JSIJ 10 (2012) 257-359

A TALMUDIST’S HALAKHIC HERMENEUTICS:

A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF MAIMONIDES’
PRINCIPLE OF PESHAT PRIMACY*

MORDECHAI Z. COHEN**

(2 ‫ משכיל בדרך תמים )ע"פ תה' קא‬,‫לעילוי נשמת מורי ורבי פרופ' מיכאל שורץ זצ"ל‬

While Moses Maimonides (1138-1204) is recognized as a profound

Jewish philosopher and master talmudist, his biblical exegesis has
received less attention and is generally viewed in isolation from the
celebrated Andalusian exegetical school that had reached its zenith in
his time, as reflected by his older contemporary Abraham Ibn Ezra
(1089-1164). Fleeing from Spain in 1140, Ibn Ezra spent the rest of
his life wandering from town to town throughout Italy, France and

* Research for this study was supported by two Stern College Ivry Faculty
Enhancement Awards and a Bernard Revel Graduate School travel grant to
consult manuscripts in Jerusalem. I thank Baruch Alster, David Berger, Yitzhak
Berger, Baruch Schwartz, Josef Stern, Eran Viezel and an anonymous JSIJ
reviewer for their learned and helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this essay.
Michael Schwarz reviewed this essay in detail, generously sharing with me his
profound understanding of Maimonides and wide-ranging knowledge of Arabic.
Sadly, he passed away recently, and this publication is dedicated to his memory
as a token of my appreciation. I thank Robert Gleave and Joseph Lowry for
guiding my foray into the study of Muslim jurisprudence in preparation for this
study. This essay is part of a series of studies of mine (some referred to in the
notes below) that situate Maimonides within the so-called “peshat school” of
Jewish exegesis, a subject addressed comprehensively in my recently published
monograph, Opening the Gates of Interpretation: Maimonides’ Biblical
Hermeneutics in Light of His Geonic-Andalusian Heritage and Muslim Milieu
(Leiden 2011). A key to the bibliographic abbreviations used below appears in
the reference list at the end of this essay. Unless otherwise specified, translations
from Hebrew and Arabic in this study are my own, though I have consulted
modern and medieval translations. I transliterate Hebrew and Arabic technical
and quasi-technical terms, but retain the original script for non-technical usages,
as well as entire sentences that include technical terms.
** Yeshiva University, New York.

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258 Mordechai Z. Cohen

England, writing commentaries according to the philological-

contextual “way of peshat,” as opposed to midrashic interpretation
(derash). In his new host communities in Christian Europe, Ibn Ezra
vied with the commentaries of the supremely influential northern
French exegete Rashi (1040-1105), who had pioneered a peshat
method of his own, taking as his motto the talmudic maxim “Scripture
(or: a biblical verse) does not leave the realm (lit. hands) of its peshat”
(‫)אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו‬.1 While Ibn Ezra embraced that maxim as his
touchstone, he regarded Rashi’s commentaries as a poor example,
since they actually drew heavily upon midrashic interpretation. (It is
unclear how much Ibn Ezra knew of the “purer” peshat commentaries
of Rashi’s students, Joseph Qara [c. 1055-1130] and Rashbam [c.
1080-1160].2) Instead, Ibn Ezra turned to the tradition of philological
analysis pioneered by the Babylonian Geonim Saadia (882-942) and
Samuel ben Hofni (d. 1013), and refined by their successors in
Muslim Spain, including the great linguists Menahem ben Saruq (mid-
tenth century), Judah Hayyuj (late tenth century) and Jonah Ibn Janah
(early eleventh century), as well as the great commentators Moses Ibn
Chiquitilla and Judah Ibn Bal‘am (both eleventh century). Since those
authors (with the exception of Menahem) wrote in Judeo-Arabic, their
works were unavailable to Jews in Christian lands, an imbalance Ibn
Ezra redressed in his Hebrew commentaries.
Maimonides, who fled Muslim Spain as a youth and eventually
settled in Egypt, may have read Ibn Ezra’s writings,3 but he certainly
had direct access to the Geonic-Andalusian heritage. Against this
backdrop, it is significant that the talmudic peshat maxim appears
prominently in his Book of the Commandments (Sefer ha-Miṣwot), a
halakhic-exegetical work that enumerates the 613 biblical
commandments. To ensure that this is done systematically, he begins
by establishing fourteen cardinal principles, the second of which is
that only laws stated in Scripture are to be counted as biblical laws. By
contrast, those derived through the midrashic hermeneutical rules
known as ribbuy (“redundancy”) and the so-called “thirteen middot
(hermeneutical rules) by which the Torah is interpreted” are classified

1
On my translation of the Talmudic peshat maxim, see Appendix A of the
monograph announced in n. * above. On its use by Rashi, see Kamin,
Categorization, 57-110; Ahrend, “Concept,” 244-259.
2
See Mondschein, “Inter-Relationship”; for further references see Cohen,
Three Approaches, 12-13.
3
See below, n. 54.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 259

as rabbinic and excluded from the enumeration.4 To support this bold

assertion, Maimonides cites the talmudic rule that “a biblical verse
does not leave the realm of its peshat” (hereafter: “the peshat
maxim”).5
The Book of the Commandments, like most of Maimonides’ major
writings (the exception being his great Code of Jewish Law, Mishneh
Torah), was written in Judeo-Arabic. A query from a Provençal reader
unable to read Arabic prompted him to refer to Principle #2 in a
Hebrew responsum, where he writes by way of summary:

No matter derived by analogy (heqqesh), a fortiori reasoning

(qal wa-ḥomer), verbal congruity (gezerah shawah) or through
any of the “thirteen middot by which the Torah is interpreted”
is biblical unless the sages say so explicitly…. There is nothing
that is biblical except for that which is explicit in the Torah
(meforash ba-Torah), such as sha‘tnez, kil’ayim, the Sabbath
and the forbidden sexual unions, or something that the Rabbis
said is from the Torah—and those are but three or four things.6

In clearing the thicket of rabbinic halakhic exegesis to return to

Scripture itself, it would appear from these programmatic statements
that Maimonides took up Ibn Ezra’s campaign for the primacy of “the
way of peshat.” This, in any case, was the perception of the great
Catalan talmudist Nahmanides (1194-1270), who remarks:

The second principle… is shockingly beyond my

comprehension, and I cannot bear it, for… if so… then the truth
is the peshat of Scripture alone, not the matters derived
midrashically, as he mentions from their dictum, “a biblical
verse does not leave the realm of its peshat.” And as a result we
would uproot the “thirteen middot by which the Torah is

4
On ribbuy and the thirteen middot (listed in the introduction to Sifra, the
halakhic midrash on Leviticus), see Kasher, “Interpretation,” 584-586.
5
Book of the Commandments, Kafih ed., 12-14. In this study, we will focus on
Maimonides’ explicit references to the peshat maxim—which are the clearest
applications of Principle #2. It is true, however, that this principle underlies
Maimonides’ legal hermeneutics at large: see below, n. 277.
6
Responsa #355, Blau ed., II:632; qal wa-ḥomer and gezerah shawah are
actually two of the thirteen middot. This responsum was to a query of R. Pinhas
ha-Dayyan of Alexandria, an émigré from Provence who evidently did not read
Arabic comfortably. See Frenkel, Elite, 122; Blau, Responsa, III:45.

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260 Mordechai Z. Cohen

interpreted,” as well as the bulk of the Talmud, which is based

on them.7

Much as Nahmanides elsewhere speaks disparagingly of Ibn Ezra as a

“pursuer of peshat” oblivious to rabbinic tradition,8 here he rejects
Maimonides’ notion of a halakhic system based exclusively on peshat.
To be sure, Nahmanides himself was an insightful practitioner of the
peshat method, for which he was primarily indebted to Ibn Ezra and
his Provençal devotee David Kimhi (c. 1160-1235).9 However, as a
staunch talmudist (influenced by northern French learning), he could
not regard it as the exclusive key to unlocking the meaning of
Scripture.
Nahmanides’ critique highlights the intriguing questions raised by
Maimonides’ bold second principle, especially since The Book of the
Commandments was a blueprint for Mishneh Torah. Did he in fact
intend to construct a system of halakhah in which biblical authority
would be ascribed only to what is “explicit in Scripture”? Such
scripturalism might be appropriate in a Karaite work,10 but it seems
inconceivable that “the way of peshat”11 could provide the exclusive
core stratum of a code of Talmudic law. Indeed, even Ibn Ezra and
other (Rabbanite) practitioners of the “way of peshat” specifically
avoided drawing halakhic implications from their philological
exegesis.12 In fact, even a cursory glance at Maimonides’ halakhic

7
Hassagot Ramban, critique of Principle #2, Chavel ed., 44-45.
8
Usually outside the realm of halakhah: see, e.g., Nahmanides on Gen 11:2
(Chavel ed., I:71); see also below, n. 12.
9
See Septimus, “Open Rebuke,” 17-23. It is unclear if Nahmanides, residing in
what had long been a Christian section of Spain, could read Arabic: see Jospe,
“Ramban,” 67-93. A similar question is raised about David Kimhi; see Talmage,
Kimhi, 63-64. It is evident, however, that both were far more comfortable reading
Hebrew and absorbed the heritage of Andalusian learning largely from Hebrew
digests (e.g., Ibn Ezra’s works) and translations.
10
Whereas talmudic law is largely based on the “Oral Law” recorded in the
Mishnah, Scripture is the central—though hardly the exclusive—source of
Karaite halakhah: see below, at n. 65 and Frank, “Literature,” 529-530 (with
references cited there). See also below, n. 98.
11
I.e., the philological method. Nahmanides, of course, is projecting his
understanding of the term peshat (shaped by Ibn Ezra and Kimhi) onto
Maimonides: see below, n. 22.
12
Maimonides would have been aware of Ibn Janah’s programmatic statement
distinguishing between peshateh di-qera and halakhah; see Maman, “Linguistic
School,” 271. The same basic view (with some adjustment) was shared by

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 261

writings reveals his reliance on talmudic halakhic exegesis—often of

the type that Ibn Ezra (and Nahmanides, for that matter) excluded
from peshat. If so, what did the great codifier have in mind when
invoking the peshat maxim in his Book of the Commandments? The
goal of the current essay is to answer this question and define a central
feature of Maimonides’ unique halakhic hermeneutics through an
investigation of what became his principle of peshat primacy.
As we shall see, Maimonides recruited the talmudic peshat maxim
to develop a boldly novel hermeneutical theory that indeed served to
establish Scripture as the basis of Rabbanite halakhah. This legal-
exegetical integration—which others deemed problematic—was
possible only within the rubric of the stratified halakhic theory that
Maimonides devised, in part by appropriating concepts and
terminology from Muslim jurisprudence.13 Here he followed Geonic
and Andalusian predecessors who drew upon Arabic learning to
account for the relationship between halakhah and Scripture,
especially in light of the Karaite challenge.14 But Maimonides was the
first to do so in conjunction with a strong reading of the peshat
maxim.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify two preliminary
methodological issues. First, a cautionary note regarding the meaning
of the term peshat itself, which is often taken for granted and left
unclarified. A number of recent studies have aimed to rectify this
matter by seeking to define this rather complex and elusive notion
precisely.15 It has become evident that we can discern various usages
of the term peshat in the medieval tradition, which was usually
contrasted with derash, i.e., fanciful homiletics. At times it is used to
connote (1) the literal sense (sometimes termed the “plain” sense) as
opposed to a metaphorical or symbolic (midrashic) reading. While this

Abraham Ibn Ezra: see Yesod Mora, Cohen and Simon ed., 39-41. In the northern
French school, this approach is articulated by Rashbam: see Japhet, “Tension,”
403-422.
13
Maimonides’ familiarity with this discipline has been amply demonstrated in
recent scholarship: see, e.g., Libson, “Parallels”; Kraemer, “Influence”;
Bloomberg, “Legal Terms.”
14
See Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni, 55, 143-165; Faur, Studies, 61-99. Regarding
the overall influence of Muslim jurisprudence on the Geonim, see Libson,
Custom.
15
See Kamin, Categorization, 11-17; Garfinkel, “Clearing”; Ahrend, “Concept,”
237-259; Schwartz, “Peshat and Derash,” 72-76; Japhet, Job, 54-75; idem,
“Tension”; Touitou, Exegesis, 29-30; Cohen, “Two Perspectives”; idem,
“Qimhi,” 396-415; idem, Three Approaches, 3-16, 323-331.

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262 Mordechai Z. Cohen

definition of peshat is prevalent nowadays, it has been proven

inadequate. What if a verse was intended figuratively, e.g., “The Lord
is my shepherd” (Ps 23:1), or “Come let us build us a city and a tower
with its top in the sky” (Gen 11:4)? Some therefore argue that peshat
should be defined as (2) the straightforward sense, i.e., the meaning
determined by reasonable, contextual-philological exegesis, which
may call for a figurative reading, as opposed to the midrashic
penchant for hyper-literal readings.16 But even this definition does not
capture other nuances of this term, which is also used as a label of
approbation, i.e., to signify (3) the correct sense of a verse, or the
intent of the author, as opposed to artificial midrashic readings.
For our purposes it is important to note that these definitions were
devised to account for the widespread use of the term peshat from the
turn of the twelfth century onwards in Rashi’s school, and by Ibn Ezra
and his successors Kimhi and Nahmanides. As recent studies have
demonstrated, however, the term peshat—and the peshat maxim—
were actually used in a completely different sense in the Talmud.17
(This, of course, would explain why the sages of the Talmud did not
hesitate to engage in manifestly non-philological, midrashic biblical
interpretation.) The use of the term peshat in the medieval tradition as
the basis of the philological-contextual method thus represents an
appropriation of talmudic terminology, recast to support an essentially
novel exegetical approach.18
Where would Maimonides have stood vis-à-vis this terminological
innovation? By all indications, he knew very little about the northern
French peshat school,19 and for him Ibn Ezra was a newcomer on the
Andalusian intellectual horizon still dominated by earlier authors of
the Judeo-Arabic school.20 In that tradition, no consensus had yet been

16
This can be seen, e.g., by comparing Rashi (following the Midrash) with
Rashbam and Ibn Ezra on the phrase “a tower with its top in the sky” (Gen 11:4):
see Cohen, “Two Perspectives,” 268-270.
17
Kamin, Categorization, 23-43; Ahrend, “Concept,” 237-244; Halivni, Peshat
& Derash, 52-79; see also below, n. 203.
18
See Kamin, Jews and Christians, xxxi-xxxii; idem, Categorization, 57-59.
19
This is the general scholarly consensus (to which I subscribe), since neither
Rashi nor his students are ever mentioned by Maimonides, though some indirect
evidence might be taken to suggest that he saw Rashi’s talmudic commentary in
Egypt. See Friedman, “Use of Rashi,” 403-438.
20
Ibn Ezra began writing commentaries in the 1140s in Italy and continued until
his death in 1164. Even if Maimonides eventually knew of his writings (see
below, n. 54), they may not have been disseminated in Muslim Spain quickly
enough to became part of his formative early education there in the 1150s.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 263

reached regarding the concept of peshat; in fact, those authors—like

their Karaite colleagues—relied heavily on Arabic hermeneutical
terminology and used the terms peshuto shel miqra and peshateh di-
qera sparingly.21 In the tradition that shaped Maimonides’ outlook,
peshat was a marginal concept, perhaps still colored by its talmudic
usage, but certainly open for reinterpretation by a bold thinker like
him.
Recent studies of Maimonides’ notion of peshat tend to sidestep
these considerations and simply borrow the commonly-used
definitions coined in modern scholarship for Rashi, Ibn Ezra and
Nahmanides.22 For example: “The meaning of the biblical text is
identical to its obvious and simple understanding”;23 “Scripture never
loses its straightforward sense”;24 “…the word peshuto… mean[s]
simple or plain meaning… no text can be deprived of being
interpreted exclusively according to peshat.”25 Invariably, however,
these renderings lead to contradictions, since Maimonides often
disregards the “straightforward” sense of Scripture, as much of his
biblical exegesis is drawn from the Talmud and midrashic literature.26
But in light of his milieu—which was distinct from the emerging
culture of “the way of peshat” among Hebrew writers in Christian
Europe—it is unreasonable to expect that Maimonides would have
used the term peshat in that sense. In the current study we shall
demonstrate that Maimonides, in fact, developed a unique definition
of peshat that reflects his immersion in Talmud and his Arabic
learning, as well as the pre-twelfth century Geonic-Andalusian
heritage.
Our second preliminary methodological point highlights a factor
that no doubt contributed to the confusion just mentioned. When
seeking to define Maimonides’ concept of peshuto shel miqra it is, of
21
See Cohen, “Hermeneutical Terms.” The Arabic term ẓāhir was sometimes
used to connote the obvious, contextually indicated sense of Scripture: see below,
at n. 33.
22
This tendency can be traced to none other than Nahmanides, who assumed
that Maimonides used the term peshat as he did: see above, at n. 11. On the
fallacy of projecting onto Maimonides conceptions that developed in Christian
Europe rather than analyzing his words in light of his Geonic-Andalusian
heritage and Arabic cultural milieu, see (rather polemically), Faur, Studies, 1-11.
23
‫ ;משמעות הטקסט המקראי זהה להבנתו הגלויה והפשוטה‬Sagi, “Nahmanides,” 128.
24
Davidson, Maimonides, 132.
25
Halivni, Peshat & Derash, 80.
26
This has been noted, e.g., by Davidson, Maimonides, 132; Halivni, Peshat &
Derash, 83. See also below, at nn. 29, 130.

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264 Mordechai Z. Cohen

course, necessary to identify the relevant passages of his writings for

the purpose of the analysis. Naturally, this includes Principle #2,
where he actually discusses the implications of the peshat maxim.
Maimonides explicitly invokes that principle another nine times in
The Book of the Commandments, either with the Aramaic term
peshateh di-qera (i.e., “the peshat of Scripture”), but sometimes with
the term gufeh di-qera (“Scripture itself”, or “the essence of
Scripture”), which he takes to be closely related (as discussed below).
These ten passages (Principle #2 and its nine applications)—the focus
of the current study—represent Maimonides’ essential discussion of
“the peshat of Scripture” in his major writings. The term peshat never
appears in the Mishnah Commentary or in the Guide of the Perplexed,
even though Maimonides seemingly had ample opportunity to use it in
his extensive exegetical discussions in both works. In the entire
expanse of Mishneh Torah, the term appears in only four marginal
instances, none of which relate to the peshat principle.27
Some readers may be surprised by this assessment, since the term
peshat appears numerous times in the Hebrew versions of the Mishnah
Commentary and the Guide. In fact, a leitmotif of the latter work is
Maimonides’ vociferous claim that the biblical text often cannot be
taken “according to its peshat” (ki-peshuto), i.e., literally, for example,
in its anthropomorphic depictions of God. J. Stern refers to this as the
Maimonidean “devaluation” of peshat in the Guide,28 which seems to
contradict the aforementioned Principle #2.29 But when we consult the
original Judeo-Arabic texts of the Guide and Mishnah Commentary,
we discover that in those works, Maimonides in fact never used the
term peshat, which was chosen (perhaps less than fortunately) by the
translators—both medieval and modern—to render Arabic ẓāhir (lit.
apparent, obvious), a term drawn from Qur’anic hermeneutics and
used regularly in the Judeo-Arabic exegetical tradition to denote the
obvious or literal sense of the biblical text.30 Only in The Book of the
Commandments does he use peshat as a technical talmudic term,
which (like other citations from rabbinic literature) stands out in

27
These examples are discussed in Appendix B of my monograph announced in
n. * above, which also includes a discussion of Maimonides’ occasional use of
the term peshat in his Responsa.
28
Stern, Problems, 84.
29
This contradiction was noted by Harris, Fragmentation, 292-293; see also
Kaplan, “Problems,” 362.
30
See Ben-Shammai, “Tension,” 36-40; Fenton, Jardin, 258-298.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 265

Hebrew (peshuto shel miqra) or Aramaic (peshateh di-qera) against

the background of his Judeo-Arabic prose.
While in some contexts it might not be unreasonable to use the term
peshat to render ẓāhir,31 Maimonides did not equate the two when
invoking the principle of peshat primacy, which for him implies that
“the peshat of Scripture” is the inviolate, unique source of biblical
law. By contrast, what he devalues in the Guide is merely the
obvious—or apparent—literal sense (ẓāhir) of Scripture.32 Indeed, in
The Book of the Commandments he also uses the term ẓāhir to denote
the literal or philological-contextual sense of Scripture, but not to
grant it the authority of peshateh di-qera.
It is important to emphasize that within the exegetical tradition that
Maimonides inherited, the ẓāhir (or: ẓāhir al-naṣṣ; i.e., the apparent
sense of the text) hardly had absolute authority. Most prominently,
Saadia articulated the fundamental axiom that ―

One must... take the book of the Torah according to the

apparent sense (ẓāhir) of its words, I mean the well-known
meaning (mashhūr) understood among speakers of its
language... unless (1) sense perception or (2) rational
knowledge contradicts the well-known meaning of that phrase,
or if (3) the well-known meaning contradicts another verse that
is unambiguous or (4) a tradition [transmitted by the rabbis]...
[in which case]... the verse is not [said] according to its
apparent sense, but contains a word or words that are majāz
(i.e., non-literal language). When one discerns the type of

31
Indeed, this corresponds to the common (though incomplete) definition of
peshat as the literal sense. A more precise Hebrew translation of ẓāhir would be
nigleh (apparent [sense]), which is used occasionally by the medieval translators.
But the technical exegetical term ẓāhir actually has a range of meanings. While
in some instances it connotes the “plain”—and manifestly correct—sense,
elsewhere it connotes a misleading superficial literal reading, as we shall
demonstrate currently. (For further detail, see chapter 2 of my monograph
announced in n. * above.) In such cases translating ẓāhir as peshat is
misleading—especially given the authority Maimonides ascribes to peshateh di-
qera. Pines, in his translation of the Guide, renders ẓāhir “the external sense,”
which often captures Maimonides’ intent, especially where it is contrasted with
bāṭin (the “inner,” or “hidden” sense).
32
For Stern (above, n. 28) we can say that Maimonides devalued what
Nahmanides—who was influenced by the Hebrew translations of the Guide—
referred to as peshat.

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266 Mordechai Z. Cohen

majāz it is… then the verse will conform to sensory and

rational knowledge, the other verse and tradition.33

For Saadia, the apparent sense is merely an initial exegetical

assumption (sort of a default position) to be adjusted based on a
variety of considerations. In the four cases he enumerates here, proper
exegesis requires a non-literal interpretation—what he refers to
elsewhere as ta’wīl (a term commonly used in Qur’anic hermeneutics
to denote an interpretation that diverges from ẓāhir al-naṣṣ [see n. 121
below]). To illustrate, Saadia cites Gen 3:20, “And Adam called his
wife’s name Eve, because she was the mother of all living beings ( ‫אם‬
‫”)כל חי‬:

If we leave the expression “all living beings” according to its

well known meaning… we forsake sense perception, for this
implies that the lion, ox, donkey and other animals are Eve’s
children. Now since there is no trick that will dislodge sense
perception, we maintain that there is a concealed (i.e., implied)
word in this verse, through which it can be brought into
agreement with the unmistakable [facts], as I shall explain.34

Saadia’s ta’wīl here entails positing that the word “speaking” is

understood from context. Accordingly, in his commentary on that
verse he writes:

In my translation of ‫ אם כל חי‬I added [the words] ‫חי נאטק‬

(human beings; lit. speaking living beings) in order to make
this expression exclude animals such as the horse, donkey and
others, which sense perception contradicts.35

Saadia repeats his fundamental exegetical rule elsewhere in his

writings and applies it frequently in his translations and
commentaries.36 Furthermore, it was endorsed almost universally
within the subsequent Geonic-Andalusian exegetical tradition.37 Yet,

33
Saadya on Genesis, Introduction, Zucker ed., 17-18 (Ar.); 190-191 (Heb.).
34
Ibid., 18 (Ar.); 191 (Heb.).
35
Ibid., 78 (Ar.); 296 (Heb.)
36
The rule appears in his introductions to Isaiah and Job, and in Beliefs and
Opinions 7:1; see Ben-Shammai, “Tension,” 34-36; idem, “Introduction,” 380-
382; Brody, “Geonim,” 80-81.
37
See Fenton, Jardin, 266-321; Cohen, Three Approaches, 36-42.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 267

the unfortunate translation of ẓāhir as peshat in the modern Hebrew

translations of Saadia’s writings38 has led to a misimpression, as
evident in the following remark by D. Weiss-Halivni:

The first Rabbi to ascertain the superiority of peshat over

derash was R. Saadya Gaon…. who says in several places…
that “Everything that is found in the Bible has to be understood
according to peshat except when the peshat is against the
senses, or against reason, or if it contradicts another verse in the
Bible or if it opposes tradition.” In the exceptional cases one
has to interpret the text according to derash.39

But the peshat-derash opposition is a talmudic one that Saadia does

not use in the context of his fundamental axiom. Rather, to arrive at
Scripture’s correct sense, he argues that where the apparent sense (not
the “peshat”!) is untenable (because it is inconsistent with reason or
other types of certain knowledge), one must apply ta’wīl—which is
not the same as derash.40 As Saadia conceived it, ta’wīl (where
genuinely required) is the methodologically sound sense of Scripture
in light of reason. It is worth noting that Abraham Ibn Ezra formulates
a Hebrew version of Saadia’s rule using the term tiqqun to render
ta’wīl, which he regards as a necessary component of the “way of
peshat,” i.e., a rational, philological-contextual reading of Scripture.41

38
See Zucker’s translation, cited above, n. 34. In the parallel in Beliefs and
Opinions 7:1, Kafih follows suit, using Hebrew ‫ הרי הוא כפשוטו‬to render Saadia’s
Arabic ‫( פהו עלי ט'אהרה‬Kafih ed., 219). The medieval translator Judah Ibn Tibbon
here renders ẓāhir with Hebrew nir’eh ( ‫כל אשר בספרי הנביאים הוא כאשר נראה ממשמעו‬
‫ ;והידוע ממלותיו‬Kafih ed., 328). It should be noted, however, that he had a different
version of the Arabic original (than the one published by Kafih), which reads:
‫( ג'מיע מא פי כתב אללה אלמנזלה לנא עלי ט'אהר מסמועה ומשהור לפט'ה‬Bacher ed., 102).
This matches Saadia’s definition of ẓāhir as “the well-known meaning
understood among speakers of its language” (see above, at n. 33).
39
Halivni, Peshat & Derash, 79-80. Halivni refers to Saadia’s formulation in
Beliefs and Opinions, which he evidently read in Hebrew translation (see
previous note).
40
This point has been made by Ben-Shammai, “Prognostic Midrash,” 2; idem,
“Tension,” 36, 45n. Other commentators, however, do seem to use the pair of
terms ẓāhir- ta’wīl to express the peshat-derash dichotomy: see, e.g., Shy,
Tanhum, ‫ מב‬,‫לח‬, 15, 111.
41
Ibn Ezra, Pentateuch Commentary, Introduction (alternative version), “the
fourth approach.” See also Cohen, Three Approaches, 42.

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268 Mordechai Z. Cohen

We have digressed to expose the fallacy of automatically equating

ẓāhir with peshat in Maimonides’ literary milieu, thereby rectifying
the optical illusion created by the Hebrew translations of his works,
which give a skewed impression of how he used the term peshat in his
Arabic writings. His own multifaceted use of the term ẓāhir and its
complex relationship to his conception of peshat are beyond the scope
of the current essay, and I deal with them elsewhere.42 Here we shall
focus on the ten passages in The Book of the Commandments that
actually feature the terms peshateh di-qera and gufeh di-qera, yielding
a circumscribed Maimonidean usage that reflects a consistent legal-
hermeneutical theory based on his understanding of the talmudic rule
of peshat. Indeed, unlike other exegetes who used this maxim to
construct an overall theory of biblical interpretation, Maimonides
applied it exclusively in the context of halakhah as a legal rather than
purely exegetical principle.
Having clarified these preliminary matters, we can proceed with
our study, which is divided into five sections: (1) A brief survey of
Maimonides’ exegetical heritage, in which we identify the range of
sources he used and the key hermeneutical issues confronting the
Geonic-Andalusian school that informed his outlook; (2) An outline of
the classification of rabbinic readings of Scripture in Maimonides’
first halakhic work, the Mishnah Commentary, where he traces the
history of the development of halakhah in a discussion upon which
the second principle in The Book of the Commandments is predicated;
(3) A detailed analysis of Principle #2; (4) A survey of the nine
additional passages throughout The Book of the Commandments in
which Maimonides invokes the rule of peshat in accordance with
Principle #2; (5) Conclusions about his conception of peshat and its
role within his unique system of halakhic hermeneutics.

1. Exegetical Heritage

Although Maimonides is sometimes portrayed as a boldly original

thinker who recast Scripture and rabbinic literature in a new light
(aided by his Greco-Arabic learning), it is important to emphasize that
his outlook was firmly anchored in the Geonic-Andalusian tradition.
In many instances, his agenda was dictated by the pressing issues of
concern to his predecessors in that school. Moreover, without denying
his ability to devise novel solutions and approaches, recent scholarship

42
In the studies announced in nn. *, 21 above.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 269

suggests that for this purpose Maimonides often drew upon notions
already developed in his Andalusian Jewish milieu. As a first step in
our study, we therefore briefly explore the range of sources that would
have informed his interpretation of Scripture, as well as the relevant
hermeneutical conceptions of his Geonic-Andalusian predecessors.
a. Sources
Maimonides’ aversion to documenting his sources is well-known; but
his post-talmudic Jewish predecessors fared worse in this respect than
others.43 He often draws explicitly upon rabbinic literature to interpret
the biblical text, and he will occasionally even mention how the
teachings of Greek and Arab philosophers shed light on Scripture. By
contrast, there is hardly a mention in his writings of the great linguists
and exegetes influential in twelfth-century al-Andalus, whose names
are mentioned frequently by Ibn Ezra. This tendency has perpetuated a
portrait of Maimonides as a talmudist-philosopher disconnected with
the mainstream Geonic-Andalusian exegetical tradition; but just
beneath the surface we can detect the impact of this tradition on his
biblical interpretation.44 In particular, we can discern four streams of
post-talmudic Jewish scholarship upon which he seems to have drawn.
(1) While Maimonides makes vague references to the collective
Babylonian “geonim,” modern research has documented his
substantial debt to this school by tracing many aspects of his literary
output to the works of specific Geonic authors. In particular, his
references to Saadia, though sporadic and usually oblique, suggest the
broad and deep impact of that Gaon’s views, especially on biblical
interpretation, which Maimonides at times challenges, but otherwise
relies upon.45 The imprint of Samuel ben Hofni, who carried on
Saadia’s tradition, can likewise be detected in Maimonides’ writings.46
(2) Maimonides’ occasional discussions of Hebrew grammar and
philology indicate his knowledge of this discipline, which perhaps
more than anything else characterizes the Andalusian exegetical
method. Echoes of Menahem ben Saruq and Hayyuj can be detected in

43
See Pines, “Introduction,” cxxxii-cxxxiv; Twersky, “Guide”; idem,
“Influence,” 21*, 39-42*.
44
See Bacher, Bibelexegese, vi-vii, 168-174; Twersky, Code, 58; Cohen, Three
Approaches, 14-15, 98, 179-180, 213; Davidson, Maimonides, 118.
45
This is especially evident in Schwarz’s notes in his translation of the Guide of
the Perplexed: see, e.g., I:25 (p. 38, n. 6); I:65 (p. 168, n. 22); III:18 (p. 480, n.
45). See also Rawidowicz, Studies, 178-230; Cohen, “Disagreement.”
46
See Havazelet, Geonites, 71-74; Libson, “Two Sureties”; Sklare, Samuel ben
Hofni, xi, 174n, 189.

