In collaboration with

McKinsey & Company

The Global Cooperation

Barometer 2025
Second Edition
INSIGHT REPORT
JANUARY 2025
Images: Getty Images

Contents
Foreword 3

About the Global Cooperation Barometer  4

Executive summary 6

Introduction: The state of global cooperation 7

1 Five pillars of global cooperation 11

Pillar 1: Trade and capital 11

Pillar 2: Innovation and technology 14

Pillar 3: Climate and natural capital 16

Pillar 4: Health and wellness 18

Pillar 5: Peace and security 20

2 Recommendations: the need for disordered cooperation  22

Appendix 23

Contributors 26

Endnotes 28

Disclaimer
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conclusions expressed herein are a result
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storage and retrieval system.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 2

January 2025 The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025
Second Edition

Foreword
Børge Brende
Bob Sternfels
President and
Global Managing Partner,
Chief Executive Officer,
McKinsey & Company
World Economic Forum

The second edition of the Global Cooperation multistakeholder processes. Unlocking the benefits
Barometer comes amid unsettled political and of technological innovations in an equitable way while
geopolitical climates. ensuring necessary guardrails are in place to mitigate
risks will require some form of coordination.
Political shockwaves cut across many continents
this past year – a “super year” of elections in which As a result, leaders will need new mechanisms for
half the world’s population had the opportunity to working together on key priorities, even as they
go to the polls.1 For the first time, every governing disagree on others. The past several years have
party facing an election in a developed economy shown this balance is possible. Foreign investment
lost vote share.2 These expressions of electorate announcements are increasing across the world
disapproval are due, in large measure, to forces and data and intellectual property (IP) are flowing
that have been building for over a decade and were between countries in ever greater quantities.
intensified by the COVID-19 pandemic. A sense Meanwhile, global commitments to climate- and
of insecurity – financial or personal – has increased resilience-linked finance continue to grow.
alongside feelings that the “system” has not been
working. People around the world are looking for It is against this backdrop that the World Economic
solutions while expressing a desire for change Forum and McKinsey & Company have released this
to the mechanisms meant to deliver results. second edition of the Global Cooperation Barometer
with a focus on where cooperation stands today and
At the same time, the global order that held for what it can look like in the new technological age.
the first 30 years after the end of the Cold War The inaugural 2024 report stated its intentions: to
has passed. Today, competition and conflict are serve as a tool for leaders to better understand the
rising, and countries are re-examining their place contours of cooperation broadly and along five pillars
in the world. Alongside geopolitical upheaval, – trade and capital flows, innovation and technology,
technological change is also under way. The rapid climate and natural capital, health and wellness, and
development and uptake of frontier technologies peace and security. In its second year, the barometer
such as generative artificial intelligence is poised draws on new data from the 41 indicators to offer an
to reshape economies and societies. updated picture of the state of cooperation today:
overall cooperation has been steady, with some
While the geopolitical dial won’t, and shouldn’t, significant drops that are offset by other gains.
turn back to the order of the past, it must turn
more towards cooperation. Advancing global The hope is that by measuring the state of
health, prosperity and resilience cannot be done cooperation, the barometer can track trends and
by single nations alone. Resolving ongoing security identify the potential for new areas of cooperation
challenges can only happen through multilateral and and help plot a path forward.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 3

 About the Global
Cooperation Barometer
The Global Cooperation Barometer is Outcome metrics (such as life expectancy)
structured along five dimensions of global measure the progress of cooperation but are
connection: trade and capital, innovation and typically influenced by additional factors beyond
technology, climate and natural capital, health cooperation. The metrics span countries in all
and wellness, and peace and security. geographies and all levels of development.

These five pillars were chosen because of their The barometer examines the period from 2012
impact on global development and their explicit to 2023 to establish a trend line of cooperation.
dependence on cooperative efforts among nations It indexes data to 2020 for the following reason:
and economies. As a guiding element in the as the COVID-19 pandemic (hereafter referred to
analysis, the barometer identified goals that actors as “the pandemic”) took hold, it accelerated many
are working towards in each of these themes. existing trends in business and society and set
In doing so, the barometer draws inspiration from many new ones in motion. Indexing the time series
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals to 2020 highlights the trends in place before the
(SDGs) and the efforts of other global institutions. pandemic and those that emerged from it.
Note that some metrics have been inverted so that
To quantify change in these pillars, 41 indicators any increase represents a positive development.
were identified that research suggests are either
cooperative actions that advance progress towards Though this tool is imperfect and necessarily
the goals of the pillars or demonstrate a broad incomplete, it offers an overview of global
outcome from those actions. Cooperative action cooperation that both captures broad
metrics measure actions that provide evidence trends and identifies important nuances.
of cooperation; these indicators (such as flows
of goods and exchange of intellectual property) The methodology used for the Global Cooperation
are evidence of real, manifested cooperation Barometer is outlined on the following page. Details
and do not include “on paper” commitments. on sourcing of individual metrics are in the Appendix.

FIGURE 1 The Global Cooperation Barometer’s five pillars of global cooperation

The barometer rests on five pillars of global cooperation

Trade and Innovation Climate and Health Peace

capital and technology natural capital and wellness and security
Promote global Accelerate innovation Support the resolution Enable global Prevent
development and beneficial of climate and natural population to lead and resolve
and resilience technological progress capital challenges longer and better lives conflicts
Focus of analysis is Focus of analysis is Focus of analysis is on Focus of analysis is on Focus of analysis is
on 1) development and on 1) global progress 1) lowering of emissions, 1) impact of the burden of on 1) prevention of death
resilient outcomes; in innovation and preservation of disease on duration and and long-term negative
through 2) presence technology; through natural capital, and quality of life; through implications of conflict;
of global economic 2) presence of the global preparedness for likely 2) commitment to global through, 2) commitment
flows that promote sharing of underlying impact of climate change; public health standards to multilateral
likely opportunities knowledge that through, 2) shared global and collaboration through peacekeeping operations
for these outcomes contributes to these goals/commitments that flows of goods, R&D/IP and international
outcomes by fostering increase humanity’s and health financing stabilization efforts
collaboration across ability to limit and adapt
global talent to the dynamics of
a changing climate

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 4

Data coverage 1. Indexed trendlines
Data from 2020 serves as the base year to
develop comparable trendlines, with all values
1. Geography in 2020 equal to one (2020 = 1). This base-
Across all metrics, the barometer aims year standardization is the basis of the score
to collect global data. In most cases, an calculation, enabling a uniform reference
aggregate global weighted average is available. point for all metrics and comparability, despite
When a global weighted average is not different units and datasets.
available, the most comprehensive data is
used – such as Organisation for Economic Co- 2. Data normalization
operation and Development (OECD) member Where possible, metrics are normalized to ensure
countries, or a sample set of countries where that trendlines can be assessed independently
data is available for all years. of the effects of economic growth or population
changes. For example, trade, capital and other
2. Years financial flows are normalized to global GDP
While the barometer measures cooperation (gross domestic product) while migration metrics
from 2012 through 2023, some metrics are normalized to global population levels.
do not have data for all years. All
metrics have 2020 data to ensure the 3. Weighting
indexed trendline can be calculated. Each pillar comprises two indices: an action
index and an outcome index. To arrive at each,
the metrics within are weighted equally
(i.e. the action index is a simple average
Index calculation of metrics measuring cooperative actions).
The overall index for a pillar is calculated as
To evaluate global cooperation fairly and compare an average of the action and outcome metrics.
trendlines of the action and outcome metrics across Aggregate indices across pillars are also
the five pillars, the global cooperation barometer calculated as a simple average of pillar indices
applies the following methodology: (i.e. equal weighting across pillars).

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 5

Executive summary
Amid increasing global disorder, leaders
must find new ways to cooperate.

