A CRITICAL SEAM: ORGANIZING AIR COMMAND

AND CONTROL FOR PEER CONFLICT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Art of War Scholars

by

DUSTIN C. JOHNSON, MAJOR, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

B.A., University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2008

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2021

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14. ABSTRACT
The emerging era of great power competition presents a clear mandate for U.S. military forces to prepare for,
deter, and, if necessary, prevail in conflict against a peer adversary. Yet the primary enabler of decisive U.S.
airpower—its air command and control (C2) system—is not optimized for this kind of fight. While future
concepts such as Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) offer a potential path forward in the
decades to come, short-term solutions are needed should a crisis arise in the interim. This study analyzes the
organization of the current Air C2 system, focusing specifically on the relationship between the Air
Operations Center (AOC) and the Wing, to determine the changes needed to improve the system for peer
conflict. The author begins with a review of Air C2 history and theory, covering key ideas and events that
explain the system as it exists today while drawing attention to areas that are problematic in peer conflict. A
thorough analysis is then conducted to characterize Air C2, identify its functions, and demonstrate how the
system responds to threats. The findings of the study reveal an excessively high degree of centralization at
the AOC, a problem that creates a vulnerable, single point of failure in the Air C2 system. To address this
issue, the author argues that the development of a tailored C2 capability at the Wing level is essential.
Ultimately, recommendations are provided as to how this might be achieved quickly—within existing
resource constraints—as the study calls for airpower thinkers to reconsider contemporary notions of Air C2.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Air C2, Air Operations Center, Wing, Wing C2, Mission Command, Distributed Control, Agile
Combat Employment, Great Power Competition, Peer Conflict, Contested Operations
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

ii
 MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Dustin C. Johnson

Thesis Title: A Critical Seam: Organizing Air Command and Control for Peer Conflict

Approved by:

_________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair

John H. Modinger, Ph.D.

_________________________________________, Member
Robert D. Beckel, MBA

_________________________________________, Member
Brian W. McLean, M.A.

Accepted this 18th day of June 2021 by:

_________________________________________, Assistant Dean of Academics for

Dale F. Spurlin, Ph.D. Degree Programs and Research

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
statement.)

iii
 ABSTRACT

A CRITICAL SEAM: ORGANIZING AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR PEER

CONFLICT, by Major Dustin C. Johnson, 118 pages.

The emerging era of great power competition presents a clear mandate for U.S. military
forces to prepare for, deter, and, if necessary, prevail in conflict against a peer adversary.
Yet the primary enabler of decisive U.S. airpower—its air command and control (C2)
system—is not optimized for this kind of fight. While future concepts such as Joint All
Domain Command and Control (JADC2) offer a potential path forward in the decades to
come, short-term solutions are needed should a crisis arise in the interim.

This study analyzes the organization of the current Air C2 system, focusing specifically
on the relationship between the Air Operations Center (AOC) and the Wing, to determine
the changes needed to improve the system for peer conflict. The author begins with a
review of Air C2 history and theory, covering key ideas and events that explain the
system as it exists today while drawing attention to areas that are problematic in peer
conflict. A thorough analysis is then conducted to characterize Air C2, identify its
functions, and demonstrate how the system responds to threats. The findings of the study
reveal an excessively high degree of centralization at the AOC, a problem that creates a
vulnerable, single point of failure in the Air C2 system. To address this issue, the author
argues that the development of a tailored C2 capability at the Wing level is essential.
Ultimately, recommendations are provided as to how this might be achieved quickly—
within existing resource constraints—as the study calls for airpower thinkers to
reconsider contemporary notions of Air C2.

iv
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I was told when I started the process of writing this thesis that where I eventually

ended up would not look at all like where I started. This could not have been more true as

this last year was quite a journey. I have to start by giving a huge thank you to my

committee members. They were instrumental in the development of my thoughts and

writing, not to mention they represent decades of experience fishing in the waters that I

had just begun to approach. Without their guidance, this study likely would have been

well-intended but ill-informed. In the same vein, I must also thank the many mentors and

senior leaders who have helped me along the way. Their thoughts and concerns were the

inspiration behind this work. Additionally, numerous subject matter experts took time out

of their extremely busy schedules to discuss a wide range of issues with me. Their inputs

put the meat on the bones of this study and I am ever grateful for the time they invested.

I would also like to thank Dr. Nowowiejski and the Art of War Scholars. The

environment this group provided enabled in-depth study, thoughtful reflection, and time

for writing supported by critical feedback. From whiteboard think-tank sessions to peer

review groups over breakfast, Dr. No and the team provided a support infrastructure that

exceeded anything I could have expected or imagined. I cringe to think of what a final

product would look like without their assistance.

Last, but most importantly, I must thank my family, and especially my wife

Allison. She is our rock and supports all of us through thick and thin. None of this would

be possible without them.

v
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............ iii

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi

ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................... viii

ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................................... xii

PREFACE ........................................................................................................................ xiii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1

Background ..................................................................................................................... 1
Problem Statement .......................................................................................................... 2
Purpose of Study ............................................................................................................. 3
Research Questions ......................................................................................................... 4
Primary Research Question......................................................................................... 4
Secondary Research Questions (SRQ)........................................................................ 4
SRQ 1 .......................................................................................................................4
SRQ 2 .......................................................................................................................4
SRQ 3 .......................................................................................................................4
SRQ 4 .......................................................................................................................4
Methodology ................................................................................................................... 4
Definition of Terms ........................................................................................................ 5
Limitations .................................................................................................................... 10
Delimitations ................................................................................................................. 10
Significance of the Study .............................................................................................. 11
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 12

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................13

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 13
The Organization and Over-Centralization of Air C2 .................................................. 14
The Problematic Evolution of CC/DE ...................................................................... 15
The Search for Solutions ........................................................................................... 20
Air C2 in Contested Environments ............................................................................... 31
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 36

vi
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................39

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 39
Methodology ................................................................................................................. 39
Data Collection ............................................................................................................. 42
Ethical Assurances ........................................................................................................ 44
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 45

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS .................................................................................................46

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 46
The AOC ....................................................................................................................... 46
The Wing ...................................................................................................................... 52
The Relationship between the AOC and the Wing ....................................................... 56
The Threat ..................................................................................................................... 60
Air C2 Functional Analysis .......................................................................................... 63
Air C2 System Analysis ................................................................................................ 75
Findings ........................................................................................................................ 82
Finding #1: The Air Force has centralized nearly all Air C2 capability at the AOC
creating a single point of failure within the system .................................................. 82
Finding #2: The threat posed by peer conflict demands a redundant and resilient
system with Air C2 capabilities at multiple echelons of command .......................... 83
Finding #3: The Wing is not organized or resourced to produce the requisite C2
capability to institute a mission command style approach........................................ 84
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 85

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................87

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 87
On-going Initiatives ...................................................................................................... 87
Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 91
Recommendation #1: Elevate the Wing’s Role in the Air C2 System ..................... 91
Recommendation #2: Organize for Wing C2 ........................................................... 92
Recommendation #3: Train to Wing C2 ................................................................... 93
Other Viewpoints and Critiques ................................................................................... 94
Areas for Further Research ........................................................................................... 96
Determine the “Right” Amount of Wing C2 Capability........................................... 96
Cost Analysis of Material and Resource Requirements ........................................... 97
Best Practices for Generating a COP at the Wing Level .......................................... 97
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 97

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................100

vii
 ACRONYMS

A2AD Anti-Access, Area Denial

ACC Air Component Commander

ACE Agile Combat Employment

ADCON Administrative Control

AE Aeromedical Evacuation

AEW Air Expeditionary Wing

AFCENT Air Forces Central Command

AFFOR Air Force Forces

AFI Air Force Instruction

AI Air Interdiction

AMD Air Mobility Division

AOC Air Operations Center

AOD Air Operations Directive

AOR Area of Responsibility

ASAT Anti-satellite

ASOC Air Support Operations Center

ATO Air Tasking Order

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

C2 Command and Control

CAS Close Air Support

CBA Conditions-Based Authority

CC/DE Centralized Control, Decentralized Execution

CC/DC/DE Centralized Command, Distributed Control, Decentralized Execution

viii
COD Combat Operations Division

COMAFFOR Commander, Air Force Forces

CONUS Continental United States

COP Common Operating Picture

CP Command Post

CPD Combat Plans Division

CRC Control and Reporting Center

DAFMAN Department of the Air Force Manual

DCA Defensive Counterair

DOD Department of Defense

EW Electronic Warfare

FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne)

FOC Full Operational Capability

GPS Global Positioning System

ISRD Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division

ITO Integrated Tasking Order

JADC2 Joint All Domain Command and Control

JAO Joint Air Operations

JAOP Joint Air Operations Plan

JFC Joint Force Commander

JP Joint Publication

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

LNO Liaison Officer

MAAP Master Air Attack Plan

MAJCOM Major Command

ix
MCO Major Combat Operations

MOE Measure of Effectiveness

MOP Measure of Performance

MPC Mission Planning Cell

MTO Mission-Type Orders

NAF Numbered Air Force

NSS National Security Strategy

OCA Offensive Counterair

OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

OPCON Operational Control

PACAF Pacific Air Forces

PED Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination

PR Personnel Recovery

SATCOM Satellite Communications

SD Strategy Division

SME Subject Matter Expert

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SPINS Special Instructions

SRQ Secondary Research Question

TAC(A) Tactical Coordinator (Airborne)

TACC Theater Air Control Center

TACP Tactical Air Control Party

TACS Theater Air Control System

USAF United States Air Force

USAFE United States Air Forces Europe

x
WOC Wing Operations Center

XP Wing Plans

xi
 ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

Figure 1. JFACC Staff and JAOC Organization ................................................................50

Figure 2. AFFOR Staff and AOC Organization .................................................................51

Figure 3. Wing Organization..............................................................................................56

Figure 4. Theater Air Control System (TACS) ..................................................................59

Figure 5. Air C2 Essential Activities .................................................................................68

Figure 6. Air C2 Cross-Functional Matrix .........................................................................70

Figure 7. Combined Wing C2 Capability ..........................................................................72

Figure 8. The Current Air C2 System ................................................................................76

Figure 9. Non-Kinetic Attack .............................................................................................78

Figure 10. Kinetic Attack ..................................................................................................79

Figure 11. Redesigned Air C2 System ..............................................................................80

Figure 12. Redesigned Air C2 System with AOC Attacked .............................................81

xii
 PREFACE

Just prior to the completion of this thesis, the United States Air Force began a

significant overhaul of its standing doctrine at the order of its Chief of Staff, General

Charles Q. Brown. On April 22, 2021, a new capstone document was released, titled Air

Force Doctrine Publication 1, The Air Force. It is difficult to overstate the importance of

the changes in the new doctrine, not the least of which is the transformation of the

decades-old primary tenant of airpower, “Centralized Control, Decentralized Execution.”

In its place is a new tenet—mission command. Readers will find that both of these

concepts are fundamental, central themes of this study, although they were written about

prior to the new doctrine being released. The willingness of the Air Force to embrace the

concept of mission command through “centralized command, distributed control, and

decentralized execution” is a bold step, one which adds an even greater sense of urgency

to findings and recommendations herein.

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

History is not kind to nations that go to sleep. Pearl Harbor woke us up and we
managed to win, although we are already forgetting the dark days when victory
was uncertain, when it looked as though the scales might be tipped the other way.
—General George C. Kenney, quoted in “Quotations on Airpower”

Background

Today the United States military is operating in a global strategic environment

with extraordinary levels of complexity and uncertainty. The potential for conflict

between great powers is greater than it has been since the end of the Cold War; a reality

that is exacerbated by the unprecedented pace of technological advancement, the scale of

global connectivity, and the ever-expanding spectrum of weaponized effects.

Furthermore, the growing importance of cyberspace and its implicit anonymity have

blurred the traditional lines of conflict and emboldened states to take increasingly overt

adversarial actions against one another. Great power military activities in places such as

the Black Sea, the South China Sea, Syria, Libya, and the Arctic, have created a series of

potential flashpoints across the globe. Meanwhile, long-standing alliances such as the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization and emerging regional coalitions of opportunity 1 0F

inherently contain the conditions for regional conflict to expand globally. One could

surmise this is a “powder-keg” moment akin to the early 1900s prior to the outbreak of

World War I. The increasing potential for conflict amongst great power states has been

1
Alexander Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia
Military Cooperation,” Asian Security 15, no. 3 (2019): 233-252.

1
widely acknowledged and is driving change across the United States military. To deter

such conflict, the joint force must be credibly prepared to win it.

In 2017, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States was updated to

recognize the return of great power competition. 2 Within the NSS is a clearly stated
1F

mandate for the joint force to prepare to fight and win in peer competition, and if

necessary, conflict. 3 As the primary service leading Joint Air Operations (JAO), the
2F

United States Air Force (USAF) needs to institute significant changes to meet this intent.

The challenge lies in overcoming two decades of institutional inertia which has been

aimed at winning counter-insurgency conflicts in largely uncontested environments.

Several of the ways JAO are conducted in today’s conflicts are either not applicable in

major combat operations (MCO) or would be significantly contested, if not outright

denied, in MCO versus a peer adversary. One of those ways is how the Air Force

executes command and control (C2) of JAO to deliver decisive airpower for the joint

force.

Problem Statement

While national strategy dictates the need for joint military forces to be prepared to

win in peer conflict, the Air Force’s current organization of Air C2 is not optimized to do

so. It has been shaped by decades of war fought against less capable adversaries

conducted from a largely uncontested position of advantage, not by the need to deliver

2
U.S. President, National Security Strategy of the United States of America
Washington, DC: December 2017), [Link]
uploads/2017/12/[Link], 27.
3
Ibid., 4.

2
decisive joint airpower in a highly contested conflict. Furthermore, the current

arrangement creates a vulnerable single point of failure that can be exploited to

devastating effect. The Air Force must reorganize its Air C2 capability to meet the

demands of the rapidly evolving security environment.

Purpose of Study

This study was designed to conduct an in-depth analysis of how the USAF

organizes units to produce the desired combat effects in JAO, focusing specifically on the

seam between the Air Operations Center (AOC) and the Wing. Further details regarding

the ACC, AOC, and Wing, are provided in the “Definition of Terms” section of this

chapter.

The author conducted research to develop a detailed understanding of the

organizational mechanisms and associated functions of the AOC and the Wing that

enable Air C2, then established clear connections to the problem statement. The author

then conducted functional and system analysis to produce recommendations as to how the

Air Force should organize its Air C2 system to best meet the intent of the national

strategy. This process also included an assessment of existing recommendations within

the air community and enables the author to provide alternative recommendations for

specific gaps that were identified. The ultimate purpose of this study is to provide

relevant input to ongoing discussions within the air community regarding Air C2 and to

inform current efforts. Additionally, this study serves as a compilation of current and

relevant sources on the topic and as a starting point for further research.

3
 Research Questions

Primary Research Question

How should the Air Force’s primary operational C2 entity, the AOC, and its

primary warfighting unit, the Wing, organize within an Air C2 system to ensure delivery

of air effects in a conflict with a peer adversary?

Secondary Research Questions (SRQ)

SRQ 1

How is the AOC currently organized and what are the key functions the AOC

must perform that drives that organization?

SRQ 2

How is the Wing currently organized and what are the key functions the Wing

must perform that drives that organization?

SRQ 3

How do the organizational structures of the AOC and the Wing interact to

produce air effects in combat?

SRQ 4

What defines a peer adversary in terms of threat capabilities it possesses that can

contest Air C2?

Methodology

The author conducted a Qualitative Case Study of Air C2. This study used

systems theory as a theoretical framework, focusing on how the AOC and the Wing

4
function as an organizational system to deliver Air C2 in combat operations against a

peer adversary. To facilitate the Case Study, data was collected through document

analysis and a series of semi-structured interviews. The author’s data sample was

developed utilizing chain sampling; “a nonprobability, purposeful approach to data

collection.” 4 The data sample culminated once saturation was achieved, meaning data
3F

collection concluded once the data became redundant. 5 A more detailed description of the
4F

research methodology is provided in Chapter 3.

Definition of Terms

The majority of terms used throughout this document are well defined in Joint or

Air Force doctrine. However, the foundational terms of this study will be described here

to establish a solid base for understanding and to orient readers who may be unfamiliar

with JAO. Additionally, a few key terms warrant further discussion due to nuanced

differences between command and control, and how they will be standardized for this

study.

Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR): In Joint operations, the

COMAFFOR is the Air Force service component commander who possesses the

responsibilities and authorities derived from his or her roles in fulfilling the Service’s

4
Sharan B. Merriam and Elizabeth J. Tisdell, Qualitative Research: A Guide to
Design and Implementation, 4th ed. The Jossey-Bass higher and adult education series
(San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 98.
5
Ibid., 101.