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270 Mordechai Z. Cohen

his writings.47 Ibn Janah is mentioned by name only once in the

Guide; but his imprint is manifest throughout the numerous
lexicographic chapters of that work.48 Maimonides was also expert in
the Greco-Arabic discipline of logic, ‘ilm al-manṭiq, a type of meta-
grammar that explored the fundamental workings of language, to
which he devoted his Treatise on Logic.49 Throughout his works, he
invokes linguistic concepts clarified in the Treatise, such as sentence
structure, predication and the construction of an argument, as well as
literal and metaphorical usage, all of which would align him with the
Andalusian philological school, rather than the midrashic methods of
the Rabbis.50
(3) Sporadic references to the “Andalusian commentators” in
Maimonides’ writings51 usually offer little more than tantalizing hints
at his debt to the great exegetes who flourished in al-Andalus. But in
his Treatise on Resurrection he is more forthcoming in the course of
responding (among other things) to a critique leveled against his
figurative reading of Isaiah’s famous messianic prophecy (“the wolf
shall dwell with the lamb …” [11:6-11]) in Mishneh Torah (Hilkhot
Melakhim 12:1). Following his usual style in the Code, Maimonides
had originally presented this reading without attribution. In the
Treatise on Resurrection, however, he responds to his critic by noting
that in this understanding of Isaiah’s prophecy he simply followed
“the men of learning among the commentators, such as R. Moses ben

47
See Mishnah commentary on Terumot 1:1, Sotah 5:5 (with Kafih’s notes ad
loc.); see also Guide I:67.
48
In Guide I:43; see Strauss, “How to Begin,” xlvi; Cohen, Three Approaches,
104-106.
49
See Stern, “Language,” 179-185. It is believed that Maimonides penned the
Treatise, a summary of Alfarabi’s logic, in his youth: see Kraemer, “Portrait,” 20,
48-49. This traditional attribution has been questioned by Davidson, Maimonides,
313-322. His objections, however, are not conclusive: see Hasnawi,
“Réflexions,” 69-78; Cohen, “Imagination,” 420-421. Moreover, Maimonides’
tendency to draw upon logic in his writings (see following note) would seem to
support the traditional attribution.
50
See, e.g., below, nn. 143, 144 and examples (4) and (5) of section 4. The
importance of logic for biblical interpretation was also recognized by Ibn Ezra
(who refers to it in Hebrew as ‫)חכמת המבטא‬: see Yesod Mora, Cohen and Simon
ed., 80, 89, 91, 93-94.
51
See Shailat, Letters, I:328 [Ar.], 357 [Heb.]; Guide I:42 (Pines trans., 92);
Responsa #267, Blau ed., II:509.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 271

Chiquitilla and [Judah] Ibn Bal‘am.”52 This remark opens a window

into Maimonides’ exegetical thought, not only by identifying the
anonymous Andalusian commentators he had in mind, but also by
indicating that they may be the source of unattributed commentaries
elsewhere in his writings.53 This may account for at least some of the
numerous and occasionally striking parallels between Maimonides
and Abraham Ibn Ezra (who frequently acknowledged his debt to Ibn
Chiquitilla and Ibn Bal‘am), although there are also numerous
indications that Maimonides was directly influenced by Ibn Ezra’s
writings.54

52
Shailat, Letters, I:329 [Ar.]; 359 [Heb.]. This interpretation is not found in Ibn
Bal‘am’s extant commentary on Isaiah (see Goshen-Gottstein and Perez ed., 75-
77). Ibn Chiquitilla, however, is cited by Abraham Ibn Ezra (comm. on Isa 11:1)
as interpreting this entire prophetic passage (11:1-11)—which begins with a
prediction that a righteous king from the “stock of Jesse” will restore justice—as
a reference to King Hezekiah, who implemented sweeping religious reforms (see
II Chr 29-32; II Kgs 18-20; Jer 26:17-19). Evidently, Ibn Chiquitilla assumed that
Isa 11:6-11 was meant figuratively, and this seems to be the precedent
Maimonides had in mind, even though he interpreted this as a messianic
prophecy.
53
E.g., in his commentary on m. Yevamot 2:8, Maimonides evidently relied on
Ibn Bal‘am’s reading of Deut [Link] see Perez ed., 59 [Ar.], 111 [Heb.].
Maimonides’ silent reliance on the writings of Ibn Bal‘am and Ibn Chiquitilla is a
matter that requires further research.
54
For a dedicated study of this matter, see Twersky, “Influence.” For much of
the twentieth century, scholars pointed to the remark in the ethical will
Maimonides purportedly wrote to his son, Abraham: “Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra,
may the memory of the righteous be blessed… brought many matters to my
attention, and I did not know them until after I had compiled the Mishnah
commentary… Mishneh Torah and… the Guide of the Perplexed” (Qoveṣ,
Lichtenberg ed., II:39-40). Shailat (Letters II:697-699), however, deems this
document a forgery, though he notes that Maimonides elsewhere refers in passing
to “R. Abraham ben Ezra, may he rest in paradise” (Letters, II:530). Relying on
this more modest reference, Twersky cautiously rebuilds the case for influence,
collecting parallels between the two authors, while noting that they may simply
reflect a shared Andalusian outlook. Subsequent studies, however, have raised
many more parallels that strengthen the impression that Maimonides actually had
Ibn Ezra’s writings: see Ben-Menahem, “Jurisprudence”; Cohen, Three
Approaches, 14-15; Harvey, “First Commandment,” 209-211. Notwithstanding
Shailat’s determination regarding the text of Maimonides’ purported ethical will,
it is evident that his son, Abraham, did indeed study Ibn Ezra’s commentaries,
which are cited copiously in his own biblical commentary: see Wiesenberg,
Commentary, 539.

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272 Mordechai Z. Cohen

(4) We must also consider Maimonides’ exposure to the substantial

linguistic and exegetical work of the great tenth- and eleventh-century
Karaite scholars, notwithstanding his fierce battles with the members
of that sect in Egypt in his time. Although Maimonides generally
mentions the doctrines of the Karaites dismissively, there is evidence
that he was familiar with Karaite scholarship and used it where he saw
fit, as Ibn Ezra and other Rabbanite exegetes did.55
b. Earlier Attitudes toward Rabbinic Halakhic Exegesis
All four of the above-mentioned schools that informed Maimonides’
hermeneutical outlook would have made it difficult for him to accept
talmudic exegesis of Scripture at face value. Indeed, the philological
method pioneered by Saadia created a theological challenge for all
Rabbanite scholars, since talmudic halakhah is based on manifestly
midrashic readings of Scripture, a point often raised by their Karaite
counterparts. This situation engendered a dual allegiance that required
a delicate balance. Ibn Ezra, for example, professes adherence to
“grammar and… reason,” as opposed to Jewish Bible commentaries
he found in Christian Europe, which “do not regard the rules of
grammar, but rely on the way of derash.”56 Still, he pledges allegiance
to “the transmitters [of tradition], who were all righteous” and
promises to “rely on their [words of] truth” rather than turning to
heresy by “join[ing] with the Sadducees (i.e., Karaites) who say that
their tradition contradicts Scripture and grammar.”57 To balance these
opposing values, he posits that Rabbinic exegesis must be read
critically: “One who has a mind will be able to discern when they
speak peshat and when they speak derash, for their words are not all
of one type.”58 For Ibn Ezra, the Rabbis themselves “knew the
peshat,” whereas their far-fetched “readings” of Scripture were never
intended as genuine exegesis, but merely as derash, i.e., fanciful
homiletics.59
This solution can be traced to Saadia, who devised his
hermeneutical model using Arabic terminology rather than the peshat-

55
See Lasker, “Karaism”; Melammed, Commentators, 676-678; Simon, “al-
Kanzi,” 372-373.
56
See introduction to his (standard) Torah commentary (Weiser ed., I:1,7);
Simon, “Ibn Ezra,” 378.
57
Torah commentary (standard), introduction (Weiser ed. I:10); see Maori,
“Approach,” 43, 50 (n. 12); idem, “Attitude,” 208-215.
58
Yesod Mora, Cohen and Simon ed., 130-131; see Maori, “Attitude,” 213.
59
See alternative Torah commentary, introduction (Weiser ed., I:141); Simon,
“Ibn Ezra,” 381; Harris, Fragmentation, 82-85.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 273

derash dichotomy. On the one hand, the halakhah itself, he argued,

was faithfully transmitted from the time the Torah was given. Saadia,
in fact, leaves little room for rabbinic legislation in his sweeping
application of this claim to every detail of talmudic law. As he writes
in his essay that “establishes (or: confirms) the tradition known from
the Mishnah and Talmud” –

Just as the fundamental principles (uṣūl; lit. roots) of the law

have come to us in the same way that they came to our ancient
authorities, by way of [the senses], and they then transmitted
them to us, so the applications (or: derivatives; furū‘; lit.
branches) [of the law] have come to us from knowledge which
the forefathers knew by way of the senses.60

Using a standard dichotomy of Muslim jurisprudence, Saadia argues

that the halakhah in its entirety—both the principles (“roots,” uṣūl)
and applications (“branches,” furū‘)—were given at Sinai.61 Ever
concerned with epistemology, Saadia makes this claim in order to
confirm the validity of the halakhah as a true reflection of God’s will.
For this purpose he invokes the Mu‘tazilite idiom “knowledge of the
senses,” by which he means something that one actually witnessed,
which yields ‘ilm ḍarūri (immediate or compelling knowledge), as
opposed to ‘ilm muktasab (acquired knowledge), arrived at through
naẓar (speculation, reflection).62 The latter might be subject to debate;
the former, however, is incontrovertible. Saadia thus establishes the
truth of talmudic law by arguing that the generation that stood at Sinai

60
See Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni, 160-161 (Arabic text and English translation;
the text was originally published in Zucker, Genesis, 13). Saadia makes this
claim elsewhere: see, e.g., his comm. on Genesis, Zucker ed., 13-17 [Ar.], 181-
190 [Heb.] 181-190. This theme is repeated by Ibn Ezra: see his comm. on Lev
25:9 (Weiser ed., III:94); Yesod Mora, Cohen and Simon ed., 70, 130-131.
61
The uṣūl-furū‘ dichotomy was used widely in Judeo-Arabic discussions of
halakhah: see Libson, Custom, 197-198; Zucker, “Hefeṣ,” 9 and below at nn. 79,
89, 134.
62
See Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni, 146-147, 161; compare Hallaq, History, 61; see
also n. 86 below. Regarding “acquired knowledge,” Sklare writes: “Such
knowledge is acquired through reflection on an indication (dalīl) placed in the
world by God, which leads to a conclusion based on it…. If this act of reflection
meets all the requirements for soundness (naẓar ṣaḥīḥ) it will generate certain
knowledge” (Samuel ben Hofni, 147). Sklare (ibid.) also notes that ‘ilm muktasab
is used interchangeably with ‘ilm istidlālī in Judeo-Arabic sources. This
terminology will be significant in our study of Maimonides below.

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274 Mordechai Z. Cohen

heard it completely for themselves, and then transmitted it orally over

the centuries until it was recorded in writing in the Mishnah and
Talmud.
On the other hand, Saadia regarded the midrashic activity of the
Rabbis to be a later development intended to artificially link the laws
known from tradition to Scripture. Speaking about the “thirteen
middot by which the Torah is interpreted” he writes:

The Rabbis of blessed memory did not write down these

thirteen because they infer (yastadilluna) [anything] through
them, but rather because they found that the laws they had
correspond to (lit. tend toward) these thirteen types [‫ ;פן‬i.e., of
inference], not that they… are the foundation confirming (or:
establishing) the laws. And just as we say about the Massorah
(the discipline of counting words in Scripture) that it clarifies
that ‫[ תיעשה‬appears in Scripture] ten [times], ‫ בטוב‬nine, ‫בבבל‬
eight [etc.]… these words did not come into being because of
the Massorah, but rather it counted and found thus.63

By arguing that the oral tradition is the exclusive source of the full
range of Rabbanite halakhah, Saadia denies that the middot serve any
creative legal function.64
Karaite scholars, on the other hand, viewed the middot as
interpretive tools by which the Rabbis derived halakhah from
Scripture, akin in their eyes to what was known in Muslim
jurisprudence as qiyās, i.e., legal derivation based on analogical
inference, which Karaite scholars likewise used to create their system
of halakhah.65 Obviously, this was based on naẓar, human speculation
to ascertain the will of God. Responding to Saadia’s criticism of that
endeavor, the tenth-century Karaite scholars Abu Yusuf Ya‘aqub al-
Qirqisani and Yefet ben Eli accused him of hypocrisy, since he
rejected the validity of qiyās while accepting the Rabbis’ analogous

63
Zucker, “Taḥṣīl,” 378 (Arabic text with Hebrew translation). On istidlāl, see
previous note and below, n. 82.
64
See Harris, Fragmentation, 76-80.
65
See Zucker, “Fragments,” 321-331, 342; Faur, Studies, 89-99; Frank, Search,
9, 24-25. On qiyās in Muslim jurisprudence, see below, n. 79. It has been
suggested, based on the terminological similarity to the talmudic term heqqesh
(analogy), that this notion was borrowed from rabbinic jurisprudence: see Libson,
Custom, 5, 192-193.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 275

use of the middot.66 Evidently, Saadia’s claim regarding the middot

was intended to undercut this accusation by characterizing them as
nothing more than a method for classifying laws transmitted through
an authoritative ancient tradition that the Karaites lacked.67
Saadia’s debate with the Karaites (as well as subsequent
discussions of halakhic theory in the Andalusian tradition, including
those of Maimonides) can be understood in light of the discipline of
uṣūl al-fiqh (the roots [i.e., sources] of the law), which aimed to
account for the development of Islamic law from the Qur’an to the
prevailing legal system centuries later.68 By the tenth century, legal
scholars recognized four primary sources of Muslim law (fiqh, an
Arabic term that Jewish authors also used to render the Hebrew term
halakhah):69 (1) the Qur’an, a written record of the divine word itself,
and (2) ḥadīth, oral “narratives” or “reports” of the practices (sunna)
of the Prophet and his companions, which were subsequently
committed to writing.70 The proliferation of these narratives, which
were often fabricated, made it necessary to establish their authenticity
based on the principle of tawātur (lit. “recurrence”), i.e., the notion
that reports transmitted through many different (“recurrent”) channels
could not possibly be fabricated (and only these were deemed
genuine).71 Beyond the Qur’an and ḥadīth, which were regarded as
“foundational texts,”72 further laws were established based on (3)
ijmā‘ (consensus), i.e., legal decisions accepted by a consensus of
Islamic scholars, or, according to some, the Muslim community.73

66
See Zucker, “Taḥṣīl,” 374-375.
67
See Zucker, “Taḥṣīl,” 373-379.
68
See Weiss, Search, 13-15, 24-28. For a revisionist account of this discipline
(which also summarizes the traditional approach), see Jackson, “Functional
Analysis.”
69
See Weiss, Search, 151-157; idem, Spirit, 38, 66-68, 122-127; Hallaq,
Origins, 122-128; Schacht, Introduction, 59-61, 114-115; Lowry, “Shāfi‘ī.”
70
See Weiss, Search, 161-180; Hallaq, Origins, 69-76, 128-134.
71
See Weiss, Search, 271-282; Hallaq, Origins, 102-109, 134-138; idem,
History, 58-68. Aiming to reflect the proportion of authentic to inauthentic
reports, Hallaq writes: “Indicative of the range of such forgeries is the fact that
the later traditionists—who flourished during the third/ninth century—accepted
as ‘sound’ only some four of five thousand ḥadīths out of a corpus exceeding half
a million. This is one of the most crucial facts about the ḥadīth, a fact duly
recognized by the Muslim tradition itself” (Origins, 104).
72
See Weiss, Spirit, 38, Hallaq, Origins, 119.
73
See, Weiss, Search, 181-258; Hallaq, Origins, 138-140.

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276 Mordechai Z. Cohen

What came to be regarded as the fourth source of law—qiyās—has

a long, controversial history. Before the absolute authority of the
ḥadīth was established (at the end of the eighth century), many jurists
made legal decisions based upon what was stated explicitly in the
Qur’an, supplemented by their own discretionary legal intuition and
reasoning, referred to as ra’y (lit. opinion). As the body of ḥadīth
grew, however, a split divided two schools of Islamic legal scholars:
traditionalists known as ahl al- ḥadīth (lit. the folk of ḥadīth), who
asserted that all laws must be based on what was stated explicitly by
the Prophet (as recorded in the Qur’an) and his companions (as
reported in the ḥadīth), as opposed to rationalist legal thinkers known
as ahl al-ra’y (lit. the folk of ra’y), who believed that law could also
be determined independently, based on legal reasoning.74 Once the
authority of the ḥadīth had been firmly established, the traditionalists
took the upper hand and ra’y suffered a decline, its very validity
questioned.
The place of rationalism in Muslim jurisprudence would be
restored, albeit in a more circumscribed form, in what is termed by W.
Hallaq, a contemporary scholar of uṣūl al-fiqh, the “great rationalist-
traditionalist synthesis” that took hold finally toward the end of the
tenth century and signaled the maturation of Muslim legal theory. The
roots of this synthesis can be traced to the seminal Muslim legal
theorist Muhammad b. Idris al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 819), who argues that ra’y
on its own, as broadly defined, i.e., pure legal reasoning, is arbitrary
and cannot be used as a source of law. On the other hand, Shāfī‘i
acknowledged the validity of qiyās, a more strictly defined form of
legal inference based on laws stated explicitly in the Qur’an and
ḥadīth.75 This type of reasoning, alone, can truly reveal the will of the
Divine legislator.76 But, as Hallaq has shown, the terminological
differentiation between ra’y and qiyās is somewhat misleading, since
the former term originally was used for all types of legal reasoning,
including those that would come to be known as qiyās.77 Effectively,
then, Shāfi‘ī defined the type of ra’y—i.e., the subset that met the
standard of what he termed qiyās—that could be regarded as a valid
source of law. While influential, Shāfi‘ī’s view was not universally
accepted, and some important theorists rejected even the more
restricted category of qiyās, insisting on basing Muslim law only on

74
See Hallaq, Origins, 53-54, 74-76, 113.
75
See Hallaq, Origins, 114-120.
76
See Weiss, Spirit, 66-87.
77
See Hallaq, Origins, 114.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 277

the other three sources. It was only toward the end of the tenth century
that these traditionalist opponents of legal rationalism were truly
marginalized, and the four-fold system of uṣūl al-fiqh became
generally accepted in the mainstream of (Sunni) Muslim
jurisprudence.78
The term qiyās (lit. to measure) itself was borrowed to denote legal
inference by analogy, which was conceived as “measuring” one thing
(i.e., a legal case) against another. Much effort was expended by
Muslim legal theorists to define the parameters of this procedure
precisely.79 In applying qiyās, a jurist would use reasoning (or:
speculation; naẓar) to draw an inference from an established law
(termed the aṣl, i.e., root [pl. uṣūl]) stated in the Qur’an or ḥadīth, or
one accepted by consensus. Upon determining the rationale (‘illa; lit.
reason) for the established law, he could then apply it to a new case to
yield the appropriate derivative law (the far‘, i.e., branch [pl. furū‘]).
The classic example cited to illustrate this procedure is the
determination of the status of date wine. Drinking grape wine is
prohibited explicitly in the Qur’an, presumably because it is
intoxicating. Since this ‘illa applies to date wine, it, too, is prohibited.
Apart from simple analogy, other logical forms of reasoning were also
subsumed under the category of qiyās, such as the a fortiori argument.
For example, the Qur’an prohibits disrespecting parents by saying
“Fie!” to them; from this it is deduced a fortiori that striking a parent
is prohibited.
The notion of qiyās was of interest not only in the field of
jurisprudence. In the Greek-influenced Arabic discipline of logic (al-
manṭiq), the term qiyās was used specifically to denote the syllogism,
i.e., a structured formal argument that draws a conclusion based on
specific premises—expressed in at least two propositions—in
accordance with the rules of logic.80 Maimonides, for example,

78
See Hallaq, Origins, 122-128. Shi‘i legal theory, as well as some other minor
schools (including the now extinct Ẓāhiri school), did not accept qiyās: see
Weiss, Spirit, 70.
79
See Weiss, Search, 155, 551-557, 633-654; idem, Spirit, 66-87; Hallaq,
Origins, 140-145; idem, History, 61, 82-107; idem, “Non-Analogical
Arguments.”
80
While qiyās ultimately became the standard term for the syllogism in Arabic
works on logic, we do find an occasional reference to this Greek notion as
sulujismus (‫ "! س‬# $): see Lameer, Syllogistics, 42. Our general discussion of
the syllogism in Arabic logical writings is based upon Black, “Logic”; see also
Maimonides, Treatise on Logic, chapter eight.

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278 Mordechai Z. Cohen

describes the workings of this form of deduction in chapters six

through eight of his Treatise on Logic, where he largely draws on
Alfarabi. The so-called demonstrative syllogism (al-qiyās al-burhānī),
which is incontrovertible, was the gold standard in the eyes of the
logicians and had to adhere to strict criteria; e.g., that its premises be
known with certainty, and its conclusions apodictic. By contrast, the
dialectical syllogism (al-qiyās al-jadalī) allowed for a wider range of
premises and modes of reasoning, including analogy, and therefore is
not as compelling. Since many Muslim legal theorist were themselves
also experts in logic (as, for example, was Maimonides), it is not
surprising that the syllogism as a form of reasoning eventually made
its way into uṣūl al-fiqh. In fact, the logicians referred specifically to
the category of the “juridical syllogism” (al-qiyās al-fiqhī).81 Many
legal theorists, however, insisted on restricting the legal notion of
qiyās to the categories listed above (analogy, a fortiori reasoning,
etc.), and regarded the syllogism merely as istidlāl (lit. adducing a
dalīl, i.e., an “indicator” or proof), a broader category that includes
miscellaneous types of derivation outside of the main four sources.82
In light of the rationalist-traditionalist divide in uṣul al-fiqh in the
early tenth century, we now can place the debate between Saadia and
his Karaite contemporaries squarely within their larger Muslim
context. According to Qirqisani, the Karaites—adopting a rationalist
legal approach—relied on three sources to establish their halakhah:
Scripture, consensus (of the Karaite community), and qiyās.83 Saadia,
on the other hand, held a view similar to that of the traditionalist
Muslim camp, arguing that authentic Jewish law is based only on
Scripture and the distinct oral tradition, to the exclusion of qiyās.
Indeed, in his introduction to the Pentateuch, Saadia lists and
disqualifies four types of qiyās for determining halakhah: logical
(manṭiqī), dialectic (jadalī), juridical (fiqhī), and “the qiyās of the
sectarians” (i.e., Karaites).84 By arguing (in the passage cited above at
n. 60) that the halakhah in its entirety—both “roots” and
“branches”—was given at Sinai, Saadia removes naẓar from the

81
See Lameer, Syllogistics, 233-258. Maimonides uses this term as well: see
Treatise on Logic, chapter six, Efros 1938 ed., ‫[ טז‬Ar.], 47 [Eng.]; Book of the
Commandments, introduction, Kafih ed., 54-55; Letters, Shailat ed., 380. See also
below, n. 144.
82
See Hallaq, “Logic”; Weiss, Search, 655-660. The terms dalīl and istidlāl will
be discussed below.
83
See sources cited in Faur, Studies, 80-94; Frank, “Literature,” 529-530.
84
Commentary on Genesis, Zucker ed., 16-17 [Ar.]; 188-189 [Heb.].

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 279

picture.85 Another component of Saadia’s theory was clarified by

Samuel ben Hofni, who was asked about the legal status of consensus
(ijmā‘) as a source of halakhah. Confirming the primacy of the oral
tradition, he responded that consensus alone cannot yield halakhah,
but that laws agreed upon in the Jewish community are authoritative
because they fulfill the requirement of tawātur, i.e., their
preponderance indicates that they reflect genuine ancient oral
traditions.86
The “traditionalist”—and thus largely static—Geonic conception of
halakhah continued to have some adherents in Muslim Spain even
though it is difficult to square with the tenor of talmudic literature,
where it seems clear that the thirteen middot and other midrashic
methods are used to interpret Scripture and derive new laws.87
However, a more balanced approach did emerge, as evident in the
following account by Bahya Ibn Paquda, the eleventh-century
Saragossa philosopher and religious judge (dayyan). In his ethical
work Duties of the Heart, he speaks in passing about the juridical
procedures of the “pious early forefathers,” i.e., the sages of the
Talmud:

When a question occurred regarding the applications (furū‘) of

the laws and their peculiarities (i.e., unusual cases), they
reflected (naẓarū’) upon them (i.e., the laws) at that time with
their analogical reasoning (qiyās), and they extracted

85
Saadia invalidates qiyās specifically with respect to the “revelational”
commandments (al-sam‘iyya); see Zucker, “Taḥṣīl,” 388-404. Theoretically, one
might infer from this that the Gaon accepted the use of qiyās in their counterpart,
the “rational” commandments (al-‘aqliyya). However, as Ravitsky (Logic, 43-44)
argues convincingly, in practice Saadia excluded qiyās altogether as a method of
determining halakhah. On the possibility that Samuel ben Hofni allowed for
limited use of qiyās see Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni, 218-220.
86
See Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni, 161-165. See also Hallaq, “Corroboration,” 10,
who writes: “The mutawātir report, whose authenticity is absolutely certain,
reaches us… [from] people witnessing the Prophet saying or doing a particular
thing… [and is thus] based on sensory perception (maḥsūs)….
Epistomologically, this report yields necessary or immediate knowledge (‘ilm
ḍarūrī)… in contradistinction to mediate knowledge (‘ilm muktasab or naẓarī).”
Some Muslim thinkers, however, disputed this: see Schwarb, “God’s Word,”
127*.
87
See Blidstein, “Tradition,” 15-20; Harris, Fragmentation, 80-86; Halbertal,
People, 54-59.

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280 Mordechai Z. Cohen

(istanbaṭu’)88 the law from the principles (uṣūl) that they

safeguarded (i.e., as part of the sacred tradition)…. When the
need arose to implement the law, if the law was plainly clear
from the principles (uṣūl) transmitted by the prophets, peace
upon them, then they would implement the law accordingly.
And if the question was [a matter] of the applications (furū‘),
the laws of which are to be extracted from the principles (uṣūl)
of the transmitted tradition, they applied their ra’y and qiyās to
them. And if all of the leading scholars agreed about their law,
then it is decided according to their word. And if their qiyāsāt
(pl. of qiyās) disagreed over the law, then the opinion of the
greater number among them was adopted. And this is based on
their dictum regarding the Sanhedrin (the high court in
Jerusalem): “If a question was asked before them, if they heard
(i.e., had received a tradition about this matter) they told [it to]
them (i.e., to the questioners), and if not, they took a vote: if the
majority declared it ritually clean, they declared it ritually
clean, if the majority declared it ritually unclean, they declared
it ritually unclean” (b. Sanhedrin 88b).89

To conceptualize his talmudic source, Bahya borrows terminology

from uṣūl al-fiqh (in which, by his time the synthesis of rationalism
and traditionalism—and the place of qiyās—was well established);
accordingly he describes how the applications (furū‘) of the law not
already known from the received sources (which are the uṣūl) are
derived through ra’y and qiyās.90 As a religious judge, Bahya
presumably was quite familiar with this halakhic process himself. But
since he evidently did not write works of legal theory or even positive
law (i.e., halakhah), we do not get much further detail from him. In
fact, it is reasonable to assume that Bahya did not depart from
Saadia’s model on his own authority, since he was not known as a
particularly distinguished or innovative talmudist.
Until recently, it was difficult to clarify this matter further due to
the fragmentary nature of the extant halakhic literature from eleventh-
century al-Andalus.91 However, from the riches of the Cairo Genizah a

88
On this term in Muslim jurisprudence and exegesis, see Sviri, “Istinbāṭ.”
89
Ḥovot ha-Levavot (Duties of the Heart), Kafih ed., 28-29; see also Sklare,
Samuel ben Hofni, 161n.
90
Although some Muslim scholars distinguished between these two terms,
Bahya here evidently uses them synonymously: see above, at nn. 75, 77.
91
See Ta-Shma, Commentary, 160-185.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 281

fresh outlook on this question has emerged in recently discovered (and

soon to be published) fragments of Kitāb al-Ḥāwī by David ben
Saadia ha-Ger (the Proselyte), who served as a dayyan in Granada in
the mid-eleventh century.92 This work, which was evidently influential
for over a century in the Judeo-Arabic world, included substantial
discussions of both positive law (halakhah) and jurisprudence, i.e., the
“sources of the law” in the spirit of uṣūl al-fiqh.93 David ben Saadia
outlines three major sources of Rabbanite halakhah:
(1) the text (naṣṣ) of Scripture;
(2) the transmitted tradition (al-ḥadīth al-manqūl);
(3) interpretation of the matters (sharḥ al-ma‘āni) by the Sages (lit.
folk) of the Talmud.94
This tripartite division seems to be based the talmudic dictum “A
person must always divide his years [for study] into three: a third in
Scripture, a third in Mishnah and a third in Talmud” ([Link]
30a).95 David ben Saadia identifies Mishnah with the category of
ḥadīth in uṣūl al-fiqh. The Talmud, which seems to be cast here as an
interpretation of the Mishnah and perhaps Scripture, is regarded by
David ben Saadia as being composite:

As for the interpretations of the matters by the Sages (lit. folk)

of the Talmud, this occurs in two ways: some of them are (a)
interpretations transmitted (manqūl) explicitly; and others are
(b) interpretations extrapolated (mustakhraj) through
unadulterated judgment (ra’y) and sound analogy (qiyās). And
about this they say: “If it is a tradition (halakhah) we must
accept it; but if it is a logical inference (din), there may be an
objection to it” ([Link] 3:9).96

Using the mishnaic categories of “tradition” and logical inference,

David ben Saadia distinguishes between two sorts of sharḥ
(interpretation): some interpretations derive their authority from
tradition, while others are the product of independent judicial
reasoning—which he term ra’y and qiyās. This clear statement by

92
Sklare, “Ḥāwī,” 109-123.
93
Ibid., 103-109.
94
Stampfer, “Jewish Law,” 221.
95
David ben Saadia’s adaptation of this talmudic tripartite division adumbrates
that of Maimonides in Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:11. See Twersky, Code, 489.
96
Stampfer, “Jewish Law,” 223. On the notion of istikhrāj see n. 139 below.
Regarding the rule in m. Keritot 3:9, see Jastrow, s.v. ‫הלכה‬.

