Illiberal Cultural War and Hegemony-Building in Hungarian Academia

ILLIBERAL CULTURAL WAR AND

HEGEMONY-BUILDING IN HUNGARIAN
ACADEMIA: SCHOLARS BETWEEN CO-
OPTATION AND RESISTANCE
by Szilvia Horváth
DOI: 10.53483/MOLAL8977

Illiberal Regime-Building in Hungary

Following a short tenure around the millennium, Viktor Orbán became the
prime minister of Hungary again in 2010. Now the strongman of
illiberalism, he won the most recent elections in 2022 as well. Under his
leadership, which has now endured for more than a decade, Hungarian
democracy has declined enormously. The de-democratization has occurred
in a step-by-step manner, transforming the country into a prominent
example of latter-day autocratization.

Despite the huge differences between the two countries, the Hungarian and
American strains of illiberalism are comparable, both at the state level and
in the field of academia. Especially striking are the sociological similarities
between the conservative supporters of illiberalism in the two countries.
Nonetheless, the resilience of the democratic institutions and the
supportive effects of political culture in the United States may serve as
better counterforces to tyrannic will than exist in Hungary. And, as David
L. Swartz noted for in response to a question at the 2022 ECPR conference,
one crucial obstacle to illiberal occupation of academia in the United States
is the private character of most of the country’s universities, in contrast to
Hungary’s largely state-funded universities—where recent “privatization”
has in practice meant occupation by Orbán’s cronies.

Hungary can be seen both as a model of illiberal regime-building and as a

warning against the dangers that illiberalism poses to democracy. The
occupation of academia is part of this regime-building, which embraces a
cultural war, or an antagonistic fight led by the strongman-captured state.
This situation calls for conceptualizing the effects not only on democracy,
but also on citizens. The academy comprises both supporters of Orbán’s
illiberal turn and those who are either regime opponents or neutral
researchers. The former are generally responsible for the heteronomous
intervention of politics into the relatively autonomous academic sphere,

321
Szilvia Horváth

and the latter should use diverse strategies to overcome this. Interpreting
these practices from a non-neutral pro-democratic standpoint and from the
perspective of the oppressed, this paper explores the burdens that an
illiberal turn puts on the shoulders of anyone living under such conditions.
Declaration of Culture War
But how—in what way—does such an occupation of a state, including a
specific sphere, happen? Should an illiberal turn have an ideological—that
is, a discursively explicated—background? Interestingly, there was a
moment when Orbán expressed his will to transform the whole character
of Hungarian society and the state. After the third consecutive victory of
his party Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats) in 2018, he declared it his
goal to build a “new era”:

And our two-thirds victory in 2018 is nothing short of a

mandate to build a new era. […] An era is a special and
characteristic cultural reality. An era is a spiritual order
[...]. A political system is usually determined by rules and
political decisions. An era, however, is more than this.
An era is determined by cultural trends, collective beliefs,
and social customs. This is now the task we are faced
with: we must embed the political system in a cultural
era.

It is worth quoting these phrases at length, as they highlight that the logic
of regime-building contains a moment when conflict intensifies, since
politics aims to reach the very bottom of society in order to rewrite it. This
practice rests on the polarization of society and deeply affects people’s lives.
Orbán expresses here his intention to intervene into “culture” broadly
construed, subsuming it under the aims of a political regime that wants to
extend its life beyond the normal periodicity of democracies. This kind of
“era-building” is a deliberate call for a political culture war led by the state.

Moving from a regime to an era entails a moment of intensity change in the

polarizing dynamics. The supporting ideology seems to be a combination
of, among others, the Schmittian political, which explicates politics as an
inherently combative endeavor; the Gramscian idea of hegemony, which
helps to highlight the relevance of culture for politics and can be read as a
call to occupy it; and, tacitly, Tilo Schabert’s theory of governance and
leadership, which rests on the relevance of strong leaders in politics and the
need to always stir up conditions and place occupied institutions in the
hands of loyal cronies. It is interesting, although compatible with
contemporary populisms, that the supporting regime ideology combines
right- and left-wing ideological elements. Although some of these elements

322
 Illiberal Cultural War and Hegemony-Building in Hungarian Academia

are borrowed from the left, they are transformed, with the over-
simplification of politics, into sheer battle, as exemplified in the works on
culture war of a regime ideologue, Márton Békés, who sketches the
“political equation of the 21st century” for the “new right… that is not
afraid of being revolutionary” as “Schmitt + Gramsci = Victory.”