5
administrative control (ADCON) function. 6 The COMAFFOR organizes, trains, and
5F

equips, Air Force forces which are presented to the Joint Force Commander (JFC).

Additionally, the COMAFFOR utilizes an AFFOR staff, in coordination with the AOC,

to exercise operational command and control of air forces. 76F

Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC): In Joint operations, the

JFACC is a senior airman, not necessarily from the Air Force, chosen by the JFC to

establish unity of command and unity of effort for JAO. The JFACC role will normally

be assigned to the Air Force component commander if that commander possesses the

preponderance of air forces for a given operation, and the ability to effectively plan, task,

and control joint air operations. 8 The JFACC role involves operational authorities beyond
7F

that of the COMAFFOR role. The JFC in almost all cases designates the COMAFFOR as

the JFACC. 9 If a JFACC is given authority over coalition forces, his title changes to
8F

Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC).

Air Component Commander (ACC): For the purposes of this study, ACC is a

generic term used to describe an Air Force commander who executes both the

6
Department of the Air Force (DAF), Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-
30, Command and Control (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center for
Doctrine Development and Education, 2020), 2–3.
7
Department of the Air Force (DAF), Department of the Air Force Manual
(DAFMAN) 13-1, Operational Procedures-Air Operations Center (AOC)/Operations
Center (OC), vol. 3 (Washington, DC: DAF, 2020), 11-12.
8
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication
(JP) 3-30, Joint Air Operations (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), II-2.
9
DAF, AFDP 3-30, 3.

6
COMAFFOR and JFACC roles. 10 If distinction between roles is required, the terms will
9F

be used separately as described by the definitions listed above.

Air Operations Center (AOC): The AOC is the senior agency of the ACC that

provides command and control of Air Force air and space 11 operations and coordinates
10 F

with other components and Services. 12 In other words, the AOC is an organization
11 F

comprised of people, processes, and systems, commanded by the ACC to conduct air and

space operations. If the AOC includes personnel from two or more services, it is labeled a

Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC). If coalition forces are involved, it is now a

Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). 13 While modern-day operations will most
12 F

likely call for either a JAOC or a CAOC, this paper uses AOC as a generic term to

describe the Air C2 entity regardless of whether it is Joint or Combined.

Wing: The Wing is an echelon of Air Force command with a distinct mission and

significant scope, usually composed of a primary mission group and the necessary

supporting groups, and possesses organic self-support capabilities in functional areas

such as maintenance, supply, and conventional munitions. 14 The Air Force defines three
13F

broad categories of Wings; Operational Wings, Air Base Wings, and Specialized Mission

10
DAF, AFDP 3-30, 3.
11
The definition here is still reflected in doctrine; however, the newly established
United States Space Force (USSF) is beginning to take over operations in space.
12
CJCS, JP 3-30, GL-6.
13
DAF, AFDP 3-30, 23.
14
Department of the Air Force (DAF), Air Force Instruction (AFI) 38-101,
Manpower and Organization (Washington, DC: DAF, 2019), 74.

7
Wings. 15 Wings can be further identified by their primary mission or mission aircraft, for
14F

example, the 48th Fighter Wing. In this thesis, the term Wing is used to refer to an

Operational Wing; specifically, one with the requisite assets to produce air effects during

JAO. Analysis of this type of Wing is required to understand the broader implications of

how the Wing fits into Air C2 as a system.

Command and Control (C2): The exercise of authority and direction by a properly

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the

mission. 16 Within the definition of C2, JP 1 further defines command as “the art of
15F

motivating people and organizations into action to accomplish missions” and control as

“manag(ing) and direct(ing) forces and functions consistent with a commander’s

command authority.” 17 Regarding C2, joint doctrine also states that “control is inherent
16 F

in command.” Readers familiar with JAO may associate the terms “C2” or “Air C2” with

tactical C2 assets, such as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

However, unless specifically stated otherwise, the author will be discussing Air C2

holistically, which includes elements at both the operational and tactical levels of war.

While the terms “command” and “control” seem inextricably linked, it is necessary to

draw a clear distinction between the two when used separately.

15
DAF, AFI 38-101, 74.
16
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication
(JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: JCS, 2017),
I-18.
17
Ibid.

8
 Command: The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises

over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. 18 When distinguishing between

17 F

command and control, this paper defines command in terms of those authorities and

responsibilities possessed by the ACC which cannot be delegated.

Control: Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander

over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. 19 When distinguishing

18F

between command and control, this paper defines control in terms of specific control

activities which the JFACC may delegate to a subordinate commander.

Centralized Control: Giving one commander the responsibility and authority for

planning, directing, and coordinating a military operation or group/category of

operations. 20 This definition adequately describes one-half of the Air Force tenet,
19 F

“Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution” (CC/DE). The following two terms

are established to propose alternatives to current doctrine.

Centralized Command: Follows the same definition of Centralized Control as

stated above; however, Centralized Command implies the ability to delegate specific

control activities to subordinate commanders. This term is used to discuss a proposed

construct of Centralized Command, Distributed Control, and Decentralized Execution

(CC/DC/DE).

18
CJCS, JP 1, GL-5.
19
Ibid., GL-6.
20
CJCS, JP 3-30, I-3.

9
 Distributed Control: The conditional, adaptive delegation or assumption of control

activities through orders or protocols to synchronize operations, maintain initiative, and

achieve commander’s intent. 21 This term is also used to discuss CC/DC/DE.

20F

Limitations

This study was primarily limited by classification. Discussion regarding detailed

and technical specifics of C2, especially as they relate to critical capabilities or

vulnerabilities, quickly falls into the classified realm. The author has focused the analysis

around organization in order to arrive at meaningful conclusions within an unclassified

study. However, some results of the study may be invalidated by unknown classified

considerations. The study was also limited by the time available to complete it within one

academic year. The time limitation was a significant factor in the chosen delimitations

Delimitations

To scope the study, the author utilized three primary delimitations. First, research

and analysis in this thesis was focused on organizational aspects of the AOC, the Wing,

and their direct corollaries. Implications regarding other relevant areas such as force

presentation, protection, and sustainment were not a significant area of research. Second,

recommended solutions to the problem statement only included those which could be

accomplished with existing resources. Recommendations that would require material

solutions or depend on the development of future technology were not considered.

21
Gilmary Michael Hostage III and Larry R Broadwell, “Resilient Command and
Control: The Need for Distributed Control,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 74 (July 2014): 6.

10
Options that require investment in a new echelon of command 22 were not included either
21 F

due to the personnel implications such an approach would incur. Finally, the study did

not consider solutions that are dependent on the actions of sister services or allied forces.

The intent was to limit the study to those aspects which are within the span of control of

the USAF. However, the author recognizes the important role of joint and allied partners

in the greater context of JAO; joint and allied considerations are a critical part of this

study and are evident in all aspects of the research. The recommendations proposed in

thesis are made with JAO in mind and are meant to be compatible in joint and allied

environments.

Significance of the Study

In recent years, there has been a growing consensus across Air Force senior

leadership acknowledging that the current Air C2 construct would not be fit for purpose

in a peer conflict. This problem has been the center of several high-profile studies,

conferences, and exercises. 23 As a result, there is a growing body of work and solutions
22F

being developed. This research project aims to add to that body of work and to advance

the conversation. Additionally, much of the research brainpower in the air community is

22
One example would be an Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF), which Air
Force doctrine describes as a “sub-theater-level” echelon of command. See DAF, AFDP
3-30.
23
Several key studies and exercises are cited throughout this study and listed in
the Bibliography. The author also draws on first-hand knowledge from participation in
several conferences such as Weapons and Tactics Conferences (WEPTAC, Ramstein AB,
Germany, and Nellis AFB, NV) from 2017-2019, the 2019 Air C2 Summit (Washington,
DC), the 2019 Air, Space, and Cyber Conference (Washington, DC), and the 2019 Joint
Air and Space Power Conference (Essen, Germany).

11
currently aimed at realizing the future capability of Joint All Domain Command and

Control (JADC2). While JADC2 is promising in theory, the Department of Defense

(DOD) currently projects it will not reach its Full Operational Capability (FOC) until

2035. 24 This study is intended to provide Air C2 solutions that are achievable within
23F

current USAF means; to bridge the gap between now and JADC2, a capability that is at

least fourteen years on the horizon.

Summary

The return of great power competition has rekindled a sense of urgency across the

United States defense community. The United States’ NSS acknowledges the fact that

America once again has nation-state peers capable of achieving at least military parity,

and in some areas may even exceed its own capabilities. Massive changes are underway

to reverse twenty-plus years of institutional inertia and recreate a force that is ready to

win in large scale combat operations. Since Desert Storm, the USAF has delivered

airpower more decisively than any other air force in history. However, adversaries have

been watching. They have developed several capabilities that can deny the way the Air

Force has done business so successfully in the past. To ensure that airpower can continue

to be decisive in future combat operations, the USAF must evolve its concepts of Air C2.

24
Theresa Hitchens, “‘Bold Quest’ To Demo Allied Connectivity for All-Domain
Ops,” Breaking Defense, August 24, 2020, [Link]
quest-to-demo-allied-connectivity-for-all-domain-ops/.

12
 CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Out-of-date theories have consistently proved the ruin of armies.

—J.F.C. Fuller, War and Western Civilization

Introduction

In the long history of military operations, air forces are pretty new to the scene. It

has been just over one-hundred years since aircraft first made an appearance in the

military, a blip on the timeline compared to land and naval forces that have existed for

millennia. Despite this relatively short period of existence, there is no shortage of

airpower literature. A wide range of works address theory, history, and doctrine of

airpower, how it should be employed, and how it should be commanded and controlled.

For the purposes of this thesis, a thorough review of relevant literature is fundamental to

a comprehensive understanding of Air Command and Control (C2).

In this chapter, the author focuses on literary works regarding Air C2;

specifically, the history and evolution of Air C2 which has driven current constructs and

provides context to the prevalent thought amongst airmen today. The literature review is

directly tied to the problem statement in Chapter 1 and, accordingly, is broken into two

broad themes: 1) The organization and over-centralization of Air C2; and 2) Air C2 in

contested environments. Within these themes, the author identifies literary works that

have forged a relatively stable consensus regarding how airpower should be applied in

combat, bringing attention to the stark contrast between contested and uncontested Air

C2 environments. The author also conducts a thorough review and critique of recent

13
publications and scholarly works that have contributed to the on-going discussion within

the air community. 25

2 4F

The Organization and Over-Centralization of Air C2

The first theme apparent in the literature review is a relative consensus amongst

Air Force senior leaders and strategic thinkers that the current Air C2 construct is overly

centralized, generally meaning that too many processes and decisions are held at the

highest level of command. It is well known amongst military thinkers that over-

centralization of C2 can cause a myriad of problems for military commanders. Placing

too much decision authority with a single commander lengthens decision processes

across subordinate echelons of command, which results in slower response times for the

fighting force as a whole. Over-centralization dissipates subordinate commanders’

initiative and ability to execute flexibly in combat. In some cases, it can even lead to

paralysis of a fighting force. If a subordinate force is dependent on direction from a

higher commander before it can act, and that higher commander’s decision cycle is

disrupted by the enemy such that decisions are delayed or not made at all, then the

subordinate force is unable to act.

While these ideas may seem fairly straight forward, the unique qualities of

airpower and the history of Air C2 make this a much more nuanced dialogue. Therefore,

to focus the discussion within the broader theme of over-centralization, the author has

25
Many of the literary works on this topic reiterate similar ideas with minor
differences. To increase the richness of the discussion, this chapter will focus on a few
key pieces that represent the most significant ideas to explore in depth. Writings
researched on this topic but not mentioned in this chapter are found in the bibliography.

14
identified two significant sub-themes: 1) the problematic evolution of Centralized Control

/ Decentralized Execution (CC/DE), and; 2) the search for solutions.

The Problematic Evolution of CC/DE

The first of these two sub-themes is best captured by then Lt Col Clint Hinote in

his monograph titled, Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution: A Catchphrase

in Crisis? published by the Air Force Research Institute in 2009. The essence of Hinote’s

argument is that CC/DE, what he calls the Air Force’s “master tenet,” has devolved into a

dogma that is simultaneously preached by airmen yet not well understood, instead of the

malleable doctrinal tenet it is intended to be. Furthermore, this dogmatic application of

the master tenet has significantly contributed to the Air Force’s highly centralized C2

organization in all military operations, even when high levels of centralization are not

necessary or are even problematic.

Hinote builds a strong case, correctly pointing out that the challenge of achieving

balance between centralization and decentralization is not a new problem and is not

unique to the Air Force. He draws on B.H. Liddel Hart to point out the dualistic nature of

centralization, stating “there is a trade-off between centralization and decentralization in

any military operation . . . As with any trade-off, we must appreciate the factors involved

to achieve the proper balance.” 26 To demonstrate this point, Hinote conducts a

25 F

comprehensive review of the history of Air C2, in which he identifies varying levels of

centralization throughout a wide spectrum of historical operations. In doing so, Hinote

26
Lt Col Clint Hinote, “Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution: A
Catchphrase in Crisis?” (Research Paper 2009-1, Air Force Research Institute, Maxwell
Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL, 2009), 1.

15
also brings to light the key lessons learned which were the genesis of the master tenet and

demonstrates the Air Force’s journey to find the right balance of centralization.

The most important such lesson was first learned in World War II. At the

beginning of the conflict, Allied air forces were organized to be attached to land forces.

This structure resulted in several divisions and separate chains of command across the air

forces, a practice which was dubbed “penny packeting” by British Air Marshal Sir Arthur

W. Tedder. It was quickly revealed that dividing air forces into “penny packets” disabled

the very aspects of airpower that make it distinct from surface forces and decisive in

combat. That is, airpower’s strength lies in its ability to leverage its unique speed, range,

and flexibility, to quickly achieve concentration and mass effects nearly anywhere on the

battlefield. Dividing its organization and attaching it as subordinate to land forces made it

all but useless; thus, the nascent tenet of centralized control of airpower was born. While

this may seem indicative of a preference for more centralization than less, Hinote

accurately points out that, for most of airpower history, this tenet was seen as flexible in

that the appropriate level of centralization would vary depending on the specifics of any

given operation, and that it should be adjusted accordingly. During the following forty-

five years of Air Force history, this was the predominant interpretation of what would

eventually become known as centralized control; however, things began to change with

the commencement of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. 27 26F

Hinote points to Desert Storm as the defining moment where the majority of

airmen began to believe “the appropriate level of centralized control was the senior

27
Hinote, “Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution,” 7-12.

16
airman in-theater,” 28 meaning the Air Component Commander (ACC). This is a critical
2 7F

point. The implicit assumption is the overwhelming success the Air Force enjoyed during

Desert Storm began the dogmatic thinking which now permeates the institution.

Essentially, Desert Storm provided a blueprint for the single best way to conduct Air C2,

and that blueprint is now so engrained in the Air Force’s culture, any other way of doing

business is inconceivable to most. Furthermore, airmen today directly correlate the

successful execution of CC/DE with the execution of air operations in Desert Storm. The

result is an inflexible, narrow interpretation of a perceived “proper” application of

CC/DE. This, in turn, hinders a more comprehensive view that encompasses the entire

breadth of the historical purpose and evolution of CC/DE.

Another keen observation by Hinote is to identify doctrinal language as one of the

primary reasons why CC/DE has experienced a troubled evolution. He specifically

highlights how the definition and application of the terms “command” and “control” have

been problematic for Air Force’s master tenet. Contrasting the influence of military

historian Martin van Creveld with implications of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act,

Hinote exposes a significant tension between military thought and policy regarding

command and control:

While van Creveld included in command everything a force needed to exist—that

is, what we call organizing, training, and equipping—together with the things a
force needed to conduct operations, the U.S. military was undergoing a
fundamental reorganization that, in essence, separated these functions into two
distinct chains of command. Goldwater-Nichols mandated that the services
organize, train, and equip their forces, but the combatant commanders would
direct operations with these forces. This meant that in the U.S. military the word

28
Hinote, “Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution,” 7-12.

17
 command would become a term full of nuance and qualification, because
Goldwater-Nichols split van Creveld’s concept in halves. 29
28F

As a result, the term “control” has been used liberally to encompass a wide range of

authorities that may or may not be directly tied to “command,” causing frequent

confusion about its meaning and application. Therefore, utilizing the term “centralized

control” to describe the Air Force’s master tenet is, it itself, unclear and problematic.

Finally, Hinote’s piece does well to define what is meant by centralization of Air

C2. He characterizes Air C2 in terms of four broad functions; planning, directing,

coordinating, and controlling, and then asserts that airmen believe these four functions

should be centralized at the theater level, under a single airman commander. This

framework of centralized Air C2 is utilized by Hinote to analyze a series of operations in

Iraq and Afghanistan, which clearly highlights several flaws in the “master tenet,” or at

least in its application at the time. While Hinote provides an excellent comprehensive

analysis of the issues surrounding the Air Force’s tenet of CC/DE, there are ideas

presented and gaps in concepts that require further exploration for the purpose of this

thesis.

