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Miller, Toby 2016. Greenwashed sports and environmental activism: Formula 1 and FIFA. Environmental
Communication 10 (6) , pp. 719-733. 10.1080/17524032.2015.1127850

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Greenwashed sports and environmental activism: Formula 1 and FIFA

Two of the most globally popular sports events, Formula 1 motor racing and the Men’s World
Cup of football, are directly and indirectly environmentally destructive. They serve as
advertisements for heavy industry, are designed for elite as much as mass consumption,
and provide sponsors with dubious social licenses to operate. This occurs through the very
mechanisms of the events themselves (engines in Formula 1, tourists in the World Cup).
I have selected those two sites for three reasons. First, because they appear at first
blush to be so different from one another: international elite motor racing automatically
elicits critique of its class and ecological indexicality and impact, while football is
associated with a more populist, accessible culture. Second, because despite those
distinctions, both Formula 1 and global football have drawn the ire of a similarly
transnational actor, in the form of Greenpeace, attracted by their shared association with
its sworn enemies, oil companies drilling in the Arctic. And third, because the environ-
mental issues that these competitions pose have eluded substantive critique and
successful activism. I look at the greenwashing claims made about Formula 1 and football
and examine attempts by Greenpeace to problematize them, juxtaposed with ways in
which environmental activism might operate via counter-discourses of economic and
ecological citizenship. I suggest that a progressive agenda can be forwarded by vanguard
organizations working with their fellow elites in motor sport. In the case of football, the
lead should come from grassroots fans rather than the usual
third-sector suspects of Big Green (http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title = ig_Green).
Along with many other things, both Formula 1 and the Men’s World Cup are sites
where participants and sponsors seek social licenses to operate. This surprisingly overt
term has been adopted with relish by extractive polluters to explain their plans for winning
local, national, and international communities’ approval of exploration and mining (Klein,
2012; Prno & Slocombe, 2012; Nelsen, 2006; Thomson & Boutilier, 2011). The
International Energy Agency numbers social licenses to operate among its ominously titled
Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas (2012). Apart from offering such direct benefits to
communities as energy and employment, companies seek to buttress their
searches for social licenses to operate via art and sport.
The global oil and gas company, BP, has powerful, enduring relationships with some of
Britain’s principal cultural institutions, including the National Gallery, the National Maritime
Museum, Tate Britain, the Natural History Museum, the Science Museum, and the National
Gallery. Blockbuster shows sponsored by environmental miscreants work both ways. They
give alibis to the arts by countering populist claims that only elite segments of society visit
such places, and they associate quality and populism alike with big oil.
Sport offers an even more direct hold on the popular imagination. The 255 public,
private, and mixed projects of international development listed as utilizing sport in 2008
represented a 93% increase over five years. A high proportion involved corporations,
frequently via “Astroturf” ( faux grassroots) organizations. Sport can make corporations
resemble governing agencies operating with the public good in mind, even as their actions
frequently heighten north–south imbalances, pro- mote their own wares, commodify sports,
distract attention from corporate malfeasance in terms of the environment and labor, and
stress international/imperial sports over local ones (Levermore, 2010; Silk, Andrews, &
Cole, 2005): a classic case of a social license to operate.
Formula 1 directly incarnates Big Oil’s search for a social license, because it embodies
both the glamorous sphere of high performance and the quotidian necessity of transport.
For its part, football accretes extractive sponsors who wish to benefit from its auratic blend
of excitement and everyday life. So, BP’s carbon management division (which is described
as not-for-profit) cut a deal with the Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) for the 2014 World Cup whereby ticket holders could register to have their carbon
bootprint offset—with the prospect of two registrants winning tickets to the Final
(https://www.bptargetneutral.com/uk/2014/04/1690/). Hence, the symbolic significance of
these events for environmentalists seeking to disrupt business as usual—emphasizing their
own social license to operate through activism against such greenwashing.
Formula 1 is a complex field for critical scholars of the environment. Its chrome cars are
coeval stars with the brash boys who ride them. The sport’s advanced engineering seeks
ever-greater fuel efficiency, which is in turn passed on to everyday business and domestic
motoring, supposedly diminishing the latter’s carbon footprints (King, 2013; Sam, 2012;
Scott, 2013).
For its part, football, easily the world’s most popular sport in terms of playing and
watching, appears on the surface to be among the least ecologically malevolent of
pastimes: it requires a ball, a field, and physical play, as opposed to engines, roads, and
carbon-fueled speed. But when we take into account where the equipment is made and
transported for use, the water and chemicals involved in ground maintenance, the food
consumed at games, the use of electricity in powering, covering, and watching, and the
impact of travel and tourism for major events such as the Men’s World Cup, the story looks
remarkably different (Malhado & Rothfuss, 2013).
