell, et al., v. Vestil, et al., the Court held that in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be
ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action
will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
the action is one where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein.

It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance
or rescission of contracts.

Here, the averments in the complaint reveal that the suit filed by private respondent
was primarily one for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year
lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court
should find that the subject contract of lease was breached. As alleged therein,
petitioner’s failure to pay rentals due for the period from January to March 1997,
constituted a violation of their contract which had the effect of accelerating the payment
of monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998. The same complaint likewise implied a
premature and unilateral termination of the term of the lease with the closure of and
removal all communication equipment in the leased premises. Under the circumstances,
the court has to scrutinize the facts and the applicable laws in order to determine
whether there was indeed a violation of their lease agreement that would justify the
award of rentals and damages. The prayer, therefore, for the payment of unpaid
rentals in the amount of P84,000.00 plus damages consequent to the breach is
merely incidental to the main action for specific performance.

That plaintiff’s complaint also sought the payment by the defendant of P3,376.00,
plus interest and attorney’s fees, does not give a pecuniary estimation to the
litigation, for the payment of such amounts can only be ordered as a consequence of
the specific performance primarily sought. In other words, such payment would be
 but an incident or consequence of defendant's liability for specific performance. If no
such liability is judicially declared, the payment can not be awarded. Hence, the
amounts sought do not represent the value of the subject of litigation.

Clearly, the action for specific performance case, irrespective of the amount of rentals
and damages sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence
cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore, did not err
in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

3. [ G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014 ]

SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA, NAMELY: EPIFANIA G. BAUTISTA
AND ZOEY G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. FRANCISCO LINDO AND
WELHILMINA LINDO; AND HEIRS OF FILIPINA DAQUIGAN, NAMELY: MA.
LOURDES DAQUIGAN, IMELDA CATHERINE DAQUIGAN, IMELDA DAQUIGAN
AND CORSINO DAQUIGAN, REBECCA QUIAMCO AND ANDRES QUIAMCO,
ROMULO LORICA AND DELIA LORICA, GEORGE CAJES AND LAURA CAJES,
MELIDA BAÑEZ AND FRANCISCO BAÑEZ, MELANIE GOFREDO, GERVACIO CAJES
AND ISABEL CAJES, EGMEDIO SEGOVIA AND VERGINIA SEGOVIA, ELSA N. SAM,
PEDRO M. SAM AND LINA SAM, SANTIAGO MENDEZ AND MINA MENDEZ, HELEN
M. BURTON AND LEONARDO BURTON, JOSE JACINTO AND BIENVENIDA
JACINTO, IMELDA DAQUIGAN, LEO MATIGA AND ALICIA MATIGA, FLORENCIO
ACEDO JR., AND LYLA VALERIO, RESPONDENTS. (incapable of pecuniary
estimation or real action?)

Facts. A parcel of land is covered by free patent. It is owned by a person. He sold it to

different vendees. Later, the original owner sued for repurchase of the subject lots. The
case was filed in the RTC. A motion to dismiss was filed on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction as the selling price of the lots was around Php16,000.00, and so the
assessed value is less than Php20,000 – the jurisdictional threshold floor for real actions
falling within the jurisdiction of RTC.

Issue. Rule on the motion.

Resolution. The core issue is whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving
title to or possession of real property or any interest therein or one incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

The course of action embodied in the complaint by the present petitioners’ predecessor,
Alfredo R. Bautista, is to enforce his right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned
pursuant to the right of a free-patent holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public
Land Act.

The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil
action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in

the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation,

viz:

1. Actions for specific performance;

2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.

The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific
performance.

While the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to
repurchase by the applicant within a period of five (5) years from the date of
conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed
integrated and made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the
law is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is the law between the
parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written
therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties. Thus, it is a binding
prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to enforce. That is precisely what he
did. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot subject of
free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly
such action, then it is akin or analogous to one of specific performance. Such being the
case, his action for specific performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and
cognizable by the RTC.

Not a real action. Respondents argue that Bautista’s action is one involving title to or
possession of real property or any interests therein and since the selling price is less
than PhP 20,000, then jurisdiction is lodged with the MTC. They rely on Sec. 33 of BP
129.