The ideological background, as well as political discourse and institutional

changes, serve to ground a kind of culture war, which always stems from—
or is an expression of—political polarization. Orbán’s logic of regime-/era-
building does not rest on the acceptance of the other but wants to minimize
everything that resembles the other. To refer to Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic
democratic theory, these are not the kind of agonistic conflicts that are
necessary for democratic flourishing; instead, they represent an
exclusionary illiberal practice that de-democratizes the country.

But what shape has this antagonistic logic taken in the cultural field? If we
restrict our focus to the academic field, it is clear that it had undergone
enormous change even before Orbán’s declaration of 2018. Universities
lost most of their economic autonomy in the early 2010s; then CEU was
expelled from the country after a series of political attacks; and around that
time the government banned state-supported gender studies education by
administrative means. Before the declaration, there was an (albeit sporadic)
effort to build a parallel system of institutions through the creation of
various historical institutes, an important move for the creation of a
nationalist identity; thereafter, a more strategic and overarching
restructuring occurred. Almost all the state-owned universities were
“privatized”—meaning, in effect, that their leadership boards were packed
by Orbán’s cronies, including incumbent ministers. On top of this,
substantial financial support was given to Mathias Corvinus Collegium, an
institute with close ties to Fidesz.

Both political argumentation and its supporting ideology indicate an intent

to change the intensity of political conflict. This seems to reflect a project
that aims at a total occupation of culture. However, elite studies by
individuals such as Luca Kristóf suggest that hegemonization was
unsuccessful in various fields in the 2010s, especially in those subfields—
like literature—where it is not formal status, but informal reputation, that
matters. Moreover, as Barna et al. suggest, the different logics of ideological
production limited overall cultural homogenization.

It seems that right-wing hegemonization may have internal limitations,

whether imposed by elite rivalry, the reality of heterogeneous principles
governing the field, or the fact that the field to be hegemonized is simply
too large. Nonetheless, the regime aims to transform the whole cultural

323
Szilvia Horváth

field, going beyond the goals and tools that are common in the cultural
policy of contemporary democracies.
Different Intensities of Hegemonization
As hegemonic practice intensifies, it urges the creation of a regime ideology
and puts pressure on people to legitimize regime-building. Gramscian and
post-Gramscian theory is useful here not just because it influences the
horizon of regime intellectuals and leaders, but because it enables us to
differentiate between interventions into the academy on the basis of
intensity: co-optation and extension are two kinds of hegemonic practice
that can be drawn from it.

Co-optation refers to an extension of power that moves forward in the

ideological sphere by incorporating existing elements, along with those
people in the field who are inclined to compromise. This is not a situation
of sheer suppression or deliberate political intervention. It may lead to self-
censorship, but equally, it may take a far smoother form: academics can
continue to operate autonomously, but with new colleagues, generally less
prepared academically, who support the regime. The former group of
academics serve to legitimize these new colleagues’ less academic practices,
producing tacit support for the regime’s ideology.

In terms of discursive content, co-optation means incorporating existing

discursive elements but putting them into a different context. Historical
studies may serve as good examples, as these are generally high-level
research but can also be parts of a nationalist intellectual agenda. We can
see here a rather blurred picture—real academic practice in a heteronomous
academic context—that proves the transitory character of any compromise.
It is perhaps no coincidence that in the first, less intensive period of cultural
intervention, a set of historical institutes were established, forming a parallel
institutional system to the standard set of academic institutions that already
existed.

