A Feasible Theoretical Approach on Attainment of Malicious Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks

Divya Vadlamudi1, Movva N. V. Kiran Babu2, Makineni Siddardha Kumar3, Batta Kumar Babu4
1. Assistant Professor, K L University,divyaonlineid@[Link] 2. Associate Professor, Mother Teresa Inst. of Science & Technology,kiranbabuonline@[Link] 3. Lecturer, RVR & JC Engineering College, siddardha1947@[Link] 4. Lecturer, Bapatla Engineering College,kmrbabu@[Link]

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011

Abstract Noncooperative behavior at the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer, radio channel jamming-based Denial-ofService (DoS) attacks against sensor networks and secure key agreement in peer-to-peer wireless networks. Security is at the core of any communication system and, in particular, of wireless (radio) networks. We perform an extensive evaluation of the proposed protocol, we use both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to model and analyze the co-existence of multiple CSMA/CA egotistical users. Using insights from the game theoretic analysis, we propose a simple channel access protocol that discourages egotistical behavior and results in the optimal and fair allocation of the available bandwidth. Keywords: Sensors, Selfish, Attack, Key, Key Agreement, Egoistic users, Jamming, Wormhole. 1. Introduction

created. The cost of sensor nodes is similarly variable, ranging from hundreds of dollars to a few pennies, depending on the complexity of the individual sensor nodes. Size and cost constraints on sensor nodes result in corresponding constraints on resources such as energy, memory, computational speed and communications bandwidth. The topology of the WSNs can vary from a simple star network to an advanced multi-hop wireless mesh network. The propagation technique between the hops of the network can be routing or flooding. [Link] types of attacks Major types of attacks in wireless sensor networks are Misconfiguration attacks, RAP attacks, Insertion and Interception attacks, Selfish attacks, War driving attacks, Client to Client attacks, and Jamming attacks etcHere we consider two types of malicious behavior. The first type deals with an adversary whotries to obstruct the operation of a wireless network by jamming the used radio channel. The secondtype is concerned with an adversary who interferes with a key agreement protocol executed betweenparties that use a radio link, in an attempt to learn their private information or to fool them intoaccepting fake messages as genuine. 2.1 Adversary Behaviour one: Jamming the Used Radio Channel Generally, we distinguish two basic types of sensor networks: proactive and reactive. Proactivenetworks involve a periodic flow of data between sensor nodes and the sinks. On the contrary, inreactive networks, packets are sent only when some event of interest occurs and is sensed. Reactivenetworks are characterized by lower energy consumption and therefore longer network [Link] the case of proactive sensor networks, several simple solutions can be proposed to ensure thatthe operator receives event reports or detects jamming. One solution consists in having sensorsperiodically report their status to the network operator (e.g., upon query from the operator); ifa sensor does not report its status within an expected period, the operator can request a retransmissionor conclude that the communication from that sensor is prevented by an [Link] these status reports are sent very frequently, sensor batteries will be exhausted in a short time;if they are

A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of spatially distributed autonomous sensors to monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion or pollutants and to cooperatively pass their data through the network to a main location. The more modern networks are bi-directional, enabling also to control the activity of the sensors. The development of wireless sensor networks was motivated by military applications such as battlefield surveillance; today such networks are used in many industrial and consumer applications, such as industrial process monitoring and control, machine health monitoring, and so on. The WSN is built of "nodes" from a few to several hundreds or even thousands, where each node is connected to one (or sometimes several) sensors. Each such sensor network node has typically several parts: a radio transceiver with an internal antenna or connection to an external antenna, a microcontroller, an electronic circuit for interfacing with the sensors and an energy source, usually a battery or an embedded form of energy harvesting. A sensor node might vary in size from that of a shoebox down to the size of a grain of dust, although functioning "motes" of genuine microscopic dimensions have yet to be

