Myanmar’s Coup D’Etat: What Role for ASEAN?

A forthright and coercive response is unlikely, but there are steps the bloc
could take to improve its ability to deal with future crises.

On February 1, the Myanmar armed forces, led by Sen. Gen. Min Aung
Hlaing, seized power in a coup, detaining State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi,
the de facto head of government, and declaring a state of national
emergency for one year. The military’s justification for its actions is that the
general elections held in late 2020 — which Aung San Suu Kyi’s National
League for Democracy (NLD) won by a landslide, with the military-backed
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) coming a very distant
second — were fraudulent. Myanmar’s election commission, however,
has rejected these claims. The military has stated their intention to
conduct fresh “free and fair” elections. Amid this political crisis, what role
could ASEAN — of which Myanmar has been a member since 1997 — play?

As an international organization, ASEAN has been (in)famous for its strict

adherence to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of
member states, to the extent that statements made by political leaders
about domestic political crises are frowned upon. There has, however, been a
marginal dilution of this principle over the years, most prominently in relation
to Myanmar. When Cyclone Nargis devastated Myanmar in 2008, ASEAN
responded to international outrage over the military government’s
mishandling of the crisis by directly engaging with the government and
serving as a channel for aid from the international community. In 2007,
ASEAN leaders agreed to skip Myanmar’s turn to host the ASEAN Summit
over concerns about its authoritarian government. Multiple episodes of
persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims have raised international alarms
and led to strong calls for ASEAN to (re)act. While ASEAN has far from met
these demands, it has occasionally expressed some, albeit minimal, concern
by way of brief, anodyne references to “displaced persons from Rakhine
State” in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting’s (AMM) joint communiques
and the ASEAN Summit’s chairman’s statements. How can we expect ASEAN
to respond to the recent coup?

In 2008, ASEAN member states adopted the ASEAN Charter. (The

organization was formed in 1967 on the basis of a Declaration.) The Charter
contains multiple references to democracy, a new addition to ASEAN’s
vocabulary. The preamble includes a commitment to “Adhering to the
principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance.” Article 1 lists
“strengthen[ing] democracy, enhanc[ing] good governance and the rule of
law” as among ASEAN’s main “purposes.” Article 2 on the organization’s
“principles” includes “adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the
principles of democracy and constitutional government.” Acquiring such a
formal commitment to democracy by a set of largely autocratic governments
was not an easy task. But exactly how this principle would be operationalized
by members, and enforced by ASEAN, remained intentionally unclear.

A common mode of non-coercive, low-degree intervention for democracy

enforcement by regional organizations that has emerged in the last two
decades is election observation. Several organizations spanning different
regions, including the Organization of American States, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the African Union, have developed
election observation architectures. ASEAN has toyed with election
observation in the past. In 2011, it organized a forum of ASEAN Electoral
Management Bodies. In 2012, ASEAN sent an election observation mission to
Myanmar for parliamentary by-elections. In its most constructive step yet, in
2015, the bloc, in a Philippines-led initiative, organized a workshop on
election observation and released a report detailing “incremental steps
towards the establishment of an ASEAN Election Observation Mechanism.”
But efforts towards this end have since faltered and a regional election
observation mechanism has not yet taken shape.

Developing election observation capabilities, however, would serve as an

able means for ASEAN to potentially prevent political crises in member
states. The presence of ASEAN election observers during the 2020 Myanmar
general election might have accorded an additional degree of legitimacy to
the electoral process, especially as an endorsement by an organization of
which Myanmar is a member, as opposed to by other external observers.
This, in turn, might have undercut the logic used by the Tatmadaw to justify
the coup.

In response to the coup, Brunei, who currently holds ASEAN’s rotating

chairmanship, released a statement calling for “dialogue, reconciliation and
the return to normalcy” in Myanmar, citing the ASEAN Charter’s democracy
principles. If “dialogue” implies mediation by ASEAN — a noncoercive form of
intervention — in the Myanmar crisis, it would represent new terrain for the
organization. This seems unlikely, however, as other members remain
split over intervening. It remains to be seen whether and how ASEAN’s
official bodies — the AMM or the ASEAN Summit (scheduled for April 2021) —
will address the Myanmar coup. A need to go beyond symbolic statements,
however, is clear.

