City Government of Baguio v.

Masweng
G.R. No. 180206, February 4, 2009

FACTS:

The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued by the City Mayor of Baguio
City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures constructed by
Lazaro Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol
Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without the required building
permits and in violation of Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended,
Presidential Decree No. 1096 and Republic Act No. 7279.

Corresponding series of demolition advice, were, then, issued to the occupants, informing
them of the intended demolition of the erected structures. As a result, Elvin Gumangan,
Narciso Basatanand Lazaro Bawas filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. In their petition, the
private respondents claimed that the lands where their residential houses stand are their
ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and continuously
since time immemorial. Also, their ownership over the subject land have been expressly
recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage
of the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus, contended that the demolition of their residential
houses is a violation of their right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by
the Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained.

The petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals, and the latter upheld the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and affirmed the Temporary Restraining Orders,
granting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, issued by the NCIP. The
government claims that Busol Forest Reservation is exempt from ancestral claims and as such
the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for injunction. Furthermore,
since IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter, the right over the
alleged ancestral lands cannot be validly asserted under the provisions of the IPRA. The
private respondents, on the other hand, contend that jurisdiction of the NCIP to take
cognizance of and decide main actions for injunction arguing that the IPRA does not state
that the NCIP may only issue such writs of injunction as auxiliary remedies, and that the
IPRA does not exempt Baguio City from its coverage nor does it state that there are no
ancestral lands in Baguio City. The court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority to
issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, the fact remains that the Busol
Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable in the case of Heirs of
Gumangan v Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ancestral land claim of private respondents was indeed recognized by
Proclamation No. 15.
RULING:
The IPRA provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter. Its
exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes
the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its
effectivity. The IPRA demands that the city's charter respect the validity of these recognized
land rights and titles. The Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents' ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies
the Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as
claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested
rights over the same.

City Mayor of Baguio vs. Masweng

G.R. No. 165003, February 2, 2010

FACTS:

Respondents Judith K. Cariño, Jacqueline Cariño and the other heirs of Mateo Cariño and
Bayosa Ortega are members of the Ibaloi tribe, an indigenous cultural tribe of Baguio City
and Benguet Province. Their ancestors were grantees of a survey plan approved by the
Director of Lands in 1920. Currently, they have pending petitions before the National
Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) for the validation of ancestral land claims
covering a parcel of land in Resident Section "J" in Baguio City and Tuba, Benguet. A
portion of the land being claimed by petitioners overlaps with the Baguio Dairy Farm, a
government reservation under the supervision of the Department of Agriculture (DA).

On June 29, 2003, respondents filed a petition for injunction (with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order [TRO] and/or a writ of preliminary injunction) with the NCIP
seeking to enjoin the mayor of Baguio City and the head of the city’s demolition team from
implementing Demolition Order No. 17, series of 2003. The order, issued by the office of the
mayor upon complaint of the DA, directs the demolition of shanties and other structures
within the premises of the Baguio Dairy Farm belonging to private respondents which were
then undergoing construction or were recently built without the required permits. In response,
public respondent Brain Masweng, regional hearing officer of the NCIP in the Cordillera
Administrative Region, issued a 72-hour TRO.

In a resolution dated July 21, 2003, respondent Masweng granted the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari filed by
petitioners. Upholding the NCIP’s jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for injunction,
the CA denied both the petition and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the preliminary injunction issued by the
NCIP
RULING:

The NCIP may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any
prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction. The power
to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute over
which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which may cause them grave
or irreparable damage or injury.

Private respondents base their claim to the disputed area on an alleged time-immemorial
possession and a survey plan awarded to their forebears by the Director of Lands in 1920. In
1940, Proclamation No. 603 withdrew the contested area from sale or settlement and reserved
the same for animal breeding station purposes, subject to private rights. The claim of
respondents on the subject land is still pending before the NCIP. Thus, their rights are mere
expectations, not the present and unmistakable right required for the grant of the provisional
remedy of injunction. Moreover, the structures subject of the demolition order were either
built or being constructed without the requisite permit at the time the demolition order was
issued in 2003. Hence, private respondents were not entitled to the preliminary injunction
issued by the NCIP.

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

December 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution
RULING:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within
their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land
on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources,
and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
 La Bugal Blaan Tribal Association v. Ramos
January 27, 200
FACTS:
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of
RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering
close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and
North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40,
adopted on December 20, 1996. Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and
the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that
they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop
Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of
the Charter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-
owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources
RULING:
RA 7942 is Unconstitutional RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is
unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine
natural resources. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian
Doctrine which states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
The 1987 Constitution has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in the
1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance.
The management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the
primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987
Constitution sought to avoid. The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into
FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. According, such provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said
act authorizes service contracts.
 Diosdado Sama and Bandy Masanglay vs. People
January 5, 2021