As the world transitions from what had been a stable and wellness, and peace and security. In this way,
post-Cold War global order to a new, more unsettled leaders can identify what is working and what is not,
and unpredictable period, political and geopolitical and adjust course accordingly.
turbulence has the potential to degrade global
cooperative efforts. But it does not need to. Amid The barometer finds that after trending mostly
mounting economic, environmental, technological positively for the better part of a decade, overall
and security challenges, constituencies may not global cooperation is above pre-COVID-19
be in favour of current methods but are looking for pandemic (hereafter referred to as “the pandemic”)
collaborative solutions to, rather than retreat from, levels but has flatlined over the past three years.
these issues. A key reason for the stall has been the significant
degradation in global peace and security, which has
As a result, leaders will need to be adaptive and pulled the barometer’s overall measurement down.
innovative within today’s more disordered context, Still, the barometer shows that while cooperation
identifying new ways to work with partners may be slowing in some areas, there are also signs
to deliver results. Progress will be especially of growth.
important, not only because the patience of
populations is wearing thin but because time is – Trade and capital: cooperation dropped
running out. As the world enters the latter half slightly, driven mostly by reductions in goods
of the decade, there is limited time to meet the trade in China and developing economies.
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), of which These declines were partially offset by growing
just 17% are currently on course.3 flows of capital, services and people.

This lack of progress comes as the past year was – Innovation and technology: digitization of the
the hottest on record, the global economy faces global economy continues to drive increased
weak growth prospects and global security is at cooperation, but global fragmentation of
a crisis point. Many of these challenges caused frontier technologies could slow global
voters around the world to express a desire for a productivity growth.
change to the status quo. Yet, despite strong voter
backlash last year against sitting governments, – Climate and natural capital: cooperation
there are signals that constituencies are looking continues to show strength, but it needs to
to accelerate rather than derail solutions. For improve much more and much faster if the world
instance, a large share of the global population is to meet climate and natural capital goals.
wants their respective country to do more when
it comes to addressing climate change.4 – Health and wellness: health outcomes like
life expectancy continue to improve post-
At the same time, advancements in frontier pandemic, but cross-border development
technologies are racing ahead faster than assistance for health is falling.
mechanisms can be developed to address
their risks and share their benefits. Leaders – – Peace and security: the world’s collective
even those who may be market or geostrategic security system is under severe pressure
competitors – will need to work together to unlock from geopolitical tensions. Cooperation on
the benefits of technology while placing appropriate this pillar deteriorated and pulled down the
safeguards around it. overall barometer. Increased conflicts and the
high number of forcibly displaced people are
The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 uses prominent challenges.
41 indicators to measure the current state of
global cooperation. As with last year’s inaugural Ultimately, as last year’s edition presented,
edition, the aim is to offer leaders a tool to better the foundation of resilience, security and growth
understand the contours of cooperation broadly and is cooperation. The question leaders must ask
along five pillars: trade and capital flows, innovation themselves, then, is not whether they should
and technology, climate and natural capital, health cooperate, but how.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 6

 Introduction: The state
of global cooperation
Within a turbulent global context,
cooperation is flatlining.

Global cooperation is above pre-COVID-19 in the Middle East have taken the lives of tens
pandemic levels, but only barely, and has stagnated of thousands and the war in Sudan is creating a
since 2020. The flatlining of cooperation comes as humanitarian crisis. All told, it is estimated that
the world is entering a state of greater instability 122 million people worldwide are currently forcibly
caused by high levels of electoral discontent and displaced, double the number from a decade
geopolitical rivalry. ago.6 The inability of the international community
to come together to prevent or stop this escalation
The last year saw elections in 72 countries, of violence is the most serious concern about the
with many incumbent governments, both left and state of the global cooperative muscle.
right facing strong voter backlash. The common
message among electorates has been for change The concern with a stalled level of cooperation
to the status quo. At the same time, global tensions is that as the world enters the second half of
have risen, threatening to undermine prior patterns the decade, with critical global deadlines ahead,
of multilateral cooperation. progress is not where it needs to be. For instance,
just 17% of the Sustainable Development
A “purgatory of polarity”, as the United Nations (UN) Goals (SDGs) are on track to meet the 2030
Secretary-General António Guterres termed it – in deadline.7 Furthermore, as many communities
which global divisions widen and harden – is most have experienced, global temperatures have
stark when it comes to the degradation of security risen to record levels, with 2024 being the
around the world.5 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is hottest year on record.8 Additionally, global
approaching the three-year mark, ongoing conflicts economic growth is projected to be at historically

FIGURE 2 Global cooperation overall and by pillar

Global Cooperation Barometer over time

1.2

Climate and natural capital

1.1

Trade and capital

Innovation and technology

1.0
Overall
Health and wellness

0.9

0.8

Peace and security

0.7
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Source: Aggregation of 41 metrics, McKinsey & Company analysis.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 7

 weak levels (3.1% over the coming five years), The mixed picture of cooperation is salient when
according to the International Monetary Fund comparing cooperation before and after the
(IMF).9 This projection comes alongside a COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 3). Strengthened
burgeoning debt crisis that has left over 3 billion cooperation can be seen across four of the five
people living in countries that spend more on pillars, notably when it comes to indicators that
debt interest than education or health.10 track the cross-border spread of knowledge, R&D,
data flows and the increase of certain capital flows
The sharp decline in global security has weighed such as foreign investment and climate finance.
heavily on the Global Cooperation Barometer’s However, these positive markers should be
calculation of global cooperation. It is a key reason qualified in two ways; firstly, that rising flows were
the barometer shows that for the last three years, often concentrated in a few economies, potentially
overall global cooperation has levelled off despite undermining the broad-based prosperity that is
relatively stronger levels of cooperation in the areas needed to sustain cooperative trends. Secondly,
of climate and nature, innovation and technology, as noted, these flows remain well below levels
and health and wellness (Figure 2). required to reach collective goals (for example,
reaching net-zero targets).
However, the flatlining of cooperation does not
mean that cooperation has completely receded. In As the world moves further away from the post-
September 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted Cold War era of cooperation and finds itself
the Pact for the Future – an ambitious agenda to in a period of greater disorder, it is at risk of
strengthen international cooperation and revitalize maintaining a new, structurally muted cooperative
multilateralism. In November, the world’s 20 largest normal that offers fewer opportunities for actors
economies agreed in Rio de Janeiro to a joint G20 to pursue solutions to known and emerging global
Leader’s Declaration, a few days prior to a global issues together. To avoid this outcome, leaders will
agreement for a climate financing at the UN Climate need to take steps that deliver immediate results
Change Conference (COP29) in Baku. However, both to populations who are waiting for answers while
did fall short of expectations, signalling that the global putting the world on course towards achieving
cooperative muscle, while working, is atrophying. collective goals.

FIGURE 3 Comparison of pre- and post-pandemic cooperation

Excluding the COVID-19 period, cooperation has increased across all pillars besides peace and security
The black 45-degree line marks where cooperation in the latest two years (2022-23) is equal to the two years preceding the COVID-19
pandemic (2018-19), and the red line represents where the metrics would be if they maintained the average pre-pandemic trend. Four
of the pillars displayed increased levels of cooperation relative to the pre-pandemic trend (above both the red and black lines).

