127 Phil.
306; 65 OG 3648 (April, 1969); 65 OG 2354 (March, 1969)
[ G.R. No. L-24693. July 31, 1967 ]
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC. AND GO CHIU,
PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VS. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR
OF MANILA, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT, VICTOR ALABANZA,
INTERVENOR-APPELLEE.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and,
therefore, null and void.” For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must
be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its
validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel
del Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the
second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his
capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City
of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to
the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels
and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city
authorities regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500
persons and representing an investment of more than P3 million."[1] (par. 2). It was then
alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at
the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was
the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to
enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City
of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of
due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which would
require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or
lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any
room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a
lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name
and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship,
age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as
his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and
bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels
and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of
Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy
and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant
and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable
and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second
class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels,
motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful
guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its un‐
reasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in
Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the automatic
cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the
business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process
clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment
declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6,
1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances
regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the
hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a
denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting
forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance
bears a reasonable relations to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and
proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court
could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was
contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts
dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. and Hotel del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu
is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and the intervenor
Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be
sued;
"2 That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and
chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
“3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating
hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
“4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the
respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and
669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting
therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the
respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in his 4th Indorsement dated
February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
“5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was
submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal
Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
“6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05
from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners)
operating in the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid
on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its
lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S.
v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise
refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely
two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating
in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be
applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged
ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association,
and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court
observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with
the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision
of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties
the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged
ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the
alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion
that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against
respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question."
Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such
a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to
stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset
the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was
expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity. ***
. The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their parti‐
cular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given
notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people. * * *. The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation."[2]
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which
is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading
case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,[3] where the American Supreme
Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: "The
statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions
of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the
lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption
of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective
as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals
is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope
of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers,[4] extending as it does "to all the great public needs."[5] It would be,
to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be
deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare.[6] Negatively put, police power is "that inherent
and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society."[7]
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part
to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry,
presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The
challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration
form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the license
fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would
appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the
validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval,
ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;[8] providing a
license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;[9]
prohibiting gambling;[10] prohibiting jueteng;[11] and monte;[12] prohibiting playing of
panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;[13] prohibiting the operation of
pinball machines;[14] and prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an
opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used,[15] all of which are
intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other
applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it
may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where
such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised
to the question of due process.[16] There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What
then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from
the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is
ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly
has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea
of fair play.[17] It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom
of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect
[democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."[18] It is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"[19] decisions based
on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."[20] Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery
to form or phrases.[21]
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet
what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary
and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in
the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it
with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records,
and as has been set forth, none is even attempted here, to attach to an ordinance of such
character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor
does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of
Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees
for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain
particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the
latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels,
P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license
fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises,
for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue
purposes only.[22] As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: "(2)
Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of
the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class
of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint
upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of
course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of
license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have
frequently been upheld, especially in cases of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the
latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable."[23]
Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta[24] this Court affirmed the doctrine
earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement
the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad
taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is
sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so
levied is for public purpose, just and uniform.[25]
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila
in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion
is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the
operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.[26] The
discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another
decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the
enforcement of the ordinance would deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of
livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs
are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city
markets under certain conditions is permitted. * * *. And surely, the mere fact, that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode
of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case,
persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected
by the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the disadvantages
which may result from the legal exercise of that power."[27]
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any
hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment
shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as
a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which
such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How
could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to
curtailment of liberty, which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus:
"One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly
apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty
regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man
can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the
individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good.
* * *. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of
the public order and safety or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."[28]
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom
of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state * * *. To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.[29]
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue
deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,[30] no longer "retains its virtuality as a
living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption
by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with
public interest."[31] What cannot be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much
more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.[32] How justify then the
allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by
invoking the principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the
petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however,
point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the
companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for
determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the
customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room with him at about the same
time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which
cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the
discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would
require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease
thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations
suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask
the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.[33] to Adderley v.
Florida,[34] the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to
such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is
this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there
is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."[35]
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments
pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law
principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a
reversal of the appealed decision.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, JP, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., on official leave.
The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden Gate Motel, Miami
[1]
Hotel, Palm Spring Hotel, Flamingo Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto Hotel,
Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel, Siesta Court, Sun Valley Hotel, Springfield Hotel, New
Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar, Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.
[2]U. S. v. Salaveria (1918) 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the
presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria
decision in Eboña v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
[3] 282 US 251, 328, January 5, 1931.