The most glaring omission from Catchphrase in Crisis is analysis regarding how

any enemy with the ability to contest the Air C2 construct impacts Hinote’s conclusions.

In Desert Storm, for example, the Iraqi enemy did not pose any real threat to the ACC’s

ability to generate airpower, plan air operations, or communicate with his forces; in other

words, to command and control. This was certainly true of the insurgent enemies later

faced in Iraq and Afghanistan as well. The result is a long list of lessons learned which

29
Hinote, “Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution,” 15.

18
are all predicated on the assumption that the ACC will be able to execute uncontested C2

of air forces. It is easy to see how changing that assumption would impact some of

Hinote’s conclusions. For example, he argues that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

would be good instances to utilize a more decentralized approach by delegating C2 to the

forward commander. To support his argument, he leans on the actions taken by World

War II General George Kenney, who was General MacArthur’s air commander in the

Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II, in what he calls a “similar situation.” 30 29F

Hinote goes on to conclude the Air Force needs a more flexible Air C2 construct. He

further argues a distributed approach to control, as in the Kenney example, does not

necessarily violate the master tenet of CC/DE as many airmen today believe it would.

However, when you consider Hinote’s conclusions from a threat perspective, the

Kenney comparison appears flawed. The nature of threat Kenney faced is much more

analogous to large scale combat operations against a peer adversary, wherein the enemy

has the capability to contest C2 of air forces, than it is to the conflicts in Iraq and

Afghanistan. While Hinote’s conclusions are still valid despite this shift in perspective, it

is the “why” behind his conclusions that changes. Hinote’s “why” was largely about

better integration with joint partners for more effective and efficient operations. For this

thesis, the “why” is about necessity. While Catchphrase in Crisis argues for a flexible Air

C2 construct primarily for optimization, today’s threat environment demands the same

flexibility out of necessity. If the enemy possesses the ability to contest Air C2, then a

highly centralized approach is no longer a feasible option.

30
Hinote, “Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution,” 70.

19
 In many ways, Catchphrase in Crisis subtly captures the predominant military

thinking at the turn of the century. That is, the era of great power competition had ended

with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the armed forces of the United States of

America would enjoy a considerable advantage over all potential adversaries for the

foreseeable future. Therefore, it was reasonable to assume that advantages of the past

would continue to be prevalent in future operations. But even then, there were several

concerns. The Air Force’s utilization of and reliance on technology coupled with

commanding airpower in relatively benign or permissive environments had led to the

development of a C2 system that was overly centralized. While this model had worked

with devastating effect against inferior adversaries, it also created a vulnerability that

could be exploited. Additionally, there were growing concerns about the Anti-Access,

Area Denial (A2AD) systems being developed in Russia and China. As the new threat

environment was slowly and reluctantly realized, flurries of articles regarding Air C2

began being published in prominent military journals. By 2013, even the highest-ranking

generals in the Air Force were questioning the current application of the sacred tenet of

CC/DE, and new concepts were emerging.

The Search for Solutions

Given President Obama’s 2011 “Pivot to the Pacific” strategy 31, it is no surprise
3 0F

that academic conversations within the military community began to shift away from

31
Mark E Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F.
Martin, Ronald O’Rourke, and Bruce Vaughn, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama
Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia, Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2012), 33.

20
ideas dominated by counterinsurgency operations and towards concepts necessary to

prevail in large scale operations against peer adversaries. As priorities shifted and the

conversation evolved, many began to address the increasingly obvious problem the Air

Force had with over-centralization and the search for solutions began. Within the air

community, more leaders and thinkers began to suggest that the tenet of CC/DE should

be adapted to address this issue. As an antidote to that perceived over-centralization, the

concept gaining the most traction was one of “Distributed Control,” which was

repeatedly suggested as an appropriate modification to the master tenet in the form of:

“Centralized Command / Distributed Control / Decentralized Execution” (CC/DC/DE).

The new concept was staunchly advocated by General Herbert Carlisle who, in 2013,

went so far as to list CC/DC/DE as a replacement for CC/DE in the PACAF Command

Strategy. 32
3 1F

One year later, the Commander, Air Combat Command (COMACC), Gen Mike

Hostage, together with his executive officer, Colonel Larry Broadwell, published an

article in Joint Force Quarterly titled, “Resilient Command and Control: The Need for

Distributed Control.” In this article, COMACC outlines the need for the Air Force to

adopt CC/DC/DE as a necessary adaptation to the legacy tenet in order to meet the

challenges of the contemporary threat environment. 33 He also lays out a clear picture of
32F

what is meant by distributed control, defining it as, “the conditional, adaptive delegation

32
Gen Herbert Carlisle, “Pacific Air Forces: Command Strategy” (PACAF/
A5XC, January 2013).
33
Hostage and Broadwell, “Resilient Command and Control,” 43.

21
or assumption of control activities through orders or protocols to synchronize operations,

maintain initiative, and achieve commander’s intent.” 34 33F

The thoughts expressed by Hostage in this article are a marked departure from the

small-scale conflict paradigm which drove the work of Hinote and others in the years

before. Accordingly, Hostage’s threat-centric argument regarding the need for

distributed control and his vision for its utilization are both clear:

It is preposterous to believe any sophisticated future adversary would not possess

at least the desire and, likely, the capability to disrupt our C2 architecture.
Therefore, we must be prepared to synchronize and project combat airpower
through distributed control during periods when our C2 architecture is strained by
asymmetric challenges or saturated with intense air activity. If the Combined
Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) becomes isolated, the concept of
distributed control empowers subordinate commanders, organizations, operations
centers, and battle management command and control (BMC2) platforms to
amalgamate otherwise disconnected units into teams of synchronized combat
airpower. 35 34F

Thus, while the idea for a flexible Air C2 construct is consistent with Hinote’s thinking,

the shift in threat perspective provides a more compelling purpose. Yet, the flexible

approach to Air C2 is not the only place where Hostage and Hinote find alignment. They

both also recognize the importance of empowering subordinate commanders by

establishing broad commander’s intent and setting the conditions for subordinate forces

to maintain initiative. This alludes to a tried-and-true principle of military operations,

well codified in joint doctrine, known as “mission command.”

Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, defines

mission command as, “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution

34
Hostage and Broadwell, “Resilient Command and Control,” 39.
35
Ibid.

22
based on mission-type orders,” and goes on to state that it is the preferred method of

executing C2. 36 The joint doctrine publication which pertains specifically to airpower
35F

goes further to describe the relationship between mission command and the airpower

tenet of CC/DE:

Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized

execution based upon mission-type orders and is a key component of the C2
function. Commanders delegate decisions to subordinates wherever possible,
which minimizes detailed control and empowers subordinates’ initiative to make
decisions based on the commander’s guidance rather than constant
communications. While philosophically consistent with historical C2 of air
operations, modern joint air operations demand a balanced approach to C2. This
approach is best codified in centralized control and decentralized execution. 37 36F

Thus, joint air doctrine seems to suggest that, while the two concepts are closely related,

they are still distinct from one another, but this is not entirely clear. Perhaps in attempt to

address potential confusion, Air Force doctrine further clarifies:

[Mission Command’s] intent is for subordinates to clearly understand the

commander’s intent and to foster flexibility and initiative at the tactical level to
best accomplish the mission. Decentralization of tactical planning via conditions-
based or mission-type orders, combined with command by negation and accepting
the appropriate level of risk, allows subordinate commanders to focus on the
superior commander’s intent and required effects to accomplish the mission in an
efficient manner. Joint education, planning, and training are required to develop
and demonstrate professional competence based on doctrine and knowledge. This
approach is best codified in centralized control and decentralized execution. 38 37F

Restated succinctly, Air Force doctrine describes CC/DE as the Air Force’s approach to

mission command in an attempt to make the two concepts one in the same. Yet, despite

this attempt to bridge the two terms in theory, the contemporary manifestation of CC/DE

36
CJCS, JP 1, V-15.
37
CJCS, JP 3-30, I-3.
38
DAF, AFDP 3-30, 71.

23
in practice does not appear to be well aligned with mission command at all. In fact, the

Air Force’s application of CC/DE often finds itself in direct conflict with the concept of

mission command. Examples of this include reliance on an Air Tasking Order (ATO)

versus mission-type orders, retention of authorities versus delegation of authorities, and

subordinate commanders unable to exercise initiative due to the design of the current Air

C2 system. 39 This is problematic considering that, in order to function in the threat

38F

environment outlined by Hostage, Air C2 will be dependent on an approach more akin to

mission command for success.

Therefore, a large part of the philosophical struggle facing the Air Force is the

ability to reconcile the tenet of centralized control with the principle of mission

command. Furthermore, seeing as both concepts agree on the approach to “decentralized

execution,” the fundamental difference in application must come down to “centralized

control” and the elusive task of finding the right balance. Given the previous definition

of over-centralization, it can be concluded that the Air Force’s current construct is widely

perceived to be out of balance, investing far more in centralized control than in

decentralized execution. As airpower thinkers began to work through these issues in the

early 2010’s, distributed control emerged as a promising concept to address the

challenges at hand.

Like Hinote, Hostage also recognized the need to address the terms “command”

and “control” individually; however, Hostage advocates a much different solution. While

39
This argument is further developed later in this chapter and in Chapter 4.
Additionally, the Air Force has several ongoing initiatives to address these issues which
are discussed in Chapter 5.

24
Hinote recommends a more permanent delegation of authority to forward commanders as

evidenced by his Kenney example, Hostage sees distributed control as a much more

temporary arrangement during operations, only being utilized when the ACC loses

communications with subordinate forces. Hostage goes further to draw a crisp line in the

sand, stating, “Distributed control absolutely does not delegate command authorities or

command responsibilities from the CFACC or a subordinate commander to another.” 40 3 9F

He is very clear that any delegation of authority would be strictly limited to that of

“control activities,” thereby creating a significant, if not confusing, distinction between

command and control.

The confusion arises when one analyzes Hostage’s discussion of subordinate

commander activities and roles during the execution of distributed control. Within the

concept of distributed control, he sees delegated control authorities primarily being

carried out by tactical C2 platforms such as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control

System (AWACS) or ground-based Control and Reporting Centers (CRCs). The

discussion here is about delegation of control authorities to entities, not specific

commanders. The role of subordinate commanders is only discussed in the context of

“self-organization,” a concept which Hostage describes here:

It is even possible, if isolated for many days to weeks, for subordinate units to
self-organize into larger, more comprehensive units using distributed control.
Self-organization would only occur in the direst of circumstances and does not
include modifications to the chain of command, leaving prehostility command
authorities and responsibilities intact. Furthermore, any self-organization would
remain under the command of the CFACC and should evolve as expressed in his
mission intent orders about extended periods of lost communications. These new
organizations could become as robust as an Air Expeditionary Task Force
(AETF), thus husbanding resources from otherwise isolated units—fighters,

40
Hostage and Broadwell, “Resilient Command and Control,” 39.

25
 bombers, tankers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
aircraft—into a composite fighting force. 4140F

Hostage reiterates that, in such a construct, there still would be no change to command

authorities or responsibilities. Instead, it would be “control authorities” that the

subordinate commander would be executing, all the while attempting to reestablish the

pre-existing command structure. However, when critically examining what would be

required of subordinate commanders in a period of self-organization (“husbanding

resources” for example), it can be easily argued that these are actually “command

authorities” being executed, even if they are labeled as “control authorities.” Thus, the

conversation risks being reduced to a debate over semantics.

However, Hostage clearly feels it is necessary to highlight this distinction. He

views it as essential that the ACC maintains the full authority and responsibility of his

command, although he does not explicitly state why. One potential reason Hostage places

so much emphasis on the retention of all aspects of command for the ACC is to safeguard

against the known pitfalls of Air C2. As previously discussed, there are several valid

reasons why air commanders would be distrustful of any C2 organization which risked

return to a “penny packet” type structure. The forward commander construct that Hinote

argues for can be interpreted as a division in command structure, and therefore the

beginning of packeted air forces. Furthermore, it is typical for surface component

commanders to desire their own dedicated air forces. The idea of having airpower on call,

directly subordinate to one’s own objectives, is very appealing. Perhaps the concern of

Hostage and other air commanders is that a forward commander construct presents too

41
Hostage and Broadwell, “Resilient Command and Control,” 39.

26
tempting of an option for surface commanders in a Joint C2 environment, in which it may

be decided to attach such a forward commander to surface forces and subordinate to a

surface commander. This would violate the known best practice for employing airpower;

therefore, one prevents this from being an option by continuing to emphasize the primacy

of the ACC and refusing to budge on any concept which may pose a threat to that idea.

This would help explain why Hostage continually reiterates that distributed control is

about the delegation of control authorities, not about the delegation of any aspects of

command.

The final aspect of distributed control that merits further exploration is that of

commander’s intent and orders, thereby warranting a brief return to the discussion of

mission command. As previously mentioned, the concept of mission command is built on

mission-type orders, which are codified in joint doctrine as follows:

Mission-type orders direct a subordinate to perform a certain task without

specifying how to accomplish it. Within these orders, the actual mission statement
should be a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential
task (or tasks) and purpose—a clear statement of the action to be taken and the
reason for doing so. The senior leaves the details of execution to the subordinate,
allowing the freedom and the obligation to take whatever steps are necessary to
deal with the changing situation while encouraging initiative at lower levels. 42
41F

Herein lies another significant issue that Hostage alludes to with the concept of

distributed control; an issue somewhat unique to Air C2 when compared to the other

components. The problem lies in the high level of synchronization demanded by modern

air operations. The ACC must find a way to align the activities of hundreds, if not

thousands, of aircraft launching from multiple bases across the theater, and to converge

42
CJCS, JP 1, V-16.

27
all the effects produced by those aircraft to achieve the objectives of the broader joint

campaign. This extremely complex endeavor has traditionally been accomplished by the

commander issuing an Air Tasking Order (ATO), which is “a method used to task and

disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies

projected sorties, capabilities, and/or force to targets and specific missions.” 43 Of note,
42F

the ATO is a very specific and detailed order and, in some ways, is the antithesis of

mission-type orders

When assessed in the modern threat environment as outlined by Hostage, the

problem with the Air Force’s current ATO process is that it is a cumbersome, single point

of failure. To illustrate this point, consider ATO production and dissemination. First, the

ATO is typically produced every 24-hours; it is a very specific and detailed order which

requires high-levels of planning and a large staff. Accordingly, the ACC utilizes the

capabilities of the AOC for ATO production. Second, the ATO must be delivered to

subordinate units, a process dependent on a consistently functioning communication

network. In a modern peer conflict, it is not difficult to envisage a scenario in which the

AOC comes under attack, be it via non-kinetic means such as a cyber-attack, or via

kinetic means such as a missile attack. Any such attack would clearly degrade, if not

outright deny, the ability of the AOC to produce the ATO. Furthermore, in a scenario

where the AOC becomes isolated from subordinate units in terms of communications, or

where units may be isolated from the AOC, the ATO cannot be delivered. Stated simply,

units would not receive orders. These issues become even more worrisome when

43
CJCS, JP 1, GL-6.

28
considering the need to deliver an ATO every 24 hours; disruptions to the ATO process

would have ripple effects and become exponentially impactful over time. This exercise in

logic clearly demonstrates the need for the Air Force to develop a more agile and resilient

means to produce and deliver orders to prevail in peer conflict.

To address this issue, Hostage and others suggest ideas mirroring the concepts of

mission command, that is, a concept founded on the ability of subordinate forces to

maintain the initiative enabled by the broad issuance of commander’s guidance and

communicated through mission-type orders. As Hostage explains, “the ability to maintain

initiative and act in the throes of combat is key to putting combat airpower over friendly

forces or taking it to the enemy . . . to enable this initiative, the commander must have

clearly expressed his intent to subordinate commanders and their units.” 44 He stops short
4 3F

of directly referring to this element of the distributed control concept as mission

command, however, the similarities are clear. Additionally, while he never uses the

words “mission-type order,” he does propose the ACC should be able to issue a series of

“preplanned ATOs covering several days.” 45 44 F

Doctrine is also beginning to address the ATO problem. The most recent edition

of Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-30, Command and Control, adds a single-paragraph

section titled “Control of Airpower in Contested Environments,” in which it introduces a

concept labeled as a standing Integrated Tasking Order (ITO):

In this air equivalent of mission command, forward based air expeditionary wings
or task forces receive conditions based authorities with standing orders and
commander's intent on the ITO . . . This decentralized execution model enables

44
Hostage and Broadwell, “Resilient Command and Control,” 41.
45
Ibid., 39.

29
 local commanders to maintain pressure on the enemy even when disconnected
from communications with higher headquarters due to a contested environment
against a peer or near-peer adversary. 46
45F

While the notion of an ITO shows promise, it is clearly a nascent concept that is only

beginning to be understood in the air community. Execution of a standing ITO versus a

traditional ATO would be a dramatic departure from the Air Force’s current way of doing

business. It is not currently clear if the Air Force is organized, trained, or equipped, to

deliver orders in such a manner, much less if it can do so as a means to successfully

conduct air operations in a peer conflict. Regardless, the point remains, if the Air Force is

to fight and win in peer conflict, it must adapt its current ATO construct.