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282 Mordechai Z. Cohen

David ben Saadia, coupled with Bahya’s remarks, suggest that the
dynamic model of halakhah, powered by concepts from Muslim
jurisprudence, had taken root in al-Andalus by the end of the eleventh
century.
Unlike Saadia’s primarily static model of talmudic halakhah, which
was tacitly abandoned in al-Andalus, his characterization of (at least
some) rabbinic “readings” of Scripture as secondary projections onto
the biblical text became a commonplace in al-Andalus.97 The Spanish
philosopher-poet Judah Ha-Levi (1175-1041) draws upon this notion
in his Kuzari in responding to the perception that “Karaite…
arguments seem superior and most fitting with the texts of the
Torah,”98 whereas the Rabbis―

… interpret verses of the Torah—at times laws, at other times

in derashot—in ways distant from logical reasoning,99 for we
intuitively know (lit. our soul testifies and our heart tells us)
that the intent (qaṣd)100 of that verse is not what they
mentioned…. Only rarely does their interpretation match
common sense and the obvious meaning (ẓāhir) of the
language.101

To uphold Rabbinic tradition, ha-Levi offers two alternative

explanations. In some cases, he suggests, the Rabbis―

… used the verses by way of [an artificial] prooftext (isnād)

which they called asmakhta (lit. support), used as a sign
(‘alāma) for their tradition. As they made [Gen 2:16] “And the
Lord God commanded the man, saying: ‘Of every tree of the
garden you may freely eat’” a sign for the seven
97
See Elbaum, Perspectives, 65-94; Harris, Fragmentation, 80-86.
98
Kuzari III:22, Baneth and Ben-Shammai ed., 112. Ha-Levi here articulates a
common Rabbanite perception of Karaite scripturalism. Recent scholarship,
however, has shown that the Karaites’ professed scripturalism did not always
produce a straightforward, contextual-philological reading of the biblical text: see
Frank, “Limits”; Erder, “On the Peshat.”
99
‫ יבעדהא אלקיאס‬might also be rendered, “that logical reasoning makes unlikely
(lit. distant, remote).” The term qiyās, as discussed below, was often used in the
specific sense of legal analogy or syllogism, but it also connotes correct
reasoning and common sense, as in this context: see Blau, Dictionary, s.v. ‫;קיאס‬
Lobel, Mysticism, 62; compare Maimonides, Guide II:24, Pines trans., 322, n. 1.
100
On this term, see below, n. 170.
101
Kuzari III:68-72, Baneth and Ben-Shammai ed., 142-143.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 283

commandments commanded to the children of Noah: “‘And

[He] commanded’ – these are the social laws; ‘the Lord’ – this
is blasphemy; ‘God’ this is idolatry; ‘the man’ – this is
bloodshed; ‘saying’ this is adultery; ‘of every tree of the
garden’ – this is robbery; ‘thou mayest freely eat’—this is a
limb [torn] from a living animal” (b. Sanhedrin 56b). How
disparate are these meanings (or ideas; interpretations)102 and
this verse! But these seven commandments were transmitted to
the nation by tradition, and they attached it to this verse as a
sign (siman) to make it easier to remember.103

Ha-Levi here uses the talmudic term asmakhta to characterize this

type of artificial prooftext for laws that are known through tradition,
as his younger colleague and friend Abraham Ibn Ezra would also
do.104 But ha-Levi knew that this account is difficult to project onto all
rabbinic halakhic exegesis and therefore adds that in such cases
another procedure seems to be at work:

They [must have] had secrets hidden from us in their ways of

interpreting (tafsīr) the Torah, which came to them as a
tradition in the usage of the “thirteen middot.” …. And perhaps
both methods [i.e., this and asmakhta] were used by them in the
interpretation of the verses.105

Unlike Saadia, ha-Levi acknowledges that the Rabbis applied the

middot independently to interpret Scripture and create new
legislation.106 But he does not go as far as Bahya or David ben Saadia,
and resists equating the middot with qiyās, perhaps because he wished

102
Aghrāḍ (sing. gharaḍ) lit. purposes. On this term, see below, at n. 168.
103
Kuzari III:73, Baneth and Ben-Shammai ed., 143.
104
See Cohen and Simon, Yesod Mora, 39-41. While this concept has its roots in
the Talmud, the term asmakhta is used there for laws of rabbinic origin
artificially “attached” to a biblical verse. But ha-Levi and Ibn Ezra use the term
askmakhta in association with laws of biblical authority, i.e., ones given orally at
Sinai together with the Written Law, i.e., the Pentateuch. For a similar conception
of asmakhta in Maimonides, see below, n. 169. (Maimonides, however, rules that
such laws do not have biblical authority, notwithstanding their Sinaitic origin: see
Responsa #355, Blau ed., 632.)
105
Kuzari III:73, Baneth and Ben-Shammai ed., 143.
106
I would therefore qualify J. Harris’ absolute statement that “Halevi denies to
rabbinic halakhic midrash any creative role in the fashioning of the halakhic
system” (Fragmentation, 82).

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284 Mordechai Z. Cohen

to avoid validating the parallel Karaite endeavor.107 Moreover, ha-

Levi observes that the middot do not resemble any rational exegetical
method and he therefore characterizes them as a mysterious cipher,108
which only the Rabbis knew through a tradition from Sinai.109

2. Maimonides’ Classification of Rabbinic Readings of

Scripture

Despite differences between David ben Saadia and Bahya, on the one
hand, and ha-Levi, on the other (most notably regarding the validity of
qiyās), these three Andalusian scholars represent a more dynamic
model of halakhah than the one portrayed by Saadia. And it is against
this backdrop that we must evaluate Maimonides, who lived in their
intellectual milieu and was probably influenced by their writings.110
Like ha-Levi, he sought to account for the tenuous rabbinic “readings”
of Scripture, not least in light of the Karaite challenge. The latter is
addressed in his Mishnah Commentary:

The heretics we call Karaites in Egypt, referred to by the

Rabbis as Sadducees and Boethusians… began challenging the
tradition (naql) and interpreting the [biblical] texts (ta’wīl al-
nuṣūṣ)111 according to what seemed most cogent to each
individual without yielding to a Sage at all, in violation of His

107
See Kuzari III:23-37; III:49; Lobel, Mysticism, 58-68.
108
In using the term tafsīr (interpretation) in this context, ha-Levi implies that the
middot were used to discover the original intent of Scripture, a view Maimonides
would challenge, as discussed below. Ha-Levi thus represents a sort of
modification of Saadia’s system: he acknowledges the creative use of the middot,
though he endeavors to differentiate them from qiyās, which is based on human
reasoning. As Sagi (“Praxis,” 306-309, 313-317) shows, ha-Levi believed that in
applying the middot, the Rabbis were discovering the meaning of God’s word,
adhering to what Sagi terms the “discovery model” of truth, as opposed to the
“creative model”; see also below, n. 142.
109
See Lobel, Mysticism, 62-63, 204. Ha-Levi also argues that the sages of the
Sanhedrin benefited from a special connection with the divine spirit located in
the Temple, another feature that distinguished their legislation from Karaite
halakhah based on qiyās, i.e., human legal reasoning. See Lobel, Mysticism, 132-
133; Arieli, “Halevi,” 45-47.
110
See Kreisel, “Influence”; Cohen, Three Approaches, 180, 208-212. On the
influence of David ben Saadia in al-Andalus, see n. 93 above.
111
On the term ta’wīl, see below, n. 121.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 285

dictum, may He be exalted:112 “According to the Law (Torah)

they legislate to you… do not deviate from [it]” (Deut
17:11).113

Rather than responding to the Karaites on empirical grounds,114

Maimonides argues simply that legislative authority was granted only
to the Rabbis, undercutting the validity of independent legal exegesis.
He based this argument on Deut 17:11, as he explains more fully in
Mishneh Torah:

The Torah placed trust [in]… the [sages of the] great religious
court (‫ )בית דין הגדול‬in Jerusalem… as it says: “According to the
Law that they legislate to you [you must act]”– this is a positive
commandment…. Whoever does not act according to their
ruling violates a negative commandment, as it says: “Do not
deviate from the matter they tell you either to the right or to the
left”…. Whether it be matters they expounded from the
tradition (mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah), which are the Oral Law (Torah
she-be-‘al peh), or matters they deduced through their own
understanding with one of the middot by which the Torah is
interpreted.115

Maimonides here makes a critical distinction between two aspects of

rabbinic legislative authority. On the one hand, the Rabbis are faithful
transmitters of the “Oral Law,” i.e., the interpretations of Scripture
transmitted in an unbroken chain from Sinai. Indeed, among the
thirteen cardinal principles of faith Maimonides lists in the Mishnah
Commentary, we find, along with the divine origin of Scripture itself,
the belief that “its transmitted interpretation (tafsīr marwī) is also from
the Almighty.”116 But he also acknowledges the creative role the

112
‫ ;קולה תעאלי‬lit. His saying, may He be exalted: see below, n. 229.
113
Mishnah Commentary, Avot 1:3, Kafih ed, IV:410. On the Karaite-Sadducee
link (mentioned also by Ibn Ezra [cited above]), see Erder, “Karaites.”
114
I.e., by claiming the rational or philological superiority of rabbinic exegesis,
as Ibn Ezra seems to do: see his (standard) introduction to the Torah, Weiser ed.,
I: 2-6.
115
Hilkhot Mamrim 1:1-2.
116
Intro. to Pereq Ḥeleq, Shailat ed., 372-373 [Ar.]; 144 [Heb.]. Compare the
locution ‫“( אלתפאסר אלמרויה ען משה‬the interpretations handed down / transmitted
from Moses”), Intro. to Mishnah, Shailat ed., 338 [Ar.]; 40 [Heb.].

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286 Mordechai Z. Cohen

Rabbis played by legislating new halakhot derived from Scripture

using the thirteen middot.117
The clarification of this two-tiered system in Maimonides’ theory
of uṣūl al-fiqh (i.e., sources of halakhah)118 is a salient contribution of
recent Maimonidean scholarship, addressed in important studies by Y.
Levinger, J. Faur, J. Harris, D. Henshke, M. Halbertal and—most
extensively—G. Blidstein.119 As Blidstein writes:

The term Oral Law… denotes only the divine explanation of

Scripture given explicitly at Sinai [as opposed to] subsequent
interpretation and legislation…. That which is Oral Law is
historically Sinaitic, but rabbinic interpretation and legislation
are no less historically man’s deed…. Maimonides… anchors
much of the Talmudic tradition in objective human
creativity.120

This focus on human creativity distinguishes the dynamic

Maimonidean halakhic model from Saadia’s static one, as the above-
mentioned scholars have emphasized. Building on their work, we will
examine the hermeneutical terms and concepts that he employs in
presenting his model.

a. Transmitted Interpretations
Maimonides begins his Mishnah Commentary by reconstructing how
the laws of Torah were received at Sinai:

Every law that God revealed to Moses our master was only
revealed to him with its interpretation. God told him the text
(naṣṣ), and then told him its interpretation (tafsīr) and
117
In order to undercut the analogous Karaite system of halakhah based on qiyās,
he argues that Deut 17:11 grants exclusive legislative-interpretive authority to the
Rabbis.
118
See Blidstein, “Halakhah,” 13. On Maimonides as a Jewish uṣūlī, see Faur,
Studies, 9.
119
See Levinger, Techniques, 34-65; Faur, Studies, 13-49; Harris,
Fragmentation, 86-90; Halbertal, “Architecture,” 457-473; idem, People, 54-63;
Henshke, “Basis”; Blidstein, Authority 34-45; idem, “Tradition,” 14-20; idem,
“Oral Law,” 108-114.
120
Blidstein, “Oral Law,” 110-111. Maimonides at times uses the term “Oral
Law” in a more general sense to connote all laws that are not explicit in the
biblical text, including those newly enacted by the Rabbis. See Blidstein,
Authority, 27; idem, “Tradition,” 13n; cf. Henshke, “Basis,” 128n.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 287

explanation (ta’wīl)121 …. And they (i.e., Israel) would write

the text and commit the tradition (naql) to memory. And thus
the Sages, peace upon them say: “the Written Law” and “the
Oral Law,” and… [that] “all of the commandments (miṣwot),
their general principles, their details and their particulars
(‫)כללותיהן ופרטותיהן ודקדוקיהן‬, were said at Sinai”… [thus for all]
six hundred and thirteen laws.122

The distinction Maimonides makes here between the text of the Torah
and its original oral interpretation underlies a terminological
convention in his citation of biblical proof-texts throughout his
writings (in both Arabic and Hebrew), as the following chart
illustrates:

Written Law Oral Law

Maimonides’ [‫נץ אלתורה ]=לשון התורה‬ ‫ג'א פי אלתפסיר אלמרוי ]=בא‬
Arabic: Book of “the language (or: very [‫בפירוש המקובל‬
the wording, text) of the “it came [to us] in the
Commandments Torah” transmitted (Heb.
[medieval received)
Hebrew trans. ‫נצת אלתורה ]=בא לשון‬ interpretation”125
by Moses Ibn [‫התורה‬
Tibbon] “the Torah stated ‫ג'אנא אלנקל פי תפסיר הד'א‬
explicitly”123 ‫הקבלה‬ ‫]=ובאה‬ ‫אלפסוק‬

121
Tafsīr is a generic term for interpretation, and usually connotes one that
expresses the most direct, simple meaning of the text. (E.g., Saadia’s translation
is called the Tafsīr.) Although the term ta’wīl also means interpretation (and was
at one time used in Arabic interchangeably with tafsīr), it came to connote a
deeper, more complex type of interpretation, e.g., a figurative or otherwise non-
literal interpretation: see Poonawala, Ta’wīl; Zucker, “Fragments,” 316-318, 320-
321; Weiss, Search, 470-479. In using the term ta’wīl, Maimonides probably
wishes to account for the fact (noted by ha-Levi; above, n. 101) that the Oral Law
does not always represent the most obvious or straightforward interpretation: see
below, at n. 130.
122
Introduction to Mishnah, Shailat ed., 327-328 [Ar.]; 27-28 [Heb.].
123
The term ‫ נץ‬can be a noun (vocalized naṣṣ) meaning text or the very wording,
formulation, language of a book (as reflected in the Hebrew translation ‫)לשון‬, or a
verb (nasṣṣa-yanusṣṣū [=masc.]; nasṣṣat-tanuṣṣū [fem.]; past participle manṣuṣ)
meaning to specify, to state explicitly. See Lane, s.v., ّ'(; compare Blau,
Dictionary, s.v., ‫נצץ‬. Accordingly, ‫ נצת אלתורה‬means the Torah stated explicitly,
whereas ‫( נץ אלתורה‬in the construct state) means the language (or: very wording,

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288 Mordechai Z. Cohen

[‫בפירוש זה הפסוק‬
[‫ג'א אלנץ ]=בא הכתוב‬ “the tradition has come to
“the text [i.e., us in the interpretation of
Scripture] came [to this verse”126
say]”

\ [‫ביין אלנץ ]=ביאר הכתוב‬

‫תביין פי אלנץ ]=התבאר‬
[‫בכתוב‬
“the text made clear” /
“it was made clear in
the text” 124
Maimonides’ ...‫ בפירוש‬,‫מפי השמועה למדו מפורש בתורה‬
Hebrew: ‫בתורה‬ “based on the tradition
Mishneh Torah “explicit… in the they expounded”128
Torah” 127

text) of the Torah. The term naṣṣ can also connote a perfectly clear text that is not
subject to interpretation: see Weiss, Spirit, 122; Hallaq, Origins, 209.
125
The term tafsīr marwī might be rendered more literally “handed-down
interpretation.” Ibn Tibbon renders it perush mequbbal, i.e., “received
interpretation.”
124
See, e.g., Book of the Commandments, Positive Commandment #46, #52, #54,
#55, #88, #89, #110, #128, #236, #239, Negative Commandment #5, #90, #192,
#195, #228, #318, #328, #355. Compare the locution ‫“( נץ ג'לי בביאן‬a clearly
explicit [biblical] text”) in Negative Commandment #194. Maimonides uses
similar phraseology dozens of times in his Mishnah Commentary. In Guide
III:41, Munk-Joel ed., 409, 415, he uses the term naṣṣ-nuṣūṣin his endeavor to
interpret Scripture independently of the halakhah (which derives from the
transmitted interpretation): see Twersky, Code, 437n; Blidstein, “Halakhah,” 15-
16, and below, n. 156. In his halakhic works, of course, he accepts the
“transmitted interpretation” implicitly: see below, n. 130.
126
See, e.g., Book of the Commandments, Positive Commandment #6, #8, #32,
#33, #109, #153, #157, #159, #164, #173, #177, #198; Negative Commandment
#20, #21, #30, #132, #336. These expressions occur numerous other times in The
Book of the Commandments, as well as in the Mishnah Commentary.
127
See Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De‘ot 6:10; Shabbat 20:2; Shofar 7:22; Issurei
Bi’ah 12:10-11; Sheḥitah 5:3, Ma’akhalot Asurot 6:1; Shevu‘ot 5:2; Shegagot
10:5, Ḥovel u-Mazziq 4:9. In Responsum #355, however, the term is used in a
different sense: see n. 191 below.
128
This expression, which appears over a hundred times in Mishneh Torah, has
its origins in geonic literature: see Halivni, Peshat & Derash, 83; Elbaum,
Perspectives, 58. The equivalence of mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah and tafsīr marwī can be
seen, e.g., by comparing Book of the Commandments, Principle #9, Positive

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 289

The terminology in the left-hand column reflects Maimonides spirited

endeavor to demonstrate that the laws he codifies are among “the
commandments written clearly in the text of the Torah,”129 which even
the Karaites would be forced to acknowledge. The price he pays is the
implicit admission that in other cases the Rabbanite legal system
requires faith in the Oral Law. And, indeed, as a number of scholars
have observed, wherever Maimonides employs the phrases
“transmitted interpretation” and “based on the tradition they
expounded”, he tacitly acknowledges that his reading of the biblical
proof-text is not a straightforward philological analysis.130
Maimonides’ initial account of the Oral Law would seem to echo
that of Saadia, especially since he cites the rabbinic dictum regarding
the “general principles… details and… particulars” of the
commandments (above, at n. 122). For him, the “transmitted
interpretation” was comprehensive, and left no biblical text unclear.
There are, however, some new aspects in Maimonides’ account.
Unlike Saadia, he does not use the aṣl-far‘ dichotomy to describe the
range of laws covered by the “transmitted interpretation,” a matter to
which we will return shortly. Maimonides also refines Saadia’s theory
by clarifying the interpretive nature of the Oral tradition, regarding it
not merely as a body of laws, but as an actual commentary on the
Written Law. More significantly, he makes an additional—and rather
striking—claim, which he deems a principle of critical importance:
“[t]hat the interpretations transmitted from Moses, there was no debate
about them at all… at any time, from Moses to R. Ashi (the last of the
talmudic sages).”131 The implications of this claim—and why it is
incompatible with Saadia’s model—become clear when we turn to the
next source of law that Maimonides describes.

Commandment #198 (Kafih ed., 40, 159) with Hilkhot Sanhedrin 18:3, Malweh
we-Loweh 5:1, respectively. See also Henshke, “Basis,” 138-144; cf. Ettinger,
“Legal Logic,” 21n.
129
(‫ ;אלמצוות אלמנצוצה פי אלתורה בביאן )=המצוות הכתובות בתורה בבאור‬Book of the
Commandments, Principle #2, Kafih ed., 14 (cited below); Hebrew translation by
Moses Ibn Tibbon (Heller ed., 8, 13-15).
130
See Levinger, Techniques, 40; Neubauer, Divrei Soferim, 87; Ettinger, “Legal
Logic,” 21. Implicitly, then, Maimonides was aware that Scripture could
theoretically be interpreted differently than as explained at Sinai. His sporadic
interest in exploring such non-halakhic readings has attracted much attention in
Maimonidean scholarship: see below, n. 156. This matter is addressed at length
in chapter three of the monograph announced in n. * above.
131
See below, at n. 153.

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290 Mordechai Z. Cohen

b. The “Thirteen Middot”

Maimonides—using language that strongly echoes Bahya—goes on in
his account of the development of halakhah to explain how it
expanded after Moses’ time:

Whatever… the elders received [from Moses] was not subject

to discussion or disagreement. But the applications (furū‘) not
heard from the Prophet were subject to discussion, the laws
being extrapolated (tustakhraju) through qiyās, with the
thirteen rules given to him at Sinai, and they are “the thirteen
middot by which the Torah is interpreted.” And among those
extrapolated [laws were] matters that disagreement did not
occur in them, but rather there was consensus (ijmā‘) about
them; but in some of them there was disagreement between the
two syllogisms: for this one devised a syllogism and
maintained it strongly, and the other devised a[nother]
syllogism and maintained it strongly, for this typically occurs
with the dialectic syllogisms (al-maqāyīs al-jadaliyya).132 And
if such a disagreement arises, the majority is followed, because
of the dictum of God: “Lean toward the many” (Exod 23:2).
… And when Joshua, peace upon him, died, he transmitted to
the elders (a) the interpretation (tafsīr) that he received, (b)
what was extrapolated (ustukhrija) in his time about which
there was no disagreement, and (c) what was subject to
disagreement and was decided according to the opinion of the
majority.133 And it is about them [i.e., those elders] that
Scripture says: “And all of the days of the elders who lived on
after Joshua” (Josh 24:31). After that, those elders transmitted
what they received to the Prophets, peace upon them, and the
Prophets one to another. And there was no time at which there
was no study of halakhah (tafaqquh) and [legal] creativity
(tantīj; or: bringing forth new things, drawing new
conclusions). And the people of each generation made the
words of those who came before them a principle (aṣl), and
[laws] would be extrapolated (yustakhraju) from it, and new

132
The plural form maqāyīs (rather than the more usual qiyāsāt [see, e.g., above,
at n. 89]) used by Maimonides here and elsewhere (e.g., in his Treatise on Logic,
chapters six through eight), is found in Alfarabi’s writings: see Lameer,
Syllogistics, 42-43. See also Blau, Dictionary, s.v. ‫ מקיאס‬,‫קיאס‬.
133
On the importance Maimonides places on the distinction between categories
(b) and (c), see below at n. 145.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 291

conclusions would be drawn (yuntaju natā’ij); and [as for] the

[original] transmitted principles (lit. roots; al-uṣūl al-marwiyya)
[i.e., from Moses] there was no disagreement about them.134

Whereas Saadia had argued that all of talmudic law—uṣūl and furū‘—
can be traced directly to Sinai, Maimonides argues that only a
relatively small core of laws—the “transmitted principles” (al-uṣūl al-
marwiyya)—was given there, in the text of the Torah with its
“transmitted interpretation.” But much of halakhah was left to be
extrapolated through the middot, yielding derivative laws, i.e.,
furū‘.135 As he would clarify in The Book of the Commandments, the
number of uṣūl is fixed at 613, whereas the furū‘ number “in the many
thousands” (below, nn. 220, 221).
The terminology Maimonides uses to describe this dynamic process
is revealing. He refers to the constant creative legislative activity of
the sages as tafaqquh and tantīj. The first term can be rendered simply
“the study of fiqh”; but it also seems to have the connotation of the
original sense of the root f-q-h (understanding, comprehension), which
in this form of the verbal noun would yield the notion of probing,
aiming for a deep understanding, i.e., of halakhah.136 The term tantīj

134
Intro. to Mishnah commentary, Shailat ed., 328, 335 [Ar.]; 28-29, 36-37
[Heb.].
135
Much has been made of Maimonides’ supposed originality in this respect.
See, e.g., Halbertal, People, 59 (“He is the first to claim that the Sages introduced
novel interpretations of the Torah of their own invention alongside the received
tradition from Moses”). In light of the above-cited passages from Bahya, David
ben Saadia and ha-Levi, it seems that the dynamic model was already in place in
Maimonides’ Andalusian heritage.
136
For a similar usage of the term tafaqquh in Muslim jurisprudence together
with istikhrāj and istinbāṭ, see Sviri, “Istinbāṭ,” 385-387. Alharizi here renders
tafaqquh ‫( התבוננות‬Rabinowitz ed., 28). Maimonides elsewhere identifies this
legislative activity with what is referred to in rabbinic sources as pilpul
(dialectics, probing study) and diqduq (scrutiny; as in ‫=[ דקדוקי סופרים‬scrutiny by
the scribes/sages]); see Book of the Commandments, Principle #2, Kafih ed., 15.
On the definition of fiqh and its relationship to the notion of understanding and
intellectual probing, see Weiss, Search, 24-25; Yunis Ali, Pragmatics, 1-2;
Goldziher-Schacht, “Fiḳh.” In the Book of the Commandments Maimonides
speaks in a different vein of Scripture (rather than the Rabbis) engaging in
tafaqquh (‫)תפקה אלנץ‬, by which he means that the biblical text specified the laws
in a particular area: see Principle #7, Positive Commandments #128, #138 (Kafih
ed., 22-24, 123, 129). In those passages the medieval translator (Moses Ibn
Tibbon) rendered ‫ תפקה אלנץ‬as ‫( דקדק הכתוב‬Heller ed., 13-14, 68, 70). Compare

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292 Mordechai Z. Cohen

means to draw new conclusions;137 but it also has a figurative overtone

of creativity that brings to mind B. Weiss’ characterization of Muslim
jurisprudence:

The Arabic term uṣūl literally means “roots.” The rules [i.e.,
laws; MC] that the jurists produce are called, on the other hand,
“branches” (furū‘) or “fruit” (thamara). The extraction of rules
from the sources is often called “harvesting” (istithmār). The
work of the jurists is thus described by means of agricultural
metaphors. Only the roots (that is, the sources) are given; the
branches, or fruit, are not but rather must be made to appear;
and for this human husbandry is required. The jurist is the
husbandman who must facilitate the growth of the law… out of
the roots.
In carrying out this task, the jurist must first explore… the
meaning of the texts in order to determine what rules are
contained within that meaning. This task requires him to
employ the skills of a philologist and to be well versed in
Arabic lexicography, morphology, syntax and stylistics....
When he is satisfied that he has harvested whatever rules of law
lie within the text’s meaning thus conceived, he may then…
attempt to see what further rules may be gleaned by way of
qiyās with rules already determined.138

Although Maimonides does not use the language of harvesting, he

does make a clear distinction between the two types of legal analysis
delineated by Weiss. For Maimonides, the laws stated in Scripture—
according to its transmitted interpretation—are the uṣūl, from which
further laws are derived using the middot. He refers to this process as
“extrapolation” (istikhrāj; lit., bringing out, extracting139), but not
tafsīr, indicating that it was not used to explain the words of the
biblical text, i.e., reveal its basic meaning (what we might call
interpretation in its most restricted sense). Indeed, for Maimonides
that would be superfluous because, by his account, the written Torah

Blau, Dictionary, s.v. ‫פקה‬, V (“to treat the specifications and ramifications of a
religious law”); see also Schwarz, “Fiqh.”
137
Alharizi renders this term ‫חידוש ענינים‬: see Rabinowitz ed., 28; compare
Shailat’s modern Hebrew translation ‫( הולדת תולדות‬p. 37).
138
Weiss, Spirit, 22-23.
139
Alharizi (Rabinowitz ed., 13, 28) renders istikhrāj in Hebrew using the root y-
ṣ-’ in hif‘il (‫)להוציא‬.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 293

was given at Sinai already with a comprehensive oral elucitation (the

“transmitted interpretation” [tafsīr marwī]) which did exactly that.
Rather, the middot are principles of inference from the laws (uṣūl)
stated in the biblical text, by which new laws (furū‘) not specified
therein are “extrapolated.”140 Maimonides call this process tantīj, i.e.,
“bringing forth” new laws.
As M. Halbertal has shown, this crucial distinction can be regarded
as the centerpiece of Maimonides’ hermeneutical theory.141 Indeed, in
making this distinction, Maimonides finds a powerful new solution to
an old dilemma. When faced with the inappropriateness of the middot
for determining the intent (qaṣd) of the biblical text, ha-Levi (above,
at n. 108) had suggested defining them as a mysterious cipher
entrusted to the Rabbis for interpreting (tafsīr) the biblical text.
Maimonides—a superior talmudist with a better understanding of
rabbinic legal hermeneutics—alleviates the problem in more rational
way by distinguishing between two types of interpretation: (a)
determining the original intent of the language, i.e., tafsīr, as opposed
to (b) inferring new laws from those stated explicitly, i.e., istikhrāj,
tantīj and tafaqquh. By viewing the middot as a counterpart to qiyās in
uṣūl al-fiqh, Maimonides removes them from the first category
altogether. In his view, when the Rabbis applied the middot, they
never thought that they were engaging in textual exegesis and
uncovering the original meaning of the text; instead they were
drawing inferences from it to create new legislation.142
Maimonides’ conception of qiyās—and by extension, the middot—
would, of course, have also been colored by his background in the
discipline of logic. As we have already noted, he devotes three full
chapters (six, seven and eight) of his Treatise on Logic to qiyās, where
the term is clearly used to denote the syllogism. Echoing the standard
hierarchy in Arabic logic, he explains in chapter eight of the Treatise

140
For illustrations of this distinction between interpretation and inference, see
below, nn. 159, 223.
141
See Halbertal, “Architecture,” 468-473; idem, People, 59-63; idem, Truth, 47-
52. On the implication of the term istikhrāj in particular, see Halbertal,
“Architecture,” 469; compare Weiss, Spirit, 88-89.
142
We can define this distinction in terms of the two theories of legal
hermeneutics defined by Sagi, “Praxis,” 305-309: the activity of tafsīr fits what
he calls the “discovery model,” whereas istikhrāj, tantīj and tafaqquh are the
hermeneutical operations of the “creative model” (which ha-Levi wished to avoid
as part of his anti-Karaite polemic: above, n. 106). On the important implications
of this distinction in the realm of legal theory, see below at nn. 144, 173.