Whilst not proposing that Formula 1 is angelic and the World Cup demonic, the basic
paradoxes identified above necessitate that environmentalists inspect such circumstances
with some care. Neither event has seen significant activism, apart from secondary boycott-
style attempts to interrupt the link between them and polluting sponsors. Greenpeace, a
rightly well-regarded and in many ways effective campaign organization, has tried to disrupt
fans’ views and enjoyment of Formula 1 (the Brussels Grand Prix) and football (the
Champions’ League) to push for secondary boycotts against Shell and Gazprom, extractive
corporations that seek social licenses to operate via sponsorship of these competitions
(Cohen, 2014a, 2014b; Cooper, 2013; Naidoo, 2013).
In addition to examining arguments for and against the green claims that these events
make, I am also concerned to evaluate the utility of counter-discourses that are meant to
raise awareness (this used to be called “consciousness”) among both fans and the wider
public through spectacular disruption. I conclude that the efforts of Greenpeace to appear
as a grassroots organization combating Big Sports may be misguided. It might do better to
recognize the reality that Formula 1 and Greenpeace are fellow multinational organizations
with huge bureaucracies, then draw on that con- sanguinity to call for change (Sam, 2013).
In the case of football, it might be advised to allow the lead to be taken by others and accept
a follower’s role, undertaking relevant research and encouraging grassroots fan activism.
Formula 1
Most sports are about individuals or teams, but rarely both. Most sports involve the use of
technology, but rarely in ways that give equal prominence and rewards to each. Most sports
involve degradation of the environment, but rarely as an overt component of their very
essence. Yet, along with its hyper- masculine First World class base and industrial
showmanship, Formula 1 motor racing combines all these factors (Pflugfelder, 2009). It is
an unusual business—and a very big one.
The sport’s 2012 prospectus disclosed 2011 revenue of US$1.5 billion and operating
profit of US
$451 million, while 2013 analyses suggested annual income growth of 9% through 2016,
much of it because sponsors like the fact that its events are global and its season eternal:
Formula 1 is akin to an Olympics or a World Cup where the key events occur annually, year
round, and across the world, rather than every four years, for a month, and in one region
(Blitz, 2013). It is a perfect example of world capitalism physically transcending space and
time in ways that elude other sports, which tend to be constrained by seasons and zones.
Not surprisingly, the cost of holding a Formula 1 Grand Prix is vast. For example, the
annual bud- get of the Australian event is reportedly A$30 million, compounded at 15% a
year. Much of that figure is met with public funds; hence the need for triple bottom-line
analysis that looks at the costs and benefits of such occasions in economic, social, and
environmental terms (Fairley, Tyler, Kellett, & D’Elia, 2011).
Again and again, studies of the economic impact of relocating sports teams, subsidizing
stadia, attracting international events, and the like have shown the spuriousness of public
subsidies for such enterprises (Nunn & Rosentraub, 2003). In the Australian case,
Economists at Large (under- taking the splendidly entitled analysis, “Priconomics”) have
shown that the 2012 Grand Prix generated a loss to the state of Victoria of A$60.6 million
(http://www.ecolarge.com/blog/grand- priconomics-2013/; Campbell, 2013). This is apart
from the impact on birdlife, waterways, trees, noise, trash, carbon footprints, and public
utilization of the venue in Albert Park (Fairley et al., 2011).
Yet, states persist in sporting subvention, and even sacrifice their own authority as part
of the pro- cess. A Grands Prix Act exempts the Melbourne event from otherwise mandatory
environmental protection (Fairley et al., 2011) and the bourgeois media and State and
Federal governments largely ignore evidence that runs counter to the boosterism that
characterizes the affair and distorts its popularity (Australian Press Council, 2012; Crook,
2011).
The Save Albert Park grassroots group has produced kits on legal, economic,
environmental, and traffic implications and has a regular radio show (http://save-albert-
park.org.au/sapweb/kits.html; http://tunein.com/radio/Save-Albert-Park-p571571/). But its
efforts draw diminishing concern because of bipartisan political support for the event
(Green, 2014).
Beyond Australia, potentially positive externalities deriving from Formula 1 lead the way
in state and media discourses alike. While acknowledging setbacks to green momentum
caused by the global financial crisis, “Lord” Drayson (2010), Britain’s former Minister for
Science and Technology and a lapsed race-car driver and proprietor, told the grandly
named European Cleaner Racing Conference that “motorsport can become an even
greater national asset as we move to a low-carbon economy” by developing
environmentally sound technologies that can be sold to commercial and customer
automotive interests. Conventional press reporting leads with the same message (Elliott,
2014; Scott, 2013) even arguing that “Cyclists are miles behind Formula 1 in the
environmental race”
due to the massive impact of travel on events such as the Tour de France, weighed against
the “cut- ting-edge technology” that saw Formula 1 vehicles use a third of the fuel in 2014
compared to the previous year with no loss in performance (Pickford, 2014).
The sport’s overall governing body is the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
(FIA). But Formula 1 is a private, corporate endeavor and has significant autonomy. FIA
support for greener technology cannot be mandated to cover Formula 1 and is frequently
pooh-poohed by participants in its richest and most prestigious competition. Formula 1
bosses are horrified, for example, by emis- sion changes that have reduced the noise
pollution of its macho toys (Blitz, 2013; Pearce, 2009; Spur- geon, 2014).