In summary, this section of the literature review has established that the current

organization of Air C2 is widely perceived to be overly centralized, a problem which

arose out of a misunderstanding, if not a misapplication, of the airpower tenet of CC/DE.

The highly centralized structure of Air C2 is problematic for a multitude of reasons, not

the least of which is the threat posed by emerging peer competitors. As a result, the air

community has been in search of solutions to find the appropriate balance of centralized

control which would better enable a mission command type of approach. Emerging

concepts such as distributed control and standing ITOs offer promise but warrant further

exploration. To further shed light on this discussion, it is necessary to understand what

assumptions fundamentally change when an adversary possesses the capability to contest

Air C2.

46
DAF, AFDP 3-30, 3.

30
 Air C2 in Contested Environments

When determining the need for change to a system as successful as Air C2 has

been in recent decades, it is necessary to have a thorough understanding of what drives

the need for change. In this case, the reason is simple; for the first time since the end of

the Cold War, the United States has recognized the existence of potential adversaries who

possess the capability to contest the command and control of air forces. This section

explores the theme and relevant literature regarding Air C2 in contested environments.

First, it is necessary to establish a baseline for discussion as to what is meant by

“contested environments,” then the implications of that environment can be further

examined.

The Air Force’s existing Air C2 architecture is dependent on two essential

elements that enable the system to function: persistent communications and sanctuary of

forces. Communication is, of course, inherent in and essential to any form of C2.

Commanders must be able to communicate with subordinate forces, though

communications may vary in frequency, duration, and detail. Modern military operations

offer many means of near-instantaneous communications including line of sight (LOS)

radio, high frequency (HF) radio, satellite communications (SATCOM), datalinks, fiber,

and internet-based communications, to name a few. The Air Force, along with the rest of

the United States military, has enjoyed a significant period of dominance regarding such

communications technologies, wherein commanders have consistently achieved high

levels of connectivity with subordinate forces against adversaries who were powerless to

prevent it. Similarly, the Air Force has benefited tremendously in recent decades from the

sanctuary of its forces. In the majority of U.S. conflicts since World War II, air

31
commanders have been able to mass forces in theaters of operations with near impunity.

Indeed, while smaller-scale attacks have occurred, the legitimate threat of a large-scale

attack has been absent since the end of the Cold War. Additionally, air commanders

themselves, their staffs, and the AOC, have largely been able to operate out of reach of

the enemy. 47 For the purposes of this thesis, the term “contested environment” is used to
46 F

describe an operational scenario in which the adversary possesses the capability to

degrade or deny both of these essential elements which enable the current Air C2 system.

To better understand the current situation, a brief discussion of historical

precedence is warranted. In a book titled Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in

Command and Control, 1942-1991, authors James Winnefeld and Dana Johnson offer an

excellent starting point. In this work, Winnefeld and Johnson conduct a thorough review

of six major air campaigns from World War II to Desert Storm, identifying major

historical lessons learned in the joint application of Air C2. In analyzing the World War

II Solomons Campaign in the Pacific theater, Winnefeld and Johnson observe:

First, it must be said that survival and the desire to win when the issue is
in doubt are major incentives to put lesser concerns aside . . . The enemy
contested control of the air over the battlefield until late in the campaign. Air
commanders have not faced similar challenges in subsequent wars. In the Korean
and Vietnam wars U.S. airfields and naval forces were not under air attack, and
the staffs were themselves seldom threatened. In the Solomons, everyone in the
islands was under threat of attack at any time. 48
47F

47
A notable exception are those forces in range of missile threats posed by Iran
and North Korea during periods of heightened tensions in recent years.
48
James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of
Unity in Command and Control, 1942-1991, A RAND research study (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1993), 34.

32
It is difficult to overstate the significance of one historical fact that this excerpt

highlights—no enemy has contested U.S. Air C2 since World War II.

This point presents several challenges when considering best practices. First, there

is an extremely limited well to draw from when searching for examples of what has

worked in the past. Lessons drawn from conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, and the first

Gulf War, are foundational to modern airpower, but many lessons learned from those

conflicts would likely change had the enemy been able to significantly contest Air C2.

Second, institutional memory of how to operate in such an environment atrophies over

time. While the study of history and doctrine can serve as a means to hold onto portions

of institutional memory, they are no substitute for widespread individual experience of

those in the force. Third, the historical examples that do exist struggle to stand up to

criticisms of relevance. Airpower and its associated technologies have advanced

tremendously in the seventy-five years since the end of World War II, making it

imprudent to draw direct correlations between Air C2 then and now.

But there are a few enduring truths that are still germane to current and future

operations. To begin, the previous point that communication is an essential element of

Air C2 can be observed from a historical perspective. As one of the major findings of

their work, Winnefeld and Johnson point out, “communications are the known Achilles’

heel of any military operation, but particularly of a joint air operation.” This perspective

is shared more recently by then Lt Col Francisco Gallei in his dissertation titled The

Roots of the Command and Control of Air Power: An Appraisal of Three Air Forces

Through 1945. After an in-depth study of the contestation of airpower during World War

II, Gallei concludes:

33
 Sometimes it appears as if the concept is new; and it is for this generation. WWI
and WWII, however, were ‘contested environments,’ both in the air and on the
ground, and nations developed command and control systems to operate in those
environments. It was a way to orchestrate and provide order for the commander to
respond to battlefield events. Belligerents attacked each other’s command and
control system by intercepting radio transmissions and jamming radio and radar.
Each side countered with a myriad of methods in order to continue operating.
Command and control relies on a communications infrastructure. To be effective,
air forces require a command and control system that is robust, redundant, and
protected. 49
48 F

Here, Gallei not only reinforces the importance of communications, but he also highlights

the need for Air C2 to be “robust, redundant, and protected” in contested environments.

While current-day Air C2 is certainly robust, evidence to this point suggests that it is

highly centralized instead of redundant, and vulnerable versus protected. Gallei also

seems to suggest that Air C2 in World War II naturally evolved as part of an iterative

process; a series of attacks and counterattacks between belligerents that required each

side to make adjustments until a workable solution was found. It is reasonable to believe

that such a process would also occur in future conflicts between peers, which emphasizes

the need for an Air C2 system that is flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing

circumstances during combat.

In addition to looking to the past for insights, it is also necessary to accurately

envision how warfare will be different in the future, a task which has proven difficult to

achieve for military thinkers throughout history. Nineteenth century Prussian general

Helmuth von Moltke offers a rare example of success in this endeavor. During a period of

relative peace, Moltke was able to intellectually synthesize significant changes in

49
Lt Col Francisco M Gallei, “The Roots of the Command and Control of Air
Power: An Appraisal of Three Air Forces through 1945,” (Ph.D. diss., Air University,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL, 2014), 380.

34
technology, weaponry, communications, and logistics, to arrive at a prescient vision of

what future war would look like. Unfortunately, his belief that future conflicts would be

long and devasting total wars proved to be true in World War I, albeit on a much more

horrific scale than anyone could have predicted. 50 While Moltke may have been able to
49F

correctly predict certain aspects of future warfare, history is littered with many more

military thinkers who were unable to do so.

So, the challenge today, once again during a period of relative peace between

great powers, is to arrive at the best possible approximation of future warfare and prepare

for it, not just to fight and win if necessary, but ideally to deter and prevent. A recent

RAND study published in 2018 is a good focal point for this discussion. Distributed

Operations in a Contested Environment: Implications for USAF Force Presentation is an

in-depth study of the impacts of the modern threat environment on existing Air Force

structures. The first finding of the study addresses the two Air C2 essential elements of

communications and sanctuary:

The U.S. Air Force force presentation model and operating concepts are based on
assumptions that are incompatible with a contested environment. A conflict with a
great power will overturn two key assumptions about the operating environment
that have prevailed during counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT), and
stability operations in recent decades: that air bases are sanctuaries and
communications reliable. In this setting, wing-sized units at main operating bases
and centralized planning at the JAOC mean that the enemy could disrupt air
operations with attacks on a few high-payoff targets. 5150F

50
Michael Krause, Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art (Washington:
Center for Military History, 2005), 113.
51
Miranda Priebe, Alan Vick, Jacob Heim, and Meagan Smith, Distributed
Operations in a Contested Environment: Implications for USAF Force Presentation
(RAND Corporation, 2019), x, accessed November 7, 2020, [Link]
research_reports/[Link].

35
This finding alludes to two broad characteristics that will likely be present in future

conflicts. First, in peer conflict, traditional notions of sanctuary no longer exist. Just as

the Air Force has touted “global reach” as a strategic effect of airpower, 52 inherent in the
51F

nature of a peer competitor is that they also possess a degree of global reach, even if it is

asymmetric to U.S. notions of the concept. Cyber capabilities, anti-space capabilities,

long-range missiles, and submarines, are just a few of the means available to potential

adversaries to deny any traditional notion of sanctuary via geographic location alone.

Therefore, in future conflicts, it should be expected that air forces will be attacked and

the Air C2 system should be designed to account for this inevitability. Second, the

communication environment will be chaotic. Potential adversaries have been observing

how the Air Force has been able to use exquisite communications technology to

devastating effect, and they have developed several means to degrade or deny it.

Successful Air C2 in future warfare will be predicated on the ability to continue

operations in a communication degraded or denied environment. These two

characteristics of future conflict and their impact on the Air C2 system are significant

factors for analysis in Chapter 4.

Summary

What this chapter reveals is a growing consensus amongst the air community that

the current design of the Air C2 system is over-centralized, due in large part to the slow

devolution of CC/DE from a flexible tenet into a rigid dogma. This devolution was the

52
Department of the Air Force (DAF), Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global
Power for America, 2013, 10, [Link]
2015/newGV_GR_GP_PRINT.pdf.

36
logical outcome of the circumstances in which air operations have been conducted for the

past 75 years—The U.S. Air Force’s ability to conduct C2 has not been truly contested

since World War II. Furthermore, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end

of the Cold War, the U.S. has enjoyed a long period of unipolar world order, during

which the Air Force possessed a significant technological advantage relatively unrivaled

by adversaries. The conditions were set for the Air Force to naturally walk down a path

towards an ever more centralized approach to Air C2.

Yet in recent years, U.S. national strategy has recognized the emerging era of a

multipolar world order and a return to great power competition. Consequently, the likely

characteristics of future warfare dictate the need for Air C2 that can persist in contested

environments. Despite the narrow window of historical precedence, a few enduring

lessons for contested air operations are apparent: communications are essential to Air C2;

Air C2 should be robust, redundant, and protected; and Air C2 must be flexible enough to

adapt when attacked. Moreover, traditional notions of sanctuary will be denied to air

forces and communications environments will be unpredictable.

When considering these points in their totality, it is clear contested environments

fundamentally change the underlying assumptions on which current Air C2 structures are

built. As a result, the Air Force must make significant changes to ensure Air C2 can

continue to deliver decisive airpower in future conflicts. Senior leaders and strategic

thinkers have recognized this need and have been willing to reconsider traditional

approaches to Air C2 in search of better answers. Promising concepts such as distributed

control and standing ITOs have emerged as a result, but many changes are still needed if

Air C2 is to be successful in future operations. The challenge is to achieve a more

37
appropriate balance of centralization in Air C2 without abandoning the principles which

have made airpower so effective for the joint force. This thesis hopes to address a very

specific piece of that equation with a thorough analysis of the relationship between the

AOC and the Wing.

38
 CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

It is ever a paradox in military affairs that the only way to obtain license for
intellectual ideas is to prove oneself an expert in conventional practices.
—B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, quoted in “Quotations on Airpower”

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is threefold: 1) execute in-depth research and analysis of air

Command and Control (C2) theory, doctrine, and practice; 2) identify how its current

structure might be exploited by a peer adversary, and; 3) propose organizational solutions

to overcome some of the challenges posed by peer conflict. To meet this aim, the author

conducted a Qualitative Case Study of Air C2, using systems theory as a theoretical

framework. The study focuses on how the Air Operations Center (AOC) and the Wing

function as an organizational Air C2 system to deliver effects in combat operations

against a peer adversary.

Methodology

As described in Chapter 1, this study was conducted to develop a detailed

understanding, to provide and assess recommendations, and to provide input into the

ongoing conversation. In comparison, there are four primary characteristics of qualitative

research: 1) a focus on meaning and understanding; 2) the researcher as the primary

instrument of data collection; 3) it is an inductive process, and; 4) the product results in

rich description. 53 There is, therefore, significant alignment between these characteristics
52 F

53
Merriam and Tisdell, Qualitative Research, 14-19.

39
and the purpose of this study. Additionally, this study was intended to be descriptive and

understanding in nature, as opposed to a quantitative approach which seeks to be

predictive and controlling. 54 Thus, the purpose of this study demanded a qualitative
53 F

approach.

Acknowledging that there are numerous ways to design qualitative research, this

thesis utilized the Case Study Method. A case study can be defined as, “an in-depth

description and analysis of a bounded system.” 55 In this research project specifically, the
5 4F

“case” is “Air C2” as a system, bounded by the interaction of two entities, the AOC and

the Wing. The system is characterized in Chapter 4 by functional analysis, through which

the author breaks each entity down by organization and subsequently into a

comprehensive list of functions that are performed to generate Air C2. The sources of

information regarding functions were derived from regulation, joint doctrine, Air Force

doctrine, Air Force publications, and a series of semi-structured interviews with subject-

matter experts (SMEs). The primary and secondary research questions were used to scope

this process.

Additionally, this research project uses systems theory as a theoretical framework,

meaning “the focus is on the interactions and on the relationships between parts in order

to understand an entity’s organization, functioning and outcomes.” 56 The author utilizes

55 F

54
Merriam and Tisdell, Qualitative Research, 20.
55
Ibid., 37.
56
Cristina Mele, Jacqueline Pels, and Francesco Polese, “A Brief Review of
Systems Theories and Their Managerial Applications,” Service Science 2, no. 1–2 (June
2010): 127.

40
functional analysis to characterize Air C2 as a system. This approach is accomplished by

describing the functions in terms of the processes and relationships required to perform

those functions. Once established, the system is graphically depicted to enable

visualization of the system. This visualization utilizes links, which are established

between the AOC, the Wing, requisite functions, and the other elements of system, to

depict how the organizational processes interact to generate Air C2. Then, the final step

of the system analysis is to assess how it reacts to a contested environment. To do this, a

threat to the system must be identified.

This project is focused Air C2 in peer conflict; therefore, a threat to the Air C2

system are capabilities possessed by a peer adversary. To ensure the research is

applicable to a broad range of potential future threats, no specific country is discussed.

Instead, in Chapter 4, the author develops a country-agnostic list of broad capabilities that

might disrupt, degrade, or deny certain aspects of the current Air C2 system. A “peer

adversary” is then defined as a notional state actor which possesses those capabilities.

Once the threat is defined as such, peer adversary capabilities are applied against the

system to demonstrate how Air C2 responds to the threat.

Last, acknowledging that form should function, the author leverages the

functional and system analysis to arrive at organizational solutions to the problem

observed. This final step is asking, “if certain functions of the system are being disrupted

or denied by the threat, what organizational change(s) to the AOC and/or Wing would

allow the system to continue to function?” The organizational solutions recommended are

intended to be achievable by the Air Force on a relatively short timeline, defined as less

than two years, and independent of any material solutions. The reasoning for this non-

41
material approach to recommendations is grounded in the belief that immediate solutions

to the Air C2 problem are required and can be achieved, at least partially, outside of the

problematic acquisition system.

Data Collection

This study collected data and amassed evidence through a combination of

document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The document analysis included

published articles, peer-reviewed studies, or other scholarly works as they pertain to the

primary and secondary research questions. Document analysis also incorporated

Department of Defense (DOD) documents, including joint doctrine, Air Force doctrine,

and Air Force Instructions (AFIs). Key topic areas for data collection were Air C2, the

AOC, the Wing, national strategy, peer threat capabilities, and large-scale combat

operations.

