EE 6307

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Advanced Power System Control

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Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Khulna University of Engineering & Technology
 Introduction
• System security involves practices designed to keep the system operating
when components fail.

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• For example, a generating unit may have to be taken offline because of
auxiliary equipment failure. By maintaining proper amounts of spinning

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reserve, the remaining units on the system can make up the deficit without
too low a frequency drop or need to shed any load.

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• Similarly, a transmission line may be damaged by a storm and taken out by
automatic relaying. If, in committing and dispatching generation, proper
regard for transmission flows is maintained, the remaining transmission
lines can take the increased loading and still remain within limit.
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Kinds of Outages
All equipment in a power system is designed such that it can be
disconnected from the network. The reasons for these disconnections
are generally divided into two categories: scheduled outages and

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forced outages.

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• Scheduled Outages
• Operators take component out for maintenance or repair

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• Forced Outages
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• Outage is not scheduled and not done by an operator
• Outage is due to random event such as weather, internal breakdown, etc.
• Both can cause trouble for a power system

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 System Blackout
• Because the specific times at which forced outages occur are unpredictable, the
system must be operated at all times in such a way that the system will not be
left in a dangerous condition should any credible outage event occur.

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• Since power system equipment is designed to be operated within certain limits,

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most pieces of equipment are protected by automatic devices that can cause
equipment to be switched out of the system if these limits are violated.

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• If a forced outage occurs on a system that leaves it operating with limits
violated on other components, the event may be followed by a series of further
actions that switch other equipment out of service. If this process of cascading
failures continues, the entire system or large parts of it may completely
collapse. This is usually referred to as a system blackout.
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 NERC (n-1) rule
No generation outage will result in so large a

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frequency drop that other generators will be • System with n
forced off line. components

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• n − 1 is its state with
one component out
No single transmission or generation outage

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will result in other components experiencing
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such a large flow or voltage change that new
limit violations occur.
NERC is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation that sets the reliability standards for all
electric systems.
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Three major security functions carried out in
an operation control center
1. System monitoring

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• Are there any components with parameters out of limit right now?

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2. Contingency analysis (WHAT IF? Analysis)

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• Are there any components with parameters that would be out of
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limit due to the outage of another component?

3. Security-constrained optimal power flow

• How do we correct for problems?
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Four operating objectives
•Normal state dispatch

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•Postcontingency

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•Secure dispatch

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•Secure postcontingency
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 The use of optimal power flow
Optimal dispatch: this is the state that the power system is in prior to any
contingency. It is optimal with respect to economic operation, but it may not be
secure.

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We assume that the system as shown above is in economic dispatch; that is, the
500 MW from unit 1 and the 700 MW from unit 2 are the optimum dispatch.
Further, we assert that each circuit of the double circuit line can carry a maximum
of 400 MW, so that there is no loading problem in the base-operating condition.
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Post Contingency
Post contingency: is the state of the power system after a
contingency has occurred. We shall assume here that this condition

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has a security violation (line or transformer beyond its flow limit, or
a bus voltage outside the limit).

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Secure Dispatch
Secure dispatch: is the state of the system with no
contingency outages, but with corrections to the operating

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parameters to account for security violations.

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Secure Post Dispatch
Secure post-contingency: is the state of the system when the
contingency is applied to the base-operating condition with

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corrections.

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Security-constrained optimal power flows
By adjusting the generation on unit 1 and unit 2, we have prevented the
postcontingency operating state from having an overload. This is the

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essence of what is called “security corrections.”

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Programs that can make control adjustments to the base or
precontingency operation to prevent violations in the postcontingency
conditions are called “security-constrained optimal power flows” or

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SCOPF.
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These programs can take account of many contingencies and calculate
adjustments to generator MW, generator voltages, transformer taps,
interchange, etc.

