Turnip Winter

The Turnip Winter (German: Steckrübenwinter) of 1916 to 1917

was a period of profound civilian hardship in Germany during
World War I.

Introduction
For the duration of World War I, Germany was constantly under
threat of starvation due to the success of the Allied blockade of
Germany. Whatever meagre rations remained were sent to the
troops fighting the war, so the civilian population faced the brunt of
the famine. The winter of 1916–1917, later known as the "Turnip
Winter", marked one of the harshest years in wartime Germany.
Poor autumn weather led to an equally poor potato harvest and
much of the produce, that was normally shipped to German cities
instead rotted in the fields. Germany's massive military recruitment
played a direct role in this, as all areas of the economy suffered
from lack of manpower, including agriculture.[1] The loss of the
potato crop forced the German population to subsist on Swedish
turnip or rutabaga as an alternative.
A ration stamp of the city of Erfurt,
Traditionally used as animal feed, the root vegetable was virtually 1917 for 1 kilogram (2.2 lb) of turnips
the only food available throughout the winter of 1917. per week
Malnourishment and illness claimed thousands of lives, mainly
those of civilians and wounded soldiers who had returned to the
home front. A notable marker of the harsh conditions in Germany was a spike in female mortality which
increased by 11.5% in 1916 and 30% in 1917 when compared to pre-war rates.[2] This rate increased due to
malnutrition and disease that was commonplace amongst the German populace. The famine and hardship of
the Turnip Winter severely affected the morale within Germany, revealing to the Germans just how hard-
pressed the country had become under the duress of the war.

Background
At war with France, Britain, and Russia beginning in the summer of 1914, Germany faced the strain of a
two-front war. To evade this compromising situation the Germans developed a strategy known as the
Schlieffen Plan. The Plan proposed that if German troops could invade France through Belgium and defeat
the French, quickly removing one front, they would then be able to focus solely on Russia.[3] German faith
in the Schlieffen Plan proved overly optimistic and French forces commanded by General Joseph Joffre
“checked the German attack at the Marne River in September,” in what would be known as the First Battle
of the Marne.[4] After facing defeat at the Battle of the Marne, the actual strain of a two-front war became
progressively more real for Germany. The Germans had assumed that the Schlieffen Plan would prove
successful and that the war would not be a prolonged affair.[5] In the months after the Battle of the Marne,
German troops faced a succession of battles against combined British and French armies, known as the
“Race to the Sea,” where the opposing forces attempted to “turn the other’s flank" in a contest to reach the
North Sea.

From October to late November, the armies clashed in a nearly month-long battle at Ypres in Flanders, near
the North Sea, which incurred a devastating loss of life for both sides.[6] After Ypres, only months after the
beginning of the Great War, the German army had already lost 241,000 men.[7] As the end of 1914
approached, fighting in Western Europe, ultimately known as the “Western Front,” settled to a draining
affair as the German, French and British lines entrenched themselves.[8] In response to the early land
campaigns, the British responded with naval measures. In order to wear down German forces, the Royal
Navy, towards the end of 1914, blockaded “the northern approaches to the North Sea in an effort to cut off
supplies to the soldiers and civilians of the Central Powers.”[9] Locked into sustained fighting on the
Western Front, which had already reduced supplies, the Germans now faced both the Russian threat in the
east and the British blockade that “cut Germany off from sources of essential commodities.”[10]

The British blockade highlighted major flaws in German wartime society. Although the German economy
was an international juggernaut that “managed to produce most of the industrial requirements of the war,”
the nation “failed to secure a sufficiency of food.”[11] With continued fighting on two fronts and supplies
restricted by the British blockade, German food shortages at home and for troops became increasingly
troublesome issues. During the winter of 1916–17, such problems reached new levels in a period known as
the "Turnip Winter'".