1.10
Higher post-2020 Climate and natural capital
Trade and capital
1.05
Innovation and technology

1.00
2022-23 average

Health and wellness

0.95

0.90

0.85

Lower post-2020
0.80
Peace and security
0.75
0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03

2018-19 average

Extrapolated increase based on 2012-19 trend 45° line, where 2022-23 average = 2018-19 average

Source: Aggregation of 41 metrics, McKinsey & Company analysis.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 8

 Innovation: a frontline of
cooperation… and competition

Frontier technologies are reshaping the global Biden agreed to prevent AI from having control over
landscape. As the world enters a new period in nuclear weapons systems. In September, the UN
which machine learning applications will scale Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Body on
across economies and societies, mastering artificial AI issued its final report, Governing AI for Humanity,
intelligence (AI) will be crucial for countries and which presents the first global plan for addressing
companies to deliver growth.11 Generative AI AI-related risks and ensuring the benefits of the
alone could generate $2.6 trillion to $4.4 trillion in technology are shared equitably.
value across industries.12 Yet, while AI is projected
to affect almost 40% of jobs around the world, In today’s challenging context, leaders will both
according to the IMF, approximately half of these need to find ways to work together to prevent
are at risk of redundancy.13 new advancements in AI from being used for
harmful purposes (either on its own or by malicious
Both companies and countries are racing to actors), and unlock benefits in the areas the Global
position themselves competitively within this Cooperation Barometer measures.
new reality. In just over a year since it was
introduced, generative AI is being used by the
organizations of 65% of respondents to a McKinsey Trade and capital: crucial to and
& Company survey of global executives.14 At
the country level, US federal investment in AI
a beneficiary of new technologies
has accelerated significantly15 in recent years
and China is expected to invest $1.4 trillion in Well-functioning global cooperation in the form of
its AI industry over the coming years.16 Saudi trade and capital flow is a crucial requirement for the
Arabia has committed17 to invest $100 billion invention and deployment of new technologies. This
in AI projects and India announced plans to type of cooperation includes the flow of financing
develop a “national AI innovation ecosystem”.18 for innovation, the flow of cross-border services to
develop innovation, and the flow of materials and
The rapid increase in national funding of AI, goods to manufacture and distribute innovation.
alongside restrictions in some countries over Once technologies are developed, cooperation
the ability to invest in foreign markets, raises is needed to ensure that these technologies are
the possibility of a new frontline of geostrategic shared equitably. Rising trade restrictions, especially
competition, with the potential for an “AI arms race” in important innovation sectors such as low-carbon
in which countries compete in zero-sum rivalry technologies, present significant risks to global
for geostrategic advantage.19 This landscape of cooperation and progress on sustainability goals
competition would complicate the ability to develop and the global accessibility of these innovations.20
safeguards to mitigate the risks of new technology.
Mastering
Left ungoverned, AI could accelerate the While trade is crucial for facilitating the development
artificial intelligence dissemination of disinformation and bring new risks of new technologies, new technologies can
will be crucial for to peace and security. Yet, signs of cooperation offer immense efficiency gains and increased
countries and have emerged. For instance, in November 2024 opportunities for trade. By some estimates,
companies to at a meeting in Peru on the sidelines of the APEC digitizing the trade ecosystem could increase trade
deliver growth. Summit, Chinese President Xi and US President across the G7 by nearly $9 trillion or nearly 43%.21

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 9

Climate and natural capital: At the same time, global collaboration is crucial
to strengthening risk detection and protocols
innovation as a lynchpin of for pandemics. The World Health Organization’s
meeting green goals (WHO) Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic
Intelligence is working towards a world where
As much as 90% of 2050 baseline man-made collaborative surveillance empowers countries
emissions could potentially be abated using and communities to minimize the impact of
current technologies.22 However, less than 10% of pandemic and epidemic threats. Collaborative
the required deployment has occurred to date.23 surveillance, preparedness, response and
Cooperation is needed to realize the potential of resilience facilitate the systematic strengthening
technologies and ensure they are deployed and of capacity among diverse stakeholders
equitably distributed. Indeed, the Paris Agreement globally (both within and beyond the health
notes “the importance of technology for the sector) to enhance public health intelligence
implementation of mitigation and adaptation and improve evidence for decision-making.
actions” when it comes to climate action.24

Nascent innovations that are early in their Peace and security: innovation
development curve but could be crucial for
the energy transition could also open (and rely
as a tool for accord
on) new avenues of cooperation. For example,
decarbonizing steel and ammonia could motivate Technology has been a long-standing factor in
new flows of hydrogen derivatives and “green iron” shaping developments on the battlefield, but in
between economies in Africa and Europe. recent years, new technologies have also helped
with conflict response and even mitigation.

Health and wellness: High-resolution satellite imagery has been

indispensable in assessing infrastructure damage
advancing global health in Ukraine. Organizations such as the UN Institute
requires shared innovation for Training and Research (UNITAR) and private
companies such as Maxar Technologies have
Frontier technologies are showing immense promise provided up-to-date images of conflict zones.
regarding the detection, diagnosis and treatment of These images help map destroyed buildings,
diseases. Yet, these developments, as well as long- roads, bridges and utilities. The data supports
standing technologies such as imaging devices, are humanitarian aid planning and lays the groundwork
often limited in low- and middle-income countries.25 for future reconstruction efforts by identifying priority
Cooperative approaches to bringing medical areas for rebuilding.
technology to underserved areas or developing
innovation or production pipelines will be key to Organizations are using AI and technologies like
advancing global health priorities. secure content verification tools on the frontline
of conflict to identify patterns of violence, monitor
The many biomedical innovations born of ceasefire agreements and help strengthen
cooperation that are now gaining momentum will peacekeeping efforts.27 Improved cooperation could
continue to provide a tailwind for health outcomes help prevent conflicts from spreading by identifying
around the world. The BioNTech/Pfizer COVID-19 and countering misinformation online, defending
vaccine – comprised of 280 components from 19 computer systems against cyberattacks, and
different countries26 – pioneered the use of mRNA developing technology to help mitigate damage,
(messenger ribonucleic acid) vaccines, which are such as early-warning systems, emergency
now being studied for their potential to treat a range services, and search and rescue.
of diseases, from influenza to cancer.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 10

 1 Five pillars of
global cooperation
Measuring cooperation along five pillars
presents a picture of where cooperation
is increasing and where it isn’t.

The Global Cooperation Barometer measures global Each pillar examines evidence of cooperative
cooperation across five areas, or pillars: trade and actions and outcomes of these actions to
capital flows, innovation and technology, climate determine an overall level of global cooperation
and natural capital, health and wellness, and peace in that area.
and security.

Pillar 1 Trade and capital

Cooperation dropped slightly, driven mostly Trade of goods dropped by 5% in 2023, partially
by reductions in goods trade from China and reversing some of the large growth experienced in
developing economies. These declines were the prior two years.28 China accounted for nearly
partially offset by growing flows of capital, 15% of the reduction in global exports in 2023,
services and people. and other emerging economies accounted
for another 45% – both as a result of
The trade and capital pillar looks at cooperation increased conflicts29 and slower economic
through flows of goods and services, trade, capital growth. Trade between Western and Eastern-
and people. It includes metrics about the magnitude aligned economies declined, while trade
of flows – such as foreign direct investment or between partners who are geopolitically
labour migration – and the distribution of flows aligned increased, indicating an apparent
(including trade concentration and developing intensification of geopolitical fragmentation.30
Trade between country share of manufactured goods). The global
partners who are trade and capital flows pillar was on an upward The World Trade Organization (WTO) projects
trajectory from 2012 to 2022, overcoming even the goods trade will increase by 2.7% in 2024,31
geopolitically
the volatility during the pandemic (see Figure 4). but warns that “geopolitical tensions and increased
aligned increased,
In 2023, this pillar experienced a small decline, economic policy uncertainty” are putting the
indicating though almost all indicators remain above their near-term and medium-term growth forecasts into
an apparent pre-pandemic averages (above the black line question. There are strong headwinds ahead –
intensification in Figure 5). The exceptions are foreign portfolio interventions such as tariffs have increased three-
of geopolitical investment (FPI) and trade concentration, which to six-fold on trade between the US and China,
fragmentation. sit below their pre-pandemic averages. the world’s two largest economies, since 2017.32

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 11

 FIGURE 4 Trade and capital flow trends

Trends in developing countries and shrinking goods trade led to a slight drop in 2023
Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) %
1.10
Trade and capital index

1.05

Foreign direct investment (FDI) stock

1.00

0.95 Labour migration

0.90
Services trade
0.85

0.80 Remittances

0.75
Foreign portfolio investment (FPI)
0.70

0.65 Trade concentration*,**

0.60
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 Official development assistance

*Metrics were reflected given negative connotation.