Co-optation is beneficial for powerholders, for two reasons. First, the

ideological elements already exist, so powerholders do not have to invest in
their innovation. Second, the compromise-oriented character of hegemony
dramatically curtails opportunities for resistance. Part of the deal is that a
co-opted citizen stays in the compromised situation (or accepts the deal),
remaining silent at points when it would be worth engaging in critique. Co-
optation thus involves tacit legitimization, not active ideological activity,
and individuals retain a limited amount of autonomy.

In the expansive model, powerholders seek to conquer the field. Room for
maneuver is not only limited but close to disappearing. Academics are

324
 Illiberal Cultural War and Hegemony-Building in Hungarian Academia

expected to follow the rules, decisions, and even unspoken will of the
powerholders: they must have tacit knowledge of the oppressive rule. The
academic function is not passive but active legitimization; scholars are
required to take part in ideological production. This condition may have the
somewhat unexpected consequence of supporting the articulation of
antagonism, albeit outside the local regime of hegemonization.

What does extension, an expansive strategy of hegemonization, look like?

The post-2018 phase of the culture war led to an overwhelming institutional
transformation. An example of such a major intervention is the way the
University of Theatre and Film Arts was practically privatized and occupied
by a Fideszist board of trustees, leading to a series of student-professor
protests (a very rare event due to the weakness of Hungarian civil society)
that culminated in most of the academic staff being replaced with
supporters of the regime.

Even minor interventions hint at what a culture war looks like as part of an
illiberal regime-building effort. One example is anecdotal evidence that
even in a STEM field, expressing one’s political opinion on Facebook can
result in an academic failing to receive national-level financial support.
Another example is the case of the National University of Public Service, a
Fidesz-flagship university with direct links to the Prime Minister’s Office.
In 2018, while I was working there, we organized a political theory
conference that accepted gender studies papers, although the name of the
relevant panel was carefully chosen to avoid using the “G-word.” Some
weeks later, a minister in the Prime Minister’s Office called the head of the
institute responsible to ask “what it was.” Although this kind of micro-
management is arguably rare, macro-level changes and the fact that
intervention can occur on the micro level create an unfavorable climate for
free academic research.
Freedom under Constraint
Illiberal regime-building and the culture war have an impact on individual
lives and choices. Looking at this situation from the perspective of those
for whom this situation is unfavorable, let us pose an important question:
what is the extent of their freedom and what are the limits thereon?

Co-optation is permissive compared to expansive hegemony. But the room

for maneuver is not static; the borders of freedom should therefore be
explored from time to time. In situations of co-optation, researchers are
used to legitimize causes unrelated to academia or causes coming from the
political power. At a certain point, they may start to wonder whether it
would be more advantageous to explicitly identify themselves with the

325
Szilvia Horváth

regime, building a profile of loyalty and creating/renewing the regime’s

ideology.

The limitations on their freedom and the retaliatory consequences for

overstepping these bounds are heavier burdens for those who do not
identify themselves with the regime. Powerholders—whether state or
local—will likely invest more resources in co-opting or, if co-optation fails,
oppressing them. Coopting political-ideological enemies is a strategic
choice for powerholders, for two main reasons. First, a co-opted researcher
appears on the radar of power, which can control her or him through
punishment or reward. Second, co-opting a researcher makes it possible to
divide similar-minded intellectual groups, as co-optation forces them to
decide who is a friend, who is an enemy, and what kind of actions are
acceptable under pressure. In other words, co-optation blurs the
boundaries of identities and the formerly clear-cut difference between the
morally good and bad.

In practice, it can be hard to capture the point where passive legitimacy

must become active. This is supposedly due to the rhetorical nature of
power, which should never reveal how it functions; it should hide its violent
core. The change seems to be induced by a change in the intensity of
politics. Expansive hegemony and active legitimacy demands are fostered
by polarization.

I have tried to outline the logic of hegemonization as a regime-building

strategy in the field of epistemic authority. I hope it has become clear that
these strategies restrict freedom, and individuals are expected to react to
this fact. Individual answers may differ, and there are various means to self-
legitimize obedience. Indeed, there are numerous reasons that people
accept such unwanted rule.