FACTS:
Petitioners Diosdado Samay Hinupas and Bandy Masanglayy Aceveda and their co-accused
Demetrio Masanglayy Aceveda were charged for violation of Section 77 of Presidential
Decree 705 or theRevised Forestry Code of the Philippines. Accused were caught cutting,
with the use of unregistered power chainsaw, a Dita tree, in Barangay Calangatan,
Municipality of San Teodoro, Province of Orienta [Link] three accused pleaded not
guilty, alleging that they are members of the Iraya-Mangyan tribe, and assuch, are governed
by Republic Act No. 8371 or The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The
motion was [Link] trial, the defense presented testimony that the cutting of the dita
tree was for the construction of the Iraya-Mangyan IPs' community toilet. Further, thedita tree
was planted within the ancestral domain of the Iraya-Mangyan [Link] trial court, in
convicting the accused, ruled that adita tree with an aggregate volume of 500 board feet can
be classified as "timber" within the purview of Section 77 of PD 705, as amended. Thus,
cutting the dita tree without a corresponding permit from the DENR or any competent
authority violated the law. The trial court further held that a violation of Section 77 of PD 705
constituted malum prohibitum, thus, criminal intent does not have to be established
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the RTC conviction. It
focused on the failure of the accused to present any license agreement, lease, or permit
authorizing them to log the dita tree. The accused purportedly failed to substantiate their
claim that they are Iraya-Mangyan IPs and the land where the dita tree was situated is part of
their ancestral domain and lands. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dita tree cut and collected from a forest land, an alienable or disposable
public land, or private land as contemplated in Section 77 of PD 705 as ammended
RULING:
YES. Section 3 (mm) defines private lands indirectly as those lands with titled rights of
ownership under existing laws, and in the case of national minority, lands subject to rights of
possession existing at the time a license is granted under PD 705, which possession may
include places of abode and worship, burial grounds, and old clearings, but exclude
productive forests inclusive of logged-over areas, commercial forests, and established
plantations of the forest trees and trees of economic values. Therefore, the language of
Section 77 incriminates petitioners as they cut, gathered, collected, and removed timber from
adita tree from the land which they have called their own since time immemorial, which
could either be a forest land, or an alienable or disposable public land, or a private land, as
defined under PD 705, as amended, without the requisite authority pursuant to PD 705 's
licensing regime. Justice Caguioa firmly opines, however, that ancestral domains and lands
are outside the ambit of Section 77. He is correct that ancestral domains and lands are a class
of their own. They have been referred to repeatedly assui generis property. Nonetheless, the
text of Section 77, as amended is very clear. It does not exempt from its coverage ancestral
domains and lands. As Chief Justice Peralta aptly points out, the term "private land," which
Section 77 expressly covers, includes lands possessed by “national minorities" such as their
sacred and communal grounds. This term should mean no other than what we sensitively and
correctly call today as the IPs' ancestral domains and lands. Ownership is not an essential
element of the offense as defined in Section 77 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the
information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material, it was sufficient
that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.
[People v. CFI of Quezon (Branch VII)] We hold that this ruling in CFI of Quezon (Branch
VII) remains true to the amended iterations of Section68, now Section 77. Ownership of the
land from which the timber or other forest products are taken is neither an element of the
offense nor a defense to this offense — so long as timber or other forest products were cut,
collected, gathered, or removed from a forest land, an alienable or disposable public land, or
private land as defined in PD 705, as amended, without any authority granted by the State. As
well, ownership per se of either the land or the timber or other forest products, as this right is
understood in our Civil Code, does not amount to an authority granted by the State to justify
the otherwise forbidden acts. The reason for this ruling is the relevant part of Section 68 that
has remained unchanged in its present version - the actus reus ("cut, gather, collect, remove"),
the object of the actus reus (timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land), and the penalties for this
offense. The role of ownership in the determination of criminal liability for this offense has
not evolved.

Central Mindanao Univerity vs. Executive Secretary

September 21, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run
by the State. In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of
lands of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU.
Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMU’s registered lands for distribution to indigenous
peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.
On April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive
Secretary, et al., seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it
declared unconstitutional.
The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay
RTC over the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of
the Executive Department done in Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC.
The RTC issued a resolution granting NCIP, et al motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed
CMU’s action for lack of jurisdiction. Still, the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was
constitutional, being a valid State act. The RTC said that the ultimate owner of the lands is the State
and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf. CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution but the RTC denied the same on April 19, 2004. This prompted CMU to appeal the RTC’s
dismissal order to the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station, however, CA dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in dismissing its action for
prohibition against NCIP, et al for lack of jurisdiction and at the same time ruling that
Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional
RULING:
The RTC invoked two reasons for dismissing CMU’s action. The first is that jurisdiction over
the action to declare Presidential Proclamation 310 lies with the RTC of Manila, not the RTC
of Malaybalay City, given that such action relates to official acts of the Executive done in
Manila. The second reason, presumably made on the assumption that the Malaybalay RTC
had jurisdiction over the action, Presidential Proclamation 310 was valid and constitutional
since the State, as ultimate owner of the subject lands, has the right to dispose of the same for
some purpose other than CMU’s use.
There is nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on the one hand that it has no
jurisdiction over a case, and on the other, based on an assumption that it has jurisdiction,
deciding the case on its merits, both with the same results, which is the dismissal of the
action. At any rate, the issue of the propriety of the RTC using two incompatible reasons for
dismissing the action is academic. The CA from which the present petition was brought
dismissed CMU’s appeal on some technical ground.

The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state colleges and
universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually eroded by
misconstruing the exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and universities are the
main vehicles for our scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so
vital to the existence, growth and development of this country. It did not matter that it was
President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to appropriate the lands for
distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. As already stated, the lands by
their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them
for CMU’s use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have
ceased to be alienable public lands.

Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act
8371 in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that "property rights within the ancestral domains
already existing and/or vested" upon its effectivity "shall be recognized and respected." In
this case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958.
Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not
in accord with the IPRA.
 Central Mindanao University vs. Republic of the Philippines
February 22, 2016

FACTS:
Petitioner, Central Mindanao University (CMU), is an agricultural educational institution
owned and run by the State established by virtue of RA 4498. In 1946, CMU took possession
of two parcels of land and started construction for the school site upon the confirmation of
Secretary of Public Instruction. However, it was found out that there were several adverse
claims over the property.

In 1956, Pres. Carlos P. Garcia signed Proclamation no. 476, through the provisions of the
Public Land Act, reserving certain portions of the land to CMU. Said parcel of lands were
withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the school. Director of Lands filed the
necessary petition for compulsory registration of said land. On January 1961, Director of
Lands then filed with CFI of Bukidnon for settlement and adjudication of title of parcels of
land for determination of rights of adverse claimants. Cadastral Court approved petition and
ordered that specific portion of subject lots be adjudicated to 33 claimants. Republic of the
Philippines, through OSG, filed before CA annulment of the decision by Cadastral Court
granting in favor of CMU the title of the land. CA ruled in favor of the Republic regarding
the subsequent disposition and alienation of the public domain.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that the subject property has already been declared,
classified, and certified by the Office of the President as alienable and disposable lands, by
the indorsement to file the compulsory registration of the parcels of land reserved under their
name

ISSUE:

Whether or not subject lots became alienable and disposable

RULING:

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership is presumed to belong to the State. Consequently, the person applying for
registration has the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of ownership of lands of the
public domain.

To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land
as alienable, and disposable must be established. However, it is clear under Sec. 88 of
Proclamation no. 476, that the reserved parcels of land would ordinarily be inalienable and
not subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease or other disposition. Moreover, pursuant to Sec. 8
of C.A. 141, the lands which can be declared open to disposition or concession are those
which have been officially delimited and classified, or when practicable surveyed; those not
reserved for public or quasi-public purpose; those not appropriated by the Government; those
which have not become private property in any manner; those which have no private right
authorized and recognized by C.A. No. 141 or any other valid law may be claimed; or those
which have ceased to be reserved or appropriated.

Unlike in De la Rosa, the lands, having been reserved for public purpose by virtue of
Proclamation No. 476, have not ceased to be so at the time the said directive was made. The
subject land, among others, have been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes. In the
instant case, CMU’s reservation was for educational purposes. Hence, the lots did not revert
to and become public agricultural land for them to be the subject of a declaration by the
President that the same are alienable and disposable. Being a property included in the public
domain, it cannot be registered under the Torrens system.