Developing countries share of FDI
**Outcome metrics.
Note: Due to missing data in some metrics, data from the
closest years are used to calculate the trend. These metrics
Developing countries’ share of
include cross-border data flows.
manufacturing exports**
Sources: World Bank, UN Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), UN Comtrade, International Monetary Fund
Goods trade
(IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), International Labour Organization
(ILO), McKinsey & Company analysis.
-10 -5 0 5 10

Improvement in: 2012-20 6/10 2020-22 7/10 2022-23 6/10

2012-20 2020-22 2022-23

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 12

 While goods trade has retreated, capital flows Nonetheless, there were bright spots of increased
grew in 2023. Foreign direct investment (FDI) interconnectedness. In 2023, labour migration
and FPI stocks outgrew GDP (gross domestic increased by 4.1%, and remittances (the money
product) in 2023, a positive sign for cooperation, foreign workers send to their home country)
though the main beneficiaries were a small set increased by 2.5%. Both have now surpassed
of developed countries. Some of the largest FDI their pre-2020 levels, indicating that flows of labour
projects announced in 2023 were investments and immigration seem to have recovered from the
in strategic sectors, such as semiconductors, COVID-19 period (in 2020, migration flows fell by
batteries and renewable energy, that were the focus 2.5% and remittances dropped by almost 5%).
of industrial policy, mostly in the US and Europe.
Looking ahead, substantial uncertainty remains
In fact, as the world fragmented further in about the evolution of trade and capital flows,
2023, developing economies saw a decline as economies continue to reconfigure their
in their share of trade and capital flows. Their economic ties. A fragmented global economy
share of global manufacturing exports dropped risks setting back progress on global priorities
by two percentage points (mostly due to a such as reducing poverty and inequality and
decrease from China), and their share of FDI can dampen growth while fuelling inflationary
inflows dropped by one percentage point. pressures.33 Leaders will need to pursue policies
Developing economies also saw a flatlining of that strengthen trade while also investing in
development assistance they received as a domestic programmes such as training and
proportion of their gross national income (GNI). education to help make trade more inclusive.34

FIGURE 5 Pre- and post-pandemic trade and capital cooperation

Only trade concentration and FPI are lower today than pre-pandemic
Index averages

1.20
Higher post-2020 ODA Services trade
Goods trade
1.15
Developing share of FDI
International migration
1.10

Developing share of manufacturing

1.05
Remittances
2022-23 average

1.00
Reduction in trade concentration

0.95
FDI
0.90
FPI
0.85

0.80

0.75

0.70

0.65
Lower post-2020
0.60
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20

2018-19 average

45° line, where 2022-23 average = 2018-19 average

Sources: World Bank, UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Comtrade, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), International Labour Organization (ILO), McKinsey & Company analysis.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 13

 Pillar 2 Innovation and technology

Digitization of the global economy continues The digitization of the global economy
to drive increased cooperation, but global continued to propel the growth of this pillar.
fragmentation of frontier technologies In particular, IT services trade, cross-border
could slow global productivity growth. data flows and the number of individuals using
the internet continued to increase in 2023.
The innovation and technology pillar examines
elements of global cooperation that can accelerate Global cooperation in technology and innovation
innovation and create beneficial technological also continued to drive global adoption of
progress. In 2023, growth in this pillar continued new technologies. Lithium-ion batteries, which rely
the positive trajectory it has seen since 2012 (see on highly global value chains, saw their prices fall in
Figure 6). Almost all metrics remain above their 2023.35 This was partly driven by continued innovation
pre-pandemic averages (above the black line in and a strong ramp-up in the supply of intensely
Figure 7). International students are the exception, traded critical minerals inputs, often enabled by
which remain below their pre-pandemic average. advances in prospecting and extraction technologies.

FIGURE 6 Innovation and technology trends

There were gains across the innovation portfolio in 2023, moderated only by declining trade in goods
Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) %
1.10
Innovation and technology index
1.05

Average price of a lithium-ion battery*,**

1.00

0.95 IT services trade

0.90
International students
0.85

0.80 Cross-border data flows

0.75
Individuals using the internet**
0.70

0.65 Total factor productivity growth**

0.60
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 Cross-border patent applications

*Metrics were reflected given negative connotation.

**Outcome metrics. IT goods/intermediates trade

Note: Due to missing data in some metrics, data from the

closest years are used to calculate the trend. These metrics
include cross-border data flows. Cross-border R&D

Sources: The Conference Board, International

Telecommunication Union, BloombergNEF, Cisco, United
Nations Trade and Development (UNCTAD), PATSTAT, -20 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
Institute of International Education (IIE), Organisation
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD),
Improvement in: 2012-20 8/9 2020-22 6/9 2022-23 6/8
McKinsey & Company analysis.

2012-20 2020-22 2022-23 Extrapolation

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 14

 This drop in price supported a growth of 30% in the All of these trends may be contributing to
deployment of this technology. the worryingly stagnant trajectory of total factor
productivity (TFP).37 While not the only indicator,
Finally, in 2023, student flows started to rebound TFP is a useful measurement of overall innovation.
after their pandemic decline, although they remain It measures the ratio of overall output (GDP) to
below their pre-pandemic average. overall inputs, with innovation being a key factor
in increasing the productivity level.
Despite these positive signs, there are major
questions about the global fragmentation of frontier Looking ahead, as innovation becomes a frontline
technologies as different economies strive to of geostrategic considerations, leaders will need
maintain their advantages. Important supply chains, to identify pathways for implementing common-
such as semiconductors, have been impacted sense security measures while not cutting
by increased measures to control flows of raw off cooperation. For instance, sovereign AI
materials and advanced technologies.36 The transfer – developing AI systems and attendant capabilities
of some intangibles around the globe has also within national borders – can be pursued alongside
slowed. Cross-border patent applications fell in the advancement of multilateral partnerships that
2023, and cross-border R&D fell in 2022 (the latest set standards, establish guardrails and facilitate
year for which this data is available). cross-border data flows38

FIGURE 7 Pre- and post-pandemic innovation and technology cooperation

Knowledge sharing indicators tend to be above pre-pandemic trend

Index averages

1.20
Higher post-2020

1.15

Trade in IT services Internet users

1.10
Cross-border patents
2022-23 average

1.05 Cross-border data flows

Battery price
Cross-border R&D
1.00 Total factor productivity (TFP)
Trade in IT goods

0.95
International students

0.90

0.85

0.80

0.75

0.70

0.65

Lower post-2020
0.60
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20

2018-19 average

45° line, where 2022-23 average = 2018-19 average

Sources: The Conference Board, International Telecommunication Union, BloombergNEF, Cisco, United Nations Trade and Development (UNCTAD), PATSTAT,
Institute of International Education (IIE), Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), McKinsey & Company analysis.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 15

 Pillar 3 Climate and natural capital

Cooperation improved in 2023 but would need to in deployment and emissions intensity. Climate
improve much more and much faster if the world finance flows from both the public and private
is to meet global climate and natural capital goals. sectors reached new heights. Despite this growth,
finance flows remain below the level required to
This pillar looks at the global cooperation on make a meaningful impact. The capital committed
lowering emissions, preserving natural capital and to climate finance as of 2023 was between a
preparing for the likely effects of climate change. tenth and a fifth of the projected annual needs
Our measure shows modest improvement in for the world to reach net zero by 2030.39
2023 (see Figure 8). Nearly all metrics are above
their pre-pandemic averages (black line in Figure The growth of finance flows also enabled expanded
9). Nonetheless, because global emissions technology deployment and associated growth in
continue to rise, this pillar would need increased trade. Trading in low-carbon technology products
and accelerated cooperation if the world is to was 12% higher in 2023, one of the only categories
reach stated climate and natural capital goals. of goods trade that saw growth. The acceleration of
growth in the rollout of low-emissions technologies
In 2023, cooperation in this pillar grew as contributed to a decline in the emissions intensity of
finance and trade flows enabled improvements GDP (i.e. a reduction in emissions generated by unit

FIGURE 8 Climate and natural capital trends

There were positive gains across the board on climate cooperation, headlined by accelerating finance
Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) %
1.15
Climate and natural capital index
1.10

