ELCANO GLOBAL

2022
PRESENCE REPORT
© 2022 Real Instituto Elcano
C/ Príncipe de Vergara, 51
28006 Madrid
[Link]

ISSN: 2255-5293
Depósito Legal: M-36047-2013
 ELCANO GLOBAL
PRESENCE REPORT 2022
ILIANA OLIVIÉ
MANUEL GRACIA1

1 Iliana Olivié, senior analyst and Manuel Gracia, analyst at Elcano Royal Institute.
For more information check: [Link]/en/contact
INFORME ELCANO DE PRESENCIA GLOBAL 2016

7
Executive summary

8
Frequently asked
questions

11
1. Post-globalisation

17
2. A stable ranking of global presence?

4
21
3. Global Europe?

27
Methodological annex
Brief history of the project
Main elements of the Elcano Global Presence Index
The inclusion of the European Union in Elcano Global Presence Index

39
Statistical annex

5
Executive Summary
Post-globalisation

Prior to the eruption of the pandemic, globalisation was already showing signs of fatigue. The
sum of the index value of global presence for all 150 countries for which we calculate the
Elcano Global Presence Index had reached its peak in 2015. New data for 2021 show a
contraction in this aggregate value of 2.35% with respect the previous year –the largest annual
drop for the entire time series–.
Of the three economic, military and soft dimensions, the latter is the most hit by this contraction
(7% between 2020 and 2021), despite the fact that soft exchanges had been those showing
a greater dynamism during the past two decades.

A stable ranking of global presence?

As in previous editions of the Elcano Global Presence Index, the top 20 ranking is fairly stable,
with the same group of countries occupying similar positions for several years in a row and
showing that, despite geopolitical and geo-economic changes depicted in previous editions
of this report, the West and/or the North still account for a great deal of the aggregate global
presence.

China gains an enormous volume of external projection and continues to narrow the global
presence gap with the US. The index value of Chinese global presence is now 2.3 times lower
than that of the US (2.9 times lower only one year before), the latter losing global presence
over the past year.

Spain is the country that loses the greatest volume of global presence among all 150 countries,
despite retaining its 13th position.

Global Europe?

We calculate the global presence index for the European Union (EU) as if it were a single
country, allowing for the analysis of its global role, in comparison with the US and China.

The EU records a global presence index value of 3,377 points in 2021, higher than that of the
US (3,241) and much higher than that of China (1,365). However, between 2020 and 2021,
coinciding with the COVID-19 pandemic but also with the materialisation of Brexit, the EU’s
global presence decreases by 300 index value points, while US external projection falls by only
6 points and that of China increases by 62.

7
 Frequently asked questions about the
Elcano Global Presence Index

The index measures global presence. By global presence we understand

What does the Elcano
the effective positioning, in absolute terms, of the different countries (in
Global Presence Index
terms of products sold, tourists welcomed, victories in international sports
measure?
competitions…).

No. A country may have a strong international projection and a weak

Does the Elcano regional or global influence (or vice-versa). The relationship between
Global Presence Index presence and power depends on the foreign policy of each country or on
measure power? the limiting factors of the exercise of influence depending, for instance, on
the presence of another regional leader.

Does it reflect the effort No. This Index measures the results of internationalisation, not its means.
of countries attempting For example, a country may have deployed a significant number of troops
to achieve greater abroad with a defence expenditure that is relatively smaller than that of
internationalisation? another country with a smaller military presence.

No. The Elcano Global Presence Index considers the external projection of
the different countries and not so much the way in which they absorb the
Does it measure the external action of other countries in their national territory. That is why the
openness of countries? Index considers, for instance, the exports of manufactured goods but
disregards the imports. It does not measure world interdependence,
though it may help to analyse it.

Objective. Its purpose is not to ascertain how a country is perceived by

Is it calculated with
certain elites or by public opinion as a whole. The Index is calculated to
objective or subjective
determine the effective external projection of the different countries,
data?
regardless of their reputation or image.

Both. The Elcano Global Presence Index comprises three dimensions –

Does it measure
economic, military and soft presence–, which in turn comprise variables of
merely the ‘quantity’ of
a different nature (ranging from energy to development cooperation, troops
a country’s presence
deployed or tourism). It is therefore useful in revealing not only how present
or also its nature?
countries are in the global order but also the nature of their presence.

First, presence is reflected in a single direction, which could be deemed its

unidirectionality. Secondly, the results of presence are measured and not
the means to achieve them. In addition, all the variables have an explicitly
How are the variables
external component in the sense that they reflect cross-border presence.
of the Elcano Global
Presence is given in absolute and not relative terms; in other words, the
Presence Index
indicators are not proportional to the demographic or economic size of the
selected?
country. Likewise, as for any other index, the best explanatory capacity is
sought with the fewest variables or indicators possible. Finally, hard data
on presence are taken and not data based on judgments or opinions.

8
 Frequently asked questions about the
Elcano Global Presence Index

Weights assigned to variables and dimensions are based on experts’

And how are they criteria. Surveys were conducted in 2012, 2015, 218 and 2021:
combined in a questionnaires were sent to specialists in international relations and
synthetic index? answers were combined to determine the weights of variables and
dimensions.

What about missing In these cases we have also referred to expert opinion. A total of 5,205
cases? How are they data items have been estimated from 86,447 observations. The number of
estimated? estimations accounts for 6% of the base.
The Index has been
For 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010-21. Since 2010 the calculation is
calculated for what
performed annually.
years?
To reveal the transformations in the world order since the end of the Cold
Why those years?
War.

The Elcano Global Presence Index is calculated for 150 countries. These
For what countries?
are selected, mainly, according to their size in terms of GDP.

Not exactly. The presence of different countries can be combined,

showing regional trends of global presence. Moreover, as new editions
include an increasing number of countries, for some regions (ie, Latin
Can the presence of America or East Asia) the number of countries selected for the Index is
different countries be high enough to consider the aggregated index value as a fair reflection of
combined to reveal the the external projection of the whole region.
joint presence for a However, it is important to note that, in these cases, the total index value
chosen group or records the relative presence of some countries in others of the same
region? group or region (ie, the global presence index value of Latin America
includes the relative presence of Argentina in Brazil). Thus, the adding
together of global presences should not be considered a metric of a given
region’s external projection outside its boundaries.

Can the presence of No, for the reason mentioned above. It must be borne in mind that the
European countries be global presence of the member states is partly reflected in other member
combined and can it states of the Union. In order to apply the Index to the EU, intra-European
be assumed that that presence has been deducted. The intra-European presence of the
is the presence of the member states is precisely what the Elcano European Presence Index
EU? measures.

Frequently asked questions 9

1. Post-globalisation
The Elcano Global Presence Index is now calculated for 150 countries, which account for
98.4% of the global economy and 98.5% of the world’s population. Therefore, the aggregation
of the index value of all countries included in it can give us a glimpse of the state of globalisation
–its behaviour, volume, nature and evolution–. An increase, over time, of the aggregate global
presence of all countries might indicate that globalisation is under way –since it would reflect
that international exchanges are intensifying–. Conversely, a decrease of aggregate global
presence would be a symptom of de-globalisation, and a decline of global exchanges. Also,
since total global presence is composed of three dimensions –economic, military, soft–, which,
in turn, are made of up to 16 variables –from energy to development cooperation–, observing
globalisation through this lens also enables to track its changing nature –from harder to softer
types of external relations, for instance–.
As already analysed elsewhere, previously to the eruption of the pandemic, globalisation was
already showing signs of fatigue. There were already doubts about the evolution of the
globalisation process, given the possible exhaustion of the period of trade openness and the
increase of protectionism, the growing concern about the ecological footprint and, in general
terms, a strengthening of nation-state visions. According to data updated for this edition,
global exchanges increased steadily during the 1990s and 2000s (at an average annual rate
of over 2%) and rapidly in the early 2010s (at rates over 3%). However, in 2013 growth started
to slow down and, after peaking in 2015, the aggregate value of global presence decreased
in 2016 for the first time in this series’ records. Data for the following years show that
globalisation plateaued, with mild increases or declines until the eruption of the pandemic, that
is reflected in this Index for 2021 data.
Globalisation began fundamentally as an economic process and continues to be so. It is the
most relevant dimension, with an aggregate value of economic presence more than twice that
of the soft or military dimensions (Graph 1.1). However, with different speeds of globalisation,
also came a changing nature of this global trend. The main driver of globalisation during the
90s was the economic dimension (6% annual growth, on average, during that decade), with
more modest increases of the soft dimension (2.5%) and a contraction of the military realm (-
2.4%), following the collapse of the Soviet bloc. In the 2000s, the trend of the military
dimension continued, though at a lower pace (-0.4% per year), the economic dimension
substantially smoothed its rate of growth (to 2.8% annually) and the soft dimension took the
lead in the globalisation process (increasing at an annual rate of 5.6% throughout this decade).
The first half of the past decade, with a slower globalisation, saw an even slower growth of the
economic dimension (less than 1.7% per year), a low but positive increase of the military
dimension (1.7% per year) and, still, the lead of the soft dimension (5.4% per year). During the
second half of the decade, and until the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic, increases of
economic exchanges dropped to less than 1% per year, those of military international relations