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294 Mordechai Z. Cohen

that the most forceful type of qiyās is the “demonstrative syllogism”

(al-qiyās al-burhānī), which is incontrovertible, as opposed to the
looser and weaker “dialectical syllogism” (al-qiyās al-jadalī).143 In the
above-cited passage of the introduction to the Mishnah, Maimonides
clarifies that the type of qiyās used in halakhah (which he refers to
elsewhere as the qiyās fiqhī) falls under the latter category, and
therefore is subject to debate by its very nature.144
This does not mean that all derivations through the middot were, in
fact, debated. As Maimonides notes, some such legislation was
accepted universally at the time it was introduced, in which case it
enjoyed the special authoritative status of “consensus” (ijmā‘).145
However, the very possibility of debate over applications of the
middot contrasts sharply with the 613 “root” laws contained in
Scripture (as explicated by the “transmitted interpretation”), which
were never subject to debate according to Maimonides. This strong
claim is quite revolutionary, and—as later talmudists noted—
overlooks talmudic evidence to the contrary.146 We must therefore ask
why it was so important for Maimonides to make this assertion, which
he reiterates in a later passage by vociferously rejecting the
alternative:

Those who suppose that… disagreement occurred… in laws

transmitted from Moses… through error of the traditions (or:
reception) or forgetfulness…. This, God knows, is a very
repugnant and disgraceful statement…. And the thing that
prompted this corrupt belief is a deficient grasp of the words of

143
Treatise on Logic, Efros 1966 ed., 23-24 (Ar.); English trans., Efros 1938 ed.,
48-49.
144
See above, at n. 81. In Muslim jurisprudence, as well, some authors noted that
qiyās—as a source of law—is inherently subject to debate, referred to as jadal
fiqhī (“juridical disputation”): see Hallaq, History, 94. On the relationship
between the notion of burhān (demonstration) and the juridical qiyās, see Hallaq,
“Logic,” 320-330, 336-339. In acknowledging the inherent subjectivity of legal
reasoning, Maimonides seems to deny that there is necessarily a single correct
answer to every halakhic question. On this matter and its theoretical implications,
see Sagi, Elu va-Elu, 88-117; see also Ettinger, “Controversy.” See also
Ravitsky, “Arguments,” 197-205, who discusses the precise nature of the
relationship between the qiyās fiqhī and qiyās jadalī in terms of Maimonides’
syllogistic categories.
145
As Bahya described (above, n. 89). For a manifestation of the notion of ijmā‘
in Maimonides, see Libson, Custom, 198-199 and studies cited there.
146
See Levinger, Techniques, 63-65, 183; Blidstein Authority, 46-54.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 295

the sages found in the Talmud… and [a failure to] distinguish

between the transmitted principles and the new conclusions that
were extrapolated (‫)אלאצול אלמרויה ואלנתאיג' אלמסתכ'רג'ה‬.147

As M. Halbertal has shown, this rejected position was articulated by

Abraham Ibn Daud (Spain, c. 1110-1180), following the Geonic view
that limited the creative legislative role of the Rabbis and conceived
the halakhic process exclusively “as the transmission from generation
to generation of an orally revealed body of halakhah.”148
Consequently, debates found in talmudic literature could only be the
result of a “crisis in the transmission of tradition.”
Highlighting rabbinic legislative creativity, Maimonides could offer
an account of halakhic debate that does not apply to the original laws
given at Sinai, thereby bolstering the “Oral Law” by arguing that its
transmission was never compromised. What comes to mind is the
notion of tawātur that guaranteed the authenticity of the ḥadīth in uṣūl
al-fiqh. As we have seen, Samuel ben Hofni invoked this notion
explicitly in reference to the oral tradition. Although Maimonides does
not use this specific term, the idea of tawātur—namely, that identical
oral accounts from multiple sources guarantee authenticity—would
seem to inform his claim that the transmitted interpretations were
never debated.149 Most basically, then, his halakhic model reflects the
dichotomy in uṣūl al-fiqh between laws known through a chain of
transmission (naql), i.e., those appearing in the Qur’an and ḥadīth,
which have the epistemological status of ilm ḍarūrī, as opposed to
new legislation by jurists applying their powers of intellect and
speculation (‘aql, naẓar) to infer God’s will without a direct indication
from the sources of revelation.150 For Maimonides, likewise, our
certitude regarding the original laws given to Moses is based on the
authenticity of the transmission (naql) that can be traced to divine
revelation. On the other hand, all further laws were derived by the

147
Introduction to Mishnah, Shailat ed., 339 [Ar.], 40-41 [Heb.].
148
Halbertal, People, 54-59; see also Blidstein, Authority, 38; Harris,
Fragmentation, 292, n. 55.
149
Levinger, Techniques, 183, regards this as a manifestation of the notion of
ijmā‘. However, as recent scholarship of uṣūl al-fiqh has demonstrated, the
authenticity of ḥadīth reports are guaranteed by tawātur, not ijmā‘ (a concept
Maimonides applies to some laws “extrapolated” through the middot, as
mentioned above): see Zysow, “Economy,” 19-31, 198-216; see also Hallaq,
“Inductive Corroboration,” 21-24.
150
See above, n. 86; Hallaq, “Logic,” 338n; Weiss, Search, 43-45, 259-260.

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296 Mordechai Z. Cohen

application of legal reasoning (naẓar, qiyās), the “correctness” of

which is based on the legislative authority granted to the Rabbis and
the soundness of their legal reasoning (naẓar ṣaḥīḥ).151
Maimonides acknowledges one respect in which his model is
difficult to square with the talmudic evidence, since the sages often
apply the middot to establish the meaning of the biblical text, which,
according to him should have already been completely clarified in the
“transmitted interpretation.” Moreover, such “interpretations” are
debated, contradicting his claim that the “transmitted interpretations”
enjoyed unanimity. To address these issues, Maimonides writes:

This is a principle that you must understand…. There is no

debate whatsoever about the “transmitted interpretations” from
Moses. [For example,] we never found a debate… among the
sages, at any time from Moses to Rav Ashi, where one of them
said that one who blinds the eye of a[nother] person, his eye
should be blinded because of the dictum of God, “eye for an
eye” (Deut 19:21), and the other said that he is liable only to
pay monetarily. And we likewise did not find a debate about
the dictum of God, “the fruit of the beautiful tree” (Lev 21:9),
such that one said that it is the citron (etrog), and the other one
said the quince or the pomegranate or something else…. And
anything else like this with respect to any of the
commandments—there is no debate about it, because they are
interpretations transmitted from Moses, and about these and
those that are like them it is said, “All of the Torah, its
principles and details were said from Sinai.”
However… due to the wisdom of the revealed word (i.e.,
Scripture), these interpretations can be extrapolated from it by
means of syllogisms (qiyāsāt), prooftexts (isnādāt), allusions
(or: hints; talwīḥāt), and indications (or: allusions; ishārāt) that
occur in the text.152 And when you see them [i.e., the Rabbis] in

151
See Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni, 147; compare Bahya’s formulation ...‫נט'רוא פיהא‬
‫( בקיאסהם‬above, n. 89). Maimonides elsewhere invokes the naql-qiyās dichotomy
explicitly: see below, n. 189.
152
These three terms (isnād, ishāra and talwīḥ) are used here by Maimonides to
denote a type of reasonable inference from Scripture that is equivalent in rank to
the syllogism. He uses the term ishāra elsewhere in a similar sense: see below, n.
166; see also references cited in Bacher, Bibelexegese, 29n; Davidson,
Maimonides, 131n, 134n (including references to Maimonides’ use of the term
talwīḥ). On the use of this term in Muslim jurisprudence, see, e.g., Hallaq, “Non-

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 297

the Talmud debating (yatanaẓrūna) and disagreeing in the

manner of speculation (naẓar), and they bring a proof for one
of these interpretations… it is not because the matter is in doubt
for them such that they required to bring these proofs for it…
but rather they sought an indication (ishāra) occurring in the
text for this transmitted interpretation.153

Borrowing a version of Saadia’s characterization, Maimonides argues

that the middot are sometimes used in the Talmud to confirm laws
known through the tradition, rather than to derive new laws. In such
cases, the law was never actually in question; the sages merely applied
tools of legal inference to demonstrate that theoretically, the
“transmitted interpretation” could have been extrapolated
independently from the biblical text. In other words, laws known
through naql can be confirmed by legal reasoning and speculation
(‘aql, naẓar). This, for Maimonides, manifests the “wisdom of the
revealed word,” i.e., that Scripture was written in such a way that it
contains indirect allusions to matters clarified in the oral law.
It is helpful to illustrate this category by considering Maimonides’
analysis of the first example he cites, the law of lex talionis in Exod
21:24-25 (“eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand… burn for burn,
wound for wound, bruise for bruise”) and Lev 24:19-20 (“if a man
causes a blemish in his neighbor, as he has done, so shall be done to
him… eye for eye, tooth for tooth”), which was interpreted by the
Rabbis as monetary compensation, a reading that the Talmud (b. Bava
Qamma 83b-84a) bases on a number of alternative midrashic
inferences.154 In Maimonides’ scheme, however, the meaning of these
verses would have had to have been determined already at Sinai. If so,
why would the Talmud need to derive it through midrashic inference?
He therefore argues that the rabbinic interpretation was, in fact,
received at Sinai, a claim he supports by pointing to the absence of
any record of a literal reading of these verses in rabbinic literature.
This law, then, is known from tradition (naql). Yet the Rabbis

Analogical Arguments,” 291 (ishārat al-naṣṣ). Maimonides is not consistent,

however, in his use of the term isnād, which can also mean an artificially devised
textual “support” in his lexicon: see below, n. 167. On the term isnād—used in a
different sense—in Muslim jurisprudence, see Weiss, Spirit, 13.
153
Intro. to Mishnah commentary, Shailat ed., 337 [Ar.]; 38 [Heb.].
154
Ibid., 337 [Ar.]; 38-39 [Heb.]. This blatant contradiction of the literal sense
would have been troubling for authors living in the shadow of Karaite literalism
(compare Kuzari 3:46-47), as Maimonides was well aware: see below, n. 156.

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298 Mordechai Z. Cohen

demonstrated that it could have been inferred independently through

the methods of qiyās, due to the “wisdom” of Scripture. As
Maimonides writes in Mishneh Torah:

“Eye for eye”—based on the tradition (mi-pi ha-shemu‘ah)

they expounded that when it says “for” it is to pay money….
For it says: “You shall take no ransom for the life of a
murderer” (Num 35:31)—for a murderer alone there is no
ransom, but for loss of limbs or wounds there is ransom….
And how do we know that… “eye for (‫ )תחת‬eye…” is
payment? Since it says in this matter “bruise for (‫ )תחת‬bruise”
(Exod 21:25), and it says explicitly (‫)בפירוש‬, “If one strikes
another with a stone, or with his fist… he shall only pay for the
loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed”
(Exod 21:18-19), you may deduce that “for” said in connection
with a wound is payment. The same rule applies to “for” said in
connection with an eye and other limbs.
Even though these matters are apparent from the sense of the
Written Law, they are all clearly stated from Moses our Master
from Mount Sinai… and our forefathers witnessed that the law
was applied in this way in the court of Joshua and in the court
of Samuel [the Prophet] of Ramah and in every court that arose
from the days of Moses our Master until now.155

In theory, Maimonides could simply have codified this law based

solely on the authority of “the tradition” (shemu‘ah)156 which was
“clearly stated from Moses our Master from Mount Sinai” and
confirmed by the practice in all subsequent courts of Jewish law. Yet,
following the talmudic precedent, he chooses to demonstrate that it
can also be inferred from the “sense of the Written Law”157 using the

155
Hilkhot Ḥovel u-Mazziq 1:2-6.
156
As noted above, in using the expression “based on the tradition they
expounded” he acknowledges that the “transmitted interpretation” does not
accord with the straightforward literal reading of Exod 21:24 and Lev 24:20.
Maimonides actually discusses the implications of the literal reading in Guide
III:41, Pines trans., 558: see Levinger, Philosopher, 56-67.
157
Maimonides occasionally makes this type of observation with respect to other
laws: see Hilkhot Nedarim 3:8; Miqwa’ot 1:2, Shegagot 10:5, Melakhim 9:1; see
also discussion of these examples by Twersky, Code, 57; Rabinovitch, Studies,
135-138.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 299

rabbinic methods of legal reasoning.158 As Maimonides explains, a

restrictive reading of Num 35:31 (in his paraphrase: “for a murderer
alone there is no ransom”) implies that monetary compensation
suffices in lesser offenses.159 He then notes that an explicit verse—
Exod 21:18-19—indicates that “bruise for bruise” in Exod 21:25 must
mean monetary compensation and not literal talion; by analogy, the
same would apply to all of the offenses listed in Exod 21:24-25,
beginning with “eye for eye.”160 While tacitly acknowledging that this
is not a literal—or even straightforward—reading of the biblical text,
Maimonides, ever the talmudist, shows that it can be supported
through reasonable legal inference.161

c. Derashot
It is important to emphasize that Maimonides regarded the middot as
reasonable methods of inference,162 distinct from the truly tenuous
rabbinic “readings” of Scripture said in (what he describes elsewhere
as) “the manner of the derashot… [which have] the status of poetical
conceits [and]… are not meant to bring out the meaning (ma‘na) of

158
The endeavor to rationalize the rabbinic interpretation of lex talionis was quite
common in the tradition Maimonides inherited: see Saadia, comm. on Exod
21:14, Ratzaby ed., 115-116; ha-Levi, Kuzari 3:46-47, Baneth and Ben-Shammai
ed., 127; Abraham Ibn Ezra, long and short comm. on Exod 21:24 (Weiser ed.,
II:152, 295).
159
This is a good example of an inference (from A we infer B) as opposed to the
interpretation of the words “eye for eye” (the expression X means Y): see above,
n. 140.
160
The inference from Num 35:31 appears in b. Bava Qamma 83b. At first
glance, Maimonides’ analysis of the word ‫ תחת‬resembles the talmudic application
of a gezerah shawah from Exod 21:36, “He shall surely pay ox for (‫… )תחת‬ox”:
see ibid., 84a. But Maimonides actually is making a type of logical argument by
demonstrating that the ‫ תחת‬in Exod 21:25 can only mean monetary
compensation; compare Leḥem Mishneh (commentary on Mishneh Torah), Ḥovel
u-Mazziq 1:5; see also below, n. 264.
161
Truth be told, however, the “prooftexts, allusions and indications” cited by the
Rabbis are rarely quite as cogent as the ones Maimonides cited in this case (and
the others mentioned in n. 157). See, e.g., the types of “indication” (ishāra) he
cites in the Mishnah Commentary (Shailat ed., 337 [Ar.]; 38 [Heb.]) from b.
Sukkah 35a-b to confirm that “the fruit of the hadar tree” (Lev 23:40) is the
citron (etrog).
162
Compare his characterization of inferences based on the middot as “more
clear” and “more worthy” than mere derashot (below, n. 213). This is
Maimonides’ claim, though, as noted above (n. 161), we might not consider all
applications of the middot to be distinguishable from mere derash.

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300 Mordechai Z. Cohen

the [biblical] text (naṣṣ).”163 He clarifies this distinction in the

introduction to the Mishnah in connection with the legal standards and
measurements used in the Talmud (the size of an olive, a wheat grain,
etc.), which he claims have absolutely no scriptural basis.164 Yet, he
acknowledges that the Talmud records an atomistic reading of Deut
8:8, “a land of wheat and barley…” according to which “this entire
verse is said for measurements.”165 Maimonides’ response is that the
set of halakhic measurements, in fact–

… cannot be extrapolated by syllogism (qiyās), nor is there any

indication (ishāra166) for it in all of the Torah, but the verse was
used only for support (isnād167) as a sort of sign (siman) so that
163
This is his characterization of such readings in Guide III:43, Munk-Joel ed.,
420, Pines trans., 572-573; see also Guide II:30; III:45, Munk-Joel ed., 248, 423;
Pines trans., 353, 578; Book of the Commandments, introduction, Kafih ed., 7.
(As Bacher [Bibelexegese, 31n] observed, Maimonides uses the term derash [pl.
derashot] to designate a fanciful, non-philological rabbinic reading, whereas the
term Midrash in his lexicon denotes a genre of literature, which—in his view—
includes exegetically sound readings of Scripture.) Compare the remark in a
similar vein by Maimonides’ son, Abraham, comm. on Gen 25:29, Wiesenberg
ed., 66-67; see also Elbaum, Perspectives, 146-168. This portrayal of midrashic
exegesis was not uncommon in the Andalusian tradition; compare Abraham Ibn
Ezra, introduction to Lamentations; Nahmanides, Kitvei ha-Ramban, Chavel ed.,
I:308.
164
Intro. to Mishnah commentary, Shailat ed., 337-338 [Ar.]; 39-40 [Heb.].
Maimonides classifies these under the category of “a law to Moses from Sinai”
(‫)הלכה למשה מסיני‬, i.e., a purely oral tradition from Moses that has no inherent
connection to the Written Law. On this category, see Levinger, Techniques, 50-
65.
165
See b.‘Eruvin 4a-b.
166
The contrast with isnād (i.e., an artificial or fanciful “prooftext”: see following
note) makes it clear in this context that Maimonides uses the term ishāra (see
above, n. 152), similar in rank to qiyās, to connote an “indication” that can
reasonably be inferred from Scripture, although it is not stated explicitly.
167
This term (which can be rendered ‫[ הוסמך‬lit. supported] in Hebrew) is not used
consistently in Maimonides’ lexicon. Generally speaking, by isnād he means a
prooftext, and the root s-n-d (form IV) is used in the sense of supporting, i.e., by
providing a prooftext. Here and in other passages (see, e.g., below at n. 184) he is
referring to an artificial or fanciful linkage with Scripture, which he calls siman
in Hebrew and asmakhta in (Aramaic) talmudic parlance. (The term is used
similarly by other authors in the Judeo-Arabic tradition: see, e.g., above at n.
103.) On the other hand, in the above-mentioned discussion (n. 152) Maimonides
uses isnād to signify a reasonable inference from Scripture akin to a syllogism. It
is therefore necessary to determine the precise connotation of this term in

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 301

it would be retained and remembered, but that is not the intent

(or: purpose – gharaḍ168) of the Book (i.e., Scripture), and this
is the meaning of their [i.e., the Rabbis’] saying “the verse is
merely an asmakhta” wherever they said this.169

These comments regarding the derashot would seem to suggest a

sharp dichotomy between fanciful homiletical readings and a
circumscribed exegetical method that aims only to reveal the
intent/purpose (gharaḍ; elsewhere: qaṣd170) and meaning (ma‘na) of
Scripture, in the spirit of Ibn Ezra’s distinction between derash and
peshat (above, at n. 58). Indeed, the terms gharaḍ and qaṣd do reflect
the hermeneutical axiom—well attested in Andalusian tradition—that
equates the meaning of a text with its author’s intent.171 B. Weiss
likewise points to this terminology in characterizing Muslim jurists as
“intentionalists” committed to “a hermeneutics that focuses on
authorial intent as the object of all interpretation.”172
However, it is only partially accurate to speak of Maimonides as an
intentionalist in this sense. While he seems to concur that the meaning
of the biblical text itself is limited to the (divine) author’s intent, as a
staunch talmudist he championed the right—indeed the obligation—of
the Rabbis to construct a legal system through expansive analysis and

Maimonides’ writings based on the context; see other references cited in Bacher,
Bibelexegese, 29n.
168
The term gharaḍ (goal or purpose) is used by Maimonides and other medieval
authors in the sense of intent (see, e.g., above at n. 102 and below at n. 238),
more or less interchangeably with the term qaṣd (goal, aim, intention): see n. 170
below.
169
Intro. to Mishnah commentary, Shailat ed., 337-338 [Ar.]; 39-40 [Heb.]. The
concept of asmakhta (which the Talmud [b. Eruv. 4b] actually invokes in
connection with this reading), was often applied to such far-fetched midrashic
readings in the Andalusian tradition: see above n. 104.
170
See, e.g., Guide, introduction, Munk-Joel ed., 9 (ll. 17, 20: ‫ לם‬...‫אלגרץ' אלמקצוד‬
‫ ;)יקצד‬compare Abraham Maimonides, comm. on Gen 25:28, Wiesenberg ed., 66-
67 (‫ ואן לם יכן קצד אלנץ‬...‫ ;)ומא אחלי בעץ' אלדרשות‬see also above, n. 100. In theory,
one might distinguish between the meaning of a language expression and the
purpose for which it is used, i.e., the speaker’s intention. But Maimonides, in
fact, uses the term ma‘na interchangeably with gharaḍ and qaṣd, which suggests
that he did not make any such distinction.
171
See Cohen, Three Approaches, 231, 324-326; Stern, “Language,” 216-224.
This identification of the meaning of a text with its author’s intent (now termed
“the intentional fallacy”) has been challenged in modern literary theory: see
Stallman, “Intentions”; see also below, n. 173.
172
Weiss, Spirit, 52-58; the citation is from p. 53.

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302 Mordechai Z. Cohen

inference, i.e., qiyās, which unquestionably goes beyond Scripture’s

original intent.173 The difference between this type of legal
interpretation and mere derash is more subtle: both go beyond
Scripture’s original intent, but the former is a genuine, logical process
of derivation, whereas the latter is merely an artificial or poetic
secondary projection onto the text. In classifying the talmudic
“reading” of Deut 8:8 as an asmakhta, Maimonides is thus not merely
arguing that it does not reflect the original intent of this verse. His
point is that it cannot be regarded even as a genuine application of the
middot; i.e., it is not a true “indication” (ishāra) by which the Rabbis
extrapolate new legislation from Scripture. We must therefore assume
that the law of measurements was known from a purely oral tradition,
and was associated with this verse secondarily, as a way to remember
it.
In sum, Maimonides delineates three types of “readings” of
Scripture recorded in rabbinic literature:
(1) Original interpretations of Scripture that were transmitted from
Moses at Sinai;
(2) Logical inferences from Scripture using the thirteen middot;
(3) Artificial readings devised as mnemonic aids or poetic
elaborations.
Based on this three-fold classification and its role in his halakhic
model, we can now proceed to Maimonides’ discussion in Principle
#2 of The Book of the Commandments, which is predicated upon it.

3. The Second Principle in The Book of the Commandments

After completing the Mishnah Commentary in 1168, Maimonides

began planning Mishneh Torah, to which he would devote the next
decade of his life. As a first step, he composed The Book of the
Commandments to enumerate the 613 biblical commandments that
form the core of Jewish law. Although the Code would be written in
Hebrew, this preliminary work—like the Mishnah Commentary—was
written in Arabic, a decision Maimonides would later regret.174 Be that
as it may, its composition in Arabic, sprinkled with citations in
Hebrew and Aramaic, highlights his use of technical talmudic
terminology against the backdrop of his own formulations, a stylistic
matter of significance when we seek to define his understanding of the
173
On the modern debate over intentionalism in legal theory and its relevance to
Maimonides, see Halbertal, People, 46-48, 59-63, 157-161.
174
See Responsa, #447, Blau ed., 725; Twersky, Code, 333-336.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 303

talmudic expression peshuto shel miqra/peshateh di-qera.175

Additionally, his Arabic prose renders transparent his use of
terminology from uṣūl al-fiqh in his analogous quest to delineate the
sources of Jewish law.
The Book of the Commandments was intended to supplant earlier
enumerations of the 613 commandments in the Geonic-Andalusian
tradition, especially the one appearing in Sefer Halakhot Gedolot by
the ninth-century Babylonian author Simon Qayyara, which, as
Maimonides observes, influenced later authors who took up this
endeavor.176 Arguing that such works were unsystematic, Maimonides
devised fourteen principles to insure a proper enumeration. His first
principle, “It is not proper to count… laws that are rabbinic (de-
rabbanan),”177 is directed against his predecessors who included
rabbinically instituted laws such as kindling the Hanukkah lights and
reading the Scroll of Esther.178 Indeed, as D. Sklare has noted, the
emphasis the Geonim placed on the role of the Rabbis as faithful
transmitters of the oral tradition, rather than independent legislators,
caused them to blur the line between rabbinic and biblical
commandments.179 Maimonides, on the other hand, insists on making
this distinction sharply:

175
This is an important feature of Maimonides’ Arabic writings in general, which
helps to distinguish between his voice and the rabbinic statements and coinages
he cites. It is important to note subtle differences between some of Maimonides’
Arabic terms and the seemingly equivalent Hebrew ones; e.g., Torah and Sharī‘a
(see below, n. 182); ‫ שלש עשרה מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן‬and qiyās; ‫סימן‬-asmakhta
and isnād (above, n. 167).
176
See Book of the Commandments, introduction and Principle #10 (Kafih ed., 4-
5, 43); Davidson, Maimonides, 170-171. This introductory list of the 613
commandments—published as Haqdamat Sefer Halakhot Gedolot—may have
been written by another author and later appended to Halakhot Gedolot: see
Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni, 183n, 222n. Among those influenced by it,
Maimonides mentions Kitāb al-Sharā’i‘ of Hefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ and the “many
azharot (poetic listings of the 613 commandments) compiled in our place in al-
Andalus,” probably a reference to the azharot of Solomon Ibn Gabirol and
perhaps of Saadia Gaon (though his azharot were obviously not written in al-
Andalus).
177
Kafih ed., 9.
178
This is attested in Halakhot Gedolot, Saadia, Hefeṣben Yaṣliaḥ and Ibn
Gabirol: see Kafih 9n and Zucker, “Studies,” 97-100.
179
Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni, 159-160n. This tendency is reflected in Ibn Ezra:
see Yesod Mora, Cohen and Simon ed., 113 (with editors’ note).

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304 Mordechai Z. Cohen

Nothing rabbinic may be counted in the sum of 613

commandments because this sum [consists] entirely [of] the
texts (nuṣūṣ) of the Torah.180

Although the distinction between biblical and rabbinic law is already

found in the Talmud, Maimonides’ focus on “the texts of the Torah”
signals a revolutionary biblical orientation that emerges with full force
in Principle #2: “It is not proper to count everything known through
one of the ‘thirteen middot by which the Torah is interpreted’ or a
redundancy (ribbuy).”181 As he goes on to clarify:

We have already explained in the introduction to our

commentary on the Mishnah that most of the precepts of the
Law (sharī‘a182) are derived through the “thirteen middot by
which the Torah is interpreted,” and that disagreement may
occur about a law derived by means of one of those middot.

On the other hand,

Some laws are transmitted interpretations (tafāsīr marwiyya)

from Moses our Master about which there is no disagreement,
but they offer a proof (yastadillu’) for them by one of the
thirteen middot, for it is the wisdom of Scripture that it is
possible to find in it an indication (ishāra) that proves (yadullu)
that transmitted interpretation, or a syllogism (qiyās) that
proves (yadullu) it.183

Maimonides goes on to make his critical distinction: laws based on

Scripture and its transmitted interpretation are biblical, but those
derived through the middot are merely rabbinic. Yet we cannot
automatically assume that all laws presented in the Talmud as being

180
Kafih ed., 12.
181
Kafih ed., 12.
182
The Arabic term sharī‘a (usually rendered Torah by the medieval Hebrew
translators) means religious law and is used by Maimonides here to denote
Jewish law in the general sense. Often, however, he uses the term
interchangeably with Hebrew Torah to connote the biblical text, specifically the
Pentateuch (which he sometimes refers to specifically as “the Written Law”
[Torah sh-bi-khtav]). See Blau, Responsa, II:446n; Kraemer, “Naturalism,” 49-
51.
183
Kafih ed., 12. On the translation of Arabic yadullu as proves, see below.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 305

based on the middot fall into the latter category, since they were
sometimes used to confirm laws known from transmitted
interpretations. The great codifier therefore formulated his distinction
circuitously:

And since this is so, not everything that we find that the Rabbis
extrapolated by one of the thirteen middot is to be classified as
biblical (lit. do we say that it was said to Moses at Sinai), nor
do we classify as (lit. say that it is) rabbinic (de-rabbanan)
everything for which we find the Rabbis bringing a prooftext
(isnād) from one of the thirteen middot, because it may be a
transmitted interpretation (tafsīr marwī).184

Maimonides thus devises an indirect test to ascertain the status of

such laws:

Anything for which you do not find a [source-]text (naṣṣ) in the

Torah and you find that the Talmud deduces it through one of
the thirteen middot, if they [i.e., the Rabbis] themselves
clarified and said (or: stated explicitly) that this is a Torah
principle (guf Torah) or that this is a biblical law (de-orayta),
then it is proper to enumerate it, since the transmitters of the
tradition said that it is biblical (de-orayta). But if they do not
clarify this and did not say anything explicit about this, then it
is a rabbinic law (de-rabbanan), since there is no [biblical] text
(naṣṣ) indicating (yadullu) it.185

To understand these passages, we must clarify the meaning of the

Arabic verb dalla – yadullu (lit. point to [d-l-l, form I]), which was
used in uṣūl al-fiqh to speak of how the law is “indicated” by its
sources. The source of a law is called a dalīl, i.e., an indicator. When
the law is explicitly written (manṣūṣ) in the Qur’an or ḥadīth, its
indicator—which is a prooftext (naṣṣ)—is a dalīl naqli, i.e., a
transmitted dalīl. For laws not explicit in the written texts (ghayr
manṣūṣ ‘alayha), but rather derived through qiyās, the indicator is a
dalīl ‘aqli, i.e., a rational or intellectual dalīl.186 That type of dalīl is
not a prooftext, but rather the legal reasoning that underlies the law.

184
Kafih ed., 13.
185
Ibid. For the expression guf torah, see, e.g., m. Hagigah 1:8, b. Hagigah 11b.
186
See Weiss, Search, 42-46; Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments,” 290; see
also above, at n. 150.