The Turnip Winter

The Turnip Winter occurred during the winter of 1916–1917 in
Germany. Continually poor weather conditions led to a diminished
harvest, most notably in cereal production.[12]: 233 Additionally, an
Allied blockade first instituted in 1914 contributed to reduced food
supplies from the Central Powers by 33 percent.[13] Food shortages
were also attributed to a seizure of horses for the army, the
conscription of a large part of the agricultural workforce, and a
shortage of farming fertilizers caused by the diversion of nitrogen to
explosives production.[14] Rutabaga or Swedish turnip – usually
used in Germany to feed pigs
In response, the German government initiated a food rationing
campaign. The campaign began with the establishment of the War
Food Office on 22 May 1916. The office was responsible for “the perception of the Chancellor to create
and uphold the military and nation's food supply.”[15] In the summer of 1917, the food allocated only
offered 1,560 calories (6,500 kJ) daily diet and dropped to 1,000 calories per day in winter.[12]: 237
However, the Imperial Health Office (renamed "Reich Health Office" in 1918) required 3,000 calories
(12,600 kJ) for a healthy adult male, three times what was available in winter. The Health Office also set
maximum prices to ensure the nutrition of Germany's poor. Current historians attest that national figures
regarding the event are misleading, stating farmers and soldiers ate better than common folk. The
government also worked to combat cereal shortages by making bread baked with potato. At the rise of a
potato famine in 1916, a German culinary staple, the government substituted the item with turnips hoping to
make up the difference. In turn, German soldiers, "increasingly relied, for sheer survival, on one of the least
appealing vegetables known to man, the humble turnip."[16] During this time, the black market became a
prominent means of obtaining otherwise scarce foodstuffs. Historian Avner Offer suggests that
approximately “one-fifth to one-third of food could only be obtained through illegal channels.”[17]

Social unrest
Driven by starvation, children would break into barns and loot orchards in search of food. Such disregard
for authority effectively doubled the youth crime rate in Germany.[18] Historian G.J. Meyer noted that,
according to a report from a prominent Berlin physician, “eighty thousand children had died of starvation in
1916.”[16] Worker strikes were also common during this time as food shortages often directly led to labor
unrest. The most notable strike took place in Düsseldorf in the summer of 1917 where workers complained
of uneven food distribution.[19]

Military issues
In 1916, a naval revolt arose from protests against inedible rations. Sailors claimed that they received rations
shorted by two ounces for three consecutive weeks while officers ate and drank luxuriously.[20] The
conservative German government believed a Socialist conspiracy was behind the mutiny. In 1926, German
officials put Socialist Deputy Wilhelm Dittmann on trial for the uprising. Through letters from sailors to
their respective homes, Dittmann illustrated that food was inedible and “did not have any political
significance.”[20] The letters cleared the Socialist party from accusations that they had sought to extend the
Bolshevik Revolution into Germany.[20]

Aftermath
The solution to replace potatoes with turnips greatly affected the diets and nutrition of the German people
during and after the war. By the start of the war, Germany consumed potatoes more than any other food,
and the shortage greatly changed the gastronomic tastes of the Germans.[21] In addition to affecting the
Germans’ tastes, replacing the potatoes did not allow the German people to get the necessary vitamins and
minerals they were accustomed to acquiring.[21] The turnips did not affect just the potatoes, but the bread as
well. Bread called Kriegsbrot ("War bread")[note 1] contained flour from potatoes. When replaced by
substitutes, the bread became significantly harder to digest, making it difficult for the body to adapt. The
Kriegsbrot demonstrates how the Turnip Winter reached the front lines as well, as soldiers were greatly
affected by the lack of food.[21] The continued search for substitutes during the blockade truly affected the
ability of the German people to obtain food in cities. One woman recounts the experience by saying:

We are all growing thinner every day, and the rounded contours of the German nation have
become a legend of the past. We are all gaunt and bony now, and have dark shadows round our
eyes, and our thoughts are chiefly taken up with wondering what our next meal will be, and
dreaming of the good things that once existed.[21]
However, not only were there physical symptoms, as she describes, but also social consequences, such as
the pillaging of food stores after the war.[21]

Notes
1. Cozean, Jesse (2011). My Grandfather's War: A Young Man's Lessons from the Greatest
Generation ([Link] Globe
Pequot. p. 112. ISBN 9780762776092. "The recipe, as quoted from the records of the
German Food Providing Ministry published in Berlin in 1941, was "50% bruised rye grain,
20% sliced sugar beets, 20% 'tree flour' (sawdust), 10% minced leaves and straw." "