11
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

returned to negative values (-0.9% annually) and the expansion of the soft dimension
smoothed out its trend of the previous years, dropping to an annual increase of 1.4%. In short,
while economic exchanges led the globalisation process during the 90s, in the 2000s and
2010s the process was driven, to a greater extent, by the soft dimension, even during the
years of stagnating globalisation in the second half of the past decade. Although the military
dimension has expanded in some years, in general terms it has tended to lose ground in the
globalisation process.
It has been argued that the pandemic accelerated global trends prior to the eruption of the
global health crisis. With respect to the pace and nature of globalisation, tracked with the
aggregated index value of global presence for the 150 countries included in this calculation,
this is partly true. On the one hand, during the pandemic, there was a contraction of this
aggregate value, that decreased by 2.35% in a single year (from 15,589 points in 2020 to
15,222 in 2021) –the largest annual drop for the entire time series–. There is, therefore, a
continuation of the stagnation or contraction of global exchanges in previous years. However,
on the other, the dimension most hit during the past year is the soft one, which is, precisely,
the one that had been showing a greater dynamism during the past two decades. While there
were hardly any variations in the economic dimension (at roughly 8,500 points in both 2020
and 2021), the military dimension contracted by 3% and the soft one by 7% (Graphs 1.1 and
1.2).
18,000

GRAPH 1.1
16,000 Global, economic, military and soft presence
(in index value 1990-2021)
14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Economic Military Soft

Note: values for 1990 apply for the 1990-94 period, those of 1995 to 1995-99, those of 2000 to 2000-04 and
those of 2005 to 2005-09.
Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

12
Indeed, maybe counterintuitively, the economic dimension did not contract during the
pandemic, despite declines in the variables of energy, manufactures and services and due to
increases in the two variables of primary goods and investments. Almost all types of export
flows fell substantially: the energy indicator was hardly hit for two years in a row (-30.7%
between 2020 and 2021),1 so were services (-16.5%) –given the collapse of tourism and the
contraction of the transport of goods– and, to a lesser extent, manufactures (-2.2%).
Nevertheless, global exchanges of primary goods, including food and beverages, were resilient
during the global health crisis and actually increased. In terms of the Elcano Global Presence
Index this translates into a 5.6% growth with respect to the previous year, implying a change
of trend and the highest increase since the end of the latest commodities’ boom. Something
similar happened with the investments variable, partially explained by the fact that it reflects
foreign direct investment stocks, not flows. Therefore, even in the event of a contraction of
international investments flows (which was actually the case during the pandemic), stocks
remained resilient and even increased by 13% during the last year. In short, with the exception
of services, the rest of the economic variables and the economic dimension as a whole
behaved similarly to the pre-pandemic years, recording similar values (Table 1.1).

9.000
GRAPH 1.2
8.000 Economic, military and soft presence
(in index value 1990-2021)
7.000

6.000

5.000

4.000

3.000

2.000

1.000

0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Economic Military Soft

Note: values for 1990 apply for the 1990-94 period, those of 1995 to 1995-99, those of 2000 to 2000-04 and
those of 2005 to 2005-09.
Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

1
A trend that we expect to be reversed in the next edition of the Elcano Global Presence Index, given the behaviour of energy
prices during the second half of 2021 and 2022.

Post-globalisation 13
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

Troops deployed overseas, in international conflicts or in foreign military bases, is the variable
most hit in the military dimension (-5.8% between 2020 and 2021). It could be argued that this
behaviour is consistent with the restrictions imposed to human mobility as a response to the
propagation of the COVID-19 disease and reflects a similar behaviour as those of services in
the economic dimension or tourism in the soft one. However, this variable has tended to
decrease over the past five years and is associated with a lower participation of countries in
international conflicts –eg, Afghanistan– until the invasion of Ukraine. Despite the enormous
budgetary commitments made by NATO members in the past couple of years,2 the variable of
military equipment follows a similar trend, although with milder variations. This indicator
decreased by 1.6% the past year, following a 1% decrease the previous one, given that military
capacities require years (if not decades) to materialise after the financial commitments are
adopted.3 As a result, the military dimension is also on a sort of plateau since the mid-2010s,
which is the net result of decreasing Western capacities and increasing Asian military
equipment.
The soft dimension was the one most hit by the de-globalisation process in 2021. However,
although this dimension contracted by 7% between 2020 and 2021, only five out of nine soft
variables retrenched. Much to the contrary, although to different extents, there was an increase
of global exchanges in the domains of technology (+0.4%), science (+11.6%), education
(+0.3%) and development cooperation (+0.1%). As for technology, this performance implies a
changing trend with respect to previous years, perhaps associated with the gigantic effort
made in research for COVID-19 vaccines. This probably has derivatives in the variable of
science that, however, records an upward trend in the time series as a whole. Although human
mobility was seriously restricted, sudden lockdowns probably fixed part of the students’
population in host countries, while colleges and universities made an effort to transit from
physical to virtual courses. Lastly, despite initial pessimist forecasts, the bulk of the
international community saw the pandemic as a global threat and another signal (such as the
climate emergency) of the need to build common goods and renew financial efforts in
development cooperation. The modest increase of 0.1% comes after two consecutive years
of decreases in this soft variable.
Several soft variables record contractions between 2020 and 2021. Sports and information
are both reduced by 1.2% and migrations by 1%. As for the latter, just as with investments, it
must be taken into account that this indicator is on stocks, not flows, of international migrants.
International cultural exchanges and world tourism went down by 27% and 65.9%,
respectively. In the case of culture, this record is similar to that of the previous year. Much on
the opposite, the performance of tourism breaks an upward trend for the whole time series; a
fact that is explained with travel restrictions, lockdowns and the drastic contraction of
household consumption. In absolute terms, the number of world tourists recorded in 2021
was below 1995 levels.

2
And documented here.
3
In this respect, it should be noted that for the Elcano Global Presence Index we consider military equipment needed for the
external deployment of troops, thus mainly naval gear.

14
TABLE 1.1
Global presence variations by variable
(in %)
Variable 2015-20 variation 2020-21 variation

Energy -5.7 -30.7

Primary goods -2.7 5.6
Manufactures -0.5 -2.2
Services 1.9 -16.5
Investments 2.6 13.0
Troops -1.8 -5.8
Military equipment 0.9 -1.6
Migrations 0.6 -1.0
Tourism 3.5 -65.9
Sports -1.4 -1.2
Culture -4.0 -27.0
Information 12.3 -1.2
Technology 2.1 0.4
Science 4.5 11.6
Education 4.0 0.3
Development cooperation 0.1 0.1

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

Post-globalisation 15
2. A stable ranking of global presence?
As in previous editions of the Elcano Global Presence Index, the top 20 ranking is fairly stable,
with the same group of countries occupying similar positions for several years in a row and
showing that, despite geopolitical and geo-economic changes depicted in previous editions
of this report, the West and/or the North still accounts for a great deal of the aggregate global
presence analysed in the previous section. The emergence of the rest, which, in the case of
global presence is limited to that of Asia, shows China holding the 2nd position, Japan the 4th,
India the 11th, South Korea the 12th and Singapore the 17th. Regarding Europe and the West,
it is interesting to note that, besides intuitive results such as the US topping the ranking and
Germany, the UK and France occupying important positions, smaller countries (economically
or demographically) such as Belgium, Ireland and Sweden are still in the top 20, while gigantic
countries, such as India, still record external projections lower to those of Canada, the
Netherlands and Italy (Graph 2.1).