Republic Act No. 7691 amended Sec. 33 of BP 129 and gave Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in
all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos (PhP20,000) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.

At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of
the lots he sold to respondents. Since the total selling price is less than PhP20,000,
then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case. This proposition is incorrect
for the re-acquisition of the lots by Bautista or herein successors-in-interests, the
present petitioners, is but incidental to and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by
the latter to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141. The reconveyance of
the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of such right to
repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main relief or remedy
sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the
performance of the obligation to return the property conformably to the
express provision of CA 141.

Estoppel. Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an
interest therein which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of
BP 129, as the total selling price is only PhP 16,000 way below the PhP 20,000 ceiling,
still, the postulation of respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water. This is
because respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC and
 aggressively defended their position, and by virtue of which they are already barred to
question the jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.

In Heirs of Jose Fernando v. De Belen, it was held that the party raising defenses to the
complaint, actively participating in the proceedings by filing pleadings, presenting his
evidence, and invoking its authority by asking for an affirmative relief is deemed
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court.[18]

Here, we note that aside from the belated filing of the motion to dismiss––it having been
filed nine (9) years from the filing of the complaint––respondents actively participated in
the proceedings through the following acts:

By filing their Answer and Opposition to the Prayer for Injunction[19] dated September
29, 1994 whereby they even interposed counterclaims, specifically: PhP 501,000 for
unpaid survey accounts, PhP 100,000 each as litigation expenses, PhP 200,000 and PhP
3,000 per daily appearance by way of attorney’s fees, PhP 500,000 as moral damages,
PhP 100,000 by way of exemplary damages, and costs of suit;

By participating in Pre-trial;

By moving for the postponement of their presentation of evidence;[20]

By presenting their witness;[21] and

By submitting the compromise agreement for approval.[22]

Having fully participated in all stages of the case, and even invoking the RTC’s authority
by asking for affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the
said trial court. Simply put, considering the extent of their participation in the case, they
are, as they should be, considered estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction as a ground
for the dismissal of the action.

4. [ G.R. No. 172293, August 28, 2013 ]

ARACELI J. CABRERA AND ARNEL CABRERA AND IN BEHALF OF THE HEIRS OF
SEVERINO CABRERA, PETITIONERS, VS. ANGELA G. FRANCISCO (neither incapable of
pecuniary estimation nor real action)

Facts. A vast parcel of land is owned by a person. Administrators were placed on the
said land. It was alleged that there was a contract between the administrators and the
owner of the land in which the former will look for a buyer of the land and will get a
commission from the proceeds of the sale of the land. Eventually, a buyer of the land
was presented. However, the owner did not want to proceed with the sale, and even
terminated the services of the administrators. A suit for Collection of Agent’s
Compensation, Commission and Damages against the owner was filed before the RTC.
Attached to their Complaint is a copy of the tax declaration for Lot No. 1782-B.
Petitioners prayed that they be paid (1) commission and compensation in the form of
real property equivalent to five percent of the 24-hectare Lot No. 1782-B, (2) moral
damages of P100,000.00, and (3) attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of
P100,000.00.

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that since the total
market value of Lot No. 1782-B is P3,550,072, five percent thereof is only P177,506.60
or less than the said jurisdictional amount, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over
petitioners’ Complaint, arguing that the complain is for recovery of sum of money.

Issue. Rule on the motion.

Resolution. Petitioners’ Complaint is neither one which is incapable of pecuniary

estimation nor involves interest in a real property.

Insisting that the RTC has jurisdiction over their Complaint, petitioners contend that the
same is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation or involves interest in a real
property the assessed value of which exceeds P200,000.00.

The Court does not agree. To ascertain the correctness of petitioner’s contention, the
averments in the Complaint and the character of the relief sought in the said Complaint
must be consulted. This is because the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the Complaint.

