Columbia-Class Submarine Program Overview
Columbia-Class Submarine Program Overview
Summary
The Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program is a
program to design and build a class of 12 new SSBNs to replace the Navy’s current force of 14
aging Ohio-class SSBNs. Since 2013, the Navy has consistently identified the Columbia-class
program as the Navy’s top priority program. The Navy procured the first Columbia-class boat in
FY2021; the boat was funded with three-year incremental funding in FY2021-FY2023. The Navy
procured the second Columbia-class boat in FY2024; the boat is being funded with two-year
incremental funding (also called split funding) in FY2024-FY2025. The Navy wants to procure
the remaining 10 boats in the program—boats 3 through 12—at a rate of one per year in FY2026-
FY2035.
The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of the first boat at
$15,179.1 million (i.e., about $15.2 billion) and the procurement cost of the second Columbia-
class boat at $9,283.1 million (i.e., about $9.3 billion). The first boat’s procurement cost is much
higher than that of subsequent boats in the class because the first boat includes most of the detail
design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the class. (It is a long-standing Navy
budgetary practice to incorporate the DD/NRE costs for a new class of ship into the total
procurement cost of the first ship in the class.) The first boat’s estimated procurement cost
includes $6,557.6 million for plans, meaning (essentially) the DD/NRE costs for the class.
Excluding costs for plans, the estimated hands-on construction cost of the first ship is $8,621.5
million (i.e., about $8.6 billion).
The Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $3,341.2 million (i.e., about $3.3 billion) in
procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the second Columbia-class boat and
$6,215.9 million (i.e., about $6.2 billion) in advance procurement (AP) funding for Columbia-
class boats to be procured in FY2026 and subsequent years.
Issues for Congress for the Columbia-class program include the following:
• The impact of an estimated 12- to 16-month delay in the delivery of the first
Columbia-class boat on the Navy’s plans for replacing Ohio-class SSBNs on a
timely basis;
• industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-
class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time;
• the risk of cost growth in the Columbia-class program; and
• the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on funding that will be
available for other Navy programs, including other shipbuilding programs.
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Navy SSBNs in General .................................................................................................... 1
Mission of SSBNs ............................................................................................................... 1
Current Ohio-Class SSBNs ................................................................................................. 2
U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and the New UK SSBN ................................................ 3
Submarine Construction Industrial Base ................................................................................... 3
Columbia-Class Program .......................................................................................................... 4
Navy’s Top Priority Program .............................................................................................. 4
Program Name, Origin, and Milestones.............................................................................. 4
Planned Procurement Quantity and Schedule ..................................................................... 5
Columbia-Class Design ...................................................................................................... 7
Tight Schedule for Designing and Building Lead Boat ...................................................... 8
Estimated 12- to 16-Month Delay in Delivery of Lead Boat .............................................. 8
Program Cost ...................................................................................................................... 9
National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) ............................................................... 10
Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP) ....................................................................................... 10
Cost-Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) Contract for First Two Ships ........................................... 11
Use of Incremental Funding for Procuring First Two Boats ............................................. 12
FY2025 Funding Request ................................................................................................. 13
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 14
Impact of 12- to 16-Month Delay in Delivery of First Boat ................................................... 14
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 14
Navy Perspective as of October 2023 ............................................................................... 14
GAO Perspective as of June 2023 and January 2023 ....................................................... 15
Industrial-Base Challenges of Building Both Columbia- and Virginia-Class Boats ............... 17
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 17
Press Report ...................................................................................................................... 20
Strategic Outsourcing........................................................................................................ 22
Potential Oversight Questions for Congress ..................................................................... 24
Risk of Cost Growth................................................................................................................ 24
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 24
Navy Perspective as of July 2023 ..................................................................................... 25
CBO Perspective as of October 2023 ............................................................................... 25
Cost-Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) Contract.......................................................................... 26
Change in Estimated Procurement Costs Since FY2021 Budget Submission .................. 27
Impact on Funding for Other Navy Shipbuilding Programs ................................................... 28
Legislative Activity for FY2025 .................................................................................................... 29
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2025 Funding Request .......................................... 29
FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8070/S. 4638) ........................................ 29
House ................................................................................................................................ 29
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 29
FY2025 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 8774/S. 4921) ......................................................... 30
House ................................................................................................................................ 30
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 31
Figures
Figure 1. Ohio (SSBN-726) Class SSBN ........................................................................................ 3
Figure 2. Columbia (SSBN-826) Class SSBN ................................................................................ 7
Figure 3. Columbia (SSBN-826) Class SSBN ................................................................................ 8
Figure 4. Navy Graph Showing Projected Growth in Submarine Tonnage Under
Construction ............................................................................................................................... 18
Tables
Table 1. Procurement Funding Profiles for First Two Boats ......................................................... 12
Table 2. Navy Confidence Levels as of August 2020 for Estimated Columbia-Class Unit
Procurement Costs...................................................................................................................... 25
Table 3. Change in Estimated Procurement Costs Since FY2021 Budget .................................... 27
Table 4. Congressional Action on FY2025 Funding Request........................................................ 29
Appendixes
Appendix A. Summary of Past U.S. SSBN Designs ..................................................................... 33
Appendix B. U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and the New UK SSBN ..................................... 35
Appendix C. Columbia-Class Program Origin and Milestones .................................................... 38
Appendix D. Design of Columbia-Class Boats ............................................................................. 41
Appendix E. National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) ...................................................... 50
Appendix F. October 25, 2023, Navy Testimony on Increasing Capacity of Submarine
Industrial Base ............................................................................................................................ 56
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 59
Introduction
This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the
Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class program, a program to design and build a class of 12 new
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 aging Ohio-class
SSBNs. Since 2013, the Navy has consistently identified the Columbia-class program as the
Navy’s top priority program. The Navy procured the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021; the
boat was funded with three-year incremental funding in FY2021-FY2023. The Navy procured the
second Columbia-class boat in FY2024; the boat is being funded with two-year incremental
funding (also called split funding) in FY2024-FY2025.
The Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $3,341.2 million (i.e., about $3.3 billion) in
procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the second Columbia-class boat and
$6,215.9 million (i.e., about $6.2 billion) in advance procurement (AP) funding for Columbia-
class boats to be procured in FY2026 and subsequent years.
The Columbia-class program poses a number of issues for Congress. Decisions that Congress
makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. military capabilities and funding
requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
This report focuses on the Columbia-class program as a Navy shipbuilding program. Another
CRS report—CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments,
and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf—discusses the Columbia class as an element of future U.S. strategic
nuclear forces in the context of strategic nuclear arms modernization efforts and arms control
agreements.
Background
U.S. Navy SSBNs in General
Mission of SSBNs
The U.S. Navy operates three kinds of submarines—nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs),
nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs).1 The SSNs and SSGNs are multi-mission ships that perform a variety of
peacetime and wartime missions.2 They do not carry nuclear weapons.3
1 In the designations SSN, SSGN, and SSBN, the SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-powered (meaning the
ship is powered by a nuclear reactor), G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise missile), B stands for ballistic
missile. As shown by the “Ns” in SSN, SSGN, and SSBN, all U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-powered. Other navies
operate nonnuclear powered submarines, which are powered by energy sources such as diesel engines. A submarine’s
use of nuclear or nonnuclear power as its energy source is not an indication of whether it is armed with nuclear
weapons—a nuclear-powered submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a nonnuclear-powered submarine can be armed
with nuclear weapons.
2 For more on the Navy’s SSNs and SSGNs, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and
AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Report RS21007,
Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
3 The Navy’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons—meaning all of the service’s nuclear weapons other than submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—were removed from Navy surface ships and submarines under a unilateral U.S.
nuclear initiative announced by President George H. W. Bush in September 1991. The initiative reserved a right to
rearm SSNs with nuclear-armed cruise missiles at some point in the future should conditions warrant.
The SSBNs, in contrast, perform a singular mission of strategic nuclear deterrence. To perform
this mission, SSBNs are armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which are
large, long-range missiles armed with multiple nuclear warheads. SSBNs launch their SLBMs
from large-diameter vertical launch tubes located in the middle section of the boat.4 The SSBNs’
basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their SLBMs, so as to deter a nuclear attack on the
United States by another country by demonstrating to other countries that the United States has an
assured second-strike capability, meaning a survivable system for carrying out a retaliatory
nuclear attack.
Navy SSBNs, which are sometimes referred to informally as “boomers,”5 form one of three legs
of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force, or “triad,” which also includes land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and land-based long-range bombers. At any given
moment, some of the Navy’s SSBNs are conducting nuclear deterrent patrols. The Department of
Defense’s (DOD’s) report on the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released on February 2,
2018, states the following:
Ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable leg of the triad. When on patrol,
SSBNs are, at present, virtually undetectable, and there are no known, near-term credible
threats to the survivability of the SSBN force. Nevertheless, we will continue to hedge
against the possibility that advances in anti-submarine warfare could make the SSBN force
less survivable in the future.6
4 SSBNs, like other Navy submarines, are also equipped with horizontal torpedo tubes in the bow for firing torpedoes
or other torpedo-sized weapons.
5 This informal name is a reference to the large boom that would be made by the detonation of an SLBM nuclear
warhead.
6 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, released February 2, 2018, pp. 44-45.
7 A total of 18 Ohio-class SSBNs were procured in FY1974-FY1991. The ships entered service in 1981-1997. The first
8 boats in the class were originally armed with Trident I C-4 SLBMs; the final 10 were armed with larger and more-
capable Trident II D-5 SLBMs. The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommended a
strategic nuclear force for the START II strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty that included 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, all
armed with D-5s. This recommendation prompted interest in the idea of converting the first four Ohio-class boats
(SSBNs 726-729) into SSGNs, so as to make good use of the 20 years of potential operational life remaining in these
four boats, and to bolster the U.S. SSN fleet. The first 4 Ohio-class boats were converted into SSGNs in 2002-2008,
and the next 4 (SSBNs 730-733) were backfitted with D-5 SLBMs in 2000-2005, producing the current force of 14
Ohio-class SSBNs, all of which are armed with D-5 SLBMs. For more on the SSGN conversion program, see CRS
Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
Eight of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs are homeported at Bangor, WA, in Puget Sound; the other six
are homeported at Kings Bay, GA, close to the Florida border. Unlike most Navy ships, which are
operated by single crews, Navy SSBNs are operated by alternating crews (called the Blue and
Gold crews) so as to maximize the percentage of time that they spend at sea in deployed status.
The first of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs (SSBN-730) will reach the end of its 42-year service life in
2027. The remaining 13 will reach the ends of their service lives at a rate of roughly one ship per
year thereafter, with the 14th reaching the end of its service life in 2040.
The Navy has initiated a program to refurbish and extend the service lives of D-5 SLBMs to
about 2040. As Columbia-class SSBNs begin to replace Ohio-class boats in 2031, refurbished D-
5s carried by retiring Ohio-class boats will be transferred to new Columbia-class boats.
Columbia-class boats will continue to be armed with these refurbished D-5s until about 2040, at
which time the D-5s are to be replaced by a successor SLBM.
Including the Ohio class, the Navy has operated four classes of SSBNs since 1959. For a table
summarizing these four classes, see Appendix A.
8Although the SLBMs on UK SSBNs are U.S.-made, the nuclear warheads on the missiles are of UK design and
manufacture.
News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA. GD/EB and HII/NNS are the only two
shipyards in the country capable of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines
only, while HII/NNS also builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other
types of surface ships. The two yards currently are jointly building Virginia-class attack
submarines.9
In addition to GD/EB and HII/NNS, the submarine construction industrial base includes hundreds
of supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research facilities, in numerous states. Much of the
total material procured from supplier firms for the construction of submarines comes from sole-
source suppliers. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of stabilizing
work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction program.10
Much of the design and engineering portion of the submarine construction industrial base is
resident at GD/EB. Smaller portions are resident at HII/NNS and some of the component makers.
Columbia-Class Program
9 For more on the arrangement for jointly building Virginia-class boats, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class
Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
10 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. In terms of work provided to nuclear-propulsion
component suppliers, a carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion plants.
11 On September 18, 2013, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, then-Chief of Naval Operations, testified that the Columbia-
class program “is the top priority program for the Navy.” (Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief
of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services Committee on Planning for Sequestration in FY2014 and
Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review, September 18, 2013, p. 10.)
Navy officials since then have reiterated this statement on numerous occasions. At a September 12, 2013, hearing
before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on undersea
warfare, a Navy official stated the following:
The CNO has stated, his number one priority as the chief of Naval operations, is our—our strategic
deterrent—our nuclear strategic deterrent. That will trump all other vitally important requirements
within our Navy, but if there’s only one thing that we do with our ship building account, we—we
are committed to sustaining a two ocean national strategic deterrent that protects our homeland
from nuclear attack, from other major war aggression and also access and extended deterrent for
our allies.
(Transcript of hearing. (Spoken remarks of Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge. The other witness
at the hearing was Rear Admiral David Johnson.)
12 In the designation SSBN(X), the (X) meant that the design of the boat had not yet been determined.
As discussed in the CRS report on Navy ship names, on December 14, 2016, the Navy announced
that SSBN-826, the first boat in the class, would be named Columbia, in honor of the District of
Columbia. Consequently, since December 2016, the 12 or more planned boats have been referred
to as Columbia (SSBN-826) class boats. On June 3, 2022, the Navy announced that it was
modifying SSBN-826’s name from Columbia to District of Columbia, so as to avoid an overlap in
names with USS Columbia (SSN-771), a Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack submarine that was
named for Columbia, SC; Columbia, IL; and Columbia, MO. The Navy states that
notwithstanding the modification to SSBN-826’s name, the 12 or more planned new SSBNs will
continue to be referred to as Columbia (SSBN-826) class boats.13
For information on the Columbia-class program’s origin and milestones, see Appendix C.