Special Issue

Page 83 of 91

ISSN 2229 5208

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011 sent infrequently, the batteries will last longer, but the time elapsed between an eventhappened and its reporting can be long and might render the alarm useless. Another similarsolution is that sensors hold the list of their neighbors and periodically poll them to check if thecommunication links between them are still valid. This solution has similar drawbacks as the firstproposal, as it either has high energy cost (if the polls are frequent), or opens a time window withinwhich an event is undetected (if the polls are not frequent).These and similar proactive solutions require the sensors to periodically communicate even ifno event has occurred. Furthermore, these solutions do not ensure that the network operator isinformed about the event immediately after it happens. We therefore argue that instead of beingproactive, in many applications event reporting need to be reactive, saving energy (as the sensorscommunicate only when an event is detected) and enabling the network operator to be informedabout an event within a reasonably short time [Link] event reporting is, however, vulnerable to jamming, because if the communication froma sensor to the operator is jammed, the operator will not raise any alarm as it does not expect any reports to come at any given time. It is therefore important to ensure that, if a sensor detects anevent, it can communicate this event to the network operator despite adversarys jamming. . 2.1.1 Proposed Solution: Probabilistic Wormholes we present and analyze three mechanisms to achieve timely event reporting Wired pairs of sensor nodes; Coordinated frequency-hopping pairs; Uncoordinated channel-hopping. Here we give just a high level overview of the proposed approach. In our solution, a portion ofpairs of sensor nodes create (probabilistically) communication links that are resistant to [Link] not requiring all the sensor nodes in the network to have this capability, we actually trade-offthe network robustness with the network complexity (and the cost). Now, for the given randomlylocated adversary (attacker), there will be a positive probability that a sensor node, residing in theexposure region of the attacker, forms a (multihop) path from the exposure region to the regionnot affected by jamming, in such a way that this path is not affected by ongoing jamming. We callsuch a path the probabilistic wormhole. An example of a probabilistic wormhole, realized throughwires, is shown on Figure 1 (b).We emphasize here that our goal is not to propose a single solution but rather to explain andmotivate the principle of probabilistic wormholes. 2.1.2 Wormholes via Wired Pairs of Sensor Nodes In this solution, we propose to augment a wireless sensor network with a certain number of pairsof sensor nodes that are each connected through a wire. Connected sensor nodes are also equippedwith wireless transceivers, just like regular sensor nodes. As a result we obtain a hybrid sensornetwork as shown on Figure 2.2(a): isolated points represent regular nodes and connected pairsare denoted as connected points.

Figure. 1 (a)

Figure. 1 (b) 2.1.3 Rationale of Wired Pairs We now introduce some terminology and explain the operating principles underlying the approachbased on wired pairs of sensor nodes. We denote with d the length of the wire connecting a pairof nodes; we assume all pairs to be connected with wires of the same length. Assuming randomdeployment of connected pairs (e.g., by throwing them from an aircraft), the distance between thenodes of a given connected pair, once the pair lands in the field, is a random variable taking valuesfrom interval [0, d]. We further denote with Rt the transmission range of the wireless transceivers,