Expectations of coercive measures by ASEAN, such as sanctions, are almost

nonexistent. Statements of concern regarding Myanmar’s internal affairs,
however, have increased in recent years. While these may be largely
symbolic, they represent a form of low-degree, noncoercive intervention, a
step above doing nothing and keeping mum, as might be expected under
ASEAN’s traditional mode of regional cooperation. Election observation,
which ASEAN has expressed interest in pursuing, might provide ASEAN with
an additional instrument to deal with political crises, while steering clear of
coercive instruments. Whatever be ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar coup,
the organization stands to learn important lessons from its actions. These
lessons will be crucial for developing regional crisis management and
prevention mechanisms to fulfill ASEAN’s aspirations of “strengthen[ing]
democracy.”

Sahil Mathur is a PhD Candidate in International Relations at American

University. His dissertation examines why regional organizations around the
world respond differently—some with coercive and others with noncoercive
means—to political crises in their member states.

1. The de facto head of government

This phrase means a person who exercises the power and
responsibilities of a head of government, even if they don’t hold the
official or legal title. In Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi was not the official
president but held the most authority in the civilian government.

2. Won by a landslide
This expression refers to winning an election by a very large margin or
majority. It indicates overwhelming public support for a candidate or
party, as was the case with the National League for Democracy in
Myanmar.

3. The principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of

member states
This principle means that ASEAN members should not interfere in the
domestic political matters of other member countries. It emphasizes
respect for national sovereignty and has been central to ASEAN's
diplomacy.
 4. A marginal dilution of this principle
This means that the strict application of nonintervention has been
slightly weakened or relaxed. In ASEAN’s case, this has happened
when humanitarian or severe political crises, like those in Myanmar,
forced some limited involvement.

5. Non-coercive, low-degree intervention

This refers to gentle or symbolic actions that do not use force or
pressure to influence a situation. Examples include election monitoring
or making public statements, rather than imposing sanctions or
military involvement.

6. Toyed with election observation

This phrase suggests that ASEAN has experimented or lightly
considered implementing election monitoring, but without fully
committing to it. It implies only superficial or limited efforts have been
made.

7. Accorded an additional degree of legitimacy

This means that something (like an election) is seen as more credible
or valid because it received approval or support from a trusted source.
In this context, ASEAN election observers could have increased public
trust in Myanmar’s 2020 election results.

8. Undercut the logic

To “undercut the logic” means to weaken or challenge the reasoning
behind an action. If ASEAN had validated the election, it could have
invalidated the military's justification for the coup.

9. Doing nothing and keeping mum

This phrase means remaining completely silent and inactive in a
situation. It criticizes inaction, especially when some response or
statement is expected.

Comprehension Questions (3 sentences each)

1. What reason did the Myanmar military provide when seizing

power in a coup?
The Myanmar military claimed that the 2020 general elections were
fraudulent and that voter irregularities invalidated the results. They
argued that a new election was needed to ensure fairness. However,
 the official election commission rejected these allegations, confirming
the results.

2. How has ASEAN traditionally approached the principle of

nonintervention, and in what instances has it deviated from
this principle, particularly concerning Myanmar?
ASEAN has traditionally been committed to nonintervention, avoiding
involvement in the domestic issues of its member states. However, it
has deviated from this stance in cases like Cyclone Nargis in 2008,
where ASEAN directly helped Myanmar, and during the Rohingya crisis,
where mild statements were issued. These moments show limited but
growing flexibility in ASEAN’s approach toward intervention.

3. What commitments does the ASEAN Charter make regarding

democracy, and how has ASEAN explored democracy
enforcement?
The ASEAN Charter includes principles such as promoting democracy,
good governance, and the rule of law. While these are stated values,
enforcement has been vague and inconsistent. ASEAN has made
tentative efforts in democracy promotion through forums and election
observation trials but has not established any strong or binding
mechanisms.

4. How does the article propose that ASEAN could potentially

prevent political crises in member states, especially in the
context of the 2020 Myanmar general election?
The article suggests that having ASEAN election observers during
elections could help legitimize the process and reduce claims of fraud.
This, in turn, might prevent military or political actors from using such
claims to justify coups. Strengthening election observation could be a
proactive, non-coercive way to uphold democracy within the region.

5. What do ASEAN's official bodies need to do to address the

Myanmar coup?
ASEAN’s bodies, like the ASEAN Summit and the Foreign Ministers’
Meeting, need to move beyond vague statements and take concrete
steps. These might include initiating mediation, supporting democratic
dialogue, or reviving the idea of election monitoring. Doing so would
strengthen ASEAN’s credibility and help prevent future political crises.