Greenpeace, a key multinational environmental activist bureaucracy with the scale
necessary to coordinate campaigns in a way that is equal if not superior to its opponents,
has endeavored to dis- rupt Grand Prix events through a now-familiar tactic: people
dressing up in bright colors and climb- ing onto things that are owned by others. Such
practices are neither contra the sport itself nor focused on its environmental record. Rather,
they represent a kind of secondary boycott strategy directed at particular event sponsors,
notably Shell, as part of a campaign to stem drilling for oil in the Arctic (Naidoo, 2013;
Sam, 2013).
Greenpeace has had recent success with a secondary boycott, persuading Lego not to
renew its product-placement deal with Shell in 2014 through the deployment of well-drilled
child activists and expensive video art. A smart, sophisticated, and well-heeled
multinational marketing campaign drew on the services of advertising agencies,
appropriated trademarks, and copyrights and was further enabled via a vast network
(Miller, 2014). Unlike Greenpeace’s failed interventions into sport, the campaign did not
feature vanguardists craving TV coverage through perilous pranks.
There is no evidence of success in removing sponsors or changing attitudes among
motorsport fans as a consequence of these latter, overly familiar, forms of direct action.
Ironically, it seems that Formula 1’s corporate sponsors have been more effective
advocates for a green agenda than Greenpeace or spectators (Black, 2010; Allen, 2013,
2014). This is because corporations are well schooled in taking what they call asymmetrical
actions against smaller but still sizeable critics. Extractive companies base their strategies
on successful struggles by regular armies against guerrilla forces. Such activism may irritate
but rarely deters them (Marshall, Telofski, Ojiako, & Chipulu, 2012). They select parts of
the critique they can implement at minimal cost then move on.
It is telling that Greenpeace insists on secrecy in its direct actions, despite its faith in
spectacle and calls for others to be transparent in their dealings, and boasts of marketing
experts who teach it how to engage in effective branding even as it attacks public-relations
discourse. There is at least a para- dox here. Similarly, the organization entered a
competition to design green strategies for the 2000 summer Olympics for adoption by the
host committee. Its participation featured in the Australian governments’ bid, with
Greenpeace representatives traveling from Australia to Monaco to extoll the virtues of a
Sydney-based Games on the grounds that sports were ideal sites for propelling a green
agenda into the public sphere. It stayed studiously away from the most pressing
environmental issue of such events—travel—and avoided upsetting most sponsors
(including world-leading eco-mis- creants such as UPS, Coca Cola, Kodak, and
McDonalds) while endorsing the use of reclaimed pol- luted sites for the Olympics and the
prospects for minimizing ecological damage to the region, despite its longstanding
opposition to toxic dumping1 (Kearins & Pavlovich, 2002). This love of the darkness and
subterfuge, blended with a frottage with corporate expertise, reads remarkably like
clandestine Australian governmental consultation with companies over Grand Prix
decisions and actions (Cohen, 2014b; Lowes, 2004). It is not a good look for civil society.
Moving away from secrecy would be more in keeping with the Quaker religious sources of
the organization’s ethos (Wapner, 1995).
Beyond these ethical missteps, the failure to generate change suggests that there may
be greater utility for Greenpeace in using its multinational power and bureaucracy to
negotiate with Formula 1 and associated sponsors, rather than alienating fans who show
little appreciation of the undoubted importance of its message.

World Cup
Staging a World Cup is also massively expensive. Brazil budgeted US$31 billion for the 2014
Finals, though this included construction projects for the 2016 summer Olympics as well.
FIFA claims the actual cost of hosting (which it calculates as the price for creating “temporary
infrastructure”) was US
$600 million, while the Association itself spent US$1.7 billion and profited by US$2.7 billion
(War- shaw, 2014).
Like the FIA and Formula 1, FIFA routinely sidesteps sovereignty over space and people
(Bond, 2010; Hyde, 2010)—consider the way it transcended the European Union to broker
power-sharing in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cooley & Mujanović, 2014). But the Association does
have a more progressive environmental policy than Formula 1:
Issues such as global warming, environmental conservation and sustainable
management are a concern for FIFA, not only in regards to FIFA World Cups™,
but also in relation to FIFA as an organisation. That is why FIFA has been
engaging with its stakeholders and other institutions to find sensible ways of
addressing environmental issues and mitigate the negative environmental impacts
linked to its activities. (FIFA, 2012)
 From solar-powered stadia to free public transportation, the 2006 World Cup featured a
“Green Goal,” which claimed to make the event “climate-neutral” by saving 100,000 tons of
carbon dioxide through offset projects in India and South Africa and minimizing transport,
energy, water, and refuse (Collins, Jones, & Munday, 2009; Mitchell, 2007). But the data
excluded international tra- vel—a crucial difference between environmental audits that
focus on one country but do not con- sider wider ecological impacts. This has led to
accusations of greenwashing (Collins et al., 2009).