13 See CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
14 For additional discussion, see “Navy Responds to Debate Over the Size of the SSBN Force,” Navy Live, May 16,
2013, accessed July 26, 2013, at [Link]
ssbn-force/, and Richard Breckenridge, “SSBN Force Level Requirements: It’s Simply a Matter of Geography,” Navy
Live, July 19, 2013, accessed July 26, 2013, at [Link]
its-simply-a-matter-of-geography/.
15 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, released February 2, 2018, p. 49. A similar statement (which
differs only in saying “COLUMBIA program” rather than “COLUMBIA-class program”) appears on p. x.
16 See, for example, Marc Selinger, “Navy Might Someday Consider Buying More Than 12 Columbia-Class
Submarines,” Defense Daily, April 12, 2018: 2-3; Jason Sherman, “Navy Keeping Options Open to ‘Tack On’
Additional Submarines to 12-Boat Columbia Buy,” Inside Defense, November 18, 2020. See also Richard R. Burgess,
“Navy SSBN PEO: Data Clearly Supports Building More than 12 Columbia Subs,” Seapower, June 9, 2022.
17 Madelyn R. Creedon, Chair, et al., America’s Strategic Posture, The Final Report of the Congressional Commission
on the Strategic Posture of the United States, October 2023, pp. 48, 99.
18 Source: Navy information paper on the FY2022 Fiscal Planning Framework and submarine service life extensions,
February 5, 2021, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and CRS on
February 5, 2021. See also Rich Abott, “Navy Confirms Extending Five SSBNs Starting In 2029,” Defense Daily,
November 8, 2023; Sam LaGrone and Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy Mulling Large Diameter Sub Hulls After 12
Columbias, SSN(X) Requirements Due Next Year,” USNI News, November 8 (updated November 9), 2023; Nick
Wilson, “Navy Planning Ohio Service Life Extension to Mitigate Risk as Columbia Construction Continues,” Inside
Defense, November 8, 2023; Justin Katz, “Navy Planning to Execute 3-Year Ohio-Class Sub Life Extensions,”
Breaking Defense, November 7, 2023; Megan Eckstein, “US Navy May Accelerate Investments to Extend Some Ohio
Subs’ Lives,” Defense News, May 19, 2023; Rich Abott, “Navy Eyes 2026 Decision On First Ohio-Class SSBN
Extension,” Defense Daily, November 2, 2022; Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Wants to Avoid Shortfall of Nuke-Armed
Subs in 2030s,” Defense News, November 2, 2022; Justin Katz, “Navy ‘Scoping Study’ to Examine Shipyard Capacity,
Potential for a New Yard,” Breaking Defense, November 2, 2022; Caitlin M. Kenney, “A Handful of Ohio Subs Could
Get Yet Another Service Life Extension,” Defense One, November 1, 2022; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Could Extend Life
of Five Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Boats to Hedge Against Columbia Program Delays,” USNI News, November 1,
2022; Nick Wilson, “Navy to Consider Service Extensions for Select Ohio-Class Subs,” Inside Defense, November 1,
2022; Emma Helfrich, “Navy Eyeing Life Extension Of Nine Ohio Class [SSBN and SSGN] Submarines,” The Drive,
(continued...)
Columbia-Class Design
The Columbia-class design (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) includes 16 SLBM tubes, as opposed to
24 SLBM tubes (of which 20 are now used for SLBMs) on Ohio-class SSBNs. Although the
Columbia-class design has fewer SLBM tubes than the Ohio-class design, it is larger than the
Ohio-class design in terms of submerged displacement. The Columbia-class design, like the
Ohio-class design before it, will be the largest submarine ever built by the United States.
Source: Cropped version of illustration accompanying David B. Larter, “US Navy Inks $9.4B Contract for two
Columbia-class Nuclear Missile Submarines,” Defense News, November 5, 2020. A caption to the image credits
it to the U.S. Navy.
Current U.S. and UK plans call for the Columbia-class and the UK’s Dreadnought-class SSBN to
use a missile compartment—the middle section of the boat with the SLBM launch tubes—of the
same general design called the Common Missile Compartment (CMC).19 As mentioned earlier,
Dreadnought-class SSBNs are to each be armed with eight D-5 SLBMs, or half the number to be
carried by the Columbia class. The modular design of the CMC will accommodate this difference.
The UK provided some of the funding for the design of the CMC, including a large portion of the
initial funding.20
May 18, 2022; Megan Eckstein, “Navy May Extend Life of Ohio SSBNs to Provide Cushion for Introduction of
Columbia-class,” USNI News, November 16 (updated December 24), 2020; Aidan Quigley, “Navy Considering
Expanding Life Cycles of Some Ohio-class Submarines to Ease Columbia Transition,” Inside Defense, July 7, 2021;
Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Reorganizes Submarine Enterprise to Address Challenges in Construction, Maintenance,”
Defense News, September 27, 2021.
19 Statement of Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, Before the Subcommittee
on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee [on] FY2011 Strategic Systems, March 17, 2010, p. 6,
which states the following: “The OHIO Replacement programs includes the development of a common missile
compartment that will support both the OHIO Class Replacement and the successor to the UK Vanguard Class.”
20 See Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-
10-388SP, March 2010, p. 152; Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected
Weapon Programs, GAO-11-233SP, March 2011, p. 147; Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Deterrent Decisions: US
and UK Wait on Next Steps for SSBN Replacements,” Jane’s Navy International, May 2010, pp. 10-11.
Source: Detail of slide 2, entitled “OHIO Replacement Program System Description,” in Navy briefing on
Columbia-class program presented by Captain William J. Brougham, Program Manager of PMS 397 (i.e., Project
Manager Shipbuilding, Office Code 397, the office for the Columbia-class program), at the Sea, Air, and Space
Symposium, April 8, 2014, posted at [Link] (subscription required), April 9, 2014.
21Anthony Capaccio, “US Navy Sees Delays of a Year or More for New ICBM Submarine,” Bloomberg, April 2,
2024. See also Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, “First Columbia Nuclear Missile Sub At Risk of 1-Year Delay
Due to Supplier Problems,” USNI News, March 11, 2024; “Absent General Dynamics Improvements, Pentagon
Forecasts Year-Long Delay to Columbia-class Nuclear Submarine Program,” Capitol Forum, March 11, 2024.
“One of the most significant challenges that we have with Columbia … is actually the late
delivery of the turbine generator to Columbia by subcontractor Northrop Grumman,” Del
Toro the House Appropriations subcommittee on defense.
“That has had a major impact on the Columbia.”…
In addition to the turbines, sources familiar with the slip in schedule have also pointed to
the delay in completing the bow dome of District of Columbia. The dome, the same design
as the Ohio-class, is getting cast at forge at HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia.22
An April 17, 2024, press report states:
A delay of as much as 16 months in delivering the first of the US’s first Columbia-class
nuclear-missile submarines—the Navy’s top weapons priority—stems from contractor
delays in delivering the vessel’s bow section and power generators, according to an internal
assessment by the service….
… HII was to ship the bow in May 2025 from its Newport News, Virginia, yard to the
General Dynamics facility in Groton, Connecticut. That’s now estimated for June 2026, or
13 months late, according to internal service figures….
In addition, Northrop Grumman Corp. was contracted by the Navy to deliver the first ship’s
turbine generators by November 2021, which would have provided months of margin
before they’d be needed.
Instead, the turbine generators are projected to be delivered in early 2025, according to a
Navy statement.23
Program Cost
22 Sam LaGrone, “Late Turbines Have ‘Major Impact’ on Columbia Sub Delivery Schedule, Says SECNAV,” USNI
News, April 10, 2024. See also Rich Abott, “Del Toro Says Turbine Generator A Major Issue In Columbia Delay,”
Defense Daily, April 10, 2024.
23 Anthony Capaccio, “US Nuclear-Missile Sub Delayed Up to 16 Months Over Bow, Generators,” Bloomberg, April
17, 2024.
24 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Programs Are Not Consistently
Implementing Practices That Can Help Accelerate Acquisitions, GAO-23-106059, June 2023, p. 159.
The above estimates do not include military construction (MilCon) costs (which are a third
component, along with development and procurement costs, of total acquisition cost) or estimated
costs for refurbishing D-5 SLBMs so as to extend their service lives to about 2040.
25
Columbia Class MS [Milestone] B, Congressional Notification, January 6, 2017, p. 1.
Navy briefing, “COLUMBIA Class National Sea Based Deterrence Fund Procurement Authorities & Initiatives,”
26
March 2022, provided to CRS and CBO by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, July 1, 2022.
is adjusting the division of work on the Virginia-class attack submarine program (in which boats
are jointly built at GD/EB and HII/NNS),27 so that HII/NNS will receive a larger share of the
final-assembly work for that program than it has received in the past.28
27 For more on the arrangement for jointly building Virginia-class boats, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-
Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
28 Key elements of the Navy’s plan include the following:
• GD/EB is to be the prime contractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
• HII/NNS is to be a subcontractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
• GD/EB is to build certain parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to the
parts that GD/EB builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
• HII/NNS is to build certain other parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to
the parts that HII/NNS builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
• GD/EB is to perform the final assembly on all 12 Columbia-class boats;
• as a result of the three previous points, the Navy estimates that GD/EB would receive an estimated 77%-78%
of the shipyard work building Columbia-class boats, and HII/NNS would receive 22%-23%;
• GD/EB is to continue as prime contractor for the Virginia-class program, but to help balance out projected
submarine-construction workloads at GD/EB and HII/NNS, the division of work between the two yards for
building Virginia-class boats is to be adjusted so that HII/NNS would perform the final assembly on a greater
number of Virginia-class boats than it would have under a continuation of the current Virginia-class division
of work (in which final assemblies are divided more or less evenly between the two shipyards); as a
consequence, HII/NNS would receive a greater share of the total work in building Virginia-class boats than it
would have under a continuation of the current division of work.
See Julia Bergman, “Congressmen Visit EB A Day After It Is Named Prime Contractor for Ohio Replacement
Program,” The Day (New London), March 29, 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Ohio Replacement Plan Is Good News
For Electric Boat,” Breaking Defense, March 29, 2016; Robert McCabe, “Newport News Shipbuilding’s Share of
Virginia-Class Submarine Deliveries to Grow,” Virginian-Pilot (Newport News), March 29, 2016; Valerie Insinna,
“GD Electric Boat Chosen To Take Lead Role for Ohio Replacement Sub,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2016: 1-3; Hugh
Lessig, “Navy: More Submarine Work Coming to Newport News Shipyard,” [Link], March 30, 2016; Lee
Hudson, “Work on Ohio-Class Replacement Will Be 80-20 Split Between GDEB, HII-NNS,” Inside the Navy, April 4,
2016. See also Richard R. Burgess, “Submarine Admirals: ‘Unified Build Strategy’ Seeks Affordability for Future Sub
Fleet,” Seapower, July 8, 2016. See also Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Development and Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Integration of Capabilities and Resources, and Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant, Combat
Development and Integration & Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Department of the
Navy Seapower and Projection Forces Capabilities, February 25, 2016, p. 12.
29 For more on block buy contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy
Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
the ship.30 The Navy as of 2022 was reportedly is considering using a five-ship block buy contract
for the third through seventh boats in the program.31
30 Source: Telephone discussion with Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, June 24, 2020.
31 Rich Abott, “Navy Planning Five-Ship Block Buy Of Columbia SSBNs, Little Margin Left On First Sub,” Defense
Daily, November 1, 2022; Justin Katz, “Navy Plans to Seek Block Buy for Next Five Columbia-Class Subs,” Breaking
Defense, November 1, 2022.
32 For background information on the use of incremental funding in procuring Navy ships, see CRS Report RL32776,
Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
33Source: Attachment 4: Submarine Industrial Base (pages 58-63) to letter dated October 20, 2023, from Shalanda D.
(continued...)
Overview
One oversight issue for Congress concerns the impact of the estimated 12- to 16-month delay in
the delivery of the first Columbia-class boat on the Navy’s plans for replacing Ohio-class SSBNs
on a timely basis. Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following:
• What impact might a 12- to 16-month delay in delivering the first boat have on
the delivery dates of subsequent boats in the class?
• How likely is it that the estimated delay in delivering the lead boat will grow to
something greater than 12 to 16 months as construction of the boat continues?
• To what degree can the delay in delivering the first boat (and possibly some of
the subsequent boats) be offset by extending the service lives of up to five of the
Ohio-class SSBNs? What will be the net impact on the size of the SSBN force?
What are the estimated costs of extending the service lives of these five boats?
Young, Office of Management and Budget, to The Honorable Patrick McHenry, Speaker Pro Tempore of the House of
Representatives, accessed October 23, 2023, at [Link]
[Link].
“I want to buy more margin back” to allow for challenges in these areas, he said, noting
the Navy and industry are seeking to accelerate the remaining outfitting and final assembly
work.
Because the Columbia-class SSBN is the Navy’s top acquisition priority and a key effort
for the Defense Department as well, the government-industry team has given the Columbia
program the resources it needs to stay on schedule, even at the expense of the Virginia
submarine program.
Defense News previously reported that, because the Columbia production line was filled
first with experienced workers, the Virginia production line at shipbuilding partner HII’s
Newport News Shipbuilding wasn’t fully staffed until February. At Electric Boat, the
newest employees were assigned to the Virginia program, meaning there were more
mistakes and longer rework time, exacerbating existing delays.