Special Issue

Page 84 of 91

ISSN 2229 5208

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011 Figure 1: Probabilistic wormholes via wired pairs of sensor nodes: (a) Hybrid sensor networkwith randomly deployed sensor nodes: isolated points are regular nodes, connected points representsensor nodes connected through a wire.; (b) Hybrid sensor network with an attacker who jams thesurrounding nodes. Connected pair (1, 2) and regular node 3 create a wormhole from the exposureregion to the region that is not jammed. mounted on the sensor nodes. Let us now consider the scenario shown on Figure 1(b). In thisscenario, the attacker (A), represented by sign x, stealthily jams the region (called jamming region)within jamming range Rj . We call the exposure region the region that surrounds the attacker andfrom which the attackers presence can be detected. As can be seen on Figure 1(b), we modelthe exposure region by a circle centered at the location of the attacker. We denote with Rs theradius of the exposure region. The exposure region is related to the sensing capabilities of theemployed sensors, which is the reason for using subscript s in Rs. Note, however, that the notion ofexposure region is much broader. For example, when the attacker jams some area, the nodes whosetransmissions are affected by this attack can deduce that an attack is taking place by observingmultiple failures to receive the ACK from their intended destinations. In this case, all such nodesmake the exposure [Link] order to prevent any report (e.g., a report about the attackers presence), generated by theregular nodes located within the exposure region, to successfully leave the exposure region, theattacker simply jams the area within jamming range Rj Rt+Rs. In this situation, the connectedpairs serve as a rescue. In our example on Figure 1(b), connected pair (1, 2) creates a linkresistant to jamming from the exposure region. When node 1 senses the presence of the attacker, itmakes use of the wired channel to communicate a short report to its peer node 2. Since the wiredchannel between nodes 1 and 2 is not affected by the jamming activity of the attacker, the report sent by node 1 is successfully received by node 2. In turn, node 2 simply transmits (broadcasts)this report using the wireless transceiver with transmission range Rt. Some node (e.g., node 3 onFigure 1 (b)) that is located within transmission range Rt from node 2 and outside of the jammingregion, will potentially receive the report and pass it further, possibly over multiple hops, to somesink. Therefore, the 2-hop path between nodes 1 and 3 can be thought of as a wormhole that isresistant to the ongoing jamming activity by the [Link] course, the attacker can simply increase the jamming region in such a way that the attackeralso jams node 3. However, in the same way, the network operator can further increase the transmissionrange (Rt) of the wireless transceivers, the length of the wire (d), as well as the exposureregion (by deploying more advanced sensors with more advanced sensing capabilities). In addition,if a jamming signal is stronger, the probability that it gets detected and reported increases. we develop an approximation model that allows us to better understand potentialbenefits of changing the system parameters: Rt, Rs, d and Rj , as well as the node [Link] are many technical issues to address within the approach proposed in this section. In thiswork, however, our goal is to establish the relationship between the probability that at least onewormhole (from the given exposure region) is created and different system parameters. 3. Adversary Behaviour two: Interference with a key agreement protocol It is a common belief that peer-to-peer security is more difficult to achieve than traditionalsecurity based on a central authority; moreover, wireless communication and mobility are consideredto be at odds with security. Indeed, jamming or eavesdropping is easier on a wireless link than ona wired one, notably because such mischief can be perpetrated without physical access or contact;likewise, a mobile device is more vulnerable to impersonation and to denial-of-service attacks. Recently, researchers have proposed solutions that run exclusively on a radio link (hence theydo not require a special channel such as physical contact or infrared), which increases usability. Tocompensate for the much higher vulnerability of radio channels, in some solutions users are required to type a password in both [Link] describe two novel approaches to the problem of user-friendly key agreement (and mutual authentication) in settings where the users do not share any authenticated secret orcertified public key in advance. The first approach belongs to the family of solutions requiring theusers to compare strings of words, whereas the one is completely novel; it is based on radiochannel specific technique called distance-bounding. In addition, we make the following contributions: (i)we design protocols that are provably secure in a realistic communication model, (ii) we apply amodular approach to designing and analyzing the protocols, thus paving the way to the design ofre-usable (provably secure) message transfer (MT) authenticators, and (iii) we significantly increaseuserfriendliness. In the same vein, we develop Integrity (I)-codes that provide amethod to ensure the integrity (and authentication) of a message transmitted over insecure channel,and which are based solely on message coding (no shared secret or certified public key is required). 3.1 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Based on Distance Bounding(DH-DB) In this section, we describe a key agreement protocol that is based on verifiable principal proximity, achieved through distance bounding. We call our protocol Diffie-Hellman with Distance-Bounding (DH-DB). The protocol ensures the secure establishment of a shared key between two parties A and B if there are no other parties that are closer to A or to B than they are to each other. In this section, we assume that the pair of devices have the means to accurately estimate the distance between themselves (later in this section we discuss the possible techniques for this purpose). The proximity check between the two devices is performed through