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306 Mordechai Z. Cohen

As B. Weiss observes, the two types of “indicators” function

differently. Dalālat al-naṣṣ (“what the text indicates”) is a direct
“indication” since the law is stated explicitly by the text. But for laws
derived through qiyās, the dalīl is adduced to prove or demonstrate the
validity of the law; in that case the English translation “to prove” best
captures the sense of the verb dalla – yadullu, as we have rendered for
Maimonides.187
The distinction between the dalīl naqlī and dalil ‘aqlī underlies
Maimonides’ claim that the 613 biblical laws are those stated clearly
(manṣūṣ) in Scripture, i.e., each has a “text indicating it.”188 On the
other hand, laws extrapolated through the middot are merely rabbinic,
since their dalīl is a product of human reason, not the divine word
itself. However, in many instances the middot are also used to confirm
what is already known from a transmitted interpretation, i.e., of the
biblical text. In that case, as Maimonides clarifies later in this
principle,

We indeed count it, for it was known through tradition (or:

transmission; naql), not through a syllogism (qiyās), but its
syllogism and proof (istidlāl) through one of the thirteen
middot was only [adduced] to reveal the wisdom of the text
(i.e., of Scripture), as we explained in the Mishnah
commentary.189

187
The same semantic range applies to the verb istidlāl (d-l-l, form X; i.e., to
adduce a dalīl), which can mean simply mentioning (dhikr) the prooftext that
states a given law explicitly, but is also used to in the sense of seeking a rational
proof for a law that has no explicit textual basis: see Weiss, Search, 655. The
medieval Hebrew translators rendered istidlāl ‫( הביא ראיה‬bringing a proof). As for
the verb yadullu, Moses Ibn Tibbon (translator of The Book of the
Commandments) rendered it ‫( יורה‬lit. to point to), which can likewise mean either
to indicate (i.e., with an explicit direct prooftext) or to demonstrate (through a
rational argument). The term dalāla, of course, can also mean to guide in the
sense of indicating the proper path, as in Dalālat al-Ḥā’irīn (Guide of the
Perplexed; Heb. ‫)מורה נבוכים‬. For further discussion of the notion of dalāla in
Muslim jurisprudence, see Schwarb, “God’s Speech,” 124*, 128*, 130*, 146-
148*.
188
‫נץ ידל עליה‬. Admittedly, Maimonides uses this phrase in the opposite
connection, i.e., in referring to a law that does not have biblical force, because it
lacks “a text indicating it.” But the implication is clear: a law is of biblical force
if and only if it has a text indicating it.
189
Kafih ed., 15. Maimonides’ reference is to the citation from the Mishnah
commentary above, at n. 153.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 307

In this case, the true basis of the law is a dalīl naqli, i.e., the
underlying transmitted interpretation, whereas the qiyās merely shows
that it could have been demonstrated rationally as well.
At this point we must observe a certain terminological
inconsistency (perhaps a calculated sleight of hand?) in Maimonides’
use of the term naṣṣ in reference to the biblical text. As mentioned
above (at nn. 123, 129), he employs this term throughout his writings
to connote that which is explicit in the Written Law, without any need
to consult its “transmitted interpretation” (tafsīr marwī, naql). But
Maimonides could not have had this connotation in mind when
establishing that the 613 commandments consist only of “the texts of
the Torah” (Principle #1), since he goes on to exclude laws derived
through the thirteen middot (Principle #2), unless they actually come
from the transmitted interpretations, in which case they are to be
counted. The implication is clear: a law that derives from Scripture
according to its transmitted interpretation is biblical—even if it is not
necessarily clear from the biblical text alone (what he elsewhere refers
to as naṣṣ). And indeed, this is confirmed by the many entries in The
Book of the Commandments in which the biblical prooftext is
accompanied by a transmitted interpretation—specifically labeled as
such.190 When using the term naṣṣ in connection with Scripture in
Principles #1 and #2, Maimonides evidently means the biblical text, as
elucidated by the transmitted interpretation.191
We are now equipped to address Maimonides’ construal of the
peshat maxim, which he introduces to undermine the methods of
enumeration in the Halakhot Gedolot and works of like-minded
authors:

When they found a derash on a verse that… requires

performing certain actions or avoiding certain things, and all of
those are undoubtedly rabbinic (de-rabbanan), they counted
them in the sum of the commandments, even though the peshat
of Scripture (peshateh di-qera) does not indicate (yadullu) any
of those things.192

190
See above, n. 126.
191
A similar observation applies to the Hebrew expression meforash ba-Torah
that Maimonides used in Responsa #355: see above, nn. 6, 127. This point was
made by Levinger, Techniques, 40.
192
Kafih ed., 14. On the term yadullu in this context, see above, n. 183.

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308 Mordechai Z. Cohen

A law based on mere derash cannot be regarded as having a genuine

textual indicator (dalālat al-naṣṣ); i.e., it has no true source in “the
peshat of Scripture.” Invoking talmudic authority for support,
Maimonides notes that Halakhot Gedolot violated the famous rabbinic
dictum:

They [i.e., the Rabbis] of blessed memory taught us…: “A

biblical verse does not leave the realm of its peshat”, and the
Talmud in many places inquires: “The verse itself (gufeh di-
qera), of what does it speak?”193 when they found a verse from
which many matters are deduced by way of commentary
(sharḥ) and inference (or: bringing a proof; istidlāl).194

The Talmud will at times offer an expansive reading of a verse, but

then inquire what “the verse itself” actually says. Based on the
talmudic maxim, “A biblical verse does not leave the realm of its
peshat,” Maimonides argues that the Rabbis granted biblical authority
only to the latter. Evidently he took the maxim to mean that “a biblical
verse does not go beyond its peshat,” i.e., only what peshateh di-qera
says (“indicates”) has biblical authority.195

193
As Kafih here notes, this precise expression (‫ )גופיה דקרא במאי קמדבר‬is not
found in rabbinic literature, though this type of inquiry is certainly attested in the
Talmud. Compare the talmudic locutions: ‫“( פשטיה דקרא במאי כתיב‬the peshat of
the verse, of what is it written?”) and ‫ משתעי קרא‬...‫“( ב‬the verse speaks [of]…”).
194
Kafih ed., 14. On the terms sharḥ and istidlāl in this context see below.
195
If we use the talmudic idiom, we might say that Scripture remains exclusively
“in the hands of” its peshat. Maimonides’ construal of this maxim was
understood in this way already by Nahmanides, who rejects it, writing –
They did not say ‫“( אין מקרא אלא כפשוטו‬A biblical verse is nothing but its
peshat”), but rather we have its midrash (‫ )מדרשו‬with its peshat and it does not
leave the realm (lit. “hands”) of either one of them. But Scripture can bear all
[meanings], both being true. (Critique of Principle #2, Hassagot, Chavel ed.,
44-45)
According to Nahmanides the maxim means that although derash is a legitimate
interpretation, the peshat still stands (as though the verse still remains in the
possession or realm of the peshat even though the derash has control over it as
well). On this debate, see Wolfson, “Way of Truth,” 126-129; Schwartz, “Peshat
and Derash,” 74-75. Based on Nahmanides’ position, which seems to reflect the
hermeneutical assumption of Rashi’s school (see Kamin, Jews and Christians,
xxviii-xxxiii), the peshat maxim is sometimes rendered “Scripture (or: a biblical
verse) cannot be deprived of (or: never loses) its peshat” (see above, nn. 24, 25).

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 309

What does the term peshat itself mean for Maimonides? If Principle
#2 were penned by Ibn Ezra or Nahmanides, we could assume peshat
to be the straightforward or philological-contextual sense of
Scripture. But Maimonides accepted the “transmitted interpretation”
of Scripture implicitly, even while acknowledging its divergence from
the straightforward sense. We must therefore seek an alternative
definition of the term that would reflect his usage. Some basic
observations can be made based on what we have already seen in
Principle #2, which we will confirm in our examination of the other
passages in the Book of the Commandments in which it is applied
explicitly.196
(1) Maimonides equates peshateh di-qera and gufeh di-qera.
a. This is evident in his paraphrase (deliberate misquote? [above, n.
193]) of the talmudic query “the peshat of the verse of what is it
written?” (‫)פשטיה דקרא במאי כתיב‬, which he renders “the verse itself,
of what does it speak” (‫)גופיה דקרא במאי קמדבר‬.
b. This equivalence is also reflected by Maimonides’
interchangeable use of the two expressions elsewhere in The Book
of the Commandments.197
(2) The Arabic equivalent of peshat in Maimonides’ lexicon would
appear to be naṣṣ.
This emerges from a comparison of the following two locutions:
– “peshateh di-qera does not indicate (‫ )פשטיה דקרא לא ידל‬any of
those things”
– “…there is no [biblical] text (naṣṣ) indicating (‫ )ליס ת'ם נץ ידל‬any
of those things”198
This parallel suggests that when Maimonides uses the term
peshateh di-qera he is speaking about nothing other than the textual
dalīl itself.

196
I.e., where the terms peshateh di-qera or gufeh di-qera are used: see below, n.
219. Principle #2 can be said to underlie much of Maimonides’ exegesis in the
Book of the Commandments—and Mishneh Torah for that matter. But that
subject is beyond the scope of the current study. See below, n. 277.
197
In three other places in the Book of the Commandments he uses the term gufeh
di-qera to invoke his peshat principle: twice in Negative Commandment #45
(below, nn. 247, 249; note parallel to the discussion of the same example in
principle #8 [below, n. 246], where he employs the expression peshateh di-qera);
once in Negative Commandment #165 (below, at n. 233).
198
See citations above, at nn. 185, 192. Compare the locution ‫פידל הד'א אלנץ‬
‫“( במפרדה‬and this text by itself indicates”) in Positive Commandment #140
(Kafih ed., 130).

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310 Mordechai Z. Cohen

(3) Maimonides uses the locution “peshat di-qera speaks about ( ‫יתכלם‬
‫[ )פי‬such and such]”:
– Positive Commandment #20 ...‫פשטיה דקרא פהו יתכלם פי‬
– Negative Commandment #4 ...‫פשטיה דקרא יתכלם פי‬199
It would not be reasonable to render peshateh di-qera “the
straightforward interpretation (or: sense) of the biblical verse” in
this locution.200 It would seem, rather, that when Maimonides uses
the term peshateh di-qera he means the biblical verse itself (gufeh
di-qera) or the biblical text (naṣṣ), which “speaks about…” If
peshateh di-qera were the straightforward interpretation, he would
say: “according to its peshat (‫)לפי פשוטו‬, the verse speaks about
such and such,” as other authors do.201 This would suggest that
peshateh di-qera is the object of interpretation, not its result.202
Based on this evidence, we can conclude that for Maimonides, the
term peshateh di-qera is not the name of a method of interpretation or
an approach to understanding Scripture. Rather, peshateh di-qera
connotes the biblical verse itself, just like the term gufeh di-qera or

199
See below, at nn. 254, 260. Indeed, Maimonides’ paraphrase ‫גופיה דקרא במאי‬
‫—קמדבר‬for the talmudic ‫—גופיה דקרא במאי כתיב‬is based on his Arabic term ‫יתכלם‬
...‫פי‬.
200
The other Maimonidean locutions that include the term peshateh di-qera
would theoretically allow for its translation as “the straightforward sense,” but
the term can also be rendered the verse itself, as we see from the remaining
examples from the Book of the Commandments (all discussed below). In one
case: “the gist of the verse itself” (‫ ;תחציל פשטיה דקרא‬Positive Commandment
#94). In four cases ‫“ פשטיה דקרא‬is about…” or “is not about”:
• Principle #3, ‫ — פשטיה דקרא ליס הו פי ד'לך‬the verse itself is not about this.
• Negative Commandment #179, ‫ … — פשטיה דקרא הו פי אלשרץ פקט‬is about a
swarming thing only.
• Negative Commandment #299, ‫ …— פשטיה דקרא הו פי מא ד'כר אול‬is about
what was mentioned first.
• Principle #8, '‫ …— לא אן פשטיה דקרא פי הד'א אלגרץ‬not that the verse itself
has this intent.
201
See, e.g., Nahmanides on Lev 6:23 ( ‫ אין הכתוב מדבר אלא בחטאות‬,‫ועל דרך הפשט‬
‫)הפנימיות שצוה כבר בשריפתן‬, Rashbam on Exod 28:38 ( ‫לפי פשוטו לא דיבר הכתוב‬
‫)בטומאת קדשים‬, Radak on II Sam 23:20 ( ‫וכל אלה דברים רחוקי' מדרך הפשט כי הכתוב‬
‫)מספר גבורות כל אחד מהם‬. For all of these authors, it is Scripture (‫ )הכתוב‬that
“speaks”—according to “its peshat” or “the way of peshat.”
202
Compare S. Kamin’s remark based on Rashi’s talmudic commentary: “What
emerges from Rashi’s formulation is that peshateh [di-qera] is the object of the
act of interpretation, not its result. This is implied by the linguistic combinations
[of Rashi]: ‫( דריש פשטיה‬he interpreted its peshat), ‫( דאתא פשטיה לאשמועינן‬the peshat
comes to teach us)” (Categorization, 40-41).

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 311

naṣṣ. All three of these terms refer to the divine text that “indicates”,
i.e., communicates, God’s will. While modern readers accustomed to
the usage of the term peshat by Rashi, Ibn Ezra and their followers
might regard this as unusual, it matches precisely the meaning of this
term in talmudic literature, as S. Kamin and M. Ahrend have
interpreted it.203 Given Maimonides’ talmudic background, it should
not be surprising that he would employ the term peshat as it used in
rabbinic literature.
Of course, the natural question arises: What determines the
meaning of “the text itself,” i.e., peshateh di-qera? In theory, a
locution of this sort might imply that the meaning of the text is self-
evident (consider Maimonidean expressions naṣṣ jalī bi-bayān,
meforash ba-torah); but in practice, Maimonides relies heavily on the
“transmitted interpretation” to make this determination.204 Evidently,
then, Maimonides would define what “the text itself says / indicates”
(dalālat al-naṣṣ or dalālat al-peshat) as: what is known for certain to
be the meaning of the text, either because the text is explicit or
because it is an interpretation from Sinai transmitted through a
tradition about which there never was—nor could be—any debate.205
This incontrovertible tradition reveals how peshateh di-qera was

203
See references above, n. 17. Kamin (Categorization, 31) summarizes her
conclusion in the following words:
From a detailed examination of [the terms] peshuto shel miqra and peshateh
di-qera in their contexts… [it is evident that] the basic meaning of these
Hebrew and Aramaic terms is Scripture itself (‫)הכתוב עצמו‬. Just like the terms
‫ כתוב‬,‫ פסוק‬,‫מקרא‬, so too ‫ פשוט‬and ‫ פשט‬denote the linguistic unit. ‫פשוטו של מקרא‬
and ‫ פשטיה דקרא‬mean the Biblical text (‫)משמעם הכתוב המקראי‬.
See also above, n. 202. Ahrend, “Concept,” 246, writes similarly:
In the Talmud, this… expression denotes neither the meaning of the words,
nor the interpretation of Scripture, and certainly not any sort of defined
method according to which it is “proper” to interpret it. Peshuto shel miqra—
peshateh di-qera – is the Scriptural text itself.
Halivni, Peshat & Derash, 53-79, offers a slightly different analysis of the
talmudic term peshateh di-qera; but he, too, assumes that it connotes the biblical
text (in its wider context) and not a method of interpretation.
204
Compare the observation of M. Halbertal (“Architecture,” 472n) that Scripture
“does not need any interpretation; it is clear, either through regular reading or
through the tradition.” Halbertal, however, does not correlate this assumption
with the meaning of the term peshat.
205
I am grateful to Josef Stern for his suggestions in formulating this definition.
On the epistemological certitude Maimonides’ associated with the “transmitted
interpretation” and its Muslim context, see above, at nn. 149, 150.

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312 Mordechai Z. Cohen

originally “interpreted”—i.e., assigned an exclusive, practical

meaning—by God Himself.206
As for the peshat maxim, Maimonides construes it to mean that
Scripture does not go beyond itself. In other words, whatever was not
initially pronounced by God as being signified by peshateh di-qera
(i.e., it is not dalālat al-naṣṣ) does not have biblical authority. As
opposed to the “transmitted interpretations,” which illuminate
peshateh di-qera, the further hermeneutical activities of the Rabbis—
to which Maimonides refers as “(i) commentary (sharḥ) and (ii)
inference (istidlāl)”—can create laws of rabbinic authority only. To
clarify the parameters of the latter two categories, we must turn to the
ensuing discussion in Principle #2.207 Maimonides, for example,
criticizes the author of Halakhot Gedolot and those who followed in
his path, because –

… they enumerated… visiting the sick, consoling mourners and

burying the dead, on account of the derash… “And you shall…
show them the way wherein they must walk, and the work that
they must do” (Exod 18:20)…—“‘The way’ – this is deeds of
loving kindness; ‘they must walk’ – this is visitation of the
sick; ‘wherein’ – this is burial; ‘and the work’ – these are the
laws; ‘which they must do’ – this is [to go] beyond the margin
[i.e., letter] of the law” (b. Bava Qama 99b-100a). And they
thought that every single one of those actions is a separate
commandment, and they did not know that all of those actions
and the like are included in the single commandment… stated

206
I am grateful to Baruch Schwartz for suggesting this formulation. See citation
from the Mishnah commentary above, at n. 122. Maimonides speaks there of the
two components being naṣṣ (text) and naql (tradition). Where the text is clear by
itself, presumably the tradition simply confirmed that fact. Even in such cases,
then, the interpretation was originally fixed by God Himself.
207
Philological analysis of these terms themselves is not sufficient here, because
they are used in a number of ways by Maimonides. Sharḥ is rather vague and can
refer to various types of exegesis. While Maimonides here seems to use it in
reference to mere derash (as we shall document presently; see also below, at n.
255), elsewhere it denotes philological-contextual analysis, e.g., he refers to his
own Mishnah commentary as sharḥ al-mishnah. He also uses this term to denote
a “transmitted interpretation” that he deems authoritative (see, e.g., below, nn.
256, 259). The term istidlāl, likewise, is used in a number of ways, both to label
what he regards as reasonable inferences using the thirteen middot (see, e.g.,
above, at n. 183) and derash that is cited in the Talmud as an artificial support for
a rabbinic law, i.e., an asmakhta (see below, nn. 232, 236).

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 313

explicitly (manṣūṣ… bi-bayān) in the Torah… “Love your

neighbor as yourself” (Lev 19:18).208

Based on what is stated (manṣūṣ) in Lev 19:18, Maimonides

enumerates the single commandment of acting kindly toward
others.209 On the other hand, the specific acts of kindness enumerated
in the atomistic, acontextual talmudic reading of Exod 18:20 do not
have a genuine basis in the biblical text, and he therefore regards them
as rabbinic enactments. As specified in Mishneh Torah: “Even though
all of these miṣwot are rabbinic (mi-divreihem), they are included in
‘Love your neighbor as yourself’” (Hilkhot Evel 14:1). For the great
codifier, only the general principle is biblical, but its implementation
in the specific types of activity mandated in the Talmud is merely
rabbinic.210
A similar acontextual analysis is cited by Maimonides in the next
example that he considers to have been improperly enumerated:

And in this very way they counted calculation of the seasons

(intercalation) as a commandment because of the derash…
“For this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of
the nations” (Deut 4:6)…—“What wisdom and understanding
is in the sight of the peoples? Say, that it is the science of
seasons and planets” (b. Shabbat 75a).211

When seen in context, as part of Moses’ exhortation to the people

(“See I have imparted to you laws and rules, as the Lord… has

208
Kafih ed., 14. See also Hilkhot Evel 14:1. On Maimonides’ tendency to seek a
cogent biblical source where the Rabbis engaged in derash, see below, n. 265.
209
See Book of the Commandments, Positive Commandment #206, Kafih ed.,
163. Maimonides does not cite a specific rabbinic source for this straightforward
reading, nor can it be traced to any of the (rather remote) legal derivations in
rabbinic literature: see, e.g., b. Ketubot 37b, Qiddushin 41a, Sanhedrin 45a, 84b,
Niddah 17a.
210
The precise implications of this distinction are difficult to grasp in this case,
since, after all, when one performs the rabbinically required activity, one is
presumably also fulfilling a biblical obligation. Perhaps Maimonides means to
say that the biblical obligation itself leaves room for subjective interpretation, i.e.,
by granting each individual leeway to decide which type of activities are most
important, e.g., helping a disabled person with household chores might be more
important than visiting the sick. The Rabbis, however, made the latter a definite
obligation. I am indebted to my friend Jordan Mann for this suggestion.
211
Kafih ed., 14.

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314 Mordechai Z. Cohen

commanded... Observe them faithfully, for this is your wisdom and

your understanding in the sight of the nations, who on hearing all of
these laws will say: ‘Surely that nation is a wise and discerning
people’” [Deut 4:5-6]), it is quite clear that this verse does not actually
refer to intercalation, an idea projected onto the text by way of derash.
In the Book of the Commandments Maimonides does not offer an
alternative reading of this verse; but in Guide III:31 he interprets it
contextually to mean that the rationale for the commandments (their
“wisdom”) is discernable to all nations.212 Evidently he regarded this,
rather than the rabbinic interpretation, as the correct construal of
peshateh di-qera, i.e., what the verse itself communicates.
The fanciful rabbinic derashot on Exod 18:20 and Deut 4:6, of
course, made easy targets for Maimonides’ exclusionary principle.
However, he goes on to apply the peshat maxim to the more serious
methods of inference that underlie rabbinic legislation:

And had he [i.e., the author of Sefer Halakhot Gedolot] counted

what was more clear than that, which could be considered more
worthy to be counted, namely everything known through one of
the “thirteen middot by which the Torah is interpreted,” the
number of commandments would reach many thousands.213

Unlike mere derash, the middot—in Maimonides’ view—are logical

inferences. Moreover, he is quick to emphasize the validity of this
hermeneutical activity and the laws derived therefrom:

And lest you think that we refrain from counting them because
they are not certain (mutayaqqina), and that the law derived
from such a middah may be valid (ṣaḥīḥ) or may be invalid,
that is not the reason. But the reason is that everything [so]
derived are applications of the principles (furū‘ min al-uṣūl; lit.
branches from the roots) that were told to Moses at Sinai
explicitly, and they are the 613 commandments.214

212
See Guide III:31, Pines trans., 524. A similar interpretation is given by Ibn
Ezra, comm. on Deut 4:6 and in Yesod Mora, Cohen and Simon ed., 156. On this
parallel, see Twersky, Code, 385; idem, “Influence,” 28-32.
213
Kafih ed., 14.
214
Kafih ed., 15. On the legal implications of this distinction, see Levinger,
Techniques, 78-87.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 315

For Maimonides, of course, the derivation of new laws—“branches

from the roots”—through qiyās is essential to the halakhic system.
Here he adds, however, that since such derivatives are based on
inference rather than what is stated in Scripture itself (peshateh di-
qera, dalālat al-naṣṣ), their authority is rabbinic rather than biblical.
Having clarified precisely which types of “commentary (sharḥ) and
inference (istidlāl)” Maimonides distinguishes from peshateh di-qera,
we can now correlate the halakhic implications he draws from the
peshat maxim with the hermeneutical distinction presented in his
introduction to the Mishnah between (a) the transmitted interpretation
(tafsīr, ta’wīl) of Scripture—which reveals the original intent of the
biblical text itself, and (b) the further legal inferences istikhrāj,
istidlāl, which go beyond it. We had originally concluded from the
second category that Maimonides is not a pure “intentionalist”
because he allows for innovative rabbinic legal hermeneutics that
actually create meaning, rather than aiming simply to discover the
original intent of Scripture. In Principle #2, however, he does reveal a
degree of intentionalism by arguing that only category (a)—which is
known exclusively through the tradition (‘ulima bi-l-naql) from
Sinaitic revelation—has biblical authority, since it reveals the
meaning of peshateh di-qera, i.e., Scripture itself. Category (b), on the
other hand, is merely rabbinic since it “leaves the realm of peshuto
shel miqra”; i.e., it is not a legal construal of Scripture itself, but
rather represents the “creation of meaning” through human reasoning
(‘aql, qiyās), not revelation.
The hermeneutical distinction that Maimonides makes based on the
peshat maxim can be characterized in three ways: historical,
epistemological and legal.
(1) Historically speaking, this maxim (as interpreted by
Maimonides) separates the original interpretations of the Pentateuch
given or understood at the time of the Sinaitic revelation from
subsequent inferences from the text or projections onto it.
(2) From an epistemological perspective, the certainty of the former
is absolute—since the meaning of peshateh di-qera is either self-
evident, or has been transmitted in an unbroken and uncontested chain
of tradition that originates in the meaning of the text assigned by God.
By contrast, legal inferences from the text, which are based on human
reasoning (naẓr, ‘aql), are subject to debate and their correctness
therefore cannot be known for certain.
(3) The legal authority of peshateh di-qera is biblical, whereas
further laws derived from the text have only rabbinic authority. While

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316 Mordechai Z. Cohen

the distinction between laws of biblical and rabbinic authority in itself

is talmudic, Maimonides uses the epistemological distinction from
uṣūl al-fiqh to conceptualize it.
For Maimonides, the peshat maxim does not necessarily (i.e., by
definition) imply—or depend upon—a methodological criterion (the
“plain” or “straightforward” sense), as it typically does for other
pashtanim. Indeed, in this respect, the great codifier’s definition of
peshateh di-qera is practically unique within the exegetical
tradition.215 Nonetheless, his application of the peshat maxim—which
he effectively turns into a principle of peshat primacy—reveals
important points of contact with the Geonic-Andalusian exegetical
school, as we shall see currently.

4. Explicit Applications of the Second Principle

Among Maimonides’ halakhic positions, his classification of laws

derived exclusively through the middot as rabbinic rather than biblical
is certainly one of his most novel and controversial. Nahmanides,
perhaps the most important critic of The Book of the Commandments,
deems “this book… ‘sweetness and entirely delightful’ (Song 5:16),”
but decries “this principle… [as] evil and bitter,” adding that “it
should sink [into the ground] and never be uttered.”216 Citing abundant
talmudic evidence, Nahmanides demonstrates that the Maimonidean
notion that “the truth is the peshat of Scripture, not matters derived
midrashically” (in Nahmanides’ paraphrase; above, n. 7) is difficult to
square with the spirit of rabbinic halakhic exegesis.217 This, of course,

215
The monograph announced in n. * above includes a comparison of
Maimonides’ construal of the peshat maxim with the ways it was otherwise
understood within the Geonic-Andalusian and northern French exegetical
schools.
216
Hassagot, critique of Principle #2, Chavel ed., 51.
217
Maimonides’ talmudic defenders, in a tradition dating to the fourteenth
century, suggested reinterpreting his words to mean that the laws derived through
the middot are indeed of biblical force, and that when Maimonides classifies
them as “rabbinic” (de-rabbanan) he only means to say that they cannot be
enumerated among the original 613 commandments given at Sinai. For a detailed
survey of this tradition, see Neubauer, Divrei Soferim, 30-75. This, of course, is
not how Nahmanides understood the matter, and modern scholarship tends to
accept his literal understanding the second principle: see Neubauer, Divrei
Soferim, 24-30, 81-86; Levinger, Techniques, 46-50; Halbertal, “Architecture,”
464n. Interestingly, the traditional reinterpretation has been revived in a more

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 317

points to the boldness of Maimonides’ endeavor to impose order on

the talmudic halakhic system. Yet to properly gauge this innovation,
we must explore precisely how he applied his principle of peshat
primacy in the Book of the Commandments.
Nahmanides’ critique assumes that Maimonides sought to classify
as rabbinic (de-rabbanan) all halakhot that are not based on a
straightforward reading of Scripture (which corresponds to
Nahmanides’ own definition of peshuto shel miqra). This is echoed by
the conventional understanding of Maimonides’ Principle #2, as
reflected, for example, in the following characterization by Sh.
Ettinger:

Regarding the question, According to what principle and based

on what criterion does Maimonides determine if a given law
that was derived from Scripture is biblical or rabbinic?, one can
answer simply: A derivation that appears to Maimonides,
according to his logic and reasoning, to emerge from Scripture
according to its peshat, or at least is a derivation that fits
Scripture—is biblical. Conversely, a derivation that appears far
from the peshat of Scripture and one cannot regard it as being
included in the meaning of Scripture, must be merely an
asmakhta and its status is rabbinic.218

On this view, Maimonides applies an empirical test to rabbinic

halakhic exegesis, akin to Ibn Ezra’s remark, “One who has a mind
(lit. heart) will be able to discern when they speak peshat and when
they speak derash” (above, n. 58).
But this characterization oversimplifies—and thus misrepresents—
Maimonides’ true position, in part by projecting a foreign definition of
the term peshat onto his writings. In truth, as we have demonstrated,
he does not invoke the peshat maxim as Ibn Ezra does, i.e., to filter
out the straightforward, philological-contextual readings of Scripture
from the corpus of rabbinic exegesis. For Maimonides, peshateh di-
qera means nothing other than the text of Scripture itself, which must
be understood according to the single sense assigned to it by God
Himself in the Oral Law given at Sinai and transmitted by the Rabbis
(the tafsīr marwī)—and that is not necessarily equivalent to the

nuanced form in some recent studies: see Halivni, Peshat & Derash, 83; Ben-
Menahem, “Roots,” 20-25.
218
Ettinger, “Legal Logic,” 20. Translation my own; bold in the original. On the
equivocal phraseology “…or at least… fits Scripture,” see below, n. 283.

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318 Mordechai Z. Cohen

straightforward sense. The simple peshat-derash dichotomy of Ibn

Ezra and Nahmanides does not suit the Maimonidean model, which is
predicated upon a different hermeneutical classification. He invokes
the peshat maxim to isolate dalālat al-naṣṣ—what is known for
certain to be God’s will—from other laws subsequently projected
artificially onto, or even legitimately derived from Scripture by way of
“commentary and inference,” i.e., derash and the middot.
There is a kernel of truth in the conventional wisdom, since
Maimonides’ application of Principle #2 at times reflects the values of
the Andalusian model of peshat as articulated, for example, by Ibn
Ezra. In order to clarify this dimension of his halakhic hermeneutics,
we will now analyze the nine additional passages of The Book of the
Commandments in which he explicitly invokes Principle #2 by using
either the term peshateh di-qera or gufeh di-qera.219 Before doing so,
however, it is important to note some general features of this
Maimonidean halakhic work. Every commandment enumerated in The
Book of the Commandments (with only “three or four exceptions”
[below, n. 278]) is based on a biblical prooftext. In some cases, this
prooftext is what Maimonides calls a ‫“( נץ ג'לי בביאן‬clearly explicit
text”; above, n. 123), i.e., a verse that speaks for itself. In most cases,
however, he reads the prooftext in light of a rabbinic source. But in
doing so, Maimonides is selective. It is important to keep in mind that
rabbinic halakhic exegesis appears in the Talmud and midrashim as a
largely undifferentiated mass of readings lacking any identifying
methodological labels. Typically, a biblical source will simply be
cited therein with an interpretation in some variation of the form “the
verse X means Y” or “from X we deduce Y.” Maimonides thus
manifests a substantial degree of independence when sorting out such
readings according to his classifications. It is here that he reveals his
exegetical sensibilities, since he decides whether a given reading is to
be regarded as a “transmitted interpretation”—and hence a genuine
construal of peshateh di-qera—as opposed to an inference or mere
derash.

