IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA

AT DAR ES SALAM MAIN REGISTRY

MISC. C IV IL APPEAL NO. 3 OF 2017

(CORAM: TEEMBA, MUTUNGI, ARUFANI, JJJ)

(Originating from Application no. 10 of 2014 In The M atter of the
A dvocates Committee)

NATHAN A L E X ...................................................................................... APPELLANT

VERSUS

VALERIAN CRISPIN M L A Y ............................................................1* RESPONDENT

THlt A D V O CA TES CO M M ITTEE...............................................2 1* RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

TEEMBA, J.

On 12/5/2014, Velerian Crispin Mlay, the first respondent

wrbte a com plaint tetter addressed to the C hairm an of the
A d vo cates Com m ittee com plaining against Nathan Alex,
for professional m isconduct, in order to a p p re cia te the
grounds of a p p e a l and the arguments from both sides, w e
wi|t summarize the facts as recorded by the A d vo cates
Com m ittee. Velerian Crispin Mlay w as an ex-em ployee of
Kagera Tea C o m p any Limited (KTC) and the two had a
labour dispute on the retirement benefits. The first respondent
e n g a g e d the appeilant, Nathan Alex, an A d v o ca te of HAK!
Attorneys to represent him in the Commission for Mediation
and Arbitration (CMA) and in the High Court. The CM A
d ecid ed the dispute in favour of the first respondent and
avjard ed him Tshs 142, 101, 799.21 KTC a p p e a le d to the High
Cc|urt, Labour Division where the amount w as raised to Tshs
26f, 371, 799.21. An attem pt to lodge an a p p e a l to the Court
ofjA p p eal failed. KTM sought for a settlement out of court
arid finally agreed to p ay the first respondent a total amount
o f| Tshs 65,000,000/= as final and conclusive in the claim .
Though hesitantly, the second respondent a c c e p te d the
proposal that the m oney would be paid through his lawyer,
thfe appellant, in four instalments of Tshs 15,000,000/= by
Mjsrch 2014; Tshs 17,000,000/= by April 2014; Tshs 17,000,000/=
by M ay 2014; and Tshs 16,000,000/= by June 2014. A ccording
to|the first respondent, The first two instalments amounting to
Ts^is 32,000,000/= w ere paid through the ap p e lla n t’s
a cco u n t. When he co n ta cte d the oppeilant in respect of the
sdid paym ent the latter refused to talk about it. Todate, and
b ecau se of this bad relationship, the ex-em ployer has not
p<bid the remaining sum. The first respondent com plained to
the High Court, Labour Division and an order w as issued to
com pel the ex-employer to p a y the remaining sum. As a
result of that order, the appellant filed a civil suit no. 18 of 2014
in the Resident M agistrates’ Court of Kag era at Bukoba
against the first respondent claiming for Tshs 39,300,000/= as
hisllegal fees. The appellant also obtained an interim order
to [stop the paym ents to the first respondent irrespective of
th^ execution order by the labour Court. At the time of
hearing this a p p e a l the suit at Bukoba Resident Magistrates'
Cdurt w as still pending.

In his d e fen ce before the A d vo cates Com m ittee the

appellant adm itted that he represented the first respondent
in [he CM A and High Court. He alleged that his client had
ag reed to p ay shs, 40,000,000/= as legal fees but after the
settlement betw een KTM and the first respondent, the client
refused to discuss the legal fees and instead he m aintained
thcfct the appellant was entitled to only Tshs 8,000,000/=. The
appellant also adm itted to h ave lodged a civil suit against
th& first respondent claiming for Segal fees of Tshs 39,300.000/.
Thfe appellant alleged that Shs 32,000,000/= paid to him w as
received from Bukoba Tea Blenders (BTB) for legal expenses
asl the co m p any w as his client since 05/1/2014 in another
dispute involving tea farmers. He adm itted that his retainer
fe£ w as shs 6,000,000/= but he w as overp aid. However,
neither BTB nor the appellant has informed the other side in
writing that the appellant w as overpaid. M oreover, the
appellant did not call any witness from BTB to support his
allegation that the paym ent was for legal services rendered
to fhe com pany.