1.05 Finance: global climate mitigation

1.00
Finance: global climate adaptation
0.95

0.90 Global trade in low-carbon

technology products*
0.85
Global progress on
0.80 emissions intensity*,**

0.75 Terrestrial protected areas

(million km2)
0.70
Ocean Health Index**
0.65

0.60
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 Global progress on emissions**

Marine protected area

*Metrics were reflected given negative connotation. (million km2)
**Outcome metrics.
Note: Due to missing data in some metrics, data from
the closest years are used to calculate the trend. These -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
metrics include terrestrial protected areas, climate finance
mitigation and climate finance adaptation. Trade in low- Improvement in: 2012-20 7/8 2020-22 7/8 2022-23 6/8
carbon technology products mostly based in 2023 actuals,
partial extrapolation for missing data
2012-20 2020-22 2022-23
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Climate Policy
Initiative (CPI), Organizational Health Index (OHI), Protected
Partial extrapolation (some countries reporting 2023 numbers) Extrapolation
Planet, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
McKinsey & Company.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 16

 of economic output). For example, solar and wind including more flows of trade and capital.43 For
deployment moderated coal and gas demand for example, clean technologies, such as solar, wind and
power generation, while the deployment of electric EVs, rely on well-functioning flows of critical minerals.44
vehicles (EVs) led to less oil demand than would have
otherwise been observed.40 These trends continued Measures of cooperation relating to natural
in 2024, with continued growth in the deployment capital were mostly flat – including terrestrial
of EVs (including a 25% year-on-year increase in the protected areas and the ocean health
first half of 2024) and renewable energy (including a index – or even declined last year, including
36% year-on-year increase in the first half of 2024).41 marine protected areas (down by 1.3%).

Importantly, despite this progress, the world Looking ahead, though elements of climate and
continues to be far from what would be required nature cooperation may continue on a positive
for a net-zero scenario. Absolute greenhouse trajectory, protectionist policies in key economies
gas (GHG) emissions grew in 2023 and are on may set back efforts to reach net zero by 2050.
track to set yet another record high in 2024.42 These challenges to advancing a global climate
agenda should not be used as an excuse to
By some estimates, only around 10% of the required delay other efforts in the near term, particularly
deployment of low-emissions technologies to meet scaling up carbon trading mechanisms, investing
climate goals has been achieved – and further in green technologies and securing the additional
progress would require more global cooperation, financing needed to meet climate targets.45

FIGURE 9 Pre- and post-pandemic climate and natural capital cooperation

Climate finance has outperformed pre-pandemic trend, but progress in reducing emissions has lagged
Index averages

1.70
Higher post-2020 Climate finance (mitigation)

1.60

1.50

1.40
2022-23 average

1.30

1.20

Climate finance (adaptation)

1.10 Marine protected area
Trade in low-carbon goods Emissions intensity

1.00 Terrestrial protected areas Ocean Health Index

Emissions
0.90

0.80

0.70

Lower post-2020
0.60
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20

2018-19 average

45° line, where 2022-23 average = 2018-19 average

Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), Organizational Health Index (OHI), Protected Planet, United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), McKinsey & Company analysis.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 17

 Pillar 4 Health and wellness

Health outcomes like life expectancy continue In 2023, metrics related to health outcomes (child
to improve post-pandemic – but cross-border mortality, maternal mortality and life expectancy)
assistance is falling. improved, but at a slower rate than before the
pandemic. Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs),
The health and wellness pillar looks at the impact one of the key measures of health, stagnated
of global cooperation on enabling people after significant improvement in 2022.
worldwide to live longer and better lives.
Cooperation increased from 2012 to 2019 There is a risk that decreased cooperative
and spiked in 2020 as the world navigated the actions now will eventually drag down health
pandemic. There was a decline in 2021 and 2022, outcomes, as the former lags the latter. In fact,
which was partially reversed in 2023. Almost all metrics related to cooperative actions, including
of the metrics in this pillar therefore remain above cross-border assistance and pharmaceutical
their pre-pandemic averages (represented by the R&D, have continued to fall since 2020, although
black line in Figure 11). they remain above pre-pandemic levels.

FIGURE 10 Health and wellness trends

Health outcomes saw steady improvement in 2023, but development assistance

retreated with distance from the pandemic
Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) %
1.00
Health and wellness index

0.95
Child mortality**

0.90
Life expectancy at birth*,**
0.85

Maternal mortality*,**
0.80

Disability-adjusted life year*,**

0.75

0.70 Health-related goods trade

0.65 International Health

Regulations score

0.60
Development
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
assistance for health

*Metrics were reflected given negative connotation.

Cross-border pharma R&D
**Outcome metrics.
Note: Trade in health-related goods mostly based in 2023
actuals, partial extrapolation for missing data.
Sources: UN, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
(IHME), Policy Cures Research, World Health Organization
(WHO), UN Comtrade, McKinsey & Company analysis. Improvement in: 2012-20 7/8 2020-22 4/8 2022-23 3/7

2012-20 2020-22 2022-23 Extrapolation

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 18

 There were other indications of flagging Additionally, the growing number and protracted
advancement in cooperation actions. For nature of conflicts around the world could have a
instance, trade in health-related goods, like most major negative effect on global health outcomes,
goods trade, fell this past year. International both from the physical impacts of conflict and the
Health Regulations scores also declined, a cascading disruptions to health systems.46
sign that public health capacity was stagnating
or falling around the world. Furthermore, the Looking ahead, actors will need to build cooperative
World Health Assembly (WHA) failed to align mechanisms to protect against global health threats
on a Pandemic Agreement (a comprehensive, so that they bolster their own health systems. Over
binding framework under the WHO constitution the next 25 years, the global population aged 60
to better prevent, prepare for and respond to and over is projected to double. This means that
future pandemics). The latter is a stark example of many economies will need to share best practices
challenges in post-pandemic global cooperation for developing health systems that are sustainable
on health and particularly concerning given the and can support this burgeoning ageing population
recent re-emergence of Mpox. while they collaborate on addressing near-term
global health risks.47

FIGURE 11 Pre- and post-pandemic health and wellness cooperation

Most metrics are in line with pre-pandemic trends – except assistance and pharma R&D
Index averages

1.20
Higher post-2020

1.15

1.10

DALYs
1.05
Child mortality
2022-23 average

International health regulations Maternal mortality

1.00
Trade in health goods
Life expectancy
0.95

0.90

0.85 Health development assistance

0.80

0.75
Cross-border flows of
pharma R&D/intellectual
0.70 property (IP)

0.65

Lower post-2020
0.60
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20

2018-19 average

45° line, where 2022-23 average = 2018-19 average

Sources: United Nations (UN), Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), Policy Cures Research,
World Health Organization (WHO), UN Comtrade, McKinsey & Company analysis.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 19

 Pillar 5 Peace and security

The world’s collective security system is under Multilateral institutions that were created to prevent
severe pressure from geopolitical divides, with and resolve conflicts have largely been unable to do
actors unable to prevent or end conflict. Levels so in recent years. The result has been a continued
of conflict and attendant humanitarian crises increase in conflicts in 2023, with the continued
have increased to record levels in the past year. deterioration of security, including but not limited
to the Middle East, Russia-Ukraine and Sudan,
The peace and security pillar examines the impact and a significant increase in the number of forcibly
of global cooperation in preventing and resolving displaced people, estimated at more than 118 million
conflicts. The focus is on the prevention of death in 2023 and over 122 million as of 2024.48
and ameliorating the long-term negative implications
of conflict through commitment to multilateral Actions by the UN, such as new or augmented
peacekeeping operations and international peacekeeping missions or resolutions from the UN
stabilization efforts. Security Council, have been largely confined to
humanitarian assistance rather than peace-making.49
This pillar has deteriorated for the past seven years Notably, the Security Council has not mandated a
and continued its trajectory in 2023. All metrics in new peacekeeping operation since 2014. Instead,
this pillar remain below their pre-pandemic averages there has been a shift towards regionally led peace
(below the black line in Figure 13). The decline operations. Recent analysis by the International
in this pillar had the largest impact on the overall Peace Institute found that cooperative actions in
barometer results. peace and security decreased the most among