Special Issue

Page 85 of 91

ISSN 2229 5208

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011 distance bounding [23]:each device upper-bounds its distance to the device with which it is agreeing on a key. The measureddistance appears on both device displays. The users then visually check whether there areother users/devices closer to them than the displayed distance bounds. If this is not the case, theexchanged DH public parameters and the corresponding identities are [Link] DH-DB protocol is shown on Figure 3(a). Note that the protocol on Figure 3(a) is actuallybuilt upon the DH-SC protocol. The only difference is that the verification of the authenticationstrings sAand sB(in the DH-DB protocol) is performed through Brands and Chaumsdistance bounding protocol [23]. Thus, Alice (A) and Bob (B) exchange the commitment/openingpairs (cA, dA) and (cB, dB) in the first four messages in exactly the same way as in DH-SC protocol. Furthermore, A and B perform all necessary verifications as in the DH-SC protocol. Finally, A andB calculate k-bit verification strings sAand sB. As we can see on Figure 3(a), A and B also exchangecommitments c0A and c0B to concatenations 0kRA and 1kRB; again, 0 and 1 serve to protect againstthe reflection [Link] reception of the commitments c0A and c0B, the devices execute distance bounding by exchangingbit by bit all the bits of RA, RB, sAand sBas shown on Figure 3(a). During distancebounding, the devices measure round-trip times between sending a bit and receiving a response [Link] device estimates the distance-bound to the other device by multiplying the round trip timeby the speed of light in the case of the radio or by the speed of sound in the case of [Link] exchanged RA, RB, sAand sB, A and B open c0A and c0B by sending out d0A and d0B,which they then use to retrieve bRBand bRA, respectively. A and B then use bRBand bRAto retrievebsBand bsA; this is done by performing a series of k xor operations as shown on Figure 3(a). Finally,A and B verify bsBand bsAagainst sAand sB; note that this verification is now done by the devicesA and B, whereas in the DH-SC protocol this comparison is performed by users A and [Link] successfully verified bsBagainst sAand bsAagainst sB, the devices A and B display themeasured distance bounds on their screens. The users A and B then visually verify that thereare no other users/devices in their vicinity (in what we call the integrity region of A and B; seeFigure 3(a)). If the displayed distance bound corresponds to the distance to the closest device, theusers accept the exchanged DH public parameters gXAand gXBand the corresponding identitiesIDA and IDB as being authentic; otherwise, they reject them. This last step is important as itguarantees that the exchanged messages in the protocol preserved their integrity, meaning that theycannot have been maliciously modified or generated by an adversary, but only by the closest party. 3.1.1 Properties of DH-DB Protocol In DH-DB, the MITM attack is prevented by the proximity verification. We define the integrityregion of users A and B as the union of two spheres each centered at the position of devices A and B with radii equal to the distance d between devices A and B (see Figure 3(b)). If the users can visually verify that there are no other users/devices within the integrity region and if the distance bounding phase is secure, then the integrity of messages sAand sBis respected; i.e., sAand sBsent from A and B will reach B and A, respectively, unchanged. Note here that the security of the distance-bounding phase relies on the fact that the attacker does not learn RA and/or RB until the end of this phase; all that M knows are commitment. Figure 3(a): Operation of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement with Distance Bounding; all the communicationtakes place over an insecure (high-bandwidth) channel. Figure 3(b): Integrity region of users A and B (d is the distance between users devices) to A and B that the attacker

Figure. 3 (a) cannot send the bits, in the distance-bounding phase, earlier than receiving the previous bit; for this reason, it cannot appear to be closer than it actually is. If attacker M is not within the integrity region, he will not be able to send messages to A such that it seems that it is placed on the same (or shorter) distance from A as B. With this, the integrity of sAand sBis preserved as if users A and B exchanged sAand sBface to face (e.g., voice communication). Since sAand sBare actually authentication strings from the DH-SC protocol, by verifying that sAand sBmatch, users A and B are guaranteed that messages mA and mBare authentic, except with a satisfactorily small probability (see Proposition 2).A nice property of this protocol is that it does not depend on the power ranges of the devices, but solely on their proximity d. Specifically, the closer the parties are, the smaller the integrity region is, and the harder it is for the adversary to get into the region without being noticed by the honest parties. For example, getting the devices as close as d = 30 cm should be a sufficient guarantee, even for the most

Special Issue

Page 86 of 91

ISSN 2229 5208

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011 demanding users, that no adversary (be it even a small device) resides in the corresponding integrity region.
3.1.2 Implementation We envision two possible implementations of DH-DB: with radio (RF) and with ultrasound (US).

Both exhibit equal security guarantees, but require different equipment attached to the devices. We briefly report on how these implementations have been addressed so far. propose a distance bounding protocol that can be used to verify the proximity of two devices connected by a radio link; it requires devices with a high (nanosecond) precisionof-time measurement. To the best of our knowledge, the only commercial technique that achieves such precision, and achieves therefore a high precision-of-distance measurement, is Ultra Wide Band (UWB). In [38], Fontana has demonstrated that with UWB, distances can be measured with an error margin of up to 15 cm. Sastry, Shankar and Wagner [93] propose a distance bounding measurement precision, but of course it needs each device to be able to communicate via ultrasound. Ultrasound-based distance bounding has centimeter precision. In both radiofrequency and ultra-sound solutions, the response time (the xor operation and the reversion of the transceiver) of the challenged principal must be tightly bound and predictable.