Because the claims made for the 2006 tournament rang hollow, FIFA set up an
Environmental Forum. Its task was to “green” stadia, training grounds, accommodation,
amenities, and so on, in accordance with the UN Environmental Program’s Global Forum
for Sports and the Environment (Collins et al., 2009). For the 2010 tournament, South Africa
used biogas from landfills, power from wind farms, and efficient lighting. The local organizers
proudly proclaimed that nine teams had their jerseys made from recycled polyethylene
terephthalate bottles. Coincidentally, these nations were themselves sponsored by a major
sporting goods company, which remorselessly promoted its good deed (Climate Neutral
Network, n. d.).
But South Africa has one of the worst records in the world in its neglect of alternative
energy. Because of poor internal transportation infrastructure and a dependence on coal-
fired power, a mas- sive carbon footprint from an influx of tourists was inevitable. Before the
2010 World Cup, the South African and Norwegian governments conducted a study of its
likely environmental impact. They came up with these figures:

Component Emissions (tCO2e) Share

International transport 1,856,589 (%)
67.4
Inter-city transport 484,96 17.6
Intra-city transport 1
39,577 1.4
Stadia constructions and materials 15,359 0.6
Stadia and precinct energy use 16,637 0.5
Energy use in accommodation 340,12 12.4
Total excluding international 8
896,66
transport 1
Total including international 2,753,250 100
transport
Source: Republic of South Africa et
al., (2009).
The South African Government generated tender documents inviting competition to
offset the environmental impact of World Cup travel, but issued no contracts. Mostly fueled
by European tour- ism, the 2010 Finals had the largest carbon footprint of any commercial
event in world history, twice that of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In the absence of high-speed
rail and adequate existing stadia, 850,000 tons of carbon were expended, 65% through
construction and flying (there were some improvements to municipal mass transit). Claims
that corporate efforts to green things encouraged fans to act similarly remain unproven.
Green Goal sought to inspire additional environmental
initiatives across time and across the country, but neither efficacy nor proliferation has been
satis- factorily demonstrated (Bond, 2010; Climate Neutral Network, n. d.; Cornelissen,
Urmilla, & Swart, 2011; Cartwright, 2010; Death, 2011; Mol, 2010; Shachtman, 2010).
In addition, the drain on power sources in other countries broadcasting the Cup is huge—
the Car- bon Trust has shown that people watching football via mobile-data phone
connections multiply their footprint 10-fold in comparison with television or WiFi viewing, for
example (http://www.carbon- trust.com/media/360767/carbon-bootprint-infographic.pdf).
But this gluttony is rarely acknowl- edged other than as self-promotion: the UK’s National
Grid highlights its management of peak electricity usage based on audience activity during
half time in Finals matches, when people race to the kettle and porcelain. Power use surges
by as much as 10% in what is known as the “TV pick-up” (National Grid, 2010).
The 2014 tournament in Brazil was supposed to be played in green stadia—a veritable
Copa Verde. The green claims repeated the subterfuge of 2010 in sidestepping the
international and internal transportation of over three and a half million tourists, which
amounted to 84% of emissions associated with the Finals. And misuse of public money on
unsustainable construction projects led to mass protests (Estrada, 2010; Spanne, 2014).
As in the South African case, positive externalities of reputation, tourism, and foreign
currency outweighed such concerns in the eyes of the state, capital, and the bourgeois
media.
Attempts by Greenpeace to problematize Big Football’s impact on the environment have
largely foundered. Again, they have targeted secondary entities rather than bringing the
event’s very exist- ence, or at least its management, into question. Sponsors are prioritized
in Greenpeace’s activities, and at the cost of fans’ enjoyment of matches. When it sought
to interrupt the Champions’ League Final of 2014 by protesting against Gazprom, an
extractive sponsor, the ruse was quickly uncovered and managed (and said nothing about
the unsustainability of the event itself). In defensive mode, Greenpeace used
embarrassingly corporate language to say that it had “total domination in the sphere of
delivery” (Cohen, 2014a). Prolix capitalist machismo lives; but that suggested, as per the
Formula 1 protests and the use of advertising agencies, how close the organization’s
vocabulary and strategy are to its apparent adversaries, and how distant from football
fans—some of whom have radical ideas.
Citizenship
In the light of Greenpeace’s tendentious secondary boycott strategies and the failure of
states to con- trol the self-legislating, arrogant entities that are Formula 1 and FIFA, how
might citizens respond to the environmental challenges posed by the activities of Big
Motoring and Big Football?
The last 200 years of modernity have seen the expansion of citizenship—theoretically,
geographi- cally, and demographically. It occupies three zones, with partially overlapping
and partially distinct historicities. These spheres are the political (conferring the right to
reside and vote), the economic (the right to work and prosper), and the cultural (the right
to know and speak). They correspond to the French Revolutionary cry of liberté, égalité,
fraternité [liberty, equality, solidarity] and the Argentine left’s contemporary versión: ser
ciudadano, tener trabajo, y ser alfabetizado [citizenship, employment, literacy] (Martín-
Barbero, 2001, p. 9). The first category concerns political rights; the second, material
interests; and the third, cultural representation (Miller, 2007). Each one has nor- mally
operated within national jurisdictions.