Interviews were required to gather several aspects of data not available through

document analysis alone. First, interviews were instrumental to being able to ascertain the

real-world practice of the processes and procedures described in doctrine and AFIs; to

verify what is done against what is written. Additionally, interviewees were particularly

critical to determining what unwritten capabilities exist at the Wing level. Last,

interviews with Air C2 SMEs were essential in determining what on-going Air Force

initiatives exist which may also address the problem as stated in this thesis.

For the interviews, data was collected utilizing a pre-determined list of questions

and issues developed by the author to guide a discussion with the interviewees. To

document the data, interviews were recorded and transcribed. The population for data

collection via interview included Air C2 SMEs and Wing SMEs. This study used two
42
screening criteria to ensure the contributions of interviewees were relevant to the

research. First, if providing information about current practices, subjects must have had

recency of knowledge, defined as within the last two years. Second, if providing

information as an SME, subjects must have had at least three years of experience with the

applicable topic.

The interviewee data sample was developed utilizing chain sampling, which is a

nonprobability, purposeful approach to data collection. Nonprobability sampling, as

opposed to probabilistic sampling, is aimed at “discovering what occurs, the implication

of what occurs, and the relationships linking occurrences,” 57 and is the standard approach
56 F

to sampling for qualitative research. 58 The primary method of nonprobability sampling is

57F

known as purposeful sampling, which “is based on the assumption that the investigator

wants to discover, understand, and gain insight and therefore must select a sample from

which the most can be learned.” 59 Chain Sampling, also known as Snowball or Network
58F

Sampling, is a strategy that targets a few key participants who meet the screening criteria,

then asks each subject for a follow-on reference to be interviewed. 60 This process
59F

continues to increase the sample until it reaches the appropriate size. As is typical for

qualitative research, this project did not have a pre-identified number regarding the

57
Merriam and Tisdell, Qualitative Research, 96.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid., 98.

43
sample size. 61 The data sample culminated once saturation was achieved, meaning data
60F

collection concluded once the required data had been collected and the data itself had

become redundant.

The data collected, both by document analysis and interview, was analyzed to

develop an expert understanding of Air C2 functions, to characterize those functions in

terms of a system, to understand the relationships and processes within the system, and to

understand how the system functions as a whole. Data was also analyzed to characterize

threats to the system. The data collected is depicted in Chapter 4 through text and various

figures, including a visual representation of Air C2 as an organizational system. The

combination of document analysis and interviews is intended to increase the precision of

the research and add credibility to the results.

Ethical Assurances

To protect the interviewees participating in this project, strict professional and

ethical guidelines were adhered to. An informed consent document was issued to all

potential participants. This document outlined key aspects of the research, identified

potential risks to participants, offered confidentiality if desired, and highlighted the

voluntary nature of participation. Both the researcher and participants signed the

informed consent document prior to data collection.

61
Merriam and Tisdell, Qualitative Research, 101.

44
 Summary

The author’s thesis is a Qualitative Case Study of Air C2. The research design

utilizes systems theory as a theoretical framework for analysis by depicting the functions

of the AOC and the Wing as an organizational system that produces Air C2. Threats to

the system were identified by developing a country-agnostic list of capabilities that define

a “peer adversary.” This framework for analysis drove the data collection methods of

document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The author utilized a Chain Sampling

strategy to collect data from interviewees. Strict professional and ethical guidelines were

followed to ensure protection of the interviewees. This methodology was designed to

support the ultimate goal of the research, which is to provide potential solutions to the

stated problem in the thesis.

45
 CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

To win, you must decide what you want your tomorrow to be, and then make it
happen faster than the rate of change in your competitive environment.
John A. Warden III, Winning in FastTime

Introduction

This chapter provides a foundation for analysis by first answering the secondary

research questions (SRQs) listed in Chapter 1. The author then synthesizes the discussion

in Chapter 2 with the answers to the SRQs by performing a functional analysis of Air

Command and Control (C2). This analysis enables a clear understanding of what it means

to C2 airpower. Finally, the results of the functional analysis are used to characterize Air

C2 as a system. This depiction demonstrates how the system functions, or ceases to

function, in the face of threats posed by a peer adversary. The culmination of analysis

ultimately provides insights to the primary research question and allows the author to

provide recommendations in Chapter 5.

The AOC

This section of analysis answers thesis SRQ 1: “How is the AOC currently

organized and what are the key functions the AOC must perform that drives that

organization?” In doing so, it is important to note that the AOC was not developed in a

vacuum. That is to say, the AOC the product of decades of organizational and

institutional changes primarily targeted to address Air C2 problems. Therefore, before the

present state of the AOC is discussed, it is necessary to briefly cover its background to

provide the broader context of its development.

46
 The two world wars that immediately followed the advent of powered aviation

were the forge in which combat airpower was molded. By the end of World War II, major

airpower lessons had been identified and tenets developed, many of which are still

prevalent in how airpower theory and doctrine are taught today. As discussed in Chapter

2, the primary lesson regarding Air C2 was captured in a tenet which would eventually

become known as Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution (CC/DE) of air

operations by a single airman commander. The conflicts that followed in Korea and

Vietnam demonstrated the struggles of the Air Force as it determined how best to

organize for such an approach, a problem that was compounded by the continual

relearning of old lessons. 62 During this timeframe, the Air Force developed the Theater
61F

Air Control System (TACS) to provide C2 of air assets. Within TACS, one of the

primary C2 nodes was known as the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), of which there

could be multiple within a single theater of operations. 63 Following Vietnam, a series of

62F

reforms took place leading to the eventual transformation of the TACC into the AOC—a

single operational C2 entity commanded by a single airman commander. Following the

tremendous success of the AOC in Desert Storm, then Air Force Chief of Staff, General

Michael Ryan, officially dubbed the AOC a “weapon system,” a moniker usually

reserved for platforms such as aircraft and one that enabled the AOC to become the new

62
Joseph H. Justice III, “Airpower Command and Control: Evolution of the Air
and Space Operations Center as a Weapon System,” (Master’s thesis, US Army War
College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2004), 4, accessed January 20, 2021,
[Link]
63
Ibid., 3.

47
standard of operational Air C2 across the Air Force. 64 This significant declaration
63F

marked the beginning of the institutionalization of the AOC as it is now known.

Today, descriptions of the AOC and its purpose, capabilities, and organization,

can be found in many different official documents. 65 While there is decent alignment
64F

between these publications, it is noteworthy that there have been significant revisions in

recent years as the Air Force attempts to address known problems, incorporate emerging

concepts, and adapt to institutional changes such as the creation of the United States

Space Force. It is not inconsequential that many of these documents have been revised

within the last two years, perhaps the most significant of which is DAFMAN 13-1AOC,

the document that supersedes the previous Air Force Instruction (AFI) 13-1AOC, not

revised since 2011. The pace and rapid succession of these revisions are likely to blame

for inconsistent discussion of emerging concepts therein; however, it is also indicative of

the Air Force’s sense of urgency regarding change.

Despite these considerations, a coherent picture of the AOC across publications

remains. JP 3-30 describes the AOC as “the senior C2 element of the TACS and includes

personnel and equipment of necessary disciplines to ensure the effective planning and

conduct of component air and space operations.” 66 Additionally, the AOC “should be
65 F

manned with subject-matter experts who reflect the capabilities/forces available to the

JFACC” with the “capability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, execute, monitor, and

64
Justice III, “Airpower Command and Control,” 6.
65
See CJCS, JP 3-30; DAF, AFDP 3-30; DAF, DAFMAN 13-1.
66
CJCS, JP 3-30, II-9.

48
assess the activities of assigned or attached forces.” 67 While both doctrine and regulation
66F

acknowledge that each AOC will be somewhat unique in that they are all tailored to fit its

specific Area of Responsibility (AOR), there is also an agreed-upon baseline structure.

As described in Joint doctrine:

JAOC organizations may differ. Elements that should be common to all JAOCs
are the strategy division (SD); combat plans division (CPD); intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance division (ISRD); air mobility division (AMD);
and combat operations division (COD). Divisions, cells, or teams within the
JAOC should be established as needed. 6867 F

Air Force doctrine further explains, “Each [division] integrates numerous disciplines in a

cross-functional team approach to planning and execution.” 69 A visual depiction of this

68F

organization is provided in Figure 1.

Finally, in analysis of the AOC, the Air Force Forces (AFFOR) staff also warrants

discussion. Although the two are technically separate entities, their roles are inextricably

linked as it is the collective product of their efforts that truly enables Air C2 for the

ACC. 70 The combination of the AOC and the AFFOR staff is referred to holistically as
69F

the air component staff. To understand how the air component staff can be arranged to

support the ACC, Air Force doctrine describes two primary options which are depicted in

Figure 2; either the AOC is operationally aligned as a part of the AFFOR Staff A-3, or it

67
CJCS, JP 3-30, II-14.
68
Ibid., II-14-15.
69
DAF, AFDP 3-30, 56.
70
Department of the Air Force (DAF), Air Force Instruction (AFI) 13-103, Air
Component Headquarters AFFOR Staff Operations, Readiness and Structures
(Washington, DC: DAF, 2020), 4.

49
is a separate entity which coordinates horizontally with the AFFOR staff. In either case, it

is clear the AOC depends heavily on its integration with the AFFOR staff, and while it is

not the focus of this research, it is important to note that any analysis of the AOC or

resulting recommendations are inevitably tied to implications for the AFFOR staff.

Figure 1. JFACC Staff and JAOC Organization

Source: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication 3-30,
Joint Air Operations (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), E-2.
50
 Figure 2. AFFOR Staff and AOC Organization

Source: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-30, Command
and Control (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine
Development and Education, 2020), 50.

51
 The Wing

The next piece of analysis answers SRQ 2: “How is the Wing currently organized

and what are the key functions the Wing must perform that drives that organization?” As

outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis focuses specifically on Operational Wings which

possess the requisite assets to produce air effects during joint operations. To clarify this

distinction, it is necessary to further explore different ways in which Wings may be

categorized. In addition to being Operational, Base, or Specialized Mission, Wings may

also be characterized as in-garrison or expeditionary.

In-garrison Wings are those permanently assigned to a specific base or group of

bases. During normal times, they are typically subordinate to a Numbered Air Force

(NAF) for the day-to-day activities of organizing, training, and equipping, and each NAF

is subordinate to a Major Command (MAJCOM). The focus and composition of each in-

garrison Wing are going to be closely tied to that of its parent MAJCOM. For example,

in-garrison Wings assigned to United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) are likely to be

organized, trained, and equipped to address the challenges posed by the European AOR.

In contrast, in-garrison Wings located in the continental United States (CONUS) might

not be assigned to any particular AOR, and instead, prepare for a wide range of possible

deployments or contingency operations.

Expeditionary Wings, on the other hand, are a type of Air Force provisional unit,

formally known as Air Expeditionary Wings (AEWs). They are established in support of

specific contingency or exercise operations 71 and typically operate from deployed

70 F

71
DAF, AFI 38-101, 151.

52
locations. An AEW may be formed around a primary force provider, such as existing in-

garrison Wing, or it may be comprised of multiple subordinate units which come from

various force providers as is the case in U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT).

Thus, AEWs are intended to be modular, flexible, and temporary by design, whereas in-

garrison Wings are much more fixed and enduring in structure.

In addition to these disparities, there is also a significant difference in the organic

C2 capability of these two types of Wings. A typical in-garrison Wing is authorized a

single Command Post (CP) which performs such activities as monitoring and controlling

assigned forces, operating communications systems, and area defense. Additionally, in-

garrison Wings have a Plans (XP) team that develops, coordinates, and publishes wing

plans. 72 Wing XP is also responsible for standing up an Emergency Operation Center

71F

(EOC) in the event contingency response is required to unexpected events such as natural

disaster or enemy attack. 73 Therefore, suffice it to say the organic C2 capability of an in-
72 F

garrison Wing is extremely limited and internally focused. The AEW, however, has a

slightly more robust capability in the Wing Operations Center (WOC). The WOC

includes not only a CP, but also key C2 elements such as a battle staff and planning

personnel; it is designed to integrate vertically with the AOC and horizontally with other

elements of the TACS. 74 The capability and role of the WOC in the greater Air C2
73 F

system is a key point that will be revisited in later in this chapter and in Chapter 5.

72
DAF, AFI 38-101, 87.
73
Department of the Air Force (DAF), Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 10-207,
Command Posts (Washington, DC: DAF, 2018), 83.
74
Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA), Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.17, TAGS: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
53
 A final point of distinction regarding the characterization of a Wing, specifically,

an Operational Wing, is that of the type of assets assigned to the Wing. For instance, if

the majority of aircraft assigned to a Wing are bomber aircraft, the Wing is likely to be

dubbed a “Bomber Wing.” As a result, there are a variety of such qualifiers across Air

Force Wings. For example, there are Fighter, Bomber, Special Operations, Air Control,

Air Mobility, Air Refueling, Airlift, and Missile Wings, to name a few. Additionally, if a

Wing possesses multiple aircraft to service a variety of mission sets, it may be called

simply a “Wing” with no qualifier other than the unit’s numerical designation. This is the

case for the 18th Wing at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan, which has permanently

assigned fighter, air control, air refueling, and rescue aircraft.

Returning to the question at hand, the term “Wing” as a subject of research for

this thesis can now be further clarified. The type of Wing being considered is an

Operational Wing, as opposed to an Air Base Wing or Specialized Mission Wing. Given

this analysis is in the context of peer conflict, the Wing may be an in-garrison Wing if it

is proximate to the area of conflict, which would likely be the case for Wings in the

USAFE or Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) AORs. It may also be an AEW if such a

provisional unit is formed in response to peer conflict, or if an existing AEW is utilized.

Finally, the type of Wing being analyzed might be organized around a variety of different

aircraft and mission sets depending on the capabilities required. Therefore, it is not

necessary to utilize qualifiers such as “Fighter Wing” for this thesis.

for the Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS) (Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA: ALSA,
2020), 28.

54
 While it is now clear there is a multitude of ways to classify a Wing, the

organization internal to an Operational Wing is generally the same. Each Wing is

comprised of a Wing Staff and multiple subordinate Groups; the Groups are organized

around a primary mission Group and the necessary supporting Groups. For Operational

Wings, the primary mission Group is the Operations Group, and the standard supporting

groups are the Maintenance Group, Mission Support Group, and Medical Group, 75 as 74F

depicted in Figure 3. Therefore, answering SRQ 2, the Wing’s organization is driven

functionally by its mission; it is assigned aircraft to accomplish the mission, built around

a primary Operations Group in pursuit of that mission, and provided various other Groups

in support. A more subtle but equally important aspect of the Wing’s organization is that

it represents, by design, the lowest echelon of command with the requisite structure and

resources to self-sustain air operations. As such, the Wing is the ideal unit poised to grow

Air C2 capability in the face of peer conflict—so that it may remain an effective fighting

force capable of maintaining the initiative, even if isolated from the AOC.

75
DAF, AFI 38-101, 74.

55
 Figure 3. Wing Organization

Source: Department of the Air Force (DAF), Air Force Instruction 38-101, Manpower
and Organization (Washington, DC: DAF, 2019), 85.

The Relationship between the AOC and the Wing

Analysis of the AOC and the Wing to this point lays the foundation to answer

SRQ 3: “How do the organizational structures of the AOC and the Wing interact to

produce air effects in combat?” The first item to clarify is that the Wing essentially has

two different chains-of-command depending on the circumstances of its activities. One

chain-of-command is utilized for routine organize, train, and equip activities during

peacetime, for which the Wing reports through the NAF to the MAJCOM. This can be

called the administrative chain-of-command. The second chain-of-command is specific to

military operations and joint training, during which the Wing reports to the ACC through

56
both the AFFOR staff and the AOC. 76 This analysis focuses on the latter of the two,
75F

which can be referred to as the operational chain-of-command.

After an in-depth study of AOC’s interaction with the Wing, it is the author’s

assertion that all activities which comprise Air C2 fit into one of two categories; 1)

enabling activities, meaning those performed when the aircraft are on the ground, or 2)

execution activities, meaning those that are performed once aircraft are in the air. When

the Wing’s aircraft are on the ground, most Air C2 enabling activities revolve around

planning and preparation, which primarily involves the activities of the AOC’s Strategy

Division (SD) and Combat Plans Division (CPD), with inputs from Intelligence,

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division (ISRD) and Air Mobility Division (AMD).