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Generation Outages
• Effect on other generators
• Power imbalance between load and generation

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• Drop in frequency
• If insufficient spinning reserve available other generators

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can go out due to drop in frequency

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• Changes in line flows as generation is shifted to other
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generators
• Lines can be overloaded or bus voltages drop due to flow
changes and loss of generator var support
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 Transmission outages
A line outage means flows shift to remaining lines

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• Remaining lines can overload

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• Reactive losses increase on the remaining
transmission lines

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• Bus voltages may drop below acceptable limits
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Reactive effects of a transmission loss

all lines
I 2x Reactive loss on the transmission system

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  2
(Vfrom B  V 2
to end Bcap )

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end cap
all lines of line of line

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Reactive power injected into the system from line charging capacitance

 
all buses i
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Vi 2 Bfixed cap
at bus i
Reactive injections from fixed capacitors

The reactive losses in the transmission system have a big effect on

the voltages at the buses.
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Summing the reactive loss terms

all lines
I 2x  
all lines
2
(Vfrom B
end cap
of line
 Vto end Bcap ) 
2

of line

all buses i
Vi 2 Bfixed cap
at bus i

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= reactive power losses

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When a line is lost the first term increases due to increased line current
flow, this may cause the remaining terms to drop as the bus voltages

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drop.
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Result: increased var losses and decreased var injections into the
system, this in turn will increase the var demand on generators, and if
they hit their var limits then the generator terminal voltages drop
making everything worse.
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 ET
Six Bus system
(see Appendix A

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Chapter 7)

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Gerald B. Sheblé, Power generation,
Operation, and Control, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Case 1 Base Case

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Voltages are all within their limits of 0.95–1.07 pu; the
reference bus is scheduled at 1.07 pu and is therefore
labeled at UL for upper limit.

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All reactive power limits are being met and all line flows are
within their MW limits.

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All loads are at the base-case value of 100 MW and 15

The real power losses are small and the reactive power
losses are negative (meaning more reactive power is coming
into the system from capacitive MVARs than is lost by the
transmission lines).
Note: UL = quantity at or above upper limit
LL = quantity at or below lower limit Dept. of EEE, KUET 18
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Case 2 Generator Outage
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The generator on bus 3 is lost with base-case
(Case 1) loads. The deficit in generation is made
up by an increase in the output of the reference
generator on bus 1.
Bus voltages on 4, 5, and 6 drop slightly and one
slight overload appears on line 1–4.
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 Base case

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Case 3 Line Outage Case
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Line outage on line 1–4, base-case conditions on load buses.
Voltage at load buses 4, 5, and 6 fall but not below low
limits.
Lines 1–2, 1–5, and 2–4 are now above their max MW limits.
Reactive losses reverse from −14 to +22 MVAR; real power
losses double reflecting increased line currents.

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 Case 4 Appendix A Chapter 7
Case 4 double load on bus 4

All lines and generators in.

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Reactive power losses go positive and large, bus voltages at bus 4,5,and 6 are low.

Total Pgen = 428.79 MW Total Qgen = 93.04 MVAR

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Total PLoad = 400.00 MW Total Qload = 60.00 MVAR
Total PLosses = 28.79 MW Total QLosses = 33.04 MVAR

Bus Pmin Pgen Pmax Qmin Qgen Qmax Pload Qload Vmin Vbus Vbus Vmax
MW MW MW MVAR MVAR MVAR MW MVAR pu pu kV pu
1 50.0 328.8 450.0 -100.0 -2.9 150.0 0.0 0.0 0.95 1.07 UL 246.1 1.07

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2 37.5 50.0 150.0 -100.0 72.3 150.0 0.0 0.0 0.95 1.05 241.5 1.07
3 45.0 50.0 180.0 -100.0 23.6 120.0 0.0 0.0 0.95 1.05 241.5 1.07
4 200.0 30.0 0.95 0.99 227.2 1.07

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5 100.0 15.0 0.95 1.02 233.5 1.07
6 100.0 15.0 0.95 1.02 235.4 1.07

Case 4 Double Load on Bus 4

All lines and generators in.
Bus 4 load goes to 200 MW and 30 MVAR.
Reactive power losses go positive and large, and bus voltages at bus 4, 5, and 6 are low.
Line flow overloads appear on lines 1–4 and 2–4.
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Case 4 Appendix A Chapter 7 cont’
Bus 4 load goes to 200 MW and 30 MVAR

Line flow overloads appear on lines 1-4 and 2-4.