References
1. Grebler, Leo; Winkler, Wilhelm (November 1941). The Cost of the World War to Germany
and to Austria-Hungary ([Link] New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. p. 29.
2. Keegan, John (2012). The First World War ([Link]
YC&pg=PT495). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 495. ISBN 9780307831705.
3. Robbins, Keith (22 August 2002). The First World War ([Link]
nTq4w-Ny3oC). Oxford University Press. p. 30. ISBN 9780192803184. "It had appeared, for
a time, that the British and French were going to be defeated in northern France and
Belgium, with a similar fate awaiting the Germans on their Eastern front and the Serbs on
their Northern front, but in all cases the defenders had averted disaster."
4. Gordon Wright. "France in Modern Times." (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 302.
5. Michael S. Neiberg. Fighting The Great War. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005),
32.
6. Robbins 2002, p. 34. "At the other end of the line, further German attempts to outflank Verdun
failed, but they did capture Saint-Mihiel and a section of the west bank of the Meuse before
they were stopped. In the north, a sustained German attack in early October led to the
surrender of Antwerp on 10 October. Not even the presence of Winston Churchill and a few
thousand British marines could prevent the inevitable. Churchill, King Albert and the Belgian
army extricated themselves in time. The Belgians joined the British in Flanders and, together
with a small French contribution, they formed a not invariably solid line confronting the
Germans. The Germans appeared confident that they could reach the Channel ports,
through the British also appeared confident that they could attack. The Allies did give ground
in the series of battles which took place between mid-October and mid-November known
collectively as the first battle of Ypres, but the Germans did not achieve their objectives."
7. Keegan 2012, p. 136.
8. Robbins 2002, p. 34a.
9. William Kelleher Storey. "First World War: A Concise Global History." (Rowman & Littlefield,
2010), 71.
10. Meyer, G. J. (2006). A World Undone ([Link]
Random House Publishing Group. p. 275. ISBN 9780440335870.
11. Offer, Avner (1989). The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation ([Link]
m/books?id=hthmAAAAMAAJ). Clarendon Press. p. 23. ISBN 9780198219460.
12. Starling, Ernest H. (1920). "The Food Supply of Germany During the War" ([Link]
org/stable/2341079). Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. 83 (2): 225–254.
doi:10.2307/2341079 ([Link] JSTOR 2341079 ([Link]
[Link]/stable/2341079).
13. Webb, Ken (2017) [2012]. "World War I: From Sarajevo to Versailles". Ken Webb (3rd
Edition): 79.
14. Holborn, Hajo (1982). A History of Modern Germany, Volume 3: 1840-1945 ([Link]
[Link]/books?id=Y4pLQ1jC1JIC&pg=PA459). Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
pp. 459–460. ISBN 978-0691008868.
15. Tucker, Spencer; Roberts, Priscilla Mary (2005). World War I: A Student Encyclopedia (http
s://[Link]/books?id=TogXVHTlxG4C&pg=PA1242). ABC-CLIO. p. 1242.
ISBN 9781851098798. "When the Imperial Grain Corporations (Reichsgetreidestelle) was
established in July 1915, [Dr. Georg] Michaelis became chairman of its board. In 1916 he
proposed establishment of an independent War Food Office (Kriegsernährungsamt) to
organize the entire German food supply on the home front. Due to bureaucratic rivalries, he
did not head the new office."
16. Meyer 2006, p. 415.
17. Offer 1989, p. 54.
18. Offer 1989, p. 59.
19. Offer 1989, p. 69.
20. Eyre, Lincoln (23 January 1926). "Says Food Caused German Mutinies". The New York
Times.
21. Vincent, Charles Paul (1985). The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany,
1915-1919 ([Link] Athens, OH: Ohio
University Press. p. 127. ISBN 9780821408209.

Sources
Keegan, John (2012) [1998]. The First World War ([Link]
CGuSi1YC). Knopf Doubleday. ISBN 9780307831705.
Meyer, Gerald J. (2006). A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914 to 1918 ([Link]
[Link]/details/worldundonestory00gjme). Random House. ISBN 978-0-553-80354-9.
Offer, Avner (1989). The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation ([Link]
m/books?id=hthmAAAAMAAJ). Clarendon Press. ISBN 9780198219460.
Robbins, Keith (2002) [1984]. The First World War ([Link]
8uF7TDNEC). Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780191647178.

Further reading
Neiberg, Michael S. Fighting The Great War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Storey, William Kelleher. First World War: A Concise Global History. Rowman & Littlefield,
2010, 71.
Wright, Gordon. France in Modern Times. New York: W. W. Norton, 1981.

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