EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

” To be
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005 held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active
Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of
Alfredo Oculam’s regular customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to
guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged
post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be
of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was
spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence
Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by
between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy
in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the
post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED ACCOUNT”; when the acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one
Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
he filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient design and purpose
deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the
checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement
that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that
petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the
issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga
spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of
the three checks that bounced but her co-accused husband under the
latter’s account could be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 as conspirator.

Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that
“a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
ROMUALDEZ v. MARCELO that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it
find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, investigation;
vs.
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission
Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the
GOVERNMENT, respondents
G.R. Nos. 165510-33 information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the
July 28, 2006 prescriptive period;

FACTS: that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986
until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code.
Romualdez is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019
for failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period The PCGG avers that the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint
1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on
Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as the alleged offenses of the petitioner;
Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
And since both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 (the Act To Establish
Romualdez claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and
discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To
violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft Run) are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the
and Corrupt Practices Act; offender is absent from the Philippines, the RPC should be applied.

Romualdez asserts that the Ombudsman (Marcello) cannot revive the (RPC provides that prescription is interrupted when accused is outside of
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the the Philippines)
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004.

He also claims that the case should be dismissed on the ground of

ISSUE:
prescription.
W/N the prior quashal of an information bars subsequent prosecution
The Ombudsman, however, contends that:
W/N the offenses charged have already prescribed
the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from HELD:
criminal prosecution;
FOR THE FIRST ISSUE
The court held that the prior quashal of an information does not bar (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
subsequent prosecution.
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that an order
sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal Section 11 of RA 3019 (amended by BP 195) provides a prescriptive
liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another period of 15 years but before it was amended by BP 195 on March
information for a crime constituting the same facts. 16,1982, the prescriptive period was 10 years. The amendment cannot be
given retroactive effect because it is not favourable to the accused.
In this case, the original information was dismissed due to the lack of
authority of the officer who filed it, hence, a subsequent prosecution Hence, offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to
of the same offense is allowed by law. March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand,
for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from
The court also pointed out that informations were filed by an March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured even by conducting
another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no As to when the period begins to run and when it is interrupted, reference
information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings. is made to Section 2 of Act No. 3326:

Also, the court said that the petitioner’s right to be informed of the Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
charges against him was not violated when the preliminary investigation the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
conducted used the same docket number, which was already previously from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
efficient record keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
sequential order corresponding to the date and time of filing a case. the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
The use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely for
reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new docket
numbers were assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049. The court ruled that the prescriptive period began to run from the
FOR THE SECOND ISSUE discovery thereof on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed
by the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner
The court held that the offenses charged have already prescribed. with the PCGG.

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following The court however disagrees to the respondents’ contention that the
should be considered: prescriptive period was interrupted when petitioner was outside the
Philippines because Article 91 of the RPC should be applied suppletorily.
(1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(Art 91 – prescription is interrupted when accused in outside the
Philippines)
The court’s answer is that suppletory application of the Revised Penal
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only
absence of the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matter.
prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean
that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the The court said that RA 3019 is a special law and its prescription is
prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91. governed by Act 3326.

Hence, petitioner’s absence from the Philippines did not interrupt the The Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the absence of the accused
prescriptive period. from the Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive
period while Act No. 3326 does not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326
must prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies to
special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to special laws
The only matter left is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG only suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the contrary.
in 1987 as well as the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan Indeed, elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that special legal
to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989 interrupted the provisions must prevail over general ones.
running of the prescriptive period.

The court held that an invalid information is no information at all and

cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings. Hence, no proceedings exist Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused
that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods. from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus,
the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the
In addition, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the
Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the
periods. prescriptive period.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius - express mention of one person,

thing, act, or consequence excludes all others
JUSTICE CARPIO DISSENT:

Justice Carpio argues Article 91 should apply to RA 3019.