Unduran,vs. Aberasturi
October 20, 2015

FACTS:

Respondents filed a petition for Accion Reivindicatoria with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with Damages against
petitioners before the RTC, and this prompted the petitioners to file for a Motion to Dismiss,
alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners alleged that with the
advent of R.A No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA).
With that, the NCIP filed a Motion to Refer the case to the Regional Hearing Office-National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-NCIP), alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the subject
matter. RTC released an order dismissing said motion, for being moot and academic. Said
order
was affirmed by CA and ruled that the RTC correctly granted the amendment of the
complaint
and properly refused to refer the case to the RHO-NCIP. Based on the allegations of both
original complaint and amended complaint, the CA found that the subject matter of both
complaints is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction

RULING:

Yes. After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and amended complaints,
the Court notes that respondents neither alleged therein that the parties are members of
ICCs/IPs nor that the case involves a dispute or controversy over ancestral lands/domains of
ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in respondents' original complaint make up for an accion
reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an interest in a real property with an assessed
value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their amended complaint make out a case for
injunction, a civil action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court therefore
finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the amended complaint based on
allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Contrary to petitioners' contention,
the mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not
enough to for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA. A
careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from the qualifying provision that "no
such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies
provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same
has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
petition with the NCIP." Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes
arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Hence, the case shall
fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP.

Unduran vs. Aberasturi,

April 18, 2017
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court’s En Banc Decision dated October 20, 2015, which the petition was denied and
affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. In the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, they
maintain their contention believing that it is the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) not the regular courts, which has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies
involving ancestral domain of the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICC’s) and Indigenous
Peoples (IP’s) regardless of the parties involved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction over the disputes and
controversies involving the ancestral domain of the ICC and IP regardless of the parties
involved not the NCIP.
RULING:
Yes. It is the court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide cases
whose subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. In contrast, a court of limited
jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly
delegated. An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of
limited jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are specifically granted to it by
the enabling statutes. Limited or special jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular
causes or which can be exercised only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the
statute.
Meanwhile, the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited under customary laws presents two important
issues: first, whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with penalties under
customary laws; and second, whether a member of a particular ICC/IP could be punished in
accordance with the customary laws of another ICC/IP.
Therefore, the Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of a case is not merely based on the allegations of the complaint in
certain cases where the actual issues are evidenced by subsequent pleadings. It is well settled
that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend on the defenses raised by the
defendant in the answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant. Suffice it also to state that the Court is unanimous in
denying the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the CA correctly ruled that the
subject matter of the original and amended complaint based on the allegations therein is
within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Carino vs. The Insular Government

212 US 449 (1909)
FACTS:
This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for the registration of
certain land. The application was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was
taken to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet on behalf of the government
of the Philippines, and also on behalf of the United States, those governments having taken
possession of the property for public and military purposes.

The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the
Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris,
April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land
as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the
holding of cattle, according to the custom of the country, some of the fences, it seems, having
been of much earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing
cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as owners by
the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father in accordance with
Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and
although, in 1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal
decrees then in force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps, information that
lands in Benguet could not be conceded until those to be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had
been designated -- a purpose that has been carried out by the Philippine government and the
United States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage
law, and the lands were registered to him, that process, however, establishing only a
possessory title, it is said.

Ruling of the Court of First Instance:

The Court of First Instance found the facts and dismissed the application upon grounds of law

Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Philippines:

This judgment (judgement of the Court of First Instance) was affirmed by the supreme court,
7 Phil. 132, and the case then was brought here 9 (US Supreme Court) by writ of error.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the plaintiff owns the land?

2. Whether or not the plaintiff wrongfully occupy a royal land?

RULING:

1. Yes, the plaintiff owns the land.

The US Court held that every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a
case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back
as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly, in a case like this, if there is doubt or
ambiguity in the Spanish law, the Court ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.
Whether justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought not to carry us beyond a
subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the attitude of Spanish law,
humane though it was, it is unnecessary to decide.

In this case, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. They all had been
recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father
in accordance with Igorot custom.

2. No, the plaintiff did not wrongfully occupy royal land.

The US Court held and cited the laws of Spain that for private ownership, there must have
been a grant by competent authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all
legal effects, those who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners.
For cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5.
Also, in Article 6, it is provided that "interested parties not included within the two preceding
articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty years] may legalize their
possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment
proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner..."

In this case, when this decree went into effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by
the very terms of the decree. The object of this law was to require the adjustment or
registration proceedings that it described, and in that way to require everyone to get a
document of title or lose his land. That purpose may have been entertained, but it does not
appear clearly to have been applicable to all. The regulations purport to have been made "for
the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals." It does not appear
that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Ronald M. Cosalan

July 4, 2018

FACTS:
Respondent alleged that the Cosalan clan came from the Ibaloi Tribe of Bokod and Tublay,
Benguet; that he was the eldest son of Andres Acop Cosalan (Andres), the youngest son of
Fernando Cosalan (Fernando), also a member of the said tribe; that he was four generations
away from his great-grandparents, Opilis and Adonis, who owned a vast tract of land in
Tublay, Benguet; that this property was passed on to their daughter Peran who married
Bangkilay Acop
(Bangkilay) in 1858; that the couple then settled, developed and farmed the said property;
that
Acop enlarged the inherited landholdings, and utilized the same for agricultural purposes,
principally as pasture land for their hundreds of cattle; that at that time, Benguet was cattle
country with Mateo Cariño (Mateo) of the landmark case Cariño v. Insular Government,
having
his ranch in what became Baguio City, while Acop established his ranch in Betdi, later
known as Acop’s Place in Tublay Benguet, that Mateo and Acop were contemporaries, and
became “abalayans” (in-laws) as the eldest son of Mateo, named Sioco, married Guilata, the
eldest daughter of Acop; and that Guilata was the sister of Aguinaya Acop Cosalan
(Aguinaya), the grandmother of respondent.

Respondent alleged, among others, that he acquired the subject land in open, continuous,
exclusive, peaceful, notorious and adverse occupation, cultivation and actual possession, in
the
concept of an owner, by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest since time
immemorial; that he occupied the said land which was an ancestral land; that he was a
member of the cultural minorities belonging to the Ibaloi Tribe; that he took possession of the
subject land and performed acts of dominion over the area.