In the contemporary world, citizenship is difficult, if not impossible, to describe without
reference to its seeming antinomy of consumption. Citizens and consumers shadow each
other—national sub- jects versus rational ones, altruists versus monads. Under
neoliberalism, politics has become artificial and consumption natural, a better means of
legitimizing social arrangements. Adopting the tenets of consumers, citizens are desirous,
self-actualizing subjects who conform to general patterns of con- trolled behavior. Adopting
the tenets of citizens, consumers are self-limiting, self-controlling subjects
who conform to general patterns of purchasing behavior. Sometimes, both sides fail to
see what is “good” for them (as when citizens resist financial globalization, or consumers
borrow ill-advisedly). In ecological and democratic terms, such beliefs lead to plutocratic
arrangements—for example, if green activism is ordered around consumption, those who
do not consume, or barely do so, are ipso facto excluded from the exercise of power in the
same way as they are marginal to decisions made by the International Monetary Fund or
the World Bank, where voting is decided by financial contri- bution. And ontologically,
we must reject the timeless, spaceless, monadic selfishness envisioned in bourgeois
social science (Hardin, 1968). The evidence does not support its conceits of corporate
beneficence and consumer selflessness as solutions to environmental despoliation
(Humphreys, 2009; Seyfang, 2005). But it would be unwise to turn our backs completely
on the current hegemony of economic citizenship and reject all forms of plutocracy. The
conjuncture will not permit such
comforting purity.
 Beginning in the 1970s, there was a change in economic citizenship away from the
welfare of the public and toward the welfare of the private in ways that inflect and infect
citizenship tout court. In addition to fundamental policy decisions that redistributed wealth
upwards and internationally, this radical change had an ideological dimension—
neoliberalism. One of the most successful projects to reshape individuals in human history,
neoliberalism’s achievements rank alongside such productive and destructive sectarian
practices as state socialism, colonialism, nationalism, and religion. Its lust for market
regulation over democratic regulation is so powerful that true-believing prelates opine on
every topic imaginable, from birth rates to divorce, suicide to abortion, and performance-
enhancing drugs to altruism. Rhetorically, neoliberal economic citizenship stands against
elitism (for popu- lism); against subvention (for markets); against politicians (for activists);
and against public servants (for philanthropists) (Grantham & Miller, 2010).
It comes as no surprise that when the Trinity was being ideologized within Christianity,
some- thing had to be done to legitimize the concept at the same time as dismissing and
decrying polytheistic and pagan rivals to the new religion’s moralistic monotheism. Hence
oikonomia, a sphere of worldly arrangements that was to be directed by a physical presence
on Earth representing theology’s prin- cipal superstition, the deity. God gave Christ “the
economy” to manage, so “the economy” indexically manifested Christianity (Agamben,
2009).
In keeping with neoliberalism’s crass class project, economic citizenship has changed
dramatically from social welfare to corporate welfare. Begging/demanding firms are handed
taxpayers’ money while individuals and social groups are told to fend for themselves. In
direct contradiction to doc- trines of equality and social justice, this is socialism for
capitalists and capitalism for workers. The most powerful of the three conventional
citizenship discourses, it adds to the burden of environ- mental costs, because its growth
ethic is “hollowed out by a misguided vision of unbounded consu- mer freedoms” (Jackson,
2009, p. 5). Environmental disasters are instances of negative economic externalities
whose costs that are not borne by the companies and governments that create them. This
is especially true when the damage is transnational (Rosen & Sellers, 1999, pp. 585–586).
The social license to operate is a classic invocation of economic citizenship that seeks
to elude state regulation by appealing to the material or affective interests of communities
through a compli- cated mélange of consumerist self-interest and civic pride. This is
especially troublesome because the national boundaries and interests that typically define
and engage citizens are brought into question by the border-crossing impact of
environmental despoliation (Dean, 2001)—and sporting agencies and bodies frequently
transcend physical and legislative borders.
More than an addition to the rights and responsibilities of territorially based citizenship,
green citizenship is a critique of them, a corrective that seeks to save nature, infrastructure,
and heritage from capitalist growth. Bypassing localism and contemporaneity to address
universal and future obligations, it transcends conventional political–economic space and
time, extending rights beyond the hic et nunc in search of a globally sustainable ecology.
Green citizenship looks centuries ahead, refusing to discount the health and value of future
generations, and opposing elemental risks that are created by capitalist growth in the
present (Dobson, 2003). Its concerns touch on the very essence of political activity. Bruno
Latour explains:
From the time the term politics was invented, every type of politics has been defined
by its relation to nature, whose every feature, property, and function depends on the
polemical will to limit, reform, establish, short-cir- cuit, or enlighten public life. (2004,
p. 1)
Environmental citizenship necessitates allocating equal and semi-autonomous significance
to natural phenomena, social forces, and cultural meaning. Just as objects of scientific
knowledge come to us in hybrid forms that are coevally subject to social power and textual
meaning, so the latter two domains are themselves affected by the natural world (Latour,
1993, pp. 5–6).