The A d vo ca te s’ Com m ittee found the appellant guilty

anjd convicted him of professional m isconduct. The
Com m ittee also suspended him from p ra ctice for five years
ar^d cond em ned him to p ay costs of that application. Being
aggrieved by the decision and order of the A d v o ca te s’
Com m ittee, the appellant has a p p e a le d to this court on the
following nine grounds:

That, the trial A d vo cates Com m ittee erred in law and

facts to hear and determine the application while the
Com m ittee w as not properly m oved.

fc. That, the proceedings before the A d vo cates

Com m ittee were irregular and null and void for failure to
com ply with the requirements and procedures under
Rule 3 of the A d vo cates (Disciplinary) Rules, GN No. 135.

3. That, the Ruling of the Com m ittee is irregular and b ad in

law for being not signed by the C hairm an.
4. That, the proceedings before the A d vo cates
Com m ittee w as nullity for action of drawing issues at the
stage of composing the Ruling.
 3. That, the trial Com m ittee grossly erred in law and facts
for failure to afford the Appellant full right to be hearcjl on
the issues fram ed by the Com m ittee while composing
the Ruling.

That, the proceedings, Ruling and decision of |the

A d vo cates Com m ittee are b ad in law for being in
violation of rules and principles of natural justice.

That, trial Com m ittee erred in law and facts for

convicting the Appellant on professional m isconduct
while the sam e was not proved to the required standard
of proof.

That, the A d vo cates Com m ittee erred in law and facts

for failure to evaluate and weigh up e vid e n ce before it
to the m andatory standards.

f . That, generally the orders and punishment against the

Appellant was excessively punitive without regards to the
nature of purported m isconduct.

Before this Court, the appellant w as represented by Mr

R^vocatus Thadeo, learned a d v o c a te while the second
respondent was represented by Mr. Mwitasi, learned Senior
Stcf]te Attorney. The first respondent a p p e a re d in person.
 In arguing the a p p e a l Mr Thadeo ab a n d o n e d ground
nufnber 3. He argued grounds no. 1 & 2 jointly stating thail the
Com m ittee was not properly m oved and thus, the
proceedings w ere also irregular for failure to com ply witni the
requirements of Rule 3 of the A d vo cates (Disciplinary) R^les,
GMJ No. 135 of 1955 which requires a com plaint to| be
acjdressed to the secretary of the Com m ittee. He submitted
th<tat the record of the Com m ittee reveals at p a g e 2 of| the
proceedings that when the Com m ittee sat for the first time, it
wdis m oved by a letter from the first respondent arid it
ordered a formal application to be brought. The learned
a d v o c a te a d d e d that, this that was wrong as the Com m ittee
wets supposed to strike out that application instead of asking
foil a new application. He also submitted that the Com m ittee
adted wrongly on the second application b e ca u se even this
orle was not addressed to the Secretary as stipulated under
Ru|le 3. To support his argum ent that the proceedings were
ndll and void, the learned counsel m ad e reference to the
cc)se of RUTAGATINA C .L Vs The ADVOCATES COMMITTEE and
CllAVERY MTINDO NGALAPA, Civil Appeal No. 46 of 2012,
Court of Appeal, (Unreported).

In his reply, the first respondent w as firm thatl his

com plaint was proper before the Com m ittee after bringing
th^ formal com plaint as ordered by the Com m ittee. He
submitted that his com plaint was supported by an affidavit
an|d docum ents.

Mr Mwitasi, learned Senior State Attorney, submitted that

th^se two grounds of a p p e a l have no merit. He challeng ed
th^ appellant by arguing that the grounds ought to be
preliminary objections which could be dealt with at the ^arly
stcpges of hearing by the Com m ittee. He submitted that, as
loifig as these are not addressing the jurisdiction of the
Ccbmmittee or limitation period, they can n o t be a c te d upon
in this a p p e a l. To reiterate his point, The learned State
Attorney cited the ca se of Tanzania-China Friendship Textile
C^.Ltd Vs Our Lady of Usambara Sisters [2006] T.LR.70.

Alternatively, the learned counsel argued that if this

ccfrurt agrees with the appellant that the application was
wfongly filed still there is no harm com m itted by the
Com m ittee b e ca u se there w as an application in p la ce
which was supported by an affidavit as required by Rule 3 of
th|e A d vo cates (Disciplinary) Rules, GN no. 135 of 1955. He
therefore distinguished the c a se of Rutagatina (supra) from
thje present a p p e a l on the ground that the former I had
neither application nor affidavit before the Com m ittee. In
addition, he submitted that the rules of procedure should not
be! applied strictly in this case as applied strictly in criminal
cdses.