DENR-CAR opposed the application filed by respondent on the ground that the subject land
was part of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217.
On July 29, 2011, the RTC approved respondent’s application for registration. It held that the
subject land was owned and possessed by his ancestors and predecessors even before the land
was declared part of the forest reserve by virtue of Proclamation No. 217. Aggrieved,
petitioner
appealed before the CA. In its decision dated August 27, 2014, the CA affirmed in toto the
ruling of the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA
in its resolution dated February 4, 2015. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent is proper

RULING:

Yes. As a rule, forest land located within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve cannot be a
subject of private appropriation and registration. Respondent, however, was able to prove that
the subject land was an ancestral land, and had been openly and continuously occupied by
him
and his predecessors in-interest, who were members of the ICCs/IPs.

The CA has correctly relied on the case of Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, which
institutionalized the concept of native title. Thus: Every presumption is and ought to be taken
against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient
to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by
individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.

Hence, respondent’s application for registration under Section 12 of the IPRA Law in relation
to Section 48 of the CA No. 141 was correct. Section 12, Chapter III of IPRA Law states that
individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually used for
agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of
eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
lands. As stated, respondent and his witnesses were able to prove that the subject land had
been used for agricultural purposes even prior to its declaration as part of the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve. The subject land had been actually utilized for dry land agriculture
where camote, corn and vegetables were planted and some parts of which were used for
grazing farm animals, horses and cattle. Moreover, several improvements have been
introduced like the 200-meter road and the levelling of areas for future construction,
gardening, planting of more pine trees, coffee and bamboo. Verily, as the IPRA Law
expressly provides that ancestral lands are considered public agricultural lands, the provisions
of the Public Land Act or C.A. No. 141 govern the registration of the subject land.

Certainly, it has been proven that respondent and his predecessors-in- interest had been in
open and continuous possession of the subject land since time immemorial even before it was
declared part of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217. Thus, the
Registration of the subject land in favor of respondent is proper.

Republic vs. NCIP, Register of Deeds of Baguio City

September 25, 2019
FACTS:

Kapitan Piraso, an Ibaloi, who occupied an ancestral land located at what is known as Session
Road, Baguio City. Aside from having five (5) children, Kapitan Piraso also adopted, in
accordance with the Ibaloi tradition. They filed an application for the identification,
delineation and recognition of the ancestral land initially before Baguio NCIP City Office
pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights
Act of 1997 (IPRA). The petitioners alleged that the subject ancestral land has been occupied,
possessed, and utilized by them and their [predecessors]-in-interest for so many years.
Subsequently, the NCIP recognized the petitioners' rights over the subject parcels of ancestral
land after finding that the genealogy of the petitioners shows an unbroken line of generations
starting from Piraso
who have never left the subject ancestral land for the last 120 years.

In view of said findings, the NCIP ordered the issuance of eight (8) Certificates of Ancestral
Land Titles (CALTs) under the petitioners' names as well as that of Nimer. The heirs of
Josephine Molintas Abanag, who in turn was a descendant of an Ibaloi native named Menchi.
Menchi originally owned several parcels of ancestral land located in various parts of what is
now known as Baguio City and these parcel were subsequently inherited by his ascendants.
Consequently, the petitioners as represented by Isaias M. Abanag and Marion T. Pool filed a
petition for the identification, delineation and recognition of their ancestral lands in Baguio
City pursuant to R.A. 8371. Thereafter, an ocular inspection was conducted which revealed
the coverage of the ancestral lands of the Molintas. In addition, the petitioners therein also
submitted numerous pieces of documentary evidence such as the narrative of customs and
traditions of the Ibaloi community in Baguio City, Assessment of Real Property, Tax receipts,
and photographs of improvements, rituals, and members of the Molintas family led by
Josephine Molintas Abanag.

The NCIP granted the petition and ordered the issuance of twenty-eight (28) CALTs covering
the same number of parcels of ancestral land in the name of the petitioners and Joan L. Gorio,
a transferee of ten (10) parcels of land from the heirs of Josephine Molintas Abanag.
Almost two (2) years after, here now comes the Republic of the Philippines as represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking to annul, reverse and set aside the assailed
Resolutions of the NCIP through this instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed a reversible error when it declared
that lands within Baguio City and the Baguio town site reservation are covered by IPRA,
contrary to law and jurisprudence corollary for the following reasons:

1. The Baguio townsite reservation, with the exception of existing property rights
recognized or vested before the effectivity of the IPRA, is exempt from the coverage
of said law as provided in section 78 thereof
2. The NCIP has no jurisdiction to issue CALTS over lands within Baguio city and the
Baguio townsite reservation, outside of those over which prior land rights and titles
have been earlier recognized by judicial, administrative, or other processes before the
effectivity of the IPRA.

RULING:

Republic Act No. 8371 (RA 8371) or the "Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997" (IPRA)
expressly excludes the City of Baguio from the application of the general provisions of the
IPRA. Section 78 of RA 8371 provides that "the City of Baguio shall remain to be governed
by its Charter and all lands proclaimed as part of its town site reservation shall remain as such
until otherwise reclassified by appropriate legislation." Section 78 of RA 8371 states:
SECTION 78. Special Provision. — The City of Baguio shall remain to be governed by its
Charter and all lands proclaimed as part of its town site reservation shall remain as such until
otherwise reclassified by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land rights and titles
recognized and/or acquired through any judicial, administrative or other processes before the
effectivity of this Act shall remain valid: Provided, further, That this provision shall not apply
to any territory which becomes part of the City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 78 is a special provision in the IPRA which clearly mandates that (1) the City of
Baguio shall not be subject to provisions of the IPRA but shall still be governed by its own
charter; (2) all lands previously proclaimed as part of the City of Baguio's Town site
Reservation shall remain as such; (3) the re-classification of properties within the Town site
Reservation of the City of Baguio can only be made through a law passed by Congress; (4)
prior land rights and titles recognized and acquired through any judicial, administrative or
other process before the effectivity of the IPRA shall remain valid; and (5) territories which
became part of the City of Baguio after effectivity of the IPRA are exempted. Thus, RA 8371
is clear that, for properties part of the town site reservation of Baguio City before the passage
of the IPRA, no new CALT or CADT can be issued by the NCIP. Under RA 8371, the NCIP
is devoid of any power to re-classify lands previously included as part of the Town site
Reservation of Baguio City before RA 8371 was enacted. The said power to re-classify these
properties is solely vested in Congress and can only be exercised by Congress through the
enactment of a new law. Such prohibition to reclassify is reiterated in the Implementing
Rules of the IPRA. Rule XIII, Section 1 of the IPRA law

Private claimants to lands within the Baguio Town site Reservation were given a chance to
register their lands in Case No. 211. The provisions of Act No. 627, allowing them to do so,
are in harmony with the 1909 epochal decision of Justice Holmes in Cariño vs. Insular
Government, 212 U.S. 449,41 Phil. 935. The two Igorots named Zarate and those who were
allowed to register their lots in Case No. 211, like Mateo Cariño, the Igorot involved in the
Cariño case, inherited their lands from their ancestors. They had possession of the lands since
time immemorial. The Igorots were allowed to avail themselves of registration under Act No.
496.