Social movements invoke citizenship imperatives against consumerist ones when they
claim pub- lic rights to clean air, soil, and water that supersede the private needs of industry,
identify a respon- sibility for the environment that transcends national boundaries and state
interests, and espouse intergenerational care rather than discounting future generations in
favor of ephemeral needs.
Because environmental issues transcend state boundaries, short-term priorities, and
commercial rents, they must be managed by international organizations, both
governmental and not. This is neither new nor entirely dissociated from national citizenship.
Away from the utopic hopes of world government on a grand scale, international
organizations have been working for a very long time, sometimes quietly and sometimes
noisily, to manage particular issues. Seafaring, telecom- munications, occupational
accreditation, Catholicism, and postage all come to mind. Their business is sometimes
conducted at a state level, sometimes through civil society, and sometimes via both. In
almost every case, they encounter or create legal and political instruments that make them
accoun- table to the popular will of sovereign states, at least in name.
Environmentalism may be overdetermined or co-opted via technocratic mandarinism or
corpor- ate shill, but it remains a key site of change, generally via representative
government. This has hap- pened for both good and ill in debates over everything from bald
eagles to building codes. Even the most neoliberally misinformed trade agreements
generally provide for the ultimate political excep- tion to laissez-faire exchange between
borders—namely, standing armies as entities of the sovereign state—and may exempt
environmental matters as well.
As green governance introduces aspirations into the global public sphere that counter
the environmental despoliation threatening human life, it also confronts risks to nonhuman
nature posed by the mounting ecological crisis. This allows mainstream environmentalism
to embrace diverse environmental politics—from left eco-centrism and eco-feminism to
technocratic, anthropo- centric forms that privilege human interests (Swanton, 2010, p.
146).
These schools differ over values (which entities qualify for moral consideration and which
matter most), rights (the protection of individual and collective entities), and consequences
(responsibility for actions and motives that affect collective well-being). For anthropocentric
eco-ethics, nonhuman nature has no moral standing (and hence no rights) other than in
relation to how people are affected by changes in nature. Eco-centric ethics, by contrast,
holds that “some or all natural beings, in the broadest sense, have independent moral
status” (Curry, 2006, p. 64). Intermediate ecological ethics accords intrinsic value to
nonhuman nature, albeit not as completely as eco-centrism, though it agrees that moral
status can be extended to other sentient beings.
Anthropocentric eco-ethics dominates mainstream environmentalism and much state
and pop- ular discourse. It both endorses and attacks consumption, urging green citizens
to buy responsibly and recycle. Its gendered notion of virtue favors a hegemonic masculinity
of self-reliance, embodies a neoliberal focus on individual responsibility rather than
collective and state-based action, and rejects participatory, deliberative democracy in favor
of a moralistic and plutocratic republicanism (Arias-Maldonado, 2007; Barry, 2006; Latta,
2007; MacGregor, 2006). In a stronger model, Anne Schwenkenbecher argues that
“citizens of states which have the power to achieve an efficient climate regime” should
comply “with the moral duties they have as inhabitants of high emission countries,” not least
due to the political power available within democracies (2014, p. 183).

It is clear that national and international organizations and accords have not put a stop
to environmental destructiveness (Beck & Grande, 2010, p. 410). While Greenpeace
makes concerted attempts to follow the precepts of green citizenship, Formula 1 and FIFA
exemplify transnational actors operating with relative autonomy from states and with an
abiding taste for greenwashing. Cor- porations such as these routinely describe themselves
as citizens but principally pursue economic interests. Their restless quest for profit
unfettered by regulation is twinned with a desire for moral legitimacy and free advertising
that is based on “doing right” in a very public way while growing rich in a very private one.
They claim respect for the law and illustrate the desire to meddle in others’ lives:
greenwashing via moralism. Social licenses to operate embody this rhetoric.
FIFA and Formula 1’s shared growth evangelism makes them part of our environmental
problem in three ways: as polluters, greenwashers, and licensees. These bodies arrogate to
themselves the right to make and break laws, to buy and sell territories, and to pollute the
world. We should not be in thrall to this self-anointed elect’s control of sport, especially when
it is deeply connected to commer- cial dictates and surveillance. What can green citizens
do? What might be a way forward for environ- mental activism engaging Formula 1 and
FIFA?
Parts of Latin America have seen successful mobilization in the recent past of citizenship
rights for ragpickers, denizens of the informal economy who remove and recycle waste. In
2009, Colom- bia’s Constitutional Court ruled that they were entrepreneurs. That decision
formalized their status, decriminalized their activities, protected their livelihood from shifts
in state policy that had shut down dumps, and offered them the chance to tender for waste-
management concessions from local government. Cali-based ragpickers were pioneers
in establishing cooperatives, and held the world’s first global conference of their colleagues
in 2008. Along the way, they worked closely with highly educated progressives, notably
lawyers and public-health advocates who were able to translate across popular and elite
discourses (Maxwell & Miller, 2012).