The SD, for example, is responsible for long-term planning, developing the ACC’s

guidance, and operational assessment. The SD communicates these activities to the Wing

primarily through publishing documents such as the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP)

and the Air Operations Directive (AOD). 77 The CPD is responsible for near-term
76 F

planning and assists the ACC with OPCON of assigned forces by assigning objectives

and tasking missions. These activities are communicated to the Wing through documents

such as the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP), Special Instructions (SPINS), and the Air

Tasking Order (ATO). 78 The ISRD communicates with the SD, CPD, and the Wing
77 F

throughout all phases of planning and preparation to provide information on the

76
CJCS, JP 1, II-9.
77
DAF, DAFMAN 13-1, 22-23.
78
Ibid., 27.

57
operational environment, battlespace awareness, and target development. 79 Similarly, the
7 8F

AMD works with the SD, CPD, and the Wing to provide air mobility missions in support

of operations. 80 It is also important to note that Wings will typically embed at least one
79 F

Liaison Officer (LNO) from their unit into the AOC. The LNO communicates

developments from the AOC back to the Wing’s planning function, which depending on

the unit, may be Wing XP, a Mission Planning Cell (MPC), or some combination of both.

This relationship allows the Wing to be involved with the AOC in the iterative process as

plans are developed.

Once a plan is complete and air forces are tasked, aircraft get airborne and Air C2

execution activities begin. The ACC primarily executes C2 of airborne forces through the

Combat Operations Division (COD), which, in turn, leverages subordinate elements of

the TACS via various communications networks. The TACS can be further broken down

into ground and airborne elements. Typical ground elements include radar stations such

as a Control and Reporting Center (CRC) and ground force integration elements like an

Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) or Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). Typical

airborne elements include tactical C2 platforms such as the Airborne Warning and

Control System (AWACS) or the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

(JSTARS) and airborne extensions of air support control such as a Forward Air

Controller (Airborne) (FAC(A)) or a Tactical Coordinator (Airborne) (TAC(A)). 81 This

80 F

79
DAF, DAFMAN 13-1, 45.
80
Ibid., 53.
81
ALSA, TAGS, 23-28.

58
relationship is depicted visually in Figure 4. In addition to subordinate elements of the

TACS which are primarily external to the AOC, the COD is also supported internally by

inputs from ISRD and AMD.

Figure 4. Theater Air Control System (TACS)

Source: Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA), Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures 3-2.17, TAGS: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the
Theater Air-Ground System (Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA: ALSA, 2020), 23.

In summary, the AOC and the Wing interact in two distinctly different ways to

produce air effects during Joint Air Operations (JAO). While aircraft are on the ground,

59
they interact through various enabling activities to plan and prepare for operations. This

interaction is facilitated both by the AOC’s dissemination of several products and by the

organizational communication between the AOC and the Wing. Once aircraft are

airborne, the AOC and the Wing interact via a set of execution activities that are

primarily facilitated by the COD utilizing TACS. Although the processes for these two

sets of activities are distinct, it should also be mentioned that enabling and execution

activities can happen simultaneously during the conduct of operations. For example, the

ACC is likely to have command over multiple wings within a specified AOR. At any

given moment, the ACC may be conducting Air C2 through execution activities with one

Wing while at the same time conducting enabling activities with several others.

Additionally, a single Wing may have a portion of its personnel and aircraft in the air

engaged in execution activities while a separate portion are working enabling activities

for aircraft and aircrew still on the ground. This emphasizes the point that there is not a

clean temporal line between enabling and execution activities; however, the distinction

between the two is still apparent and provides a useful context to understand the Air C2

interactions between the AOC and the Wing.

The Threat

The final bit of analysis required to understand how Air C2 might function in peer

conflict is to comprehend the threat. This section answers SRQ 4: “What defines a peer

adversary in terms of threat capabilities it possesses that can contest Air C2?” Given the

term “peer” used in this context can be unclear and confusing, a 2001 RAND study

explains “A peer competitor . . . is a state or collection of challengers with the power and

motivation to confront the United States on a global scale in a sustained way and to a
60
sufficient level where the ultimate outcome of a conflict is in doubt even if the United

States marshals its resources in an effective and timely manner.” 828 1F

For this thesis, there are three key elements of this definition to highlight. First is

that of the “global scale” of the conflict should it occur against a peer adversary. This

implies that all components of the Air C2 system might be held at risk, be it the AOC, the

Wing, elements of the TACS, etc. Furthermore, no place of true sanctuary, aside from

perhaps CONUS, is likely to exist for air forces as it has in the past. The second key

element of the definition is the “sustained” nature of the confrontation that would likely

exist during peer conflict. While non-peer adversaries may be able to temporarily contest

Air C2, a peer adversary possesses the capability to do so persistently. Last, that “the

ultimate outcome of a conflict is in doubt” is a significant statement in itself. Conflict

with a peer adversary means that the Air Force is unlikely to achieve outright dominance

in any of the realms it has been accustomed to in the past several decades.

To further characterize the threat posed by a peer adversary, it is necessary to

discuss a few key capabilities that such an opponent is likely to possess. A simple way to

categorize capabilities that may pose a threat to AOC and the Wing is to do so in terms of

kinetic versus non-kinetic. Perhaps the most pressing concern from a kinetic attack

perspective is that posed by long-range, precision missiles. 83 Such missiles can be fired
82F

from the surface, either as ballistic or cruise missiles, or from a multitude of different

82
Thomas S. Szayna, Daniel L. Byman, Steven C. Bankes, Derek Eaton, Seth G.
Jones, Robert E. Mullins, Ian O. Lesser, and William Rosenau, The Emergence of Peer
Competitors: A Framework for Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001),
7-8.
83
Priebe et al., Distributed Operations, 9.

61
aircraft. Moreover, the recent development of hypersonic technology coupled with long-

range precision missiles renders many legacy defense systems obsolete. 84 A weapon like
8 3F

this provides a peer adversary the capability to kinetically strike an AOC or Wing.

Another key kinetic capability to consider is that of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. While

these weapons do not kinetically affect the AOC or the Wing directly, their ability to

shoot down different types of satellites can significantly degrade Air C2 capabilities. Key

examples include satellite communications (SATCOM), ISR, and global positioning

system (GPS) satellites. Given how heavily modern JAO depend on space assets such as

these, ASAT attacks have the potential to severely inhibit the ability of air forces to

produce the desired air effects.

There is also a wide range of non-kinetic capabilities that peer adversaries may

use to attack the Air C2 system, not the least of which lies in the cyber domain. A cyber-

attack, for example, may be targeted at the AOC to disrupt or deny the vast computer

networks that are required for the AOC to do its job. A cyber-attack may also target a

Wing by disrupting maintenance systems required to keep aircraft flying, or by

sabotaging weapons system software. Another non-kinetic capability that is problematic

for Air C2 is that of electronic warfare (EW); specifically, jamming and spoofing.

Utilizing an EW attack, a peer adversary could degrade or deny secure communications

such as datalinks, SATCOM, and line-of-sight radio, to name a few. They could also

distort communications or deliver false communications to confuse the C2 system.

84
S. J., “What Are Hypersonic Weapons?,” The Economist, January 3, 2019,
[Link]
weapons.

62
 This list of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities is by no means exhaustive, but it is

sufficient to understand how peer threat capabilities might deny Air C2 in a variety of

ways. It also paints a very clear picture of what a contested conflict in the future might

look like, and how it is a starkly different picture than any conflict the Air Force has

faced since World War II. Therefore, to answer the final SRQ, it can be said that a peer

adversary is one that possesses the capability to degrade or deny the mechanisms

necessary for the Air C2 system and its components to function, both kinetically and non-

kinetically, from multiple domains. To determine how the AOC and the Wing should

organize to enable Air C2 to persist in the face of such a threat, essential functions of the

system must be identified.

Air C2 Functional Analysis

The task of this section is to distill the many activities which comprise Air C2

down into a comprehensive list of Air C2 Functions around which a system can be

characterized. The goal in doing so is to arrive at a deeper understanding of what it means

to command and control airpower, which is required to answer the primary research

question of this thesis. However, this is no easy task as “function” is a multifaceted term

with many different definitions—one which is used as both a verb and a noun. It is,

therefore, unsurprising that no clear or consistent picture exists regarding what an Air C2

function is, even though there are dozens of terms and statements throughout doctrine,

regulation, and airpower literature which all claim to be “functions,” either of Air C2 or

airpower in general. Thus, to begin a functional analysis of Air C2, a clear definition

must first be established.

63
 Of the many definitions of function, two are most applicable to the discussion of

Air C2 and correlate to the term’s usage in the majority of related documents. The first is,

“the action for which a person or thing is specially fitted or used or for which a thing

exists; purpose,” and the second, “any of a group of related actions contributing to a
85
larger action.” 84 F Here there is a subtle, yet distinct, difference in the term’s meaning

which helps explain its inconsistent usage in Air C2 writings. The first definition speaks

to a thing’s purpose; or what it does. When viewing Air C2 through this lens, countless

terms come to mind, from broad to specific, large-scale to small-scale, operational to

tactical. Examples are assemble, task, assign, issue, communicate, synchronize, integrate,

manage, develop, collect, analyze, and the list goes on. This definition and the language

that follows quickly becomes unwieldy, to say the least, and makes it nearly impossible

to bound the conversation regarding what an Air C2 function truly is. Consequently, this

thesis builds on the second definition, which, instead of focusing on what something

does, is focused on how something works. For analysis in this Chapter, a function is

defined as a group of related activities that contribute to a larger action. Once the

conversation is framed in these terms, the concept of what constitutes an Air C2 function

becomes more clear.

In review of related C2 doctrine, regulation, and literature, seven terms appear

repeatedly and meet the definition of a function as described above. They are monitor,

assess, plan, execute, direct, coordinate, and control. Within each of these functions is a

group of related activities that contribute to the function’s performance. Further, it is

85
Merriam-Webster, “Function,” accessed February 18, 2021,
[Link]

64
these seven functions together that enable the commander to effectively command and

control forces. This relationship reveals another nuance about the chosen definition of

function. That is, a group of functions working together inherently create a new function

which they are a part of. For example, joint doctrine outlines several functions of joint

operations, called joint functions, one of which is C2. 86 Therefore, it follows, the seven
85F

functions identified in this thesis that constitute C2 create a function in itself—one which

is a part of a larger system.

A closer look at the seven identified C2 functions reveals that they are often used

together in different groupings. The first grouping is planning, directing, coordinating,

and controlling, a grouping that is consistent between joint doctrine and Air Force

regulation regarding C2. 87 This first grouping of functions is thereby common language
86F

between the Air Force and the rest of the joint force. The second grouping is monitor,

assess, plan, and execute. As opposed to the first grouping, this set of functions only

appears together in Air Force publications. In fact, AFI 13-103 describes this grouping as

a process called the ACC’s decision cycle. 88 The use of this terminology is likely due, at
87F

least in part, to the influence of renowned airpower theorist and retired Air Force

Colonel, John Boyd. Boyd developed a famous concept known as the OODA Loop

86
CJCS, JP 1, I-18.
87
From CJCS, JP 1, “C2 functions are performed . . . by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the
accomplishment of the mission,” echoed in AFI 13-103, “The air component C2
processes are . . . employed by the air component commander through planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of
the mission.”
88
DAF, AFI 13-103, 43.

65
(Observe, Orient, Decide, Act), which proved to be a useful model for many things, not

the least of which was a way to describe decision cycles. The OODA Loop can be used to

think about how two opponents make decisions during conflict, and the opponent who

can execute his OODA loop faster than the other—to get inside the adversary’s OODA

loop—will be the one who wins. In this way, Boyd’s concept was a popular way of

describing the Air Force’s success during Desert Storm, 89 and has since been inculcated
88F

in the culture of the Air Force. Therefore, it should not be surprising when Boyd’s

OODA Loop is compared to the ACC’s Decision Cycle listed in AFI 13-103, the

influence is clear: monitor (observe), assess (orient), plan (decide), execute (act).

Consequently, airmen see the functions that comprise the ACC’s decision cycle as an

essential element of effective Air C2.

While the two identified groupings of Air C2 functions provide some insight, this

analysis needs to be taken a step further to arrive at a more meaningful observation. For

instance, the function “plan” appears in both groupings. For redundancy’s sake, if “plan”

is removed from the first grouping, two entirely separate categories emerge; 1) direct,

coordinate, control, and 2) monitor, assess, plan, execute. Now compare these categories

of functions to the previous discussion in this chapter which describes the enabling and

execution activities of Air C2. If a function is a group of similar activities, and if Air C2

activities can be categorized as either enabling or execution activities, then it follows that

an Air C2 function would be either an enabling function or execution function, depending

on the activities it is comprised of. As such, this thesis submits that monitor, assess, and

89
John A Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing, ed. Dr. Grant T. Hammond
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2018), 385.

66
plan can be called “enabling functions” while direct, coordinate, and control can be called

“execution functions.” Finally, the term “execute” must be addressed as it describes both

a function itself and a group of separate functions. This is not entirely unexpected given

the definition of a function as a group of activities for a common purpose, and the

acknowledgment that a coordinated group of functions constitutes, by definition, a

greater function within the system. However, to standardize the language for analysis, the

following approach is taken; direct, coordinate, and control will remain labeled as three

of the seven Air C2 functions but can be thought of as sub-functions to that of execution.

This line of logic that identifies a set of “enabling functions” and “execution

functions” begins to arrive at a useful framework for functional analysis of Air C2 as a

system. However, to add appropriate depth, specific “essential activities” which comprise

the function need to be determined. To do so, the author has synthesized a broad list of

activities from document analysis of doctrine and regulation, some of which are referred

to as tasks, capabilities, or responsibilities of Air C2. Those activities which were

redundant with other activities were consolidated. Additionally, activities strategic in

nature or that require national-level coordination were removed from consideration, as

those types of activities are unlikely to be performed below the ACC level, and,

therefore, do not apply to the Wing. 90 The resulting list of essential activities is depicted
89F

90
Examples include the development of ACC guidance, coordination for space
assets, execution of cyber activities, and nuclear weapon considerations.

67
in Figure 5. While not exhaustive, the list represents the minimum activities that are

required to perform C2 of airpower and the functions they contribute to. 91

90F

Figure 5. Air C2 Essential Activities

Source: Created by author.

91
Some activities may contribute to more than one function; however, they are
listed only once under the function they are most closely related to.

68
 The description of Air C2 functions to this point begs the question, what does it

mean to C2 airpower? In other words, from an Air Force perspective, how is Air C2

different than any other kind of C2? The airpower portion of this question is outlined in

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.01, 92 which lists eight functions of the
91F

Air Force; nuclear operations, air superiority, precision attack, ISR (intelligence,

surveillance, reconnaissance), rapid mobility, agile combat support, personnel recovery

(PR), and C2. 93 Using the same approach applied to the Air C2 functions, the list of Air
92F

Force functions should be reduced to remove any not likely to be applicable below the

ACC level. Agile combat support, for example, requires theater-wide coordination and

thus is likely to require capabilities only available to the ACC. Nuclear operations meet

this criterion, as well, and C2 can also be removed as it is redundant with the previous

portion of Air C2 analysis. This leaves five remaining functions; air superiority, precision

attack, ISR, PR, and rapid mobility. These are hereby referred to as the “airpower

functions.” 94
93 F

92
Secretary of Defense (SecDef), Department of Defense Directive (DoDD)
5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components
(Washington, DC: DoD, 2020), 38-40.
93
The Air Force is not the only service that brings airpower to joint operations,
and characterizing airpower by the eight functions listed above may unintentionally omit
some of the specialized capabilities which sister services bring to the fight. However,
even amongst the other services, the majority of airpower activities can be categorized
within these eight functions.
94
Some functions have subordinate activities described in DODD 5100.01. Air
superiority is comprised of offensive counterair (OCA) and defensive counterair (DCA).
Precision attack is comprised of close air support (CAS), air interdiction (AI), and
strategic attack. Rapid mobility is comprised of air mobility and aeromedical evacuation
(AE).

69
 Using the concepts of Air C2 functions and airpower functions that have been

developed, a framework emerges that visually demonstrates what it means to C2

airpower. Figure 6 depicts a cross-functional matrix in which the x-axis lists the airpower

functions while the y-axis lists the Air C2 functions. This matrix, used in conjunction

with the list of Air C2 activities in Figure 5, was developed to provide insight into a

unit’s ability to C2 air operations by interviewing subject-matter experts (SMEs). No

interview data was needed on the AOC to this end since the C2 of air operations is the

primary purpose for the AOC’s existence. As revealed in the AOC analysis portion of

this chapter, the ability to perform Air C2 functions is inherent in the AOC’s structure.

Furthermore, its successful performance of C2 has been well documented. Instead, this

matrix was used to assess the C2 capability of the next echelon of operational command

below the AOC; that is, the Wing.

Figure 6. Air C2 Cross-Functional Matrix

Source: Created by author.