FIGURE 12 Peace and security trends

Escalating conflicts have continued to drag on overall global cooperation

Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) %
1.10
Peace and security index

1.05
Fatalities from conflicts*,**
1.00

0.95 Significant cyber incidents*,**

0.90
Forcibly displaced people*,**
0.85

0.80 Conflicts*

0.75
Ratio of mulitateral peacekeeping
operations-to-conflicts
0.70

Ratio of UNSC resolutions-to-conflicts

0.65

0.60
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 -20 0 20 40

*Metrics were reflected given negative connotation. Improvement in: 2012-20 3/6 2020-22 1/6 2022-23 2/6
**Outcome metrics.
Note: Fatalities from conflicts is a lagging indicator.
2012-20 2020-22 2022-23
Sources: United Nations High Commission on Refugees
(UNHCR), UPPSALA, Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), United Nations Security Council (UNSC),
McKinsey & Company analysis.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 20

 several domains of the multilateral system,50 with can be seen in the fact that the number of
the Security Council passing fewer resolutions in significant cyber incidents was below the 2020
2023 than in any year since 2013. peak for the third consecutive year. That said,
additional cooperation between governments
Although preliminary figures suggest fatalities declined and companies will be needed to improve
in 2023, following a ceasefire in Ethiopia (one of the cybersecurity standards and protect personal
largest sources of casualties in 2022), final figures data and critical infrastructure. In September
may be revised upward due to increased fatalities in 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted the
Sudan, Ukraine, Gaza and other frontlines of war.51 Pact for the Future, which includes commitments
to “redouble” efforts to build and sustain peace,
Conflicts have also continued to figure extensively but thus far, progress on this agenda has
in the digital domain. Some measure of optimism remained elusive.52

FIGURE 13 Pre- and post-pandemic peace and security cooperation

All metrics are below pre-pandemic trend

Index averages

1.15
Higher post-2020

1.10
Cyber incidents

1.05

1.00
2022-23 average

0.95

0.90

0.85
Forcibly displaced people

Conflicts
0.80
Fatalities

0.75

0.70
Peace operations

0.65
UNSC resolutions
Lower post-2020
0.60
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25

2018-19 average

45° line, where 2022-23 average = 2018-19 average

Source: United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), UPPSALA, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), McKinsey & Company analysis.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 21

 2 Recommendations:
The need for disordered
cooperation
Being agile Leaders across public and private sectors face are geographically nearby, ideologically aligned
and pivoting new urgency in deepening cooperation on critical or operate in the same sectors often make for
to cooperative global objectives that they cannot advance alone. natural partners, leaders will likely need to look
solutions will both Yet, such cooperation is at risk of becoming further afield when it comes to forging solutions.
elusive as the world seems poised to enter a This means potential partners should be seen
deliver results and
period of instability and volatility – an era of greater as those who are not necessarily physically or
build trust among
geopolitical (and, in some cases, political) disorder. ideologically nearby, but who are proximate to
constituencies. workable solutions and desirable outcomes.
Because the landscape is fast-changing, historical
strategies for cooperation will likely be less effective – Think big by starting small. Leaders should
than they once were. The following, therefore, are not overlook what may appear to be small
steps that leaders can take to build cooperation in opportunities for cooperation. Starting with
today’s context: these small cooperative approaches can yield
large long-term results, as the 2024 edition of
– Find flexible ways to cooperate. Leaders the Global Cooperation Barometer advised,
should be open to new approaches to because, over time, cooperation can beget
cooperation that may depart from the more cooperation as trust among parties grows.
orderly approach that was fit for a more stable
global context. While existing partnership – Consider “structural segmentation”. In the
models and multilateral mechanisms may still private sector, firms are facing an existential
offer the possibility of broad global agreements, question of whether they should remain global in
leaders cannot rely solely on approaches that a risk-filled landscape. One potential response
were designed for more collaborative climates. is to pursue “structural segmentation”, which
Instead, within today’s unsettled political entails a series of moves to manage geopolitical
and geopolitical periods, leaders must be exposure, to enable locally informed decision-
opportunistic and open to dynamic partnerships making, and to clear a pathway to safe, stable
that may differ from issue to issue. Though this growth. Structural segmentation can take
approach may feel disordered, ultimately, it will several forms, from localizing parallel activities in
likely have the greatest chance of delivering multiple locations across the world to relocating
effective solutions. towards home or geopolitically aligned
countries, at least in select domains. This allows
– Practice “planned opportunism”. Leaders companies to retain a global footprint and its
must be ready to pivot quickly towards advantages while at the same time increasing
opportunities as soon as they emerge. resilience by reducing exposure to risks.
“Planned opportunism” requires the ability
to read weak geopolitical or market signals Importantly, today’s political climate and the
that offer early indications of emerging urgency of issues like climate change, a weak
cooperative trends; it also requires the agility global economy and a deteriorating global
to rapidly reallocate resources to capture these security landscape have shortened the timeframe
nascent opportunities.53 To have this capacity, leaders have to deliver results. Leaders will need
governments will need to be open to signals to implement tools that are brutally honest in
that may run counter to their assumptions or measuring progress and in keeping companies
conventional thinking and build more nimble, and countries only on pathways that are moving
responsive teams. Businesses will need to towards solutions. Staying the course on
strengthen in-house geopolitical expertise and ineffective pathways will only build greater distrust
put in place mechanisms for reading these among partners, leaders and between leaders
signals as well as empower teams to make and their constituents. However, being agile and
decisions accordingly. pivoting to cooperative solutions will both deliver
results and build trust among constituencies,
– Redefine proximity. To identify novel cooperative creating a virtuous cycle in which trust in
solutions, leaders will need to reevaluate what cooperation deepens and new opportunities for
“proximity” means. While stakeholders who shared solutions emerge.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 22

Appendix
Sources and methodology rates – counts as ODA.
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD)
The section below highlights two important features
of the 41 indicators included in the barometer: their Remittances (as a percentage of GDP)
sources and the methodology used to construct Source: World Bank
global trend lines (if a transformation was applied),
organized by pillar. Services trade (as a percentage of GDP)
Source: World Bank

Trade and capital Trade concentration

Methodological notes: Concentration is defined
in this instance as the total value of concentrated
Developing countries’ share imports as a share of total imports. First, the
of foreign direct investment (FDI) Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is computed for
Methodological notes: FDI is defined as inward imports across all products for all countries. Then,
stock. Calculation uses categorization of each country’s imported product is categorized as
developing and developed countries as defined “high concentration” (HHI greater than 3,000) or “low
by the UN Statistics Division. concentration” (HHI less than 3,000). Finally, the total
Source: United Nations Trade and Development value of trade for both concentration categories is
(UNCTAD) aggregated over time to calculate the value share
of high- and low-concentration products globally.
Developing countries’ share The 2023 figure was extrapolated by applying the
of manufacturing exports rate of change found from the partially reported 2023
Methodological notes: Calculation uses data to the corresponding 2022 data and applying
categorization of developing and developed that to the balance of the 2022 data.
countries as defined by the UN Statistics Division. Source: UN Comtrade
Source: World Bank

FDI stock (as a percentage of GDP) Innovation and technology

Source: UNCTAD

Foreign portfolio investment (FPI) Average price of a lithium-ion battery

(as a percentage of GDP) Methodological notes: Two published charts
Methodological notes: End-December holdings were used to construct the decade trend line:
used for 2012; end-June holdings used for 2013- one presenting data from 2010-2018, and one
2023 (due to data availability). presenting data from 2013-2023. Data from the
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) former chart were used for years 2012-2018, and
2019-2023 data was extrapolated using the year-
Goods trade (as a percentage of GDP) on-year growth rates from the latter chart.
Source: World Bank Source: BloombergNEF