He claims that there is nothing in RA 3019 that prohibits the

supplementary application of Article 91 of the RPC. He claims that the
prescriptive period should have been interrupted when petitioner was
outside the Philippines. He said “An accused cannot acquire legal
immunity by being a fugitive from the State’s jurisdiction.”
People of the Philippines vs. Martin Simon Appellant’s brother (Norberto Simon) testified that his brother was in the
G.R. No. 93028 hospital that was likely due to his peptic ulcer
July 29, 1994 Confirmed by Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas
On December 4, 1989, the trial court convicted the appellant for a
Ricardo, J.: violation of the Dangerous Drug Act
Penalty = Life imprisonment, fine of PHP20,000, and pay the costs
FACTS 4 tea bags of marijuana were confiscated by the Government
On November 10, 1988 Martin Simon y Sunga was charged with a Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of
violation of Section 4, Article 2 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act prohibited drugs. Thus, it is unlikely that he was set-up and more likely
of 1972) that he committed the crime.
Alleging that on October 22, 1988 he sold 4 tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotic Command (NARCOM) in a sum of PHP40 ISSUE
On March 2, 1989 he was arraigned with counsel following his escape Whether or not the appellant is guilty of selling prohibited drugs and
from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga having possession. YES.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case.
Voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference YES.
A NARCOM operative informed the police of illegal drug activities of
ALYAS PUSA. Capt. Francisco Bustamante (Commanding Officer of the RATIO
3rd Narcotics Regional Unit) formed a team to bust appellant YES.
Lopez was handed 2 marijuana bags which cost a total of PHP40 Dangerous Drugs Act - punishes any person who unless authorized by
Lopez signaled the team with a scratch on the head and they busted the law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
appellant dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
Pfc. Villacruz corroborated Lopez’ testimony in any of such transactions
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro conducted the custodial investigation To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be
He apprised the rights of Simon: “You have the right to remain silent, clearly and unmistakably established.
etc.” One cannot sell the drugs without first having possession over it.
Simon orally waived his right to counsel No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be
Prepared “Exhibit G”, The Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be
Dr. Pedro Clara examined the appellant accompanied by the taking or pictures.
Normal except for high blood pressure YES.
No physical injuries It is indeterminate in the sense that after serving the MINIMUM, the
Appellant had gastrointestinal pains due to history of peptic ulcer convict may be released on parole, or if he is not fitted for release, he
Appellant’s side of the story shall continue serving his sentence until the end of the MAXIMUM.
He was told that he was a pusher on a jeep ride with the officers and Drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act,
forced to sign papers. He was punched in the stomach when he refused to which would put him within the exceptions to said law, and the penalty to
do so. be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua to death. The
Admitted that he escaped from the NARCOM office BUT it was because Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion,
of the maltreatment and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.
Went to his uncle’s house (Bienvenido Sunga)
Confined in the hospital for 3 days
ISSUE: whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No. The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined
7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is
provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature
and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the
HELD: system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law
The execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the
offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit
or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, otherwise.
hurto, estafa or falsification.
hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the
aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating
penalty shall be imposed on the accuse. circumstance

by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United
of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component States but differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal
penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty depending Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range
on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying of penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year
circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each component or for one to five years but without division into periods or any technical
penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as statutory cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and referred
determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying to at the time laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed
circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that component during the American regime
penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in
imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on the same manner provided therein.
mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code
cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein
said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the were specifically punished by the penalties as technically named and
special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the understood in the Revised Penal Code.
offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or
with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623,
then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the application of
minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be the penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the court must be guided
impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the
main function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with application of penalties which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries
the rules in Article 64 of the Code. of experience in the administration of criminal laws.
while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the
periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by
degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the
imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this
reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of
Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty,
and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in
order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses

final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is

applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug
offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which
would put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be
imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of
course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of
imprisonment. 68 The more important aspect, however, is how the
indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained

Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In
fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we have
applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at
prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is
now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code.
Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of
the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
themaximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposedunder the rules of said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
Garcia vs. CA (2006) the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not
Subject: necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy. Garcia’s
Mala in se vs. Mala prohibita; Acts prohibited under Sec. 27 (b) acts showed that there was intent on her part to decrease the number of votes.
of R.A. 6646 are crimes mala in se; Extraordinary diligence required in
canvassing election results Acts prohibited under Sec. 27 (b) of R.A. 6646 are crimes mala in se
Facts:
Arsenia B. Garcia, a chairman of the board of canvassers in 2. Acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors
Alaminos, Pangasinan, was charged before the RTC for allegedly and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.
decreasing the number of votes cast in favor of Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited
Jr. during the 1995 senatorial elections, a violation of Sec. 27 (b) of R.A. amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could
6646 or the Electoral Reforms Law. It was alleged that the grand total of not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors.
Sen. Pimentel Jr.’s votes were reduced to 1,921 instead of 6,921 or 5,000 However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received
votes less than the actual number of votes received.
by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent
Garcia appealed the same to the CA which affirmed the lower
court’s decision. It likewise denied his motion for reconsideration, thus an to injure another.
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Extraordinary diligence required in canvassing election results
Garcia contends that the CA’s judgment is erroneous and is based
on mere surmises instead of substantial evidence. During the trial, she 3. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by
admitted that she was the one who announced the figure of 1,921, which
the members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the
was subsequently entered by the secretary of the board of canvassers. She
also admitted that she was the one who prepared the Certificate of elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of
Canvass (COC), though it was not her duty. Despite this, she claims that the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its
there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of Senator Pimentel, supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers
Jr. are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly
The court on the other hand contends that acts prohibited under scrutinized.
Sec. 27(b) of R.A. 6646 are crimes mala in se, thus intent is taken into
consideration. Given this, the act of preparing the COC even if it was not
her task manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous COC entry. It
was further contended that it was his concern as the chairman of the board
of canvassers to ensure the authentic entry of votes.
Held:
Mala in se vs. Mala Prohibita
1. Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised
Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are
deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly,
criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that
are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become
punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes,
 [G.R. No. 111343. August 22, 1996] keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE crime of robbery or theft.”
PHILIPPINES, represented by the Office of the Solicitor Contrary to petitioner’s contention, intent to gain need not be proved in
General, and LOURDES DU, respondents. crimes punishable by a special law such as P.D. 1612.
FACTS: The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called
Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in “acts mala in se,” and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that
Davao City using the business name “Dunlao Enterprise.” positive law forbids them, called “acts malaprohibita.”[6] This distinction is
important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The
On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunato Mariquit and Carlito rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in
Catog, both employees of Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its proprietor, to acts malaprohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? [7] When an
go to petitioner’s premises together with some police officers to verify act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.[8]
information received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen from
Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat. In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals[9] involving violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law, we said:
Upon arrival at petitioner’s compound, the group saw the farrowing
crates and pipes inside the compound. They also found assorted lengths of “On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this
G.I. pipes inside a cabinet in petitioner’s shop and another pile outside the element was not clearly established by the People’s evidence and he,
shop but within the compound. therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in
After he was informed by the police operatives that said pipes were presuming the existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the
owned by Lourdes Farms and had been stolen from it, petitioner voluntarily fact that intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is
surrendered the items. These were then taken to the police station. demonstrated by the overt acts of a person (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368
[1951]; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1
Subsequently a case was filed accusing petitioner of violation of the Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the external
Anti-Fencing Law. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded NOT demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent
GUILTY. Trial ensued and the trial court rendered judgment finding the court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in
accused guilty of the said crime which was then affirmed by the CA. Hence, the body of the judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over
this petition. which he remains indifferent even at this crucial stage. Withal, the sinister
mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing
out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pick-up
ISSUE: (People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; 1 Reyes, supra at P. 46; Section
3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not required
Whether or not intent to gain is necessary in order for the accused to in crimes punished by a special stature like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979
be found guilty of violation of Republic Act 1612? (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58) because it is
the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense
(U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 [1915]; 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59;
HELD: 1 Aquino, supra, at p. 52).”
Under Presidential Decree 1612, “fencing is the act of any person who,
with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
 Republic vs. Cojuangco Jr. Issue: Whether or not respondents alleged violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 already prescribed.
G.R. No. 139930 June 26, 2012