Bus Vmag angle Pgen Qgen Pload Qload To Bus Pline Qline Max
kV deg MW MVAR MW MW MW MVAR Flow MW
1 246.1 0.00 328.79 -2.86 0.00 0.00

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2 99.40 -29.78 100
4 138.95 23.82 UL 100
5 90.44 3.09 100
2 241.5 -11.62 50.00 72.34 0.00 0.00

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1 -90.11 43.86 100
3 12.73 -5.66 60
4 68.54 31.29 UL 60
5 18.07 4.37 60
6 40.77 -1.52 60
3 241.5 -13.34 50.00 23.57 0.00 0.00
2 -12.66 -0.58 60

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5 10.39 6.62 60
6 52.27 17.52 60
4 227.2 -14.51 200.00 30.00

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1 -130.22 6.86 UL 100
2 -65.93 -28.15 UL 60
5 -3.85 -8.70 60
5 233.5 -14.18 100.00 15.00
1 -84.69 11.93 100
2 -17.74 -7.63 60
3 -10.17 -11.49 60
4 3.92 0.84 60
6 8.68 -8.64 60
6 235.4 -15.92 100.00 15.00
2 -39.71 -0.84 60
3 -51.71 -16.88 60
5 -8.58 2.72 60

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Operations needs to know which outages will cause
problems
Solution: Security Analysis
• Need to study “what if this component is lost” for each

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component in the power system

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• Run AC power flow for each line and transformer outage
• Simulate generator outage and governor response for all

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remaining generators and run AC power flow
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• Very large computational task (typically one of the largest
tasks performed in power system operations computer
systems)

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AC Power Flow
Contingency

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Analysis

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Strategies to make calculations faster
• Study the power system with approximate but very fast
algorithms.

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• Select only the important cases for detailed analysis.

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• Use a computer system made up of multiple processors
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or vector processors to gain speed.

• Use a combination of the above.

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Linear sensitivity analysis:
Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs)

f When you transfer power from bus i

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PTDFi , j , to bus j. How much of the transfer MW
P shows up on line

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Rapid contingency analysis

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See Appendix B for PTDF
derivation

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Using PTDF factors
The PTDF factor represents the sensitivity of the flow on line to a shift of power
from i to j. Suppose one wanted to study the outage of a large generating unit and
it was assumed that all the generation lost would be made up by the reference

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generation.
ˆf  f 0  PTDF
i ,ref , P

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f
PTDFi , j , 
P
for = 1...L

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where

fˆ = flow on line EE
after the generator on bus i fails

f 0 = flow before the failure

Note that in this case we substitute “ref” for “j” to indicate that
the shift is from bus i to the reference bus.

fˆ is tested against line limit Dept. of EEE, KUET 27

Linear sensitivity analysis:
Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs)
f
LODF ,k  0 When one line is lost, how much of

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fk its original flow ends up on another line

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where
LODF ,k = line outage distribution factor when monitoring line after an outage on
line k

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f = change in MW flow on line

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f k0 = original flow on line k before it was outaged (opened)
If one knows the power on line and line k, the flow on line with line k out can be
determined using "LODF" factors.

See Appendix B for LODF

derivation
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Using LODF factors
fˆ  f 0  LODF ,k f k0 f
LODF ,k  0
f 0 , f k0 preoutage flows on lines fk

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and k , respectively

fˆ

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= flow on line with line k out

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Run this for all line outages k and check all remaining lines

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Thank you

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