Introduction: Knowing the Unknown

Philosophical Perspectives on Ignorance

Selene Arfini and Lorenzo Magnani

Ignorance is a spooky word in philosophy. At first, it appears vague, almost too

broad. On second thought, it suggests more concrete and familiar notions, such as
false belief (Hogrefe et al., 1986), error (Woods, 2013), absence of knowledge (Le
Morvan, 2010), lack of true beliefs (Peels, 2011), doubt (Shepherd et al., 2007), and
misinformation (Bessi et al., 2014). The list might go on for quite some time, since,
notwithstanding its spookiness, ignorance is a concept that is acquiring a growing
importance in the philosophical literature (Sullivan and Tuana, 2007; Peels, 2017;
Arfini, 2019). Indeed, recently some authors have tried to come up with a specific
description for it,1 or to list a well defined taxonomy of its instantiations,2 but, so
far, no concluding verdict has been reached. Indeed, for now ignorance remains an
umbrella term, which refers to different kinds of cognitive and epistemological phe-
nomena. Given its comprehensive nature, ignorance still represents a rich concept
in philosophy, logic and cognitive science, which gives reason to pursue a deeper
and more focused analysis of it.
Hence, this collective volume aims at approaching a more centered discussion on
limits, potentialities, and unexpected qualities of the notion of ignorance. The con-
tributions to this collection show very well how the study of ignorance can animate
the debate on a broad spectrum of issues in philosophy, epistemology, cognitive sci-
ence, and logic. In particular, we have considered three general areas of research:

Selene Arfini
Department of Humanities - Philosophy Section and Computational Philosophy Laboratory, Uni-
versity of Pavia, Pavia, Italy, e-mail: [email protected]
Lorenzo Magnani
Department of Humanities - Philosophy Section and Computational Philosophy Laboratory, Uni-
versity of Pavia, Pavia, Italy, e-mail: [email protected]
1 The most relevant debate on the definition of ignorance has been provided by Peels (2010); Le
Morvan (2010); Peels (2011); Le Morvan (2011).
2 To mention some of the most significant taxonomies for ignorance, cf. (Smithson, 1988; Tuana,

2006; Haas and Vogt, 2015).

1
2 Selene Arfini and Lorenzo Magnani

logic and philosophy of science; cognitive science and the philosophical investiga-
tions of cognition; social and pragmatical issues in epistemology.
In this socio-cultural moment, in which scientific results are sometimes politi-
cally and socially contested, and critical reasoning is rarely considered an urgent
priority of standard educational plans, we believe that philosophy of science, epis-
temology, cognitive science, and logic could play a fundamental role in the de-
velopment of a theoretically productive and pragmatically useful investigation of
ignorance. By acknowledging this potential role of philosophy, this volume also
aims at cross-examining theoretical and pragmatic perspectives on the analysis of
ignorance, and at making it possible to redefine the concept in new cognitive, epis-
temological, and socio-psychological terms.
In the following sections, we give a brief description of the goals and theoretical
arguments of every contribution that models and enriches this collection.