70
 Wing SMEs were asked to fill in the matrix with their best assessment of the

Wing’s ability to perform each Air C2 function across each airpower function, utilizing

the green/yellow/red legend in Figure 6 and the list of essential Air C2 Activities outlined

in Figure 5. For example, if a Wing could perform a few, but not all, of planning

activities for CAS, the square at the intersection of “Plan” and “CAS” would be marked

yellow for “partially capable.” Once filled out, the matrix provides a visual representation

of a Wing’s ability to C2 the full spectrum of air operations. The author then interviewed

the Wing SMEs to better understand the context behind the assessments provided. 95 94F

Fusing the data collected from the Wings into a singular picture of Wing C2

capability presents some difficulty. Each individual Wing’s capability is closely tied to

the assets assigned; therefore, if a Wing lacks the aircraft to perform a certain airpower

function, its ability to C2 that function is “not capable” across the board. A Wing with

only air superiority fighters, for instance, is not capable of carrying out precision attack.

A Wing with no airlift assets cannot conduct rapid mobility. The result is an inconsistent

picture of Wing C2 capabilities. However, by combining the most optimistic assessments

from each Wing, a best-case scenario for Wing C2 can be depicted. Figure 7 represents

the combined Wing C2 capability of a theoretical Wing that possesses all the assets

necessary to perform the full spectrum of airpower functions. 9695F

95
Data was collected from Wings in the Pacific and European areas of
responsibility, as well as Wings based in the continental United States.
96
The Air Force is currently experimenting with a method labeled the “Lead
Wing” concept to combine the capabilities of multiple in-garrison Wings; this is
discussed further in Chapter 5.

71
 Figure 7. Combined Wing C2 Capability

Source: Created by author.

The data revealed that existing Wings possess very little capability to perform the

monitor and assess Air C2 functions; however, they have at least a limited capability to

perform the planning and execution functions. To demonstrate why this is the case, each

of these will briefly be discussed in turn. First, within the monitor function, Wings lack

access to, or the ability to develop, a common operating picture (COP). While certain

Wings with assigned tactical C2 (Tac C2) assets 97 can produce an air picture, most
96 F

cannot monitor other aspects of joint operations, such as the location and disposition of

land or sea forces. Another Wing deficiency lies in the lack of training and resources for

intelligence personnel to perform activities such as the processing, exploitation, and

97
Examples include airborne or ground-based radars. These have the capability to
provide information on friendly, neutral, and enemy aircraft.

72
dissemination (PED) of intelligence and target development—these capabilities are

mostly held at the AOC level. Despite these limitations, Wings do a have marginal

capability to perform some “monitor” activities, such as performing non-traditional ISR

via targeting pods and the ability to manage their own logistics and communications.

The assess function is where Wings are the weakest. Wings have some capability

to conduct assessment of day-to-day operations via means such as airborne battle damage

assessments and aircrew debriefs, but most other assessment activities are lacking.

Perhaps most concerning is the Wing’s inability to assess the enemy’s forces or motives;

it is almost entirely dependent on the AOC for this information. Additionally, Wings

typically do not develop or train to measures of performance (MOPs) or measures of

effectiveness (MOEs), 98 meaning they are not likely to know how their air operations are
97 F

affecting the enemy beyond the outcome of daily missions. As previously noted, the

assess function of Air C2 is an essential element of the commander’s decision cycle.

Without the assessment piece, a commander’s ability to C2 air forces effectively is

severely degraded.

Compared to the monitor and assess functions, Wings have a much greater

capability to perform the planning and execution functions. 99 When considering

98F

planning, this is in large part due to the fact that all Operational Wings require at least

some version of a mission planning cell (MPC) to perform their tactical mission. Within

98
For more information on MOPs and MOEs, reference CJCS, JP 3-30, ch. III,
III-10 – III-11.
99
However, the previously mentioned limitations with targeting and intelligence
have a negative impact on the Wing’s ability to carry out the precision attack and
offensive counterair missions.

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this function, the Wing’s primary constraints are time and scope. In the case of the

former, Wings are typically focused on short-term planning. This capability could carry a

Wing through brief periods of isolation from the AOC; however, periods of isolation

beyond one to two days would begin to exceed the Wing’s planning capability. In the

case of scope, a Wing’s ability to plan is limited by personnel—oftentimes the planners

are the same individuals who fly the missions. Additionally, an increase in planning

responsibilities often times draws in personnel from other units within the Wing. As a

final point on planning, even when assigned capable aircraft, Wings are only partially

capable of planning the personnel recovery and rapid mobility functions. This is due to

the fact that the planning functions for these activities usually tie into a larger theater-

wide network.

Finally, Wings possess varying degrees of ability to perform the execution

function of Air C2. Given that the majority of these activities are carried out by the

Tactical Air Control System (TACS), it is not surprising that a Wing’s ability to do this

directly correlates to the Tac C2 assets it has assigned. For example, a Wing that

possesses organic AWACS and CRC units is going to have a fairly robust ability to

direct, coordinate, and control, whereas a Wing without these units will have little to no

capability. Interviews revealed that Wings are experimenting with tools like Link-16

datalink and tracking pods to perform some of the execution activities; however, these

work arounds are mostly limited to providing data on the activities of friendly air forces.

Wings are heavily reliant on the TACS for the execution function.

These insights into a Wing’s Air C2 capabilities are consistent with previous

analysis in this chapter. That is to say, current Air Force doctrine and regulation

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emphasize the Wing’s role as a force provider, and very little weight is given to its role as

a node in the C2 system. In fact, many Wings are not even organized, trained, or

equipped to produce a Wing Operations Center (WOC), the ideal entity to drive the

functions which would enable Air C2 at the Wing level. Of those Wings interviewed,

several recognize this gap and are in the process of building and training to a WOC

capability; however, many noted challenges that arise due to limited personnel and

equipment. Considering the broader functional analysis in this section, it can now be said

that the Wing is not currently organized to C2 airpower. However, it does possess a

certain ad hoc Air C2 capability, limited in duration and scope, and characterized by the

units which are organic to that Wing. The task now turns to determining how this

realization affects the Air C2 system as a whole.

Air C2 System Analysis

The final step of analysis for this thesis utilizes the functions identified and

characterizes them in terms of a broader Air C2 System. The ultimate purpose of this

system is to deliver air effects during peer conflict to achieve joint campaign objectives

and mission accomplishment. Figure 8 depicts the system as it currently exists. The

system is bifurcated into two hemispheres. The left hemisphere depicts those parts of the

system which correlate to the enabling functions of the system, that is, monitor, assess,

and plan. Here, it is demonstrated how the processes of the five AOC divisions directly

feed the ACC’s decision cycle, and when that decision cycle lands on “execute,” the

system switches from the left to the right hemisphere.

75
 Figure 8. The Current Air C2 System

Source: Created by author.

The right hemisphere depicts those parts of the system which correlate to the

execution functions of direct, coordinate, and control. The ACC primarily performs these

functions through the AOC’s Combat Operations Division (COD) and the Tactical Air

Control System (TACS), the latter of which translates operational Air C2 into tactical Air

C2 and ultimately enables air effects to be delivered. Delivery of the desired effects, as

depicted by the links on the right side of the execution hemisphere, is the intended

product or output of the system. Air and land targets are hit and missions such as CAS,

ISR, and Air Mobility are conducted.

In Figure 8, it should also be noted that none of the Air C2 planning or execution

functions are linked to the Wing. While there is the potential for some Air C2 capability

to be produced at the Wing level, it is extremely limited and the current system is not

76
designed for the Wing to perform this role. In the system’s current design, the Wing is

entirely dependent on its link to the AOC for both enabling and execution functions of

Air C2. This is the critical seam.

The term “seam” is often used when discussing military operations to describe a

place where two entities come together. A seam could be a line on a map separating areas

of responsibility and authority, across which two different entities must interact. A seam

may also be an organizational feature, in which every division within an organization

requires its own mechanisms for coordination amongst one another. In this case, seams

exist between echelons of command; specifically, between the AOC and the Wing. This

seam is stitched together by the links which enable the AOC and the Wing to interact.

The seam is two-fold; the link of the AOC interacting with the Wing to perform enabling

functions and the link between the AOC and the Wing’s aircraft, once airborne, through

the TACS.

Utilizing the threat analysis provided earlier in this chapter, two scenarios will be

utilized to demonstrate how threat capabilities can affect the Air C2 system. The first will

be referred to as the “Non-Kinetic Attack” scenario, as depicted in Figure 9.

77
 Figure 9. Non-Kinetic Attack

Source: Created by author.

This diagram represents the potential effects of a non-kinetic attack targeted at the

AOC’s ability to communicate externally, thereby isolating the Wing from the AOC. In

this case, the link between the AOC and the Wing is denied, thereby blocking the Wing’s

access to the requisite enabling functions. Without the ability to perform these functions

on its own, aircraft remain on the ground and no air effects are produced until the link is

reestablished. Furthermore, this type of attack could degrade or deny the AOC’s ability to

perform Air C2 execution functions via the TACS, which likely impacts the ability of

airborne aircraft to accomplish their mission. These types of attacks can be overcome and

may be short in duration; however, they will likely occur at a high frequency during peer

conflict and pose significant challenges to the Air C2 system as it is currently designed.

78
 The next scenario is labeled “Kinetic Attack,” as depicted in Figure 10. Here, the

AOC is physically struck by the adversary and ceases to operate until it can be

reconstituted. Such a kinetic attack is likely to deny the link between the AOC and Wing

for a much longer period—potentially days or weeks—during which the Wing does not

have access to the AOC’s Air C2 functions. While the non-kinetic scenario might be

overcome by leveraging the ad hoc Air C2 capabilities of the Wing or the Tac C2 of the

TACS, the kinetic scenario causes the entire system to break down.

Figure 10. Kinetic Attack

Source: Created by author.

At this point, it is clear the AOC is the single point of failure in the Air C2

system, and if it is attacked, as is likely in conflict with a peer adversary, the system

becomes severely degraded if not entirely paralyzed. As such, the vulnerability of these
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links and their necessity to the system’s functionality are what make the seam between

the AOC and the Wing critical for the conduct of air operations. How can the system be

organizationally redesigned to be more resilient and redundant such that, even if the AOC

is isolated for extended periods, the system can continue to function? Figure 11 displays a

redesigned system that depicts a possible solution. In this system, the Wing is

reorganized to perform the essential activities of both the enabling and the execution

functions of Air C2. Furthermore, a secondary link is established between the Wing and

the TACS to be activated in the event the primary link between the AOC and the TACS

is denied.

Figure 11. Redesigned Air C2 System

Source: Created by author.

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 Now to revisit the previous threat scenarios in the redesigned system. If the link

between the AOC and the Wing is denied while aircraft are on the ground, the Wing

possesses the capability to monitor, plan, and assess internally, allowing the enabling

functions to persist until the link is reestablished. If the link between the AOC and the

TACS is denied, a secondary link between the Wing and the TACS can be activated,

providing a redundant capability for the system to perform its execution functions. In the

event that AOC is kinetically attacked, the Wing’s link to the TACS can become more

enduring until the AOC is reconstituted. Figure 12 shows how the redesigned system

could continue to function if the AOC is attacked.

Figure 12. Redesigned Air C2 System with AOC Attacked

Source: Created by author.

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 Countless other threat scenarios that can be envisaged, but the examples provided

here clearly demonstrate the necessity for redundancy in the Air C2 system to a degree

that does not currently exist. To reorganize Air C2 in such a way is essential to ensuring

the system can function in peer conflict, so the required air effects can be delivered for

the joint force. Further, to create Air C2 capacity at the Wing level is not just to produce a

more redundant and survivable system, it is to create a newly empowered echelon of

subordinate command. This is a vital element of mission command and how the Air

Force should think of its Wings if its primary warfighting unit is to maintain the initiative

throughout the fog and friction of peer conflict.

Findings

As the culmination of literature review, research, and analysis, this thesis submits

three key findings.

Finding #1: The Air Force has centralized nearly all Air C2 capability at the AOC
creating a single point of failure within the system

As demonstrated in the literature review, the Air Force’s journey to find the right

approach to Air C2 led to the development of Centralized Control and Decentralized

Execution (CC/DE) as a tenet of airpower. This tenet was originally meant to be flexible

in application, yet as the United States continued to grow as a world power, it was

consistently able to apply airpower from a relatively uncontested position of advantage.

This reality, combined with awesome capabilities provided by modern technology, set the

conditions for CC/DE to devolve from a flexible tenet into something more akin to

dogma. The overwhelming success of air operations during Desert Storm further

82
cemented this trajectory and has led, in part, to the highly centralized Air C2 system that

exists today.

Functional analysis of the AOC further exposes this fact. It has been shown that

Air C2 functions are comprised of various essential activities which can be considered

either enabling or execution in nature and that nearly all of these activities and functions

are performed at or through the AOC. Furthermore, this thesis highlights the fact that

peer adversaries possess several capabilities which hold the AOC at risk by way of

degrading or denying the AOC’s activities and its links to the Wing. This may be

accomplished through a variety of kinetic or non-kinetic attacks and, in the best case,

might be short in duration, but in the worst case, could result in the total destruction of

the AOC. When placed in the broader context of Air C2, such an attack creates a

paralytic effect on the system as it is currently designed.

Finding #2: The threat posed by peer conflict demands a redundant and resilient system
with Air C2 capabilities at multiple echelons of command

To avoid C2 paralysis in the face of such a threat, a system must be established

with C2 capabilities at more than one echelon of command. In such a system, lower

echelons of command can continue operations and maintain initiative against the enemy,

even when cut off from higher command direction. Systems analysis has demonstrated a

way this could be accomplished within the current Air C2 system, by reorganizing the

Wing so that it is capable of performing essential Air C2 functions in the event the seam

between the AOC and the Wing is denied. The result is a system that can continue to

function in the face of the threat posed by a peer adversary.

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 Developing Air C2 capabilities at multiple echelons of command is also essential

to the Air Force’s ability to execute a mission command approach to Air C2. While Air

Force doctrine points to CC/DE as the Air Force’s method to achieve mission command,

it has been shown how the contemporary application of CC/DE falls short of mission

command in practice. While recent development of concepts such as standing integrated

tasking orders (ITOs) and conditions-based authorities (CBAs) are promising steps in the

right direction, their potential will be fruitless if the Wing does not possess the

appropriate tools to perform a degree of Air C2.

Finding #3: The Wing is not organized or resourced to produce the requisite C2
capability to institute a mission command style approach

Document analysis and interviews with Wing SMEs reveal that, even in the most

robust in-garrison Wings today, there is minimal capability for the Wing to perform C2

of air operations. This is unsurprising as the Wing is not currently designed to do so—it

is designed to be primarily a force provider as opposed to a C2 element. As a result, The

Wing generally lacks the ability to perform essential C2 activities such as the processing,

exploitation, and dissemination (PED) of intelligence, target development, production of

or access to a common operating picture (COP), long-range planning of air operations,

and assessment of air operations. While the Wing does have some capacity to perform the

planning and execution functions, it is almost entirely dependent on the AOC for the

monitor and assess functions. These gaps in the Wing’s C2 capability are particularly

problematic when considering peer conflict and the need for air forces to maintain the

initiative, especially when isolated from the AOC.

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 The Wing Operations Center (WOC) is a promising construct that has the

potential to grow Air C2 capability at the Wing level; however, its implementation and

usage is inconsistent from Wing to Wing. A likely contributing factor to this

inconsistency is the notable absence of the WOC in Air Force doctrine and regulation.

The WOC is not mentioned in the Air Force’s C2 doctrine, its manpower and

organization regulation, nor its AOC regulation. In joint doctrine, the WOC is depicted

on the Theater Air Control System (TACS) diagram, but no description of its role is

provided. One place a description of the WOC can be found is in a joint service tactics

manual; however, that publication ties the WOC’s role to Air Expeditionary Wings

(AEWs), thereby not addressing the role of a WOC in an in-garrison Wing. 100 99F

Summary

This chapter of analysis was designed to ultimately answer the primary research

question, “How should the Air Force’s primary operational C2 entity, the AOC, and its

primary warfighting unit, the Wing, organize within an Air C2 system to ensure delivery

of air effects in a conflict with a peer adversary?” The research herein suggests the

answer is for the AOC and the Wing to reorganize to generate a true mission command

capability, doing so by empowering the subordinate echelon of command and enabling it

to produce a degree of Air C2. However, this is no easy task. The findings in this chapter

reveal the complexity and severity of the issues that the Air Force must overcome to

achieve such an end state, a picture which is certainly daunting. In Chapter 5, the author

100
The documents referenced here are DAF, AFDP 3-30; DAF, AFI 38-101;
DAF, DAFMAN 13-1; CJCS, JP 3-30; and ALSA, TAGS.

85
addresses this challenge, proposing a set of recommendations that can be acted on in

short order, as well as potential longer-term solutions and areas for further research.