First, there is fear-led compromise. The inner voice of this type might sound
like: “The fear of retaliation motivates me to make a compromise. And
therefore, I try to convince the Power that I am a good guy.” Second, there
is bureaucratic/pragmatic compromise. The inner voice says: “I am making a
compromise because I want to satisfy the demands of power, and I cannot
do it in any other way. This is a common thing; this is just a job.” Third,
there is career-based compromise: “I will do this because I am a clever guy who
carves out advantages even from drawbacks. If I have to compromise, then
it is better to make a career as well.” A subcategory of this third group is
when one experiences this pressure not as a compromise but as an
opportunity: “I am the one who has recognized that a little flattery may help
me to bypass limitations and launch my career/have more money/have
more influence/have more prestige.”

326
 Illiberal Cultural War and Hegemony-Building in Hungarian Academia

Room for Maneuver and Limitations on Academic Research

Scholars’ ability to conduct research under constrained conditions depends
on external factors, and context-dependency leads to various types of
research, of which I identify three: 1. Justifying (legitimizing), 2. Standard, and
3. Critical. Justifying works are those that fulfill the political or ideological
needs of the power. Examples of justifying research are nationalism studies
that support national identity-building or articles written by regime
intellectuals exploring the constitutional and legitimate character of the
already permanent state of exception.

Standard work is that which can be produced under normal conditions,

without political interference, and which follows the norms of professional
standards. (Let us leave aside the serious problems this kind of academia
may have.)

By critical work, I refer to academic works that are seen as being critical of
power; they are “critical” from the perspective of the power-holders. This
demonstrates that an authoritarian-leaning power can always be challenged
by standard science, not just by a well-defined normative position or by a
science that is explicitly critical of the regime.

Coopted authors should make mainly standard science, although part of the
deal is that it is forbidden to write about certain issues or that they must be
re-contextualized in a way suited to the regime’s ideological perspective (for
example, following academic norms and standards but calling the field
“family studies” instead of “gender studies”). The difference between that
which is ideologically proper and that which is improper is generally tacit,
not forced.

In expansive hegemony, both standard and justifying scholarly works can be

produced, but the power aims to make them the same. That is, they aim to
turn their socio-political vision into an internationally recognized standard.
This puts pressure on academics, and may be the point where a non-
supporter of illiberalism reaches the limit of cooperation.

A representative of power can read works through a critical scholarly lens at

any time. Anything can turn out to be critical academic work—that is, work
that is critical of to the regime and therefore capable of threatening it—after
the fact. For example, Andrea Kozáry, a deceased professor formerly at the
National University of Public Service, wrote extensively on hate crimes in
law enforcement, including the gender perspective, and organized a
conference on these themes in 2019, when the Orbán government’s moral
and political crusade against gender studies was rising to the intensity of the
friend/enemy distinction. Following trumped-up charges, she was fired.

327
Szilvia Horváth

The practical reason for this might be not only that conference, but her
general profile.

In the longer term, less intensive interventions than firing decisions also
affect people’s choices. Together, these practices can effectively support
illiberal regime-building in a cultural field.
Some Conclusions
The academy is just one part of culture, broadly construed, that is valuable
for illiberal regime-building. It has a specific epistemic authority useful for
ideological production and legitimacy creation. Supposedly, it will always be
exposed to authoritarian-leaning politics, as academics can play a significant
role both in legitimizing and in criticizing power. Understanding the
subjugation of the academy or its parts is important because it can
illuminate methods of subjugation that might be extended to the whole of
society. What the Hungarian case teaches us is that state capture by a leader
or a party can be detrimental to democracy and that this will not stop at
superficial aspects of human existence. A “culture war” is led by a single
power in an effort to influence the foundations of society. It may lead to
extreme, civil war-like divisions of society and to the general loss of
individual freedom. In order to avoid this, citizens should be aware of the
danger posed by leaders who aim to divide society and exploit this division
for the sake of remaining in power. As the Hungarian case also suggests, it
is a far greater task to regain lost democracy than to push back the will that
tries to destroy democracy.

328