Pappano confirmed the industrial base is prioritizing Columbia work, but said it needs to
do so even more.
“Get me the best people, the best crews, the best supervisors,” he said. “Have the right
people working to drive that first-time quality. First-time quality is going to be the key to
buying back margin.”
Though the Navy will formally procure the second sub of the class, the future Wisconsin,
this fiscal year—facilitated by a measure Congress included in the continuing resolution
now funding the government—advanced construction work has already been underway for
a couple years.
Pappano said, in that advanced construction work, he’s already seeing improvements on
Wisconsin compared to District of Columbia, which is necessary to meet Wisconsin’s
shorter contractual build schedule.
The first submarine was allotted 84 months for the build and test cycle; Wisconsin will
have 80. By the end of the 12-submarine program, that will be whittled down to 70
months.34
Megan Eckstein, “Navy Aims to Hasten Remaining Columbia Sub Work in Case of Test Delays,” Defense News,
34
As we reported last year, the shipbuilder accelerated its schedule for construction of the
lead submarine to reduce the risk of a delivery delay. However, as of September 2022, the
shipbuilder was behind this accelerated schedule not only due to design delays, but also
because of late delivery of supplier materials and a need for rework due to quality problems.
Program officials stated that the shipbuilder attempted to overcome these delays, in part,
by reassigning workers from Virginia class submarine construction. This contributed to
delays on the Virginia class program. Program officials stated that additional workers may
need to be reassigned to Columbia in the future. The Navy also identified a need for the
shipbuilder to improve hiring and training both in the near term and for when the program
reaches an annual cadence for follow-on submarine construction. Program officials told us
that the shipbuilder plans to continue adding staff to Columbia class lead ship construction
until it overcomes delays. In September 2022, we reported that the Navy cannot rely on the
shipbuilder’s schedule for the lead submarine to plan for on-time delivery because it did
not substantially meet all of our leading practices for program schedules. Meeting these
leading practices would enable the program to determine how schedule risks affect the
program’s ability to meet key dates, such as delivery.
Software and Cybersecurity
The program office reported no significant updates related to software development or
cybersecurity.
Other Program Issues
The program’s estimated procurement cost decreased by roughly 4 percent since our last
assessment. However, this decrease occurred because of an update to the calculation used
for inflation and because the Navy no longer includes supplier development funding in its
estimate. The supplier base is among the program’s top risks because the program will need
quality and timely materials to produce submarines on time. The Navy removed supplier
development funding from the cost estimate because it considers these as costs shared with,
for example, the Virginia class program.
Per the program’s updated acquisition strategy, the Navy plans to begin early procurement
and construction on one submarine per year from fiscal year 2023 through 2032. The Navy
plans for each follow-on submarine to have a progressively shorter construction schedule,
based in part on early construction efforts. In order to achieve this schedule goal, the
shipbuilder would need to overcome staffing issues and build the submarines in a shorter
amount of time than it achieved on any of its recent submarines.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program office stated that it is positioned to deliver the capabilities needed to meet
strategic deterrent requirements on cost and schedule. It also stated that it took actions to
reduce risks, such as ensuring stable requirements, executing manufacturing readiness and
supplier base efforts, and pursuing cost reduction actions. It added that the program
exceeded 83 percent overall design maturity by the start of lead ship construction–higher
than achieved for other submarine classes—and it worked through initial design tool issues
that delayed design products. Further, it noted that the Navy took actions to address
construction performance challenges in 2022. The program office stated that the Navy
conducts schedule reviews for this program similar to those conducted for previous
submarine classes. It noted that the program continues to comply with all Navy, DOD, and
Overview
A related issue for Congress concerns the ability of the submarine construction industrial base to
execute the work associated with procuring one Columbia-class SSBN plus two Virginia-class
SSNs per year (a procurement rate referred to in short as 1+2). Policymakers and other observers
have expressed concern about the industrial base’s capacity for executing a 1+2 workload without
encountering bottlenecks or other production problems in one or both of these programs. In a
nutshell, the challenge for the industrial base—both shipyards and supplier firms—is to ramp up
production from one “regular” Virginia-class boat’s work per year (the volume of work prior to
FY2011) to the equivalent of about five “regular” Virginia-class boats’ work per year (the
approximate volume of work represented by two Virginia Payload Module (VPM)-equipped
Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-class boat).37 In other words, the challenge for the
35 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Programs Are Not Consistently
Implementing Practices That Can Help Accelerate Acquisitions, GAO-23-106059, June 2023, p. 160.
36 Government Accountability Office, Columbia Class Submarine[:] Program Lacks Essential Schedule Insight amid
Virginia Payload Module (VPM), 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch
(continued...)
industrial base is to quintuple the pre-2011 volume of annual production by 2028. The challenge
is depicted in the Navy graph shown in Figure 4.
Source: Navy graph provided to CRS and CBO by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, November 16, 2023.
Concerns about the ability of the submarine construction industrial base to execute the workload
resulting from a sustained 1+2 procurement rate were heightened starting in 2019 by reports
about challenges faced by the two submarine-construction shipyards and associated supplier firms
in meeting scheduled delivery times for Virginia-class boats as the Virginia-class program
transitions from production of two “regular” Virginia-class boats per year to two VPM-equipped
boats per year.38
tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads. If building a “regular” Virginia-class
boat is viewed as requiring one unit of work, then building a VPM-equipped Virginia-class boat can be viewed as
requiring about 1.25 units of work, and building a Columbia-class boat can be viewed as requiring about 2.5 units of
work. On this basis, building two VPM-equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-class boat would require
about five units of work (1.25 + 1.25 + 2.5 = 5.0).
38 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Columbia Class Submarine[:] Overly Optimistic Cost Estimate
Will Likely Lead to Budget Increases, GAO-19-497, April 2019, pp. 20-23; David B. Larter, “Late Is the New Normal
for Virginia-Class Attack Boats,” Defense News, March 20, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “Navy: Lack of Submarine Parts
Slowing Down Maintenance, New Construction,” USNI News, March 26, 2019; David B. Larter, “The US Navy,
(continued...)
Although Virginia-class submarines are being procured at a rate of two boats per year, Navy
officials have noted that deliveries of Virginia-class submarines from GD/EB and HII/NNS have
averaged 1.2 boats per year for the past five years.39 On March 29, 2023, Secretary of the Navy
Carlos Del Toro testified that the Virginia-class production rate was at that point about 1.4 boats
per year.40 At an April 28, 2023, briefing on the Virginia-class program for CRS and CBO, Navy
officials stated that the rate as of that date was about 1.3 boats per year.41 A March 31, 2023, press
report stated that Navy officials estimate that it will take another five years—until 2028—before
the delivery rate will increase to 2.0 boats per year.42 In advance policy questions submitted for a
September 14, 2023, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee to consider her
nomination to be Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, stated that the Navy’s goal is to stabilize the Virginia-class construction rate at 1.4
boats per year by the end of 2023, increase it to at least 1.5 boats per year by the end of 2024, and
increase it to 2.0 boats per year by 2028.43
The Navy has testified that meeting both U.S. Navy needs and additional needs under the
AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) security agreement announced in September 2021 would require
increasing the Virginia-class production rate further, to 2.33 boats per year. Under the
nomenclature used here, such a combined Columbia-plus-Virginia procurement rate would be
expressed as 1+2.33.44
The Navy’s report on its FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054) shipbuilding plan states,
To achieve the goal of simultaneous construction of the Columbia-class SSBN and two
Virginia-class SSNs annually, the DoN [Department of the Navy] is investing heavily in
the submarine industrial base to reduce production risk, stabilize critical suppliers, and help
enable recruitment and retention of the skilled production workforce. Industry must do its
part to deliver capability on time and within cost….
The DoN is committed to fortifying the submarine production and sustainment industrial
base to meet U.S. needs while also enabling the sale of three Virginia class submarines to
Australia. From FY2018 appropriation/execution through FY2023, the DoD, DoN, and
Congress have worked in partnership with state/local governments and industry to invest
Seeking Savings, Shakes Up Its Plans for More Lethal Attack Submarines,” Defense News, April 3, 2019; Anthony
Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Sub Firepower Upgrade Delayed by Welding Flaws,” Bloomberg, August 13, 2019; Paul
McLeary, “Weld Problems Spread To Second Navy Sub Program,” Breaking Defense, August 14, 2019; David B.
Larter, “Questions About US Navy Attack Sub Program Linger as Contract Negotiations Drag,” Defense News, August
16, 2019; Emma Watkins, “Will the U.S. Navy Soon Have a Missile-Tube Problem?” National Interest, August 19,
2019; David B. Larter, “As CNO Richardson Departs, US Submarine Builders Face Pressure,” Defense News, August
22, 2019; David B. Larter, “After a Leadership Shakeup at General Dynamics, a Murky Future for Submarine
Building,” Defense News, October 28, 2019; Rich Abott, “Navy Says Virginia Sub Delays Due To Faster Production
Rate,” Defense Daily, November 6, 2019.
39 See, for example, Megan Eckstein, “Navy Frustration Building over Late Weapons, Ship Deliveries,” Defense News,
January 11, 2023; Rich Abott, “Fleet Forces And SecNav Argue For More Maintenance Yards,” Defense Daily,
January 12, 2023.
40 Sam LaGrone, “SECNAV Del Toro: Virginia Attack Sub Construction ‘Significantly Behind,’ District of Columbia
Submarine 10% Behind Schedule,” USNI News, March 29 (updated March 30), 2023. See also Rich Abott, “SECNAV:
Columbia Sub 10 Percent Behind, Virginia Subs Improving But Still Behind,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2023.
41 Navy briefing on Virginia-class program for CRS and CBO, April 28, 2023.
42 Sam LaGrone, “Navy Estimates 5 More Years for Virginia Attack Sub Production to Hit 2 Boats a Year,” USNI
Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
over $2.3B across shipyard, workforce, suppliers, strategic outsourcing and modern
manufacturing technology lines of effort. The Navy estimates additional $17.5 billion in
additional funding will be needed from FY 2024 through FY 2029 to achieve sustained
production levels of 1 Columbia SSBN + 2.0 Virginia SSNs by 2028, with additional
productivity required thereafter to support selling SSNs to Australia. This additional
funding was included in the FY2024 budget request, and FY2024 supplemental and is
included in the PB2025 budget request. This funding is displayed in Table 2.45
At an October 25, 2023, hearing on the submarine industrial base and its ability to support the
AUKUS framework before the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee, the Navy provided testimony on its plan to increase the industrial
base’s capacity to support the production of 2.33 Virginia-class boats per year and thus a
combined Columbia-plus-Virginia procurement rate of 1+2.33. The Navy’s testimony on its plan
is reprinted in Appendix F.
Press Report
A July 16, 2024, press report stated
Deloitte Consulting has won a potential five-year, $2.4 billion contract to work with the
Navy and Defense Department on their efforts to modernize and expand the submarine
industrial base.
Workforce development is one of several aspects Deloitte will seek to help the Navy and
DOD's Innovation Capability and Modernization Office address, as part of their larger
effort to address regional and broader challenges in submarine manufacturing.
Awarded on Monday [July 15], the contract has an initial one-year base period and up to
four option years. The General Services Administration managed the procurement for the
Navy and DOD.
Solicitation documents describe the Navy’s goal as being able to “rapidly reach and sustain
a programmed production rate of 1+2 submarines per year with a predominant emphasis
on closing associated industrial workforce gaps.”
The scope of the challenge to accomplish that is vast. The Navy, submarine makers and
the latter’s suppliers need more than 100,000 workers over the next decade to build more
subs….
Deloitte will act as the enterprise integration partner responsible for providing the needed
labor, equipment, and materials to the Navy and DOD.
A second major goal of the effort is to accelerate the development and adoption of more
modern manufacturing techniques and processes across the U.S.’ maritime supply chain.
45U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2025, March 2024, pp. 5-6.
46Ross Wilkers, “The Pentagon Is Paying a Consultant up to $2.4B to Boost Submarine Production,” Defense One,
July 16, 2024. See also Nick Wilson, “Deloitte Consulting Awarded $2.4 Billion to Orchestrate Submarine Production
Revival,” Inside Defense, July 17, 2024.
making $1.9 billion in capital investments that started in 2016 and will run through 2025,
which include facilities to accelerate submarine production.
The Navy is also pitching in with support for the facilities and equipment needed to keep
up with growing demand.
The third effort, strategic outsourcing, appears to be taking some of this growing work
away from the two shipyards. Jones said the Navy is looking to move at least 5 million
production hours a year in large-scale steel fabrication, outfitting and other heavy
manufacturing work to other locations, allowing the shipyards to focus on outfitting, final
assembly and testing….
The fourth effort is workforce development, as companies in the submarine-industrial base
of all sizes and in all locations struggle to recruit and retain the workers they need.
And the fifth is investing in new manufacturing technologies that can make work processes
more efficient, such as automated welding, robotics and additive manufacturing.
In total, Jones said, the Navy and the submarine-industrial base are executing 79 projects
in the current fiscal year aimed at boosting the capability, capacity and quality of work in
the sub-tier supply chain, in support of the so-called 1+2 production rate of Columbia and
Virginia submarines….
Even as the sector tries to ramp up to the 1+2 delivery schedule by FY26, it is also being
asked to build more spare parts to improve the performance of submarine repair activities.
The Navy proposed spending $2.4 billion from FY24 to FY28 to further infuse cash into
the supply chain and churn out parts to support submarine maintenance….
During an Aug. 3 earnings call, HII President Chris Kastner said the company, through the
second quarter of this year, “hired over 3,200 craftsmen and women on a solid pace to meet
our full year plan of approximately 5,000. Although we’re meeting our hiring targets,
attrition remains high and labor is still the greatest risk to meeting our plan.”