Figure. 3 (b) is shown

Special Issue

Page 87 of 91

ISSN 2229 5208

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011 Conclusion Concerning selfish behavior on the MAC layer, we envision extending the game theoretic modelused for a single collision domain to wireless networks of general topology. We believe this to be aright approach to defining appropriate fairness metrics for self-organized wireless [Link] to anti-jamming techniques in the context of wireless sensor networks, we would liketo develop an appropriate mathematical model for the approach based on uncoordinated channelhopping. It would be also interesting to evaluate the performances of hybrid solutions, obtainedby combining the three approaches proposed in Chapter 2. Finally, it would be interesting toimplement the presented [Link] the context of secure key agreement mechanisms, we would like to extend the proposedprotocols to multiparty settings, that is, to a group key agreement. Also, it would be interesting toimplement the distance bounding based key agreement protocol. Bibliography
[1] BTnodes. [Link] [2] Mica sensor platform. [Link] [3] Network Simulator (NS). [Link] [4] RFC 2289 - A One-Time Password System. [Link] [5] RFC 2409 - The Internet Key Exchange (IKE). [Link] [6] IEEE Computer Society LAN MAN Standards Committee. Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications, IEEE Std 802.11-1999. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York, 1999. [7] Specification of the Bluetooth System (Core). Version 1.1. [Link] 2001. [8] W. Aiello, S. M. Bellovin, M. Blaze, R. Canettia, J. Ioannidis, A. D. Keromytis, and O. [Link], DoS-Resistant, Secure Key Exchange for Internet Protocols. In Proceedings of ACM Computer and Communications Security (CCS) Conference, pages 4858, Washington, DC, 2000. [9] I. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci. A survey on sensor networks. IEEE Communication Magazine, 40(8):102114, 2002. [10] T. Alpcan, T. Basar, R. Srikant, and E. [Link] uplink power control as a Noncooperative [Link] Proceedengs of 40th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2001. [11] B. Alpern and F. [Link] exchange using Keyless Cryptography. Information processing letters, 16(2):7982, 1983. [12] E. Altman, R. El Azouzi, and T. [Link] Aloha as a stochastic game with partial [Link] Proceedings of WiOpt, 2002. [13] N. Asokan and P. Ginzboorg. Key Agreement in Ad-hoc Networks. Computer Communications, 23(17):16271637, November 2000. [14] D. Balfanz, D. Smetters, P. Stewart, and H. Wong. Talking to Strangers: Authentication in Ad-Hoc Wireless [Link] Proceedings of the 9th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2002. [15] J. Bellardo and S. Savage. 802.11 Denial-of-Service Attacks: Real Vulnerabilities and Practical Solutions. In Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Security Symposium, 2002. [16] M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk.A Modular Approach to the Design and Analysis of Authentication and Key Exchange [Link] Proceedings of the 30th Annual Symposium on the Theory of [Link], 1998. [17] M. Bellare and P. [Link] authentication and key distribution. In Advances in Cryptology Crypto 93 Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 773, Springer- Verlag, 1993. [18] J. M. Berger. A Note on Error Detecting Codes for Asymmetric Channel. Information and Control, 4:6873, 1961. [19] G. Bianchi. Performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination function. IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in Communications, 18, 2000. [20] M. Blaum and H. van [Link] t-Error Correcting/All Unidirectional Error Detecting Codes. IEEE Transactions on Computers, pages 14931501, 1989. [21] J. M. Borden. Optimal Asymmetric Error Detecting [Link] and Control, 53:66 73, 1982. [22] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe. Convex [Link] University Press, 2004. [23] S. Brands and D. Chaum. Distance-bounding protocols. In Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology, pages 344359. SpringerVerlag New York, Inc., 1994. [24] M. Cagalj and J.-[Link] agreement over a radio link. Technical Report IC/2004/16, EPFL-DI-ICA, January 2004. [25] M. Cagalj, J.-[Link], and C. Enz. Minimum-Energy Broadcast in All-Wireless Networks: NP-Completeness and Distribution Issues. In Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networks (MOBICOM 2002), Atlanta, Georgia, September 2002. [26] S. Capkun, J.-[Link], and L. Buttyan. Mobility Helps Peerto-Peer Security. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 5(1), January 2006. [27] C. Castelluccia and P. Mutaf. Shake Them Up! A movementbased pairing protocol for CPU constrained devices. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications and Services (MobiSys), 2005. [28] J.H. Chang and L. [Link] Conserving Routing in Wireless Ad-hoc [Link] Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM [Link], 2000. [29] A. Clementi, P. Crescenzi, P. Penna, G. Rossi, and P. Vocca. On the complexity of computing minimum energy consumption broadcast subgraphs. In Proceedings of 18th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2001), 2001. [30] LAN/MAN Standards Committee. ANSI/IEEE Std 802.11:Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications. IEEE Computer Society, 1999. [31] T.H. Cormen, C.E. Leiserson, R.L. Rivest, and C. Stein. Introduction to [Link] [Link] MIT Press, 2001. [32] M. Corner and B. [Link] applications with transient authentication. In First ACM/USENIX International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications and Services (MobiSys 03), San Francisco, CA, May 2003. [33] Steve Dohrmann and Carl [Link]-key Support for Collaborative [Link] Proceedings of the 1st Annual PKI Research Workshop, 2002.