It can be readily seen from the allegations in the Complaint that petitioners’ main
purpose in filing the same is to collect the commission allegedly promised them by
respondents should they be able to sell Lot No. 1782-B, as well as the compensation for
the services rendered by Severino, Araceli and Arnel for the administration of
respondents’ properties. Captioned as a Complaint for Collection of Agent’s
Compensation, Commission and Damages, it is principally for the collection of a sum of
money representing such compensation and commission. Indeed, the payment of
such money claim is the principal relief sought and not merely incidental to, or
a consequence of another action where the subject of litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money. In fact, petitioners in this case estimated their claim to
be equivalent to five percent of the purchase price of Lot No. 1782-B. Therefore, the CA
did not err when it ruled that petitioners’ Complaint is not incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

Real action? The Court cannot also give credence to petitioners’ contention that their
action involves interest in a real property. The October 25, 1976 letter of Atty. Gella
confirming Severino’s appointment as administrator of his properties does not provide
that the latter’s services would be compensated in the form of real estate or, at the very
least, that it was for a compensation. Neither was it alleged in the Complaint that the
five percent commission promised to Araceli and Arnel would be equivalent to such
portion of Lot No. 1782-B. What is clear from paragraph 4 thereof is that respondents
instructed petitioners to look for buyers of their properties and “were promised by
[respondents] a commission of five percent of the total purchase price of the said
properties as compensation for their long and continued administration of all the said
properties.” Also, petitioners’ allegation in paragraph 6 that respondents failed to pay
them “in cash or in kind” of what is due them negates any agreement between the
parties that they should be paid in the form of real estate. Clearly, the allegations in
their Complaint failed to sufficiently show that they have interest of whatever kind over
the properties of respondents.

Petitioners’ demand is below the jurisdictional amount required for RTCs outside of
Metro Manila, hence, the RTC concerned in this case has no jurisdiction over petitioners’
Complaint.

The use of the tax declaration. As the tax declaration covering Lot No. 1782-B has been
attached to the complaint as Annex “C” and made an integral part thereof, the court, in
 its desire to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of plaintiff’s
claim computed the total market value of Lot No. 1782-B, including the value of the
trees and the plants standing thereon, as appearing in said Annex “C”. The computation
shows the amount of P3,508,370.00. Five percent thereof is P175,418.50. It is way
below the jurisdictional amount for the Regional Trial Court outside Metro Manila which
is pegged at more than P200,000. Clearly, therefore, this [C]ourt has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the plaintiff’s complaint as correctly contended by the
defendants.[29]

Moral damages. There is no merit to petitioners’ averment that their demand for moral
damages should be included in the computation of their total claims. Paragraph 8,
Section 19 of BP 129 expressly speaks of demand which is exclusive of damages of
whatever kind. This exclusion was later explained by the Court in Administrative Circular
No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994 as follows:

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the

jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

Here, the moral damages being claimed by petitioners are merely the consequence of
respondents’ alleged non-payment of commission and compensation the collection of
which is petitioners’ main cause of action. Thus, the said claim for moral damages
cannot be included in determining the jurisdictional amount.

Specific performance? It could have been, if proper allegations to such effect were
made.

5. G.R. No. 234255, October 02, 2019 ] GENOVEVA G. GABRILLO, REP. HEREIN BY
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MEDARDO G. CADIENTE, JR., PETITIONER, V. HEIRS OF OLIMPIO
PASTOR REP. BY CRESENCIANA MANGUIRAN VDA. DE PASTOR, RESPONDENT.
(assessed value in real actions)

Facts. A case for or Declaration of Trust and/or Declaration of Nullity of Title,

Reconveyance, Damages, Attorney's Fees and Injunction was filed in the RTC. The
complaint alleged the market value. There is no allegation on the assessed value. There
is no document stating the assessed value.

Issue. Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the complaint?

Resolution. Nothing is more settled in procedural law than the rule that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for.[12]

Petitioner seeks the transfer of the subject property in her favor as its rightful and legal
owner via an action for reconveyance and annulment of title. Traversing the complaint,
the primary objective of petitioner is to secure her claimed ownership by recovering the
subject property from respondents and have the certificate of title under their name
cancelled. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title is an action involving title
to real property,[13] jurisdiction over which rests on the assessed value of the real
property in question as alleged in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly, both the first level and the second level court exercise original jurisdiction over
actions involving title to or possession of real property or any interest therein but it is
the assessed value of the realty involved which ordains which court shall acquire
exclusive jurisdiction over a real action as in this case.