219
Since this study is based on a close reading of Maimonides’ precise
formulations in Principle #2 and these nine additional passages in his Book of the
Commandments, we have checked all of these texts in Kafih’s edition against
early manuscripts (listed in the bibliography), as well as the earlier edition of the
Arabic text by M. Bloch. The conclusion we have reached based on the
manuscript evidence is that Kafih’s text is reliable for the sake of this study, since
none of the small variations found (see, e.g., nn. 254, 260 below) have any
bearing on Maimonides’ concept of peshuto shel miqra.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 319

(1) Lev 11:43

Maimonides codifies as Negative Commandment #179:

We are prohibited from eating any swarming thing at all,

whether a flying swarming thing, or a swarming thing of the
water, or a swarming thing of the land. And this is His dictum,
may He be exalted: “Do not make yourselves abominable with
anything that swarms; you shall not make yourselves unclean
therewith and thus become unclean” (Lev 11:43).220

To support this rather straightforward construal of Scripture,

Maimonides cites a talmudic discussion in b. Makkot 16b that takes
Lev 11:43 as a prohibition against eating worms, eels, insects and the
like. But he then notes that the same talmudic source records other
readings of this verse that imply further prohibitions:

Now they also said: “One resisting responding to the call of

nature (lit. delaying his openings [from excreting]) violates ‘do
not make [yourselves] abominable,’” and similarly, “He who
drinks water out of the surgeon’s horn”—which is the vessel
for drawing blood—“violates ‘do not make yourselves
abominable.’” And the same applies by analogy (qiyās) to
eating dirty and disgusting things and drinking disgusting
things from which most people recoil. All of this is prohibited,
but one does not incur liability of lashes (malkot; punishment
for a biblical violation) for it, since the verse itself is about
nothing other than a swarming thing alone ( ‫פשטיה דקרא אנמא הו‬
‫)פי אלשרץ פקט‬. But [instead] they beat him with makkat mardut
(“blows of rebelliousness” for violating a rabbinic injunction)
for this.221

A simple reading of the Talmud might suggest that these further

prohibitions are presented as being included in the meaning (ma‘na,
gharaḍ) of the phrase “Do not make yourselves abominable”; and,
indeed, some talmudists regarded these as biblical violations.222 But
Maimonides understands the original intent of this phrase exclusively
as indicated within the context of the entire verse: “Do not make

220
Kafih ed., 265.
221
Kafih ed., 269.
222
See Ritba, Makkot 16b (Ralbag ed., 189), in the name of R. Meir ha-Levi
(Ramah); see also Meiri, Beth ha-Behirah, ad loc. (Strelitz ed., 93n).

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320 Mordechai Z. Cohen

yourselves abominable with (i.e., by eating) anything that swarms….”

This prohibition alone can be considered dalālat al-naṣṣ, to the
exclusion of all others, which were inferred by analogy.223 To be sure,
Maimonides does not deny the legitimacy of these additional laws,
which are codified in Mishneh Torah under the rubric of this
prohibition.224 Yet in this entry of The Book of the Commandments he
distinguishes between the prohibition stated in Scripture itself (i.e.,
peshateh di-qera), which is biblical, as opposed to its extension to
other matters by analogy, which is merely rabbinic.225

223
Maimonides uses the term qiyās only in reference to the additional “disgusting
things” not mentioned in the Talmud; but we can assume that he considered qiyās
to be the basis for the talmudic expansion of this prohibition itself. This is a good
example of the distinction between an inference from Scripture (from prohibition
A we can infer prohibition B), as opposed to an interpretation of the language of
the biblical text itself (the verse X means Y): see above, n. 140.
224
In Hilkhot Ma’akhalot Asurot 17:29-31 he writes: ‫כל דברים אלו בכלל אל תשקצו‬
‫ את נפשותיכם‬but adds that their violation incurs only ‫( מכת מרדות‬lit. “blows of
rebelliousness,” i.e., for violating a rabbinic edict).
225
In a number of other cases Maimonides deems an extension or application of a
biblical commandment to be of rabbinic authority only (without invoking the
notion of peshateh di-qera explicitly):
(1) The prohibition of destroying fruit-bearing trees, from which it is inferred
(presumably by analogy) that all purposeless destruction is likewise prohibited:
see Negative Commandment #57 (Kafih ed., 209-210, esp. n. 100) and Hilkhot
Melakhim 6:10.
(2) An added (i.e., second) prohibition for the High Priest to be defiled by contact
with the dead, which the Rabbis extended by a gezerah shawah to all priests: see
Negative Commandment #168 (Kafih ed., 259-260, esp. n. 32); compare Hilkhot
Avelut 3:6.
(3) The prohibition against eating the flesh of an animal mortally wounded by
another, which was extended to any animal suffering from a mortal disease
(listed in the Talmud as the ṭerefot): see Negative commandment #181 (Kafih
ed., 270-271, esp. n. 19). It would appear, however, that Maimonides changed his
mind in Mishneh Torah: see Hilkhot Ma’akhalot Asurot 4:6-9; Hilkhot Sheḥitah,
5:1-3; Henshke, “Basis,” 107-111, 119-123, 144-148. See also Nahmanides,
Hassagot, critique of Principle #2, Chavel ed., 46-47.
(4) The prohibition against adopting customs of idolaters, which was applied by
the Rabbis to the type of haircut known as belorit: see Mishnah Commentary,
‘Avodah Zarah 1:3 and Responsa #244 (Blau ed., 446). Here Maimonides clearly
changed his mind and ruled in Hilkhot ‘Avodat Kokhavim 11:1 that this
prohibition is actually biblical.
(5) Perhaps the most famous application of Principle #2 is Maimonides’ ruling
that betrothal through a ceremonial transfer of money (‫ )קידושי כסף‬is merely
rabbinic, and that biblical betrothal is accomplished in other ways specified in m.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 321

(2) Num 4:20

In Principle #3 of The Book of the Commandments Maimonides
establishes that the 613 commandments include only laws that are
applicable permanently, but not those of limited duration, such as the
ones given specifically for the time of the Israelites’ sojourn in the
desert. He thus criticizes his predecessors for enumerating Num 4:20,
“They shall not go in to see when the holy things are covered, lest
they die,” which was said of the Kohathites regarding the dismantling
of the Tabernacle by the priests during the travels in the desert.226
Maimonides acknowledges, however, that the Rabbis derived another
prohibition from this verse relevant in later times, which requires him
to explain further:

Even though it was said (b. Sanhedrin 81b): “They shall not go
in to see [etc.]” is an allusion (remez) to [death at the hands of
zealots] for one who steals the ‫( קסוה‬a holy measuring vessel
used in the Temple). Now it is sufficient in their saying remez
[to conclude] that the verse itself is not about that ( ‫פשטיה דקרא‬
‫)ליס הו פי ד'לך‬.227

By pointing to the term remez (=hint, allusion) used in the Talmud

itself to label this analysis of Num 4:20, Maimonides argues that the
Rabbis did not present it as an interpretation of the verse itself
(peshateh di-qera), but rather some sort of secondary association or, at

Qiddushin 1:1 (transfer of a marriage document, or intercourse; ‫)שטר וביאה‬. He

makes this ruling in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Ishut 1:2, and justifies it in
Responsa #355 (Blau ed., II:631-632, cited above, n. 6), both cited in the harsh
attack by Nahmanides, Hassagot, critique of Principle #2 (Chavel ed., 34-37).
Maimonides’ position on this matter seems to have developed over his career.
Originally he maintained that intercourse alone consummated marriage
biblically: see Mishnah Commentary, Qiddushin 1:1 (Kafih ed., III:280-281, esp.
n. 15); Book of the Commandments, Positive Commandment #213 (Kafih ed.,
167-168, esp. n. 17). But he later changed his mind (based on the talmudic
evidence cited in the responsum) and reclassified betrothal through a document
biblical. According to his son, Abraham, Maimonides later even retracted his
opinion in Mishneh Torah and ultimately classified all three forms of betrothal as
being of biblical force: see Abraham ben Maimonides, Birkat Avraham,
responsum #44 (Goldberg ed., 62); see also Levinger, Techniques, 45.
226
See Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot, 42. As Hildesheimer notes (n. 112 ad loc.),
other talmudists—including Saadia—likewise enumerated this verse as a
negative commandment.
227
Kafih ed., 16.

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322 Mordechai Z. Cohen

most, an inference from the verse.228 He therefore concludes that it is

merely a rabbinic prohibition, and does not merit enumeration as one
of the 613 commandments.

(3) Lev 21:12

As the preceding example indicates, Maimonides will use talmudic
evidence (where available) to support his determination regarding the
nature of a rabbinic reading of Scripture. In Negative Commandment
#165 he draws upon a more subtle analysis of the rabbinic evidence:

The priests are prohibited from exiting the Temple during the
time of the service, and this is the dictum [of Scripture],229
“And from the entrance of the Tent of Meeting you shall not
exit” (Lev 10:7). And this prohibition is repeated for the High
Priest, as it says: “And from the Sanctuary he shall not exit”
(Lev 21:12).230

These two verses appear in contexts that discuss the case of a priest
who has suffered the death of a close relative. As Maimonides
explains, these verses prohibit the priests from abandoning their
service due to personal tragedy, but do not absolutely prohibit exiting
the holy Sanctuary, i.e., once the service has been completed. After
acknowledging Sifra, the halakhic Midrash on Leviticus, as the source
of this analysis,231 he notes that the Talmud derives a separate law
from the second verse:

Know that for the High Priest there is an additional matter, that
he may not accompany the bier [of his relative] and this is the
apparent sense of the text (ẓāhir al-naṣṣ)… “and from the
Sanctuary he shall not exit,” [as] clarified in the second
[chapter] of Sanhedrin that if a death occurs for him, that he

228
Maimonides may regard this law as a purely oral tradition, i.e., a “halakhah to
Moses from Sinai”: see his commentary on m. Sanhedrin 9:6. The law is codified
in Hilkhot Sanhedrin 18:6, but Num 4:20 is not cited there.
229
‫ ;קולה‬lit. its saying. I follow the convention of Pines in his translation of the
Guide (see, e.g., I:42, Pines trans., 93) to render ‫“ קולה‬the dictum [of Scripture]”
and ‫“ קולה תעאלי‬His dictum, may He be exalted” (see above, n. 112).
230
Kafih ed., 257.
231
As Maimonides writes: “And the text of Sifra: ‫יכול בשעת העבודה ושלא בשעת‬
‫ הוי אומר בשעת העבודה‬,‫ ומן המקדש לא יצא ולא יחלל‬:‫ תלמוד לומר‬,‫( ”העבודה‬Kafih ed.,
ibid).

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 323

does not go out following the coffin, and this was inferred
(‫ ;אסתדל עלי ד'לך‬lit. a proof [dalīl] for this was brought) from the
dictum [of Scripture], “And from the Sanctuary he shall not
exit.”232

Maimonides here refers to the mishnaic comment: “If a death occurs

for [the High Priest]… Rabbi Judah said: He must not leave the
Sanctuary [to participate in the funerary procession], because it is
said: ‘And from the Sanctuary he shall not exit’” (m. Sanhedrin 2:1).
On this view, Lev 21:12 enjoins the High Priest from exiting the
Sanctuary to join the funeral procession even after completion of his
service. Yet Maimonides does not enumerate this commandment:

Even though… [this prohibition] repeated for the High Priest

obligates a new matter as we have explained, this does not
increase the number of commandments [according to]… what I
have prefaced, for the verse itself (gufeh di-qera) [indicates]
nothing other than [the prohibition] that he should not [exit]…
while serving.233

In his view, only the restricted reading in Sifra reflects what the verse
itself (gufeh di-qera) says; the additional law adduced by Rabbi Judah
must therefore not be enumerated.234 It is fair to say that Maimonides’
assessment of R. Judah’s reading can be traced to the Talmud, which
concludes that the prohibition for the High Priest is merely a rabbinic
precautionary measure, lest he defile himself by touching the bier.
This implies that the verse was cited merely as an asmakhta;235 it is
thus not a genuine construal of the biblical text itself, i.e., peshateh di-
qera.236
232
Kafih ed., 258.
233
Kafih ed., 258.
234
Kafih (n. 23) understands that Maimonides here refers to Principle #9 (that
two verses that repeat the same law must not be counted separately; see below, n.
258). But this principle is relevant here only because Principle #2 precludes
regarding Rabbi Judah’s derivation from Lev 21:12 as a “new matter” (which
would merit separate enumeration).
235
This does even seem to be a case of qiyās, because it is not an inference from
Scripture, but rather a precautionary rabbinic measure, i.e., a gezerah: see
Maimonides’ introduction to the Mishnah, Shailat ed., 340 [Ar.], 42 [Heb.].
236
See b. Sanhedrin 19a; Nahmanides, Hassagot, critique of Principle #2, Chavel
ed., 75-76. Our reasoning depends on a corollary of Maimonides’ understanding
of the peshat maxim, namely that a rabbinic law can never be a valid construal of

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324 Mordechai Z. Cohen

(4) Deut 23:24

In the preceding examples we have seen that Maimonides invokes the
peshat maxim to relegate a given law—seemingly derived from
Scripture—to rabbinic status. In Positive Commandment #94,
however, he invokes this maxim to make a purely exegetical point:

We were commanded to fulfill everything that we have

obligated ourselves to do verbally, whether it be an oath, a
vow, sacrificial offering or anything else, and that is His
dictum, “That which is gone out of your lips you shall keep and
perform; [even a freewill offering, according to what you have
vowed to the Lord your God, which you have promised with
your mouth]” (Deut 23:24).237

When turning to the rabbinic source for this interpretation, he

mentions an important reservation:

Although they separated the language of this verse and ascribed

to each of its utterances a meaning, the intention (gharaḍ) is
[generally speaking]… to fulfill any sort of obligation that a
person undertakes verbally.... And [as for] the wording of Sifre,
“That which is gone out of your lips – this is an affirmative
precept […],” you know that no meaning is implied by the
expression, “that which is gone out of your lips” alone; but the
intention (gharaḍ) is only the gist of the verse itself (‫תחציל‬

peshateh di-qera. This assumption was not shared by other Geonic-Andalusian

authors, who did not adopt Maimonides’ sharp distinction between biblical and
rabbinic laws (see above, at n. 179). Ibn Ezra here writes: ‫ אמרו‬- ‫ומן המקדש לא יצא‬
‫ אחר המת; והוא הנכון‬:‫( המעתיקים‬comm. on Lev 21:12 [Weiser ed., III:74]), a reading
evidently influenced by Saadia’s Tafsīr on this verse: see Zucker, Saadya’s
Translation, 389. Interestingly, Nahmanides (ibid.) inferred from Maimonides’
language that he took Rabbi Judah’s reading to be a genuine construal of the
biblical text—and therefore a biblical prohibition—since he referred to it as ẓāhir
al-naṣṣ. But this is a misunderstanding of Maimonides’ intent, since ẓāhir al-naṣṣ
is not equivalent to peshateh di-qera in his lexicon, as discussed above.
Moreover, Nahmanides (ibid., Chavel ed., 77) himself acknowledges that
Maimonides in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Kelei ha-Miqdash 5:5 does not base this
prohibition on Lev 21:12, implying that it is merely rabbinic, and has no biblical
source; see also Maimonides, comm. on m. Sanhedrin 2:1 (Kafih ed., IV:153).
237
Kafih ed., 109.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 325

‫ )פשטיה דקרא‬that I mentioned to you, which obligates doing all

that a person utters with his lips.238

Here Maimonides does not invoke the notion of peshateh di-qera to

draw any legal conclusion, but merely to note that the reading in Sifre
is not a genuine interpretation of this verse, which, as he says
elsewhere, is a “clearly explicit text” (naṣṣ jaliy bi-bayān; above, at n.
123).
Maimonides’ comment here reflects an important aspect of his
exegetical outlook. In typical fashion, Sifre interpreted this verse
atomistically, attributing a separate reference to each phrase in
isolation.239 Needless to say, this method was discredited in the
grammatical Andalusian school, of which an echo may be detected
here. But another influence must be also considered, namely the
discipline of logic, which included a clear notion of sentence structure.
Indeed, in the first chapter of his Treatise on Logic, Maimonides
comments:

The noun which the Arab grammarians call a “beginning,” the

logicians call “a subject” (mawḍū‘) and that which the
grammarian calls “information concerning the beginning,” the
logicians call “a predicate” (maḥmūl). It does not matter
whether the information is a noun, a verb, a particle, or a
phrase… nor is there any difference as to whether the
information affirms or negates…
The entire expression…, i.e., the subject and the predicate
together is called “a proposition” (qaḍīya)…. The proposition
always has two parts: the subject and the predicate, even if it
consists of many words. For example, when we say “Zayd of
Basra, who resided in the house of Amr killed his son Abu
Bekr of Egypt,” we say that the subject of this proposition is
“Zayd of Basra, who resided in the house of Amr,” and its
predicate is “killed his son Abu Bekr of Egypt.”240

238
Ibid. Maimonides abbreviated the rabbinic interpretation of this verse. See the
following note.
239
“You shall keep – [this is] a negative precept; And perform – this is an
injunction to the court to force you to do; According to what you have vowed –
this is a vow” (Sifre Deuteronomy §265 [Finkelstein ed., p. 286]); a similar
commentary appears in b. Rosh ha-Shanah 6a.
240
Treatise on Logic, Efros 1938 ed., 5-6 (Heb./Ar. section); English trans., 34-
35.

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326 Mordechai Z. Cohen

For Maimonides, the basic unit of meaning is a complete sentence (a

“proposition”), which requires a subject and predicate. He therefore
would have been compelled to regard the atomistic reading in Sifre as
mere derash, since “no meaning is implied by the expression, ‘That
which is gone out of your lips.’”

(5) Num 17:5

In the second chapter of the Treatise on Logic, Maimonides divides all
propositions into two categories:

Every proposition either affirms something of something, e.g.,

“Zayd is wise”… or negates something of something, e.g.,
“Zayd is not wise”…. The proposition which affirms something
of something is called “the affirmative proposition” (al-qaḍīya
al- mūjaba); that which negates something of something we
call a “negative proposition” (al-qaḍīya al-sāliba).241

This illuminates Principle #8 of The Book of the Commandments: “It

is not proper to enumerate negation (nafy) as we do [lit. with]
prohibition (nahy).” As Maimonides goes on to explain, invoking the
authority of the experts “on the art of logic,” a prohibition is a
prescriptive statement (command; amr), whereas a negative
proposition, i.e., “negation of a predicate from a subject,” is a
descriptive statement and thus cannot be the source of a
commandment.242 To illustrate, he comments on Num 17:5, “There
will never again be like Korah and his company, as God said by the
hand of Moses to him”:

The Rabbis explained that it is a negation (nafy) and they

clarified its meaning and said: That He, may He be exalted,
said that any rebel who revolts against the priesthood and
claims it for himself, what happened to Korah and his
company—namely being swallowed up and burned—will not
happen to him, but his punishment will be “as God said by the
hand of Moses to him,” namely leprosy, and that is His dictum,
may He be exalted, to him [Moses]: “Bring your hand into your

241
Treatise on Logic, Efros 1938 ed., 6 (Heb./Ar. section); English trans., 35.
242
Book of the Commandments, Kafih ed., 26-27.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 327

bosom” (Exod 4:6), and they brought a proof from what was
told about Uziah, King of Judah (II Chr 26:19).243

Having established that this verse is a proposition rather than a

command,244 Maimonides must address the implication raised by
another rabbinic reading:

Even though we find… in Gemara [b.] Sanhedrin (110a)…:

“Anyone who sustains a quarrel violates a negative
commandment, as it says: ‘There will never again be like
Korah and his company,’” this is only by way of warning,245
not that the verse itself is about this matter (lit: intention; ‫לא אן‬
'‫)פשטיה דקרא פי הד'א אלגרץ‬.246

Having accepted the first reading as the correct construal of “the peshat
of Scripture,” Maimonides invokes the rules of logic to prove that Num
17:5 cannot be the source of a prohibition. He therefore regards this
reading as mere derash, as he reiterates later:

… their dictum, “Anyone who sustains a quarrel violates a

negative commandment, as it says: ‘There will never again be
like Korah and his company’”… [is] by way of derash, whereas
the verse itself (gufeh di-qera) is a threat as the sages have
explained, and it is negation rather than prohibition.247

243
Kafih ed., 29; the primary rabbinic source is Tanḥuma ad loc.; other sources
are cited by Kafih in his notes.
244
Maimonides arrived at this conclusion based on a rabbinic reading that could
be disputed. (See Nahmanides’ critique of this principle, Hassagot, Chavel ed.,
90-91. Rashi labels this reading midrasho, as opposed to an alternative reading
that he regards as peshuto shel miqra: see Kamin, Categorization, 206n.) This
occurs elsewhere more dramatically, as Maimonides himself notes in Negative
Commandment #46.
245
Ar. '‫ועץ‬. Ibn Tibbon (Heller ed., 16) renders this ‫אסמכתא‬. Perhaps he had a
different Arabic text (since '‫ ועץ‬cannot be construed as ‫ ;אסמכתא‬cf. the
explanation offered by Bacher, Bibelexegese, 30n). But we should note that
Nahmanides (Hassagot, Chavel ed., 91) seems to have had the text '‫ועץ‬, since he
translates ‫על דרך תוכחה‬.
246
Kafih ed., 29.
247
Book of the Commandments, Negative commandment #45, Kafih ed., 204.

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328 Mordechai Z. Cohen

(6) Deut 14:1

Intriguingly, in Principle #8, after noting that “sustaining a quarrel” is
not truly enjoined by Num 17:5, Maimonides goes on to remark: “But
indeed the prohibition of this matter is included in another negative
commandment as I will explain in its place.”248 The only other
reference to this matter in The Book of the Commandments appears in
Negative Commandment #45, where Maimonides offers the following
analysis of Deut 14:1, “You shall not gash yourselves (‫)לא תתגודדו‬, nor
shave the front of your head for the dead”:

We were prohibited from wounding ourselves as idol

worshippers do, and this is His dictum, may He be exalted,
“You shall not gash yourselves.” And this prohibition is
repeated in different language, and that is the dictum [of
Scripture], “You shall not make a gash (‫ )שרט‬in your flesh for
the dead” (Lev 19:28). And it has been made clear in… [b.]
Yevamot [13b] that the verse itself (gufeh di-qera) is needed for
its own prohibition (lit. itself; ‫)מיבעי ליה לגופיה‬, [i.e.,] that the
Merciful One said: ‘Do not make a wound for the dead.’” And
in Gemara [b.] Makkot [21a] they said that ‫ שריטה‬and ‫ גדידה‬are
one and the same... as it says in the prophetic books, “and they
gashed themselves (‫ )ויתגודדו‬after their custom with knives and
lances” (I Kgs 18:28).
Now they [i.e., the Rabbis] have said that the prohibition
also includes the prohibition to divide the community…: “ ‫לא‬
‫ – תתגודדו‬Do not split into many groups [‫( ”]אגודות אגודות‬b.
Yevamot 13b), but the verse itself (gufeh di-qera) is as they
have explained…, “Do not make a wound for the dead,”
whereas this is a sort of derash.249

As it turns out, then, Maimonides regards the talmudic reading ‫אגודות‬

‫ אגודות‬to be mere derash as well, and there really is no biblical basis
for this prohibition.250
In making this distinction, Maimonides invokes talmudic authority.
However, a closer look at the source to which he refers indicates that
he interpreted it in a novel way:

248
Kafih ed., 29.
249
Kafih ed., 204.
250
It is conceivable that Maimonides changed his mind and did not revise his
introduction accordingly (on this phenomenon, see Henshke, “Basis,” 114-117,
144-147).

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 329

Resh Lakish said to R. Johanan: …‫ – לא תתגודדו‬Do not split into

many groups! But this [verse] ‫ לא תתגודדו‬is needed for its own
prohibition (lit. itself; ‫“ …)מיבעי ליה לגופיה‬You shall not make a
wound for the dead!” If so, Scripture should have said ‫לא תגודדו‬.
What is ‫ ?תתגודדו‬From that we deduce this [second prohibition].
Perhaps the entire [verse] refers to this only? If so, Scripture
should have said ‫לא תגודו‬. What is ‫ ?לא תתגודדו‬From that we
deduce both.

While it is true that the Talmud refers to the prohibition to make a

wound as gufeh, this does not preclude the derivation of a second
prohibition from Deut 14:1, which is actually supported based on a
quasi-grammatical analysis. Maimonides’ classification of the second
prohibition as mere derash (not even a logical inference!) thus reflects
an independent exegetical outlook. In light of his Andalusian heritage,
it is of course not difficult to see why he would have come to this
conclusion. Contextually speaking, the ‫ אגודות אגודות‬reading does not
fit the remainder of this verse, which prohibits shaving one’s forehead
as a sign of mourning. Moreover, as philological analysis based on the
assumption of an underlying three-letter root was a hallmark of the
Andalusian Hebrew grammatical school, Maimonides would have
naturally distinguished between the verb ‫( תתגודדו‬g-d-d, hitpa‘el,
imperfect) and the noun ‫’( אגודות‬-g-d, derived from the qal form of the
verb).251 The prooftext from I Kgs 18:28 was therefore decisive in his
eyes, unlike the playful association (“poetical conceit”) of ‫ תתגודדו‬and
‫אגודות‬.

(7) Exod 20:21

Maimonides likewise manifests independent exegetical thinking in
Positive Commandment #20, the obligation to establish a Holy

251
Hayyuj established the (minimum) three-letter root as a rule without
exceptions (his predecessors believed that some verbs had two-letter roots); but
the distinction between the two roots in this example was recognized already by
Menahem ben Saruq: see his Maḥberet, s.v. ‫ גד‬,‫ ;אגד‬see also Ibn Janah, Kitāb al-
Uṣūl, s.v. ‫ גדד‬,‫אגד‬. On Maimonides’ knowledge of the Andalusian Hebrew
grammatical school, see above, n. 47. Intriguingly, in Hilkhot ‘Avodah Zarah
12:13-14 he cites the ‫ אגודות אגודות‬reading and does not label it derash. While it is
not unusual for him to employ derash in Mishneh Torah (see, e.g., below, n.
266), it is somewhat surprising that he does not make this clear in this instance
(e.g., by using the label “the Rabbis said…”).

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330 Mordechai Z. Cohen

Sanctuary, based on Exod 25:8, “And they shall make for Me a

sanctuary,” followed by detailed instructions for constructing the
Tabernacle (Exod 25-31), which Maimonides (following the Rabbis)
took to be a prototype for the Holy Temple ultimately built by King
Solomon. The great codifier argues that all of the Tabernacle’s
components described in those chapters, e.g., the candelabrum, ark,
table, etc., are subsumed under the rubric of this single
commandment—and Maimonides had established in Principle #7 that
the details of any given commandment must not be enumerated
separately. The commandment to build an altar, however, might have
merited separate enumeration, because it appears in an earlier
narrative, unconnected with the Tabernacle. As Maimonides explains:

With respect to His dictum regarding the altar: “Make Me an

altar of earth (‫[ )מזבח אדמה‬and sacrifice offerings on it]” (Exod
20:21), about which it could be thought that this text is a
commandment in its own right that stands apart from the
commandment of a Holy Sanctuary, the matter is as I shall
describe to you. As for the verse itself (peshateh di-qera), it
speaks (‫ )יתכלם‬about the time in which outside altars (bamot)
were permitted, that it was permissible for us then to make an
altar of earth in any place and offer sacrifices.252

Maimonides first presents a contextual analysis of the verse itself

(peshateh di-qera): based on its appearance in the narrative of the
revelation at Sinai (which occurs well before the Tabernacle is even
mentioned), he assumes that it relates to the pre-Tabernacle period
(which corresponds to later periods when there is no central Temple)
when “outside altars” were permitted, during which time this verse
indicates a preference that these be made of earth, rather than
stones.253 On this reading, the prescription in this verse is a temporary

252
Kafih ed., 69. Our translation (“that it was permissible for us then …”) reflects
an emendation of Kafih’s text (read '‫אלד'י כאן מבאח לנא חיניד‬, not ‫אלד'י כאן מבאח‬
'‫ )חיניד‬based on virtually all of the manuscripts we consulted (listed in the
bibliography below), as well as Bloch’s text.
253
This reading (repeated in Guide III:45, Pines trans., 578; see also Abraham
ben Maimonides, comm. on Exod 20:21, Wiesenberg ed., 327) has no precedent
in rabbinic literature, though it may be based on earlier Andalusian exegesis.
Compare Abraham Ibn Ezra (long comm. on Exod 20:21-22), who interprets the
verse as a reference to the temporary altar Moses built at the foot of Mount Sinai,

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 331

law and therefore must be excluded from enumeration based on

Principle #3 (as mentioned above), a matter that Maimonides clarifies
in discussing the alternative rabbinic reading of this verse:

But they [the Rabbis], peace upon them, have said that the
meaning (ma‘na) of this is that it is a command to build an altar
attached to the ground and that it should not be mobile as it was
in the desert. And this is their dictum in Mekhilta of R. Ishmael
as commentary (sharḥ) on this verse: “When you enter the
Land [of Israel], make Me an altar attached to the ground ( ‫מזבח‬
‫)מחובר באדמה‬.” And if the matter is thus, then this is a command
that applies forever [lit. for all generations; ‫]לדורות‬, and it is one
of the parts of the Temple, I mean that an altar must necessarily
be built of stones.254

On this reading, the command in this verse applies eternally and

therefore cannot be excluded based on Principle #3; however, since it
is simply a part of the larger commandment to build the Holy
Sanctuary, it must excluded from enumeration based on Principle #7.
It is important to compare the two readings that Maimonides
juxtaposes here. Since the Rabbis in the Mekhilta identified the “altar”
in this verse with the one in the Temple, which was indeed built of
stones, they reinterpreted “an altar of earth” as “an altar attached to
the earth,” i.e., the ground. Maimonides, however, does not classify
this as a genuine construal of peshateh di-qera, evidently because it
does violence to the language of the verse and takes it out of context
entirely. This reading, then, would be regarded by Maimonides as a
matter deduced “by way of commentary (sharḥ),” rather than being
stated explicitly in Scripture itself (peshateh di-qera / gufeh di-
qera)—precisely the distinction he makes in Principle #2.255 Normally

and dismisses the rabbinic halakhic reading as an asmakhta. Saadia, on the other
hand, follows the halakhic reading in his Tafsīr: see Zucker, Translation, 332.
254
Kafih ed., 69.
255
See above, nn. 194, 207. In theory, then, Maimonides could have argued that
the Mekhilta reading of Exod 20:21 cannot serve as the basis for a separately
enumerated commandment based on Principle #2, i.e., because it is not stated in
peshateh di-qera. It would seem that he chose to invoke Principle #7 because the
fact that the altar is one of the components of the Holy Sanctuary is self-evident,
whereas the status of the Mekhilta reading might be subject to debate. E.g.,
Saadia seems to have endorsed it (see above, n. 253). Interestingly, Maimonides
himself records the Mekhilta reading in Hilkhot Beit ha-Beḥirah 1:13. It is
conceivable that even he changed his mind and regarded this as the “transmitted

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332 Mordechai Z. Cohen

he would turn to another rabbinic source to interpret peshateh di-qera;

but in this case he chose to record what would seem to be his own
contextual interpretation of Scripture (see n. 253).