Ruling: R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period
Facts: In 1977, Regala, Lazatin, et al incorporated the United Coconut Oil should be computed in accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326 which
Mills, Inc. (UNICOM). On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the states that “prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
UCPB, composed of respondents Cojuangco et al, authorized UCPB to of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
invest not more than P500 million from the fund in the equity of the discovery thereof xxx”
UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut farmers. On September 4, 1979
UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10 million shares
without par value. On September 18, 1979, a new set of UNICOM
directors, composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al That investment does not, however, appear to have been withheld from
approved another amendment to UNICOM’s capitalization by increasing the public. The transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM
its authorized capital stock to one billion shares. The paid-up board rooms when UNICOM applied with the SEC to accommodate
subscriptions of 5 million shares without par value were then converted to UCPB’s investment. Changes in shareholdings are reflected in the
500 million Class A voting common shares without par value per share. General Information Sheets that corporations have been mandated to
submit annually to the SEC.

Respondents amended again UNICOM’s capitalization on September 18,

1979, giving the incorporators unwarranted benefits by increasing their 1 Reckoning the 10-year prescriptive period from the commission of the
million shares to 100 million shares without cost to them. And UNICOM violation of law, the last day for filing the action was, at the latest, on
filed its Certificate of Filing of Amended AOI with the SEC on February February 8, 1990. Hence, the action has already prescribed.
8, 1980, making public respondents acts as board of directors.

On March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 against
respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors, before
the PCGG. Nine years later, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a
memorandum that the action has already prescribed.
PEOPLE vs. PANGILINAN The RTC ruled that the action has not prescribed having filed with
G.R. No. 152662 the OCP on
June 13, 2012 16 September 1997. On respondent’s appeal, the CA ruled that the action has
Prescription (Act No. 3326) prescribed. The commencement of the period started in 1995 and, pursuant to
Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, petitioner had 4 years therefrom or until
This case is a review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the decision of the Court the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the
of Appeals. petitioner before the proper court. Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended,
provides that prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
FACTS: against the guilty person. In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes Jr.1 the Supreme
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against amended, are ‘judicial proceedings’, which means the filing of the complaint
Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor or information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the
(OCP) of QC. The complaint alleges that respondent issued 9 checks with an prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in
aggregate amount of Php 9,658,592.00 in favor of private complainant which court and not on any date before that. The informations were only filed with
were dishonored upon presentment for payment. the MeTC on 3 February 2000.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting,
recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract ISSUE: Whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation
and specific performance against private complainant before the RTC of of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the OCP of QC on 16 September 1997
Valenzuela City. interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
On 10 December 1997, respondent filed a “Petition to Suspend
Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question” before the OCP of QC, HELD:
citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of YES. Act No. 3326 entitled “An Act to Establish Prescription for
Valenzuela City. Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
On 2 March 1998, Asst. City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay Prescription Shall Begin,” as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22
recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the cases. Appositely, the law reads:
outcome of the civil action. The recommendation was approved by the City “SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special
Prosecutor of QC. Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
the DOJ. prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a)
On 5 January 1999, then DOJ Secretary Serafin P. Cuevas reversed xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by
the resolution of the City Prosecutor of QC and ordered the filing of imprisonment for more than one month, but less
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent for 2 of the 9 than two years; (c) xxx.
checks. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run
7 other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September from the day of the commission of the violation of
1997 were, however, dismissed. The two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22 the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
were filed against respondent on from the discovery thereof and the institution of
3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, MeTC QC. judicial proceedings for its investigation and
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash punishment.
the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before The prescription shall be interrupted when
MeTC. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
of prescription. The presiding judge granted the motion and the case was
raffled to the RTC.
1 This case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance.
 and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.”
BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment
of not less than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine for its
violation, it therefor prescribes in 4 years in accordance with the aforecited
law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon
the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
It has been held in People vs. Olarte that the filing of the complaint
in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal
responsibility. In Francisco, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. the filing of the
complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends the running of the
prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to
cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction
between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect
to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v.
Reyes, Jr. is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican, Ingco, et
al. v. Sandiganbayan, Brillante v. CA, and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,
cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the
period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, et al., the Court even ruled that investigations
conducted by the SEC for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the
Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period
because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,
which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before
the OCP effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they
had been charged under BP Blg. 22.
In light of all the foregoing, the instant petition was GRANTED.