Assessed value is the valuation ascribed on the property as fixed by the taxing
authorities for the purpose of determining the applicable tax rate.[15] It represents a
fraction of the realty's fair market value that qualifies for taxation, calculated by
multiplying the market value by the assessment level. Fair market value, on the other
hand, is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to
sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.[16] Assessed value pertains
to the taxable value of the real property while the fair market value is tantamount to the
estimated value of the real property as agreed on between a willing buyer and a willing
seller under reasonable and ordinary conditions.

Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 is explicit that the jurisdiction of the court over an action
involving title to, or possession of a real property is determined by its assessed value
and not the market value thereof.[17] It contemplates a more conservative and stable
method of valuation that is based on a standard mechanism (multiplying the fair market
value by the assessment level) conducted by the local assessors. This assessed value
must be averred in the complaint; otherwise, it cannot be ascertained which trial court
shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the action.

In the case at bench, petitioner's complaint did not allege the disputed property's
assessed value, but instead stated its market value pegged at P50,000.00. Settled is the
rule that the courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed value or even the market
value of the land.[18] The assessed value of the realty in question must be clearly set
forth in the complaint to prompt the court whether it can or cannot take cognizance of
the case. Thus, for petitioner's failure to allege the assessed value in the complaint, the
RTC cannot be said to have gravely erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.

The Court is not unmindful of the liberal application of the above rule. In Foronda-
Crystal v. Son,[19] it was held that the failure to allege the real property's assessed
value in the complaint would not be fatal if, in the documents annexed to the complaint,
an allegation of the assessed value could be found. It justified the relaxation of the rule
by echoing the Court's pronouncement in Tumpag v. Tumpag,[20] viz.:

Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine
whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. There may be instances, however, when a rigid
application of this rule may result in defeating substantial justice or in prejudice to a
party's substantial right. x x x

Here, not even a single document reflecting the assessed value of the subject property
was annexed to petitioner's complaint. The attachment of the sworn declaration of real
property to the complaint would have triggered the liberal application of the rule since it
bears the assessed value of the property at issue. Jurisprudence teaches that "the tax
declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of
regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency."[21] Petitioner,
however, failed to adduce the tax declaration which could have shown that the RTC
indeed had jurisdiction over the case.
 The market value of the subject property alleged in the complaint cannot be the basis to
determine whether the court a quo has jurisdiction over the case since it is the assessed
value which determines the jurisdiction of the court. If the lawmakers intended to
recognize the market value of the realty as basis in determining the jurisdiction, they
could have specified the same in R.A. No. 7691 which amended B.P. Blg. 129. There
being no modification of Section 19(2) and Section 33(3), the rule stands that the
jurisdictional element for real action is the assessed value of the property in question.
[22]

6. [ G.R. No. 139031, October 18, 2004 ]

MARIE ANTOINETTE R. SOLIVEN, PETITIONER, VS. FASTFORMS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
RESPONDENT. (incidental damages of whatever kind; estoppel)

Facts. A person obtained loan from creditor. For failure to pay the loan, a suit for
collection of sum of money was filed in the RTC. In the complaint, the loan and interest
were summed to Php190,000.00. There are claims for moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees. Judgment was rendered against the defendant/debtor.
The defendant/debtor raised, for the first time, in the MR regarding the court’s lack of
jurisdiction, considering that the actual damages were below the RTC’s jurisdiction.

Issue. Did the RTC validly exercise jurisdiction?

Resolution. In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, we specified
the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. 7691. Paragraph 2 of the Circular provides:

“2. The exclusion of the term ‘damages of whatever kind’ in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.” (underscoring ours)

Here, the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum of money amounting
to only P195,155.00. The damages being claimed by petitioner are merely the
consequences of this main cause of action. Hence, they are not included in
determining the jurisdictional amount. It is plain from R.A. 7691 and our
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the instant case. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals in its
assailed Decision:

“Conformably, since the action is principally for the collection of a debt, and the
prayer for damages is not one of the main causes of action but merely a
consequence thereto, it should not be considered in determining the jurisdiction of
the court.”