1. United States 3.241

2. China 1.365
3. Germany 860
4. Japan 853
5. United Kingdom 835
6. France 704
7. Russia 562
8. Canada 484
9. Netherlands 421
10. Italy 365
11. India 319
GRAPH 2.1
12. South Korea 311
Ranking of global presence top 20
13. Spain 272
(in index value, 2021)
14. Switzerland 260
15. Australia 248
16. Belgium 219
17. Singapore 207
18. Ireland 202
19. Turkey 172
20. Sweden 149

0 500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500 3.000 3.500

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

17
With respect the previous year, the UK loses one position (to the 5th) after Brexit, swapping its
place with Japan.
China gains an enormous volume of external projection and continues to narrow the global
presence gap with the US. The index value of Chinese global presence is now 2.3 times lower
than that of the US (2.9 times only one year before). Within Asia, Japan's growth is also
noteworthy, while Korea, Singapore and especially India record losses of global presence in
absolute terms.
Some European countries have seen increases of global presence over the past year but, in
general terms, it would seem that the pandemic has had a greater impact in this region, just
as occurred with the Great Recession. Particularly, Spain is the country that loses the greatest
volume of global presence among all 150 countries, despite retaining its 13th position (Graph
2.2).

China 62
Ireland 27
Switzerland 27
Japan 23
Canada 22
Belgium 10
Sweden 6
Australia -1
South Korea -1
Germany -3
Singapore -6
United States -6 GRAPH 2.2
Netherlands -8 Global presence variations, top 20 countries
Turkey -13 (in index value, 2020-2021)
United Kingdom -15
Russia -19
India -21
Italy -23
France -23
Spain -35

-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

Spain’s global presence has decreased by 11% in only one year, due to huge retrenchments
in its economic (-12%) and soft (-16%) dimensions. The economic dimension was particularly
hit through the variables of energy (-37%) –fuel exports being an important component of
Spain’s sales overseas– and services (-41%) –a phenomenon strongly related to the drop in
exports of goods and to lockdowns and limitations to human mobility, including tourism–. All
variables of Spain’s soft presence decrease in relation to the previous year, with the only
exception of science, following the world trend outlined in the previous section. Major declines
in this dimension are those of tourism (-57%) and culture (-17%) which are, precisely, two
important channels of the country’s external projection (Table 2.1).

18
TABLE 2.1
Spain’s Elcano Global Presence Index

2020 2021 Variation

(index value) (index value) (%)
Global presence 307 272 -11

Economic dimension 435 382 -12

Energy 50 32 -37
Primary goods 149 158 6
Manufactures 405 382 -6
Services 546 323 -41
Investments 828 855 3

Military dimension 223 220 -1

Troops 101 95 -5
Military equipment 315 313 -1

Soft dimension 204 172 -16

Migrations 245 243 -1

Tourism 461 199 -57
Sports 109 102 -6
Culture 135 113 -17
Information 76 67 -11
Technology 152 137 -10
Science 300 343 14
Education 134 132 -1
Development cooperation 237 235 -1

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

A stable ranking of global presence? 19

3. Global Europe?
For several editions now, we have been calculating the global presence of the EU as if it were
a single country. This is done, roughly, by adding the external projection of all Member States
(MS) –adapting the calculation to the evolving composition of the EU– and detracting the
presence of each MS in others. This exercise allows for the analysis of the global role of the
EU, particularly in comparison with the two world poles, the US and China. However, it also
has obvious conceptual limitations, since political decisions affecting the global presence of
the EU depend on all sovereign States (sometimes at different administrative levels) plus EU
institutions and are therefore highly decentralised and even uncoordinated, unlike the situation
in the US and, especially China, where the volume and nature of both countries’ external
projections depend more heavily on government strategy. All in all, we consider this simulation
(or exercise of political fiction) to be useful for exploring the potential of a more integrated
and/or coordinated EU in the global sphere.
4.000
European Union

3.500

3.000

2.500
United States

2.000

1.500 GRAPH 3.1

Global presence
EU, US and China China
1.000 (in index value, 1990-2021)

500

0
1990 2000 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Note: values for 1990 apply for the 1990-94 period, those of 1995 to 1995-99, those of 2000 to 2000-04 and
those of 2005 to 2005-09.
Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

21
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

The EU records a global presence index value of 3,377 points in 2021, higher than that of the
US (3,241) and much higher than that of China (1,365), following the analysis of the US-China
gap included in the previous section of this report. The EU’s global presence has been higher
than that of the US for the whole past decade and both external projections follow similar
trends, with decreasing values since the mid or late 2010s, very much in line with the
performance of the globalisation process depicted in the first section. Much to the contrary,
China’s global presence evolution shows a consistent upward trend, that accelerated in the
mid-2000s (Graph 3.1). Nevertheless, the gap is still visible and, as mentioned above, despite
its strong growth, China's global presence record today is less than half of that of the US in
the 1990s.
Between 2020 and 2021, coinciding with the COVID-19 pandemic but also with the
materialisation of Brexit, EU’s global presence decreases by 300 index value points, while the
US external projection falls by only 6 points and, perhaps surprisingly, China’s increases by 62
(Graph 3.1).
That is, despite the fact that the health crisis originated in China and the harshness of the
measures it implemented, the West appears to have been more hardly hit in global presence
terms. In the case of the EU, its performance also responds to a re-composition effect, since
data for 2020 reflect the global presence of the EU-28 while those for 2021 refer to the EU-
27, without the UK. It should be noted that the EU could have increased its global presence
despite the UK’s exit. This is so because although, on the one hand, it loses a major global
actor, on the other, the EU gains a partner for its external presence since the global projection
of the other 27 MS in the UK is now recorded as part of the EU’s global presence. According
to global presence data, the net effect seems to be negative. The UK is a major military actor
–an asset that the EU loses with Brexit– and this is a domain where the EU is not likely to
project itself in the former member. It could have recorded significant increases of economic
and soft presence that, nevertheless, did not materialise in a context of health and economic
crisis. More specifically, the only variables that increase in the global presence records for the
EU are information in the soft dimension and investments and primary goods in the economic
domain. All in all, the global presence index of the EU in 2021 falls back to the levels of 2012
(Graph 3.1).
The Chinese increase in global presence between 2020 and 2021 is due to the economic
dimension and, more precisely, to the performance of the variables of investments and of
manufactures –despite the sudden stop in world production and trade in goods, the effect of
which will become clearer in future editions of the index–. This contrasts with the behaviour of
the US and the EU’s economic dimension that, as we have already mentioned, do retrench,
with declining values for all variables with the only exception of investments.
The EU’s potential global leadership is grounded in its economic dimension, which is
substantially higher than that of the US and more than double that of China. To a lesser extent,
the EU is also a soft leader, a dimension where its record also surpasses those of the two
global powers. In line with previous analyses on this issue, the EU’s military projection is much
more discrete and substantially lower than that of the US which is, by very far, the military
leader. The anchor of Chinese external projection is economic, although the military and soft
presences are also relevant (Graph 3.2).

22
 2,500

Economic
2,155
GRAPH 3.2
Economic, military and soft presence
2,000
EU, US and China
(in index value, 2021)
Economic
1,581

1,500

1,000 Military Economic

Soft 868 Soft 846
809 793

Military
500 413
Military Soft
246 272

0
European Union United States China

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

1,800

1,600

Economic
1,400

1,200

1,000 Military

800

600

Soft

400

GRAPH 3.3
200
US' economic, military and soft presence
(in index value, 1990-2021)
0
1990 2000 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

Global Europe? 23
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

1,000

900
GRAPH 3.4
China's economic, military and soft presence
800
(in index value, 1990-2021)

700

600
Economic

500

400

300

Soft
200

Military
100

0
1990 2000 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

2,500

GRAPH 3.5
EU's economic, military and soft presence
(in index value, 1990-2021)
2,000 Economic