Labour migration Cross-border data flows

(as a percentage of the population) (as a percentage of total intellectual property traffic)
Methodological notes: For countries where 2023 Source: International Telecommunication Union
data was unavailable, international migrant data (ITU) (international bandwidth usage); Cisco (IP
was extrapolated using a five-year compound traffic), TeleGeography
annual growth rate (CAGR).
Source: International Labour Organization (ILO) Methodological notes: 2023 figure was extrapolated
using the growth rate from TeleGeography report.
Official development assistance (ODA)
(as a percentage of GDP) Cross-border patent applications
Methodological notes: According to the OECD, (as a percentage of total patent applications)
prior to 2018, the ODA flows basis methodology Source: European Patent Office, PATSTAT
covered loans expressed on a “cash basis,”
meaning their full face value was included; Cross-border R&D (as a percentage of GDP)
repayments were subtracted as they came in. From Methodological notes: Total R&D is used in this
2018, the ODA grant-equivalent methodology is instance as a proxy for cross-border R&D, given
used whereby only the “grant portion” of the loan – that cross-border R&D data is scant.
that is, the amount “given” by lending below market Source: OECD

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 23

Individuals using the internet Mitigation finance (as a percentage of GDP)
Source: International Telecommunication Methodological notes: Mitigation finance includes
Union (ITU) dual-use finance, as it is assumed to be total
climate finance minus adaptation finance. The 2023
International students figure for total climate finance was extrapolated
(as a percentage of the population) based on the 2012-2022 CAGR.
Methodological notes: Due to data availability, Source: CPI
destination countries included are Australia,
Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, New Ocean Health Index
Zealand, Norway, Spain, the UK and the US. Source: Ocean Health Index
The 2021 values were linearly interpolated for
China and Norway. Terrestrial protected area
Source: Institute of International Education Methodological notes: The 2022 and 2023 figures
were extrapolated based on the 2012-2021 CAGR.
IT goods trade (as a percentage of GDP) Source: Protected Planet
Source: UNCTAD

IT services trade (as a percentage of GDP) Health and wellness

Source: UNCTAD

Total factor productivity Cross-border health-related R&D

Source: The Conference Board (as a percentage of GDP)
Methodological notes: Total health-related R&D
is used in this instance as a proxy for cross-border
Climate and natural capital R&D, given that cross-border R&D data is scant.
Source: Policy Cures Research

Adaptation finance (as a percentage of GDP) Development assistance for health (DAH)
Methodological notes: 2023 figures were (as a percentage of GDP)
extrapolated based on the 2012-2022 CAGR. Source: Institute for Health Metrics and
Source: Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) Evaluation (IHME)

Biodiversity Intactness Index Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)

This metric was removed this year as it had not Methodological notes: IHME’s forecasted values
recently been updated. Its removal did not have a were used for the 2020-2022 figures.
material impact. Source: IHME

Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions Health-related goods trade

Source: United Nations Environment (as a percentage of GDP)
Programme (UNEP) Methodological notes: The 2023 figure was
extrapolated by applying the rate of change found
GHG emissions intensity in the reported data between 2022 and 2023 to
(ratio of emissions to GDP) the 2022 figure.
Source: UNEP and World Bank Source: UN Comtrade

Low-carbon goods trade International Health Regulations (IHR) score

(as a percentage of GDP) Methodological notes: All capacities’ average
Source: IMF score used
Source: WHO
Methodological notes: The 2023 figure was
extrapolated from the partially reported 2023 data Life expectancy at birth
to the corresponding 2022 data and applying that Source: United Nations
to the balance of the 2022 data.
Maternal mortality
Marine protected area Source: IHME
Source: Protected Planet
Under-five mortality
Source: IHME

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 24

Peace and security Significant cyber incidents
Methodological notes: Significant cyber
Conflicts incidents are defined by CSIS as cyberattacks
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) on government agencies, defence and high-tech
companies, or economic crimes with losses of
Fatalities more than $1 million.
Source: UCDP Source: Center for Strategicand International
Studies (CSIS)
Forcibly displaced people
Source: United Nations High Commission on UN Security Council resolutions
Refugees (UNHCR) Source: United Nations

Multilateral peacekeeping operations

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI)

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 25

Contributors
World Economic Forum McKinsey & Company

Mirek Dušek Oliver Bevan

Managing Director Partner, Chicago, Risk and Resilience Practice

Ariel Kastner Andres Cadena

Head, Geopolitical Agenda and Communications Senior Partner, Bogota, Strategy and Corporate
Finance Practice
Jessica Margolis
Lead, Geopolitical Agenda Jeffrey Condon
Senior Knowledge Expert, Atlanta,
Miriam Schive McKinsey Global Institute
Deputy Head, Geopolitical Agenda
Tiago Devesa
Senior Fellow, Lisbon, McKinsey Global Institute
Production
Mekala Krishnan
Partner, Boston, McKinsey Global Institute
Laurence Denmark
Creative Director, Studio Miko Acha Leke
Senior Partner, Johannesburg, Social, Healthcare,
Martha Howlett and Public Sector Entities Practice and Chairman of
Lead Editor, Studio Miko McKinsey’s Africa region

Jay Kelly Michael Neary

Designer, Studio Miko Engagement Manager, San Francisco,
McKinsey Global Institute
Will Liley
Editor, Studio Miko Daniel Pacthod
Senior Partner, New York; Global Leader,
McKinsey Leadership Factory

Olivia White
Senior Partner, San Francisco, Director,
McKinsey Global Institute

Acknowledgements

Thank you to Anna Bruce-Lockhart, Charlotte Santiago Gazzo, Max Gleischman, Ziad Haider,
Beale, Alexander Court, Trevor Chueu, Beatrice Charlie Lewis, Jan Mischke, Ramiro Prudencio,
Di Caro, Karis Everhart, Spencer Feingold, Harry Roger Roberts and Carlo Tanghetti.
Gray Calvo, Maxwell Hall, Gayle Markovitz, Alan
Mwendwa, Akolade Omishope, Luca Pasqualotti, The report benefited from the insight and expertise
Sybile Penhirin, Robin Pomeroy, Emily Poyser, Anais of several members of the Global Cooperation
Rassat, Julia Rignot and Christina Schunck with Barometer Advisory Board (serving on the advisory
the World Economic Forum and Taylor Burns at board does not constitute endorsement of the
McKinsey & Company for assistance in developing report’s finding). Members of the advisory board were
and launching the report. drawn from the World Economic Forum’s network
of Global Future Councils and included the below.
Thank you to Shreyangi Prasad and Daniel Soto Thank you to Judith Espinoza, Rabab Fayad, Haleh
and Senior Editor Max Berley and Editorial Director Nazeri, Houssam Al Wazzan and Kyle Winters at
Mark Staples of McKinsey Global Publishing. the World Economic Forum for facilitating discussion
This project benefited from the perspectives of at the 17 October 2024 meeting of the Global
individuals at McKinsey & Company: Matt Craven, Cooperation Advisory Board meeting in Dubai.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 26

Basma AlBuhairan Eileen McNeely
Managing Director, Centre for Member, Faculty; Executive Director, Sustainability
the Fourth Industrial Revolution Saudi Arabia and Health Initiative, Harvard University

Dubai Abulhoul Alfalasi Robin Niblett

Chief Executive Officer, Fiker Institute Distinguished Fellow, Chatham House

Ben Caldecott Danny Quah

Founding Director, Oxford Sustainable Dean and Li Ka Shing Professor in Economics,
Finance Group Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National
University of Singapore
Ilona Szabó de Carvalho
President, Igarape Institute Samir Saran
President, Observer Research
Santiago Fernández de Lis Foundation (ORF)
Head, Regulation, BBVA
Jagjit Singh Srai
Mona Haddad Director, Research; Head, Centre for International
Global Director, Trade, Investment and Manufacturing, Institute for Manufacturing,
Competitiveness, The World Bank University of Cambridge

Jane Harman Kellee Tsai

Chair, United States Commission on the National Dean, College of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Defense Strategy Northeastern University

Bruce Jones Jürgen Karl Zattler

Senior Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy Non-Resident Fellow,
and Technology, The Brookings Institution Center for Global Development)