The Colombian example opens up questions of scale and citizenship. Top-down ties are
required in the case of vast entities such as the ones I have focused on here. There are
several standard ways of regulating multinational corporations and the trans-territorial
challenges they pose for citizen action: “soft law [protocols of international organizations],
hard law [nationally based legislation], codes of conduct [transnational norms] and
voluntary self-regulation.” The process is imperfect: these strat- egies have not always
secured a nexus between “the transfer of technology” and the transfer of “prac- tices for
using it safely” (Baram, 2009, p. 756). And their agendas must come about in consultation
with the popular classes, scientific and legal counsel, and transnational as well as local
perspectives in addition to traditional elites.
Decentralized, participatory governance can play a vital role in policy-making by involving
com- munity members, resource users, experts, and elites (Karpowitz, Raphael, &
Hammond, 2009,
p. 584). Well-organized local institutions have greater success in managing resources when
external laws provide for their autonomy (involving users in their choice of regulations so
that these are per- ceived to be legitimate) and political–economic arrangements
encourage organizational relation- ships between enterprises and communities that share
ecosystems, monitoring what works and what does not, modifying methods of resource
acquisition, eliminating harmful waste, and sharing information (Ostrom, 2000, p. 47). Such
models transcend the neoliberal policy framework that has dominated the ideology of
growth for three decades, recognizing instead that rational outcomes may derive from
stakeholder approaches to managing the commons (Kearins & Pavlovich, 2002).
That implicates activists in mainstream approaches. The stereotypical vanguardist taste
for out- sider status as pranksters who transgress the norms of institutions that represent
the electoral public or financial shareholders can make them abjure such incorporation. But
Greenpeace has shown that it can transcend that Angst in its sophisticated scientific
research and policy proposals on such issues as electronic waste and sporting apparel,
which have been more effective than its secondary-boycott sporting activities (Greenpeace,
2012, 2014).
The Colombian ragpickers represent a fascinating exemplar of the transformation of
political sub- jects from social problems to social boons: they shifted from being
regarded as unpleasant, odoriferous embodiments of an abject underclass to enterprising
citizens and targets of the contemporary development discourses of microcredit and
sustainability. And their case involved a mobilization from below that borrowed elite
expertise to make its mark. It could model football-fan activism supported by Greenpeace
research and lobbying (not spectacle imposed from above).
When we ponder public uses of spectacle by organized vanguards in the name of a
connection to the wider population, it is easy to fall into either a critical camp or a celebratory
one. The critical camp would say that rationality must be appealed to in discussions of
climate change, competition for emotion will ultimately fail, and grassroots ties are wildly
imaginary or mechanistically cliché. Why? The silent majority does not like direct action;
corporations outspend activists; such occasions preach to a light-skinned, middle-class
eco-choir; media coverage is inevitably partial and hostile; and crucial decisions are made
by elites, not in streets. This critique has particular resonance in the case of events that
are always already animated by spectacle, such as global sporting contests.
Conversely, the celebratory camp would argue that a Cartesian distinction between
hearts and minds is not sustainable; a sense of humor is crucial in order to avoid the image
of environmentalists as finger-wagging scolds; corporate capital must be opposed in public;
the media’s need for vibrant textuality can be twinned with serious discussion as a means
of involving people who are not conventional activists; and a wave of anti-elite sentiment is
cresting. The lugubrious hyper-rationality associated with environmentalism clearly needs
leavening through sophisticated, entertaining, participatory spectacle. A blend of dark irony,
sarcasm, and cartoonish stereotypes effectively mocks the Big Sport’s dalliance with Big Oil.
But has the latter occurred? No.

Alternative strategies
There is little scholarly evidence that social-media environmental activism reaches beyond
its dutiful chorines (Schäfer, 2012). This leaves us looking to engagement with sporting elites
and fans, depend- ing on the case in hand, rather than focusing on a distant clickocracy that
shows outrage on behalf of the Earth via credit-card activism or participates in centrally
orchestrated campaigns.
Despite the rhetoric, Big Green bureaucrats are very accustomed to sitting down far from
their putative grassroots supporters in boardrooms and offices populated by corporate and
public servants in order to discuss shared matters of concern. They know how to play dress-
up there just as well as when they put on blue-collar hats to disrupt blue-collar work. There
is nothing wrong with this. If you do not talk to your opponents, you will not get your needs
met. So chatting with the FIA, Formula 1, governments, and their sponsors should not feel
odd. But Big Green is much less used to engaging football fans.
Football supporters frequently draw on the discourse of citizenship to reject wholesale
corporate control, as per the Football Supporters’ Federation and Supporters Direct, and
even call for greener bootprints (http://www.fsf.org.uk; Keoghan, 2014; www.supporters-
direct.org; http://www.gareth- huwdavies.com/environment/environment_blog/newcastle-
united-football-club-top-of-the-green- league/). The US League of Fans’ Sports Manifesto
notes today’s almost unbridled commodification, as the newer media join their elderly and
middle-aged counterparts in “a frenetic rush for money.” The League is concerned that
this tendency diverts attention from the communality of sport—its capacity for cultural and
civic expression and togetherness. One side effect is a lopsided relationship between
spectatorship and participation: the media emphasize the former, notably sports in which
they have financial interests. The League calls for a focus on all sports stakeholders and
building “citi- zenship through sports activism” (2011). We see similar tendencies in college
sports fans’ attitudes to the environment (Casper, Pfahl, & McCullough, 2014).