1,500

1,000

Soft

500
Military

0
2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

24
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and over the past three decades, the US has tended to balance
the nature of its external projection from a global presence heavily dependent on the military
dimension to a greater role of the soft and, particularly, the economic dimension (Graph 3.3).
As for China, the massive increase of its global presence is explained, to a great extent, by the
performance of the economic dimension, although the Asian country also its increases military
and soft forms of foreign action (Graph 3.4).
The EU’s potential global leadership follows the performance of the economic dimension,
which increases during the 2010s, and somehow resists in the past few years, despite Brexit
and the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there is a substantial drop of the military dimension
that has been going on since the mid-2000s and that, as mentioned above, accelerates in the
past couple of years mostly due to the UK’s exit from the EU, given the importance of the navy
and the type of equipment included in the Index. Brexit could also explain the sudden
retrenchment of the soft dimension, reversing the trend of a continued increase since the
beginning of the series, despite the fact that the effect could have been the opposite as the
UK now becomes a major destination of the EU’s (soft) external projection (Graph 3.5).
Given that both events materialised during the same years, it is not possible to differentiate the
effects on the EU of Brexit and the pandemic. However, there is an obvious re-composition of
the European space as a result of the UK’s exit, the pandemic and other global and European
trends. Such a re-composition is reflected in the Elcano European Presence Index, which
calculates the external projection of MS in the EU space.
There are some changes in the ranking of MS according to the Elcano European Presence
Index. With respect to 2020, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Finland and Lithuania gain one position
each, and Bulgaria moves up three. Spain, Poland and Greece lose one position, and Croatia
three. Despite retaining the 2nd position, the Netherlands lose over 62 points of European
presence. In line with its performance in global presence, detailed in the previous section, the
contraction of Spanish European presence amounts to nearly 55 points. Again, the impact of
the pandemic on tourism is the main explanation, but unlike what has occurred with its global
presence, Spain’s European presence is also reduced due to the indicators of investment,
information, culture and migration –most likely a direct cause of the UK's exit from the EU
area–. Other important declines are those recorded by France (-18 points), Ireland (-14) and
Greece (-12). As a result of these changes, not only is there a sorpasso in 2021, as Italy is now
4th in European presence, replacing the position held by Spain one year ago, but also, Belgium
is now 5th in European presence, recording a projection in the European space 20 points higher
than that of Spain, which is now 6th in this ranking (Table 3.1).

Global Europe? 25
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

TABLE 3.1
Elcano European Presence Index
(in index value)

2020 2021 2020-21 variation

1 Germany 676 672 -4,0
2 Netherlands 515 453 -62,1
3 France 399 381 -18,5
4 Italy 258 270 12,1
5 Belgium 240 239 -0,9
6 Spain 263 219 -44,9
7 Austria 133 131 -2,6
8 Poland 136 127 -9,2
9 Sweden 121 115 -5,6
10 Ireland 117 103 -14,1
11 Denmark 86 87 0,9
12 Czech Republic 85 84 -1,8
13 Hungary 65 64 -1,3
14 Portugal 57 51 -5,8
15 Finland 47 46 -1,4
16 Greece 57 45 -11,7
17 Romania 41 42 1,1
18 Slovakia 37 41 4,4
19 Bulgaria 24 26 2,5
20 Luxembourg 26 25 -1,0
21 Slovenia 24 24 0,1
22 Lithuania 20 23 2,8
23 Croatia 26 19 -6,7
24 Estonia 13 13 -0,3
25 Cyprus 13 12 -0,4
26 Latvia 11 10 -0,4
27 Malta 8 7 -1,3
28 UK 500 0

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

26
Methodological annex
Brief history of the project
The 2010 version of the Index, its first edition, published in 2011, ranks 54 countries according
to their 2010 global presence.4 That edition and, therefore, the design of the Index itself, was
coordinated by Ignacio Molina and Iliana Olivié –both senior analysts at the Elcano Royal
Institute– and was the result of nearly three years of methodological discussions. These
discussions were conducted in the framework of a working group composed by the above-
mentioned coordinators of the Index, Narciso Michavila and Antonio Vargas (from GAD3),
Émêrson Correa (Olympus Consulting), several Elcano senior analysts and other staff
members (Félix Arteaga, Carola García-Calvo, Carmen González, Jaime Otero, Juan Antonio
Sánchez, and Federico Steinberg), and external experts (Alfredo Arahuetes –Pontificia
University of Comillas–, Ángel Badillo –University of Salamanca, currently also senior analyst
at the Elcano Royal Institute–, José Fernández Albertos –Spanish National Research Council,
CSIC– and José Ignacio Torreblanca –ECFR Madrid–). We also received methodological
suggestions from Philip Purnell (Thomson Reuters), Santiago de Mora-Figueroa, Marqués de
Tamarón (Ambassador of Spain), Teresa G. del Valle Irala (University of the Basque Country),
Ángel Vilariño (Complutense University of Madrid), Cristina Ortega, Cintia Castellano and
Amaia Bernara (from the FECYT of the Ministry of Science and Innovation).
The 2011 edition of the Index included a re-designing of the military equipment variable. This
change, led by Félix Arteaga, was based on previous methodological discussions with several
experts on that field: Francisco Asensi (Ministry of Defence), Alberto de Blas (Ministry of
Defence), Amador Enseñat (Ministry of Defence), Dagmar de Mora-Figueroa (NATO), Pablo
Murga (Ministry of Defence), Diego Ruiz Palmer (NATO), Andrés Sanz (Ministry of Defence),
Steven R. Sturn (NATO) and Federico Yaniz (Ministry of Defence).
The 2015 edition of the Index updated the weights of variables and dimensions by means of
a new survey to experts in international relations (representing think tanks in all continents)
conducted in mid-2015. This survey was repeated later in 2018 and 2021, and all the results
were added to previous responses obtained in 2012. These combined results aimed at filling
off particular time and geographical biases.
The 2018 edition also incorporated the conclusions of the statistical audit conducted by the
Competence Centre on Composite Indicators and Scoreboards (COIN) of the Joint Research
Centre of the European Commission. Individual indicators are now denominated first by
countries’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or population and later re-scaled by a scaling factor
that takes into consideration the relative share of a country in global GDP or population.
Methodological reviews of the indicators are carried out periodically. In the 2015 edition, the
information indicator was made more sophisticated by including, in addition to the Internet

4
Iliana Olivié & Ignacio Molina (2011), ‘Elcano Global Presence Index¡, Estudios Elcano 2, Elcano Royal Institute.

27
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

band-width, explicit references to countries and their citizens in news of global news
agencies (AP, AFP, Reuters, Xinhua, ITAR-TASS, EFE, ANSA and DPA). In the 2019 edition
we widened the variables included in the sports indicator, incorporating the women’s FIFA
and football-club points to the men's FIFA and the Olympic medal table. In the 2020 edition
we added trade in cultural goods to the culture indicator and intellectual property-royalties
income to the technology indicator.

Graph A.1. Structure of Elcano Global Presence Index

For the design of both the Elcano European Presence Index, an initiative led by Manuel Gracia,
and the calculation of the EU’s global presence, several external experts were consulted anew:

28
Alfredo Arahuetes, Marisa Figueroa (ECFR Madrid), Narciso Michavila and José Molero
(Complutense University of Madrid).
Moreover, the project and its methodology have been presented to and discussed with the
Institute’s Board of Trustees, the Executive Committee, the Media Committee, the
Management Committee and, on several occasions, the Institute’s Scientific Council (including
its 2015 meeting and the 2015, 2018 and 2021 experts’ survey). We have also received useful
comments and suggestions over the years as a result of numerous meetings to present and
discuss progress on the Index. At the national level, these discussions have taken place with
members of the Spanish Parliament (2011), officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Cooperation (2011) and of Economy (2011), analysts and officials from the Presidency of the
Government (2011), experts from Accenture Spain (2013), members of the Central Bank of
Spain (2014) and both professors and students at different universities (Saint-Louis University
of Madrid in 2015, Rey Juan Carlos University in 2014 and 2015, Deusto University in 2016
and 2018, Salamanca University in 2015 and 2017, International University of Andalucía in
2017, and Coruña University in 2017). The Index has also been presented to the general public
(once a year) and to foreign diplomats based in Madrid (twice in 2014) and discussed at the
Matías Romero Institute in Mexico (2011), at the GIGA Institute in Hamburg (2011), at the
Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (2018), at the
Joint Research Centre in Ispra (2017 and 2018), at the South African Institute of International
Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg (2018) and at the Elcano Royal Institute’s Brussels office (2016
and 2018).
Throughout the life of the project, the final calculation of the Index has been made possible
thanks to the generous aid provided in data-gathering by several people and institutions, as
well as to those who have participated in the weighting survey, in the methodological support
and in the statistical audit: Shaheen Afroze (BIIS, Bangladesh), Ángel Aguado (EFE, Spain),
Hayden Allen (Accord, South Africa), Deniz Altayli (PASSIA, Palestina), Liliana Alvarado (Ethos,
México), Marcos Álvarez Díaz (Joint Research Centre), Isabel Álvarez (ICEI-UCM, Spain),
Alejandro Anaya (Center for Research and Teaching in Economics, Mexico), Barbara d’Ándrea
(World Trade Organisation), Nisha Arunatilake (Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka), Raul
Asensio (IEP, Perú), Bruno Ayllón (Complutense University of Madrid, Spain), D. Shyam Babu
(Centre for Policy Research, India), Yaroslava Babych (ISET, Gerogia), Juan Battaleme (CARI,
Argentina), Saradindu Bhaduri (CSSP, India), John Blaxland (ANU Strategic & Defence Studies
Centre, Australia), Małgorzata Bonikowska (Center fo International Relations, Poland), Gordan
Bosanac (Centar za mirovne studije, Croatia), Amelia Branczik (Crisis Group, Belgium),
Eamonn Butler (Adam Smith Institute, UK), Carlos Augusto Chacón (ICP, Colombia), Chiao-
Ling Chien (UNESCO), Alba Çela (Albanian Institute for International Studies), Alistair D.B. Cook
(Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore), Juan Pablo Corlazzoli (CLAEH,
Uruguay), José Miguel Cortés (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Marie Cross (Institute of
International and European Affairs, Ireland), Helga Cuéllar Marchelli (Fusades, El Salvador),
Jean-François Daguzan (Foundation for Strategic Research, France), Neelam Deo (Gateway
House, India), Gonzalo Diéguez (CIPPEC, Argentina), Allan Gyngell (AIIA, Australia), Rafael
Domínguez (University of Cantabria, Spain), Marcos Domínguez-Torreiro (Joint Research
Centre), Stephanie Fenkart (IIP, Austria), Cinthya Fernández (Flacso, Costa Rica), Andreas
Freytag (ECIPE, Belgium), Adam Frost (CGAI, Canada), Jorge Gómez Arismendi (Fundación
para el Progreso, Chile), Christine Ma. Grace R. Salinas (Philippine Institute for Development

Methodological annex 29
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

Studies), Alan Hao Yang (IIR, Taiwan), Jordan Harris (Pegasus Institute, USA), Indira Hirway
(CFDA, India), Graham Hopwood (Institute for Public Policy Research, Namibia), Sunjoy Joshi
(ORF, India), Charles Jebuni (Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana), Katie Jost (GAD), Gape
Kaboyakgosi (Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis), Cristóbal Kay (ISS, the
Netherlands), Guillermo Kessler (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Munir Khasru (IPAG,
Bangladesh), Changsu Kim (Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Republic of Korea), Anna
Koós (Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, Hungary), Andrey Kortunov (Russian
International Affairs Council, Russian Federation), Jan Kovar (Institute of International Relations,
Czech Republic) Carlos Latorre (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation),
Tony Lawrence (ICDS, Estonia), Adam Lupel (IPI, USA), José María Lladós (Argentine Council
for International Relations), Akaash Maharaj (Mosaic Institute, Canada), Sébastien Maillard
(Jacques Delors Institute, France), Meruert Makhmutova (PPRC, Kazakhstan), Patrick Malope
(BIDPA, Botswana), Raquel Marín (ICEI-UCM, Spain), Ognjen Markovic (CEDEM, Montenegro),
Luis Martí (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Fernando Masi (CADEP, Paraguay), Pauline Massart
(Security & Global Europe, Belgium), Salvador Maspoch (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Cooperation), Fernando Mier (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Ramón Molina (Spanish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Roman Mogilevskii (IPPA, University of Central
Asia), Lumkile Mondi (Wits, South Africa), Manuel Moreno (Spanish delegation to the United
Nations and other international organisations based in Geneva), Camino Mortera (Centre for
European Reform, Belgium), Said Moufti (Royal Institute for Strategic Studies, Morocco), Dawn
Nakagawa (Berggruen Institute, US), Moisés Naim (CEIP, US), José Miguel Nátera (CANACYT,
Mexico), Franklin Oduro (Ghana Centre for Democratic Development), Anna Orlonek
(demosEUROPA, Poland), Kwame Owino (IEA, Kenya), Eleni Panagiotarea (Hellenic
Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, Greece), Plamen Pantev (Institute for Security and
International Studies, Bulgaria), Roderick Parkes (Swedish Institute of International Affairs,
Sweden), Raynier Pellón Azopardo (CIPI, Cuba), Rodrigo Perera (Borde Político, Mexico),
Moisés Pérez (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Juan Pita (Spanish Agency for International
Development Cooperation), Henry Plater-Zyberk (Prague Security Studies Institute, Czech
Republic), Anton du Plessis (Institute for Security Studies, South Africa), Rosario Pons (EFE),
Arantxa Prieto (World Trade Organisation), Philip Purnell (Thomson Reuters), Martin Rapetti
(CIPPEC, Argentina), Charles P. Ries (Rand, US), Martín Rivero (SEGIB), Robert Robinson
(Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, Spain), Lorena Ruano (CIDE, Mexico), Antonio Ruiz Michel
(CPTS, Bolivia), Ventura Rodríguez (Spanish Agency for International Development
Cooperation), Diego Rojas Toro (CEIUC, Chile), Eulalia Rubio (Jacques Delors Institute,
France), Pep Ruiz (BBVA Research, Spain), Michaela Saisana (Joint Research Centre),
Verónica Samper (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Manuel Sánchez (Spanish Ministry of
Economy), Patrick Sandoval (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Paul
Saunders (Center For the National Interest, US), Olufemi Muibi Saibu (INCDS-UNILAG,
Nigeria), Gabriele Schwarz (Spanish Ministry of Economy), James Sherr (International Centre
for Defence and Security, Estonia), Andrés Serbin (CRIES, Argentina), Katarzyna Sidlo (Center
for Social and Economic Research, Poland), Pedro Sosa (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Cooperation), Moussa Soumahoro (IPSS, Ethiopia), Spanish Foundation for Science and
Technology (FECYT), David J. Theroux, (The Independent Institute, US), José Tregón (Spanish
Ministry of Economy), Márton Ugrósdy (IFAT, Hungary), Yan Vaslavsky (MGIMO-Moscow State
Institute of International Relations, Russia), Sébastien Velley (Thomson Reuters), Antonio
Villafranca (Italian Institute for International Political Studies), Marija Vuksanovic (Centre for

30
Democracy and Human Rights, Montenegro), Bibian Zamora (Spanish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation), María Pilar Zaragüeta (EFE, Spain), Mario Abou Zeid (Carnegie
Institute, Lebanon) and Ann Zimmerman (OECD).
Lastly, several collaborators and intern students have contributed both to data leverage and
to analyses of the results of the Index (Datamérica Global, tweets, blogposts, or ARIs): Sergio
Juan Alburquerque, Nacho Álvarez, Jorge Arias, Pablo Balsinde, José Ignacio Díaz, Mariola
Gomariz, David Hernández, Lucía Mantecón, Ginés Martínez, Juliana Andrea Pizón, Marcos
Ochoa, Carlos Raya, Davide Rognini, Celia Ruiz, Manuel Sainz, Néstor Santana and Karla
Sulca.

Main elements of the Elcano Global Presence Index

This year’s edition covers the global presence of a selection of 150 countries. The selection is
done according to GDP and population World Bank data (table A.1). For this 2020 edition, 10
new countries have been added to the selection: Burundi, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Rwanda,
Somalia, South Sudan, Tajikistan and Togo.
Finally, in terms of country selection, bear in mind that by making calculations at time intervals
that go back to 1990, the intention of the project is to show the two-bloc world, even if in
decline. Thus, Russia’s 1990 values refer to those of the Soviet Union, those of Germany to
the German Federal Republic, those of the Czech Republic to Czechoslovakia, those of Serbia
to Yugoslavia. Moreover, Eastern European countries that became independent after 1990
have no value assigned in that year. This is the case for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia,
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine and Uzbekistan as part of the Soviet Union, Slovakia as part of Czechoslovakia, and
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, North Macedonia and Slovenia as part of Yugoslavia.
Likewise, South Sudan since 2012, after its independence.