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 CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Our Nation has come to expect much from its Air Force, and we will rise to the
challenge of tomorrow’s highly competitive environment to deliver — but to do
so, we must accelerate change now!
—General Charles Q. Brown, Accelerate Change or Lose

Introduction

The analysis and findings presented in Chapter 4 outline a clear mandate for

action to be taken if the identified problems are to be addressed—this is not lost on the

Air Force. Leaders at the highest levels, civilian and military alike, have openly

acknowledged many of the same issues outlined in this thesis. As a result, there has been

a wide range of initiatives rolled out and experimentation conducted in recent years. In

this chapter, the author will briefly review those initiatives which are relative to the

discussion herein and assess how they might contribute to potential solutions. Once the

context of on-going initiatives is laid out, recommendations for solutions will be

provided, focusing specifically on those which can be achieved quickly, before finally,

areas for future research and potential longer-term solutions are identified.

On-going Initiatives

This thesis represents a very narrow slice of a much broader command and

control (C2) problem-set the Air Force is attempting to address. As such, many of the

initiatives discussed here have implications that involve much more than the organization

of the AOC and the Wing. With this in mind, the first initiative to discuss is Agile

Combat Employment (ACE). ACE is the combined product of the Air Force’s search for

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solutions to the problems posed by peer adversaries and grassroots experimentation at the

tactical level. The concept has changed frequently through its evolution, but the Air Force

is beginning to consolidate the ACE effort and streamline its language. In fact, ACE is

now being taught to Air C2 leaders and planners at the 505th Command and Control

Wing, 101 which defines ACE as a “proactive and reactive operational scheme of
100F

maneuver executed within threat timelines to increase survivability while generating

combat power.” 102 101 F

The emphasis for ACE is to address all facets required for air forces to be able to

operate in contested environments, one of which is C2. Within the ACE construct, there

is an emphasis on mission command that addresses many of the concerns outlined in this

thesis. For instance, flexible command relationships allow for more delegation of

authority to lower levels of command. Also, during periods of disrupted C2, conditions-

based authorities (CBAs) enable the rapid transfer of authority from the Air Component

Commander (ACC) to other C2 nodes and back. Finally, the use of mission-type orders

(MTOs) enables mission command when an air tasking order (ATO) cannot be

disseminated. The ACE approach to Air C2 is certainly a significant shift in the right

101
“The mission of the 505th Command and Control Wing is to shape the way
joint and coalition warfighters execute command and control of multi-domain operations
through experimentation, training, testing, evaluation, exercises, and tactics
development.” 505th Command and Control Wing, “The 505th Command and Control
Wing,” U.S. Air Force, accessed May 5, 2021, [Link]
Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/376114/the-505th-command-and-control-wing/.
102
505th Command and Control Wing, “ACE Training Primer,” (PowerPoint
Presentation, Hurlburt Field, FL, July 7, 2020).

88
direction, especially as it is being taught to AOC leaders and planners. However, these

ideas clearly have an impact on the Wing as well. This, too, the Air Force recognizes.

In October of 2020, Air Combat Command conducted its first ACE experiment,

labeled “Agile Flag.” This exercise tested many aspects of ACE, including the “Lead

Wing” concept, which the Air Force has been developing in response to the problems

posed by peer competitors. This concept recognizes that most in-garrison Wings do not

have the required infrastructure or combat power to prevail in peer conflict. Therefore, a

Lead Wing is designated, under which a predetermined set of squadrons consolidate,

many of them being pulled from other in-garrison Wings. This brings a wide range of air

force units and capabilities together under a single wing commander that, ideally, train

together in peacetime to prepare for an expeditionary deployment into a contested

environment, should it be required. In Agile Flag 21-1, the Air Force put the Lead Wing

concept into action and experimented with several of the concepts outlined in this thesis.

Significant takeaways included the need for the Wing to have a Common Operating

Picture (COP), the need for the Wing to employ a C2 element, and the need for clear

guidance via CBAs. 103

102 F

Also tested within Agile Flag was an “A-staff” structure at the Wing level. 104 As
103 F

discussed in Chapter 4, current Air Force regulation calls for Wings to be comprised of

Groups, and Groups comprised of Squadrons. However, in an A-staff structure, the

103
Lt Col Matthew P. Dale, Agile Flag Experiment 21-1: After Action Report
(Nellis Air Force Base, NV: USAF Warfare Center, January 27, 2021).
104
This structure has been in experimented with for the past several years with
Mountain Home AFB as the focal point. However, Agile Flag marked a significant test of
its role in an operational environment.

89
Group level of command is eliminated and replaced with a robust Wing staff. This staff is

organized to align directly with the Air Force Forces (AFFOR) staff structure depicted in

Figure 2. The A-staff structure flattens the Wing organization and empowers the Wing

and Squadron commanders. While there are several promising aspects of this approach, it

is not yet clear how the A-staff will impact the Wing’s ability to execute C2. As one

Wing subject-matter expert (SME) noted, the A-staff has put a strain on manning within

the Wing as the Air Force tries to determine the right balance of personnel for the new

structure. 105
104 F

Finally, of all the on-going initiatives which address Air C2, Joint All Domain

Command and Control (JADC2) is the most significant. Beyond the purview of just Air

C2, JADC2 envisions a future capability that connects sensors and shooters across all

domains via a mesh network, thereby enabling speed in joint operational decision making

that results in decision superiority over the enemy. 106 In researching this thesis, it was
105 F

readily apparent that the Air Force has placed a significant amount of its research

resources and brainpower into JADC2 development. While JADC2 has incredible

potential, it is at least 14 years from being a reality. Furthermore, given the size and

scope of JADC2, the program is likely to incur several challenges and delays along the

way. Therefore, this thesis is intentionally not about JADC2—rather, it has been designed

105
Maj Michael Lynch, “366 Fighter Wing SME Interview,” Telephone, March
30, 2021.
106
John R. Hoehn, “Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2),”
(Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, March 18, 2021),
[Link]

90
to help determine what can be done to address Air C2 concerns in the meantime, within

the constraints of existing resources.

Recommendations

Based on the research conducted in this thesis and considering other on-going Air

Force initiatives, the author submits three recommendations.

Recommendation #1: Elevate the Wing’s Role in the Air C2 System

For the Wing to become an echelon capable of operating under the auspices of

mission command, a mentality shift is required across the Air Force. Instead of being

thought of as primarily a force provider, the Wing should be viewed as a self-contained

fighting force capable of operating in high-end conflict through periods of isolation, if

required. Obviously, this recommendation speaks to a culture change, a process that can

take time to occur. However, several things can be done in short order to begin that

process.

First, senior leaders should spread awareness. Through speeches, interviews,

articles, conferences, and several other mediums, Air Force leaders have a powerful

ability to set the narrative, especially in the technology age. Their advocacy for the

Wing’s role in the Air C2 system is the quickest way to generate the required mental shift

across the Air Force. Second, update doctrine. As noted at the end of Chapter 4, the Wing

is absent from Joint and Air Force C2 doctrine. Outlining the role of the Wing in the

bedrock documents of Air C2 is essential to solidifying its role in the system. This also

provides an opportunity to standardize the language that surrounds Air C2 functions.

Last, update regulation. If the Wing is to have a C2 capability, that entity needs to

91
become a part of the standard Operational Wing organization outlined in Air Force

Instruction 38-101.

Recommendation #2: Organize for Wing C2

For the Wing to carry out the necessary Air C2 enabling and execution functions,

it must be organized to do so. This begins with making the Wing Operations Center

(WOC) a standard organizational entity for all Operational Wings, both in-garrison and

expeditionary. To clarify, the WOC would not need to be fully manned at all times.

Rather, the standard WOC would be a skeleton structure to be built up when a

contingency situation arises. The WOC would absorb existing entities such as the Wing

command post (CP), planning cell (XP), intelligence shop, and others as needed, thereby

generating C2 capacity without requiring any additional personnel. This approach

certainly has its drawbacks, but the Wings currently experimenting with this option have

demonstrated it to be an effective means of producing a WOC, even within the

constraints of existing manpower and resources.

While the Air Force is still assessing the cost-benefit analysis of an A-staff at the

Wing level, this construct may eventually contribute to increased C2 capacity for the

Wing as well. In theory, efficiencies in manpower should be created by eliminating an

echelon of command. Additionally, there is the potential for the A-staff and the WOC to

work in tandem to produce a synergistic approach to Air C2, much in the same way an

AFFOR staff interacts with an AOC. However, recent experiences at Agile Flag

demonstrate challenges in achieving an optimal manpower solution for the A-staff.

Further iterations of experimentation will be required to achieve the appropriate balance.

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 Last, Wing organization should plan for the incorporation of liaison officers

(LNOs). For the Wing to execute Air C2 when disconnected from the AOC, it will need

situational awareness regarding the location and activities of joint forces. In this scenario,

sister-service LNOs would be essential to coordinate activities between forces. However,

determining which LNOs are needed from what echelon of command would vary

depending on the operation and area of responsibility (AOR)—and should be tailored as

such. In addition to joint force LNOs, the Wing could benefit tremendously by receiving

LNOs from the AOC. As noted in Chapter 4, it is typical for the Wing to send LNOs to

the AOC, but the opposite case is not typical. Allowing for the Wing to receive LNOs

from the AOC would create an efficient mechanism to spread Air C2 expertise where it is

needed. For example, if a Wing’s C2 capability is deficient in intelligence, assessments,

and long-range planning, a handful of trained personnel from the AOC could be sent to

the Wing to help build that capability.

Recommendation #3: Train to Wing C2

Once the Wing’s role in Air C2 is solidified and it is organized to carry out the

requisite Air C2 functions, the final step is for Wings to train to this capability. Clearly, it

would be less than ideal if a Wing’s first attempt to exercise Air C2 was in combat.

Therefore, training to this capability while in-garrison is a must and it should occur in

two primary areas: organizational processes and individual expertise. Training to

organizational processes is something most Wings are very well versed in, especially

those that regularly conduct operational readiness exercises. Utilizing existing training

events, Wings should begin a crawl-walk-run approach to train to Air C2 processes. Key

components of this training include establishing a WOC, identifying required manning

93
and expertise, developing standard operating procedures (SOPs), and determining

relationships and communications plans.

In addition to the processes, the people also need to be trained. While a certain

degree of individual training will occur via the actions outlined above, Wings should also

develop specialized Air C2 expertise in individuals to enable the execution of Air C2

functions, especially the lacking monitor and assess functions. Examples include teaching

Wing planners how to incorporate assessments and long-range planning considerations

and training Wing intelligence professionals in targeting and PED. 107 Wing commanders
1 06F

will also need new training to clarify their role, responsibilities, and authorities in a

mission command environment. Frequent interaction between the Air Component

Commander and the Wing Commander is also essential to develop the trust required for

mission command to succeed.

Other Viewpoints and Critiques

The recommendations above provide a set of achievable actions the Air Force can

take in the near-term to build a more resilient Air C2 system and it can do so without

material cost or additional resources. However, there are certainly other approaches to

address the problems identified in this thesis and valid critiques of the recommendations

provided. For instance, a widespread alternative viewpoint is one that believes in the

primacy of the AOC. Thinkers in this camp view the AOC as the optimal product of Air

C2’s evolution through a history of lessons learned. Further, they view any attempt to

move Air C2 capabilities away from the AOC as inherently wrong. Their answer to the

107
This is already being experimented with at some Wings.

94
problems posed by peer adversaries is to double-down on the current Air C2 design; if it

is vulnerable, then more investment is needed to protect it. They believe highly

centralized control to be necessary for the effective employment of airpower. Indeed,

anything that appears to represent a “mini-AOC” like capability is immediately rebuffed,

as such an entity would decentralize Air C2, and therefore detract from the known best

practice in the employment of airpower.

It is the author’s opinion that this camp represents the dogmatic approach to

centralized control and decentralized execution discussed in Chapter 2, one which does

not recognize the flexibility that the tenet was originally meant to embody. Furthermore,

the range and number of threat capabilities possessed by peer competitors make the

“double-down” strategy cost prohibitive—there are simply too many vulnerabilities in the

current system for them all to be protected. In peer conflict, attacks against airbases, the

AOC, and the Air C2 system are all but guaranteed. Therefore, a flexible and resilient

approach to Air C2, even if it is less than optimal, is absolutely essential. It should also be

said that the idea of generating a tailored C2 capability at the Wing level does not equate

to the development of a “mini-AOC,” nor is that the intent. Rather, the goal is to

determine the right degree of C2 required to enable mission command and doing so in a

way that is fit for the purposes of the Wing. Such a C2 capability does not resemble the

AOC in any meaningful way—not in structure, not in scope, not in responsibility or

authority.

Perhaps the most significant critique of the recommendations provided is that of

unintended consequences. While making changes to organizational structure seems

simple enough on the surface, it is actually quite a complex endeavor, and in an attempt

95
to make things better, one may actually end up in a worse situation. Making the changes

suggested here would certainly incur a degree of risk, yet change is necessary if a

survivable Air C2 system is to be developed. Furthermore, the urgency of the threat

posed by peer adversaries warrants the acceptance of that risk now—better to figure out

what works and what does not during a period of peace than during a period of conflict.

Another potential critique is, despite appearing to have a net-zero manpower cost,

Wing C2 will not work without adding more personnel. As one Air C2 SME noted in an

interview, “there is a manpower bill that has to be paid somewhere.” 108 There is likely
107 F

some truth to this critique as it is difficult to find any large organization in the Air Force

that believes it is sufficiently manned. Personnel constraints will always be a reality.

Nonetheless, early evidence from Wing experimentation suggests that organizing for Air

C2 at the Wing level is achievable, even if it is far from perfect. As the Air Force

progresses this concept from its nascency, a better balance will eventually emerge if by

no other means than traditional trial-and-error.

Areas for Further Research

This study was limited in scope and leaves many areas that require greater

exploration. As such, the following areas for further research are recommended.

Determine the “Right” Amount of Wing C2 Capability

This thesis has demonstrated that at least some C2 capability is required at the

Wing level for the Air C2 system to function in peer conflict. However, as previously

108
T. Beagle, “Air C2 SME Interview,” Telephone, February 10, 2021.

96
alluded to, the remaining question is how much C2 is needed to get the job done? Future

researchers should explore this question and the second and third-order effects that result.

Cost Analysis of Material and Resource Requirements

The design of this study focused on organizational solutions within existing Air

Force resource constraints. Future researchers should explore further possibilities of

Wing C2 if the concept is provided additional resources, plus the costs that additional

resourcing would incur.

Best Practices for Generating a COP at the Wing Level

One of the primary limiting factors for the realization of Wing C2 is the lack of a

COP to provide situational awareness on air and surface forces alike. Future researchers

should explore potential solutions for establishing a COP at the Wing level, such as

piping in a COP from an external source, tying into a wider joint force COP network, or

producing a COP organically.

Conclusion

The United States Air Force, along with its sister services and government

partners, is at an inflection point. The challenges posed by a new era of great power

competition layout a clear imperative, one which is captured well by the Chief of Staff of

the Air Force in his letter to airmen labeled “accelerate change or lose.” As General

Brown puts it, “If we don’t change—if we fail to adapt—we risk losing the certainty with

which we have defended our national interests for decades . . . We risk losing quality

97
Airmen, our credibility, and our ability to secure our future.” 109 Indeed, accelerating
108 F

change to the way the Air Force commands and controls air forces is fundamental to

success in future conflicts. Doing so will require airmen to reconsider contemporary

notions of centralized control and decentralized execution, looking for ways to be flexible

in the application of Air C2 while staying true to the spirit of the tenet. Concepts like

“distributed control” offer a blueprint for such thinking, yet ideas such as these and the

wider conversation in the air community are quickly being overtaken by JADC2. The

development of this future concept is certainly important work, but one should not lose

sight what of can be done in the interim.

This thesis offers a way of thinking about Air C2 that reveals potential solutions.

When Air C2 is broken down into a set of primary functions, then those functions are

placed across the spectrum of air operations, a picture emerges that portrays what it truly

means to command and control airpower. By identifying which essential activities

comprise each function, depth is added to that understanding. This then becomes a

foundation from which Air C2 can be analyzed. When the functions are used to help

characterize and assess Air C2 as a system, it quickly becomes clear that greater C2

capacity is needed at the Wing level, a need that is driven specifically by the threat

capabilities of peer adversaries. The functions then provide a frame that identifies the

activities required to be performed for the Wing to produce a degree of C2. A modified

Air C2 system, one which creates C2 capacity at the Wing level, strengthens and protects

109
Gen Charles Q. Brown, Accelerate Change or Lose, U.S. Air Force, August
2020, 2, [Link]
Strategic_Approach_Accelerate_Change_or_Lose_31_Aug_2020.pdf.

98
the seam that exists between the two primary echelons of air command. Such a system

sets the conditions for mutual trust, delegation of authorities, and ultimately an

empowered subordinate command capable of maintaining the initiative—a must for the

Air Force to prevail in peer conflict.

99
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