However, while it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, “this rule
presupposes that estoppel has not supervened.” In the instant case, respondent actively
participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its
authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from
challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been
rendered.
7. [ G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010 ]
IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EDILBERTO T.
CLARAVALL (damages of whatever kind)

Facts. A complaint for damages was filed in the RTC. The complaint seeks the award of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, all summing up to Php420,000.00.
The case is sought to be dismissed on the ground that moral damages were alleged to
be in the amount of Php300,00.00, which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level
courts.

Issue. Rule on the motion to dismiss.

Resolution.

In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 [19] is instructive:

xxxx

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the

jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to
or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Emphasis ours.)

In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of
damages for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought
an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of
petitioners' utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that
jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the
latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
causes of action. [20] It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that
respondent's main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being
claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but
constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.

In Mendoza v. Soriano, it was held that in cases where the claim for damages is the
main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the said case, the
respondent's claim of P929,000.06 in damages and P25,000 attorney's fees
plus P500 per court appearance was held to represent the monetary equivalent
for compensation of the alleged injury. The Court therein held that the total amount
of monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basis to determine the
jurisdictional amount.

8. [ G.R. No. 96630, May 15, 1991 ]

NOTRE DAME DE LOURDES HOSPITAL, OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE SISTERS OF ST.
PAUL DE CHARTRES HEREIN REPRESENTED BY SISTER MARIA LINDA TANALGO, SPC.,
PETITIONER, VS. HON. HEILLA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPS, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC,
BRANCH 8, LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET, ERNESTO F. BAYUGA, VICTORIA MANALO-
CALOGNE, IRENE M. DIMALANTA, ROSSANN STA. CRUZ, FELIPE TABANDA, RONALDO A.
PARAAN, TEOFILA N. BAUTISTA, GLORIA H. LOPEZ, MEMBERS OF THE MEDICAL STAFF
OF NOTRE DAME DE LOURDES HOSPITAL; RESIDENT PHYSICIANS LILYBETH
BARTOLOME, JUDY YAN, FRANCES DE LA CUESTA, TERESA ESTERA, VICTORIA SALINAS,
ASUNCION CORAN, ARLENE NIEVES SESE, JOSEPH SOTERO, DELFIN PALOR, MANUEL
VALLO, OF THE NOTRE DAME DE LOURDES HOSPITAL; MEDICAL INTERNS JOHN
ALMIROL, CONCESA BACAMANTE, ANTHONY BALMEO GABRIEL CRUZ, DENNEL FULIGA,
MONTEMAYOR GONZALO, NEMECIO HERRERA, EDWIN IGNACIO, ROMMEL MAPAGO,
GLORY VALIENTE, SOCORRO ZARATE OF THE NOTRE DAME DE LOURDES HOSPITAL
AND PATIENTS FELIPE TABANDA, SR., JULIET OFO-OG, MOHAMMED IBRAHIM, MARTIN
MALUTE, VIOLETA TONGSON AND ORLANDO BRABANTE, PRESENTLY CONFINED AT
NOTRE DAME DE LOURDES HOSPITAL, RESPONDENTS. (RTC territorial jurisdiction)

Facts. A complaint for injunction was filed in RTC, La Trinidad, Benguet. Two of the
complainants were residents of La Trinidad, Benguet. The defendant sought the
dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, territorial
jurisdiction, and improper venue.

Issue. Rule on the motion.

Resolution.

Pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. 129, which provides:

"SEC. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. - The Supreme
Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall
exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the
Metropolitan Trial Courts Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
over which the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein
granted shall be exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the
people of the different parts of the region and making the attendance of litigants and
witnesses as inexpensive as possible."

the Supreme Court issued Administrative Order No. 7 defining the territorial
jurisdiction of every regional trial court. As later amended by Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 67, the territorial jurisdiction of Branches III to VII of the
Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region, with seat in the City of Baguio, extends
over the City of Baguio alone, while that of Branches VIII to X of the same court, with
seat in La Trinidad, Benguet covers all the thirteen (13) municipalities of Benguet
province, namely, Atok, Bokod, Buguias, Itogon, Kabayan, Mankayan, Sablan, Tuba,
Bakun, Kapanggan, Kibungan, La Trinidad, and Tublay.