Heirs of Marciano Nagano vs. Court of Appeals

November 17, 1997
FACTS:

National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant
Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of several
underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the
hydroelectric plants. On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the
property and a prayer for just compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of
the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land
had also become an unsafe place for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to
safer grounds. ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation
RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact
by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been attempted by the taking agency. The underground tunnels impose
limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them of
its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to
pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled that the
taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical
taking or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically
deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and
necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its
value.
 Heirs of Marciano Nagano vs. Court of Appeals
November 17, 1997
FACTS:
Plaintiffs-appellants [private respondents] filed complaint for the declaration of nullity of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-8265 issued in the name of the heirs of Marciano Nagaño
and covering Cad. Lot. No. 3275. Plaintiff-appellants alleged that the issuance of the said title
was on account of the fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation committed by defendant Marcario
Valerio. An information for perjury was even filed on November 2, 1983against defendant
Valerio, who unlawfully attested that Lot No. 3275 was not occupied or being claimed by
other persons. Plaintiff-appellants alleged that part of the subject property was owned by their
predecessors-in-interest Rufino Mallari and Ferminal Jamlig and that they were in possession
of the said land since 1920. They recently discovered that their entire Lot No.3275 was
registered by defendant Valerio under Free Patent No. (III-2) 001953 and OCT No. P-8265 in
the name of the heirs of Marciano Nagaño. They allegedly demanded from defendant Velerio
to execute the necessary document in order that the 2,250 square meters owned by them be
segregated from the property titled in the name of the defendants-appellee [petitioners
herein]. Defendants-appellee, however, refused to accede their demands.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondents claim ownership to the 2,250 square meter portion of the land
RULING:
It is clear from the allegations in the complaint that private respondents claim ownership to
the 2, 250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner, openly,
peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that
the lot is private land, or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private
respondents had already acquired imperfect title thereto. Consequently, merely on the basis of
the allegations in the complaint, the lot in question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of
the Director of the Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence,
dismissal of private respondent’s complaint was premature and trial on the merits should
have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters. In light of the above, and at this time,
prescription is unavailing against private respondent’s action. It is settled that a Free Patent
issued over private land is null and void, and produces no legal affects whatsoever.
Moreover, private respondents claim of open, public, peaceful, continuous and adverse
possession of the 2,250 square meter portion since 1920, and its illegal inclusion in the Free
Patent of petitioners and in their original certificate title, gave private respondents a cause of
action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible

Lim vs. Gamosa

December 2, 2015
FACTS:
Respondent Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community of Barangay Buenavista, Coron,
Palawan, filed a petition before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
against for "Violation of Rights to Free and Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and
Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioners argue that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction
over the petition filed by respondents because they (petitioners) are non-IPs/ICCs.
Essentially, they interpret the jurisdiction of the NCIP as limited to claims and disputes
involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both opposing parties are IPs/ICCs. Despite a motion to
dismiss being a prohibited pleading under the NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03,
petitioners moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: Lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition because [petitioners] are not members of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples; Lack of jurisdiction over the persons of
[petitioners], because summons were served by mail rather than by personal service; Lack of
cause of action, because there is no allegation in the petition or document attached thereto
showing that [respondents] were indeed authorized by the purported Tagbanua Indigenous
Cultural Community, and no Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title has as yet been issued
over the claim.
The CA upheld that when a claim or dispute involves rights of ICC / IP’s, the NCIP has the
jurisdiction over the case regardless of whether the opposing party is non ICC/IP. The NCIP
and the appellate court rely mainly on the wording of Section 66 of the IPRA and the averred
purpose for the law's enactment, "to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the rights
of the indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral land and to correct a grave historical
injustice to our indigenous people." According to the two tribunals, "any interpretation that
would restrict the applicability of the IPRA law exclusively to its members would certainly
leave them open to oppression and exploitation by outsiders."
The NCIP and the appellate court maintain that Section 66 does not distinguish between a
dispute among members of ICCs/IPs and a dispute involving ICC/IP members and
nonmembers. Section 66 of the IPRA, the law conferring jurisdiction on the NCIP, reads:
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, that
no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies
provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same
has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
petition with the NCIP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NCIP has jurisdiction over the subject matter in the case

RULING:
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept
of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in
origin, our national land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to
ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent. Land is not
an individual item which a man owns for himself and by himself. For he secures the rights to
land in two ways: Firstly, as a citizen of the tribe he is entitled to some arable land and
building land, and to the use of public pasturage, fishing waters, and wild products. Secondly,
in all tribes except those who shift their gardens widely and have an abundance of land, he
gets rights from membership of a village and a group of kinsfolk. That is, a man's right to
land in the tribal home depends upon his accepting membership of a tribe, with all its
obligations. The right of every subject, while he is a subject, is jealously safeguarded. There
is no clear irreconcilable conflict from the investiture of jurisdiction to the NCIP in instances
where, among others, all the parties are ICCs/IPs and the claim or dispute involves their
rights, and the specific wording of Batasang Pambansa Bilang 129, Sections 19-21on the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, and Sections 3335 on the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. All told, we rule that Section 66 of the IPRA, even as it grants
jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, requires
that the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all their remedies under their
customs and customary law before bringing their claim and dispute to the NCIP. The validity
of respondents' claim is another matter and a question that we need not answer for the
moment. Too, we do not resolve herein the other issues raised by petitioners given that we
already declared that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over the case of respondents against
petitioners.