Ignorance in Logic, Philosophy of Science and Technology

As Firestein (2012) contended, ignorance takes many forms in the scientific progress
and the development of scientific practice. Hence, it is only reasonable that both
philosophy of science and logic should aim at understanding its shapes and how it
can be approached, analyzed, and represented.
For this reason, we have first of all collected articles that help provide logi-
cal and accurate formalizations for particular descriptions of ignorance. Fano and
Graziani’s paper focuses on the invisible nature of ignorance (the subject’s unknown
unknowns), by adopting and logically approaching the concept of disbelief or, as
they call it, of radical ignorance. Carrara, Chiffi, De Florio and Pietarinen embrace
the pragmatic logic of assertions to establish a connection between ignorance and
informal decidability, also showing how to formulate some pragmatic versions of
second-order ignorance. What is more, Kubyshkina and Petrolo offer a formal set-
ting to represent the notion of factive ignorance after an in-depth analysis of the
debate between the New View and the Standard View on ignorance. The debate
around the Standard View and the New View on ignorance is an ongoing feud in
analytical epistemology. The Standard View on Ignorance usually refers to the defi-
nition of ignorance as absence or lack of knowledge, while the New View describes
ignorance as the absence or the lack of true beliefs (so deeming cases of not justified
beliefs in true statements as not belonging to the ignorance category.) 3 The Standard
View of ignorance is discussed also by Kyle: he argues that it should be modified
since, according to this View, knowledge does not entail truth. Thus, he discusses a
version of the Standard View with a truth requirement, but maintains that the best
argument for the original Standard View fails to support also this modified view.
It is from the perspective of the philosophy of science that Ordaz approaches
the theme. She analyzes how inconsistencies emerge and how various forms of ig-

3 To read a detailed review of the debate cf. (Le Morvan and Peels, 2016).
Introduction: Knowing the Unknown 3

norance are often tolerated in the scientific framework and indeed affect scientists’
work and research. An original turn has also been taken by Magnani, who consid-
ers, in his theory of eco-cognitive computationalism, the notion of ignorant entities,
which are tools or instruments devoid of cognitive capacities that can become bear-
ers of information, knowledge, and computation, since the birth of both Turing’s
(Universal) Logical Computing Machines and the (Universal) Practical Computing
Machines.

Ignorance and Cognition: Belief System Analysis, Ecological

Reasoning, and Forms of Collective Ignorance

Being ignorant of something affects the subject’s beliefs, intentions, and cognitive
activities as much as his/her knowledge: hence, we collected articles that indicate
the necessity of an analysis of ignorance in a rich cognitive perspective, which poses
theoretical and pragmatic challenges to the philosophical reflection.
To acknowledge the cognitive value of the term, some authors propose a redefini-
tion of some specific instantiations of ignorance. For example, Dellantonio and Pas-
tore examine cases of factual ignorance, in particular misconceptions, which allow
them to consider the substantial effect that ignorance has on one’s system of beliefs
and the potential significant effort that has to be exerted to recalibrate it. Bortolotti
and Sullivan-Bissett analyze, instead, the phenomenon of choice-blindness – a case
in which the agent gives reasons for making the choice B after making the choice A
– discussing whether it can be rightfully defined as a case of self-ignorance or not.
Then, also ignorance in a more distributed perspective is considered. Ranalli and
van Woudenberg, indeed, adopt the notion of collective ignorance to discuss how,
no matter our efforts, we have epistemic limitations that derive from our particular
informational insensitivity: in few words, even when we are capable of picking up
information, there is information that we do not pick up, sometimes we lack the
capacity to pick up any information whatsoever, and we do not know whether the
faculties and cognitive abilities we are endowed with process all the information
that they pick up. Another article, written by Ervas, instead focuses on ignorance
considered as the ground for metaphorical reasoning, given the fact that metaphors
allow us to understand an unknown conceptual domain in terms of another known
conceptual domain. Finally a cognitive logico-cognitive perspective is adopted by
Woods, who distinguishes four grades of ignorance based on the types of epistemic
involvement that humans exploit in their cognitive economy. From this point of view,
ignorance is a conceptual parasite of knowledge, but it also becomes intelligible and
comprehensible as such.
Another approach that brought various authors together focuses on the relevance
of ignorance in the eco-cognitive environment of the agent. Mays argues that igno-
rance is a compensatory epistemic adaptation of complex rhetoric systems: in other
words, it is a way of dealing with information that runs counter to one’s beliefs,
which could be productive as far as it produces new knowledge, and which works to
4 Selene Arfini and Lorenzo Magnani

make rhetoric systems more resistant to potential destabilization. Werner sets forth
the interesting notion of cognitive confinement in cognitive niches, which is a con-
tingent, yet relatively stable, state of being structurally or systematically unable to
gain information from an environment, determined by patterns of interaction be-
tween the subject and the world. Focusing on how, instead, ignorance can spread in
cognitive niches, Arfini writes about how ignorance can be analyzed as extended,
distributed, and situated in the cognitive environments of the agent (in particular as
misinformation, cognitive bubbles, and taboos).