He called labor “the largest obstacle, the largest risk” on the Virginia-class program, and
said the company would have to focus on recruiting, training and retaining skilled workers
for years to come….
Beyond outlining previous and upcoming initiatives, [Jones] highlighted an effort to use
data analytics to identify the best uses for this submarine-industrial base money.
The Navy team “must quantitatively and qualitatively describe challenges, gaps, and the
impact of efforts/investments,” she said.
As part of that effort, her office has mapped out and performed a risk assessment of the
16,000 suppliers in the submarine-industrial base. It identified the more than 200 million
parts the two shipbuilders will need to buy in the next 10 years, and found 15 critical
chokepoints that could threaten these future purchasing plans. 47
Strategic Outsourcing
One option for addressing industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and
Virginia-class SSNs at the same time is to increase the use of shipyards other than GD/EB and
HII/NNS, as well as other manufacturing facilities, in building components of Columbia- and/or
Virginia-class boats—a practice sometimes referred to as strategic outsourcing. An October 21,
2022, press report states
47 Megan Eckstein, “The US Navy Is Spending Billions to Stabilize Vendors. Will It Work?” Defense News, September
8, 2023.
The U.S. Navy is pouring billions of dollars into shoring up the companies that help build
nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers.
But these companies, and especially prime contractors General Dynamics Electric Boat
and HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding, cannot hire enough people to keep up with demand.
So they’re outsourcing work that was previously done in-house, two admirals said.
Rear Adm. Jon Rucker, the program executive officer for attack submarines, said the Navy
spent more than $1 billion between fiscal 2018 and fiscal 2022, and that the service is
committed to $2.4 billion from fiscal 2023 to fiscal 2027.
These funds cover supplier development, workforce development, shipbuilder
infrastructure, the development of technologies such as additive manufacturing and
nondestructive testing, government oversight, and strategic outsourcing.
In terms of tonnage of submarine construction, the Navy will see a 5.5 times increase from
FY11 to FY25. But the number of suppliers has dropped to about 5,000, compared to
17,000 companies during the last submarine construction surge in the 1980s, Rucker said
last month at an American Society of Naval Engineers conference.
Rucker said the Navy is trying to target its investments where it can make the most impact:
350 companies are considered “critical suppliers” in the submarine-industrial base, and
55% of those are located in six states. So workforce development dollars are focused on
those states to do the most good for critical suppliers in need of more workers. This effort
could see the establishment of new training sites in Virginia and Pennsylvania.
Outsourcing is becoming more important as some regions realize they aren’t receiving
enough interest for people to join the manufacturing industry, despite federal and state
government efforts to create manufacturing training opportunities.
“We are saturated in certain areas of the country. The Northeast is one of those. If we
cannot bring the people to the work, we’re going to take the work to the people,” Rucker
said.
Today, he explained, Electric Boat outsources 1.1 million hours’ worth of work a year and
Newport News Shipbuilding outsources 900,000 hours as they build new Virginia- and
Columbia-class submarines.
By 2025, that combined 2 million hours will grow to 5 million, he said—which equates to
half the work to build a Virginia submarine.
Rucker said companies across the U.S. are building structural pieces of submarines,
including some large modules, that were previously built at Electric Boat and Newport
News facilities. Now they’re constructed by companies with available workers and space,
and then shipped to the shipyard for assembly.48
A December 6, 2022, news release from Austal USA of Mobile, AL—a shipyard that builds
conventionally powered surface ships for the Navy—states
Production has commenced at Austal USA’s shipyard in Mobile, Ala., in support of their
strategic partnership with General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB) to support the U.S.
Navy’s recapitalization of the nation’s nuclear submarine fleet. Leveraging Austal USA’s
lean manufacturing techniques and modern steel production line facilities, a focus factory
approach is being used to expand production capacity of the submarine industrial base.
As part of the partnership, Austal USA is constructing and outfitting Command and Control
Systems Modules (CCSM) and Electronic Deck Modules (EDM) for the Virginia- and
48Megan Eckstein, “Defense Firms Outsource Sub, Carrier Construction amid Labor Woes,” Defense News, October
21, 2022.
Overview
Another oversight issue for Congress is the risk of cost growth in the program. As detailed by
CBO50 and GAO,51 lead ships in Navy shipbuilding programs in many cases have turned out to be
more expensive to build than the Navy had estimated. In addition, Navy shipbuilding has
experienced significant inflation during the last few years—the Navy’s FY2025 budget highlights
book states: “Due to the residual effects of inflationary pressures of the past few years, workforce
challenges, plus increased labor and supply costs across the defense enterprise, all drove costs
associated with our shipbuilding account up roughly 20% over the last couple of years.”52 As
mentioned earlier, the Navy’s estimated combined procurement cost for the 12 Columbia-class
boats increased 12.1% between the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission and its FY2025 budget
submission. As discussed in further detail below, CBO in October 2023 concluded that there is a
significant risk of cost growth in the Columbia-class program.
As mentioned earlier, Navy officials have stated consistently since 2013 that the Columbia-class
program is the Navy’s top priority program, and that this means, among other things, that from
the Navy’s perspective, the Columbia-class program will be funded, even if that comes at the
expense of funding for other Navy programs. Given this, the impact of cost growth in the
Columbia-class program in a situation of finite DOD funding might be not so much on the
execution of the Columbia-class program itself as on the consequent affordability of other DOD
49 Austal USA, “Austal USA Commences Submarine Work,” December 6, 2022. See also Justin Katz, “Known for
LCS, Alabama-Based Austal USA Starts Submarine Work,” Breaking Defense, January 19, 2023; Rojoef Manuel,
“Austal, General Dynamics Team Up for US Navy Nuclear Submarine Production,” Defense Post, December 8, 2022;
Rich Abott, “Austal Starts Submarine Construction Support Work,” Defense Daily, December 12, 2022.
50 See CBO, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2024 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2023, p. 34 (Figure 10).
51 See Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding[:] Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for
programs, perhaps particularly other Navy shipbuilding programs. The issue of the potential
impact of the Columbia-class program on the affordability of other DOD programs is discussed in
the next section of this report.
Source: Navy information paper, “Update on Confidence Levels for COLUMBIA Lead Ship and Follow Ship,”
June 24, 2021, received by CRS and CBO from Navy Legislative Affairs Office, July 29, 2021.
Note: End cost of lead ship includes cost for the ship’s missile tube module, which was funded through the
Navy’s research and development account.
53Navy information paper, “Update on Confidence Levels for COLUMBIA Lead Ship and Follow Ship,” July 31,
2023, received by CRS and CBO from Navy Legislative Affairs Office, August 2, 2023.
would be $100.2 billion [in constant FY2023 dollars] (which includes appropriations of
$21.4 billion from 2017 to 2023), or $8.4 billion per ship, on average.
According to the Navy’s estimate, the cost per thousand tons of displacement for the first
Columbia class ship would be 13 percent less than that of the first Virginia class attack
submarine. But the costs of lead ships of new classes of submarines built in the 1970s and
1980s provide little evidence that ballistic missile submarines are cheaper to build, per ton,
than attack submarines. On the basis of a calculation of cost risk completed in October
2022, the Navy has stated that there is a 54 percent chance that the cost of the first Columbia
class submarine will exceed its estimates and a 46 percent chance that it will cost less than
estimated. The likelihood that subsequent ships in the class would cost more or less than
estimated was nearly even—49 percent and 51 percent, respectively.
Moreover, the Navy’s estimates for Columbia class ships have not yet been updated to
reflect existing conditions in the submarine industrial base. As previously mentioned, the
Navy estimates that the Virginia class submarines it will buy in 2025 and 2026 will cost
about 15 percent more than the ones purchased in 2022 and 2023, after adjusting for
inflation. The Navy has attributed a large portion of that increase in the cost of future
Virginia class submarines to poor performance in the building shipyards, a fragile industrial
base for suppliers of many components, and other challenges. Columbia class ships are
being built in those same shipyards and will probably be affected by the same conditions.
Nevertheless, the Navy continues to rely on its 2021 cost estimate for the Columbia class,
which it plans to update later this year.
CBO’s estimate for the Columbia class program reflects current industry conditions and is
therefore 19 percent greater than the Navy’s. CBO estimates that purchasing the first
Columbia class submarine would cost $17.5 billion—$1.7 billion more than the Navy
estimates. Including appropriations from 2017 to 2023, CBO estimates that, all told, 12
Columbia class submarines would cost $119 billion (of which $100 billion would be
appropriated between 2024 and 2036). The 11 submarines set to follow the lead ship would
cost $9.2 billion each, on average—$1.5 billion more per submarine than the Navy
estimates.
Costs for the Columbia class submarines could, however, exceed both the Navy’s and
CBO’s estimates. The new SSBN will be the largest, most technologically complex
submarine the United States has ever built. It is expected to reuse some technology and
components from the Virginia class submarine, but it would also include many new
elements, such as an all-electric drive system, an X-stern ship control system (in which the
rear rudders and dive planes are shaped like an “X” rather than a “+”, as they are on the
Ohio class submarines), a new missile compartment, and a nuclear reactor designed to last
the entire 42-year service life of the submarine. Furthermore, the Navy has repeatedly
stated that the Columbia is its first acquisition priority and that the program must stay on
schedule to meet its strategic deterrence mission. Thus, if the program encounters problems
in construction, the Navy and the shipbuilders are likely to invest more resources and assign
more people to the program to meet the schedule, all of which would increase costs.
Conversely, costs for the Columbia class ships could be less than CBO estimates if the
Navy and the shipbuilders are successful in their ongoing efforts to increase the speed and
efficiency of construction and to improve the performance of the supplier base.54
54 CBO, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2024 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2023, pp. 25-27.
of cost growth on the first two ships because it will insulate the builders from much of the
financial risk of cost growth, providing them with a reduced incentive to control costs. They
could argue that while the Navy has used cost-plus type contracts for lead ships in other
shipbuilding programs, the Navy in this case is proposing to use one for a two-ship contract,
extending the risk of cost growth to the second ship in the program. They could argue that while
insulating builders from the risks and uncertainties of building lead ships has been a traditional
shipbuilding consideration, the risks in this case are to be reduced by the Navy’s strategy of
bringing the Columbia-class design to a high state of completion prior to starting construction on
the lead ship.
Supporters of using a cost-plus type contract could argue that doing so is a traditional approach
for procuring a lead ship in a Navy shipbuilding program that recognizes that the lead ship in
effect serves as the program’s prototype and thus presents the builders with substantial risks and
uncertainties regarding construction costs, even with a design that has been brought to a high state
of completion prior to starting construction. They could argue that this is particularly true in this
case, given that this is the first lead ship in a Navy SSBN program to start construction in about
47 years.55 They could argue that builders will still have an incentive to control costs because of
the incentive fee in the contract, and because they understand that cost growth in the Columbia-
class program could reduce funding available for other Navy priorities, including procurement of
Virginia-class attack submarines that these firms also build.
55The lead ship in the Ohio-class SSBN program was procured in FY1974—47 years before the scheduled FY2021
procurement date for the lead ship in the Columbia-class program.
As can be seen in the table, the estimated cost of the first Columbia-class boat increased by
$637.1 million, or 4.4%, from the FY2021 budget submission to the FY2022 budget submission.
Of the $637.1 million increase, $549.8 million (more than 86% of the increase) was in the
estimated cost of the boat’s plans. As discussed earlier, the cost of plans for the first Columbia-
class boat means (essentially) the detail design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the
Columbia class. (As also noted earlier, it is a long-standing Navy budgetary practice to
incorporate the DD/NRE costs for a new class of ship into the total procurement cost of the first
ship in the class.) Because the cost for plans for the first boat in a class is largely a nonrecurring
expense, the increase in the estimated cost of the first boat’s plans might not imply a similar
increase in the (much smaller) plans costs for the second and subsequent boats in the class.
Excluding the change in the estimated cost for plans, the estimated cost of the first Columbia-
class boat increased in the Navy’s FY2022 budget submission by $87.3 million, or about 0.6%,
from the FY2021 submission to the FY2022 submission. As can also be seen in the table, the
estimated cost of the second boat in the class has decreased 0.5% from the FY2021 budget
submission to the FY2025 budget submission.
56See U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal
Year 2023, April 2022, p. 17.
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report ([Link]. 118-529 of May 31, 2024) on H.R.
8070, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 4.
[Link]. 118-529 states
Report on Strategic Missile Tube Reactivation for Ohio-class Submarines
The committee understands the Navy is considering extending the lives of up to five Ohio-
class submarines through Pre-Inactivation Restricted Availabilities (PIRA) to ensure
strategic deterrence requirements continue to be met while transitioning to the Columbia-
class submarine, beginning in fiscal year 2029. To assess a potential future outside New
START Treaty limitations or to address balancing across current Commander, Strategic
Command strategic deterrence requirements, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Space Policy, to submit a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later
than December 31, 2024, on the feasibility and advisability of re-activating disabled
strategic missile launch tubes on submarines selected for PIRA, as part of the PIRA
maintenance period. If determined to be feasible, the report shall also include a description
of associated costs, including associated components and weapons systems, necessary to
operationalize the launch tubes. (Pages 325-326)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report ([Link]. 118-188 of July 8, 2024) on S.
4638, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 4. [Link]. 118-188
states:
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report ([Link]. 118-557 of June 17, 2024) on H.R.
8774, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 4.