Special Issue

Page 88 of 91

ISSN 2229 5208

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011

[34] A. [Link] and J. A. [Link] of service in sensor networks. IEEE Computer, 35(10):5462, 2002. [35] L. Eschenauer and V. Gligor.A Key Management Scheme for Distributed Sensor [Link] Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2002. [36] O. Egecioglu and T.F. Gonzalez. Minimum-energy broadcast in simple graphs with limited node power. In Proceedings of IASTED International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing and Systems (PDCS 2001), pages 334338, Anaheim, CA, August 2001. [37] A. Farago and V.R. Syrotiuk. Algorithmic problems in power controlled ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing Systems (PDCS 2001), Dalas, Texas, August 2001. [38] R.J. Fontana, E. Richley, and J. [Link] of an Ultra Wideband Precision Asset Location [Link] IEEE Conference on Ultra Wideband Systems and Technologies, November 2003. [39] F. Forgo, J. Szep, and F. Szidarovszky. Introduction to the Theory of Games: Concepts, Methods, Applications. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. [40] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Game [Link] MIT Press, 1991. [41] R.G. Gallager, P.A. Humblet, and P.M. Spira.A distributed algorithm for minimum-weight spanning trees. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, 5(1):6677, January 1983 [42] M.R. Garey and D.S. Johnson. Computers and intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness. W.H. Freeman and Company, 1979. [43] C. Gehrmann, C.J. Mitchell, and K. Nyberg. Manual Authentication for Wireless Devices, January 2004. RSA Cryptobytes, Vol. 7, No. 1. [44] C. Gehrmann and K. [Link] to Bluetooth Baseband [Link] Proceedings of Nordsec, Copenhagen, Denmark, November 2001. [45] V. Gupta, S. Krishnamurthy, and M. [Link] of Service Attacks at the MAC Layer in Wireless Ad Hoc [Link] Proceedings of MILCOM, Anaheim, CA, 2002. [46] S. Han, R. Rengaswamy, R. Shea, E. Kohler, and M. Srivastava.A Dynamic Operating System for Sensor Nodes. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications and Services (MobiSys), 2005. [47] W. Heinzelman, A. Chandrakasan, and H. [Link]-efficient communication protocol for wireless microsensor [Link] Proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS 2000), Maui, Hawaii, January 2000. [48] Dorit S. Hochbaum. Approximation Algorithms for NP-hard problems. PWS Publishing Company, 1997. [49] Y. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. Johnson. Packet Leashes: A Defense against Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (InfoCom), 2003. [50] J.-H. [Link] Ephemeral Pairing Problem. In Financial Cryptography, FC04, Key West, Florida, USA, February 2004. [51] M. Jakobsson. Payments and Diffie-Hellman key exchange (presentation slides). Private communication with M. Jakobsson. [52] M. Jakobsson and S. [Link] Weaknesses in [Link] Progress in Cryptography - CT-RSA 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2020, Springer-Verlag, February 2001. [53] Y. Jin and G. [Link] of a noncooperative game for heterogeneous users of an ALOHA network. IEEE Comm. Letters, 6, 2002. [54] E.-S. Jung and N. [Link] Energy Efficient MAC Protocol for Wireless LANs. In IEEE INFOCOM 2002, New York, USA, June 2002. [55] W. Kaiser, G. Pottie, M. Srivastava, G.S. Sukhatme, J. Villasenor, and D. Estrin. Networked Infomechanical Systems (NIMS) for Ambient [Link] Ambient Intelligence, Springer- Verlag, 2004. [56] C. Karlof and D. Wagner. Secure routing in wireless sensor networks: Attacks and countermeasures. Elseviers AdHoc Networks Journal, Special Issue on Sensor Network Applications and Protocols, 1(23):293315, September 2003. [57] C. E. Koksal, H. Kassab, and H. [Link] analysis of short-term fairness in wireless media access [Link] Proceedings of ACM Sigmetrics, 2000. [58] J. Konorski. Multiple access in ad hoc wireless LANs with noncooperative stations. In NETWORKING, volume 2345 of LNCS, Springer, 2002. [59] Y. A. Korilis, A. A. Lazar, and A. Orda. Architecting noncooperative networks. IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in Communications, 13(7):12411251, 1995. [60] B. Korte and J. [Link] [Link] and [Link]-Verlag, 2000. [61] H. Krawczyk. SIGMA.[Link] hugo/[Link]. [62] D. Kugler. Man in the Middle Attacks on Bluetooth. In Financial Cryptography, Long Beach, 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag. [63] P. Kyasanur and N. Vaidya. Detection and handling of MAC layer misbehavior in wireless networks. In Dependable Systems and Networks, 2003. [64] Kyasanur, P. and Vaidya, N. Detection and handling of MAC layer misbehavior in wireless networks. In Dependable Systems and Networks, June 2003. [65] R. J. La and V. Anantharam. Optimal routing control: repeated game approach. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, March 2002. [66] J.-O. Larsson and M. Jakobsson. SHAKE. Private communication with M. Jakobsson. [67] E. L. Leiss. Data Integrity on Digital Optical Discs. IEEE Transactions on Computers, 33:818827, 1984. [68] A. Lenstra and E. R. [Link] Cryptographic Key Sizes. 1999. [69] M. Leopold, M.B. Dydensborg, and P. Bonnet. Bluetooth and Sensor Networks: A Reality Check. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys). [70] F. Li and I. Nikolaidis. On minimum-energy broadcasting in all-wireless networks. In Proceedings of the 26th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN 2001), Tampa, Florida, November 2001. [71] L. Li, V. Bahl, Y.M. Wang, and R. Wattenhofer. Distributed topology control for power efficient operation in multihop wireless ad hoc [Link] Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM 2001, April 2001.