Social and Pragmatical Issues in the Epistemology of Ignorance

The third area of research, dedicated to the social and pragmatical epistemology of
ignorance, is the most varied in terms of contributions. Indeed, at the core of this
collection is the assumption that a philosophical analysis of ignorance can provide
hints and suggestions to its spotting, addressing, and confrontation outside of the
academic environment. Indeed, we received various kinds of articles with this core
assumption.
Williams offers an examination of cases of rational motivated ignorance – in
brief, when the costs of acquiring knowledge outweigh the benefits of possessing it
– and he drew on evidence from the social sciences to argue that this phenomenon
plays an important role in one of the most socially harmful forms of ignorance today:
voters’ ignorance of societal risks. On a similar note, Parviainen and Lahikainen
present a paper motivated by the need to respond to the spread of influential mis-
information and manufactured ignorance, discussing the conditions required for ex-
pert testimony to evolve to a reconceptualisation of negative capability as a new
form of epistemic humility. Also Tommasi, Petricca, Cozzolino, and Casadio exam-
ine a near problem: they investigate the relationships between scientific ignorance
and several individual attitudes, personality traits and cultural behaviors. Their study
illustrates that people which show specific personality traits have higher positive at-
titude and interest toward science, while other traits are more related to superstitious
beliefs.
Relating instead to issues pertaining to the philosophy of law, Ciuni and Tuzet
discuss the notion of inevitable ignorance that the Italian Constitutional Court has
introduced in justifying restriction of the legal maxim Ignorantia legis non excusat.
In particular, they offer an epistemic analysis of the notion that is based both on
the legal-theoretical framework defined by the justification of the restriction of the
maxim, and on a discussion of some paradigmatic Italian cases where the standard
of excusability involving inevitable ignorance is applied. Räikkä put forward a dis-
cussion around ignorance in the framework of distributive justice, where he argues
that a precondition of the applicability of the presumption of equality is ignorance,
but not ignorance in the sense of not having a proper justification. Zubčić offers
an analysis of the concept of ignorance in Hayekian philosophy and pointed out its
Introduction: Knowing the Unknown 5

central role in institutional epistemology, arguing that individuals involved in the

search for knowledge are constitutionally ignorant and guided by norms.
Finally, we also received a contribution that pertains to philosophy of education:
Peels and Pritchard argue that, surprisingly, a broadly conceived education should
not only aim at positive epistemic standings, like knowledge, insight, and under-
standing, but should also aim at cultivating ignorance, in terms that, for example,
educators should present students with defeaters for their knowledge, so that they
come to lack knowledge, at least temporarily.

Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Otávio Bueno, editor-in-chief of Synthese, for his constant
help, careful attention, and patience during the editorial process related to the prepa-
ration of this collection of articles. We would also like to thank all the reviewers
who have provided constructive comments and feedbacks. We also need to express
our thanks to John Woods, Sara Dellantonio, Luigi Pastore, Juha Räikkä, Tom-
maso Bertolotti, Marco Buzzoni, Lisa Bortolotti, Maria Martinez Ordaz, Christo-
pher Mays, Anne Meylan, Woosuk Park, Rik Peels, Paolo Petricca, and Carlin Ro-
mano for helpful advice during the whole process. Last but not least, we are grateful
to the contributors to this volume. The research related to this volume was supported
by Blue Sky Research 2017 (Grant No. BSR1780130) – University of Pavia, Pavia,
Italy. The preparation of the volume would not have been possible without the con-
tribution of resources and facilities of the Computational Philosophy Laboratory
(Department of Humanities - Philosophy Section, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy).

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