Methodological annex 31
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

Table A.1. Countries listed in the Elcano Global Presence Index

Afghanistan Denmark Libya Saudi Arabia

Albania Dominican Republic Lithuania Senegal
Algeria Ecuador Luxembourg Serbia
Angola Egypt Madagascar Singapore
Argentina El Salvador Malawi Slovakia
Armenia Equatorial Guinea Malaysia Slovenia
Australia Estonia Mali Somalia
Austria Ethiopia Malta South Africa
Azerbaijan Finland Mauritania South Korea
Bahamas France Mauritius South Sudan
Bahrain Gabon Mexico Spain
Bangladesh Georgia Moldova Sri Lanka
Belarus Germany Mongolia Sudan
Belgium Ghana Morocco Sweden
Benin Greece Mozambique Switzerland
Bolivia Guatemala Myanmar Syria
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guinea Namibia Tanzania
Botswana Haiti Nepal Thailand
Brazil Honduras Netherlands Tajikistan
Brunei Hungary New Zealand Togo
Bulgaria Iceland Nicaragua Trinidad and Tobago
Burkina Faso India Niger Tunisia
Burundi Indonesia Nigeria Turkey
Cameroon Iran North Macedonia Turkmenistan
Cambodia Iraq Norway Uganda
Canada Ireland Oman Ukraine
Chad Israel Pakistan United Arab Emirates
Chile Italy Panama United Kingdom
China Jamaica Papua New Guinea United States of America
Colombia Japan Paraguay Uruguay
Congo, Rep. Jordan Peru Uzbekistan
Congo DR Kazakhstan Philippines Venezuela
Costa Rica Kenya Poland Vietnam
Côte d’Ivoire Kuwait Portugal Yemen
Croatia Kyrgyzstan Qatar Zambia
Cuba Laos Romania Zimbabwe
Cyprus Latvia Russia
Czech Republic Lebanon Rwanda

32
Table A.2. Variables, indicators, and sources of the Elcano Global Presence Index
Variable Indicator Source

Economic presence
Flow of exports of energy products (oil, refined products and gas)
Energy
(SITC 3)
Flow of exports of primary goods (food, beverages, tobacco,
agricultural commodities, non-ferrous metals, pearls, precious stones,
Primary goods
and non-monetary gold), excluding oil (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 68 +
667+ 971)
Flow of exports of manufactured goods (chemical products, UNCTAD
Manufactures machinery, transport equipment, other manufactured products) (SITC
5 to 8 minus 667 and 68)
Flow of exports of services in transport, construction, insurance,
Services financial services, IT, the media, intellectual property, other business
services, personal, cultural and leisure services, and public services
Investments Stock of foreign direct investment abroad

Military presence
Number of military personnel deployed in international missions and
Troops
bases overseas
Weighted sum of aircraft carriers, big ships, destroyers, frigates, IISS
Military equipment nuclear-powered submarines, amphibious ships, medium and heavy
strategic aeroplanes, and air tankers
Soft presence
Estimated number of international immigrants in the country at mid- United Nations Population
Migration
year Division
United Nations World Tourism
Tourism Thousands of arrivals of non-resident tourists at borders Organisation (UNWTO) –
Statistics Database
Weighted sum of medals won at the summer Olympic Games, points
Sports FIFA IFFHS and IOC
in the FIFA world ranking and points of football clubs in the IFFHS
Exports of audiovisual services (cinematographic productions, radio
and television programmes, and musical recordings) and cultural
Culture WTO and UN-Comtrade
goods (antiques and works of art, books, jewellery, newspapers,
photography, etc)
Number of mentions in news of main international press agencies Factiva
Information (Associated Press, Reuters, AFP, DPA, ITARTASS, EFE, ANSA, International
Xinhua) and Internet bandwidth (Mbps) Telecommunication Union
External income for the use of intellectual property and number of
IMF and World Intellectual
Technology foreign-oriented patents (inter-related patent applications filed in one
Property Organisation (WIPO)
or more foreign countries to protect the same invention)
Number of articles, notes, and reviews published in the fields of the
Science Clarivate Analytics via FECYT
arts and humanities, social sciences, and sciences
Education Number of foreign students in tertiary education on national territory UNESCO and OECD
Development
Total gross flows of official development aid or comparable data OECD and SEGIB
cooperation
Scaling factors
Economy Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices in US$ World Bank

Population Number of inhabitants World Bank

The variables, indicators and sources for this 2022 Elcano Global Presence Index are the same
as for the previous edition. Several criteria guided the selection of the variables. First, presence

Methodological annex 33
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

is reflected in a single direction, or what could be deemed its unidirectionality. Secondly, the
results of presence are measured, and not the means or assets needed to achieve these
results. In addition, all the variables have an explicitly external component, in the sense that
they reflect cross-border presence. Presence is given in absolute and not relative terms; in
other words, the indicators are not proportional to the demographic or economic size of the
country. Likewise, as for any other index, the best explanatory capacity is sought with the
fewest number of variables or indicators possible. Finally, hard data on presence are taken,
and not data based on perceptions or opinions.5
In this 2022 edition, 5,205 cases have been estimated. Thus, the proportion of missing and
estimated cases accounts for only 6% of a database of 86,447 observations. Again,
estimations are based on experts’ knowledge. All results are available at our website
([Link]).
As for previous editions, the performance of the variables is assumed to be linear with the
exception of the sports variable. As regards normalisation, the ‘min-max’ approach is applied;
that is, global maximum and minimum values (across all countries and periods). It should be
noted that when adding data for a new edition, a review of figures corresponding to previous
years is also conducted, on the basis of data availability in each source. As a result, some
records for the past few years have changed, thus modifying the maximum value that is
referenced in the scaling. Moreover, the inclusion of new countries systematically affects the
Index values for the variables that are built on the existing spatial sample, which is the case for
sports and military equipment. Finally, it should be added that the pandemic has generated
anomalous data for 2021 that may have influenced the modification of the maximum and
minimum values. Therefore, new results may not match those of previous editions of the Index.

The inclusion of the EU in Elcano Global Presence Index

One of the features of 2012’s edition was the composite calculation for the 27 EU member
states. This was undertaken in order to try to quantify the global projection of the Union, as if
it were a political and economic union with its own identity.
The foreign presence of the EU is measured starting in 2005 and considering that the varying
composition of the Union should be reflected in the Index. Both the Union’s global presence
and the Union as the sphere of external projection calculated in the European Presence Index
do change with every new enlargement or retrenchment. As a consequence, the Union’s
presence corresponds to that of the 25 members in 2005, 27 members from 2010 to 2012,
28 members from 2013 to 2020, and again 27 members since 2021 after the UK’s exit.
To measure the EU’s presence in the world we stick to the components of the Elcano Global
Presence Index. For each of these components and for every member, the intra-European
and extra-European flows must be differentiated, since a mere totalling of their results would
be recording their projection in other member states (ie, consider the intra- and extra-European
trade in German goods). This distinction between flows has been made feasible by using
additional sources of data, especially Eurostat (Table A.4).

5
For more details on the debates and criteria that guided this selection, see Iliana Olivié & Ignacio Molina (2011), op. cit.

34
Since the 2012 edition we also calculate the presence of the individual member states within
the Union itself: the Elcano European Presence Index.6 To some extent, methodologically, this
indicator is the flip-side of the Global Presence Index for the EU. In a similar way to the latter,
it shows the cross-border presence of the member states, which in the case of the Elcano
European Presence Index is limited to the European (and not global) space. It facilitates a
comparative analysis of the current situation and recent evolution of the positioning of
European countries within the Union. It can also provide relevant information on the position
of the member states in the calculation of their European as well as their global presence.
The Elcano European Presence Index aims to be an Elcano Global Presence Index on a
European scale, so the structure and methodology of the latter has been respected as far as
possible, although some slight modifications have occasionally proved essential (Table A.4).
Thus, in general terms, the calculation of European presence modifies the calculation of global
presence by reducing the measures of presence on a global scale to the intra-European scale
(for example, intra-European migration flows, exports to the rest of the EU or European foreign
students). For that reason, three indicators compute a zero value, as they are not part of
European’s countries’ projection inside the EU: troops, military equipment and development
cooperation. Moreover, given the indivisibility of some variables, there was no possibility of
distinguishing the extra from the intra-European component, so we stick to the values of global
presence and re-scale them considering only the European countries. This is the case of
sports, science and information (in its Internet component).
It almost always does so by using Eurostat data, just as for the calculation of the global
presence of the EU. Obviously, the change in scale also reduces the scaling: the maximum
value assigned to an indicator in the Elcano Global Presence Index is given, in the case of
European presence, as the maximum value registered by a member state and for the intra-
European presence series. Finally, just as in the index for the EU, the reference area for which
European presence is measured is the Union as it has been composed in different moments
of time, variations being the result of the enlargement process.