In order to ap p re ciate the arguments on these grounds

o f|a p p e a l, let us reproduce the wording of Rule 3 oflthe
A d vo cates (Disciplinary and Other Proceedings) Rules GN
no|. 135 of 1955. The Rule states:

"3. An application to the A d v o c a te s

Com m ittee to rem ove the nam e of an
a d v o c a te from the Role or to require an
a d v o c a te to answer allegations shall b e in
writing under the hand of the a p p lica n t in
Form 1 set out in the Schedu le a n d shall b e
sent to the Secretary to the C om m ittee
together with an affidavit by the
ap plica n t stating the matters of fa c t on
which he relies in support of the
a p p lica tio n ,”

We h ave perused the record of the Com m ittee, We

acjree with the ap p ellan t’s counsel that the com plaint
against him w as presented to the C hairm an as a lejtter.
However, the Com m ittee met for the first time on 17/6/2014

8
in |he ab sen ce of parties and none of them w as notified of
thc^t sitting. It was then that the Com m ittee directed:

“A formal application b e b ro u g h t Let the

applicant b e informed a cco rd in g ly ”

Itlwas on the basis of this directive that a format application

w<tis brought under Rule 3 of the A d vo cates (Disciplinary <bnd
Oljher Proceedings) Rules. It was brought under the hand of
thp complainant/first respondent. The Application w as dulty
subported by an affidavit as provided by the law. The tn ly
th£ thing which is missing is the addressee but w e do notlsee
ar|y injustice caused by that omission b eca u se the Secretary
received and signed the affidavit as evid e n ce d at p a g e 5 of
thp co m p lainant’s affidavit which w as presented for filing on
29|th d ay of August 2014. On the basis of this record, w e hpve
n<$ doubt that the application was presented to bnd
refceived/signed by the Secretary to the A d vo cates
Com m ittee.

As submitted by the learned Senior State Attorney] w e

acpree that the cited ca se of RUTAGATINA (supra) is highly
distinguishable with the present ca se for one moin reason, in
thle Rutagatina's ca se there was no application and /or
affidavit before the Com m ittee. But in the ca se at hand, the
requirements w ere fulfilled. Thus, this reference is irrelevant to
thfc circum stances of the present a p p e a l.

in ground no.4, Mr.Thadeo submitted that the

proceedings are irregular and nullity for drawing issues at the
s tig e of composing the Ruling. He argued that the issues
drbwn by the Com m ittee at that stage are contrary to Order
Xl1/ Rule 1 (5) of the Civil Procedure C o d e , C a p 33 R.E. 2002.
To| amplify this point, he cited the cases of (1) Abdallah
H<jtssan Vs Juma Hamisi Sekiboko, Civil Appeal no. 22 of 2007
(U|nreported)(CAT); (II) Kapapa Kumpindi Vs The Plant
Mbnager, Tanzania Breweries LTD, Civil Appeal no. 32 of 2010
(QAT) (Unreported); (III) Peoples Bank of Zanzibar Vs Suleman
H^iji Suleman [2000] T.L.R 347. The learned counsel opined
th|at, had the Com m ittee found that it w as necessary to
fr$me issues then, parties were to be recalled to address
thjem.

The ap p ellan t’s counsel submitted that grounds 5 and 6

a(e co n n ected to ground no.4. He contend ed that failure to
afford the appellant full right to be heard on the issues raised
at the stage of composing the Ruling w as contrary to the
rujles of natural justice and has violated Article 13(6) (a) of the
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. in this

10
respect, the court w as referred to the decisions in (i) Edwin
Wi|ia Sheto vs. Managing Director of Arusha international
Conference Centre [1999] T.L.R.139; (ii) DPP Vs Sabini Inyasi
Tefcha and Another [1993] T.L.R 237;
(iii| Peter Ng’homango V. A.G, Civil Appeal no. 114 of 2011
(CAT) (Unreported).
(vj Halima Hassan Marealle Vs Parastatal Sector Reform
Commission and Another, Civil Application no. 81 of
1991 (Unreported).