The recommended increase of $5.0 million in procurement funding is for “Program increase—
explosion welding industrial base.” (Page 129)
The paragraph in H.R. 8774 that makes appropriations for the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy (SCN) account includes this provision, which is a recurring provision relating to the special
acquisition authorities in the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF):
… Provided further, That funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act for
Columbia Class Submarine (AP) may be available for the purposes authorized by
subsections (f), (g), (h) or (i) of section 2218a of title 10, 18 United States Code, only in
accordance with the provisions 19 of the applicable subsection.
[Link]. 118-557 states
SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION
The Committee is dismayed by delays in construction of the lead Columbia-class
submarine. The program is the Navy’s top priority and fundamental to the nuclear triad.
The Committee recognizes the strategic importance of the Columbia-class program and
has fully funded every shipbuilding construction request to ensure on time delivery of the
lead boat and overall success of the program. The Committee is troubled that the Navy
lacked the appropriate oversight of a program of such significance that it only learned of
the year delay to the program in recent months.
Further, the Committee notes the delays in the Columbia-class program will undoubtably
impact Virginia-class submarine construction. Virginia-class construction remains
challenged with production hovering at a 1.2 submarine per year cadence versus the
necessary cadence of two per year. The Committee believes that given the findings of the
45-day Shipbuilding Review showing a delay of upwards of 3 years in Virginia-class
submarine construction, that the Committee recommendation of one Virginia-class
submarine, coupled with robust investment in the submarine industrial base, appropriately
reflects the current capacity for submarine construction and deliberately targets funding to
the industrial base to achieve long-term sustainable production.
The Committee believes that providing significant and strategic investment in the
Submarine Industrial Base (SIB) is necessary to achieving the ‘‘1+2’’ production rate for
the Columbia and Virginia-class programs. Therefore, the Committee recommendation
includes $4,004,400,000 for the SIB, including $2,134,000,000 in the Shipbuilding and
Conversion account. This funding is in addition to the $3,013,400,000 included in the Indo-
Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024 and the $1,188,000,000 provided
in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2024. The Committee believes
investment in supplier capacity and capability, strategic domestic outsourcing, workforce
development, and technology and infrastructure is key to achieving and sustaining the
required submarine production cadence in the long-term and maintaining international
commitments under the trilateral Australia, United Kingdom, United States (AUKUS)
security partnership. (Pages 131-132)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report ([Link]. 118-204 of August 1, 2024) on S.
4921, recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 4. The recommended
increase of $20.6 million in procurement funding is for “Program increase: Explosion welding
facilities industrial base” ($2.0 million) and “Program increase: Tube/propulsor facilitization”
($18.6 million). (Page 132)
The paragraph in S. 4921 that makes appropriations for the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
(SCN) account includes this provision, which is a recurring provision relating to the special
acquisition authorities in the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF):
… Provided further, That funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act for
Columbia Class Submarine (AP) may be available for the purposes authorized by
subsections (f), (g), (h) or (i) of section 2218a of title 10, United States Code, only in
accordance with the provisions of the applicable subsection.
[Link]. 118-204 states:
Submarine Industrial Base.—The Committee recognizes that strengthening the submarine
industrial base [SIB] is essential to ensuring that new submarines can be constructed at the
pace outlined in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan to meet national security needs. Therefore,
the Committee strongly supports the Navy’s efforts to invest in the infrastructure and
workforce of shipbuilders and suppliers. The fiscal year 2025 President’s budget requests
funding for one new construction VIRGINIA Class Submarine [VCS] and increased
investment in the SIB in order to more fully mature SIB capacity and workforce before
returning to a two VCS construction cadence. The Committee understands that an
additional $1,000,000,000 of supplier workload could further stabilize and improve
performance of the industrial base. Based on extensive dialogue with the Navy, the
Committee understands that the Navy can resource $643,000,000 for this opportunity from
VCS Block IV economic order quantity funding appropriated in the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2024 (Public Law 118–47), VCS SIB construction spares funding
appropriated in the National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024 (Public Law
118–50), and funding the Committee recommends in this act that was requested in the
fiscal year 2025 President’s budget request. The Committee recommends an additional
$357,000,000 in the VCS program line to further solidify this key supplier capacity in
support of a second VCS shipset of materials, and to stabilize the SIB.
In addition, the Committee recognizes that the opportunity presented by historic levels of
appropriated SIB support can only achieve this capacity through carefully-targeted
investments and proper stewardship of funds. Therefore, the Committee directs the
Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later
than 90 days after the enactment of this act, and semi-annually thereafter, on the Navy’s
planned oversight approach for overseeing all phases of the SIB funding cycle, including
the identification of gaps, selection of projects, oversight of funding execution, and
determining return on investment.
The Committee also directs the Comptroller General of the United States to submit a report
to the congressional defense committees not later than 1 year after the enactment of this
act that assesses the extent to which the Department of Defense’s SIB investment strategy
and associated funding will result in a shipbuilding industrial base capable of achieving the
“2 + 1” annual submarine construction rate called for in the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding
plan. This report shall include an assessment of: (1) how the Departments of Defense and
Navy are assessing the return on investment of SIB funding to improve submarine
construction performance, (2) the extent to which the Navy intends to utilize such
assessments to inform the selection of future SIB projects, and (3) the extent to which
previously appropriated SIB funding and programmed funding in future years, in
combination with other key factors, are likely to achieve the SIB capacity and throughput
to meet the Navy’s submarine requirements.
Finally, the Committee has received spend plans from the Navy for SIB funding contained
in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2024 (Public Law 118–47) and prior
acts, as well as the National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024 (Public Law
118–50). The Committee notes that such plans do not involve the purchase of land or
property. The Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to brief the congressional
defense committees not less than 45 days prior to obligating funds that would deviate from
those spend plans. (Pages 133-134)
Sources: Prepared by CRS based on data in Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, Annapolis,
Naval Institute Press, various editions, and (for SSBN decommissioning dates) U.S. Naval Vessel Register.
Notes: Beam is the maximum width of a ship. For the submarines here, which have cylindrical hulls, beam is the
diameter of the hull.
The range of an SLBM can vary, depending on the number and weight of nuclear warheads it carries; actual
ranges can be lesser or greater than those shown.
The George Washington-class boats were procured as modifications of SSNs that were already under
construction. Three of the boats were converted into SSNs toward the ends of their lives and were
57The larger size of the Ohio-class design also reflects a growth in size over time in U.S. submarine designs due to
other reasons, such as providing increased interior volume for measures to quiet the submarine acoustically, so as to
make it harder to detect.
decommissioned in 1983-1985. The two boats that remained SSBNs throughout their lives were
decommissioned in 1981.
All five Ethan Allen-class boats were converted into SSNs toward the ends of their lives. The boats were
decommissioned in 1983 (two boats), 1985, 1991, and 1992.
Two of the Lafayette/Benjamin Franklin-class boats were converted into SSNs toward the ends of their lives and
were decommissioned in 1999 and 2002. The 29 that remained SSBNs throughout their lives were
decommissioned in 1986-1995. For 19 of the boats, the Poseidon C-3 was the final type of SLBM carried; for the
other 12, the Trident I C-4 SLBM was the final type of SLBM carried.
A total of 18 Ohio-class SSBNs were built. The first four, which entered service in 1981-1984, were converted
into SSGNs in 2002-2008. The remaining 14 boats entered service in 1984-1997. Although Ohio-class SSBNs are
designed to each carry 24 SLBMs, by 2018, four SLBM launch tubes on each boat are to be deactivated, and the
number of SLBMs that can be carried by each boat consequently is to be reduced to 20, so that the number of
operational launchers and warheads in the U.S. force will comply with strategic nuclear arms control limits.
58 Although the SLBMs on UK SSBNs are U.S.-made, the nuclear warheads on the missiles are of UK design and
manufacture.
59 A March 18, 2010, report by the UK Parliament’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee stated the
following:
During the Cold War, the UK’s nuclear co-operation with the United States was considered to be at
the heart of the [UK-U.S.] ‘special relationship’. This included the 1958 Mutual Defence
Agreement, the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) (subsequently amended for Trident), and the
UK’s use of the US nuclear test site in Nevada from 1962 to 1992. The co-operation also
encompassed agreements for the United States to use bases in Britain, with the right to store
nuclear weapons, and agreements for two bases in Yorkshire (Fylingdales and Menwith Hill) to be
upgraded to support US missile defence plans.
In 1958, the UK and US signed the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA). Although some of the
appendices, amendments and Memoranda of Understanding remain classified, it is known that the
agreement provides for extensive co-operation on nuclear warhead and reactor technologies, in
particular the exchange of classified information concerning nuclear weapons to improve design,
development and fabrication capability. The agreement also provides for the transfer of nuclear
warhead-related materials. The agreement was renewed in 2004 for another ten years.
The other major UK-US agreement in this field is the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) which
allows the UK to acquire, support and operate the US Trident missile system. Originally signed to
allow the UK to acquire the Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system in the
1960s, it was amended in 1980 to facilitate purchase of the Trident I (C4) missile and again in 1982
to authorise purchase of the more advanced Trident II (D5) in place of the C4. In return, the UK
agreed to formally assign its nuclear forces to the defence of NATO, except in an extreme national
emergency, under the terms of the 1962 Nassau Agreement reached between President John F.
Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to facilitate negotiation of the PSA.
Current nuclear co-operation takes the form of leasing arrangements of around 60 Trident II D5
missiles from the US for the UK’s independent deterrent, and long-standing collaboration on the
design of the W76 nuclear warhead carried on UK missiles. In 2006 it was revealed that the US and
the UK had been working jointly on a new ‘Reliable Replacement Warhead’ (RRW) that would
modernise existing W76-style designs. In 2009 it emerged that simulation testing at Aldermaston
on dual axis hydrodynamics experiments had provided the US with scientific data it did not
otherwise possess on this RRW programme.
The level of co-operation between the two countries on highly sensitive military technology is,
according to the written submission from Ian Kearns, “well above the norm, even for a close
alliance relationship”. He quoted Admiral William Crowe, the former US Ambassador to London,
who likened the UK-US nuclear relationship to that of an iceberg, “with a small tip of it sticking
out, but beneath the water there is quite a bit of everyday business that goes on between our two
governments in a fashion that’s unprecedented in the world.” Dr Kearns also commented that the
(continued...)
March 2010 that “the United States and the United Kingdom have maintained a shared
commitment to nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales Agreement since April 1963. The
U.S. will continue to maintain its strong strategic relationship with the UK for our respective
follow-on platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales Agreement.”60
The first Vanguard-class SSBN was originally projected to reach the end of its service life in
2024, but an October 2010 UK defense and security review report states that the lives of the
Vanguard class ships will now be extended by a few years, so that the four boats will remain in
service into the late 2020s and early 2030s.61
The UK plans to replace the four Vanguard-class boats with three or four next-generation
Dreadnought-class boats are to be equipped with 12 missile launch tubes, but current UK plans
call for each boat to carry eight D-5 SLBMs, with the other four tubes not being used for SLBMs.
The report states that “‘Main Gate’—the decision to start building the submarines—is required
around 2016.”62 The first new boat is to be delivered by 2028, or about four years later than
previously planned.63
The United States is assisting the UK with certain aspects of the Dreadnought SSBN program. In
addition to the modular Common Missile Compartment (CMC), the United States is assisting the
UK with the new PWR-3 reactor plant64 to be used by the Dreadnought SSBN. A December 2011
press report states that “there has been strong [UK] collaboration with the US [on the
Dreadnought program], particularly with regard to the CMC, the PWR, and other propulsion
technology,” and that the design concept selected for the Dreadnought class employs “a new
propulsion plant based on a US design, but using next-generation UK reactor technology
(PWR-3) and modern secondary propulsion systems.”65 The U.S. Navy states that
Naval Reactors, a joint Department of Energy/Department of Navy organization
responsible for all aspects of naval nuclear propulsion, has an ongoing technical exchange
with the UK Ministry of Defence under the US/UK 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. The
US/UK 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement is a Government to Government Atomic Energy
personal bonds between the US/UK scientific and technical establishments were deeply rooted.
(House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report Global Security: UK-US Relations,
March 18, 2010, paragraphs 131-135; [Link]
cmselect/cmfaff/114/[Link]; paragraphs 131-135 are included in the section of the report
available at [Link]
See also “U.K. Stays Silent on Nuclear-Arms Pact Extension with United States,” Global Security Newswire, July 30,
2014.
60 Statement of Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, Before the Subcommittee
on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee [on] FY2011 Strategic Systems, March 17, 2010, p. 6.
61 Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Presented to Parliament by
the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, October 2010, pp. 5, 38-39. For more on the UK’s Dreadnought
SSBN program as it existed prior to the October 2010 UK defense and security review report, see Richard Scott,
“Deterrence At A Discount?” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 23, 2009: 26-31.
63 Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Presented to Parliament by
pressurized water reactors. Earlier UK nuclear-powered submarines are powered by reactor designs that the UK
designated PWR-2 and PWR-1. For an article discussing the PWR3 plant, see Richard Scott, “Critical Mass: Re-
Energising the UK’s Naval Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s International Defence Review, July 2014: 42-45, 47.
65 Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Strategic Assets: Deterrent Plans Confront Cost Challenges,” Jane’s Navy
Act agreement that allows the exchange of naval nuclear propulsion technology between
the US and UK.
Under this agreement, Naval Reactors is providing the UK Ministry of Defence with US
naval nuclear propulsion technology to facilitate development of the naval nuclear
propulsion plant for the UK’s next generation SUCCESSOR ballistic missile submarine.
The technology exchange is managed and led by the US and UK Governments, with
participation from Naval Reactors prime contractors, private nuclear capable shipbuilders,
and several suppliers. A UK based office comprised of about 40 US personnel provide full-
time engineering support for the exchange, with additional support from key US suppliers
and other US based program personnel as needed.