6
Results of the Elcano European Presence Index are available at [Link].

Methodological annex 35
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

Table A.3. Variables, indicators, and sources of the Elcano Global Presence Index calculated
for the EU
Variable Indicator Source

Economic presence
Extra-EU flows of exports of energy products (oil, refined products, and gas)
Energy
(SITC 3)
Extra-EU flows of exports of primary goods (food, beverages, tobacco,
Primary goods agricultural commodities, non-ferrous metals, pearls, precious stones, and
non-monetary gold), excluding oil (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 68 + 667+ 971)
Extra-EU flows of exports of manufactured goods (chemical products,
Manufactures machinery, transport equipment, other manufactured products) (SITC 5 to 8 Eurostat
minus 667 and 68)
Extra-EU flows of exports of services in transport, construction, insurance,
Services financial services, IT, the media, intellectual property, other business
services, personal, cultural and leisure services, and public services
Investments Stock of foreign direct investment outside the EU

Military presence
Number of military personnel deployed in international missions and bases
Troops
outside the EU IISS
Weighted sum of aircraft carriers, big ships, destroyers, frigates, nuclear-
Military equipment powered submarines, amphibious ships, medium and heavy strategic
aeroplanes, and air tankers
Soft presence
Migration Estimated number of immigrants from outside the EU Eurostat

Tourism Thousands of arrivals of tourists from outside the EU Eurostat

Weighted sum of medals won at the summer Olympic Games, points of male
and female national teams in the FIFA world ranking and points of male FIFA, IFFHS, ICO
Sports
football clubs in the IFFHS. Corrective variable: European audience at the
World Cup Final and the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games Kantar Media and Nielsen
Extra-EU exports of audiovisual services (cinematographic productions,
radio and television programmes, and musical recordings) and cultural
Culture Eurostat
goods (antiques and works of art, books, jewellery, newspapers,
photography, etc)
Number of mentions in news of main international press agencies
Factiva and International
Information (Associated Press, Reuters, AFP, DPA, ITARTASS, EFE, ANSA, Xinhua)
Telecommunication Union
Internet bandwidth (Mbps)
External income for the use of intellectual property and number of foreign-
Eurostat and World
oriented patents (inter-related patent applications filed in one or more foreign
Technology Intellectual Property
countries to protect the same invention). Corrective variable: patents
Organisation (WIPO)
registered for each member state in other member States
Number of European articles, notes, and reviews published in the fields of Clarivate Analytics via
Science
the arts and humanities, social sciences, and sciences FECYT
Education Number of non-EU foreign students in tertiary education in the EU Eurostat
Development
Total gross flows of official development aid for all member States OECD
cooperation
Scaling factors
Economy Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices in US$ World Bank

Population Number of inhabitants World Bank

36
Table A.4. Variables, indicators, and sources of the Elcano European Presence Index
Variable Indicator Source

Economic presence
Intra-EU flows of exports of energy products (oil, refined products and gas)
Energy
(SITC 3)
Intra-EU flows of exports of primary goods (food, beverages, tobacco,
Primary goods agricultural commodities, non-ferrous metals, pearls, precious stones, and
non-monetary gold), excluding oil (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 68 + 667+ 971)
Intra-EU flows of manufactured goods (chemical products, machinery,
Manufactures transport equipment, other manufactured products) (SITC 5 to 8 minus 667 Eurostat
and 68)
Intra-EU flows of exports of services in transport, construction, insurance,
Services financial services, IT, the media, intellectual property, other business
services, personal, cultural and leisure services, and public services
Investments Stock of foreign direct investment in the EU

Military presence
Troops Value zero for all countries and years

Military equipment Value zero for all countries and years

Soft presence
Migration Estimated number of immigrants from within the EU Eurostat

Tourism Thousands of arrivals of tourists from within the EU Eurostat

Weighted sum of medals won at the summer Olympic Games, points of male
Sport and female national teams in the FIFA world ranking and points of male FIFA, IFFHS and IOC
football clubs in the IFFHS
Intra-EU exports of audiovisual and related services (cinematographic
productions, radio and television programmes, and musical recordings) and
Culture Eurostat
cultural goods (antiques and works of art, books, jewellery, newspapers,
photography, etc)
Number of mentions in news of main European press agencies (Associated
Factiva and International
Information Press, Reuters, AFP, DPA, and EFE)
Telecommunication Union
Internet bandwidth (Mbps)
Technology Number of patents registered at the European Patent Office (EPO) Eurostat
Number of articles published in the fields of the arts and humanities, social Clarivate Analytics via
Science
sciences and sciences FECYT
Education Number of EU foreign students in tertiary education Eurostat
Development
Value 0 for all countries and years
cooperation
Scaling factors
Economy Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices in US dollars Eurostat

Population Number of inhabitants Eurostat

Methodological annex 37
Statistical annex
TABLE B
Elcano Global Presence Index (index value)

Position Country 2010 2015 2020 2021 Var 2020-21

1 United States 2,844.59 3,273.48 3,247.79 3,241.49 -6.30
2 China 678.40 1,019.19 1,302.99 1,364.95 61.96
3 Germany 890.74 857.33 863.56 860.24 -3.32
4 Japan 618.47 712.80 830.83 853.48 22.66
5 UK 893.52 886.26 850.11 835.28 -14.84
6 France 761.47 746.39 726.67 703.67 -23.00
7 Russia 474.90 664.12 581.40 562.08 -19.32
8 Canada 401.39 407.02 462.51 484.48 21.97
9 Netherlands 423.51 415.76 429.16 420.68 -8.47
10 Italy 437.46 398.54 388.23 365.34 -22.88
11 India 271.23 326.07 340.22 318.97 -21.26
12 South Korea 211.80 297.49 311.74 311.02 -0.72
13 Spain 363.49 296.24 306.95 272.27 -34.68
14 Switzerland 211.23 242.03 233.18 259.90 26.72
15 Australia 225.78 242.51 248.69 248.04 -0.65
16 Belgium 252.61 225.28 208.80 219.26 10.46
17 Singapore 147.10 208.01 213.00 206.88 -6.12
18 Ireland 127.52 124.91 174.74 202.18 27.44
19 Turkey 113.59 141.73 185.70 172.35 -13.35
20 Sweden 161.00 153.30 143.41 149.48 6.07
21 UAE 81.09 131.25 162.43 140.86 -21.57
22 Saudi Arabia 120.86 176.76 164.67 137.65 -27.01
23 Brazil 137.45 156.28 130.43 130.65 0.23
24 Indonesia 80.10 109.75 135.93 123.98 -11.94
25 Thailand 100.22 123.62 141.93 120.84 -21.09
26 Mexico 116.00 127.58 130.75 113.91 -16.85
27 Austria 122.23 123.75 119.19 112.05 -7.14
28 Denmark 104.96 107.04 107.49 110.00 2.51
29 Poland 84.65 87.16 101.40 102.93 1.53

39
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

TABLE B
Elcano Global Presence Index (index value)

Position Country 2010 2015 2020 2021 Var 2020-21

30 Malaysia 99.45 126.21 115.58 97.77 -17.81
31 South Africa 60.87 75.04 74.87 74.66 -0.20
32 Norway 101.97 89.91 82.41 73.53 -8.89
33 Israel 55.10 65.72 71.63 71.36 -0.26
34 Czechia 53.71 57.72 66.66 63.84 -2.82
35 Viet Nam 22.07 38.50 73.28 61.33 -11.95
36 Finland 66.20 57.74 59.57 60.06 0.49
37 Chile 41.54 57.30 51.52 57.26 5.74
38 Egypt 60.16 46.25 63.58 56.80 -6.78
39 Greece 73.86 66.32 63.82 51.74 -12.08
40 Hungary 47.42 54.06 55.36 49.36 -6.00
41 Philippines 24.18 33.37 52.06 48.47 -3.59
42 Pakistan 73.10 65.28 51.62 48.15 -3.47
43 Portugal 55.97 51.94 54.83 47.61 -7.22
44 Bangladesh 48.40 49.97 43.03 45.39 2.37
45 Iran 45.02 44.62 55.51 43.89 -11.62
46 Argentina 62.23 59.48 52.07 40.75 -11.32
47 Romania 33.57 39.18 43.16 39.88 -3.28
48 Ethiopia 19.17 62.36 56.95 36.77 -20.18
49 Ukraine 46.19 44.82 35.70 34.27 -1.43
50 Kuwait 36.58 46.15 36.05 33.11 -2.94
51 Qatar 19.51 43.95 35.08 32.21 -2.87
52 Colombia 22.74 36.95 38.87 31.65 -7.22
53 New Zealand 29.65 53.73 33.42 31.61 -1.81
54 Kenya 11.29 28.75 32.74 31.52 -1.22
55 Uganda 15.50 33.19 35.21 31.40 -3.82
56 Luxembourg 26.45 27.72 27.69 31.23 3.53
57 Morocco 29.10 38.43 40.43 29.57 -10.86
58 Algeria 30.58 31.02 34.81 28.64 -6.18
59 Slovakia 24.07 26.02 27.19 26.69 -0.49
60 Peru 33.97 34.25 28.75 25.97 -2.77
61 Nepal 18.33 22.45 24.35 23.98 -0.37
62 Kazakhstan 23.77 31.30 28.29 23.71 -4.58
63 Bulgaria 17.72 19.88 22.28 19.73 -2.55