Responding to the ab o ve arguments the respondents

submitted that there w as no any injustice cau sed for not
drawing the issues at the com m encem ent of the hearing. Mr
MWitasi submitted that, the appellant knew about the
alllegations levelled against him and he filed his counter­
affidavit and annextures. He therefore disputed the
argum ent that the appellant w as denied the right of hearing
or] the issues raised in the Ruling b e ca u se the issues w ere
relevant to the evid en ce received . The learned State
Attorney adced that, the proceedings before the
Com m ittee are guided by rules under GN No. 135 of 1955
ar|d not the Civil Procedure C o d e . He co n clu d ed by urging
th£ court to em ploy its powers and remit the m atter b a ck to
th£ Com m ittee for retrial in the event it finds that there w as
ii
foiai irregularity. He ad d ed that, the com plaint to |the
Cdm m ittee w as genuinely presented and the irregularity, if
arjy, affects both parties.

First and foremost, w e agree with the a p p e lla n t’s

submissions that, triable issues must be fram ed before the
co m m encem ent of trials. This is the legal requirement urfider
Ortder XIV Rule 1(5) of the Civil Procedure C o d e , C a p 33 RE
20h2. All the cases cited by the a p p ellan t’s learned counsel
str|ess on this m andatory requirement in civil cases. See:
Afcdallah Hassan Vs Juma Hamis Sekiboko (supra) on this
prjnciple.

However, w e decline to ag ree with the a p p e lla n t’s

afjgument that it was m andatory for the Com m ittee to fram e
isslues when hearing the com plaint. In its proceedings, the
A d vo cates Com m ittee is guided by The Advocates’ Act C ap
341 RE 2002 and the Advocates (Displinary and Other
P*|oceedings) Rules GN no. 134 of 1955. There is no provision
either in the main A ct or in the Rules which provides the e xa ct
procedure to be followed by the Com m ittee w hen hearing
a(i application. Moreover, w e must express here that in our
research w e did not com e across the proceedings of any
application where the Com m ittee fram ed issues. However, it
is [common understanding that in applications supported by
12
affidavits, the Issues are drawn by the court w|hen
determining the prayers sought in such applications. In| the
present ca se it is true the issues w ere fram ed by the
Com m ittee at p ag e 8 of the typed Ruling. From the wording
of |the Ruling, the issues were fram ed in order to guide the
Com m ittee. The record says:

“With the ab o ve moferial at hand a n d

in order to bring ourselves to fo cu se d
attention, we frame five issues . .

Thus, the fram ed issues w ere based on the m aterial

evid en ce received by the Com m ittee. With this in mind, w e
d ijag ree with Mr Revocatus Thadeo that the ap p ellant w as
denied the right to be heard on those issues. This Court had a
c h a n c e to go through the application and affidavit filed by
thfe com plainant, the first respondent. Indeed, all the issues
fram ed by the Com m ittee were deponed in his affidavit and
this appellant filed his counter-affidavit by either taking note
oflsome facts, or denying some of them and giving additional
fajcts to dispute the deponed facts. Again, when narrating
before the Com m ittee on 24th and 25th M arch 2015, the
parties rep eated the evid en ce touching on the fees p a ya b le
to| the appellant; Deed of settlement and its enforcem ent;
th|e paym ents received by the appellant from the judgm ent
debtor; and the cond uct of instituting a suit against the
cdm piainant. Tnese issues cannot be treated as something
nelw to a ffe ct the rights of the appellant. He testified on the
bctsis of the complaints and affidavit which in fa ct contained
all)these issues.

We wish at this juncture, to cite with acknow led gem ent

thfe wisdom of our (earned brother in the c a se of Mulbadaw
Vijtage Council and 67 others vs National Agricultural and
Fc|od Corporation [1984] TLR 15. In this c a se although other
isspes w ere fram ed at the com m encem ent of trial, one issue
w^ss not fram ed at the beginning but e vid en ce w as received
during cross-examination and the d e fe n ce counsel raised it
a^ain in his final submissions. The Court at p a g e 17 held that:
“Although these arguments were not
framed as issues at the beginning they
are issues apparent from the pleadings,
the evidence on record and the
submissions of the both counsel/’
(Emphasis oc/decf)

it is our firm position that the issues fram ed by the

Com m ittee w hen composing the Ruling w ere all app aren t
fr<[)m the affidavit and counter affidavit and the evid en ce

14
acjd uced at the hearing by both parties. H ence, this ground
of lappeal lacks merit and is dismissed.