Agnes vs. Republic

July 6, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioners claim to be among the first settlers in Calauit as successors of the early settlers
therein. Petitioners were removed from Calauit as the island was going to be set up as a zoo
for rare and exotic animals. In 1976, then President Marcos signed Presidential Proclamation
No. 1578 declaring the Island of Calauit as a Game Preserve and Wildlife Sanctuary.
President Marcos then issued another proclamation, excluding certain portions of the
Reservation and opening them to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act as
resettlement areas for the settlers of Calauit, but found unsuitable for habitation by the
petitioners. Thus, petitioners returned to Calauit Island. Respondents alleged that the
petitioners' repossession and reoccupation of portions of Calauit are patently unlawful and
grossly reproachable as they had already waived and relinquished whatever rights they had
on the island when they signed and executed their respective Resettlement Agreements. The
respondent also complained of the great damage and disturbance the petitioners were doing to
the natural resources and the protected animals in Calauit. In 2008, during the pendency of
the case in the Supreme Court, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8371, entitled "The Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Act of 1997," the Office of the President, through the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), issued a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) over
lands in the Municipality of Busuanga, Province of Palawan, in favor of the Tagbanua
Indigenous Cultural Community, which comprised the communities of Barangays Calauit
and Quezon, Calauit Island, and Municipality of Busuanga. Petitioners averred that the
issuance of the CADT "in favor of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community amounts to
an affirmation and recognition of the property rights of their ancestors from whom they
traced their present individual claims.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may be compelled to vacate Calauit by virtue of their
obligations enumerated in the Resettlement Agreements

HELD:
No. With the issuance by the Office of the President of the CADT, an ostensive successor to
the Resettlement Agreements, to the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community (ICC), the
resolution of the question on the propriety or impropriety of the latter contract and their
effects on the continued stay of the settlers on Calauit appears to have been rendered moot
and academic. The right to ancestral domain carries with it the right to "stay in the territory
and not to be removed therefrom." And the CADT was issued notwithstanding the existence
of Presidential Proclamation No. 1578, which recognized the existence of private rights
already extant at the time. Thus, although the issuance of the CADT in favor of the Tagbanua
ICC to develop, control, manage, and utilize Calauit does not affect the propriety or
impropriety of the execution of the Resettlement Agreements per se, the same, however,
gainsays the avowed consequence of said contracts, that is, to remove and transfer the settlers
from Calauit to the resettlement areas.

Begnaen vs. Spouses Caligtan

August 17, 2016
FACTS:

On 3 August 2006, petitioner Thomas Begnaen (Begnaen) filed a Complaint with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against respondents Spouses Leo and Elma Caligtan (Sps. Caligtan)
for "Land Dispute and Enforcement of Rights" before the Regional Hearing Office (RHO) of
the NCIP at La Trinidad, Benguet.7 The RHO thereafter issued an Order8 dismissing the
complaint based on respondents' argument that the case should have gone to the council of
elders and not through the Barangay Lupon, as mandated by the Indigenous Peoples' Rights
Act, instead of abiding by the Order of the RHO, Begnaen filed against the Sps. Caligtan a
Complaint for Forcible Entry with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction10
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bauko-Sabangan, Mt. Province.
AllegING that he was the owner of a 125 square meter parcel of land situated in Supang,
Sabangan, Mt. Province. He claimed that on two occasions,11 respondents - by using force,
intimidation, stealth, and threat entered a portion of the subject property, hurriedly put up a
chicken-wire fence, and started building a shack thereon without Begnaen's knowledge and
consent. Meanwhile, respondents averred that they owned the area in question as part of the
land they had purchased from a certain Leona Vicente in 1959 pursuant to age-old customs
and traditions. They introduced improvements evidencing their prior physical possession.13
Respondents further contended that when petitioner's father Alfonso Begnaen (Alfonso) was
still alive, he had always respected their boundary wherein a "GIKAD" or old pine tree
lumber was buried and recovered. The "GIKAD" established their boundary pursuant to age-
old Igorot customs and traditions. To further mark their boundary, respondents also planted
bushes and a mango tree, all of which Alfonso had likewise respected. MCTC RULING
dismissed the ejectment complaint in favor of respondents. However, this was without
prejudice to the filing of a case before the RHO of the NCIP. Aggrieved, petitioner- appellant
filed an appeal before Regional Trial Court Branch 35 of Bontoc, Mt. Province (RTC). RTC
RULING RTC reversed and set aside the Resolution and Order of the MCTC, saying that it
was the latter court that had jurisdiction over the case for forcible entry. The RTC reasoned
that the provisions of the IPRA pertaining to jurisdiction do not espouse exclusivity and thus
cannot divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases as
provided by B.P. Big. 129. Respondents appealed to the CA. CA RULING CA reversed and
set aside the RTC rulings and reinstated the Resolution of the MCTC. In upholding the
jurisdiction of the NCIP over the present case, the CA ruled that the passage of the IPRA has
divested regular courts of their jurisdiction when the parties involved are members of
ICCs/IPs and the disputed property forms part of their ancestral land/domain.21 Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA . Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA, in upholding the jurisdiction of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) over the aforementioned dispute, to the exclusion of regular
courts, committed reversible error
RULING:
The NCIP Rule purporting to establish the jurisdiction of the NCIP-Regional Hearing Officer
as original and exclusive has been declared VOID for expanding the law. In its assailed
Decision, the CA reversed the RTC and held that jurisdiction properly lies with the NCIP, to
the exclusion of the regular courts. R.A. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997,
particularly Sections 65 and 66 thereof, provide: SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws
and Practices, when disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve the dispute. SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. The NCIP, through its regional
offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs:
Provided, however, that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. AND A certification shall be
issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute
that the same has not been resolved. The IPRA confers jurisdiction on the NCIP over "all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs," without qualification as to whether such
jurisdiction is original and/or exclusive. However, Section 5, Rule III of NCIP Administrative
Circular No. 1-03 dated 9 April 2003, known as "The Rules on Pleadings, Practice, and
Procedure before the NCIP" (NCIP Rules), went beyond the provisions of the IPRA to
provide: 24 Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices
shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpret.
At best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts
in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before
them within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. Thus, the court struck down as void the
NCIP rule purporting to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction upon the RHO, contrary to
the provisions of the IPRA.
 Anak Mindanao Part List vs. Executive Secretary
August 29, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants
Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364
and 379, both issued in 2004, via the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
prayer for injunctive relief. EO. 364, as amended by EO. 379, among other things, orders that
the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) placed under the supervision and
control of the Department of Land Reform, and the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) shall be an attached agency of the Department of Land Reform. Why is this
important? It alleges that by issuing Eos 364 and 379, the Executive has impaired the powers
of Congress. AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes,
they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders. It
alleges that it is concerned with the negative impact of NCIP becoming an attached agency of
the DAR on the processing of ancestral domain claims. On the issue of Locus Standi, as a
member of Congress, it has the standing to maintain the prerogatives, powers, and privileges
vested by the constitution in his office. No direct interest shown; Raises no issue of
transcendental importance; Too abstract to be considered judicially cognizable
ISSUE:
Whether or not the placing of the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under
the supervision and control of the DAR, and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) under the DAR as an attached agency is within the ambit of Executive powers
RULING:
Yes. The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over executive
departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And it lays down a limitation on the
legislative power. The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control in the President
justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of
law. Administrative Code of 1987 Sec. 31: “The President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President”
o The consolidation of functions in E.O. 364 aims to attain the objectives of simplicity,
economy and efficiency as gathered from the provision granting PCUP and NCIP access to
the range of services provided by the DARs technical offices and support systems. In the
present case, glaringly failed to show how the reorganization by executive fiat would hamper
the exercise of citizens’ rights and privileges. A law is presumed constitutional unless proved
otherwise. On the issue of Sec 16 Art. 13 of the Constitution (The right of the people and
their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political,
and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms) being violated: the state merely
facilitates this participation, and not necessarily create these mechanisms. The State provides
the support, but eventually it is the people, properly organized in their associations, who can
assert the right and pursue the objective.
 Alvarez vs. Picop Resources, Inc.
December 3, 2009
FACTS:
PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an
application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In
the middle of the processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused to attend
further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus1 against then DENR
Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus
to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP.

The RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOP’s Petition for Mandamus. The DENR
Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied. So, DENR Secretary filed a
Notice of Appeal. The Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals affirmed8 the Decision of
the RTC. The DENR Secretary and PICOP filed with this Court separate Petitions for Review
of the 19 February 2004 Court of Appeals Decision. The Petition in G.R. No. 162243 is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the RTC Decision
granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines
(PICOP) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition in G.R. No. 164516 seeking
the reversal of the same Decision insofar as it nullified the award of damages in favor of
PICOP is DENIED for lack of merit. The Petition in G.R. No. 171875, assailing the lifting of
the Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction in favor of the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1969 Document is a contract enforceable under the Non-Impairment
clause as to make the signing of the IFMA a ministerial duty

RULING:

We have ruled, however, that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the non-
impairment clause, much less a contract specifically enjoining the DENR Secretary to issue
the IFMA. The conclusion that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the
non-impairment clause has even been disposed of in another case decided by another division
of this Court, PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, 94 the
Decision in which case has become final and executory. PICOP’s Petition for Mandamus
should, therefore, fail.

Furthermore, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the 1969 Document is a
contract recognized under the non-impairment clause, and even if we assume for the sake of
argument that the same is a contract specifically enjoining the DENR Secretary to issue an
IFMA, PICOP’s Petition for Mandamus must still fail. The 1969 Document expressly states
that the warranty as to the tenure of PICOP is "subject to compliance with constitutional and
statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions." Thus, if PICOP
proves the two above-mentioned matters, it still has to prove compliance with statutory and
administrative requirements for the conversion of its TLA into an IFMA.
 Sanson vs. Indigenous Peoples of Boracay
June 10, 2019
FACTS:
The Ati Indigenous Cultural Community/ Indigenous Peoples of Boracay Island (ATI) filed a
petition for the identification, delineation, and recognition of its Ancestral Domain Claim and
issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) for a parcel of land located at
Barangay Manoc-manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan which was granted by the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) En Banc in its resolution dated August 3, 2010,
directing the Ancestral Domain Office to prepare a CADT covering the property in favor of
ATI. Consequently, an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was issued in the name of ATI by
the Register of Deedsof [Link] 2011, the claimants filed a Complaint for Cancellation of
OCT and of CADT, Reconveyance and Damages before the RTC of Kaliboon the ground that
respondents committed fraudulent acts in the issuance of the CADT. In response, ATI and
NCIP invoked the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction of the trial over the subject
matter of the case, which was denied by the RTC and instead issued orders affirming its
jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, CA granted the petition for certiorari in the assailed
Decision, reversing the decision of the RTC dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and
found that RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in taking cognizance of the petitioner’s complaint. It ruled that the complaint for
the cancellation of the original CADT issued to respondent ATI should have been filed with
the NCIP, which has exclusive and original jurisdiction over this action, and not with the
regular courts of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the NCIP has jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
Yes. The NCIP has the “primary jurisdiction” over any appeals for the cancellation of CADT
in accordance with the IPRA Law. It is contrary to the ruling of CA that NCIP has “exclusive
and original jurisdiction” over the case. The Court affirmed the CA’s finding that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case for the case absent any
showing that it had been ruled upon by the NCIP, or that the circumstances were present to
justify its exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Under Section 66 and Section 54
of the IPRA Law, NCIP has primary jurisdiction over adverse claims and border disputes
arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands, and cancellation of fraudulently
issued CADTs regardless of whether the parties are non-ICC/IP, or where the opposing
parties are members of different ICC/IP group. It is clear that respondent ATI participated in
the petition for delineation and recognition of its ancestral domain claim and issuance of
CADT over the property. Petitioners could have filed an appeal from the NCIP En Banc
Resolution to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule X, Section 27 of the Revised Rules of
Procedure before the NCIP. The records show that no such appeal was taken. It would then
appear that the complaint subsequently filed was an attempt to revive a lost appeal, which
cannot be countenanced. Thus, petition for review on certiorari was denied and CA’s decision
was affirmed. The ownership of the 25,310 square -meter land, or roughly 2-hectares was
granted in favor of the ATI.
 Alvarez vs. Picop Resources, Inc.
November 29, 2006
FACTS:

PICOP was granted Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 covering an area of 75,545
hectares in Surigao Del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley, and Davao Oriental, to
"terminate on April 25, 2002." On 23 December 1999, DENR promulgated DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53 mandating the conversion of the TLA into IFMA that
is primarily aimed at sustaining the raw materials for the continuous operation of the
integrated wood processing plant of the company. Pursuant to this, PICOP signified its
intention to convert its TLA No. 43 into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement
(IFMA). A Performance Evaluation Team was created to conduct performance evaluation
indicating violations by PICOP of such as the non-submission of its five-year forest
protection plan and seven-year reforestation plan as required by the DENR rules and
regulations. Also there are alleged unpaid and overdue forest charges of PICOP. It was the
position of the DENR members that PICOP’s application for the IFMA conversion should
undergo the process as provided in DAO No. 99-53. PICOP representative Atty. Caingat,
however, claimed that "the conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA has already been
completed" and indicated that they had "no choice except to decline participation in the
ongoing meeting and bring our issues to the proper public and legal forum." Accordingly, the
Secretary of DENR claims that further processing of PICOP’s application for the conversion
of TLA No. 43 cannot proceed until PICOP complies with the requirements. Insisting that the
conversion of its TLA No. 43 had been completed, PICOP filed a Petition for Mandamus
against then DENR Secretary Alvarez before the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC rendered a
Decision granting PICOP’s Petition for Mandamus. On appeal, CA affirmed the Decision of
the RTC. Hence, this petition by the DENR assailing that the mandamus filed by PICOP
should be out rightly dismissed on the ground that RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case since the acts questioned herein are related to the licensing regulation and
management of forest resources. Furthermore, RTC is prohibited to issue TRO, writs of
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction as provided by PD605 and
RA8975.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case because the
subject matter thereof pertains to the exclusive administrative domain of the denr secretary
RULING:

Yes. The Petition filed before the trial court was one for mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction with damages.
Specifically, it sought to compel the DENR Secretary to: (1) sign, execute and deliver the
IFMA documents to PICOP; (2) issue the corresponding IFMA number assignment; and (3)
approve the harvesting of timber by PICOP from the area of TLA No. 43. In its petition for
mandamus, [PICOP] asserted that "DENR Secretary Alvarez acted with grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction in refusing to perform his ministerial duty to sign,
execute and deliver the IFMA contract and to issue the corresponding IFMA number to it."
What is at stake is not the scope of the DENR jurisdiction but the manner by which it
exercises or refuses to exercise that jurisdiction. The courts have the duty and power to strike
down any official act or omission tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is disregarded when there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention, which are averred to be extant in this case, citing
PICOP’s employment of a sizable number of workers and its payment of millions in taxes to
the government. Moreover, contrary to [the DENR Secretary’s] claim, the approval of an
application for IFMA conversion is not purely discretionary on the part of the DENR
Secretary since the approval of an IFMA conversion depends upon compliance with the
requirements provided under DAO No. 99-53. Even assuming, arguendo, that the approval of
an IFMA conversion involves the exercise of discretion by the DENR Secretary, the writ of
mandamus may be issued to compel the proper exercise of that discretion where it is shown
that there was grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
DENR Sec is wrong in invoking the provisions of PD605 and RA8975. These statutes merely
proscribe the issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction. They cannot, under pain of violating the Constitution,
deprive the courts of authority to take cognizance of the issues raised in the principal action,
as long as such action and the relief sought are within their jurisdiction. Hence, the outright
dismissal of the mandamus prayed for by DENR herein is hereby denied.

Republic vs. Lachica

March 26, 2014
FACTS:

Before the MCTC, respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima
Lachica Sin who died in 1945 and who was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay
Tambac, New Washington, Aklan. In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents
inherited from Maxima Sin was occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for
educational purpose. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in
possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy
land until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession, respondents
presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.

On August 26, 1991, the respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint
against Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF
Superintendent) for recovery of possession, quieting of title and declaration of ownership
with damages claiming that the latter usurped their rights over the property.

ANCF countered that the subject land was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating the area of said property as civil reservation for
educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the
subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.

Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant and Lucio
Arquisola, who retired from the service during the pendency of the case, was substituted by
Ricardo Andres, then the designated Officer–in–Charge of ANCF.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view of
the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of first–level courts.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181.

On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, declaring them
the owner and possessor of the land in question in this case and for the defendants to cause
the segregation of the same from the Civil Reservation of the Aklan National College of
Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No. 2074 dated March 31, 1981.

Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, where the
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6130. On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision
affirming the MCTC judgment with modification absolving Appellant Ricardo Andres from
the payment of damages and attorney’s fees. All other details of the appealed decision are
affirmed in toto. Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade,
in her capacity as the new Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals through a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
unanimously held that respondents retain private rights to the disputed property by virtue of
their and their predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to
an imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the claim of the respondents amounts to judicial confirmation of imperfect
title

RULING:

No. At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration
Decree. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree provide the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect title: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself
or through his predecessors–in–interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which the source of any is
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by
the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man
and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof
in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as
a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must be a positive act declaring land
of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable. In the case at bar, it are therefore the respondents which have the burden to
identify a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since
respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors–in–
interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents
cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as
to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject property.

Republic vs. Mangotara

July 7, 2010
FACTS:

As a result of the 1997 Cacho case, the decrees of registration were reissued bearing new
numbers and OCTs were issued for the two parcels of land in Doña Demetria’s name. The
dispute over Lots 1 and 2 did not end with the termination of the 1997 Cacho case. Another
four cases involving the same parcels of land were instituted before the trial courts during and
after the pendency of the 1997 Cacho case. These cases are: Expropriation Case, Quieting of
Title Case, Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case, Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case.
The Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case: On October 13, 2004, the Republic filed a
Complaint for the Cancellation of OCT and Reversion against the late Doña Demetria,
represented by her alleged heirs, Vidal and/or Teofilo, together with AZIMUTH and
LANDTRADE. On October 15, 1998, Original Certificates of Title were issued in the name
of “Demetria Cacho, widow, now deceased…” consisting of a total area of Three Hundred
Seventy-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred and Seven (378,707) square meters and Three
Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty-Five (3,635) square meters, respectively, situated in Iligan
City. The afore-stated titles were issued in implementation of a decision rendered in Cacho v.
Government of the United States. The RTC-Branch 4 likewise held that the Republic failed to
state a cause of action in its Complaint. The arguments of the Republic—i.e., the absence of a
new survey plan and deed, the titles covered properties with much larger area than that
granted by the LRC—had been answered squarely in the 1997 Cacho case. Also, the
Complaint failed to allege that fraud had been committed in having the titles registered and
that the Director of Lands requested the reversion of the subject parcels of land.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Republic’s Complaint for Reversion will prosper

RULING:
Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the
government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land
subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee.134 In Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v.
Republic135 (Yujuico case), reversion was defined as an action which seeks to restore public
land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass
of public domain. It bears to point out, though, that the Court also allowed the resort by the
Government to actions for reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than
fraud. The reversion case of the Republic rests on the main argument that the OCT’s issued in
Doña Demetria’s name, included parcels of lands which were not adjudicated to her by the
Court in the 1914 Cacho case. Just because OCTs were already issued in Doña Demetria’s
name does not bar the Republic from instituting an action for reversion. Indeed, the Court
made it clear in Francisco v. Rodriguez that Section 101 of the Public Land Act “may be
invoked only when title has already vested in the individual, e.g., when a patent or a
certificate of title has already been issued” for the basic premise in an action for reversion is
that the certificate of title fraudulently or unlawfully included land of the public domain,
hence, calling for the cancellation of said certificate. It is actually the issuance of such a
certificate of title which constitutes the third element of a cause of action for reversion. The
Court further finds that the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 sufficiently
states a cause of action for reversion, even though it does not allege that fraud was committed
in the registration or that the Director of Lands requested the reversion. The other contention
that the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 does not allege that it had been filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), at the behest of the Director of Lands, does not call for its
dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Section 101 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended, simply requires that:
“SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain
or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in
his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.”