40
TABLE B
Elcano Global Presence Index (index value)

Position Country 2010 2015 2020 2021 Var 2020-21

64 Myanmar 2.86 8.66 18.31 17.72 -0.59
65 Ghana 17.75 18.25 19.30 17.06 -2.24
66 Nigeria 48.76 20.63 22.30 16.95 -5.35
67 Iraq 15.90 26.28 25.49 16.76 -8.73
68 Oman 10.81 20.52 18.83 16.44 -2.40
69 Slovenia 16.62 14.95 16.46 15.61 -0.85
70 Rwanda 15.37 13.78 15.39 15.34 -0.05
71 Lithuania 10.49 13.70 15.99 15.16 -0.83
72 Belarus 14.99 17.25 16.34 14.94 -1.40
73 Bahrain 8.81 13.62 15.45 14.56 -0.89
74 Serbia 8.72 11.07 14.52 13.99 -0.52
75 Venezuela 37.55 33.95 19.35 13.70 -5.66
76 Croatia 17.00 15.37 18.23 13.30 -4.93
77 Burundi 0.63 13.23 13.12 13.21 0.09
78 Cyprus 12.29 10.84 12.34 12.54 0.20
79 Jordan 22.68 21.34 14.29 11.95 -2.34
80 Tanzania 5.28 14.01 13.98 11.31 -2.67
81 Azerbaijan 11.66 13.57 14.16 10.84 -3.33
82 Estonia 9.10 9.65 10.14 9.83 -0.31
83 Tunisia 14.37 11.75 11.86 9.26 -2.60
84 Uruguay 6.99 13.55 10.72 9.18 -1.54
85 Lebanon 13.99 15.11 14.28 9.16 -5.12
86 Côte d'Ivoire 6.99 7.03 7.80 8.98 1.19
87 Georgia 3.30 9.09 10.70 8.80 -1.89
88 Ecuador 9.71 11.63 9.88 8.52 -1.35
89 Senegal 9.60 12.73 10.54 8.46 -2.08
90 Sri Lanka 8.26 11.22 8.71 8.18 -0.53
91 Cuba 13.09 11.71 8.35 8.06 -0.29
92 Cambodia 3.05 4.16 10.09 7.95 -2.14
93 Angola 13.51 17.56 10.75 7.54 -3.21
94 Costa Rica 5.82 7.09 8.34 7.22 -1.12
95 Sudan 5.01 4.20 8.65 7.19 -1.45
96 Malta 4.92 5.73 6.99 7.18 0.19
97 Cameroon 4.23 8.75 7.45 7.01 -0.43

Statistical annex 41
ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

TABLE B
Elcano Global Presence Index (index value)

Position Country 2010 2015 2020 2021 Var 2020-21

98 Latvia 6.92 7.55 7.29 6.99 -0.30
99 Uzbekistan 6.34 5.64 9.56 6.90 -2.66
100 Panama 7.66 9.52 9.09 6.83 -2.26
101 Zambia 4.05 3.09 7.03 6.72 -0.31
102 Guatemala 5.16 5.88 5.00 6.59 1.59
103 Dominican R. 8.10 8.35 9.56 6.35 -3.21
104 Mongolia 3.05 5.99 6.08 6.06 -0.02
105 Libya 20.57 11.20 9.79 6.02 -3.77
106 Togo 5.44 7.81 5.56 5.59 0.03
107 Burkina Faso 3.07 9.62 9.76 5.25 -4.51
108 Niger 3.08 10.03 7.03 5.20 -1.83
109 Guinea 1.10 2.07 4.89 5.06 0.17
110 Bolivia 6.34 6.52 5.88 5.03 -0.86
111 Malawi 1.65 4.98 4.76 4.60 -0.16
112 Armenia 3.46 3.78 5.60 4.58 -1.01
113 Kyrgyzstan 3.23 2.65 3.31 4.32 1.01
114 Bosnia Herz. 3.00 3.31 4.90 4.19 -0.71
115 Iceland 5.00 5.03 4.99 3.83 -1.15
116 Gabon 3.39 5.12 4.01 3.83 -0.18
117 El Salvador 2.62 3.22 4.44 3.71 -0.73
118 Honduras 3.47 3.75 3.99 3.61 -0.38
119 Albania 4.11 3.19 4.92 3.54 -1.39
120 Benin 7.55 7.23 3.76 3.52 -0.24
121 Jamaica 4.09 4.08 4.39 3.31 -1.08
122 Congo, DR 3.71 8.45 4.57 3.15 -1.42
123 Paraguay 2.77 3.97 2.96 3.02 0.06
124 Afghanistan 3.19 3.16 2.00 3.01 1.01
125 N. Macedonia 2.81 3.49 3.05 2.92 -0.13
126 Mauritius 2.31 2.55 3.63 2.76 -0.87
127 Yemen 5.16 6.95 2.61 2.70 0.09
128 Syria 7.26 4.50 2.73 2.70 -0.04
129 Moldova, Rep. 1.68 2.02 2.65 2.64 -0.02
130 Botswana 2.63 3.12 2.66 2.27 -0.39
131 Congo, Rep. 3.12 6.93 2.59 2.23 -0.36

42
TABLE B
Elcano Global Presence Index (index value)

Position Country 2010 2015 2020 2021 Var 2020-21

132 Trinidad Tob. 4.38 4.52 2.81 2.21 -0.60
133 Chad 2.62 7.02 8.46 2.18 -6.28
134 Bahamas 2.43 2.70 3.39 2.13 -1.26
135 Zimbabwe 2.99 2.81 2.57 2.08 -0.48
136 Equ. Guinea 2.64 3.29 1.48 2.07 0.59
137 Nicaragua 1.54 3.39 2.13 1.94 -0.19
138 Namibia 2.10 2.24 2.19 1.88 -0.31
139 Mali 1.86 1.83 1.89 1.85 -0.04
140 Mozambique 1.87 2.14 2.31 1.82 -0.49
141 Papua NG 1.31 1.84 2.22 1.77 -0.44
142 Turkmenistan 1.88 4.07 2.24 1.75 -0.49
143 Lao PDR 1.10 1.75 2.70 1.74 -0.96
144 Brunei 2.36 3.00 1.97 1.69 -0.28
145 South Sudan 0.34 2.14 1.61 1.40 -0.21
146 Madagascar 1.04 1.27 1.51 1.12 -0.40
147 Tajikistan 1.43 1.00 1.32 1.08 -0.24
148 Mauritania 0.54 0.77 0.78 0.84 0.05
149 Haiti 1.52 0.95 0.78 0.71 -0.07
150 Somalia 0.37 0.46 0.42 0.42 -0.01

Statistical annex 43
 Board of Trustees
MINISTERIO
GOBIERNO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES GOBIERNO MINISTERIO
DE ESPAÑA UNIÓN EUROPEA Y DE ESPAÑA DE DEFENSA
COOPERACIÓN

MINISTERIO
GOBIERNO DE ASUNTOS ECONÓMICOS GOBIERNO MINISTERIO
DE ESPAÑA Y TRANSFORMACIÓN DE ESPAÑA DE CULTURA Y DEPORTE
DIGITAL

Business Advisory Council

Collaborating Entities
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28006 Madrid (Spain)
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