The ap p ellan t’s a d v o c a te atta cke d the Com m ittee in

ground 7&8 by submitting that the testimony of the 1st
respondent was not supported by docum entary evid en ce
(D^ed of settlement and cheques) and all w hat is on record
is |hearsay. The learned a d v o c a te co ntend ed that the
alibged exhibits referred to in the Ruling w ere a tta ch e d to the
pleadings but w ere never tendered as exhibits during trial.
argued that as long as the attachm ents w ere not
tehdered at trial they could not be relied upon by the
Com m ittee. The counsel cited the c a se of (1) Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) vs Khakir Complex
[2006] T.L.R. 343; Mwajuma Mbegu vs Kitwana Amani, Civil
Appeal no. 12 of 2001, (CAT) (Unreported).

The appellant concluded his submissions by stating that

thfe procedure to admit the docum entary e v id e n ce w as not
followed and thus, the appellant was co n victed on the basis
ofl suspicion. For this reason, he a d d e d , the ap p ellant w as
convicted and sentenced without proof. In addition, the
counsel argued that even the punishment of five years
suspending the appellant from practicing as a d v o c a te is

15
excessive. He urged this court to set aside the findings of the
Com m ittee and set free the appellant.

The first respondent was very brief that he presented his

cc|se to the Com m ittee and 4 cheques (exhibits) w ere
a tta ch e d to his affidavit. He also stated that one ch eq u e
wcjis produced by the appellant and the hearing before the
Com m ittee w as for the legality of those paym ents received
the appellant.

On the other hand, Mr Mwitasi, learned counsel for the

second respondent submitted that, the com plaint against
th£ appellant w as proved to the standard required. He
rejterated that the contents of the docum ents in dispute, that
is, |the Affidavit and Deed of Agreem ent, are not disputed but
thfc appellant is challenging their status in e v id e n ce . The
learned state attorney distinguished the cases cited by Mr
Th|adeo by stating that, they all fall/apply to pleadings while
th^ present a p p e al was based on affidavits. He co ntend ed
thfcit since an affidavit is evid en ce, then even the annexture
to|the affidavit forms part of the e vid e n ce .

As for the evid en ce on record, the learned State

Al|torney submitted that there is sufficient e vid e n ce and
prpof that the appellant w as the a d v o c a te for the first
respondent who prepared the Deed of Settlement. He
acjded that, the appellant received the cheq ues from the
sister co m p any of the judgm ent-debtor and the co n ta ct
person and m anag er of the two com panies w as the sam e
person. Moreover, the counsel submitted that the appellant
intjentionally retained the money which w as intended for his
client (the 1st respondent) b ecau se while his fair paym ent
w<|js Tshs 6 million, the cheques were for Tshs 32 million.

As for the sentence, the learned stcte attorney

submitted that it w as fair b ecau se the Com m ittee had
considered several factors before com ing up with such
pjinishment. He w as of the views that, given the
circum stances and the m isconduct com m itted, the
a&pelSant should h ave been term inated from the bar as an
a d v o c a te . The learned counsel urged the court to vary the
decision of the Com m ittee and order that the m oney be
p<fsid in favour of the first respondent for his retirement
benefits.