Lynn Kuok Weihuan Zhou

Chair, Southeast Asia Studies, Associate Professor and Co-Director of CIBEL
The Brookings Institution Centre, Faculty of Law and Justice, University
of New South Wales
Ottilia Anna Maunganidze
Head, Special Projects,
Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 27

 Endnotes
1. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (n.d.). A ‘Super Year’ for Elections. [Link]
elections.
2. Burn-Murdoch, J. (2024). Democrats join 2024’s graveyard of incumbents. Financial Times. [Link]
e8ac09ea-c300-4249-af7d-109003afb893.
3. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2024). With less than one fifth of targets on track, world is
failing to deliver on promise of the Sustainable Development Goals, warns new UN report. [Link]
less-than-one-fifth-of-targets-on-track#:~:text=The%20report%20reveals%20that%20only,one%2Dthird%20stalled%20
or%20regressing.
4. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (n.d.). Peoples’ Climate Vote 2024. [Link]
5. United Nations. (2024). UN’s Guterres urges global solutions as uncertain world edges toward a ‘powder keg’.
[Link]
6. United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR). (n.d.). Data and Statistics: Global Trends.
[Link]
displaced%20at%20the%20end%20of%202023.&text=This%20equates%20to%20more%20than%201%20in%20
every%2069%20people%20on%20Earth.&text=The%20number%20of%20displaced%20people%20has%20
increased%20every%20year%20for%2012%20years.
7. United Nations. (2024). World on Track to Achieve Only 17 Per Cent of 2030 Agenda Targets, Speakers Warn, as
Second Committee Takes Up Sustainable Development Reports. [Link]
htm#:~:text=With%20only%20six%20years%20remaining,as%20it%20took%20up%20that.
8. Abnett, K. & A. Withers. (2025). 2024 is the hottest year on record, EU scientists say. Reuters. [Link]
business/environment/2024-will-be-hottest-year-record-eu-scientists-say-2024-12-09/.
9. International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2024). Steady but Slow: Resilience Amid Divergence.
[Link]
10. United Nations Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2024). A world of debt Report 2024.
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Economic Forum. [Link]
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[Link]
productivity-frontier#introduction.
13. Georgieva, K. (2024). AI Will Transform the Global Economy. Let’s Make Sure It Benefits Humanity. IMF Blog.
[Link]
humanity.
14. Singla, A., A. Sukharevsky, L. Yee, M. Chui, et al. (2024). The state of AI in early 2024: Gen AI adoption spikes and starts to
generate value. McKinsey & Company. [Link]
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the U.S. government. Brookings. [Link]
the-u-s-government/.
16. Jiang, B. (2024). China’s AI industry could see US$1.4 trillion in investment in 6 years, executive says. myNEWS.
[Link]
executive-says.
17. Newman, M. and J. Love. (2024). Saudis Plan $100 Billion AI Powerhouse to Rival UAE Tech Hub. Bloomberg.
[Link]
18. Reuters. (2024) India announces $1.2 bln investment in AI projects. [Link]
12-bln-investment-ai-projects-2024-03-07/.
19. Shepardson, D., M. Martina and T. Hunnicutt. (2024). US finalizes rules to curb AI investments in China, impose other
restrictions. Reuters. [Link]
china-impose-other-restrictions-2024-10-28/.
20. Evenett, S., A. Jakubik, F. Martín and M. Ruta. (2024). The Return of Industrial Policy in Data.
[Link]
21. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). (n.d.). G7 Creating a Modern Digital Trade Ecosystem.
[Link]
22. Heid, B., M. Linder, S. Mayer, A. Orthofer, et al. (2023). What would it take to scale critical climate technologies?
[Link]
technologies.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 28

23. Krishnan, M., C. Bradley, H. Tai, T. Devesa, S. Smit and D. Pacthod. (2024). The hard stuff: Navigating the physical realities
of the energy transition. McKinsey Global Institute. [Link]
the-physical-realities-of-the-energy-transition.
24. United Nations. (2015). Paris Agreement. [Link]
25. Song, Z. (2024). Access to medical technology saves lives. How can we make it more accessible in low- and middle-income
countries? World Bank Blogs. [Link]
26. Cueni, T. (2021). Challenges and solutions to scaling-up COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing capacity. The International
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA). [Link]
solutions-to-scaling-up-covid-19-vaccine-manufacturing-capacity/.
27. United Nations Security Council. (2023). International Community Must Urgently Confront New Reality of Generative,
Artificial Intelligence, Speakers Stress as Security Council Debates Risks, Rewards.
[Link]
28. World Trade Organization (WTO). (n.d.). World Trade Statistics 2023: Key insights and trends.
[Link]
29. International Monetary Fund. (2024). World Economic Outlook: Policy Pivot, Rising Threats.
[Link]
30. Seong, J., O. White, M. Birshan, L. Woetzel, et al. (2024). Geopolitics and the geometry of global trade. McKinsey &
Company. [Link]
31. World Trade Organization (WTO). (2024). Global goods trade on track for gradual recovery despite lingering downside
risks. [Link]
is%20projected,updated%20forecast%20on%2010%20October.
32. Seong, J., O. White, M. Birshan, L. Woetzel, et al. (2024). Geopolitics and the geometry of global trade. McKinsey &
Company. [Link]
33. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2024). World Investment Report 2024.
[Link]
34. Ibid.
35. The cost decrease reflected, in part, the cooperation of countries across the global supply chain (such as basic research
in the US and Japan; mass production capabilities in China, where more than 70% of global supply originates; and
extraction of raw materials in Australia and Chile, among other countries).
36. Tan, C. (2024). Breaking the Circuit: US-China Semiconductor Controls. Foreign Policy Research Institute.
[Link]
37. Li, N. and D. Noureldin. (2024). World Must Prioritize Productivity Reforms to Revive Medium-Term Growth. IMF Blog.
[Link]
growth.
38. Alduhishy, M. (2024). Sovereign AI: What it is, and 6 strategic pillars for achieving it. World Economic Forum.
[Link]
39. Climate Policy Initiative. (2023). Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2023. [Link]
publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2023/.
40. International Energy Agency (IEA). (2023). CO2 emissions in 2023. [Link]
41. International Energy Agency (IEA). (2024). Clean Energy Market Monitor. [Link]
market-monitor-november-2024.
42. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). (2024). Emissions Gap Report 2024. [Link]
emissions-gap-report-2024; Hausfather, Z. and P. Friedlingstein. (2024). Analysis: Global CO2 emissions will reach new
high in 2024 despite slower growth. CarbonBrief. [Link]
new-high-in-2024-despite-slower-growth/.
43. Krishnan, M., C. Bradley, H. Tai, T. Devesa, et al. (2024). The hard stuff: Navigating the physical realities of the energy
transition. McKinsey Global Institute. [Link]
realities-of-the-energy-transition.
44. McKinsey & Company. (2024). Global Materials Perspective 2024. [Link]
materials/our-insights/global-materials-perspective.
45. Daharwal, M., H. Engel, S. Frandsen, K. Jayaram, et al. (2023). Solving the climate finance equation for developing
countries. [Link]
developing-countries.
46. Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). (2023). Conflict and health. [Link]
insights-blog/global-health-insights/conflict-and-health.
47. World Health Organization (WHO). (2024). Ageing and health. [Link]
and-health.

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 29

48. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (n.d.). Refugee Data Finder.
[Link]
49. International Peace Institute (IPI). (2024). Multilateralism Index 2024. [Link]
2024#:~:text=This%202024%20edition%20of%20the,Participation%2C%20Performance%2C%20and%20Inclusivity.
50. Ibid.
51. While this data will probably be revised upward (fatality numbers have significant lags), it is likely that 2023 will remain an
overall improvement from 2022.
52. United Nations. (2024). Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations.
[Link]
53. Govindarajan, V. (2016). Planned Opportunism: Using weak signals to spur innovation. Harvard Business Review.
[Link]

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition 30

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