The relationship between the US and UK under the 1958 mutual defence agreement is an
ongoing relationship and the level of support varies depending on the nature of the support
being provided. Naval Reactors work supporting the SUCCESSOR submarine is
reimbursed by the UK Ministry of Defence.66
U.S. assistance to the UK on naval nuclear propulsion technology first occurred many years ago:
To help jumpstart the UK’s nuclear-powered submarine program, the United States transferred to
the UK a complete nuclear propulsion plant (plus technical data, spares, and training) of the kind
installed on the U.S. Navy’s six Skipjack (SSN-585) class nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs), which entered service between 1959 and 1961. The plant was installed on the UK Navy’s
first nuclear-powered ship, the attack submarine Dreadnought, which entered service in 1963.
The December 2011 press report states that “the UK is also looking at other areas of cooperation
between Dreadnought and the Ohio Replacement Programme. For example, a collaboration
agreement has been signed off regarding the platform integration of sonar arrays with the
respective combat systems.”67
A June 24, 2016, press report states the following:
The [U.S. Navy] admiral responsible for the nuclear weapons component of ballistic
missile submarines today praised the “truly unique” relationship with the British naval
officers who have similar responsibilities, and said that historic cooperation would not be
affected by Thursday’s vote to have the United Kingdom leave the European Union.
Vice Adm. Terry Benedict, director of the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs, said that
based on a telephone exchange Thursday morning with his Royal Navy counterpart, “I
have no concern.” The so-called Brexit vote—for British exit—“was a decision based on
its relationship with Europe, not with us. I see yesterday’s vote having no effect.” 68
66 Source: Email to CRS from Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, June 25, 2012. See also Jon Rosamond, “Next
Generation U.K. Boomers Benefit from U.S. Relationship,” USNI News ([Link] December 17, 2014.
67 Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Strategic Assets: Deterrent Plans Confront Cost Challenges,” Jane’s Navy
International, December 2011: 19. See also Jake Wallis Simons, “Brits Keep Mum on US Involvement in Trident
Nuclear Program,” Politico, April 30, 2015.
68 Otto Kreisher, “Benedict: UK Exit From European Union Won’t Hinder Nuclear Sub Collaboration,” USNI News,
69 In February 2007, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commissioned a task force to support
an anticipated Underwater Launched Missile Study (ULMS). On June 8, 2007, the Secretary of the Navy initiated the
ULMS. Six days later, the commander of STRATCOM directed that a Sea Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD)
capability-based assessment (CBA) be performed. In July 2007, the task force established by the commander of
STRATCOM provided its recommendations regarding capabilities and characteristics for a new SBSD. (Source: Navy
list of key events relating to the ULMS and SBSD provided to CRS and the CBO on July 7, 2008.)
70 On February 14, 2008, the SBSD ICD was approved for joint staffing by the Navy’s Resources and Requirements
Review Board (R3B). On April 29, 2008, the SBSD was approved by DOD’s Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) to
proceed to DOD’s Joint Capabilities Board (JCB). (Source: Navy list of key events relating to the ULMS and SBSD
provided to CRS and CBO on July 7, 2008.)
71 Navy briefing to CRS and CBO on the SBSD program, July 6, 2009.
72 Navy briefing to CRS and CBO on the SBSD program, July 6, 2009.
73 An August 2008 press report states that the program office, called PMS-397, “was established within the last two
months.” (Dan Taylor, “Navy Stands Up Program Office To Manage Next-Generation SSBN,” Inside the Navy, August
17, 2008.
74 “Going Ballistic,” Defense Daily, September 22, 2008, p. 1.
75 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2, Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy Budget Activity 4, entry for PE0603561N, Project 3220 (PDF page 345 of 888).
a June 26, 2013, Navy blog post discussing options that were examined for replacing the Ohio-
class SSBNs, see Appendix D.)
The program’s Milestone A review meeting was held on December 9, 2010. On February 3, 2011,
the Navy provided the following statement to CRS concerning the outcome of the December 9
meeting:
The OHIO Replacement Program achieved Milestone A and has been approved to enter
the Technology Development Phase of the Dept. of Defense Life Cycle Management
System as of Jan. 10, 2011.
This milestone comes following the endorsement of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB),
chaired by Dr. Carter (USD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) who has signed
the program’s Milestone A Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).
The DAB endorsed replacing the current 14 Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Submarines
(SSBNs) as they reach the end of their service life with 12 Ohio Replacement Submarines,
each comprising 16, 87-inch diameter missile tubes utilizing TRIDENT II D5 Life
Extended missiles (initial loadout). The decision came after the program was presented to
the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) on Dec. 9, 2010.
The ADM validates the program’s Technology Development Strategy and allows entry into the
Technology Development Phase during which warfighting requirements will be refined to meet
operational and affordability goals. Design, prototyping, and technology development efforts will
continue to ensure sufficient technological maturity for lead ship procurement in 2019.76
76 Source: Email from Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS, February 3, 2011.
• Detailed plans to ensure manufacturing readiness including robust prototyping efforts and
synergies with other nuclear shipbuilding programs
• Aggressive cost reduction actions
Affordability caps have been assigned that are consistent with current cost estimates and
reasonable margins for cost growth. Relative to Milestone A, these estimates have been
updated to adjust Base Year from 2010 to 2017, a standard practice to match Base Year
with the year of Milestone B approval. The MS A unit cost affordability target ($4.9 billion
in CY2010$ using Navy indices) used a unique metric, “Average Follow-on Ship End
Cost,” which accounted for hulls 2-12. From Milestone B forward, the affordability cap for
the unit cost will be measured by using the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC), which
includes all 12 hulls. The Affordability Cap of $8.0 billion in CY2017$ is based upon the
approved APUC estimate of $7.3 billion plus 10%....
The Navy and industry are currently negotiating the detail design and construction
(DD&C) contract, which is expected to award in early 2017. With negotiations continuing
on the DD&C contract, the Navy has ensured the COLUMBIA Program design effort will
continue without interruption. The Navy issued a contract modification to allow execution
of SCN for detail design on the existing R&D contract. With this modification in place,
detail design efforts that had initially planned to transition to the DD&C contract, will
continue on the current R&D contract to ensure continued design progress. With the
Milestone B approval and the appropriation of $773M in FY17 SCN under the second
Continuing Resolution, funding is now available to execute detail design. In accordance
with 10 U.S.C. §2218a and the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act, the Navy
deposited the FY17 SCN into the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF). The first
installment of funding will be executed on the existing R&D contract, which allows
transition into detail design and continued design progress until the award of the DD&C
contract.77
77Columbia Class MS [Milestone] B, Congressional Notification, January 6, 2017, pp. 1-2. See also Megan Eckstein,
“Columbia-class Submarine Program Passess Milestone B Decision, Can Begin Detail Design,” USNI News, January 4,
2017.
78 Rear Admiral David Johnson, briefing to Naval Submarine League Annual Symposium [on] Expanding Undersea
Dominance, October 23, 2014, briefing slide 19. See also William Baker et al., “Design for Sustainment: The Ohio
Replacement Submarine,” Naval Engineers Journal, September 2015: 89-96.
79 As mentioned earlier (see “Current Ohio-Class SSBNs”), the Ohio-class boats receive a midlife nuclear refueling
overhaul, called an Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO), which includes both a nuclear refueling and overhaul work
on the ship that is not related to the nuclear refueling.
80 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011,
February 2010, p. 5.
81 Source: Rear Admiral David Johnson, briefing to Naval Submarine League Annual Symposium [on] Expanding
Undersea Dominance, October 23, 2014, briefing slide 19. See also the spoken testimony of Admiral Kirkland Donald,
Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors, and Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, National Nuclear Security
Administration, at a March 30, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, as shown in the transcript of the hearing, and Dave Bishop, “What Will Follow the Ohio Class?” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2012: 31; and Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Strategic Assets: Deterrent Plans
Confront Cost Challenges,” Jane’s Navy International, December 2011: 16. For more on electric drive propulsion, see
CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
82 Beam is the maximum width of a ship. For Navy submarines, which have cylindrical hulls, beam is the diameter of
the hull.
83 Dave Bishop, “What Will Follow the Ohio Class?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2012: 31. (Bishop was
program manager for the Columbia-class program.) See also Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Strategic Assets:
Deterrent Plans Confront Cost Challenges,” Jane’s Navy International, December 2011: 15 and 16.
84 Sydney J. Freedberg, “Navy Seeks Sub Replacement Savings: From NASA Rocket Boosters To Reused Access
85 Navy information paper on Columbia-class program dated August 11, 2014, provided to CBO and CRS on August
11, 2014.
86 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011,
February 2010, p. 24. See also Mike McCarthy, “Navy Striving To Reduce Detectability Of Next Boomers,” Defense
Daily, February 6, 2015: 1. In an article published in June 2012, the program manager for the Columbia-class program
stated that “the current configuration of the Ohio replacement is an SSBN with 16 87-inch-diameter missile tubes, a 43-
foot-diamater hull, electric-drive propulsion, [an] X-stern, accommodations for 155 personnel, and a common
submarine radio room tailored to the SSBN mission.” (Dave Bishop, “What Will Follow the Ohio Class?” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, June 2012: 31. See also Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Strategic Assets: Deterrent Plans
Confront Cost Challenges,” Jane’s Navy International, December 2011: 15 and 16. The X-stern is also shown in Rear
Admiral David Johnson, briefing to Naval Submarine League Annual Symposium [on] Expanding Undersea
Dominance, October 23, 2014, briefing slide 19.) The term X-stern means that the steering and diving fins at the stern
of the ship are, when viewed from the rear, in the diagonal pattern of the letter X, rather than the vertical-and horizontal
pattern of a plus sign (which is referred to as a cruciform stern). The common submarine radio room is a standardized
(i.e., common) suite of submarine radio room equipment that is being installed on other U.S. Navy submarines.
• Not meet survivability (stealth) requirements due to poor hull streamlining and lack of a
drive train able to quietly propel a much larger ship
• Not meet at-sea availability requirements due to longer refit times (since equipment is
packed more tightly within the hull, it requires more time to replace, repair and retest)
• Not meet availability requirements due to a longer mid-life overhaul (refueling needed)
• Require a larger number of submarines to meet the same operational requirement
• Reduce the deterrent value needed to protect the country (fewer missiles, warheads at-
sea)
• Be more expensive than other alternatives due to extensive redesign of Virginia systems
to work with the large missile compartment (for example, a taller sail, larger control
surfaces and more robust support systems)
We would be spending more money (on more ships) to deliver less deterrence (reduced at-
sea warhead presence) with less survivability (platforms that are less stealthy).
Virginia-based SSBN design with a smaller missile. Some have encouraged the
development of a new, smaller missile to go with a Virginia-based SSBN. This would carry
forward many of the shortfalls of a Virginia-based SSBN we just discussed, and add to it
a long list of new issues. Developing a new nuclear missile from scratch with an industrial
base that last produced a new design more than 20 years ago would be challenging, costly
and require extensive testing. We deliberately decided to extend the life of the current
missile to decouple and de-risk the complex (and costly) missile development program
from the new replacement submarine program. Additionally, a smaller missile means a
shorter employment range requiring longer SSBN patrol transits. This would compromise
survivability, require more submarines at sea and ultimately weaken our deterrence
effectiveness. With significant cost, technical and schedule risks, there is little about this
option that is attractive.
Ohio-based SSBN design. Some have argued that we should re-open the Ohio production
line and resume building the Ohio design SSBNs. This simply cannot be done because
there is no Ohio production line. It has long since been re-tooled and modernized to build
state-of-the-art Virginia-class SSNs using computerized designs and modular, automated
construction techniques. Is it desirable to redesign the Ohio so that a ship with its legacy
performance could be built using the new production facilities? No, since an Ohio-based
SSBN would
• Not provide the required quieting due to Ohio design constraints and use of a propeller
instead of a propulsor (which is the standard for virtually all new submarines)
• Require 14 instead of 12 SSBNs by reverting to Ohio class operational availability
standards (incidentally creating other issues with the New START treaty limits)
• Suffer from reduced reliability and costs associated with the obsolescence of legacy Ohio
system components
Once again, the end result would necessitate procuring more submarines (14) to provide
the required at-sea presence and each of them would be less stealthy and less survivable
against foreseeable 21st century threats.
The Right Answer: A new design SSBN that improves on Ohio: What has emerged
from the Navy’s exhaustive analysis is an Ohio replacement submarine that starts with the
foundation of the proven performance of the Ohio SSBN, its Trident II D5 strategic
weapons system and its operating cycle. To this it adds:
• Enhanced stealth as necessary to pace emerging threats expected over its service life
• Systems commonality with Virginia (pumps, valves, sonars, etc.) wherever possible,
enabling cost savings in design, procurement, maintenance and logistics
• Modular construction and use of COTS equipment consistent with those used in today’s
submarines to reduce the cost of fabrication, maintenance and modernization. Total
ownership cost reduction (for example, investing in a life-of-the-ship reactor core enables
providing the same at-sea presence with fewer platforms).