We wish to note at this juncture that it is true the

docum ents relied upon by the Com m ittee w ere not
adm itted, num bered and/or signed by the Com m ittee when
th|e parties testified. However, w e decline to ag ree with Mr
R^vocatus Thadeo that the omission w as fatal to the
17
proceedings, it must be stressed here that the proceedings
w $ re not per-se a hearing of a civil suit initiated by a plaint
arid annextures under the Civil Procedure C o d e , C a p 33
R.f.2002. The com plaint to the Com m ittee was both an
application to rem ove the nam e of the appellant from the
Rqll; and also an allegation of Professional misconduct.
Urfder the provisions of Section 12 of the A d vo cates A ct, C a p
3-41, RE 2002, the com plainant is required to support the
allegations by an affidavit setting out the facts on w hich he
re|ies as proof of m isconduct. The a d v o c a te com plained
against must also file his counter affidavit. This procedure
wfis followed accordingly. In addition, the com plainant and
thle appellant annexed docum ents which formed part of the
affidavit or counter affidavit respectively. All the docum ents
referred to in the affidavits are in the original file. It is our
considered view that, those docum ents w ere part of the
evid en ce (in the form of affidavit/counter affidavit) and this
rr|ay explain the reason why the parties did not file a fresh list
of docum ents to be relied upon at the hearing as the
notices sent to them indicated. Moreover, the contents of
the annexed docum ents were never in dispute by either
pjsrty and indeed, in their oral testimonies to the Com m ittee,
tHe parties were referring to the facts stated in those
docum ents. It is therefore our considered view that the
18
cdses cited to us are relevant in the ca se where docum ents
w ere not part of the evid en ce, a situation which is different
arid does not apply to the present matter.
On the issue of proof, the ap p ellan t’s submission is that
th0 allegations were not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This main reason given is that since the docum ents were not
lefcally adm itted into evid ence then the Com m ittee relied on
th£m errenousiy. As w e h ave already pointed out a b o ve , the
arfinextures were part of the evid en ce in the affidavits. We
ai£o noted that there was no objection in respect of their
legality so as to require the Com m ittee to d e cid e on the
status of those docum ents. The argum ent that the
Cbm m ittee a cte d on suspicion is baseless b e ca u se the
evid en ce in the affidavit together with the oral evid en ce
w^re both considered by the Com m ittee in deciding the
com plaint. Being the first appellate court, w e h ave read the
e vid en ce on record and do not find any good ground to
differ with the findings of the Com m ittee. Again, the cases
referred to by the appellant do not apply and are all
distinguishable.
We wish to reiterate the wisdom of the Suprem e Court of
S4>uth Africa in the ca se of Vassen V. Law Society of C ap e of
Gbod Hope 1998 (4) SA 532 SCA at 538 that

19
 . . it must b e born in mind that the
profession of on attorney, os of any
other officer of the c o u rt is an
honourable one and as such d em an ds
c o m p le te honesty, reliability an d
integrity from its m embers . . . A client
who entrusts his affairs to an attorney
must b e able rest assured that that
attorney is an honourable man who c a n
be trusted to m an ag e his affairs
meticulously a n d honestly.

The sam e standards are stressed yet in another c a se of

K&kana Vs Society of Advocates of South Africa (1998) (4) SA
649 fSAC) 551 - 656 where the sam e Court held

. . that an a d v o c a te , whose calling is

one which is praiseworthy ond
necessary to human life, should always
cling to the famous principle that the
true jurist is an honest man. These
Qualities of honesty a n d integrity must
continue to b e displayed throughout a
legal practitioner’s ca re e r

20
 in the present ap p e a l, there is evid en ce showing how
th£ appellant handled his client especially after signing the
OL|t of court settlement. There is no doubt that since The
appellant was the a d v o c a te for the first respondent, was
e j e c t e d and entrusted to execu te the settlement terms.
Contrary to those expectations, the appellant sued his own
clijent and blocked the execution of a judgm ent and d e cre e
obtained by himself when representing the sam e client. This
is the reason w e support the findings of the Com m ittee that
thb appellant com m itted unethical and a grave professional
m isconduct for doing so. There w as proof beyond
rebsonable doubt on this com plaint. Our position is based on
thfe definition of proof beyond reasonable doubt as stated in
th|e ca se of Magendo Paul and Another vs Republic [1993]
TL|< 219,that

“If the e v id e n c e is so strong against an

a c c u s e d so as to lea ve only a rem ote
possibility in his favour which c a n easily
b e dismissed, the c a se is p ro v e d b e y o n d
reasonable d o u b t.”

We now turn to the last issue in regard to the imposed

sdntence. While the appellant considered the suspension of
fi\|e years to be too harsh, the respondents are firm that it was
a Ifair sentence in the circum stances of the m isconduct
com m itted by the appellant. When Mr. Revoca*M was
asked to address us on the proper sentence, in his view he
lowered the term of five years to at least six or twelve months.
Given the extent of professional m isconduct displayed
in (this ca se , w e join hands with the Com m ittee that an
a d v o c a te who had b reach ed the oath of his office deserves
a (commensurate sentence. Mr Mwitasi w as of the view that,
th^ Com m ittee should have rem oved the nam e of the
appellant from the Roll of ad vo cates and not suspendina his
services. We are well aw are that an ap p ellate court should
nc$t interfere with the punishment of the trial court unless there
arje very special reasons to do so. in this c a se , w e do not
hcjjve such reasons to interfere with the punishment
pfionounced by the Com m ittee. We therefore confirm that
sentence.
In the upshot and for the foregoing reasons, w e dismiss
th|e a p p e a l with costs.
R. A.TEEM BA
JUDGE
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