(8) Exod 20:20

Maimonides’ more typical tendency to seek the proper construal of
peshateh di-qera in rabbinic literature is evident in the following
analysis in Negative Commandment #4:

We were prohibited from making a human image from metals,

stones, wood and the like, even if they were not made to be
worshipped… and that is His dictum, may He be exalted: “You
shall not make with Me gods of silver, nor shall you make for
yourselves gods of gold” (Exod 20:20). And the very wording
of Mekhilta about the meaning of this prohibition by way of
commentary (sharḥ) is: “… so that you should not think ‘I am
making [these] for decoration [and it is permissible] …’; [this
verse] teaches us: You shall not make for yourselves.”256

Both Saadia and Abraham Ibn Ezra interpreted Exod 20:20 as a

prohibition against making images for the purpose of worship, as the
context suggests.257 But Maimonides endorses the interpretation in
Mekhilta, which construes this verse as a further prohibition against

interpretation” of Exod 20:21. Even that is not clear-cut, however, since

Maimonides elsewhere in Mishneh Torah adduces readings of Scripture he
almost certainly regarded as mere derashot: see, e.g., above, n. 251.
256
Kafih ed., 182.
257
Ibn Ezra (long and short comm. ad loc. [Weiser ed., II:141-142, 287]) clarifies
the connection with the preceding verse: “You yourselves have seen that from the
heavens I spoke with you,” i.e., directly, without an intermediary; therefore, you
have no need to worship idols as intermediaries between you and God. Saadia
renders this verse literally ( ‫פלא תצנעו מעי מעבודאת מן פצ'ה ומעבודאת מן אלד'הב לא‬
‫ )תצנעו לכם‬in his Tafsīr: see Zucker, Translation, 331-332. But Abraham ben
Maimonides (comm. on Exod 20:22 [Weisenberg ed., 326-327]) mentions a
tradition that Saadia distinguished between the two halves of this verse: “You
shall not make with Me gods of silver” prohibits belief in other deities; “nor shall
you make for yourselves gods of gold” prohibits fashioning images. But the latter
is prohibited presumably for the sake of worship, and thus does not support
Maimonides’ interpretation based on the Mekhilta. Abraham ben Maimonides
observes that Saadia’s double interpretation accounts for the redundant language
in this verse; but Ibn Ezra remarks: ‫ כי כן דרך‬,‫ואל תתמה בעבור שכתוב פעמים לא תעשו‬
‫( צחות לשון הקודש‬long comm. ad loc. [Weiser ed., II:141]).

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 333

fashioning images for other purposes as well.258 In this case, then, he

assumes that the rabbinic commentary (sharḥ) is an authoritative
“transmitted interpretation.”259 Yet Maimonides continues:

And it has been made clear in Sanhedrin that this

prohibition…—I mean… “You shall not make with Me gods of
silver”—includes other matters that diverge from the purpose
(or: intent; gharaḍ) of this commandment. But the verse itself
(peshateh di-qera) speaks [only] of (‫ )יתכלם פי‬what we have
mentioned.260

Having taken the Mekhilta reading as the transmitted interpretation,

Maimonides invokes the peshat maxim to exclude “other matters
deduced by way of commentary and inference.” Evidently he had in
mind the following remark: “The verse, says R. Ashi, speaks of judges
appointed through the power of silver or gold” (b. Sanhedrin 7b).261 It
is important to observe that the rabbinic sources do not differentiate
between the status of these two readings, leaving it to Maimonides to

258
Maimonides’ choice to embrace the Mekhilta’s reading is consistent with
Principle #9, namely that -
… if… the Sages… [make] a distinction between the meanings [of two
seemingly repetitive verses]… then it is undoubtedly proper to enumerate
[the second], for it is no longer for emphasis, but rather for the addition of
a [new] matter, even though the apparent meaning of the text (ẓāhir al-
naṣṣ) is that it is about one matter. For we resort to saying that this text is
repeated for emphasis… only absent the relevant words of the
commentators, transmitters of tradition. But if we find a tradition that this
command or prohibition includes such and such a matter, and the repeated
command or prohibition includes another matter, then that is the most
correct and most true, [i.e.,] that the text is repeated for a [new] matter and
then it is proper to enumerate [each separately]. (Kafih ed., p. 33.)
In other words, the rabbinic interpretation overrides ẓāhir al-naṣṣ, a situation not
uncommon in Maimonides’ exegesis, as discussed at length in the monograph
announced in n. * above. In this case, adopting the Mekhilta’s reading allows him
to avoid taking Exod 20:20 as a duplication of Negative Commandment #2,
based on Exod 20:4, “You shall not make for yourself any engraved image, or
any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath.”
259
See above, n. 207.
260
Kafih ed., 182. Our reading “… this commandment” reflects an emendation of
Kafih’s text (read: ‫הד'ה אלמצוה‬, not ‫ )הד'ה אלמצות‬based on Bloch’s text and MSS
JTS 6998, 6999; Berlin 684; Israel Alei Teiman 14.
261
This reading seems to take ‫ אלהים‬in this verse in the sense of judges (see, e.g.,
BDB, s.v.).

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334 Mordechai Z. Cohen

determine which is the “transmitted interpretation.” Evidently he

preferred the Mekhilta’s reading because it is more reasonable and
closer to the contextually indicated reading,262 whereas the fanciful
notion that the verse speaks of judges appointed improperly would
seem to be a “witty poetical conceit.”
This exegetical assessment regarding Exod 20:20 does not,
however, imply that the prohibition against such judicial appointments
is rabbinic, since it would be included in Negative Commandment
#284:

… the prohibition… to appoint a judge who is not expert in the

science of the Law because of other qualities that he
possesses…. This is the dictum: “You shall not show
favoritism in judgment” (Deut 1:17)… and the very wording of
Sifre is: “…this is [i.e., refers to] the one responsible for
appointing judges… that you should not say, ‘So and so is
handsome, I shall appoint him as a judge,’ ‘So and so is
courageous, I shall appoint him as a judge,’ ‘So and so is my
relative, I shall appoint him as a judge,’ ‘So and so lent me
money, I shall appoint him as a judge.’”263

Since Deut 1:17 appears in the context of Moses’ instructions to the

newly appointed Israelite judges, it would seem to be a more cogent
source than Exod 20:20. This example represents a trend in
Maimonides’ halakhic writings noted by Baruch ha-Levi Epstein:

One familiar with Maimonides’ composition [i.e., Mishneh

Torah] will find in almost every [!] halakhah… that he bases
[talmudic] laws… on a biblical verse in that context, even
though the Gemara used a different source… because the one
he brings is straightforward (‫ )פשוט‬and reasonable.264

This important observation is often cited as evidence for Maimonides’

“commitment to peshat.” But we should add that the “more
straightforward and reasonable” alternate biblical source he chooses is

262
This is reminiscent of the description of Rashi’s selection among midrashic
readings based on the one that is “close to peshuto shel miqra”: see Kamin,
Categorization, 63-66.
263
Kafih ed., 313-314.
264
Torah Temimah, Lev 10:6. See also above, n. 160; Halivni, Peshat & Derash,
200, n. 71; Zucker, “Fragments,” 315, who notes a similar tendency in Saadia.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 335

usually drawn from rabbinic exegesis.265 Moreover, such readings

often diverge from the contextual-philological tradition that he
inherited. Indeed, his reading of Deut 1:17 based on Sifre diverges
from the contextual interpretation reflected in Saadia’s Tafsīr and
Abraham Ibn Ezra’s commentary, i.e., that this verse is Moses’
admonition to judges he selected to adjudicate fairly in cases that
come before them.266

(9) Lev 19:14

Maimonides’ reliance on rabbinic exegesis is perhaps nowhere more
evident than in his presentation of Negative Commandment #299:

We are prohibited from causing one another to fail (lit.

stumble) in matters of opinion, that is, if someone should
inquire… in a matter in which he is inexperienced (or:
gullible), it is prohibited (lit. a prohibition has come) to
misguide him… and that is His dictum, May He be exalted,
“And before a blind man you shall not place an obstacle” (Lev
19:14). And the very wording of Sifre is: “And before a person
who is blind in a particular matter, if he seeks advice from you,
do not give him advice that is not fitting for him.”267

The acontextual, figurative rabbinic reading upon which he relies can

hardly be regarded as the straightforward sense of this verse. Saadia,
in his Tafsīr, for example, renders it literally, as Maimonides would
have been well aware.268 Maimonides evidently considered the

265
See, e.g., Hilkhot Melakhim 1:10 with commentary of Radbaz and other
examples cited in Twersky, Code, 57. In some instances, however, Maimonides
does devise an independent biblical derivation for a talmudic law: compare, e.g.,
Hilkhot Melakhim 10:7 with b. Sanhedrin 20b and above, n. 208.
266
In Hilkhot Sanhedrin 3:8 Maimonides acknowledges as much, appending the
expression ‫“( מפי השמועה למדו‬based on the tradition they expounded”) to his
reading. Interestingly, he goes on there to record the homiletical reading of Exod
20:20, though he prefaces it with the label “the sages said.”
267
Kafih ed., 320-321.
268
‫( ובין ידי אלעאמי לא תציר מעת'רא‬Derenbourg ed. ad loc.). The literal reading is
quite strongly indicated by the context: ‫( לא תקלל חרש ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול‬and
Maimonides accepts the literal sense of ‫חרש‬, i.e., one who is deaf: see Negative
Commandment #317).

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336 Mordechai Z. Cohen

reading in Sifre to be a “transmitted interpretation” and understands

this verse accordingly.269
Having determined the original meaning of this verse, Maimonides
discusses further applications of this prohibition in the Talmud:

This prohibition, they [i.e., the Rabbis] said, also includes one
who assists or causes [another to commit] a sin, because… that
person’s desire blinded his discernment.... They said about one
who lends with interest and one who borrows with interest that
both violate, “And before a blind man you shall not place an
obstacle”…. And they say about many similar things, “He
violates ‘before a blind man you shall not place an obstacle.’”
But the verse itself (peshateh di-qera) is about what was
mentioned first.270

Even though Maimonides interpreted peshateh di-qera in light of an

acontextual “transmitted interpretation,” he invokes the peshat maxim
to distinguish between dalālat al-naṣṣ, the “root” (aṣl) that is
prohibited biblically, and its further applications (furū‘) by the Rabbis,
which are merely rabbinic.271

5. Conclusions

The preceding study of the terms peshateh di-qera and gufeh di-qera
in Maimonides’ Book of the Commandments yields a clear picture of
how he applied the peshat maxim.272 Although the examples we have

269
It is surprising that he does not use one of his typical formulas to indicate that
this is a “transmitted interpretation” (which would suggest that it diverges from
the plain sense). Nor does he use the label ‫ מפי השמועה למדו‬in this connection in
Hilkhot Roṣeaḥ 12:14 (‫ הבא ליטול ממך עצה תן לו עצה ההוגנת‬- ‫ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול‬
‫)לו‬. It is also noteworthy that Maimonides never codifies the prohibition to
actually place a stumbling block in front of a blind man: see Minḥat Ḥinnukh,
Miṣwah 332, sec. ‫( ד‬II:114); see also Halivni, Peshat & Derash, 88.
270
Kafih ed., 321.
271
Maimonides’ choice to differentiate between the aṣl and furū‘ here is
surprising since the talmudic discussion implies that all of these violations are
biblical. In Mishneh Torah he seems to have changed his mind accordingly; see
esp. Hilkhot Kil’ayim 10:3; compare Hilkhot Roṣeaḥ 12:14, Hilkhot Gezelah wa-
Avedah 5:1.
272
It bears repeating (see above, at nn. 31, 42) that our survey does not include
his use of the term ẓāhir, which appears 6 times in The Book of the
Commandments (see, e.g., above, nn. 236, 258; the term also appears in Negative

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 337

analyzed form only a small sub-set of the entire corpus of his halakhic
biblical exegesis, his use of this technical term gives us a firm anchor
for assessing its underlying principles. Within this sub-set, we have
identified ten readings that he explicitly classifies as genuine
construals of peshateh di-qera, and eleven that he excludes from this
category.273 To be sure, the latter group reflects the values of the
Andalusian school, since he evidently made his determination based
on the fact that those readings do not adhere (a) to the immediate
literary context, (b) the rules of grammar/logic (in particular the
requirement that a verse be interpreted as a whole rather than
atomistically) or (c) philology.274 This would seem to support the
conventional wisdom—reflected by Ettinger—that Maimonides
adhered to the values of what Ibn Ezra referred to as “the way of
peshat.” But the readings Maimonides endorses as genuine construals
of peshateh di-qera yield a mixed picture. Of course, some of these
readings adhere to the same values, whether he relies on a
straightforward rabbinic reading of Scripture (as we have seen in five
cases: Lev 11:43, 19:28, 21:12, Deut 14:1), or interprets the biblical
text independently (as we saw in four instances: Exod 20:21, Lev
19:18, Num 4:20, Deut 23:24), implying that none of the extant

Commandments #165 [another time], #181, #303 [Kafih ed., 258, 270, 323]).
Inclusion of those examples would skew our results and given an inaccurate
picture of Maimonides’ conception of peshateh di-qera (as evident, e.g., in the
otherwise insightful analysis of the second principle found in Feintuch, Piqqudei
Yesharim, 15-22).
273
Each of the nine passages from The Book of the Commandments analyzed in
the preceding section includes a reading that is not a valid construal of peshateh
di-qera, and another that is. (While he does not specify how he interpreted Num
4:20, we can assume that he simply read the verse literally.) Additionally, in
Principle #2 he mentions two readings (of Exod 18:20, Deut 4:6) that “the peshat
of Scripture does not indicate,” while referring to Lev 19:18 as a
“commandment… stated explicitly in the Torah,” i.e., “the peshat of Scripture
indicates it.”
274
Maimonides elsewhere makes similar exegetical judgments. See, e.g., his
remarks about the rabbinic “reading” of Deut 8:8 (above, at n. 169); compare
Guide III:43, Pines trans., 572-573. He likewise rejects gimatria as a genuine
exegetical tool: see Mishnah Commentary on Nazir 1:3; see also Book of the
Commandments, Principle #3 (Kafih ed., 16). Compare Abraham Ibn Ezra’s
negative view of gimatria; see Mondschein, “Attitude.” The great poet Moses
Ibn Ezra, on the other hand, had a more sanguine approach to this method: see
Cohen, “Aesthetic Exegesis,” 286.

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338 Mordechai Z. Cohen

rabbinic readings of the verse in question can be regarded as its

Sinaitic “transmitted interpretation.”275
However, Maimonides at times relies upon more tenuous rabbinic
readings to determine what “the peshat of the verse” indicates—and
these betray a very different exegetical outlook. Most striking, of
course, is his figurative, acontextual interpretation of Lev 19:14; but a
similar assessment also applies to his readings of Exod 20:20 and
Num 17:5, in which he chooses rabbinic readings quite at odds with
those of other pashtanim.276 Nor is this a rare occurrence: as
documented in modern scholarship, Maimonides elsewhere (i.e.,
where he does not use the label peshateh di-qera) often endorses
readings that do not accord with the philological-contextual method.277
While he usually specifies that these are “transmitted interpretations”
(implying an awareness that they diverge from the straightforward
sense), we still must wonder why he did not simply regard such
readings as mere derash or inferences.
To answer this question, we must return to address a certain
circularity in Maimonides’ hermeneutical model as presented in
Principle #2. Evidently cognizant of the talmudic evidence (which
Nahmanides would cite) that could potentially undermine his claim
regarding the rabbinic status of laws derived through the middot,
Maimonides included an “escape hatch” in his theory by stipulating
that it cannot be applied to laws that the Rabbis specified as being
biblical—even though they seem to be derived in the Talmud using
the middot or other midrashic methods. In such a case, he argues

275
This reflects the dichotomy mentioned above (at n. 191) between
Maimonides’ direct analysis of the text (naṣṣ) of Scripture, as opposed to his
reliance on the “transmitted interpretation.” Usually his own analysis conforms to
the spirit of the transmitted interpretation (on this or a different verse); the
dramatic cases are the ones in which he opens a completely new avenue of
interpretation. We have discussed some of these (that feature the term peshat),
but the phenomenon as a whole merits further research; for now, see Twersky,
Code, 145-150.
276
See above, at nn. 243, 244, 258, 268.
277
As noted above (at n. 266) with respect to his reading of Deut 1:17. On this
general trend, see Levinger, Techniques, 39-40; Halivni, Peshat & Derash, 87-
88; Davidson, Maimonides, 182-184; see also above, at n. 130. By definition—
according to the second principle—every commandment enumerated in The Book
of the Commandments is based on peshateh di-qera (with only “three or four
exceptions”; see below, n. 278). The same applies to every law codified as
biblical in Mishneh Torah. Further analysis of such cases is beyond the scope of
the current study but is undertaken in the monograph announced in n. * above.

[Link]
 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 339

(above, at n. 185), we must assume that the law, in fact, is based on a

transmitted interpretation, which the “derivation” merely confirms. In
his responsum (above, at n. 6), Maimonides specifies that this occurs
in a mere “three or four” instances; and, indeed, in three entries in The
Book of the Commandments he acknowledges that he cannot find a
specific scriptural source for the given law (which he regards as
biblical because of the talmudic evidence), and instead cites only the
derivation through one of the middot.278
While the responsum zeroes in on a rare occurrence, the matter is
not presented as such in the second principle, which suggests that
Maimonides had a more general phenomenon in mind. And indeed the
logic of the “exception” illuminates a more pervasive pattern in The
Book of the Commandments. Since rabbinic readings of Scripture
rarely come with identifying labels, Maimonides actually had a good
deal of leeway in applying his classification, and in Principle #2 he
acknowledges that halakhic evidence played a decisive role in this
respect. When deciding how to classify a given rabbinic legal
interpretation of Scripture, he considered not only its philological-
contextual plausibility, but also the halakhic status of the associated
law. If the talmudic evidence indicates that the Rabbis regarded the
law as biblical, i.e., as a “root” (aṣl) rather than a “branch” (far‘), then
he will regard that derivation as a transmitted interpretation of what
the verse itself says (i.e., it is dalālat al-naṣṣ), even if it does not
accord with its straightforward reading.279 For example, since the
Talmud treats giving bad advice as biblically prohibited, he deemed
the acontextual reading of Lev 19:14 in Sifre to be its transmitted
interpretation, and hence an accurate construal of peshateh di-qera.
Alternatively, had he taken peshateh di-qera literally (not to place a

278
See Levinger, Techniques, 41, who cites negative commandments #135, #194,
#336. On the logical inconsistency these cases create in Maimonides’ position,
see Nahmanides, Hassagot, critique of the Principle #2, Chavel ed., 31-32. For
possible explanations of Maimonides’ position, see Neubauer, Divrei Soferim,
83-87; Henshke, “Basis,” 124-129 (who also has a different list of the “three or
four” exceptions to the rule).
279
As Maimonides says: “If they themselves clarified and said that this is a Torah
principle (guf Torah) or that this is a biblical law (de-orayta), then it is proper to
enumerate it,” i.e., as one of the 613 biblical commandments” (above, at n. 185).
As Faur (Studies, 26n) observes, he does not require these exact words, but
merely an indication from the talmudic discussion that the Rabbis viewed this as
a biblical law. Maimonides was well aware of the tension this can create between
the apparent sense (ẓāhir) of Scripture and what he was compelled to accept as a
correct construal of “the peshat of Scripture”: see above, nn. 244, 258.

[Link]
340 Mordechai Z. Cohen

stumbling block before a blind person) and regarded the reading in

Sifre as an extrapolation by way of qiyās, he would have rendered that
law rabbinic, a legal position he was unwilling to adopt.
More generally, it seems fair to say that Maimonides weighed
competing values when making his hermeneutical determination
regarding peshateh di-qera. While he had a preference for exegetical
propriety in the spirit of the Andalusian philological school, he was
also swayed by the need to achieve results consistent with the halakhic
system, which is a natural consequence of his theory that “the texts of
the Torah,” i.e., peshateh di-qera, are the exclusive source of the
“transmitted roots” (al-uṣūl al-marwiyya) at Sinai, i.e., the original
core of biblical laws (with only “three or four” exceptions). This
tension manifests itself in a number of ways.

• As we have seen in connection with Lev 19:14, where

Maimonides felt compelled—based on the talmudic evidence—
to classify a given law as biblical, he was willing, if necessary, to
embrace a completely acontextual reading of peshateh di-
qera.280
• In some cases, however, Maimonides was willing to re-classify
as rabbinic laws deemed biblical by other talmudists because
their derivation from Scripture is not based on a plausible
construal of the biblical text itself (peshateh di-qera), e.g., the
obligation to perform the acts of kindness “derived” in the
Talmud from Exod 18:20.281

These two extreme options, however, are exceptional, since

Maimonides usually finds more subtle ways to balance his exegetical
sense and the Talmudic halakhic system.

• At times, he needed to make only a minor adjustment to the latter

by simply finding a more cogent prooftext for a law assumed to
be biblical than the one given in the Talmud. Indeed, he often did
so by drawing upon a different rabbinic source, e.g., when he
derived the prohibition to appoint judges on account of “gold and

280
Conversely, if the talmudic discussion indicates that a given law is merely
rabbinic, then Maimonides must hold that it is not a genuine construal of
peshateh di-qera, as he argues in connection with Rabbi Judah’s reading of Lev
21:12 (above, at n. 236).
281
See also above, nn. 222, 225, 228, 271.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 341

silver” from Deut 1:17—based on Sifre—rather than from the

Talmud’s figurative reading of Exod 20:20 (above, at n. 264).
• The last example points to what is perhaps the most pervasive
pattern in Maimonidean halakhic exegesis, for although Sifre’s
reading of Deut 1:17 is not quite as problematic as the talmudic
reading of Exod 20:20, it still cannot be regarded as a true
philological-contextual interpretation. It would thus appear that
his preference was to remain within the universe of rabbinic
halakhic readings of Scripture, and from among these—wherever
feasible—to endorse the most plausible as the “transmitted
interpretation.” To borrow a locution used to describe Rashi’s
exegesis, Maimonides aimed to select from among the rabbinic
sources the interpretation that comes closest to the philological-
contextual sense.282 Maimonides will thus often embrace
readings that entail relatively minor infractions of the rules of the
philological-contextual method (e.g., an unnecessary assumption
that nonetheless does not take the verse completely out of
context) and classify the associated laws as biblical.283 Without
this willingness to bend the strict rules of the philological-
contextual method, it is hard to imagine any other way for him to
have upheld the fundamental structure of talmudic halakhah.284
In other words, his need to find prooftexts for the hundreds of
laws assumed to be biblical by the Rabbis (and codified as such
in Mishneh Torah) forced him to regard their derivations from
Scripture as “transmitted interpretations,” though he might
otherwise have viewed them as inferences or derash. Moreover,
as Ettinger has noted, Maimonides will at times do so even
where the talmudic evidence is not compelling, but simply based
on his own legal sense that a given law must be an aṣl, i.e., part
of the essential core of the 613 original biblical laws given at
Sinai.285

282
See above, n. 262.
283
Perhaps Ettinger hinted at this in his oblique phraseology “or at least is a
derivation that fits Scripture” (above, n. 218). Distinguishing these “minor
infractions” from mere derash is admittedly sometimes difficult, and is a matter
that requires further research. For now, see the preliminary classification in
Greenberg, “Interpretation,” 32-33.
284
Compare Maimonides’ programmatic statement above, n. 258.
285
See Ettinger, “Legal Logic,” 21-23. An excellent example is Positive
Commandment #5 (Kafih ed., 60-61), the obligation of daily prayer, which
Maimonides supports by citing the biblical phrase “to serve Him with all your

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342 Mordechai Z. Cohen

Coupled with the occasional truly tenuous rabbinic readings

Maimonides endorses, this tendency would seem to undermine
Ettinger’s understanding of Principle #2 (above, at n. 218) as an
indication of the great codifier’s commitment to the philological-
contextual sense of Scripture. Addressing this question, Ettinger
writes:

If so, why does Maimonides regard these laws as biblical laws,

since they do not stem from the simple sense (peshat) of the
scriptures? The answer is indeed found in the words of
Maimonides, in the second principle of The Book of the
Commandments, where Maimonides notes that if the Sages say
explicitly that a given law that they deduced midrashically is a
biblical law, then we must enumerate it as such despite the fact
that the derash does not correspond to the peshat of Scripture
(peshuto shel miqra).286

In other words, in such cases, Ettinger believes, Maimonides

suspended his rule of peshat primacy. I would question this
assessment, because Maimonides never says that this rule admits
exceptions—and by Ettinger’s own admission this would be a very
widespread phenomenon in the great codifier’s exegesis. Ettinger’s
difficulty, of course, stems from his interpretation of peshat as the
straightforward sense, which Maimonides obviously violates—and
even acknowledges doing so.
The analysis in this study provides an alternative based on the fact
that in Maimonides’ lexicon, peshateh di-qera denotes the text of
Scripture itself in its original sense—which is determined by the
interpretation transmitted from Sinai. Accordingly, what the great
codifier means in the passage to which Ettinger refers is the following:
where the derivation of a law would under normal circumstances
appear to be merely an inference or derash (i.e., it does not stem from
a philological-contextual reading), if Maimonides has a compelling
reason to believe that the law is biblical, then he must regard its
derivation as a “transmitted interpretation”—and hence a genuine

heart” (Deut 11:13) with the interpretation of Sifre, “this is prayer.” Nahmanides
(Hassagot, Chavel ed., 154-156) regards this reading as an asmakhta, and cites
talmudic evidence indicating that the obligation of prayer is, in fact, merely
rabbinic.
286
Ettinger, “Legal Logic,” 21.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 343

construal of peshateh di-qera (unless he can find a better prooftext for

it). For Maimonides, then, the rule of peshateh di-qera is absolute,
though he weighs halakhic as well as exegetical considerations to
determine how to interpret it, making his system not nearly as anti-
midrashic as Nahmanides had feared.287

***

In light of Maimonides’ strong pronouncement that “the texts of the

Torah” are the exclusive source of all 613 biblical commandments, we
can regard The Book of the Commandments as his “commentary” on
the legal sections of the Pentateuch. Admittedly, this work does not
follow the order of Scripture, but rather is arranged according to the
logic of his legal system.288 Moreover, the only exegetical sources that
Maimonides cites are from rabbinic literature, with no mention of the
great philological interpreters prominent in his Andalusian milieu,
such as Saadia, Ibn Janah, Ibn Chiquitilla or Ibn Bal‘am. The only
post-talmudic authors he mentions specifically—for the sake of
critique—are the earlier enumerators of the commandments, Simon
Qayyara, author of the Halakhot Gedolot, and Hefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ,
author of Kitāb al-Shara’i‘.289 Yet Maimonides’ Book of the
Commandments stands out among those works because of its
distinctly biblical orientation and the prominent role he grants within
it to the rule of peshat primacy
The peshat maxim itself is talmudic, and one therefore might be
tempted to argue that its application by Maimonides simply reflects

287
The need to regard tenuous rabbinic readings as genuine interpretations of
peshateh di-qera rather than mere derash or inference—as some other pashtanim
might do—is the exegetical price that Maimonides pays for his strong claim that
every commandment of biblical authority has a basis in peshateh di-qera. But the
great codifier is actually not completely alone in this respect even within the
peshat tradition: see Japhet, “Tension.” In the monograph announced at n. *
above, we shed further light on this matter by assessing Maimonides’ position on
the relationship between halakhah and peshat among others articulated in the
medieval exegetical tradition, e.g., by Saadia, Samuel ben Hofni, Ibn Janah,
Rashbam, Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides.
288
The precise nature of Maimonides’ logic in arranging the various classes and
details of halakhah is worthy of study in itself: see Soloveitchik, “Classification.”
289
See above, n. 176. The latter (of which we admittedly only have fragments:
see Zucker, “Ḥefeṣ”) represents an attempt to systematize the science of the
enumeration of the 613 commandments, but does not introduce the concept of
peshuto shel miqra.

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344 Mordechai Z. Cohen

another dimension of his rabbinic learning (especially since his usage

of the term peshat resembles that of the Talmud [above, at n. 203]).
Yet the evidence gathered in this study demonstrates that the great
codifier, in fact, harnessed the powerful winds of the Geonic-
Andalusian peshat school to chart out a substantially new system of
halakhic exegesis that recasts the talmudic peshat maxim. Three
points in particular distinguish his hermeneutical outlook in this
respect.
(1) In the Talmud, the peshat maxim is so marginal that it can
hardly be considered a genuine rule.290 Maimonides, on the other
hand, makes it the second of his cardinal principles of enumeration
and deems it virtually inviolate.
(2) He uses this principle of peshat primacy to argue that halakhot
derived through the thirteen middot are merely rabbinic rather than
biblical—a radical position that is nowhere hinted at in the Talmud.291
(3) While Maimonides does not cite any of the great Geonic or
Andalusian philologically-oriented exegetes by name,292 his selective
endorsement of some rabbinic halakhic readings as being consistent
with peshateh di-qera—and his willingness to relegate others to the
status of inference (i.e., applications of the middot) or derash—at
times reflects the very same hermeneutical values of that peshat
school.
The clarification of Maimonides’ peshat model does more than
simply demonstrate his connection to the celebrated peshat school of
Jewish interpretation; it reveals how he shatters hermeneutical barriers
and charts a bold, unique course within the revolutionary peshat
movement. Other pashtanim, as a rule, avoided drawing halakhic
conclusions from their novel exegetical methods. Maimonides, on the
other hand, specifically formulates his principle of peshat primacy in
order to shape a stratified system of halakhah anchored in “the texts of

290
Kamin (Categorization, 57-59) makes a similar observation when comparing
Rashi’s use of the term peshuto shel miqra with its use in the Talmud. As Halivni
(Peshat & Derash, 63) remarks: “The dictum was either not too well known or
not honored by all scholars [in the Talmud].”
291
This was noted by Nahmanides: see above, n. 195; see also Kamin,
Categorization, 32, 39, 41.
292
It was a characteristic trait—and perhaps a deliberate strategy—of
Maimonides to omit reference to his sources: see Twersky, Code, 97-102. Hence,
the very fact that he does not mention his exegetical predecessors in the Geonic-
Andalusian tradition by name does not indicate that he did not draw upon their
work in the Book of the Commandments—or in Mishneh Torah for that matter.