Although the Ohio replacement is a “new design,” it is in effect an SSBN that takes the
best lessons from 50 years of undersea deterrence, from the Ohio, from the Virginia, from
advances in shipbuilding efficiency and maintenance, and from the stern realities of
needing to provide survivable nuclear deterrence. The result is a low-risk, cost-effective
platform capable of smoothly transitioning from the Ohio and delivering effective 21 st
century undersea strategic deterrence.87
Overview
The Navy’s decision to design Columbia-class boats with 16 SLBM tubes rather than 20 was one
of several decisions the Navy made to reduce the estimated average procurement cost of boats 2
through 12 in the program toward a Navy target cost of $4.9 billion in FY2010 dollars.88 Some
observers were concerned that designing the Columbia class with 16 tubes rather than 20 would
create a risk that U.S. strategic nuclear forces might not have enough capability in the 2030s and
beyond to fully perform their deterrent role. These observers noted that to comply with the New
Start Treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons, DOD plans to operate in coming years a force of
14 Trident SSBNs, each with 20 operable SLBM tubes (4 of the 24 tubes on each boat are to be
rendered inoperable), for a total of 280 tubes, whereas the Navy in the Columbia-class program is
planning a force of 12 SSBNs each with 16 tubes, for a total of 192 tubes, or about 31% less than
87 “Facts We Can Agree Upon About Design of Ohio Replacement SSBN,” Navy Live, accessed July 3, 2013, at
[Link]
88 At a March 30, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Admiral Kirkland Donald, Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors and Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, National
Nuclear Security Administration, when asked for examples cost efficiencies that are being pursued in his programs,
stated the following:
The—the Ohio replacement [program] has been one that we’ve obviously been focused on here
for—for several years now. But in the name of the efficiencies, and one of the issues as we work
through the Defense Department’s acquisition process, we were the first program through that new
process that Dr. [Aston] Carter [the DOD acquisition executive] headed up.
But we were challenged to—to drive the cost of that ship down, and as far as our part was
concerned, one of the key decisions that was made that—that helped us in that regard was a
decision to go from 20 missile tubes to 16 missile tubes, because what that allowed us to do was to
down rate the—the propulsion power that was needed, so obviously, it’s a–it’s a small[er] the
reactor that you would need.
But what it also allowed us to do was to go back [to the use of existing components]. The size [of
the ship] fell into the envelope where we could go back and use components that we had already
designed for the Virginia class [attack submarines] and bring those into this design, not have to do
it over again, but several of the mechanical components, to use those over again.
And it enabled us to drive the cost of that propulsion plant down and rely on proven technology
that’s—pumps and valves and things like that don’t change like electronics do.
So we’re pretty comfortable putting that in ship that’ll be around ‘til 2080. But we were allowed to
do that.
(Source: Transcript of hearing.)
280. These observers also cited the uncertainties associated with projecting needs for strategic
deterrent forces out to the year 2080, when the final Columbia-class boat is scheduled to leave
service. These observers asked whether the plan to design the Columbia class with 16 tubes rather
than 20 was fully supported within all parts of DOD, including U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM).
In response, Navy and other DOD officials stated that the decision to design the Columbia class
with 16 tubes rather than 20 was carefully considered within DOD, and that they believe a boat
with 16 tubes will give U.S. strategic nuclear forces enough capability to fully perform their
deterrent role in the 2030s and beyond.
Testimony in 2011
At a March 1, 2011, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Gary
Roughead, then-Chief of Naval Operations, stated the following:
I’m very comfortable with where we're going with SSBN-X. The decision and the
recommendation that I made with regard to the number of tubes—launch tubes are
consistent with the new START treaty. They’re consistent with the missions that I see that
ship having to perform. And even though it may be characterized as a cost cutting measure,
I believe it sizes the ship for the missions it will perform.89
At a March 2, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE TURNER:
General Kehler, thank you so much for your continued thoughts and of course your
leadership. One item that we had a discussion on was the triad, of looking to—of the Navy
and the tube reductions of 20 to 16, as contained in other hearings on the Hill today. I would
like your thoughts on the reduction of the tubes and what you see driving that, how you see
it affecting our strategic posture and any other thoughts you have on that?
AIR FORCE GENERAL C. ROBERT KEHLER, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, first of all, sir, let me say that the—in my mind anyway,
the discussion of Trident and Ohio-class replacement is really a discussion in the context
of the need to modernize the entire triad. And so, first of all, I think that it’s important for
us to recognize that that is one piece, an important piece, but a piece of the decision process
that we need to go through.
Second, the issue of the number of tubes is not a simple black-and-white answer. So let me
just comment here for a minute.
First of all, the issue in my mind is the overall number of tubes we wind up with at the end,
not so much as the number of tubes per submarine.
Second, the issue is, of course, we have flexibility and options with how many warheads
per missile per tube, so that’s another consideration that enters into this mixture.
Another consideration that is important to me is the overall number of boats and the
operational flexibility that we have with the overall number of boats, given that some
number will need to be in maintenance, some number will need to be in training, et cetera.
And so those and many other factors—to include a little bit of foresight here, in looking
ahead to 20 years from now in antisubmarine warfare environment that the Navy will have
to operate in, all of those bear on the ultimate sideways shape configuration of a follow-on
to the Ohio.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I am not overly troubled by going to 16 tubes. As I look at
this, given that we have that kind of flexibility that I just laid out; given that this is an
element of the triad and given that we have some decision space here as we go forward to
decide on the ultimate number of submarines, nothing troubles me operationally here to
the extent that I would oppose a submarine with 16 tubes.
I understand the reasons for wanting to have 20. I understand the arguments that were made
ahead of me. But as I sit here today, given the totality of the discussion, I am—as I said, I
am not overly troubled by 16. Now, I don’t know that the gavel has been pounded on the
other side of the river yet with a final decision, but at this point, I am not overly troubled
by 16.90
At an April 5, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN:
General Benedict, we have had this discussion, not you and I, I am sorry. But the
subcommittee has had a discussion in the past with regards to the Ohio-class replacement
program.
The new START, though, when it was negotiated, assumed a reduction from 24 missile
tubes per hole to, I think, a maximum a maximum of 20.
The current configuration [for the Columbia class], as I understand it, would move from
24 to 16.
Can you discuss, for the subcommittee here, the Navy’s rationale for that? For moving
from 24 to 16 as opposed to the max of 20?
NAVY REAR ADMIRAL TERRY BENEDICT, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS
PROGRAMS (SSP):
Sir, as part—excuse me, as part of the work-up for the milestone A [review for the
Columbia class program] with Dr. Carter in OSD, SSP supported the extensive analysis at
both the OSD level as well as STRATCOM’s analysis.
Throughout that process, we provided, from the SWS [strategic weapon system] capability,
our perspective. Ultimately that was rolled up into both STRATCOM and OSD and senior
Navy leadership and in previous testimony, the secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and
General Chilton have all expressed their confidence that the mission of the future, given
their perspectives, is they see the environment today can be met with 16.
And so, as the acquisition and the SWS provider, we are prepared to support that decision
by leadership, sir.
REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN:
Yes.
And your analysis supports—did your analysis that fed into this, did you look at specific
numbers then?
REARD ADMIRAL BENEDICT:
Sir, we looked at the ability of the system, again, SSP does not look at specific targets
with...
REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN:
Right. Yes, yes, yes.
REAR ADMIRAL BENEDICT:
Our input was the capability of the missile, the number of re-entry bodies and the throw
weight that we can provide against those targets and based on that analysis, the leadership
decision was 16, sir.91
At an April 6, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
SENATOR SESSIONS:
Admiral Benedict, according to recent press reports, the Navy rejected the
recommendations of Strategic Command to design the next generation of ballistic missile
submarines with 20 missile tubes instead of opting for only 16 per boat.
What is the basis for the Navy’s decision of 16? And I'm sure cost is a factor. In what ways
will that decision impact the overall nuclear force structure associated with the command?
NAVY REAR ADMIRAL TERRY BENEDICT, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS
PROGRAMS (SSP):
Yes, sir. SSP supported the Navy analysis, STRATCOM’s analysis, as well as the OSD
analysis, as we proceeded forward and towards the Milestone A decision [on the Columbia
class program] that Dr. Carter conducted.
Based on our input, which was the technical input as the—as the director of SSP, other
factors were considered, as you stated. Cost was one of them. But as the secretary, as the
CNO, and I think as General Kehler submitted in their testimony, that given the threats that
we see today, given the mission that we see today, given the upload capability of the D-5,
and given the environment as they saw today, all three of those leaders were comfortable
with the decision to proceed forward with 16 tubes, sir.
SENATOR SESSIONS:
And is that represent your judgment? To what extent were you involved—were you
involved in that?
REAR ADMIRAL BENEDICT:
Sir, we were involved from technical aspects in terms of the capability of the missile itself,
what we can throw, our range, our capability. And based on what we understand the
capability of the D-5 today, which will be the baseline missile for the Ohio Replacement
Program, as the director of SSP I’m comfortable with that decision. 92
(a) Report Required- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of the Navy and the Commander of the United States Strategic Command shall
jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report on each of the options
described in subsection (b) to replace the Ohio-class ballistic submarine program. The
report shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of the procurement cost and total life-cycle costs associated with each
option.
(2) An assessment of the ability for each option to meet—
(A) the at-sea requirements of the Commander that are in place as of the date of the
enactment of this Act; and
(B) any expected changes in such requirements.
(3) An assessment of the ability for each option to meet—
(A) the nuclear employment and planning guidance in place as of the date of the enactment
of this Act; and
(B) any expected changes in such guidance.
(4) A description of the postulated threat and strategic environment used to inform the
selection of a final option and how each option provides flexibility for responding to
changes in the threat and strategic environment.
(b) Options Considered- The options described in this subsection to replace the Ohio-class
ballistic submarine program are as follows:
(1) A fleet of 12 submarines with 16 missile tubes each.
(2) A fleet of 10 submarines with 20 missile tubes each.
(3) A fleet of 10 submarines with 16 missile tubes each.
(4) A fleet of eight submarines with 20 missile tubes each.
(5) Any other options the Secretary and the Commander consider appropriate.
(c) Form- The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.
Subsection (c) above states the report “shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.”
The report as submitted was primarily the classified annex, with a one-page unclassified
summary, the text of which is as follows (underlining as in the original):
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) directed
the Secretary of the Navy and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) to jointly submit a report to the congressional defense committees
comparing four different options for the OHIO Replacement (OR) fleet ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) program. Our assessment considered the current operational
requirements and guidance. The four SSBN options analyzed were
1. 12 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each
2. 10 SSBNs with 20 missile tubes each
3. 10 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each
4. 8 SSBNs with 20 missile tubes each
The SSBN force continues to be an integral part of our nuclear Triad and contributes to
deterrence through an assured second strike capability that is survivable, reliable, and
credible. The number of SSBNs and their combined missile tube capacity are important
factors in our flexibility to respond to changes in the threat and uncertainty in the strategic
environment.
We assessed each option against the ability to meet nuclear employment and planning
guidance, ability to satisfy at-sea requirements, flexibility to respond to future changes in
the postulated threat and strategic environment, and cost. In general, options with more
SSBNs can be adjusted downward in response to a diminished threat; however, options
with less SSBNs are more difficult to adjust upward in response to a growing threat.
Clearly, a smaller SSBN force would be less expensive than a larger force, but for the
reduced force options we assessed, they fail to meet current at-sea and nuclear employment
requirements, increase risk in force survivability, and limit flexibility in response to an
uncertain strategic future. Our assessment is the program of record, 12 SSBNs with 16
missile tubes each, provides the best balance of performance, flexibility, and cost meeting
commander’s requirements while supporting the Nation’s strategic deterrence mission
goals and objectives.
The classified annex contains detailed analysis that is not releasable to the public.93
93Report and Cost Assessment of Options for OHIO-Class Replacement Ballistic Missile Submarine, Unclassified
Summary, received from Navy Legislative Affairs Office, August 24, 2012. See also Christopher J. Castelli,
“Classified Navy Assessment On SSBN(X) Endorses Program Of Record,” Inside the Navy, September 10, 2012.
For more recent discussions of this issue, see Patty-Jane Geller and Brent D. Sadler, “Faulty Assumptions About the
Global Nuclear Threat May Require Changes in U.S. SeaBased Nuclear Force,” Heritage Foundation, February 22,
2022, 11 pp.; Frank Miller, “Don’t Even Think About Redesigning the Columbia SSBN,” RealClearDefense, March
31, 2022.
Text as Amended
The text of 10 U.S.C. 2218a, as amended through July 17, 2022, is as follows:
§2218a. National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund
(a) Establishment.-There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund to be
known as the “National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund”.
(b) Administration of Fund.-The Secretary of Defense shall administer the Fund consistent
with the provisions of this section.
(c) Fund Purposes.-(1) Funds in the Fund shall be available for obligation and expenditure
only for construction (including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and conversion of
national sea-based deterrence vessels.
(2) Funds in the Fund may not be used for a purpose or program unless the purpose or
program is authorized by law.
(d) Deposits.-There shall be deposited in the Fund all funds appropriated to the Department
of Defense for construction (including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and
conversion of national sea-based deterrence vessels.
(e) Expiration of Funds After 5 Years.-No part of an appropriation that is deposited in the
Fund pursuant to subsection (d) shall remain available for obligation more than five years
after the end of fiscal year for which appropriated except to the extent specifically provided
by law.
(f) Authority to Enter Into Economic Order Quantity Contracts.-(1) The Secretary of the
Navy may use funds deposited in the Fund to enter into contracts known as “economic
order quantity contracts” with private shipyards and other commercial or government
entities to achieve economic efficiencies based on production economies for major
components or subsystems. The authority under this subsection extends to the procurement
of parts, components, and systems (including weapon systems) common with and required
for other nuclear powered vessels under joint economic order quantity contracts.
(2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the
United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of
appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination
of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time
of termination.
(g) Authority to Begin Manufacturing and Fabrication Efforts Prior to Ship Authorization.-
(1) The Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited into the Fund to enter into contracts
for advance construction of national sea-based deterrence vessels to support achieving cost
savings through workload management, manufacturing efficiencies, or workforce stability,
or to phase fabrication activities within shipyard and manage sub-tier manufacturer
capacity.