[4]Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. Also: "To Frankfurter the
police power, true to its etymology, is the power to shape policy. It defies legal definition; as
a response to the dynamic aspects of society, it cannot be reduced to a constitutional
formula. The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving cases, it must not fall back upon
sterile cliches; its judgments are not to derive from an abstract dialectic between liberty and
the police power. Instead, in a world of trusts and unions and large-scale industry, it must
meet the challenge of drastic social change. For him as for Holmes, 'society is more than
bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in vindicating interests
not represented by the items in a balance-sheet. In a progressive society, new interests
emerge, new attitudes appear, social consciousness quickens. In the face of the unknown one
cannot choose with certainty. Nor as yet, has the whole of truth been brought up from its
bottomless well: and how fragile in scientific proof is the ultimate validity of any particular
economic adjustment. Social development is a process of trial and error; in the making of
policy the fullest possible opportunity must be given for the play of the human mind. If
Congress or legislature does not regulate, laissez faire - not the individual - must be the
regulator. (Hamilton, Preview of a Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819)
[5]
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 US 412.
[6]
U. S. v. Gomez-Jesus (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
[7]
Rubi v. Provincial Board (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
[8] U. S. v. Giner Cruz (1918) 38 Phil. 677.
U. S. v. Rodriguez (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v. Belderol, L-15719, May 31,
[9]
1961; Lapera v. Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962.
[10] U. S. v. Pacis (1915) 31 Phil. 524.
U. S. v. Espiritu-Santo (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U. S. v. Joson (1913) 26 Phil. 1; People v.
[11]
Chan Hong (1938) 65 Phil. 625.
[12]
U. S. v. Tamparong (1915) 31 Phil. 321.
[13]
U. S. v. Salaveria (1918) 39 Phil. 102.
Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, L-14149, May 30, 1960; Miranda v. City of Manila, L-17252,
[14]
May 31, 1961.
[15] U. S. v. Ten Yu (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the right of privacy
[16]
or the prohibition against self-incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not the proper parties
to do so. Nor may such an incurable defect be remedied by an accomodating intervenor
"who has always taken advantage of, as he exclusively relies on, the facilities, services and
accomodations" offered by petitioner-motels. A general merchant, doing business not only in
Baguio City but in the City of Manila, has no legitimate cause for complaint. At least, not
according to the case as it has been developed.
[17] Frankfurter Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court (1938) pp. 32-33.
[18] Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 US 420, at 487.
[19]
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy (1961) 367 US 1230.
[20]
Bartkus v. Illinois (1959) 359 US 121.
[21]
Pearson v. McGraw (1939) 308 US 313.
[22] Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.
Citing Swarth v. People, 109 I11.,621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 I11., 627; 12 N.
[23]
E., 227; United States Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 I11., 19; Drew County v.
Bennet, 43 Ark., 364; Merced County v. Fleming, 111 Cal., 46; 43 Pac., 392; Williams v.
City Council of West Point, 68 Ga. 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind., 84; Wiley v. Owens,
39 Ind., 429; Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann., 586;
Goldsmith v. City of New Orleans, 31 La. Ann., 646; People ex rel., Cramer v. Medberry, 39
N.Y.S., 207; 17 Misc. Rep., 8; McGuigan v. Town of Belmont, 89 Wis., 637; 62 N.W., 421;
Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala., 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 AM., 728, and Muhlenbrinck v. Long
Branch Commissioners, 42 N.J.L., 364; 36 Am. Rep., 518. At pp. 829-830
98 Phil. 148 (1955) citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed.
[24]
1193; U. S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.
Ed. 579. The Lutz decision was followed in Republic v. Bacolod-Murcia Milling, L-19824,
July 9, 1966.
[25]
Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, L-24322, July 21, 1967.
[26]
Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.
Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City of New
[27]
Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.
Rubi v. Provincial Board (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones (1916),
[28]
242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. v. Cruz (1914), 189 Ala., 66.
[29] Calalang v. Williams (1940) 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734.
46 Phil. 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American sovereignty, American
[30]
Supreme Court decisions having thus an obligatory effect. No alternative was left to this
Court except to follow the then controlling decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1924)
261 US 525, which subsequently was overruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) 300
US 379.
Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court (1940) 70 Phil. 340, at 360, quoting a concurring
[31]
opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G. R. No. 46496.
Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due
[32]
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles
of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of
legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the
principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is
involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific
prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a
public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose
all of the restrictions which a legislature way have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such
slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate
danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.” (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu. v.
Barnette, (1942) 319 US 624, at 639).
[33]
269 US 385 (1926).
[34] L. ed. 2d 149, Nov. 14, 1966.
[35] Roschen v. Ward (1929) 279 US 337, 339.
Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: February 21, 2023
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