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 345

the Torah.” Fusing his exegetical sensibilities, his firm control of the
vast sea of talmudic learning and a theoretical framework he
constructed by appropriating concepts from Muslim jurisprudence,
Maimonides creates an integrated legal hermeneutics that makes him a
bright star within the constellation of great Jewish Bible interpreters.

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346 Mordechai Z. Cohen

List of References

PRIMARY SOURCES

Scripture is cited according to Tanakh: The New JPS Translation

(Philadelphia 1985), with minor adjustments as necessary. Unless
otherwise noted, the biblical commentaries of Rashi, Rashbam,
Abraham Ibn Ezra, Radak and Nahmanides are cited in this work from
the Miqra’ot Gedolot (Keter edition [ed. M. Cohen, Jerusalem 1992-],
where available).
Haqdamat Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, ed., N. Z. Hildesheimer, vol. III of
Sefer Halakhot Gedolot ed. E. Hildesheimer (Jerusalem 1987), 25-
112.
Ibn Bal‘am, Judah
“Rabbi Judah Ibn Bal‘am’s Commentary on Numbers and
Deuteronomy,” ed. and trans. [Hebrew] M. Perez (MA Thesis,
Bar-Ilan University, 1970).
Rabbi Judah Ibn Bal‘am’s Commentary on Isaiah, ed. and trans.
[Hebrew] M. Goshen-Gottstein and M. Perez (Ramat Gan
1992)
Ibn Ezra, Abraham
Torah Commentary (‫)פירושי התורה לרבנו אברהם אבן עזרא‬, ed. A.
Weiser (Jerusalem 1977).
Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah (The Foundation of Piety and the
Secret of the Torah), ed. J. Cohen and U. Simon (Ramat Gan
20072).
Ibn Janah, Jonah. Kitāb al-Uṣūl: The Book of Hebrew Roots, ed. A.
Neubauer (London 1875).
Ibn Paquda, Baḥya ben Joseph. Al-Hidāya ilā Farā’iḍ al-Qulūb: Sefer
Torat Ḥovot ha-Levavot (Duties of the Heart), ed. and trans. J. Kafih
(Jerusalem 1973).
Ha-Levi, Judah. Kuzari (Kitāb al-Radd wa-d-Dalīl fī d-Dīn adh-Dhalīl),
ed. D. Z. Baneth and H. Ben-Shammai (Jerusalem 1977).
Maimonides, Abraham ben Moses
Commentary on Genesis and Exodus [Arabic] (‫פירוש התורה לרבנו‬
‫)אברהם בן הרמב"ם ז"ל על בראשית ושמות‬, trans. [into Hebrew]
Ernest (Efrayim Yehudah) Wiesenberg (London 1959)
Birkat Avraham (Responsa), ed., Baer Goldberg (Paris 1859; rept.
Jerusalem 1960)
Maimonides, Moses

[Link]
 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 347

Treatise on Logic. Maqāla fī Ṣinā‘at al-Manṭiq: Maimonides’

Treatise on Logic, The Original Arabic and Three Hebrew
Translations, ed. I. Efros (New York 1938); more complete
Arabic text: “Maimonides’ Arabic Treatise on Logic,” ed. I.
Efros, Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish
Research 34 (1966):155-60; 9-42 (Heb. section).
Introductions to Mishnah (general and to Pereq Ḥeleq) = ‫הקדמות‬
‫הרמב"ם למשנה‬, ed. and trans. [Hebrew], I. Shailat (Jerusalem
1992); medieval Hebrew translations: general introduction by
Judah Alharizi, introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq by Samuel Ibn
Tibbon, in: ‫הקדמות לפירוש המשנה‬, ed. M. D. Rabinowitz
(Jerusalem 1980).
Mishnah Commentary = ‫משנה עם פירוש ר' משה בן מיימון‬, ed. and
trans. [Hebrew], J. Kafih (Jerusalem 1963-1968)
Book of the Commandments. ‫ספר המצוות‬, ed. and trans. [Hebrew] J.
Kafih (Jerusalem 1971); Arabic text only ed. M. Bloch (Paris
1888);293 medieval Hebrew translations by: Moses Ibn Tibbon,
ed. H. Heller (New York 1946)

293
Since the most detailed analysis of individual Maimonidean passages in this
study relate to his use of the terms peshateh di-qera and ẓāhir al-naṣṣ in his Book
of the Commandments, I have made an effort to insure the accuracy of these
texts. Therefore, in addition to the printed editions by Kafih and Bloch, the
following manuscripts were consulted. For manuscripts on microfilm at the
Jewish National Library, the Mss. R.R. Film No. is also provided.
MS JNL Mss. R.R. Date, provenance
Film No.
Jewish Theological Seminary MS 13th or 14th ct.;
6972 Yemenite
Jewish Theological Seminary MS 14th ct.
6548
Jewish Theological Seminary MS 1423; Yemenite
6999
Jewish Theological Seminary MS 15th ct.; Yemenite
6998
Berlin Staatsbibliothek Or. Qu. F1799 1491
684
Jerusalem Rabbi Joseph Kafih 66 F32306 1492
Jerusalem Sassoon 1058 F9804 15th ct.; Yemenite
Israel Alei Teiman 14 F40427, F44766 15th-16th ct.
Paris – Ecole Rabbinique 134 F4085 18th-19th ct.
Paris – Alliance Israelite F3135 1864; Yemenite
Universelle H 32 A

[Link]
348 Mordechai Z. Cohen

Guide of the Perplexed. (‫דלאלה אלחאירין )ספר מורה נבוכים‬, ed. S.

Munk and I. Joel (Jerusalem 1930); English trans., S. Pines,
The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago 1963); modern Hebrew
trans., M. Schwarz (Jerusalem 2002). References to the Guide
in this study are cited according to section and chapter. Where
necessary, the page number in the Munk-Joel edition and / or
Pines’ translation is given.
Letters = ‫( איגרות הרמב"ם‬Maimonides’ Letters) ed. and trans.
[Hebrew], I. Shailat (Jerusalem 1987-1978)
Qoveṣ = ‫( קובץ תשובות הרמב"ם ואגרותיו‬Collection of Maimonides’
Responsa and Letters), ed. A. Lichtenberg (Leipzig 1859)
Responsa = ‫( תשובות הרמב"ם‬Maimonides’ Responsa) ed. and trans.
[Hebrew], Y. Blau (Jerusalem 19862)
Menahem ha-Meiri, Beth ha-Behirah on Makkot, ed. Sh. Strelitz
(Jerusalem 1965).
Menahem ben Saruq, Maḥberet, ed. A. Saenz-Badillos ed. (Granada
1986).
Nahmanides, Moses
Commentary on the Torah (‫)פירוש הרמב"ן על התורה‬, ed. C. Chavel
(Jerusalem 1976).
Sefer ha-Miṣwot ‘im Hassagot ha-Ramban (Critique of
Maimonides’ The Book of the Commandments), ed. C. Chavel
(Jerusalem 1981).
Ritba (Yom Tov ben Abraham Ishbili), commentary on Makkot, ed. Y.
Ralbag (Jerusalem 1983).
Saadia Gaon
Beliefs and Opinions = Kitāb al-Mukhtār fi-l-Amānāt wa-l-
I‘tiqādāt; Sefer ha-Nivḥar be-Emunot we-De‘ot (Book of
Selected Beliefs and Opinions), ed. and trans. [Hebrew] J.
Kafih (Jerusalem 1970), including Judah Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew
translation of Book 7, based on an alternate recension of the
Judeo-Arabic text of Book 7 = ‫'מאמר תחיית המתים לר' סעדיה גאון‬
'‫ז"ל‬, ed. W. Bacher, in Festschrift zum Achtzigsten Geburtstage
Moritz Steinscheider’s (Leipzig 1896), 98-112.
Tafsīr (Translation of the Torah) in: Oeuvres complètes de R.
Saadia ben Iosef al-Fayyoûmî, ed. J. Derenbourg (Paris 1893);

Kafih’s edition is based on the MS from his collection listed above, written in
1492. Bloch’s edition is based on three manuscripts, one from Berlin (which may
be the Berlin MS listed above), another from the “Séminaire israélite de Paris”
(which may be the Ecole Rabbinique MS listed above), and one from the
Bodleian collection at Oxford.

[Link]
 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 349

‫=( פירושי רבנו סעדיה גאון על תורה‬partial annotated trans. into

Hebrew), J. Kafih (Jerusalem 1984).
Commentary on Genesis (‫)פירושי רב סעדיה גאון לבראית‬, ed. and
trans. [Hebrew] M. Zucker (New York 1984).
Rav Saadya’s Commentary on Exodus (including citations by later
authors), ed. and trans. [Hebrew], Y. Ratzaby (Jerusalem
1998).

SECONDARY SOURCES

Ahrend, Concept = Moshe Ahrend, “The Concept Peshuto

Shellamiqra’ in the Making” [Hebrew], The Bible In Light of Its
Interpreters: Sarah Kamin Memorial Volume, ed. S. Japhet
(Jerusalem 1994), 237-261.
Arieli, “Halevi” = Nahum Arieli, “Rabbi Judah Halevi and the
Halakha” [Hebrew], Da‘at 1 (1978): 43-52.
Bacher, Bibelexegese = Wilhelm Bacher, Die Bibelexegese Moses
Maimûni’s (Budapest 1896).
Bar-Asher, Word = Meir M. Bar-Asher, Simon Hopkins, Sarah
Stroumsa and Bruno Chiesa, eds., A Word Fitly Spoken: Studies in
Mediaeval Exegesis of the Hebrew Bible and the Qur’ān Presented
to Haggai Ben-Shammai (Jerusalem 2007)
BDB = F. Brown, S. R. Driver and C. A. Briggs, A Hebrew and
English Lexicon of the Old Testament (Oxford 1907).
Ben-Menahem, “Jurisprudence” = Hanina Ben-Menahem, “Ibn Ezra’s
Cryptic Yesod Mora as a Treatise on Jurisprudence” [Hebrew],
Diné Yisrael 22 (2003):177-201.
Ben-Menahem, “Roots” = Hanina Ben-Menahem, “Maimonides’
Fourteen Roots: Logical Structure and Conceptual Analysis,”
Jewish Law Annual XIII (2000): 3-29.
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Arabic Texts (Hebrew; Jerusalem 2006).
Blau, Responsa = see Maimonides, Responsa.

[Link]
350 Mordechai Z. Cohen

Blidstein, Authority = Gerald Blidstein, Authority and Dissent in

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Bloomberg, “Legal Terms” = Joshua Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal
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Cohen, “Aesthetic Exegesis” = Mordechai Z. Cohen, “The Aesthetic
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Cohen, “Qimhi” = Mordechai Z. Cohen, “The Qimhi Family,” HBOT
I/2: 388-415.
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Moses Ibn Ezra: Two Perspectives on Biblical Poetics,” Sefer Sara
Japhet, ed. M. Bar-Asher, E. Tov, D. Rom-Shiloni and N. Wazana
(Jerusalem 2007), 193*-217* (English section).
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The Man and His Works (New York 2005).
EI = Encyclopedia of Islam, second edition (Leiden 1960-),

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 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 351

Elbaum, Perspectives = Jacob Elbaum, Medieval Perspectives on

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Erder, “On the Peshat” = Yoram Erder, ‫על הפשט בפרשנות הקראית‬
‫הקדומה‬, Sefunot 24 (forthcoming).
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Mishpat ha-Ivry 21 (1998-2000): 37-69.
Ettinger, “Legal Logic” = Shimshon Ettinger, “On the Place of
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Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri: Annual of the Institute for Research
in Jewish Law XIV-XV (1988-1989): 1-30.
Faur, Studies = José Faur, Studies in the Mishne Torah (Hebrew;
Jerusalem 1978).
Feintuch, Piqqudei Yesharim = Avraham Feintuch, Sefer Piqqudei
Yesharim (Jerusalem 1992)
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de la métaphore de Moïse Ibn ‘Ezra (Leiden 1997).
Frank, “Limits” = Daniel Frank, “The Limits of Karaite Scripturalism:
Problems in Narrative Exegesis,” in: Bar-Asher, Word, 41*-82*.
Frank, “Literature” = Daniel Frank, “Karaite Exegetical and Halakhic
Literature in Byzantium and Turkey,” in: Karaite Judaism: A Guide
to Its History and Literary Sources, ed. M. Polliack (Leiden 2003),
529-558.
Frank, Search = Daniel Frank, Search Scripture Well (Leiden 2004).
Frenkel, Elite = Miriam Frenkel, “The Compassionate and
Benevolent”: The Leading Elite in the Jewish Community of
Alexandria in the Middle Ages (Hebrew; Jerusalem 2006).
Friedman, “Use of Rashi” = Shamma Friedman, “Maimonides’ Use of
Rashi’s Commentaries: A Reevaluation” [Hebrew], Rashi: The
Man and His Work, ed. Avraham Grossman and Sara Japhet
(Jerusalem 2008), 403-464.
Garfinkel, “Clearing” = Stephan Garfinkel, “Clearing Peshat and
Derash,” HBOT I/2: 129-134.
Goldziher-Schacht, “Fiḳh” = EI, s.v. Fiḳh, by Ignac Goldziher and
Joseph Schacht.
Greenberg, “Interpretation” = Moshe Greenberg, “Bible Interpretation
as Exhibited in the First Book of Maimonides’ Code,” The Judeo-

[Link]
352 Mordechai Z. Cohen

Christian Tradition and the U.S. Constitution, ed. D. Goldenberg

(Winona Lake, IN 1989), 29-56.
Halbertal, “Architecture” = Moshe Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Mizvot of
Maimonides – His Architecture of Halakha and Theory of
Interpretation” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 59 (1990): 457-480.
Halbertal, People = Moshe Halbertal, People of the Book: Canon,
Meaning and Authority (Cambridge, MA 1997).
Halivni, Peshat & Derash = David Weiss-Halivni, Peshat & Derash
(New York 1991).
Hallaq, “Corroboration” = Wael Hallaq, “On Inductive Corroboration,
Probability and Certainty in Sunnī Legal Thought,” Islamic Law
and Jurisprudence, ed. N.L. Heer (Seattle 1990), 3-31 (reprinted in
Hallaq, Law and Legal Theory).
Hallaq, History = Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories
(Cambridge, MA 1997).
Hallaq, Law and Legal Theory = Wael Hallaq, Law and Legal Theory
in Classical and Medieval Islam (Variorum 1995).
Hallaq, “Logic” = Wael Hallaq, “Logic, Formal Arguments and
Formalization of Arguments in Sūnni Jurisprudence,” Arabica 37
(1990): 315-338 (reprinted in Hallaq, Law and Legal Theory).
Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments” = Wael B. Hallaq, “Non-
Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyās,” Arabica 36
(1989): 286-306 (reprinted in Hallaq, Law and Legal Theory).
Hallaq, Origins = Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic
Law (Cambridge 2005).
Harris, Fragmentation = Jay M. Harris, How Do We Know This?
Midrash and the Fragmentation of Modern Judaism (Albany
1995).
Harvey, “First Commandment” = Zeev Harvey, “The First
Commandment and the God of History: Halevi and Crescas vs. Ibn
Ezra and Maimonides” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 57 (1988): 203-216.
Hasnawi, “Réflexions” = Ahmad Hasnawi, “Réflexions sur la
terminologie logique de Maïmonide et son contexte Farabien: Le
Guide des Perplexes et le Traité de Logique,” Maïmonide:
Philosophe at Savant, ed. T. Lévy and R. Rashed (Leuven 2004),
39-78.
Havazelet, Geonites = Meir Havazelet, Maimonides and the Geonites
(Hebrew; New York 1967).
HBOT = Hebrew Bible / Old Testament: The History of its
Interpretation, ed. M. Sæbø, M. Haran and C. Brekelmans, vol. I/2,
The Middle Ages (Göttingen 2000).

[Link]
 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 353

Henshke, “Basis” = David Henshke, “The Basis of Maimonides’

Concept of Halacha” [Hebrew], Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivry 20
(1995-1997): 103-149.
Jackson, “Functional Analysis” = Sherman A. Jackson, “Toward a
Functional Analysis of Uṣūl al-Fiqh,” Studies in Islamic Law and
Legal Theory, ed. Bernard G. Weiss (Leiden 2002), 177-201.
Japhet, Job = Sara Japhet, The Commentary of Rabbi Samuel Ben
Meir (Rashbam) on the Book of Job (Hebrew; Jerusalem 2000).
Japhet, “Tension” = “The Tension Between Rabbinic Legal Midrash
and the ‘Plain Meaning’ (Peshat) of the Biblical Text – an
Unresolved Problem? In the Wake of Rashbam’s Commentary on
the Pentateuch,” Sefer Moshe: The Moshe Weinfeld Jubilee
Volume, ed. Ch. Cohen, A. Hurvitz and Sh. Paul (Winona Lake, IN,
2004), 403-425.
Jastrow = Marcus Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud
Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature (London
1903).
Jospe, “Ramban” = Raphael Jospe, “Ramban (Nahmanides) and
Arabic” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 67 (1987): 67-93.
Kamin, Categorization = Sarah Kamin, Rashi’s Exegetical
Categorization in Respect to the Distinction Between Peshat and
Derash (Hebrew; Jerusalem 1986).
Kamin, Jews and Christians = Sarah Kamin, Jews and Christians
Interpret the Bible, ed. Sara Japhet (Hebrew; Jerusalem 20082).
Kaplan, “Problems” = Lawrence Kaplan, review of Problems and
Parables, AJS Review 26 (2002): 361-364.
Kasher, “Interpretation” = Rimon Kasher, “The Interpretation of
Scripture in Rabbinic Literature,” Mikra: Text, Translation,
Reading and Interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in Ancient Judaism
and Early Christianity, ed. M. J. Mulder (Philadelphia 1988), 547-
594.
Kreisel, “Influence” = Howard Kreisel, “Judah Halevi’s Influence on
Maimonides: A Preliminary Appraisal,” Maimonidean Studies 2
(1991): 95-121.
Lasker, “Karaism” = Daniel Lasker, “The Influence of Karaism on
Maimonides” [Hebrew] Sefunot n.s. 5 (1991): 145-161.
Levinger, Philosopher = Jacob Levinger, Maimonides as Philosopher
and Codifier (Hebrew; Jerusalem 1989).
Levinger, “Techniques” = Jacob Levinger, Maimonides’ Techniques
of Codification (Hebrew; Jerusalem 1965).

[Link]
354 Mordechai Z. Cohen

Lowry, “Shāfi‘ī” = Joseph Lowry, “Does Shāfi‘ī have a Theory of

Four Sources of Law?,” Weiss, Studies, 23-50.
Kraemer, “Influence” = Joel Kraemer, “The Influence of Islamic Law
on Maimonides: The Case of the Five Qualifications” [Hebrew],
Te‘udah 10 (1996): 225-244
Kraemer, “Naturalism” = Joel L. Kraemer, “Naturalism and
Universalism in Maimonides’ Thought,” Me’ah She‘arim: Studies
in Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life in Memory of Isadore Twersky,
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Kraemer, “Portrait” = Joel L. Kraemer, “Moses Maimonides – An
Intellectual Portrait,” The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides,
ed. K. Seeskin (Cambridge, England 2005), 10-57.
Lameer, Syllogistics = Joep Lameer, Al-Farabi and Aristotelian
Syllogistics (Leiden 1994).
Lane = E.W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (London 1863-1893).
Libson, Custom = Gideon Libson, Jewish and Islamic Law: A
Comparative Study of Custom During the Geonic Period
(Cambridge, MA 2003).
Libson, “Parallels” = Gideon Libson, “Parallels Between Maimonides
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Philosophical and Legal Studies, ed. I. Robinson, L. Kaplan and J.
Bauer (Lewiston, NY 1990).
Libson, “Two Sureties” = Gideon Libson, “Two Sureties: A
Comparative Study of R. Shmuel ben Hofni Gaon, Maimonides and
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Mishpat ha-Ivri 11-12 (1984-1986): 337-392.
Lobel, Mysticism = Diana Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy:
Sufi Language of Religious Experience in Judah ha-Levi’s Kuzari
(New York 2000).
Maman, “Linguistic School,” = Aharon Maman, “The Linguistic
School,” HBOT I/2:261-281.
Maori, “Approach” = Yeshayahu Maori, “The Approach of Classical
Jewish Exegetes to Peshat and Derash and its Implications for the
Teaching of Bible Today” (trans. M. Bernstein), Tradition 21
(1984): 40-53.
Maori, “Attititude” = Yeshayahu Maori, “The Meaning of the Term
‫ דברי יחיד‬in the Commentary of Ibn Ezra on the Torah: On Ibn
Ezra’s Attitude Towards Rabbinic Midrash” [Hebrew], Shnaton 13:
An Annual for Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern Studies, ed. S.
Japhet (Jerusalem 2002), 201-246.

[Link]
 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 355

Melammed, Commentators = Ezra Zion Melammed, Bible

Commentators (Hebrew; Jerusalem 1978)
Minḥat Ḥinnukh = Joseph Babad, Minḥat Ḥinnukh, commentary on
Sefer ha- Ḥinnukh (Jerusalem 1984)
Mondschein, “Attitude” = Aharon Mondschein, “On the Attitude of R.
Abraham Ibn Ezra to the Exegetical Use of the Hermeneutic Norm
Gematria” [Hebrew], Te‘uda 8: Studies in the Works of Abraham
Ibn Ezra, ed. I. Levin (Tel-Aviv 1992), 137-161.
Mondschein, “Inter-Relationship” = Aharon Mondschein,
“Concerning the Inter-Relationship of the Commentaries of R.
Abraham Ibn Ezra and R. Samuel ben Meir to the Pentateuch: A
New Appraisal” [Hebrew], Te‘udah 16-17: Studies in Judaica, ed.
Y. Hoffmann (Tel-Aviv 2001), 15-46.
Mondschein, “Secret” = Aharon Mondschein, “It Contains a Secret
and the Wise Man Will Keep It: The Enigmatic Style of Abraham
Ibn Ezra as a Key to His Personality,” [Hebrew], Shnaton 14: An
Annual for Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern Studies, ed. S. Japhet
(Jerusalem 2004), 257-288.
Neubauer, Divrei Soferim = Yequtiel Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ‘al
Divrei Soferim (Jerusalem 1957)
Pines, “Introduction” = Shlomo Pines, “Translator’s Introduction: The
Philosophic Sources of the Guide of the Perplexed,” in:
Maimonides, Guide, Pines trans., lvii-cxxxiv.
Poonawala, “Ta’wīl” = EI, s.v. Ta’wīl, by I. Poonawala.
Rabinovitch, Studies = Nachum L. Rabinovitch, Studies in
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Ravitsky, “Arguments” = Aviram Ravitsky, “Halakhic Arguments as
Dialectical Arguments and Exegetical Principles as Aristotelian
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Ravitsky, Logic = Aviram Ravitsky, Aristotelian Logic and Talmudic
Methodology: The Application of Aristotelian Logic in the
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Sagi, Elu va-Elu = Avi Sagi, Elu va-Elu: A Study on the Meaning of
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Sagi, Nahmanides = Avi Sagi, “Canonic Scripture and the
Hermeneutical Challenge: A Critical Review in Light of
Nahmanides” [Hebrew], Daat 50-52 (2003): 121-141.

[Link]
356 Mordechai Z. Cohen

Sagi, “Praxis” = Avi Sagi, “Halakhic Praxis and the Word of God: A
Study of Two Models,” The Journal of Jewish Thought and
Philosophy 1 (1992): 305-329.
Schwarb, “God’s Speech” = Gregor Schwarb, “Capturing the
Meanings of God’s Speech,” in: Bar-Asher, Word, 111*-156*.
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88.
Schwarz, Fiqh = Michael Schwarz, “Al-Fiqh, A Term Borrowed from
Islam Used by Maimonides for a Jewish Concept in his Sefer ha-
Mitzvoth and in the Guide of the Perplexed,” in Adaptations and
Innovation: Studies on the Interaction between Jewish and Islamic
Thought and Literature from the Early Middle Ages to the Late
Twentieth Century, Dedicated to Professor Joel L. Kraemer, ed. Y.
Tzvi Langermann and Josef Stern (Paris 2007), 349-353.
Septimus, “Open Rebuke” = Bernard Septimus, “‘Open Rebuke and
Concealed Love: Nahmanides and the Andalusian Tradition,”
Rabbi Moses Nahmanides (Ramban): Explorations in His Religious
and Literary Virtuosity, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA
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Shailat, Letters; see under Maimonides, Moses (primary sources)
Shy, Tanhum = Hadassa Shy, ed. and trans. [Hebrew], Tanhum ha-
Yerushalmi’s Commentary on the Minor Prophets (Jerusalem
1992).
Simon, “Ibn Ezra” = Uriel Simon, “Abraham ibn Ezra,” HBOT,
II:377-387.
Simon, “al-Kanzi” = Uriel Simon, “Isaac ben Samuel al-Kanzi,”
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Sklare, “Ḥāwī” = David Sklare, “David ben Se‘adya al-Ger and his
Work al-Ḥāwī” [Hebrew], Te‘udah 14 (1998): 103-123.
Sklare, Samuel Ben Hofni = David Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni Gaon
and His Cultural World (Leiden 1996).
Soloveitchik, “Classification” = Haym Soloveitchik, “Reflections on
Principles of Classification in Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah”
[Hebrew], Maimonidean Studies IV (2000): 107-115 (Hebrew
section).
Stampfer, “Jewish Law” = Yehudah Zvi Stampfer, “Jewish Law in
Eleventh-Century Spain – The Kitab al-Hawi of Rabbi David Ben
Saadia” [Hebrew], Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivry 25 (1998): 217-
236.

[Link]
 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 357

Stern, “Language” = Josef Stern, “Maimonides on Language and the

Science of Language,” Maimonides and the Sciences, ed. R.S.
Cohen and H. Levine (Dordrecht 2000), 173-226.
Stern, Problems = Josef Stern, Problems and Parables of Law (New
York 1998).
Strauss, “How to Begin” = Leo Strauss, “How to Begin to Study the
Guide of the Perplexed,” introduction to Maimonides, Guide, Pines
trans., xi-lvi.
Sviri, “Istinbāṭ” = Sara Sviri, “Understanding Has Countless Faces:
On Istinbāṭ, Sufi Exegesis and Mystical Understanding” [Hebrew],
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in Europe and North Africa (Hebrew; Jerusalem 1999).
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Torah Temimah = Baruch ha-Levi Epstein, Torah Temimah (Vilna
1904).
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Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines, Speculum 61 (1966), 555-558.
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Studies in the Writings of a Twelfth Century Jewish Polymath, ed.,
I. Twersky and J. Harris (Cambridge, MA 1993), 21-48 [Hebrew
Section].
Weiss, “Search” = Bernard G. Weiss, The Search for God’s Law:
Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf al-Din al-Amidi (Salt
Lake City 1992).
Weiss, “Spirit” = Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law
(Athens, GA 1998).
Weiss, Studies = Studies in Islamic Law and Legal Theory, ed.
Bernard G. Weiss (Leiden 2002).
Wiesenberg, Commentary; see under Maimonides, Abraham ben
Moses (primary sources)
Wolfson, “Truth” = Elliot R. Wolfson, “By Way of Truth: Aspects of
Nahmanides’ Kabbalistic Hermeneutic,” AJS Review 14 (1989):
103-178

[Link]
358 Mordechai Z. Cohen

Wright, Grammar = W. Wright, A Grammar of the Arabic Language

(Cambridge, England 19673)
Yunis Ali, Pragmatics = Mohamed M. Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic
Pragmatics (Richmond, England 2000).
Zucker, “Fragments” = Moshe Zucker, “Fragments from Rav Saadya
Gaon’s Commentary to the Pentateuch” [Hebrew], Sura 2 (1955/6):
313-355.
Zucker, Genesis; see under Saadia (primary sources), commentary on
Genesis.
Zucker, “Hefeṣ” = Moshe Zucker, ‫'קטעים חדשים מספר המצוות לר' חפץ בן‬
'‫“=[ יצליח‬New Fragments of The Book of the Commandments of
Hefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ”], PAAJR 29 (1961):1-68.
Zucker, “Studies” = Moshe Zucker, '‫“ =[ 'עיונים והערות‬Studies and
Notes”] PAAJR, 49 (1982): 97-104.
Zucker, “Taḥṣīl” = Moshe Zucker, “Fragments of the Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-
Sharā’i‘ al-Samā‘īyah” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 41 (1972): 373-410.
Zucker, Translation = Moshe Zucker, Rav Saadya Gaon’s Translation
of the Torah (Hebrew; New York 1959).
Zysow, “Economy” = Aron Zysow, “The Economy of Certainty”
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1984).

[Link]
 A New Understanding of Maimonides’ Principle of Peshat Primacy 359

CONTENTS

A Talmudist’s Halakhic Hermeneutics: ............................................ 257

1. Exegetical Heritage ......................................................................... 268
a. Sources .......................................................................................... 269
b. Earlier Attitudes toward Rabbinic Halakhic Exegesis ............ 272
2. Maimonides’ Classification of Rabbinic Readings of Scripture 284
a. Transmitted Interpretations......................................................... 286
b. The “Thirteen Middot”................................................................ 290
c. Derashot........................................................................................ 299
3. The Second Principle in The Book of the Commandments ....... 302
4. Explicit Applications of the Second Principle ............................. 316
(1) Lev 11:43 .................................................................................... 319
(2) Num 4:20 .................................................................................... 321
(3) Lev 21:12 .................................................................................... 322
(4) Deut 23:24 .................................................................................. 324
(5) Num 17:5 .................................................................................... 326
(6) Deut 14:1 .................................................................................... 328
(7) Exod 20:21.................................................................................. 329
(8) Exod 20:20.................................................................................. 332
(9) Lev 19:14 .................................................................................... 335
5. Conclusions ...................................................................................... 336
List of References ................................................................................ 346

[Link]