The action for injunction filed by the private respondents is a civil action in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence,
the regional trial court has exclusive original jurisdiction over it (Sec. 19, B.P.
Blg. 129). It is also a personal action because it does not affect the title to, or
possession, of real property nor asks for the partition, condemnation, or
foreclosure of mortgage on real property. As such, it may be commenced and
tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides, or may be found,
 or where the plaintiffs or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff (Sec. 2[b], Rule 4, Rules of Court).

Since two of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 90-CV-0541 - Drs. Felipe Tabanda, Jr. and
Rosann Sta. Cruz - are residents of La Trinidad, Benguet (par. 1, Complaint), the
complaint could properly be filed in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet.
That choice of venue is sanctioned by Sec. 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. It does
not matter that Drs. Tabanda and Sta. Cruz are only two among thirty-six (36) plaintiffs.
It is of no moment that, according to the petitioner, Dr. Tabanda, an employee of the
Benguet Corporation, is not a real party in interest, and that Dr. Sta. Cruz, a resident
physician of NDLH, has no cause of action against the said hospital because she has
been assured that a certificate of residency will be issued to her even if the defendant
closes its hospital. What determines jurisdiction and venue are the allegations of the
complaint, not the allegations in defendant's answer (People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154;
Ching vs. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412).

Since the First Judicial Region consists of the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte,
Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mountain Province, and Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio,
Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos (Sec. 13, B.P. Blg. 129), a writ of injunction issued
by the regional trial court sitting in La Trinidad, Benguet, is enforceable in the
City of Baguio. Section 21, subparagraph 1, B.P. Blg. 129 provides:

"Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
original jurisdiction:

"(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,

habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective
regions; x x x.” (Underscoring supplied.)

Clearly, the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII, in La Trinidad, Benguet, did not abuse its
discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint for injunction filed
against NDLH by the private respondents, for that court does have jurisdiction over the
action and the venue is properly laid before it.

We disagree. True, an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction
over the original Complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction
on the court.[14] In the present case, however, the RTC had jurisdiction because the
original Complaint involved specific performance with damages. In La Tondeña
Distillers v. Ponferrada,[15] this Court ruled that a complaint for
"specific performance with damages" is a personal action and may be filed in the proper
court where any of the parties reside, viz.:
"Finally, [w]e are not also persuaded by petitioner's argument that venue should be
lodged in Bago City where the lot is situated. The complaint is one for
"specific performance with damages." Private respondents do not claim ownership of the
lot but in fact [recognize the] title of defendants by annotating a notice of lis pendens. In
one case, a similar complaint for "specific performance with damages" involving real
property, was held to be a personal action, which may be filed in the proper court where
the party resides. Not being an action involving title to or ownership of real property,
venue, in this case, was not

An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause of action is

based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have
exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is the "legal
link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property itself."[25]

The ultimate relief sought by respondents is for the recovery of the property through the
enforcement of its sale in their favor by the late spouses Ramiro. Their other causes of
action for the cancellation of the original title and the issuance of a new one in their
name, as well as 'for injunction and damages, are merely incidental to the recovery of the
property.[26] Before any o

The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of the
documents or the reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of title covering the two
lots. These would merely follow after the trial court shall have first resolved the issue of
which between the contending parties is the lawful owner of such lots, the one also
entitled to their possession. Based on the pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or not
defendant Sevilla defrauded the Sebes of their property by making them sign
documents of conveyance rather than just a deed of real mortgage to secure their debt
to him. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful
owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of
such lots.

The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of the
documents or the reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of title covering the two
lots. These would merely follow after the trial court shall have first resolved the issue of
which between the contending parties is the lawful owner of such lots, the one also
entitled to their possession. Based on the pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or not
defendant Sevilla defrauded the Sebes of their property by making them sign
documents of conveyance rather than just a deed of real mortgage to secure their debt
to him. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful
owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of
such lots.