(2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the
United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of
appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination
of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time
of termination.
(h) Authority to Use Incremental Funding to Enter Into Contracts for Certain Items.-(1)
The Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited into the Fund to enter into
incrementally funded contracts for-
(A) advance procurement of high value, long lead time items for nuclear powered vessels
to better support construction schedules and achieve cost savings through schedule
reductions and properly phased installment payments; and
(B) construction of the first two Columbia class submarines.
(2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the
United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of
appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination
of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time
of termination.
(i) Authority for Multiyear Procurement of Critical Components to Support Continuous
Production.-(1) To implement the continuous production of critical components, the
Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited in the Fund, in conjunction with funds
appropriated for the procurement of other nuclear-powered vessels, to enter into one or
more multiyear contracts (including economic ordering quantity contracts), for the
procurement of critical contractor-furnished and Government-furnished components for
critical components of national sea-based deterrence vessels. The authority under this
subsection extends to the procurement of equivalent critical components common with and
required for other nuclear-powered vessels.
(2) In each annual budget request submitted to Congress, the Secretary shall clearly identify
funds requested for critical components and the individual ships and programs for which
such funds are requested.
(3) Any contract entered into pursuant to paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of
the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of
appropriations for that purpose and that the total liability to the Government for the
termination of the contract shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated for the
contract as of the date of the termination.
(j) Budget Requests.-Budget requests submitted to Congress for the Fund shall separately
identify the amount requested for programs, projects, and activities for construction
(including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and conversion of national sea-based
deterrence vessels.
(k) Definitions.-In this section:
(1) The term “Fund” means the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund established by
subsection (a).
(2) The term “national sea-based deterrence vessel” means any submersible vessel
constructed or purchased after fiscal year 2016 that is owned, operated, or controlled by
the Department of Defense and that carries operational intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(3) The term “critical component” means any of the following:
(A) A common missile compartment component.
(B) A spherical air flask.
(C) An air induction diesel exhaust valve.
(D) An auxiliary seawater valve.
(E) A hovering valve.
(F) A missile compensation valve.
(G) A main seawater valve.
(H) A launch tube.
(I) A trash disposal unit.
(J) A logistics escape trunk.
(K) A torpedo tube.
(L) A weapons shipping cradle weldment.
(M) A control surface.
(N) A launcher component.
(O) A propulsor.
A rationale for funding DOD sealift ships in the NDSF had been that DOD sealift ships perform a
transportation mission that primarily benefits services other than the Navy, and therefore should
not be forced to compete for funding in a Navy budget account that funds the procurement of
ships central to the Navy’s own missions. A rationale for funding BMD programs together in the
Defense-Wide research and development account is that this makes potential trade-offs in
spending among various BMD programs more visible and thereby helps to optimize the use of
BMD funding.
94Joint explanatory statement for H.R. 1735, p. 165 (PDF page 166 of 542). Following the veto of H.R. 1735, a
modified bill, S. 1356, was passed and enacted into law. Except for the parts of S. 1356 that differ from H.R. 1735, the
joint explanatory statement for H.R. 1735 in effect serves as the joint explanatory statement for S. 1356.
... the Navy is continuing to identify opportunities to further acquisition efficiency, reduce
schedule risk, and improve program affordability. Most notably in this regard, the Navy is
currently assessing [the concept of] Continuous Production [for producing components of
Columbia-class boats more efficiently than currently scheduled] and will keep Congress
informed as we quantify the benefits of this and other initiatives that promise substantial
savings....
... the Navy’s initial assessment is that the authorities and further initiatives described [in
this report] will be essential to achieving the reductions to acquisition cost and schedule
risk that are so critical to success on the OR program....
Section 1022 of the FY2016 NDAA authorized the use of funds in the NSBDF to enter into
contracts for EOQ [Economic Order Quantity purchases of materials and equipment] and
AC [advance construction activities in shipyards], and to incrementally fund contracts for
AP [advance procurement] of specific components. These authorities are essential to
successfully executing the OR acquisition strategy. The Navy is able to take advantage of
these authorities largely due to how its submarine shipbuilding plan is phased....
Economic Order Quantity contracts provide substantial cost savings to the Navy from
procuring materials and equipment in bulk quantities. In addition to the cost savings
typically associated with EOQ authority, the Navy has identified an opportunity to
implement EOQ procurements to achieve OR schedule efficiencies and commonality
contract actions with VCS [Virginia-class submarine] Block V [boats] and CVN [nuclear-
powered aircraft carriers]....
Advance Construction is the authority to begin [shipyard] construction [work] in fiscal
years of AP [advance procurement] budget requests prior to the full funding/authorization
year of a hull. Early manufacturing activities help retire construction risk for first-of-a-kind
efforts, ease transition from design to production, and provide efficiencies in shipyard
construction workload. Advance Construction would allow the shipbuilders to begin
critical path construction activities earlier, thus reducing risk to the OR delivery schedule....
The FY2016 NDAA allows the Navy and shipbuilders to enter into incrementally funded
procurements for long lead components that employ both AP and Full Funding (FF) SCN
increments. This funding approach will provide significant schedule improvements and
cost savings by maximizing the utilization of limited funding....
Maximum economic advantage can be obtained through Continuous Production. Procuring
components and systems necessary for Continuous Production lines [as opposed to
production lines that experience periods during which they are without work] would
provide opportunities for savings through manufacturing efficiencies, increased
[production-line] learning and the retention of critical production skills. In addition to
lowering costs, Continuous Production would reduce schedule risk for both the U.S. and
UK SSBN construction programs and minimize year-to-year funding spikes. To execute
Continuous Production, the Navy requires authority to enter into contracts to procure
contractor furnished and government furnished components and systems for OR SSBNs.
OR Missile Tube and Missile Tube Module component procurement through Continuous
Production lines have been identified as the most efficient and affordable procurement
strategy.... Missile Tube Continuous Production could achieve an average reduction of 25
percent in Missile Tube procurement costs across the [Columbia] Class. These savings are
compared to [the] single shipset procurement costs [that are] included in the PB17 PoR
[the program of record reflected in the President’s (proposed) Budget for FY2017]....
The Navy estimates that procuring Missile Tube Modules in Continuous Production lines
would result in a cumulative one year schedule reduction in Missile Tube Module
manufacturing for the OR Class. This schedule reduction, on a potential critical path
assembly, would reduce ship delivery risk and increase schedule margin for follow ship
deliveries. In addition to improving schedule, Missile Tube Module Continuous Production
95 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Ohio Replacement Acquisition Strategy and National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund
Accountability, April 2016, with cover letters dated April 18, 2016, pp. 1-8.
96 Navy briefing, “COLUMBIA Class National Sea Based Deterrence Fund Procurement Authorities & Initiatives,”
March 2022, provided to CRS and CBO by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, July 1, 2022.
97This is a reference to the first four Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs, which were converted into cruise missile and
special operations forces (SOF) submarines (SSGNs). The four conversions were completed in 2005-2007. The SSGNs
are to reach their ends of their service lives and be retired in FY2026-FY2028. For more on the SSGN conversion
program, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
challenged our ability to maintain the sufficiently skilled and sized workforce needed for a
resilient and robust SIB.
In FY 2018, with leadership and support from Congress, the DON began infusing funding
into the SIB to increase capability and capacity at new and existing suppliers to meet
growing demand and increase resilience across the supply chain. In October 2020, the DON
established the SIB Program within the Program Executive Office for Strategic Submarines
(PEO SSBN). The SIB Program, in partnership with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program, is executing a holistic strategy to
expand and strengthen the SIB by investing in six key areas: shipbuilder infrastructure,
supply chain capability/capacity, scaling new technologies, addressing workforce trade
skill gaps and constraints, expanding capacity via strategic outsourcing, and government
oversight of expanded industrial base efforts.
The AUKUS partnership provides an unprecedented opportunity to leverage the
capabilities of our partner nations, strengthen our defense industrial bases, create jobs, and
drive innovation across our SSN force. AUKUS relies on a strong SIB that designs,
delivers, maintains, and modernizes our apex predators of the oceans – SSNs. Our domestic
industrial base will benefit from the industrial capabilities of our partner nations, such as
joining with an Australian company to mature and scale metallic additive manufacturing
across the SIB. Ultimately, AUKUS will increase commonality, interoperability, and
therefore, warfighting lethality across our three submarine forces.
Australia’s investment into the US SIB builds upon on-going efforts to improve industrial
base capability and capacity, create jobs, and utilize new technologies. This contribution is
necessary to augment VACL production from 2.0 to 2.33 submarines per year to support
both US Navy and AUKUS requirements. Through sustained investment, consistent with
our ongoing strategy, the ultimate goal is to increase repair capacity and capability of US
shipyards to get more SSNs out of maintenance and back to the Fleet. AUKUS also presents
a unique demand on the US SIB requiring a “Whole of Government, Whole of Industry”
approach to achieve and sustain pace, including supporting both US and partner nation
efforts.
Submarine Construction:
The current submarine construction rate, coupled with systemic challenges facing the US
SIB, resulted in the current annual production rate of 1.2 to 1.3 VACL SSNs per year,
compared to the goal of 2.0 VACL SSNs per year. This SSN construction rate, coupled
with COLUMBIA Class SSBN serial production starting in FY 2026 (pending
Congressional authorization and appropriations) is what we call “1+2,” for the one
COLUMBIA Class SSBN and two VACL SSNs per year.
The recapitalization process to achieve the 1+2 cadence increases the demand on the US
SIB by a “workload equivalent” factor of five by 2028. 2015 was the last year the Navy
was scheduled to deliver one VACL SSN (1.0). One COLUMBIA Class SSBN represents
approximately 2.5 VACL SSNs in terms of build resources (manning) and tonnage. The
addition of the VPM design equates to 1.25 legacy (2015) VACL SSNs. Thus, a 1.0 build
rate from 2015 becomes 5.0 in 2028 to achieve 1+2 cadence (2.5 + (1.25 + 1.25)). The
DON’s submarine builders, GDEB and HII-NNS, and their supporting supplier base are
working to achieve this 1+2 rate in 2028 by investing in workforce development and
retention efforts, increasing capacity and capability through infrastructure and equipment
upgrades, and partnering with the DON to mature and scale advanced manufacturing
technology throughout the SIB….
SIB Recapitalization
The recapitalization of the US Submarine Force, plus the investment in AUKUS, requires
continued and significant investments in US facilities, infrastructure, and workforce. Our
SIB recapitalization effort creates large numbers of hands-on jobs across the nation.
Targeted workforce growth includes, but is not limited to
• Trades – Welders, Shipfitters, Electricians, Machinists, Pipefitters, Painters, and
Electronics Technicians.
• Supporting Disciplines – Planners, Estimators, Material Managers, Contract Specialists,
Information Technology Experts, Quality Assurance Specialists, and Project Leaders.
• STEM – Structural, Electrical, Mechanical, and Nuclear Engineers; Designers; Test
Coordinators; Metallurgists; Computer Scientists; Logisticians; etc.
Significant investments into the submarine supplier base will produce increased volume of
basic materials, specialized materials, and engineered components required for modern
nuclear-powered submarine construction, such as
• Steel and specialty metals.
• High-tech castings and forgings.
• Electrical components.
• Combat Systems.
• Propulsion Plant components.
• Valves, pumps, pipes, fittings, and fans.
• Software and information systems.
In partnership with Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the DON made
substantial SIB investments, with $2.3 billion across FY 2018 through FY 2023 currently
in execution and $1.6 billion planned for FY 2024 through FY 2027. There is also an
additional $2.2 billion for submarine sustainment efforts submitted in the President’s
Budget for FY 2024 through 2028. This much-needed resourcing is purposefully designed
to help build and strengthen SIB capacity, capability, and resilience. These resources are
primarily being utilized across six lines of effort, and are needed to support efforts to
increase submarine construction and sustainment rates:
1. Supplier Development: Add capability and/or capacity to existing suppliers, reduce
single/sole-source risks for resiliency and robustness, improve first time quality.
2. Shipyard Infrastructure: Accelerate investments in shipbuilder facilities, footprint, and
machines/fixtures.
3. Strategic Outsourcing: Increase supplier capacity to shift non-core workload away from
the two submarine shipbuilders to free up footprint, resources, and focus for shipbuilder-
only work.
4. Workforce Development: Train current and future trades at sufficient rates, and help
build adequate hiring pool for vendors and shipbuilders.
5. Government Oversight: Increase the Navy’s oversight of the vendor base as result of
lessons learned from historical quality and schedule adherence challenges.
6. Technology Opportunities: Implement additive manufacturing, and non-destructive test
imaging technology to remove known production risk areas and bottlenecks.
The DON began execution of these SIB efforts several years ago as building facilities,
growing workforces, and increasing production rates takes time. Our dividends are not
fully matured yet. Some of the significant returns on this investment include:
• 194 suppliers in 31 states received funding to generate increased production and increase
capacity.
Author Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
98 For press reports discussing [Link], see, for example, Justin Katz, “Navy Investment in BlueForge
Alliance Up to $500 Million, and Growing,” Breaking Defense, June 7, 2024; Lauren C. Williams, “Inside the Navy’s
Slick Effort to Find Workers to Build Submarines,” Defense One, June 5, 2024.
99 Joint Statement, Honorable Erik K. Raven, Under Secretary of the Navy, VADM William J. Houston, Commander,
Naval Submarine Forces, [and] RDML Jonathan Rucker, Program Executive Officer, Attack Submarines, before the
House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, October 25, 2023, pp. 4-8.
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