Special Issue

Page 89 of 91

ISSN 2229 5208

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011

[72] Q. Li, J. Aslam, and D. Rus. Online power-aware routing in wireless ad-hoc networks. In Proceedings of the Seventh Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networks (MOBICOM 2001), Rome, Italy, July 2001. [73] W. Liang. Constructing Minimum-Energy Broadcast Trees In Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc 2002), Lausanne, Switzerland, June 2002. [74] R.-F. Liao, Rita H. Wouhaybi, and A.T. Campbell. Incentive engineering in wireless LAN based access networks. In Proceedings of 10th International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP 2002), 2002. [75] D. Lichtenstein. Planar formulae and their uses. SIAM Journal on Computing, 11(2):329343, May 1982. [76] A. B. MacKenzie and S. B. Wicker. Stability of multipacket slotted Aloha with selfish users and perfect information. In Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, 2003. [77] D.P. Maher. United States Patent (No. 5,450,493): Secure communication method and apparatus. [Link] 1993. [78] K. Makki, N. Pissinou, and O. [Link] Solutions to Multicast Routing in Communication Networks. ACM Mobile Networks and Applications (MONET), 1(2):221232, 1996. [79] Wenbo Mao. Modern Cryptography, Theory & [Link] Hall PTR, 2004. [80] R. C. Merkle. A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption Function. In C. Pomerance, editor, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (CRYPTO87), volume 293, pages 369378. Springer-Verlag, 1988. [81] M. Nagy and S. [Link] Scheduling Algorithms in Mobile Networks. Cluster Computing), 1(2):177185, 1998. [82] G. Noubir and G. Lin. Low-power DoS attacks in data wireless LANs and countermeasures. SIGMOBILE [Link]. Rev., 7(3):2930, 2003. [83] A. Orda, R. Rom, and N. [Link] routing in multi-user communication networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 1(5):510521, 1993. [84] Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein.A Course in Game [Link] MIT Press, 1994. [85] A. Perrig, R. Canetti, J.D. Tygar, and D. Song. The TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol. RSA CryptoBytes, 5(Summer), 2002. [86] A. Perrig and D. Song. Hash Visualization: A New Technique to Improve Real-World Security. In Proceedings of the 1999 International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and ECommerce (CrypTEC 99), pages 131138, July 1999. [87] D. Plummer. An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol, November 1982. IETF Standards Track RFC 826. [88] John G. Proakis and [Link] Systems Engineering Second [Link] Hall, 2002. [89] Theodore S. Rappaport. Wireless communications: Principles and Practice. Prentice Hall, 1996. [90] M. Raya, J.-[Link], and I. Aad. DOMINO: A System to Detect Greedy Behavior in IEEE 802.11 Hotspots. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications and Services (MobiSys), June 2004. [91] V. Rodoplu and T. H. [Link] energy mobile wireless networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 17(8), August 1999. [92] C. U. Saraydar, N. B. Mandayam, and D. J. Goodman. Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks. IEEE Transactions on Communications, 50(2):291303, February 2002. [93] N. Sastry, U. Shankar, and D. Wagner. Secure Verification of Location Claims. In Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe), pages 110, September 2003. [94] S. Sastry. Nonlinear Systems: Analysis, Stability, and Control. Springer-VerlagTelos, 1999. [95] C. Schurgers, V. Tsiatsis, S. Ganeriwal, and M. B. [Link] sensor networks in the energy-latencydensity design space. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 1(1):70 80, January-March 2002. [96] G. Sharma and R.R. Mazumdar. Hybrid Sensor Networks: A Small World. In Proceedings of the ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc), Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, USA, 2005. [97] S. Singh, C. Raghavendra, and J. [Link]-aware broadcasting in mobile ad hoc [Link] Proceedings of IEEE PIMRC99, Osaka, Japan, September 1999. [98] Herbert Solomon. Geometric [Link], 1978. [99] D. Song. dsniff. [Link] [100] D. Song. Passwords Found on a Wireless Network. In USENIX Technical Conference WIP,June 2000. [101] F. Stajano and R. Anderson. The Resurrecting Duckling: Security Issues for Ad-hoc Wireless Networks. In Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Security Protocols, 1999. [102] Frank [Link] for Ubiquitous [Link] Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2002. [103] Vijay V. [Link] [Link], 2001. [104] W. Diffie and M. [Link] Directions in Cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, pages 644654, November 1976. [105] P.-J. Wan, G. Calinescu, and O. Frieder X.-Y. Li. Minimumenergy broadcast routing in static ad hoc wireless networks. In IEEE INFOCOM 2001, Anchorage, Alaska, April 2001. [106] [Link] and E. Felten. Proving the Location of TamperResistant [Link] report, Princeton University. [107] IEEE 802.11 WG. ANSI/IEEE Std 802.11:Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications: Medium Access Control (MAC) Enhancements for Quality of Service (QoS) IEEE 802.11/D2.0. IEEE, 2001. [108] J. E. Wieselthier, G. D. Nguyen, and A. [Link] the construction of energy-efficient broadcast and multicast trees in wireless networks. In IEEE INFOCOM 2000, pages 586594,Tel Aviv, Israel, 2000. [109] J. E. Wieselthier, G. D. Nguyen, and A. [Link] for energy-efficient multicasting in static ad hoc wireless networks. ACM Mobile Networks and Applications (MONET), 6(3):251263, June 2001. [110] [Link], J.A., Stankovic, and S.H. Son. JAM: A JammedArea Mapping Service for Sensor Networks. In Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS), Cancun, Mexico, 2003. [111] W. Xu, W. Trappe, Y. Zhang, and T. [Link] Feasibility of Launching and Detecting Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networks. In Proceedings of the ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc), UrbanaChampaign, Illinois, USA,2005. [112] W. Xu, T. Wood, [Link], and Y. [Link] Surfing and Spatial Retreats: Defenses against Wireless Denial of [Link] Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe), 2004. [113] H. Yache, R. Mazumdar, and C. Rosenberg.A game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in

Special Issue

Page 90 of 91

ISSN 2229 5208

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011

broadband networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 8(5):667678, 2000. [114] [Link], [Link], and D. [Link]-informed energy conservation for ad hoc [Link] Proceedings of the Seventh Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networks (MOBICOM 2001), July 2001.

Special Issue

Page 91 of 91

ISSN 2229 5208