Football Supporters Europe works with major non-government organizations, including
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, FIFPro (the world players’ union), the
International Trade Union Federation, and Terre des Hommes to construct systematic links
between sporting bodies, the third sector, fans, and environmental concerns
(http://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/
Themen/Sport/MSE_Coalition_Letter_to_IOC_President_14-12-03.pdf; pers.comm).
And even the much-derided football hooligans, akin in their media representation to
ragpickers, might provide organic forms of environmentalism. Marx used “hooligan” and
“rag picker” almost as synonyms to signify class-based abjection:
[F]oul and adventures-seeking dregs of the bourgeoisie, … vagabonds, dismissed
soldiers, discharged convicts, runaway galley slaves, sharpers, jugglers, lazzaroni,
pickpockets, sleight-of-hand performers, gamblers, pro- curers, keepers of disorderly
houses, porters, literati, organ grinders, rag pickers, scissors grinders, tinkers, beg-
gars (Marx, 1987, p. 63)
Several investigations of football “hooligans” reject both their romantic annunciation as
working- class scions and their criminalization via moral panics (Armstrong & Young, 1997;
Armstrong, 1998; Giulianotti, 1999, pp. 80–82; Schimmel, Harrington, & Bielby, 2007).
Such work draws on EP Thompson’s (1971) insight that crowds may be animated by
economic conditions, sexual urges, or blind rages, but also by ideological commitments
and desires to comment.
Glancing at football fans, we might note the ultràs model of Southern-European play,
with its connotations of carnival or hooliganism, depending on where you sit; the barras
bravas of Argentina, with their spectacular arena conduct and its global intertexts for
Spanish speakers; the uptake of Latin American chants on British terraces in the 1990s;
and the 1999 Liverpool fans who paraded a banner reading “Cosmopolitanismo Vaincra”
[Cosmopolitanism Will Win]. Whilst these groups may be queried for their maleness and
violence, they are significant counters to the deracinated domain of corporatized sports—
an organic rejection of neoliberalism that forcefully re-localizes the global game. And
consider the radical socialism associated with fans of Sankt Pauli FC of Ham- burg. German
football more generally institutionalizes fan charters that form compacts between sup-
porters and clubs. This example should be followed and enlivened environmentally with
reference to pollution in local areas and the green credentials of teams (Galbiati, 2013;
Montague, 2010; Totten, 2013).
It could be argued that turning to fandom as a source of environmental activism is
plutocratic— that it requires targeting consumers as activists in the very way that I have
suggested excludes many citizens. But football fandom rides a complex border between
commerce and culture in ways that are regularly invoked by participants, many of whom
see their commitments as questions of lifelong identity rather than rational purchase and
are opposed to seeing “their” teams as capitalist enterprises.

Conclusion
Like FIFA and Formula 1, corporations invoke citizenship ideals to describe themselves,
while prin- cipally pursuing economic self-interest. This is part of a restless quest for profit
unfettered by regu- lation, twinned with a desire for moral legitimacy that is based on doing
right while growing rich through a respect for law and a desire to meddle in everyday life.
Greenwashing is their way of combining these goals. Attempts by Greenpeace to bring
environmental agendas to bear on cars and balls through secondary -boycott style activism
appear to have failed on their own terms and done nothing for greener sporting events. The
specious social license to operate sails on.
Thus far, there are few signs of hope in the area of Formula 1 fandom. Despite the fact
that tele- vision ratings tumble, sponsors continue to sign up, because of the affluent
composition of the sport’s followers and its glamor. We have already noted that motor-
racing’s environmental tendencies derive from its sponsors, and that plus exerting state
pressure seem advisable activities. Greenpeace should change tack and use its
international entrée to influence those involved via research, stories in the press, policy
activism, and boardroom critiques.
Football is different. Although much of the sport is growing ever more corporate, real
resistance from fans is in evidence, and this is where Greenpeace needs to study fan
interests and offer resources, follow the example of the Carbon Trust’s carbon bootprint
research, promulgate such information through its clickocracy, and aid fans just as
Colombian ragpickers were assisted by civil society. This would add to green citizenship at
both elite and populist levels.

Note
1. It seems that Greenpeace’s public documents in support of the bid are no longer archived
on its sites. Greenpeace criticized one car-company sponsor for failing to meet promises
on ecological innovation (Kearins & Pavlovich, 2002).

Acknowledgements
Many thanks to issue editors Mike Goodman and Jo Littler for their incisive comments and
to anonymous reviewers, their identities shielded by the journal. One report was helpful,
the other not.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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